Europe's Populist Left

[Duque de Bragança]

It's possible. Even some conservatives said they would change the law to call these marriages unions. Whether it's only to look good for their conservative bases or a sincere commitment remains to be seen. This could be posturing. As for Marine, she's not pro homo-marriage but did not appear in the demonstrations against same-sex marriages to boost her base.
Her favourite topics being anti-immigration, anti-EU and pro-Putinism. The homo marriage thing seems to be a side issue for her, though a FN top member was recently outed in Vienna.

[Valmy]

'pro-Putism'? 

Is there anything so loathsome that the FN will not embrace it?

[Duque de Bragança]

Well, they look more and more like the commies of yore, so why not looking up to Moscow? Specially, when Moscow pays the bills, as before.

[Sheilbh]

Schaeuble's overreached I think. France and Italy have publicly supported Greek letter as, I believe, have some in Germany.

50 minute Tsipras-Merkel conversation this afternoon which is the key.

[Martinus]

Well, they look more and more like the commies of yore, so why not looking up to Moscow? Specially, when Moscow pays the bills, as before.

I think it's the opposite. Putin's regime is closest you get these days in Europe to regimes like that of Franco, Mussolini and Hitler-sans-Holocaust.

It is conservative, hates gays, is allied with the church (but the state as a decidedly dominant partner), practices a form of "crony capitalism", and keeps moving towards an even greater restriction of democratic freedoms.

If you look at it in the CiV ideology terms, Putin's regime is quite clearly under Authoritarianism, not Order.

[Sheilbh]

It's just Russia being Russia: defender of conservative Christian values in the face of Euro-decadence and defender of Christians in the Muslim world.

It's mostly a pose but Russia's basically using the same propaganda as they were in the 19th century.

[Valmy]

defender of Christians in the Muslim world.

They are sure doing a shit job of it.

[Sheilbh]

That's part of their PR for helping Assad.

[Zanza]

Schaeuble's overreached I think. France and Italy have publicly supported Greek letter as, I believe, have some in Germany.

50 minute Tsipras-Merkel conversation this afternoon which is the key.

Schäuble hasn't overreached. Other than France and Italy who are lukewarm about the Greek letter, he has lots of backing from Spain, Portugal, Finnland, Netherlands, the Baltics etc.

[Zanza]

http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21644237-greece-had-chance-make-euro-zone-work-better-it-blew-it-syrizas-scattergun

Charlemagne
Syriza's scattergun

Greece had a chance to make the euro zone work better. It blew it

CLIP-CLOPPING around Europe over the past few weeks, Yanis Varoufakis, Greece's dashing finance minister, has urged the euro zone to chart a new course. Endlessly forcing new loans upon indebted countries like Greece in the pretence that they will one day be repaid, he argued, was a strategy for depression and deflation. "The disease that we're facing in Greece," he told the BBC, "is that a problem of insolvency for five years has been treated as a problem of liquidity."

This view would not seem outlandish in the academic world that Mr Varoufakis recently quit. Few believe that Greece's debts, worth over 175% of GDP, will ever be repaid in full. But saying so betrayed a woeful misunderstanding of the euro zone's rules. If the European Central Bank shared Mr Varoufakis's view, it would have to cut off Greek banks, potentially driving Greece out of the euro. Indeed, earlier this month, when the minister visited the ECB in Frankfurt, Mario Draghi, its president, snippily told him to keep his opinion to himself. He has not repeated it since.

Mr Varoufakis's gaffe is a mere footnote in a list of mishaps that have characterised Greece's miserable experience in the euro. But it is depressingly typical for a government that, for all its high popularity at home, has squandered every opportunity to improve its lot, and ultimately that of the euro zone. Even as Mr Varoufakis and his colleagues in Greece's ruling Syriza party have loftily declared that the changes they seek would benefit all Europeans, not just Greeks, their negotiating strategy has been small-minded, self-defeating and naive.

Some of this may be put down to inexperience. A few Europeans were guilty of assuming that Alexis Tsipras, the prime minister, would perform what Greeks call a kolotoumba ("somersault") the instant he took office. But Syriza has no excuse for making idle references to the Nazi occupation of Greece. Nor has it helped by playing games with its partners in the Eurogroup of finance ministers. European officials have been incensed by a Hellenic habit of leaking supposedly private discussion papers.

The wrangling over whether to extend Greece's second bail-out, which expires on February 28th, has shown Mr Tsipras's government at its worst. Admittedly Syriza was dealt a bad hand by its predecessor, which before Christmas accepted an extension of only two months. But rather than accept an extension, Mr Tsipras and Mr Varoufakis have dug in their heels, robotically insisting on a "bridging" deal that would unlock euro-zone funding while allowing the government to slow or reverse reforms. Greece's creditors, unsurprisingly, were unimpressed. On February 19th Greece put forward a more conciliatory proposal to extend its loan. But this was almost immediately rebuffed by Germany. Trust has seemingly been so grievously eroded that Greek promises of discipline are not worth much in Berlin.

These spats matter far beyond the hurt feelings of a few politicians. Greece's survival in the euro depends on two factors largely outside its control: the willingness of the ECB to keep its banks on life support, and that of the Eurogroup to strike a long-term financing deal (Mr Varoufakis avoids the term "bail-out") to keep the country afloat. It has weakened its hand on both fronts.

The ECB's reasoning will rest in part on its assessment of the health of Greek banks. Depositors are withdrawing around €2 billion ($2.3 billion) a week. Syriza's stubbornness has hardened attitudes on the ECB's council. On February 18th, it offered only a small increase in liquidity support; and the support will end entirely if two-thirds of its members say so. Some are reported to favour capital controls as a better option. Greece will be on perilous terrain if it enters March without a deal in place.

As for a long-term deal, Germany and others have dangled sweeteners before Greece, including an easing of debt terms and a lower primary-surplus target. But these are prizes to be won at the end of talks, not the beginning. Syriza has already started to reverse some reforms, including privatisations and collective-bargaining rules, antagonising its creditors further. The Eurogroup will probably not withdraw its fiscal offers but, with trust in the Greeks at zero, the reform conditions that it will attach to a third bail-out will surely be tougher than ever.

Time is short, particularly if the Eurogroup fails to agree with Greece on the terms for a bail-out extension. Thanks to a collapse in tax revenues, the government could run out of cash before an IMF bond falls due in March. By squeezing suppliers and raiding funds, Greece may be able to finance itself for a few months, but without further help it will certainly be unable to meet debt repayments to the ECB in July and August.

Isolation is rarely splendid
Yet an essential formula remains unchanged: that neither Greece nor its partners want to see it forced out of the euro (although the odds of an accidental "Grexit" have shortened). So at some point Mr Tsipras will have to perform his kolotoumba, potentially at high cost. At home, having raised expectations of a big win (75% of Greeks support his tough line) he might face calls for a referendum or a new election.

The real Greek tragedy is that, with a bit more statesmanship, Mr Tsipras could have nudged Europe on to a happier path. The euro zone desperately needs a counter-narrative to its failed German-inspired policy of austerity. As leader of the hardest-hit economy, armed with a strong democratic mandate, Mr Tsipras was well placed to offer one. He could have sought allies against excessive austerity and for looser fiscal and monetary policy in places like Italy and France—and even inside the ECB. Yet by quibbling over his debt extension and backtracking so ostentatiously on sensible reform he has alienated more or less everyone. That is quite some achievement.

http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-02-19/why-germany-rejected-greece-s-peace-offering

Why Germany Rejected Greece's Peace Offering
The optics of today's events in Europe, admittedly, were bad. Greece seems to have come crawling to its creditors asking for an extension of its current bailout -- something it has resisted doing for weeks -- only for Germany to arrogantly dismiss the request.

From the German point of view, however, that's not what happened at all. Berlin believes Greece's radical leftist government is trying to weasel out of the bailout program by asking for an extension of just one of the legal documents that frame it, instead of the whole package. As far as German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble is concerned, this isn't a real compromise. And he has a point.

Here's what the letter Greece sent today to the group of finance ministers of euro area countries says:

In this context, the Greek authorities are now applying for the extension of the Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement for a period of six months from its termination during which period we shall proceed jointly, and making best use of given flexibility in the current arrangement, toward its successful conclusion and review on the basis of the proposals of, on the one hand, the Greek government and, on the other, the institutions.

The agreement in question spells out how Greece's funding is disbursed and repaid. It's a lengthy legal document that makes no reference to any policy commitments Greece must make in order to receive the bailout funds. These were set out in separate programs, which the Greek parliament approved to get the bailout funding released.

Last Monday, Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis talked to the Eurogroup about bridging Greece's financial gap until a new bailout deal could be worked out. While signaling he wanted to keep the terms of the Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement, he explained, in a speech whose text has since leaked, which reforms his government planned to continue implementing and which it didn't. He said he couldn't commit to Greece's previous privatization promises because of collapsing asset prices. He also objected to his predecessors' agreements on labor reforms and primary surpluses.

The Eurogroup, however, was resolved to hold Greece to the entirety of the previous deal, not just the part dealing with the disbursement and repayment of money. The wording of a draft Eurogroup statement that Greece apparently rejected on Monday referred to "the current program," not the Master Financial Assistance Facility Agreement.

This would explain today's statement from German finance ministry spokesman Martin Jaeger: "The letter from Athens is not a substantive solution. In truth it aims at bridge financing without the requirement to fulfill the program. This does not meet the criteria approved by the Eurogroup on Monday".

Here's how Holger Schmieding, chief economist at Berenberg Bank, explained it in a research note today:

Whether or not extending the "master financial assistance facility agreement" comes close to asking for an extension of the "current programme" is a matter which lawyers can discuss for ages. The financial assistance agreement itself does refer to full conditionality in its section about any disbursement of funds. But if Greece does not request any further disbursement of funds under the agreement, it may argue that it does not subject itself to full conditionality upon extending the loan agreement. The Greek request hence invites the interpretation that it wants to extend the assistance agreement solely as a basis for the ECB to keep Greece afloat. 

In other words, the German finance ministry fails to see what the government of Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras is giving up. It still wants a new deal on its debt (which is not even under discussion yet) and it's still rejecting previously approved reform programs. Extending the bailout agreement on such terms would simply give Tsipras more breathing space to seek a debt write-off, as he originally intended. It would also give him a boost with the Greek electorate, which would undoubtedly be impressed with its government's success in negotiating with the fearsome Germans.

Schaeuble and the other Eurogroup finance ministers are not against giving Tsipras the six-month extension, but they want assurances he will behave throughout that period as though he were someone else -- for example, his far less radical predecessor Antonis Samaras. Putting the millstone of the previous programs around Tsipras's neck would have the added benefit of playing well with German and other Central European voters. German Economy Minister Sigmar Gabriel said today he was glad Greece was ready to negotiate, but it couldn't be allowed to distribute the costs of its social policies to other countries in the euro area: "We can't explain to Slovak citizens why the minimum wage in Greece is twice as high but Slovak taxpayers should make transfers to Greece."

I still believe Germany will eventually make concessions to Greece to keep it in the euro area, but it is clearly determined to extract a price for its generosity. At the least, Berlin wants to force Tsipras and his team to give up most of their radical leftist ideas -- they might even want to drive them out of power in the process.

Contrary to the prevailing sense of urgency, there's time for more tug-of-war. "Deadlines are not firm in Europe," Schmieding notes, so even after Greece's current bailout runs out on Feb. 28, the world will not end: the ECB can still fund Greek banks and the country can hold off its creditors while talks with the Eurogroup continue. Expect more brinkmanship on both sides in the coming days -- and more meaningful concessions from Greece.

[Admiral Yi]

Finally I know what "bridging" means.

[Sheilbh]

More later, but Djisselbloem had already accepted it (and NL, FR, and IT are a big chunk of the Eurozone) and for the first time the Eurogroup is publicly divided. That's an overreach.

[Admiral Yi]

BTW Shelf, it would now appear that your line about Greece not wanting any more money was totally wrong.

[Duque de Bragança]

Well, they look more and more like the commies of yore, so why not looking up to Moscow? Specially, when Moscow pays the bills, as before.

I think it's the opposite. Putin's regime is closest you get these days in Europe to regimes like that of Franco, Mussolini and Hitler-sans-Holocaust.

It is conservative, hates gays, is allied with the church (but the state as a decidedly dominant partner), practices a form of "crony capitalism", and keeps moving towards an even greater restriction of democratic freedoms.

If you look at it in the CiV ideology terms, Putin's regime is quite clearly under Authoritarianism, not Order.

When I spoke of commies, I referred to the old French communist party. A party against the EEC, anti-immigration, anti-NATO who also advocated buying French. They weren't big human rights defenders and did not mind much the authoritarian or even totalitarian USSR.
As for not liking gays, Stalin and Brezhnev did not like them too. Marine is much more gay-friendly than her father. Easy, I know, but still true.

[Sheilbh]

Austrian FinMin gave an interview to a paper in which he said the usual line. This morning the Ministry clarified his comments were before the Greek letter and Schaeuble's response. As I say I think when Germany's line is giving pause in Vienna and The Hague they've maybe overreached.

Pre-Eurogroup meeting of Lagarde, Juncker, Moscovici, Djisselbloem, Schaeuble and Varoufakis. I suspect that'll matter more than Eurogroup.