Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-25

[Sheilbh]

I doubt Putin is sincere about a fair negotiated resolution, but if it was a possibility, I doubt that his silly rhetoric about nazis would be the critical stumbling block.

I agree - my point is, I think, a signalling thing. If you're sincere about negotiations you don't start by re-stating your justification for war including the bit that's been read as calling for regime change.

My take is this was a meeting between the two sides to try and get the measure of each other. I kknow people point to Medinsky's role as a sign Putin wasn't taking this seriously - given how much Putin's been obsessing about history in his public statements and on calls with world leaders it wouldn't surprise me if Medinsky's there because Putin trusts him. They want to look at each other across a table, get a sense of morale and how they both feel its going and re-state their positions rather than stage one of negotiations though this may be resolved in that way eventually it'll be more of a process.

I imagine serious negotiations would be more discreet, possibly through backchannels in Ankara or Tel Aviv. Public ones that coincide with Russian troops launching a fierce daylight artillery attack on Kharkiv are about sending messages in my view.

Leaving that aside, further factors that support the thesis that Putin is ratcheting down are that the battle is not going swimmingly for Russia, and that he was the one to initiate negotiations, rather than dictating terms with troops in the Ukrainian presidential palace.

It's a possibility, for sure.

[DGuller]

Putin has shown an ability to convince the Russian people of almost anything.

I think a big part of it was also convincing Russian people that they really don't want to know anything that Kremlin doesn't want them to know.  Russians can still find out things from outside the Russian propaganda umbrella, but then it might lead to a chain of realizations that may end badly for them.  Therefore, out of sense of self-preservation, they actively participate in their own brainwashing.

[OttoVonBismarck]

The future path of this war I think cleaves along two fault lines.

This war so far has not been operated like a conventional military land invasion, but more like a "special operation", for the reasons we have discussed. While Russia has started to shift to more of a conventional military approach, they are nowhere close to shifting fully to that yet, at least from what we have seen. It stands to reason there are reasons for that--which I suspect are many-fold. Reasons I can imagine off hand:

- Putin does not want a lot of casualties on either side, as that doesn't benefit his strategic goals. A more limited special operation helps to limit casualties.
- Putin hoped/hopes to avoid the potential long-term commitment consequences of a full-scale conventional war footing in Ukraine.
- The expense in supplies / consumable resources / money etc of supporting a conventional military war versus a "special operation" are probably at least somewhat at play as well
- Conventional military operations expose parts of the Russian military to counterattack he is probably quite loathe to lose--for example their expensive fixed-wing aircraft and the pilots, which can never be easily replaced for any modern military

For Putin, deciding on continuing to push the special operation vs conventional war strategy raises a lot of difficult questions.

Continue Special Operations Footing

Pro: It could still work, how good is Zelensky's security? Russians could get to him, with him gone, and maybe Kiev fallen, he could start to wave the flag of victory over the operation without having to do the various things he does not want to do. Maybe the Ukrainian people lose the will to fight in this outcome, too. Who knows (neither us or Putin.)

Cons: It could continue to not work, the longer that happens the worse this war "looks" for Russia. I put looks in quotation marks, because a good portion of how "bad" the war is going for Russia really is more about looks right now than it is about Russia really losing. However, "looks" isn't nothing, Putin style regimes, appearances are important, perception is reality, all that. Putin also would hate the personal loss of face and loss of respect for Russia on the international stage.

Another con is the longer Zelensky looks viable to keep fighting, you could see growing support for more and more NATO help for Zelensky which makes the Ukrainians better able to resist, and even resist better if the war shifts to a conventional phase.

Shift to Conventional Style War
Pro: In a conventional style approach I have little real doubt that Russia will take every major Ukrainian city and most of Ukraine's land will end up occupied by Russia (I have no idea how long that will take). Unlike the other option, which could potentially never succeed, I don't think this option realistically can fail to ultimately succeed in occupying the cities and most of the country.

The other big pro is holding all the cities and such may just erase Ukrainian morale and effectively achieve Putin's goals, but again, we don't know this one way or the other until/if it happens.

Cons: Mass, mass casualties, on both sides.

Paradoxically, it may be no better at succeeding in terms of Putin's strategic goals than is his other option. In many ways a fully occupied Ukraine with a vibrant resistance movement that ties down large numbers of Russian troops interminably is not actually a better situation than Russia is in right now, it may even be a worse one.

So far I don't see evidence Putin has committed to the conventional option, I see that he's pulling a bit more of his conventional stuff out, like artillery in Kharkiv and some reports of fixed wing aircraft bombings today, but nothing like what he could bring to bear.

[Legbiter]

Leaving that aside, further factors that support the thesis that Putin is ratcheting down are that the battle is not going swimmingly for Russia, and that he was the one to initiate negotiations, rather than dictating terms with troops in the Ukrainian presidential palace.

It's a possibility, for sure.

Yeah, let him keep Crimea, the enclaves and his own miserable hide. Promise him whatever on Ukrainian foreign policy, renege on it later. The West should keep the sanctions and reduce Russian living standards down to Onlyfans and WOW gold as being the most common ways to earn foreign currency. Let them stew in their Russia STRONK/Chinese vassalage for a generation.

[The Larch]

Apparently Ukraine is offering total amnesty and 5 million rubles to any Russian soldier that surrenders.

[Admiral Yi]

Apparently Ukraine is offering total amnesty and 5 million rubles to any Russian soldier that surrenders.

That's like 45 large US.  Where did Ukraine come up with that kind of dough?

[The Larch]

Apparently Ukraine is offering total amnesty and 5 million rubles to any Russian soldier that surrenders.

That's like 45 large US.  Where did Ukraine come up with that kind of dough?

Maybe they're factoring in a huge devaluation of the ruble because of the sanctions.

"The later you surrender, the less you get!" 

[Sheilbh]

Yep totally agree with that take Otto.

I think the core issue is the disconnect between the political objective which is some variant of partitioned Ukrain or a Belarussified Ukraine and the use of force. The only way I can see that it works is if you have the, I think, faulty assumptions/miscalculations at the start of this - assuming that Putin didn't want the cons of option 1 or basically adding a costly, economically devastated region as in option 2 to the Russian sphere.

[DGuller]

Pro: It could still work, how good is Zelensky's security?

The fictional version of Zelensky was very fatalistic about his security, and at first dismissed all his bodyguards.  Then he settled on hiring one of them back, after having to run away from an angry mob of citizens.  Hopefully that part of Servant of the People was not reflective of his real mindset.

[The Larch]

Hungary refuses to let military (lethal) shipments through its territory to Ukraine because "these may become targets for military strikes".

What a bunch of disgusting bastards. Don't tell me the CIA don't have some shit on Orban to get rid of him.

How crucial is the route through Hungary?

No idea myself, but AFAIK all supplies being currently given are grouped together in a logistical base in Poland and shipped to Ukraine from there.

[grumbler]

Apparently Ukraine is offering total amnesty and 5 million rubles to any Russian soldier that surrenders.

The way things are going, 5 million rubles won't be worth much this time next week.

[The Larch]

Apparently Twitter is mass-labeling any journalist that works or has worked (not really clear how it goes) for RT or Sputnik as "Affiliated media to the Russian government", which is hitting some freelancers pretty hard.

[The Minsky Moment]

In a conventional style approach I have little real doubt that Russia will take every major Ukrainian city and most of Ukraine's land will end up occupied by Russia (I have no idea how long that will take). Unlike the other option, which could potentially never succeed, I don't think this option realistically can fail to ultimately succeed in occupying the cities and most of the country.

Not on the force levels committed to date.

The usual source that everyone cites is a study from the mid-90s that looked at a bunch of historical case studies and concluded that a successful occupation requires a 1 to 50 ratio of occupying soldiers to population. That study was endorsed by later ones and was incorporated into the US Army Counterinurgency manual, although others have raised questions (e.g. https://cpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/sites.dartmouth.edu/dist/0/433/files/2014/07/Friedman-Manpower-and-Counterinsurgency.pdf).  Assuming the 1 to 50 ratio applies, that would suggest the need to commit around 800,000+ to a full occupation of Ukraine.  That doesn't seem to be in the cards, nor feasible. 

My view remains that the only realistic and logical outcome for Russia would be consolidating control/annexation over the separatists in the east and the territory on the Black Sea coast in and around Crimea.  But it doesn't seem that is Putin's goal.

[Jacob]

If that was his goal, he could probably have done that in a more cost effective way than this.

[KRonn]

Attempted compromise.    Come on Yi, "de-nazification" and "de-militarisation". In other words they'd let Ukraine become a Russian vassal state, their leadership appointed by Russia.

Those words have very little concrete meaning.  They could range in practice from, as you described, emasculation of the Ukrainian state, to some fig leaf gestures for Putin to save face.

As is being said here by others, I think these conditions are the starting points - go in with strong positions and then the haggling begins in subsequent meetings. Ukraine will never agree to "de-militarisation". I do think that these meetings could also be Putin's way to stall for time as his forces slowly make gains. Then I hear some reports hinting that Putin is losing some favor with at least a few cronies but who knows how much or how meaningful. He's definitely become the world's pariah. His actions have caused Germany has for the first time to send weapons to a warring nation, and I believe to look at changing their constitution on that aspect. They're also talking about raising their defense spending. Not to mention the assistance coming from all over Europe. Neutral Switzerland is sending aid to Ukraine! Whatever the case, if the stalemate continues with Russia just continuing to slowly gain ground, the conferences could give Putin a way out and to save reputation, at least some.

Not sure where the "de-nazification" comes in, though I've heard of something called the Azov brigades which are supposedly Nazis. But I don't know anything about them but I doubt if they have Ukrainian government support. On the other side Russia does support separatists, creates and imports separatists into the eastern Ukrainian regions and I'm sure those guys are no saints.