Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-25

[Crazy_Ivan80]

I don't buy the assessment that Russia would launch a major attack at the end of January, wasn't that in part the judgement of the Ukrainians?

I think it's possible Putin makes an earlier surprise attack using the forces already at the border to put NATO on the back foot. Though that is partially dependent on what the Winter weather is.

Even over the holiday period, an outside possibility??

He may hope to put extra pressure on Europeans by threatening to decrease/stop gas shipments if they do something to protect/support Ukraine. I'd imagine winter is the best time for that.

which is something that may backfire, just like the treatment of Lithuania by China may very well backfire

[Razgovory]

If the Russians invade what are the chances that the Ukrainians will be able to even offer a coherent defense?

[Threviel]

What if he annexes all of the Ukraine? What will happen that's worse than the status quo?

[Josquius]

If the Russians invade what are the chances that the Ukrainians will be able to even offer a coherent defense?

That's what the Russians want them to do and Ukraine knows it.

So who knows.

[Berkut]

What if he annexes all of the Ukraine? What will happen that's worse than the status quo?

A lot of people will have to live under the rule of an authoritarian who they don't want to rule them.

[Sheilbh]

If the Russians invade what are the chances that the Ukrainians will be able to even offer a coherent defense?

I think Russia was surprised at how robust the defence was/is in Eastern Ukraine since 2015. I don't think there's any doubt that Ukraine can defend itself - but ultimately not against all of Russia's forces for long but they can certainly make it cost.

And it is extraordinary in Ukraine that you visit towns and cities and they almost all have makeshift war memorials that have been put up, by the looks of it, by families in the last few years in the centre. This is not memorialising an event in the past - but the present conflict in Eastern Ukraine. You will often have a board of simple laminated photos of people, I imagine family members, who've been killed. The narrative and understanding of the war is being crafted in real time.

I think it' the crazy thing of Russia could get a lot of what it wants from Ukraine if they were willing to relax control - but they're not. So I think it's fair to say there may not have been much of a sense of Ukraine-ness in, say, 2012 - but I think there definitely is now and it's getting stronger precisely in response to Russia's actions.

[Threviel]

What if he annexes all of the Ukraine? What will happen that's worse than the status quo?

A lot of people will have to live under the rule of an authoritarian who they don't want to rule them.

So, yeah? Invading the Ukraine has no consequences, Russia is already as pariah as it's gonna get.

[Jacob]

So, yeah? Invading the Ukraine has no consequences, Russia is already as pariah as it's gonna get.

Are they under any sanctions that limit their international oil and gas exports? I don't know if Putin is willing to take actions that would make that realistic, but that'd be another level of pariah status Russia's not currently subject to.

[Sheilbh]

Are they under any sanctions that limit their international oil and gas exports? I don't know if Putin is willing to take actions that would make that realistic, but that'd be another level of pariah status Russia's not currently subject to.

I don't see how that's possible right now. Europe still needs plenty of gas but it's not clear to me at the minute who it could replace Russia with as a supplier. There's a global boom in demand for gas as a replacement for coal - especiallly driven by Asian countries de-carbonising (we all know about Nordstream but the other big pipelines being built are trans-Amur pipelines to supply China). In that context I don't think it' as easy to just swap out Russia and Russia's leverage will increase when it has the pipelines to China because it will have a pretty easy alternative market to emphasise.

Maybe it's possible - I'm not sure - but it strikes me as really difficult. Europe would need to replace about 25% of its energy mix at a time of high global demand. Even if you replace the supply it will be at a significant premium and at the minute European politicians are already worrying about high energy costs/cost of living isues.

[Admiral Yi]

It's too bad LNG is so expensive to ship.  I think we have plenty.

Has anyone ever heard anything about fracking in Europe?  I made a bet a while back that the fracking revolution would hit Europe by buying Shlumberger stock, but that went no where.  I wonder if Europe doesn't have any deposits or whether it does but there is political resistance to fracking at home.

[Sheilbh]

I think a bit of both - it's been banned/there's a moratorium in some countries. There's been exploration in other countries that's been underwhelming so it's not economically viable. Other countries allow it and there have been (normally quite heavily protested) fracking but even there my understanding is that it's been underwhelming in terms of productions and return. But obviously American fracking took off in the context of historically high gas prices in the 2000s. It's been a lot lower for the last decade and you'd probably need more than a potentially temporary spike (e.g. very low wind power in Europe, problems with coal mines in China, problems with nuclear plants in France, post-covid demand boom, growth in Asian demand for gas) to attract investment. If there's sustained high gas prices - which I think is possible - then that picture might shift.

Plus there's a bit of regulatory uncertainty because the EU's working on reforms for asset management and sustainable finance - a number of countries (basically Germany and CEE) are pushing for gas to be classed as "sustainable", while others (basically France and Southern Europe) are pushing for nuclear to be classed as "sustainable". That will have an impact on the availiability of financing but at the minute we don't know which side will win so it's still very uncertain.

With LNG the US is the biggest supplier to Europe - but my understanding is that there are reasons why it can't just be swapped. Asian demand is overwhelmingly LNG shipping, not pipeline gas like the EU - so that's where, right now, the most competition for demand is. At the minute Europe doesn't have enough re-gasification capacity to replace Russian gas (it could probably replace about half - and there are new terminals being built but that doesn't help now) and, from my undestanding, LNG providers generally like long-term contracts. So it's not as simple as making a swap.

[OttoVonBismarck]

I think people are drinking bad kool aid if they think a general invasion of Ukraine would not be a massive blunder. The simple reality doesn't fit--now let's be clear, if we're talking some "incursion" and a slight growing of the Russian-allied regions, or something like that, okay. I'm talking an actual complete invasion / occupation of all of Ukraine. Russia struggled mightily to pacify Chechnya, a region with less than 2m residents. The Soviet Union, far mightier even at its weakest point than modern day Russia is relatively speaking, could not hold down Afghanistan.

Ukraine is a country of 40m, and not only will it be more than 20x the scope of anything Putin has ever done, Russia's budget was wrecked just by having to take over pension payments for Russians in Crimea after annexing Crimea. The idea that Russia can afford this in money, men etc is just insane. Not to mention I genuinely believe a general invasion of Ukraine would result in near-Iran like sanctions regime being built against Russia, with an almost severing of economic ties with the entire Western world.

This likely also decreases the price Russia can get for its fossil fuels--China has actually pushed Russia into lower prices at times when Russia has faced sanctions, recognizing it gives China more bargaining leverage.

We'll also almost certainly see a repeat of the 1980s playbook where the U.S. and allies through a few intermediaries, funnels money to the Ukrainian resistance. It would just be a massive, massive mess.

Like the United States or China could not pull off an occupation of a country the size of the Ukraine, the idea Russia could just doesn't work.

What Putin wanted is what he had before the Maidan--and that's going to be hard to get because he has enflamed Ukrainian hatred of Russia with his actions since then. This isn't the age of empires any longer, you can't hold these huge ethnic conclaves with high population relative to your core any longer, it just isn't viable. China can do it with several of its regions because relative to the massive population of Han Chinese, they are relatively small entities (the total population of Uighurs in Xinjiang is less, as a % of population, than Puerto Rico is to the United States)--Ukraine/Russia doesn't fit that bill.

Putin would love something like the Union State he has with Belarus, where some Ukrainian strongman runs the country, but Russia has economic / diplomatic / military basing privileges there, that way Putin isn't (mostly) responsible for keeping the locals content. The problem is a general invasion doesn't achieve that, it likely just causes an endless insurgency and buys Putin a big nasty open-ended war, not at all what he should want.

Why would he blunder in to it? My only guess is he's buying into his own propaganda, that the Ukrainians are not a "real people" and that so many will be happy to be reunited with Russia (their true country) that he'll be able to easily set up an occupied Vichy government that will have no problems keeping things going well. I simply don't believe that is possible.

[DGuller]

I guess that is the big question mark:  how close are Ukrainian people to Russian people, really?  I think the answer is super boring:  they're closer to Russians than people in the West believe, but not as close as Russian believe.  In EU4 terms, I think they're definitely in the same culture group. 

I'm not convinced that Ukrainians outside of the Western part would fight the Russians to the death.  Western Ukrainians definitely would fight the Russians, but I imagine that Russians don't want them anyway.

[Jacob]

In general my thinking is similar to Otto's (but I'm probably less informed ).

A few thoughts and questions:

1: It is my understanding that ethnic Russian Ukrainians are not necessarily uniformly enthused with the idea of becoming defacto part of Russia.

2: There may not be a massive difference between Ukrainians and Russians, but that doesn't necessarily make absorbing them easier. Small differences can sometimes be felt more deeply.

3: This one's a bit more open-ended and a question for people here. So I generally agree with Otto's analysis in terms of the risks Putin is exposing Russia to if they get stuck in too deep. Flipping it around, though, what are the possible upsides from Putin's POV? Here's what I'm thinking:

- He may think that the West (US / EU / NATO) is internally fractured, and pushing it the right way will exploit fractures causing a break, leading to massive prestige loss and internal breakup. Like, say, there's a conflict and the West lines up to punish Russia and then Trump comes in and sells everyone out, causing a severe degradation in the level of trust between US an its allies... or maybe he thinks he can cause the EU to have an internal meltdown somehow?

- He sees some economic upside from integrating parts of the Ukrainian population and economy? I don't have any specific ideas what it would be, but could that be possible?

- On a more mercenary level, are there potential economic upsides for Putin and his coterie of oligarchs personally, even if at a cost to Russia as a nation? If so, what could those be?

- He believes he needs the internal prestige gain from a successful war to secure his hold on power, so therefore the risks are worth it. The question then becomes what is "a successful war" for his internal needs.

- He genuinely believes the West is encroaching on the Russian sphere and have been for a while. He sees this as a "this far and no further, the line must be drawn HERE" moment" for Russia. In other words, the upside is not from any additional gain but it's from sending a clear message to the West not to push Russia any further (as he sees it).

- Relatedly, Putin may see bringing Ukraine to heel as increasing his ability to push around other countries in what he considers the Russian sphere.

- Maybe he thinks if he nibbles a bite that's just the right size, he'll get some upside (increased local intimidation power, increased internal prestige, making the EU/NATO/US look weak and ineffective externally, increase internal stressors in the EU/NATO/US) while stopping short of suffering any serious consequences (crippling sanctions, massive loss of treasury and manpower).

... that's all I got. What else do you think Putin figures he might gain if he invades Ukraine?

[DGuller]

I suspect that Putin believes, and has always believed, that Ukraine should be part of Russia.  When it comes to geopolitics, sometimes you have to wait for a very, very long time to right the wrong, and he thinks that Ukraine becoming independent was a wrong that was inflicted on Russia.  Why does he think that now is a good time to strike?  As I said before, I fear that he thinks that way because he knows that China is planning to right the wrong that Taiwan inflicted on it.