Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-23 and Invasion

[OttoVonBismarck]

I do miss the days when different countries had different things.

Dare we dream?

[OttoVonBismarck]

Also mind you oil and wheat are fungible commodities, Russia can't viably just not export them, so those commodities will always be flowing onto the global market. Direct flow of oil and gas to Europe is a bigger concern for a number of reasons.

[Sheilbh]

Interesting thread from BBC Diplomatic Editor - again I'm baffled by the disparity between military means and political objectives (as re-confirmed to Macron this morning):

Mark Urban
@MarkUrban01
The Pentagon judges that 90% of the Russian force concentrated on Ukraine's borders ten days ago has now entered the country. The first phase of their operation has happened and they are stalled. So what do they do now? 1/
There are clearly efforts going on to scrape up more combat units from Russian garrisons, and we've seen footage of kit moving west, but the invasion force already used most of their regular battalion combat groups, there's not so much left. So... 2/
If assessments like those we've heard from France today, that Putin plans to occupy all of Ukraine are right, coming up with another 15 or 20 battalion groups will be inadequate anyway. As the Ukrainians estimated a few weeks ago, that's a job for 500k troops 3/
Add to this the calculation that stripping out almost the entire regular army for Ukraine could leave the Kremlin dangerously exposed (eg in North Caucasus) and the answer becomes a large scale mobilisation of reserves. Fear of this is driving many young Russians to leave 4/END

[Josquius]

Looks like RT is gone.


BBC News - RT: Russian-backed TV news channel disappears from UK screens
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-60584092

Now where do I go to find out about Jewish nazis raping grandmothers with grenades up the bum?

[OttoVonBismarck]

It's rough with the hell that is being inflicted on Ukraine to think this way, but I remember assessing months ago that if Putin were actually stupid enough to invade Ukraine, it would ultimately be good for the West because it would result in a massive quagmire and probably a permanent rot on Russia...it looks like that is more or less poised to happen. Putin has no real choice but to do whatever is necessary to win, which because his surgical operation failed, means a large conventional land war of steadily advancing fronts using heavy artillery and infantry. Over a country the size of Ukraine this will require many soldiers. Each city that falls will require occupation forces--perhaps permanently. Scale wise given the size of the comparative economies and military forces, this is maybe four or five times "worse" for Russia than the interminable U.S. occupations of Iraq/Afghanistan combined, and because Putin arguably has even less room to back out than an elected American President, I don't really see how Russia gets out of this situation.

Absolutely none of that makes things better for Ukraine, but it likely makes thing better for the West. Instead of China/Russia being a two-headed dragon, it's now more likely to be China with a sickly partner that it has to actually help subsidize in various ways. China has always shown greater institutional restraint than Russia, probably due to the nature of how Chinese leaders have emerged versus how Russian ones do, I also have to hope that maybe this teaches Xi that there just isn't a good reason to go to war in Taiwan and that whatever goals China has there, a more peaceful "long game" are a better approach than a belligerent alternative.

[The Brain]

Yeah Putin in Ukraine right now looks like Napoleon in Spain or Hideyoshi in Korea. Only worse for Putin, because he is weaker.

[Zanza]

With regards to China, most of the reasons why Russia is now hit do not apply to China: Their involvement in supply chains etc. is much more upmarket, so the interdependence with the West isuch bigger - for both sides. At the same time, China is much more insulated from global financial markets, having their own payments systems etc. So I don't think this shows anything for Taiwan's security.

[OttoVonBismarck]

Another bad omen for Putin is the Republican reaction. While a few Trump/Russia plants demurred, the vast majority of the GOP is actually falling over trying to outdo one another in advocating various bellicose actions toward Russia. Most are saying Biden is not doing enough. If Russia is still occupying Ukraine in a few years, it likely is a GOP primary issue and it will likely be very hard for any Republican to support anything but a belligerent position towards Russia. This would include even Trump, who is likely to run (and probably like to win both the primary and general), unless Trump is just a true Russian plant, I suspect his base instincts to appeal to the dumbest part of the Republican base will catch him up in anti-Russian fervor as well.

There's a wing of the Republican party that has no real taste for NATO or helping European allies when it is seen as helping our friends, but when it is couched at going after an evil enemy country, the tastes shift quite a lot. This actually aligns much with how modern Republicans view the world, they will do almost anything to hurt their enemies and will reflexively oppose anything that helps anyone else.

[Zanza]

I do miss the days when different countries had different things.

Dare we dream?

Most of the Western car makers have ceased operations in Russia. I guess Chinese companies will take over huge market shares. But the difference is that the Western companies built plants etc. in Russia, sometimes even joint-ventures with tech transfer (e.g. Renault/Autovaz). The Chines will just sell cars, no plants will be built, no tech shared. And they will likely still expect payment in USD for the cars (about 60% of RU/CN trade is in USD still). Or maybe barter them for raw materials. 

[OttoVonBismarck]

With regards to China, most of the reasons why Russia is now hit do not apply to China: Their involvement in supply chains etc. is much more upmarket, so the interdependence with the West isuch bigger - for both sides. At the same time, China is much more insulated from global financial markets, having their own payments systems etc. So I don't think this shows anything for Taiwan's security.

Disagree. For one I'm not even countenancing the economic side--I'm saying the key lesson is that military occupations suck and aren't profitable. That actually isn't because of the sanctions hitting Russia, this is something a German may not think about because you haven't done one of these in a while, but military occupations are expensive and tend to suck up your strategic focus regardless of anyone going after your economy. Even without Western sanctions, an open-ended multi-decade occupation is likely a net economic and strategic loss for any power. The sanctions for Russia make it far worse.

Taiwan is also more protected than Ukraine because the United States strategic vagueness about Taiwan has generally always been interpreted to mean U.S. Naval opposition to a Chinese invasion across the strait is on the table. Ukraine never had anything like that protecting it.

In terms of economics, if China invades Taiwan we will enter a global depression, there is very little that can stop that. That will necessarily hurt China very badly and all the rest of the world too. That is one thing that is very different about the Russia situation--we can hurt Russia economically much more than it can hurt the rest of the world. China's economic situation is such that there is no outcome of a Taiwan invasion that doesn't result in a global economic depression that likely is generational in length.

[Sheilbh]

With regards to China, most of the reasons why Russia is now hit do not apply to China: Their involvement in supply chains etc. is much more upmarket, so the interdependence with the West isuch bigger - for both sides. At the same time, China is much more insulated from global financial markets, having their own payments systems etc. So I don't think this shows anything for Taiwan's security.

I think there have been surprises which China will learn from and look at quite closely.

The Ukrainian resistance to invasion itself is one. I wonder if they'll possibly re-assess and move upwards the risk of Taiwanese resistance because I think one clear lesson from this for every country is about not underestimating your enemy and not making plans on the basis of "best case scenario".

In addition the supply of weapons into Ukraine - that has surprised me. I thought it would happen prior to an invasion but after an invasion any weapon supplies would be covert. Again that might have repercussions for any invasion of Taiwan. It also clearly links to the capacity to resist invasion.

I think the sanctions will also be a lesson - they have goone far further than I imagined was possible. From my understanding - I think it was in your post earlier - the outer limit of what Russia expected/prepared for was SWIFT. Instead there's been things like sanctioning the central bank so freezing reserves held overseas which is extraordinary (and to me seems like a declaration of economic war). The self-sanctioning of companies pulling out of Russia voluntarily has also been a surprise.

None of that is necessarily insurmountable from Xi's perspective - but I think it is likely to change the calculations around an invasion of Taiwan.

[DGuller]

With regards to China, most of the reasons why Russia is now hit do not apply to China: Their involvement in supply chains etc. is much more upmarket, so the interdependence with the West isuch bigger - for both sides. At the same time, China is much more insulated from global financial markets, having their own payments systems etc. So I don't think this shows anything for Taiwan's security.

I hope that what China sees is that when the West gets fed up with a belligerent nation, it really gets fed up.  Apart from energy, Russia is essentially embargoed now.  Can China afford to be walled off from the world with only Russia keeping it company?

[Zanza]

With regards to China, most of the reasons why Russia is now hit do not apply to China: Their involvement in supply chains etc. is much more upmarket, so the interdependence with the West isuch bigger - for both sides. At the same time, China is much more insulated from global financial markets, having their own payments systems etc. So I don't think this shows anything for Taiwan's security.

Disagree. For one I'm not even countenancing the economic side--I'm saying the key lesson is that military occupations suck and aren't profitable. That actually isn't because of the sanctions hitting Russia, this is something a German may not think about because you haven't done one of these in a while, but military occupations are expensive and tend to suck up your strategic focus regardless of anyone going after your economy. Even without Western sanctions, an open-ended multi-decade occupation is likely a net economic and strategic loss for any power. The sanctions for Russia make it far worse.

Taiwan is also more protected than Ukraine because the United States strategic vagueness about Taiwan has generally always been interpreted to mean U.S. Naval opposition to a Chinese invasion across the strait is on the table. Ukraine never had anything like that protecting it.

In terms of economics, if China invades Taiwan we will enter a global depression, there is very little that can stop that. That will necessarily hurt China very badly and all the rest of the world too. That is one thing that is very different about the Russia situation--we can hurt Russia economically much more than it can hurt the rest of the world. China's economic situation is such that there is no outcome of a Taiwan invasion that doesn't result in a global economic depression that likely is generational in length.

Full agreement on the first two paragraphs.

My point was regarding your third paragraph: China is both more relevant for global supply chains and more self-sufficient than Russia. So economic sanctions would not hit it as hard or are so drastic as to not be palatable for the West (that was my assumption) or lead to the global depression you outline. But the Russian experience, where the West can inflict outsized economic pain at relatively low own cost would not be apply to China invading Taiwan. And they know that.

[Zanza]

With regards to China, most of the reasons why Russia is now hit do not apply to China: Their involvement in supply chains etc. is much more upmarket, so the interdependence with the West isuch bigger - for both sides. At the same time, China is much more insulated from global financial markets, having their own payments systems etc. So I don't think this shows anything for Taiwan's security.

I hope that what China sees is that when the West gets fed up with a belligerent nation, it really gets fed up.  Apart from energy, Russia is essentially embargoed now.  Can China afford to be walled off from the world with only Russia keeping it company?

My point is that China could do that much better than Russia. Because China  - unlike Russia - is not just a big gas station (or sweatshop in China's case), but a vibrant, fairly self-sufficient economy that makes most of what it needs itself, while at the same time being highly integrated in global supply chains, which allows China to inflict pain on its adversaries in a way Russia is not able.

[Syt]

Russia has drawn up plans for public executions in Ukraine as and when cities are captured by Russian troops, Bloomberg reports.

Bloomberg cites a European intelligence official as saying that Moscow has drafted strategies to break morale in order to discourage Ukrainians from fighting back as cities fall under the Kremlin's control.

The official said Moscow plans to crack down on protest, detain opponents and potentially carry out public executions, the news agency writes.