Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-25

[Sheilbh]

I thought this was interesting from RUSI. In particular capturing two paradoxes that seem like they are will be an issue for Russia/the Kremlin.

First that the political system is based on people disengaged and apathetic. They don't want a politically motivated and engaged population because that presents a threat to the system (see the Potemkin village opposition parties). As long as that regime safety valve is the priority of the Kremlin it seems like it'll be a real challenge to instil in soldier the sort of political mobilisation/ideological "why we fight" necessary to do anything but defend territory they've already taken.

The second is almost an example of this - that the people who are most supportive of the war are, potentially, a threat. They care and want to win so they are most angered by the current failure. At the minute this anger is directed at individual commanders or Prigozhin but at some point they may look up the chain of command. In particcular this strand of opinion seems to be exemplified by Girkin and his blog - who has been in a big public argument with Prigozhin and very critical of the military operations so far. I believe he's widely shared and I wonder if part of the reason that he's allowed to go on, despite being very critical, is that as well as not (yet) turning his criticism on the Kremlin he represents the views of individuals in the security state (particularly with his dislike of Prigozhin):

Russia Through the Kremlin's Eyes
Dr Jack Watling
27 January 2023
5 Minute Read

Although Russian elites are highly pessimistic about the war, polling of the Russian population likely gives the Kremlin confidence that it can sustain losses in Ukraine.

Polling and assessments of public sentiment constitute a major part of Russian political decision-making. Before its invasion of Ukraine, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) conducted extensive polling of the Ukrainian population. It also routinely commissions Russian 'political technologists' to survey its own population. Examining these academic polls can provide insight into how the Kremlin perceives its own people and the risks they pose to regime stability.

RUSI has had access to a range of academic polling conducted on behalf of the Kremlin relating to the war in Ukraine. This article will refer to trends across a number of such polls, though details from specific polls are withheld to protect sources. The polling has tended to divide the Russian population into five broad categories: Cosmopolitans, Nihilists, Loyalists, Globalist Patriots and 'Ura (Hoorah)-Patriots'. The Cosmopolitans, constituting around 12–15% of the population, are viewed as forming the core of the active opposition, with just under half of this group assessed as having personal connections to Ukraine. The nihilists – comprising just over 10% of the population – are viewed as critical of the government but largely disengaged and passive. This group is viewed as unlikely to be supportive of the cosmopolitan opposition.

The remaining groups are all seen as supportive of the government, albeit to varying levels of intensity. If anything, it is the Ura-Patriots – at around 20–25% of the population – that raise the greatest policy concern, as they are the most invested in the conflict and therefore the most likely to be critical of failures. The greatest variation in categorisation is among loyalists and globalist patriots, largely reflecting the level of engagement with politics.

The Kremlin pays careful attention to the media that these groups engage with. Private polling obtained by RUSI of the Russian population conducted in August and October 2022 demonstrates that there has been a significant increase in the proportion of the Russian population who claim to value independent media. However, when asked what they mean by 'independent', most respondents answered that this meant media that validated their own views, and listed Kremlin-controlled television stations and other state media as the most independent and reliable.

Whereas academic polling conducted for the Kremlin in May and August showcased a high level of support for the war in Ukraine combined with very limited concern or engagement with it, this changed after the declaration of mobilisation. Private polling since mobilisation has demonstrated that the war is being more widely discussed and that a broader cross-section of the population are pessimistic both about their own prospects and about the economic impact on Russia. Perhaps most contentious is the closure of the border, a measure that is seen in an extremely negative light across population segments.

This growing pessimism has not yet manifested as a threat to the government, however. Many of those who are pessimistic are supportive of measures aimed at bringing about a successful outcome in the war. Others are pessimistic but see this as an imposition by NATO rather than a consequence of Russia's mistakes. Still others are deeply fearful about the outcome. The greatest concern registered in surveys is nuclear war, with respondents supportive of measures framed as a means of reducing the likelihood of nuclear conflict.

For the Kremlin, the current information landscape appears to be one over which it believes it retains a great deal of influence. Western leaders should note that Russian posturing over nuclear use is as much about raising domestic fears and therefore bolstering support for the government in diffusing these self-generated threats as it is about coercing Russia's adversaries.

For now, Russia's Ura-Patriots are vocally criticising the conduct of the war, but their criticism is largely directed at certain commanders, local administrators' handling of mobilisation, or even the attitudes of wider society. They have not yet turned their ire on President Vladimir Putin. This is the Rubicon that the Kremlin will be anxious to deter them from crossing. Once they do, then it becomes possible for those parts of Russia's elite who are most dissatisfied to begin exploring a world beyond Putin, and to communicate other explanations for the disaster to the Russian public.

The Kremlin appears comfortable for the time being that casualties on the battlefield will not force the Ura-Patriots to begin narrowing their accusations of blame. At the same time, as a greater proportion of the Russian public becomes more concerned about the war, and interest in it expands beyond local politics and the economy, the Russian population is likely to become more fragmented – even if few are looking to act. During peacetime, the Kremlin has used fragmentation to isolate its opponents and then polarise them in order to suppress and undermine political mobilisation. The result is an apathetic populace.

While encouraging the passivity of the population may ensure regime security, the Kremlin must now square the circle of wishing to mobilise its people to fight while simultaneously preventing them from coalescing into a sufficiently large constituency to be able to have sway over the Kremlin. So long as regime safety remains the organising logic of Russian politics, it is likely that popular apathy will be preserved.

The picture painted through polling is one in which the Kremlin can sustain losses, but attempting to generate the national unity required to bring about a more favourable position on the battlefield – and a more coherent drive to bring industry onto a war footing – would significantly increase the risks for Putin if setbacks continued. For now, however, the Kremlin appears to be comfortable with the domestic ramifications of protracting the war. Given that the Kremlin's picture of Ukrainian society proved so inaccurate, however, it is worth asking whether polls of the Russian population are producing a similarly distorted view.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author's, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

[Jacob]

Interesting piece, thanks for sharing. I've largely disengaged from Twitter, so much appreciated

[Barrister]

I heard a very similar analysis on the BBC's Ukrainecast podcast - that the Kremlin is just as wary of excessively patriotic and enthusiastically pro-war Russians as it is of anti-war Russians, and that the regime largely counts on an unenthusiastic and apathetic citizenry.

[Josquius]

I'm curious who these globalist patriots are. Intruiging name that could mean several wildly different things.

[Sheilbh]

It's just the usual dance.

"No, we ain't doing it"
"Well, we'd love to, but technical reasons"
"Well sure technically its possible but these other dudes must do it first"
"Fine we can send one or two"
"Ok here is 20"

Maybe - but I looked into it and these sound like legit issues/problems (with maybe a better alternative):

[...]
Mission Requirements

From a practical perspective, the Ukrainian Air Force has several key requirements for Western fighter aircraft. The most pressing is to enhance its air defence capabilities against Russian combat aircraft near the frontlines and cruise missiles inside Ukraine. The former task is extremely challenging due to the fact that Russia deploys a highly effective and multi-layered ground-based air defence (GBAD) system in Ukraine. Long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems like the infamous S-400 (SA-21) and S-300V4 (SA-23), supported by long-range radars like the 48Ya6-K1 'Podlet', can threaten fighter aircraft at distances of well over 100 km behind the frontlines, even at low altitudes. Medium-range systems like the mobile SA-17 'Buk M2' and short-range systems like the SA-15 'Tor M1/2' add further layers of threat even against low-flying aircraft within tens of kilometres of the frontlines.

Meanwhile, the progressive attrition of Ukrainian SA-11 and SA-8 SAMs by Russian Orlan-10 UAVs and artillery and missile strikes has allowed Russian fighters to patrol at high altitudes and relatively high speeds on the Russian side of the frontlines. From this high perch they menace Ukrainian fighters, bombers, helicopters and UAVs with long-range R-37M missiles.

Western fighters do offer a significantly enhanced capacity to push these Russian fighters back further from the frontlines and provide a better deterrent against future attempts to push deeper into Ukrainian airspace. However, they will have to fly very low to avoid the Russian GBAD threat, and so their missiles will be at a significant effective range disadvantage compared to Russian ones that are being launched from much higher up.

Only the newest and longest-range models of Western air-to-air missiles are likely to provide practical equivalence in range, limiting options to the US AIM-120D or European Meteor. Typhoon Tranche 1 are not compatible with Meteor, and the export of AIM-120C8/D would require US approval. Furthermore, the Typhoon is not really optimised for low-level flying, but rather for very high altitudes and speeds to give its missiles more range – a tactic largely negated by the Russian long-range SAM threat. Its air-to-ground capabilities are likewise limited to Paveway II bombs with the Litening III targeting pod – essentially useless in the threat environment over the frontlines in Ukraine.

Basing Requirements

Ukraine's other major requirement for Western fighters is to be able to sustainably operate them without having them destroyed or rendered inoperable by Russian long-range missile strikes on its airbases. Here, the Typhoon is poorly suited to Ukrainian requirements. RAF sustainment and maintenance equipment and practices for the aircraft are designed around centralised, fixed bases. The aircraft has underslung air intakes that make it susceptible to engine damage from foreign object debris (FOD), which is common on the relatively austere dispersed airbases that the Ukrainian Air Force has been using to avoid being targeted by Russian strikes.

It is also designed for operations from relatively smooth runways and is not optimised for short-field landings on rough surfaces. The same goes for the F-16, which is also regularly cited as a potential fighter for Ukraine. Therefore, to operate Typhoons (or F-16s) sustainably, the Ukrainian Air Force would have to resurface and possibly extend its runways at key bases, but this would then be easily observed by Russian satellites and the bases would be struck by cruise and ballistic missiles. The Typhoon is also fairly complex to maintain, and so significant numbers of specialised UK contractors and support equipment would be required to provide assistance for line maintenance in-country, at bases that would then become prime targets for Russian strikes.
[...]
This might, conceivably, be worth it if it acted as the trigger for supplies of more operationally suitable and sustainable jets for Ukraine. The Swedish Gripen C, in particular, stands outs as particularly suitable from an operational point of view. It is explicitly designed to counter Russian SAMs and fast jets by flying very low and having an internal electronic warfare suite, and to be easy to maintain and operate from dispersed bases with mobile teams in vehicles. Swedish Air Force teams can provide servicing, re-arming and refuelling for a Gripen on a short, relatively rough airstrip or highway with just one highly trained mechanic supervising five conscripts with only a few months of training, operating from two vehicles and a fuel truck. The author recently flew in a Gripen to a dispersed base and observed this being practiced during an exercise in person. The Gripen C is also compatible with Meteor and is much more resistant to FOD damage than the Typhoon or F-16. While there are not a huge number that could theoretically be provided from spares or leased operators, there are more than the RAF has Tranche 1 Typhoons.

Since the UK wants to help Ukraine with fighter aircraft, it could offer to clear and support in advance any transfer of the aircraft to the Ukrainian Air Force – which would be required since around 30% of the Gripen's components are produced in the UK. It could also offer to contribute munitions, funding and/or other specialists to assist with such an effort. If Typhoon Tranche 1 is the symbolic silver bullet required to unlock such a deal, then the UK government must understand the costs for RAF readiness and capability of doing so, and urgently fund replacement aircraft, spare parts kits, munitions and engineering specialists to alleviate the impact on the core of the UK's combat air capability.

The UK statement on training Ukrainian pilots here referred to them being trained on "NATO-standard" fighters and my understanding is the RAF have Gripens for training - so I wonder if the British and Swedish governments have been talking? I don't have a problem with sending planes but it does sound like what we have isn't really compatible with what Ukraine needs so maybe an alternative would be some of those circular purchases where we cover the cost of someone else providing more suitable planes?

[Tonitrus]

The USAF keeps trying (mistakenly, I think) to dump the A-10.

Lets give Ukraine a bunch of Warthogs.

[Admiral Yi]

The USAF keeps trying (mistakenly, I think) to dump the A-10.

Lets give Ukraine a bunch of Warthogs.

Wouldn't they be meat for the ZHU-whatever, the quad mount guy?  A10 has never had a deployment against top level (or second level) AA.

[Tamas]

Zelensky's EU visit provided several confirmations on how big piece of shit Orban is:

Busily shuffling papers to avoid talking to him:
https://twitter.com/i/status/1623804678478733312

Being the only one at the photo op not applauding:
https://twitter.com/i/status/1623646022130860036

Official photos show there's no love lost between them, who can blame Zelensky though:



BUT if you only follow Orban's offocial Facebook page, your impression will be different:
"Hungary is on the side of peace"

[Legbiter]

The UK statement on training Ukrainian pilots here referred to them being trained on "NATO-standard" fighters and my understanding is the RAF have Gripens for training - so I wonder if the British and Swedish governments have been talking? I don't have a problem with sending planes but it does sound like what we have isn't really compatible with what Ukraine needs so maybe an alternative would be some of those circular purchases where we cover the cost of someone else providing more suitable planes?

I don't know if Sweden has anything except boutique numbers of them. But better than nothing. 

[Tamas]

Two missiles crossed Moldavian and possibly Romanian airspace on their way to Ukraine.

I do wonder how we as the world can avoid this escalating into a world war. If it was not for nukes it already would be one (and to be fair it might have been over already).

With Putin having maneuvered himself into a corner where he cannot stop, not just in Ukraine but also with the mortal danger from the West rhetoric regardless of how the war ends; neither him, nor the collective free world have a choice but to stand their ground.
And obviously Ukraine has no choice but to fight for survival.

I think as far as historical precedents go this would be guaranteed to escalate into a full scale NATO v. Russia war. The new variable is obviously the whole MAD thing.

[The Brain]

The UK statement on training Ukrainian pilots here referred to them being trained on "NATO-standard" fighters and my understanding is the RAF have Gripens for training - so I wonder if the British and Swedish governments have been talking? I don't have a problem with sending planes but it does sound like what we have isn't really compatible with what Ukraine needs so maybe an alternative would be some of those circular purchases where we cover the cost of someone else providing more suitable planes?

I don't know if Sweden has anything except boutique numbers of them. But better than nothing. 

We have less than a hundred. If only more countries had bought Gripen, but that's spilt milk under the bridge.

[Josquius]

Two missiles crossed Moldavian and possibly Romanian airspace on their way to Ukraine.

I do wonder how we as the world can avoid this escalating into a world war. If it was not for nukes it already would be one (and to be fair it might have been over already).

With Putin having maneuvered himself into a corner where he cannot stop, not just in Ukraine but also with the mortal danger from the West rhetoric regardless of how the war ends; neither him, nor the collective free world have a choice but to stand their ground.
And obviously Ukraine has no choice but to fight for survival.

I think as far as historical precedents go this would be guaranteed to escalate into a full scale NATO v. Russia war. The new variable is obviously the whole MAD thing.

Surely if it wasn't for nukes it'd already be over with Putin long gone?

That Russia couldn't even handle Ukraine paints a pretty picture of how NATO could just wipe out their military.

[The Brain]

Two missiles crossed Moldavian and possibly Romanian airspace on their way to Ukraine.

I do wonder how we as the world can avoid this escalating into a world war. If it was not for nukes it already would be one (and to be fair it might have been over already).

With Putin having maneuvered himself into a corner where he cannot stop, not just in Ukraine but also with the mortal danger from the West rhetoric regardless of how the war ends; neither him, nor the collective free world have a choice but to stand their ground.
And obviously Ukraine has no choice but to fight for survival.

I think as far as historical precedents go this would be guaranteed to escalate into a full scale NATO v. Russia war. The new variable is obviously the whole MAD thing.

I think it's within the theoretically possible to see a limited NATO-Russia war in Ukraine, if NATO were to go that far in order to keep Ukraine in the fight. Very unlikely? Yes. Extremely dangerous considering the risk that nukes start flying? Yes. Automatically leading to MD? I don't think so.

[Tamas]

Two missiles crossed Moldavian and possibly Romanian airspace on their way to Ukraine.

I do wonder how we as the world can avoid this escalating into a world war. If it was not for nukes it already would be one (and to be fair it might have been over already).

With Putin having maneuvered himself into a corner where he cannot stop, not just in Ukraine but also with the mortal danger from the West rhetoric regardless of how the war ends; neither him, nor the collective free world have a choice but to stand their ground.
And obviously Ukraine has no choice but to fight for survival.

I think as far as historical precedents go this would be guaranteed to escalate into a full scale NATO v. Russia war. The new variable is obviously the whole MAD thing.

Surely if it wasn't for nukes it'd already be over with Putin long gone?

That Russia couldn't even handle Ukraine paints a pretty picture of how NATO could just wipe out their military.

Almost certainly yes, but it could have also triggered some sort of patriotic resurgence within Russia. We'll hopefully never know.

[Legbiter]

Two missiles crossed Moldavian and possibly Romanian airspace on their way to Ukraine.

I do wonder how we as the world can avoid this escalating into a world war. If it was not for nukes it already would be one (and to be fair it might have been over already).

Seems to me the plan is to completely ignore Russian provocations like this (like when they blew up Nordstream and that missile that strayed into Poland) and just not give Russia the attention it craves. I think there's a workable ad hoc plan in place where Russia just bleeds out in Ukraine over the next couple of years. Then we get a new Iron Curtain wherever the lines stabilize and Cold War part deux.