Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-23 and Invasion

[Zanza]

It's not known why he acts like that and I don't want to speculate. Many more knowledgeable journalists already could not figure it out. I guess we have to wait until he explains himself.

The described seesaw is something I do not perceive in German politics though.

[Tamas]

Is it possible that parts of the German leadership (business ones I would imagine) still hope that Russia can get its act together, conquer Ukraine, and let things go back to where they were, with them raking in profits thanks to cheap Russian gas?

[Admiral Yi]

Is it possible that parts of the German leadership (business ones I would imagine) still hope that Russia can get its act together, conquer Ukraine, and let things go back to where they were, with them raking in profits thanks to cheap Russian gas?

I don't think it's money first.  They're good guys.  Give them the benefit of the doubt.  I think it's intergenrational WWII guilt.  They don't want to be the bad guys again and they're super paranoid about it.

[Tamas]

Is it possible that parts of the German leadership (business ones I would imagine) still hope that Russia can get its act together, conquer Ukraine, and let things go back to where they were, with them raking in profits thanks to cheap Russian gas?

I don't think it's money first.  They're good guys.  Give them the benefit of the doubt.  I think it's intergenrational WWII guilt.  They don't want to be the bad guys again and they're super paranoid about it.

Fine but if they have "being the baddies again" guilt that means they perceive the conflict as some squabble between parties as opposed to a clear Russian aggression.

To me Scholtz' behaviour since February last year shows that he and the people he listens to had no intention of siding with Ukraine in any capacity, it's been public opinion which has been nudging them toward that against their clear preferences.

[Admiral Yi]

Fine but if they have "being the baddies again" guilt that means they perceive the conflict as some squabble between parties as opposed to a clear Russian aggression.

Not necessarily. It can just be the extent of feeling guilt about panzers driving acrosss the steppe a couple generations after they brutalized the USSR.

I got no problem with them waiting for us to go first.  That's our job, going first.

[Sheilbh]

I don't think it's money first.  They're good guys.  Give them the benefit of the doubt.  I think it's intergenrational WWII guilt.  They don't want to be the bad guys again and they're super paranoid about it.

I see AfD making this point but no-one else. It might be particularly resonant but I'm not sure it's the real motivator. Although, separately, I slightly wonder if the understanding of the second world war that created the space for German-French relations - and Western European integration in general - is an obstacle to similar relations and integration in Central and Eastern Europe?

On the money angle, I don't think it's a big factor on German public opinion or Scholz himself but there are undoubtedly networks in the SPD that have those sort of interests. Obviously Schroeder but also someone younger and still in office like Shcwesig.

I think there is a possibility that it is basically a strategic argument that Scholz doesn't want Russia to win, but also doesn't want Ukraine to win because of perceived escalation and post-war chaos risks. Unlike leaders in Canada, France, the UK, US or some other European countries, Scholz has not (as far as am I'm aware) talked about possible Ukrainian victory. So there'sa  possibility that he doesn't want Ukraine to win, but also doesn't want Russia winning and instead hopes for containment to the point where negotiations can begin and "normal" European geopolitics can resume.

My understanding is that Scholz has mentioned aspects of the risk from Russia many times. So it could also partly be fear - so Germany will not move without the US as its nuclear guarantor moving in lockstep. I think that actually would be the worst option because I think that lack of belief in Article 5 could be profoundly corrosive.

But again the reason for speculation like this is that, from everything I've seen, Scholz hasn't explained Germany's stance. The way to solve it would be for the German government to explain their position and their reasoning even to allies (acknowledging it would, immediately, leak and become public).

Separately Poland are signaling that they might transfer the tanks without German approval. The US is gesturing that it will offer tanks from its own stocks plus long term industrial partnerships for European countries that want to transition away from Leopards (by giving them away) - Poland is looking increasingly French so will probably go with South Korea. And via a German-Finnish think-tanker, Finnish defence experts saying they need to consider "extremely carefully" the extent they buy defence equipment from Germany because they can't take the risk that in a crisis their operational capability of core systems would be tied to German policy.

To me Scholtz' behaviour since February last year shows that he and the people he listens to had no intention of siding with Ukraine in any capacity, it's been public opinion which has been nudging them toward that against their clear preferences.

I disagree - I think the Zeitenwende speech was serious and important and genuinely meant. But I don't think it has tilted Germany out of its normal process of politics which can be slow moving, so the policy hasn't followed sufficiently and I don't really get a sense of urgency to practically shade in what that speech means that a war in Europe deserves.

I got no problem with them waiting for us to go first.  That's our job, going first.

Maybe - but if Germany has qualms about weapons systems aimed at Russian troops then it feels like they've been extremely reckless in arming of Eastern Europe.

[Admiral Yi]

But again the reason for speculation like this is that, from everything I've seen, Scholz hasn't explained Germany's stance. The way to solve it would be for the German government to explain their position and their reasoning even to allies (acknowledging it would, immediately, leak and become public).

This is a good point.

But has anyone else in the West explained their position?

[Tamas]

But again the reason for speculation like this is that, from everything I've seen, Scholz hasn't explained Germany's stance. The way to solve it would be for the German government to explain their position and their reasoning even to allies (acknowledging it would, immediately, leak and become public).

This is a good point.

But has anyone else in the West explained their position?

US of A
UK
Baltic States
Poland

[Sheilbh]

This is a good point.

But has anyone else in the West explained their position?

Who else are you thinking of? Most other Western countries seem to have fairly clear policies - and also seem to be less of a dependency for other countries.

Macron has occasionally maybe over explained to the point where things aren't clear again and we then need the Macronvesteher's to explain what he really meant - but that's always been a thing.

[Zanza]

I am in favor of delivering the tanks, but e.g. Poland not handing over their Mig-29 or the US not delivering Abrams tanks has also not really been "explained".

The US just says the supply chain is complex, but that's a unconvincing argument for a country capable of waging wars globally. Especially when there are much more Abrams available than Leo2s.

Poland did not want to hand over the Mig-29 themselves and hid behind the US last year.

So there seem to be considerations behind the scenes that we do not know.

By the way, a Swiss piece I just saw on Reddit gave miltary-industrial arguments as reason for not delivering the Leos.
https://www.nzz.ch/international/kampfpanzer-leopard-2-us-ruestungsinteressen-lassen-scholz-zoegern-ld.1722377

Edit: Or US nor delivering ATACMS

[HVC]

This is a good point.

But has anyone else in the West explained their position?

Who else are you thinking of? Most other Western countries seem to have fairly clear policies - and also seem to be less of a dependency for other countries.

Macron has occasionally maybe over explained to the point where things aren't clear again and we then need the Macronvesteher's to explain what he really meant - but that's always been a thing.

Macron thought he was the Putin whisperer for a while, but I don't think he kept that delusion.

[Duque de Bragança]

This is a good point.

But has anyone else in the West explained their position?

Who else are you thinking of? Most other Western countries seem to have fairly clear policies - and also seem to be less of a dependency for other countries.

Macron has occasionally maybe over explained to the point where things aren't clear again and we then need the Macronvesteher's to explain what he really meant - but that's always been a thing.

Macron thought he was the Putin whisperer for a while, but I don't think he kept that delusion.

 
Macron is know to change stated opinions whenever convenient, careful.

A bit à la António Bosta in Portuguese internal politics. 

[Legbiter]

I think there is a possibility that it is basically a strategic argument that Scholz doesn't want Russia to win, but also doesn't want Ukraine to win because of perceived escalation and post-war chaos risks.

Yeah.

[Legbiter]

Very good overview of the Ramstein meeting. Encouraging even. And the next one will focus on aviation for the Ukrainians.

https://phillipspobrien.substack.com/p/weekend-update-12?utm_source=twitter&utm_campaign=auto_share&r=1tgexa

Especially the speculation about the undisclosed aid that Ukraine will shortly be receiving.

What isn't publicly announced, but might be coming from the US soon, could even be more important, Ground Launched Small diameter bombs.

What the US seems to be trying to do is, without giving Ukraine ATACMs, provide the kind of support that will extend the effective range of Ukrainian precision weaponry.

[Jacob]

But again the reason for speculation like this is that, from everything I've seen, Scholz hasn't explained Germany's stance. The way to solve it would be for the German government to explain their position and their reasoning even to allies (acknowledging it would, immediately, leak and become public).

This is a good point.

But has anyone else in the West explained their position?

I feel like the Danish position has been very clear, both when it was cautious in the first few days - they expressed the reasoning and the excuses for the caution - and later when it became more fully committed to Ukraine.

... same really for the rest of Scandinavia. The Baltics are pretty clear, as are Poland.

Hungary's position is pretty fucking clear also, as is Turkey's.

I feel we have a pretty clear idea of where France stands, all things told. The UK has been abundantly clear and decisive.

The US has been quite clear also.

Taiwan has a pretty clear position, as does Japan. I have no idea about South Korea.

You can hedge and waffle and not be decisive and still explain your position. IMO Germany has been the only country that hasn't really even done that.