Russia Violates Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty

[CountDeMoney]

Well at least we'll have those anti-ballistic missiles now, so we don't have to worry about the Russians cheating on the INF.  So it's all good.

[Valmy]

The second, in hindsight (and actually even at the time for many of us) was clearly just showing Russia how amateur the Obama Administration was...

this comment is loaded with hindsight, though. i don't think the obama administration has been perfect, but at that time it was a worthwhile attempt

Not really everybody was mocking it at the time.  Just like we mocked Dubya thinking he saw goodness in Putin's soul.

[OttoVonBismarck]

I don't really think ABM treaty mattered much, whatever the State of ABM technology (and it is genuinely far improved) unless it's a perfect shield against thousands of simultaneous targets it's never going to be a true dome of absolute protection. But, it by sinking money into it, it pushes our enemies into having to spend money on a large number of potential war heads and/or more technologically sophisticated delivery systems down the line. Basically it's continuing an arms race that we would always win due to being far richer than Russia will ever be.

The problem with Obama's relationship with Russia, is I think he views or at least viewed international relations like he does domestic relations. Like most liberals (or conservatives) Obama has lived his political life in a bubble of people that strongly agree with him. He thinks the people who disagree with him are stupid, and simply wrong on almost every issue. He believes that if you speak pretty enough, campaign hard enough, his superior ideas will be able to win over at least a majority of people and then he's "won" and what he wants to happen will then happen.

He basically thought Russia was the same, that they were wrong-headed but at least in part because Bush was stupid in how he dealt with other countries. All it would take is the same kind of pretty talk that got him elected to fix the Russia problem. I don't believe to this day Obama understands that on a fundamental level Russia cannot be what Putin wants it to be (a Great Power at minimum, potentially positioned to some day be a super power again) without doing this stuff. There is no point of compromise because what Putin wants is Russia to be more powerful, and Russia cannot be more powerful as long as parts of the Russian Empire remain independent of him.

This may not be true for the other BRICs countries, but in all honesty the term BRIC is nonsense. All the countries on that list except Russia have consistently had really high economic growth related primarily to lots of different industries and a growing educated population. Russia has a stagnating population and its economy essentially only does well based on the global energy market, they have no real substantial other industry driving their economy. Fundamentally Russia is more like an Old Europe style economy with more natural resources. Russia won't become more powerful due to internal growth like you can expect India or China to become, so only the old fashioned way has any chance of working. I think it will ultimately fail even in that regard though, because the old fashioned way doesn't work so well anyway. Take Crimea, every analysis I've seen has suggested that relative to the Russian economy, propping up Crimea and taking responsibility for its pension payments, the deficit it always runs and needs subsidized from the rest of the country and etc it's just an extremely, extremely (relative to Russian GDP) expensive vacation spot that serves no significant interest (since Russia was always going to have its base there.) I reckon the worst thing for Russia would be if it really did get Eastern Ukraine, because that's an even bigger mess than Crimea.

[CountDeMoney]

I don't really think ABM treaty mattered much, whatever the State of ABM technology (and it is genuinely far improved) unless it's a perfect shield against thousands of simultaneous targets it's never going to be a true dome of absolute protection. But, it by sinking money into it, it pushes our enemies into having to spend money on a large number of potential war heads and/or more technologically sophisticated delivery systems down the line. Basically it's continuing an arms race that we would always win due to being far richer than Russia will ever be.

You don't bilaterally withdraw from arms control agreements when you've positioned yourself as the global leader on arms control and non-proliferation, two fundamental cornerstones of which US foreign policy has centered on for decades.   It's was a hypocrisy and an abandonment of our moral authority on the matter.  That's what makes us the United motherfucking States and the Russians the Russians.  We're better than they are, and we're better than the world.

All the worse that it was for that ungodly boondoggle of the Missile Defense Agency.  A lot of good worrying about a single shitty Fisher-Price rocket from 5 o'clock Charlie in North Korea that won't make it over the Pacific once San Diego or Philadelphia gets glassed from the homemade nuke shipped in one of the 12 billion shipping containers that arrive in US ports every year, of which less than 4% are inspected.  Buh bye, Padres.

Rogue states.  Nigga please.

[The Minsky Moment]

There is a sense in which the ABM treaty was a Cold War relic, because it is based on a particular logic of deterrence (MAD) that makes sense in the context of two opposing camps maintaining a balance of terror.  Remove the entire geo-political context, and the premise of the treaty no longer holds.  I believe that was part of the rationale of the Bush decision.

The problem is that even in the new geopolitical context, the treaty still serves an important if different function, at least for Russia.  Because the new Russia is shorn of the ideological and economic influence of the old USSR and the offensive conventional warfare potential, its continuing possession of a diminished but still potent nuclear arsenal is still an important source of influence (in the Schelling "Arms and Influence" sense), particular in respect to Russia's attempts to pursue interests in its post-Soviet "near abroad."  The Russian concern was that deployment of ABM near its borders would attenuate that influence.

So the problem is not withdrawing from ABM per se, but rather pulling out without simultaneously reaching some understanding with Russia responding to its concerns.  It should not be surprising that Russia would seek to respond by taking alternative actions with the aim of augmenting its influence and threat levels on and immediately across its borders.

This is not an endorsement of the particular steps the Russians have taken, just that it is naïve to think that such action would not lead to responses with consequences.

[Admiral Yi]

You don't bilaterally withdraw from arms control agreements when you've positioned yourself as the global leader on arms control and non-proliferation, two fundamental cornerstones of which US foreign policy has centered on for decades.

I'm having a little trouble seeing the conflict between missile defense and non-proliferation, given that missile defense ostensibly decreases the desirability of nuclear weapon stockpiles.

[HVC]

You don't bilaterally withdraw from arms control agreements when you've positioned yourself as the global leader on arms control and non-proliferation, two fundamental cornerstones of which US foreign policy has centered on for decades.

I'm having a little trouble seeing the conflict between missile defense and non-proliferation, given that missile defense ostensibly decreases the desirability of nuclear weapon stockpiles.

i would think it would raise the need to have more missiles in the hope a few get through.

[Admiral Yi]

i would think it would raise the need to have more missiles in the hope a few get through.

I suppose you could conceptualize a world in which some states perceive their goal as maintaining nuclear deterrent capability regardless of cost, but we haven't seen anyone respond in this way.  It's more logical to look at costs and benefits.

[LaCroix]

I can see why you would think that, but in fact I thought it was naive and amateurish even at the time.

Hindsight just proves that my fears were right.

i didn't necessarily mean hindsight for you 

yes, in hindsight it didn't work, but i don't think we lost anything by it. georgia seems to have been the real test

[DGuller]

i would think it would raise the need to have more missiles in the hope a few get through.

I suppose you could conceptualize a world in which some states perceive their goal as maintaining nuclear deterrent capability regardless of cost, but we haven't seen anyone respond in this way.  It's more logical to look at costs and benefits.

For a country like Russia, you almost can't put a price on the value of nuclear deterrent (assuming you're even wlling to put a price on an existential threat).  They've seen first-hand what happens to countries that exchange nuclear deterrent for economic benefits and diplomatic guarantees.

[Razgovory]

Yeah, Ukraine learned that the hard way.  A country like Brazil can afford to give up their nuclear program.  So could South Africa.  Could Pakistan?  And here's the big question, could Iran?

[Admiral Yi]

For a country like Russia, you almost can't put a price on the value of nuclear deterrent (assuming you're even wlling to put a price on an existential threat).  They've seen first-hand what happens to countries that exchange nuclear deterrent for economic benefits and diplomatic guarantees.

Both Russia and the US have dramatically reduced their nukes since the Wall came down.

[grumbler]

The problem is that even in the new geopolitical context, the treaty still serves an important if different function, at least for Russia.  Because the new Russia is shorn of the ideological and economic influence of the old USSR and the offensive conventional warfare potential, its continuing possession of a diminished but still potent nuclear arsenal is still an important source of influence (in the Schelling "Arms and Influence" sense), particular in respect to Russia's attempts to pursue interests in its post-Soviet "near abroad."  The Russian concern was that deployment of ABM near its borders would attenuate that influence.

So the problem is not withdrawing from ABM per se, but rather pulling out without simultaneously reaching some understanding with Russia responding to its concerns.  It should not be surprising that Russia would seek to respond by taking alternative actions with the aim of augmenting its influence and threat levels on and immediately across its borders.

This is not an endorsement of the particular steps the Russians have taken, just that it is naïve to think that such action would not lead to responses with consequences.

I think that it naive to think that the Russians have taken the actions they have to project the power and influence over the near abroad would not have been undertaken had the ABM Treaty still been in force.  I agree that the expiration of the treaty put Russia in a bind, and that this may have been avoidable through negotiating a post-treaty protocol that could have met their strategic needs, but the ABM Treaty's existence didn't stop the Soviets in Afghanistan.

[grumbler]

I'm having a little trouble seeing the conflict between missile defense and non-proliferation, given that missile defense ostensibly decreases the desirability of nuclear weapon stockpiles.

Strategic missile defenses increase the desirability of nuclear weapons stockpiles, because such defenses challenge the viability of a given offensive capability, without ever creating the impression of a viable defensive system.  The proper answer to another country's nuclear defense initiatives is to build up your offensive capability and forgo the defense yourself.

[DGuller]

For a country like Russia, you almost can't put a price on the value of nuclear deterrent (assuming you're even wlling to put a price on an existential threat).  They've seen first-hand what happens to countries that exchange nuclear deterrent for economic benefits and diplomatic guarantees.

Both Russia and the US have dramatically reduced their nukes since the Wall came down.

Yes, so?  Partial mutual disarmament doesn't materially reduce nuclear deterrent.