More Obama Murder of America: The Pentagon Cuts

[lustindarkness]

[crazy canuck]

In more recent budget and strategy documents, the military has been ordered to be prepared to decisively win one conflict while holding off an adversary's aspirations in a second until sufficient forces could be mobilized and redeployed to win there

The Schlieffen Plan part II, what could possibly go wrong?

What are the alternatives?
1) Having the capability to decisively win 2 conflicts - that would require a much higher level of resource commitment that the US can't or won't afford.
2) Having a lesser capability of only being able to handle one conflict without being to hold enough another adversary - then it is open season on US allies and interests if the US commits itself to one conflict.  The mere announcement of such a concept would cause havoc.
3) Having a strategy of engaging in two conflicts simultaneously but doing a crappy job in both?

Option 1 is the option that had been advocated until a political judgment has been made that the US cannot afford that option.

the Pentagon argued that it needed a military large enough to fight two wars simultaneously — say, in Europe and Asia. In more recent budget and strategy documents, the military has been ordered to be prepared to decisively win one conflict while holding off an adversary's aspirations in a second until sufficient forces could be mobilized and redeployed to win there.

It may well be true that the better option cannot be afforded. But it would be putting your head in the sand to pretend that a reduction in capability doesnt have its own drawbacks.  The spending cut only makes sense if someone more knowledgeable than you or I can determine with a significant degree of confidence that that US will not have to fight two conflicts at once or that if such a situation arises that the US can "decisively win one conflict" while holding off the adversary in the other.

That last bit sounds so similar to the logic of the schleiffen plan that it is at least worth mentioning.

[grumbler]

Option 1 is the option that had been advocated until a political judgment has been made that the US cannot afford that option.

Option 1 has not been advocated since the middle of the Reagan administration.

the Pentagon argued that it needed a military large enough to fight two wars simultaneously — say, in Europe and Asia. In more recent budget and strategy documents, the military has been ordered to be prepared to decisively win one conflict while holding off an adversary's aspirations in a second until sufficient forces could be mobilized and redeployed to win there.

It may well be true that the better option cannot be afforded. But it would be putting your head in the sand to pretend that a reduction in capability doesnt have its own drawbacks.  The spending cut only makes sense if someone more knowledgeable than you or I can determine with a significant degree of confidence that that US will not have to fight two conflicts at once or that if such a situation arises that the US can "decisively win one conflict" while holding off the adversary in the other.

The "new strategy" is the same old strategy.  The US has not had the military policy of maintaining sufficient forces to fight two major wars simultaneously to a finish since the mid-80s (remember the term "600 ship Navy"?).  The spending cut only makes sense if the competent authorities (Congress) decide that the lower funding levels meet US security interests.

That last bit sounds so similar to the logic of the schleiffen plan that it is at least worth mentioning.

Actually, it doesn't much resemble the Schlieffen Plan at all.  It is, however, pretty much identical to the "Germany First" strategy.

Made before American entry into World War II, in the context of a world threatened by Axis aggression in Europe and Asia, the judgment that Germany must be defeated first stands as the most important single strategic concept of the war. From it and the painful deliberations that preceded the decision was finally crystallized the war plan known as RAINBOW 5, the plan put into effect when the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor and the Philippines on that "day of infamy" in December 1941...

RAINBOW 5 assumed the United States, Great Britain, and France to be acting in concert; hemisphere defense was to be assured as in RAINBOW 1, with early projection of U.S. forces to the eastern Atlantic, and to either or both the African and European Continents; offensive operations were to be conducted, in concert with British and allied forces, to effect the defeat of Germany and Italy. A strategic defensive was to be maintained in the Pacific until success against the European Axis Powers permitted transfer of major forces to the Pacific for an offensive against Japan.

[LaCroix]

That last bit sounds so similar to the logic of the schleiffen plan that it is at least worth mentioning.

the world today is so unlike the late 1800s/early 1900s that I don't think that analogy should be made. not to mention the US's geographic position and alliances don't require anything that resembles schlieffen

[crazy canuck]

That last bit sounds so similar to the logic of the schleiffen plan that it is at least worth mentioning.

the world today is so unlike the late 1800s/early 1900s that I don't think that analogy should be made. not to mention the US's geographic position and alliances don't require anything that resembles schlieffen

I grant you the first one to some extent.  But in the modern age it might be more dangerous.  Consider the need to have a quick decisive victory playing into the decision of using ever more destructive weaponry in the conflict and perhaps even tactical nukes.  Also, in the modern age geography isnt as important as it was then.  It is the concept of needing a decisive victory before engaging the second foe that remains the constant.

[LaCroix]

I grant you the first one to some extent.  But in the modern age it might be more dangerous.  Consider the need to have a quick decisive victory playing into the decision of using ever more destructive weaponry in the conflict and perhaps even tactical nukes.  Also, in the modern age geography isnt as important as it was then.  It is the concept of needing a decisive victory before engaging the second foe that remains the constant.

isn't this more of a reason why schlieffen analogies can't be applied these days? also, i think geography is very much as important as it was then. I could be wrong, but the US isn't going to be deploying a full size army to Europe within weeks to stop a Russian invasion, or South Korea to stop a Chinese invasion. it takes times to move personnel overseas. likewise, it takes time for the enemy to invade the US with large numbers.

besides, large scale wars (world wars) are probably over anyway. this russia/china v. america & co. scenario isn't realistic

[CountDeMoney]

besides, large scale wars (world wars) are probably over anyway.

The other side of the planet doesn't seem to think so.

[LaCroix]

The other side of the planet doesn't seem to think so.

peasants in china don't matter. neither do their equivalent in america 

[Siege]

besides, large scale wars (world wars) are probably over anyway. this russia/china v. america & co. scenario isn't realistic

Somebody said this before.
I'm sure.

[Siege]

I would think the Warthog would be the last plane to send on a mission in the absence of air superiority.

Neil doesn't understand the concept of flying machines.  They frighten and confuse him.

[CountDeMoney]

The other side of the planet doesn't seem to think so.

peasants in china don't matter. neither do their equivalent in america 

Save it for the Eurotrash peacenik convention, Weenieboi.  Russian, Chinese and Indian defense spending and their planners prefer that you do.

[LaCroix]

Save it for the Eurotrash peacenik convention, Weenieboi.  Russian, Chinese and Indian defense spending and their planners prefer that you do.

teasing. but i don't think a world war is very feasible right now. nobody wants one. regional conflicts will exist for some time, but even those i think will die out eventually. today's world is much different than 20 years ago, and all signs point to the continued trend of global interconnection. terrorists are more of a concern to modern states than other foreign nations in most parts of the world

[crazy canuck]

I grant you the first one to some extent.  But in the modern age it might be more dangerous.  Consider the need to have a quick decisive victory playing into the decision of using ever more destructive weaponry in the conflict and perhaps even tactical nukes.  Also, in the modern age geography isnt as important as it was then.  It is the concept of needing a decisive victory before engaging the second foe that remains the constant.

isn't this more of a reason why schlieffen analogies can't be applied these days? also, i think geography is very much as important as it was then. I could be wrong, but the US isn't going to be deploying a full size army to Europe within weeks to stop a Russian invasion, or South Korea to stop a Chinese invasion. it takes times to move personnel overseas. likewise, it takes time for the enemy to invade the US with large numbers.

besides, large scale wars (world wars) are probably over anyway. this russia/china v. america & co. scenario isn't realistic

Geography isnt as important in the sense that nations dont have to be neighbours to be threats to one another.  The fact that the threat is further away geographically actually makes this doctrine more problematic in the modern age since the need to send troops off quickly in order to achieve the decisive victory increases.

[LaCroix]

Geography isnt as important in the sense that nations dont have to be neighbours to be threats to one another.  The fact that the threat is further away geographically actually makes this doctrine more problematic in the modern age since the need to send troops off quickly in order to achieve the decisive victory increases.

nations don't have to be neighbors to be threats, correct. the use of navy, nuclear arms, drones, air power, etc. in general makes this so. i don't see where there's this need for troops, however

[crazy canuck]

Geography isnt as important in the sense that nations dont have to be neighbours to be threats to one another.  The fact that the threat is further away geographically actually makes this doctrine more problematic in the modern age since the need to send troops off quickly in order to achieve the decisive victory increases.

nations don't have to be neighbors to be threats, correct. the use of navy, nuclear arms, drones, air power, etc. in general makes this so. i don't see where there's this need for troops, however

I suppose if it is possible to achieve a decisive victory the revised doctrine calls for without troops then I yield the point.  But is that possible?