Ukraine's European Revolution?

[frunk]

Yeah that is basically what I am saying. There would had been no way (IMHO) back to the continent for the Western Allies without a Soviet front, before the nukes started to fly on German cities. It would had become sort of like a North Korea situation, where an economically severely handicapped Reich (although then again more resources for the air war would stipulate a longer time needed to win the strategic air war) would keep a grim grip on it's own and occupied territories.

I think assuming that there isn't a Soviet front at all is too big a presumption.  Stalin was planning to attack Germany eventually, Hitler just did it first.  There's no way that Germany could have left the Soviet border undefended.  It would have required a significant commitment that wasn't at the same level as Barbarossa but would be a resource drain.  It means the Western front would likely have been bloodier and taken longer, but there still would have been a successful Allied invasion of the continent.

[Tamas]

Doesn't the development of nuclear weapons change all this though? Sure the Germans had some moments here and there of competitiveness, but their long term future, had they held out, was to get nuked into oblivion.

I actually mentioned "until nukes start to fall on German cities" precisely because of this

[Barrister]

Yeah that is basically what I am saying. There would had been no way (IMHO) back to the continent for the Western Allies without a Soviet front, before the nukes started to fly on German cities. It would had become sort of like a North Korea situation, where an economically severely handicapped Reich (although then again more resources for the air war would stipulate a longer time needed to win the strategic air war) would keep a grim grip on it's own and occupied territories.

I think assuming that there isn't a Soviet front at all is too big a presumption.  Stalin was planning to attack Germany eventually, Hitler just did it first.  There's no way that Germany could have left the Soviet border undefended.  It would have required a significant commitment that wasn't at the same level as Barbarossa but would be a resource drain.  It means the Western front would likely have been bloodier and taken longer, but there still would have been a successful Allied invasion of the continent.

Is the bolded bit actually true though?

A quick bit of googling suggests much controversy on that point.

[derspiess]

Is the bolded bit actually true though?

A quick bit of googling suggests much controversy on that point.

IIRC most proponents of that theory are themselves Russian, which makes me a little skeptical.  I think it's plausible that Stalin might have eventually attacked the Reich at some point if he found some juicy opportunity.  But I'd be surprised if he had a definite time frame in mind.

[citizen k]

Doesn't the development of nuclear weapons change all this though? Sure the Germans had some moments here and there of competitiveness, but their long term future, had they held out, was to get nuked into oblivion.

I actually mentioned "until nukes start to fall on German cities" precisely because of this

In the long term future the Germans themselves would have had nukes. Heck, they already had a dirty bomb and didn't know it.

[frunk]

Is the bolded bit actually true though?

A quick bit of googling suggests much controversy on that point.

I think he would have, but looking now there's less evidence than I thought there was.  To a certain extent it isn't really my point.  Hitler had to assume that Stalin would attack if he saw the opportunity.  That means either a continuing force deployment for Germany in the east or an increased risk of the Soviets taking advantage of a weakened front to attack.

[Malthus]

Yeah that is basically what I am saying. There would had been no way (IMHO) back to the continent for the Western Allies without a Soviet front, before the nukes started to fly on German cities. It would had become sort of like a North Korea situation, where an economically severely handicapped Reich (although then again more resources for the air war would stipulate a longer time needed to win the strategic air war) would keep a grim grip on it's own and occupied territories.

I think assuming that there isn't a Soviet front at all is too big a presumption.  Stalin was planning to attack Germany eventually, Hitler just did it first.  There's no way that Germany could have left the Soviet border undefended.  It would have required a significant commitment that wasn't at the same level as Barbarossa but would be a resource drain.  It means the Western front would likely have been bloodier and taken longer, but there still would have been a successful Allied invasion of the continent.

Is the bolded bit actually true though?

A quick bit of googling suggests much controversy on that point.

I would say it isn't true. Stalin was of course totally untrustworthy and perfectly willing to snap up bits and pieces of other people's territories when the opportunity presented, but he disliked taking big risks. Unlike Hitler, who was all about the big gamble.

[Berkut]

I would not put it all about Stalin vs Hitler, so much as I would note that in general, when you have two powerful Totalitarian states in close proximity to one another, both of which are very, very, VERY interested in the territory of the smaller states that lie between them....well, the idea that the Nazis and Stalinists would not come to blow at some point is a bit overly optimistic.

Which is why I don't find the argument about whether Stalin would attack absent Hitlers attack that interesting. Rather, I look at Nazi Germany and Stalinist Soviet Union in 1939 and conclude that an eventual war is almost certain. How it actually ended up triggering isn't really that interesting - a trigger was probably inevitable.

I think you can make a credible argument that it didn't need to be a existential war between them, but on the other hand, you can make a pretty good argument that even an existential war was inevitable as well.

I think the argument that the Nazi's and Soviets could have lived in peace and harmony forever and ever is not credible.

[Barrister]

I would not put it all about Stalin vs Hitler, so much as I would note that in general, when you have two powerful Totalitarian states in close proximity to one another, both of which are very, very, VERY interested in the territory of the smaller states that lie between them....well, the idea that the Nazis and Stalinists would not come to blow at some point is a bit overly optimistic.

Which is why I don't find the argument about whether Stalin would attack absent Hitlers attack that interesting. Rather, I look at Nazi Germany and Stalinist Soviet Union in 1939 and conclude that an eventual war is almost certain. How it actually ended up triggering isn't really that interesting - a trigger was probably inevitable.

I think you can make a credible argument that it didn't need to be a existential war between them, but on the other hand, you can make a pretty good argument that even an existential war was inevitable as well.

I think the argument that the Nazi's and Soviets could have lived in peace and harmony forever and ever is not credible.

There's a lot of middle ground between "lived in peace and harmony forever and ever" and "having an existential war".

My hesitation to saying "well, the USSR would have attacked Germany in any event" was precisely Hitler's justification for attacking the USSR in the first place.

[Malthus]

I would not put it all about Stalin vs Hitler, so much as I would note that in general, when you have two powerful Totalitarian states in close proximity to one another, both of which are very, very, VERY interested in the territory of the smaller states that lie between them....well, the idea that the Nazis and Stalinists would not come to blow at some point is a bit overly optimistic.

Which is why I don't find the argument about whether Stalin would attack absent Hitlers attack that interesting. Rather, I look at Nazi Germany and Stalinist Soviet Union in 1939 and conclude that an eventual war is almost certain. How it actually ended up triggering isn't really that interesting - a trigger was probably inevitable.

I think you can make a credible argument that it didn't need to be a existential war between them, but on the other hand, you can make a pretty good argument that even an existential war was inevitable as well.

I think the argument that the Nazi's and Soviets could have lived in peace and harmony forever and ever is not credible.

The Soviets and Chinese Communists managed it, give or take some border friction.

I agree that war with the Nazis was inevitable, but that was all down to Hitler, not to totalitarianism. His particular creed required war, and specifically, war with the Soviets.

Evil totalitarians *can* get along just fine.

[derspiess]

The Soviets and Chinese Communists managed it, give or take some border friction.

That's easier to accomplish when your population centers are so far apart. 

[Berkut]

The Soviets and Chinese Communists managed it, give or take some border friction.

That's easier to accomplish when your population centers are so far apart. 

And they don't really give much of a shit about the territory in between.

We know that is very much NOT true of the territory in between Nazi Germany and the USSR.

[Razgovory]

I'm not convinced Stalin would have attacked Germany.  He had a strong distrust of the army, and after the poor showing in Finland such a venture wouldn't be a sure thing.  Stalin seemed to prefer to bully weaker powers into submission and subvert stronger powers.

[alfred russel]

It isn't even so much that there was an inevitable war between the nazis and soviets. Both of them by their nature were rather prone to end up in wars period.

The nazis ended up at war with the democratic west even more quickly than the soviets. The soviets ended up in a cold war with lots of smaller hot wars that absent a looming nuclear holocaust probably would have morphed into a major war (and nearly did anyway).

[jimmy olsen]

I'll notice! 

http://www.newrepublic.com/article/118387/vladimir-putin-ukraine-he-can-still-invade-whenever-he-pleases

Putin Can Still Invade Ukraine Whenever He Pleases
And he's hoping the West won't notice

By Josh Kovensky

Yesterday, Vladimir Putin announced that he was asking Russia's upper house of parliament to revoke the government's right to send troops into Ukraine—a right parliament had granted him on March 1. In a letter to Chairman of the Federation Council Valentina Matvienko, Putin declared that the decision was taken "in the aims of normalizing the circumstances and settling the situation in the Eastern regions of Ukraine." Russian lawmakers approved the request today in a landslide vote of 153-to-1. Russian stock markets rallied at the news. The move has been lauded as a step towards peace in the region, or at least a major stride towards de-escalation.

Secretary of State John Kerry said that he was "delighted" with the news (before adding that, "this could be reversed in ten minutes").  Much of the delight has to do with anticipation surrounding the success of Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko's peace plan, as well as the relative inability of the West to effectively respond to a Russian invasion (which would still likely violate international law). Part of the upbeat response is likely also rooted in the fact that many companies with commercial interests in Russia would suffer damage to their business should sanctions go through.

Russia's positive signals may not be so positive, however. According to Vedomosti, citing a source within the Russian Ministry of Defense, Putin retains the right to send Russian troops abroad. This is thanks to Dmitry Medvedev, who, as president in 2009, requested and received the right from the Russian upper house of parliament to send the army anywhere it pleases beyond Russian borders. According to the report, the Medvedev authorization was indefinite, meaning that Russia retains the legal right to send troops abroad in perpetuity.

The report essentially says that the status quo persists in Russian law with regard to invasion, despite Putin's recent announcement. And while this may seem like an unimportant technicality, it means that all Putin has done is annul an extension of a right that had previously been granted, and which remains in effect to this day. So, even though much of the alleged Russian action in the region has been covert, his government can still openly send Russian troops into Ukraine without having to consult parliament again.

Putin's meaningless gesture nevertheless comes at an opportune time. Western governments have recently threatened a volley of coordinated sanctions against Russia in order to rally support for Poroshenko's peace plan. While EU sanctions have so far been limited to visa bans and asset freezes on specific individuals, the new sanctions would be stricter and could be announced as soon as this Friday at a meeting of the European Council in Brussels. However, thanks to the supposed annulment of the right to use force, the West might now delay imposing a new batch of sanctions that have been in the works for the past few weeks.

Other signs indicate Russia is more belligerent than its recent peaceful rhetoric suggests. Russia has redeployed more troops and artillery to the Ukrainian border in recent days, with U.S. officials alleging that special forces have arrived in order to arm and train pro-Russian separatists. And, after both sides declared a truce on Tuesday, separatist forces shot down a Ukrainian military helicopter, killing nine soldiers. The separatists who shot down the chopper may have been a rogue faction or generally unconnected to the Kremlin, but the equipment involved in recent attacks has been linked to Russian Special Forces.

Basically, nothing has changed from the beginning of this week, when Western officials were working together to launch coordinated sanctions. And while past reprimands have yet to show a meaningful impact on Russian policy in the region, it would be wrong to delay further sanctions when nothing substantial has changed.

As Western officials debate whether or not to prod and punish the Russian government, listening both to companies with commercial interests in Russia and to Putin himself, it is worth holding back. Rescinding the legal right to invade Ukraine has been the most publicized and largest conciliatory signal from Russia—it is empty.