Ukraine's European Revolution?

[Razgovory]

Creating uncertainty is generally a bad idea in international relations.  You want the other guy to know how you'll react to his moves.  If he's uncertain he may take a greater risk and you'll both blunder into war.  A concrete action, for instance guaranteeing the Ukraine with a promise of military force is more likely to dissuade Russia where as vague statements of support can encourage Russian aggression.

That is quite nonsensical and easily disproven.  Just look at this current crisis.  Do you think Putin would be in a stronger position if he announced precisely what he was willing to do and what he was not?  Of course not, it is the uncertainty of how far he is willing to go that has left the west in shambles. Uncertainty when dealing with your enemies is always the best strategy, whether it is poker or foreign diplomacy. Always keep your enemies guessing and they will use the cautionary principle to reduce their risk.  Because Putin knows what we were willing to do, or not do in this case, he felt comfortable invading the Ukraine.

Would prior knowledge of the Russian invasion actually have changed the situation?  I don't think so.  On the other hand if Putin knew before hand if West was going to give a strong respond he might not have done what he did.

Let's take some examples from history.  Prior to the Korean war there was a great deal of uncertainty whether the US would defend South Korea.  In Europe there fears that the US would return to isolation, and the US didn't trust its SK ally.  This uncertainty gave the communists the opening they needed.  Now compare this to NATO in the cold war.  If the Soviets tried to invade a NATO country they knew exactly what would happen, thus they chose wisely not to invade.  If there was uncertainty in how NATO would respond it would defeat the whole idea of deterrence.  Maybe it'll go nuclear, maybe it won't.  Maybe the US will just withdraw, maybe they'll fight.  That's the recipe for disaster.

[Razgovory]

Creating uncertainty is generally a bad idea in international relations.  You want the other guy to know how you'll react to his moves.  If he's uncertain he may take a greater risk and you'll both blunder into war.  A concrete action, for instance guaranteeing the Ukraine with a promise of military force is more likely to dissuade Russia where as vague statements of support can encourage Russian aggression.

A concrete action is best when you have decided on a concrete action.  Right now it is thoroughly clear that no major western government has any clue on how they want to react.  The same thing happened with Syria, with the response being so muddled and vague that what concrete actions were taken had less than ideal effect.  Until you decide on what your concrete action is going to be don't hem yourself in by saying what you won't do.

The response being so muddled seems to be exactly the type of uncertainty that Hans is advocating.

[jimmy olsen]

I sure hope so. Afghanistan was neccessary, but Iraq and a lot of what we've been doing in the Mid-East has shown in hindsight to be a colossal waste of blood, money and time.

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/03/ukraine-is-this-how-the-war-on-terror-ends/284214/

Maybe this is how the "war on terror" ends.

Since entering his second term, President Obama has signaled his desire to close out a foreign-policy era that he believes has drained America's economic resources and undermined its democratic ideals. But it hasn't been easy. Partly, Obama remains wedded to some of the war on terror's legally dubious tools—especially drone strikes and mass surveillance. And just as importantly, Obama hasn't had anything to replace the war on terror with. It's hard to end one foreign-policy era without defining a new one. The post-Cold War age, for instance, dragged on and on until 9/11 suddenly rearranged Americans' mental map of the world.

Now Russia may have solved Obama's problem. Vladimir Putin's military intervention in Ukraine doesn't represent as sharp a historical break as 9/11 did, but it does offer the clearest glimpse yet of what the post-war on terror era may look like. To quote Secretary of State John Kerry, what comes after the war on terror is the "19th century."

Explaining what that means requires some history. For a century after the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, five great powers—Britain, Russia, France, Austria, and Prussia (later Germany)—jockeyed for influence in Europe. Then World War I smashed three of them: Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary. And then World War II smashed Germany again, while bankrupting Britain and France. Suddenly, the world found itself dominated by two superpowers, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Each was more ideologically driven and more capable of projecting power across the entire globe than the great powers that had preceded the world wars.

So it went for almost half a century, until the Soviet empire collapsed. Immediately, some international-relations scholars predicted a return to old-fashioned great-power rivalry. In 1990, the University of Chicago's John Mearsheimer published an essay entitled "Back to the Future," in which he predicted a new "multipolar" competition resembling the one that held sway in the 19th century. This competition, Mearsheimer predicted, would be less ideological than the Cold War, but more unstable, and might plunge Europe into war.

It didn't happen. To the contrary, NATO—having won the Cold War—expanded, and no adversary rose to challenge it. This absence of great-power strife enabled the massive exchange of money, people, culture, and ideas dubbed "globalization." Even after 9/11, the era of relative great-power harmony endured as the world's strongest countries largely cooperated against terrorism. "We have an historic opportunity to break the destructive pattern of great power rivalry that has bedeviled the world since [the] rise of the nation state in the 17th century," declared Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in 2002. "Today, the world's great centers of power are united by common interests, common dangers, and—increasingly—common values."

Although Americans didn't think much about it at the time, this absence of great-power tension enabled much of what the United States did in the war on terror. Had the Soviet Union not withdrawn its troops from Afghanistan and orphaned its former client, Iraq, the U.S. could never have invaded and occupied those countries. Had China seriously challenged American power in the Pacific, the U.S. would never have enjoyed the luxury of focusing its attention and resources so overwhelmingly on the greater Middle East. Terror networks like al-Qaeda and small "rogue" states like Iraq dominated American consciousness because big powers like Russia and China stood largely offstage.

That's what's now changed. The risk of jihadi terror remains; Iran is still seeking the capacity to build a nuclear bomb. But these threats appear comparatively smaller when Russia occupies Ukraine or, as happened last November, China erects an air-defense zone over most of the East China Sea. Just look at how Putin's actions have pushed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's Iran-focused visit to Washington this week off the front page.

When there's serious tension between America and other major powers, that tension becomes the dominant reality in U.S. foreign policy. And it's likely that tension will endure. Vladimir Putin has now twice invaded his neighbors in an effort to halt, if not reverse, the West's encroachment into the former U.S.S.R. Yet the more bullying he becomes, the more desperately many in Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and perhaps other ex-Soviet republics will seek economic and military bonds with Europe and the U.S. Large chunks of the former Soviet Union now constitute a gray zone where competition between Russia and the West can breed diplomatic feuds, economic sanctions, and even proxy war.

Similarly, as China continues to rise economically, it will keep asserting control over islands, airspace, and sea lanes claimed by its smaller neighbors. And that will cause those smaller neighbors to turn to the U.S. for help, which will strain the U.S.-China relationship diplomatically, or worse. China is geopolitically ascendant and Russia is not, but both are led by intensely nationalistic regimes willing to risk conflict with the West to define a sphere of influence over their neighbors. Given the political pressure on Barack Obama—and probably any future American president—to avoid the appearance of the U.S. being in global retreat, that's a recipe for discord. And it is this great-power tension that will increasingly define a new, post-war on terror era in America's relations with the world.

It won't be another Cold War. The Cold War was a contest between two superpowers (although things got more complicated after the Sino-Soviet split); this new era of great-power tension features at least three. The Cold War was intensely ideological, with the U.S. and U.S.S.R. each promoting their political and economic systems as models for the world. Today, neither Russia nor China is espousing a revolutionary creed.

There are obvious differences between the 21st and 19th centuries, too. Democracy, nationalism, economic interdependence, and human rights are stronger forces in today's world. That makes naked aggression harder; it makes quiet diplomacy harder, too.

But this new era will be more like the 19th century than either the bipolar, ideological Cold War, the relatively placid post-Cold War era of the globalized 1990s, or the post-9/11 war on terror, in which U.S. policymakers focused overwhelmingly on terror networks and small, rogue states.

The best thing one can say about Obama's foreign policy is that by moving to end the financially draining wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and, so far, avoiding a new one in Iran, he has left the U.S. better positioned for this new era than it was when he took office. Which is good, since this new era is likely to be more dangerous, both for America and the world, than the last.

[Hansmeister]

Creating uncertainty is generally a bad idea in international relations.  You want the other guy to know how you'll react to his moves.  If he's uncertain he may take a greater risk and you'll both blunder into war.  A concrete action, for instance guaranteeing the Ukraine with a promise of military force is more likely to dissuade Russia where as vague statements of support can encourage Russian aggression.

That is quite nonsensical and easily disproven.  Just look at this current crisis.  Do you think Putin would be in a stronger position if he announced precisely what he was willing to do and what he was not?  Of course not, it is the uncertainty of how far he is willing to go that has left the west in shambles. Uncertainty when dealing with your enemies is always the best strategy, whether it is poker or foreign diplomacy. Always keep your enemies guessing and they will use the cautionary principle to reduce their risk.  Because Putin knows what we were willing to do, or not do in this case, he felt comfortable invading the Ukraine.

Would prior knowledge of the Russian invasion actually have changed the situation?  I don't think so.  On the other hand if Putin knew before hand if West was going to give a strong respond he might not have done what he did.

Let's take some examples from history.  Prior to the Korean war there was a great deal of uncertainty whether the US would defend South Korea.  In Europe there fears that the US would return to isolation, and the US didn't trust its SK ally.  This uncertainty gave the communists the opening they needed.  Now compare this to NATO in the cold war.  If the Soviets tried to invade a NATO country they knew exactly what would happen, thus they chose wisely not to invade.  If there was uncertainty in how NATO would respond it would defeat the whole idea of deterrence.  Maybe it'll go nuclear, maybe it won't.  Maybe the US will just withdraw, maybe they'll fight.  That's the recipe for disaster.

If we knew exactly how far Russia was willing to go in Ukraine it would be easy to stop by raising the cost above what Russia would be willing to pay. And the problem in Korea wasn't the lack of certainty,  it was the false certainty that US statements created when we essentially declared Korea outside of our sphere of interest.

False certainties is something different than uncertainty.  And when I say uncertainty I don't mean not signaling what you consider your interests, but how much you're willing to pay to see them through.  Signaling what is important to you is crucial, but leaving ambiguity as to how far you'll go and you force your opponent to second guess themselves.

And sometimes it's ok to draw red lines, but you then need to be ready to enforce them.  Once you draw a red line and then fail to enforce it you have shot your credibility and make future wars more likely.  Because once you are considered all bluster it is impossible to recover the ability to threaten force without using it.

In short, unless Obama starts a war he will not regain any leverage in international relations.  Nobody takes any threat by Obama serious, making war more likely.

We ought to immediately start an airlift of weapons to the Ukraine.  Javelins to be used against Russian tanks would be a good start.  Also a lot of US military advisors.  Put Putin in a position that if he starts shooting there is a good chance he would kill US Soldiers, thus giving us Casus Belli.  Putin would understand that he can't afford that. 

[Queequeg]

Jesus Fucking Christ, no.

[Hansmeister]

The war against islamofascism isn't ending.  Indeed, it has gotten a lot worse.  The threats have significantly increased throughout the Middle East and North Africa. In the long run Russia is a nuisance.  A threat mainly because we let them be.  Russia is a declining power exploiting our on irresoluteness for ethereal gain.  The islamofascist ideology is gaining in strength, continuously morphing and evolving, spreading its tentacles ever further.  We delude ourselves in believing we can simply walk away from it, their ideology won't let us.  Russia wants to recreate greater Russia, China wants to stretch its reach to their near abroad.  Neither have any ambition to destroy western civ, the same cannot be said of islamofascism.  Unfortunately, our kids kids will probably still fight that war and it isn't certain who will win.

[Hansmeister]

Jesus Fucking Christ, no.

And this is why we fail.

[Razgovory]

I have Yi on my side.  I'm essentially invincible at this point.  While I disagree with your reasoning, I do agree with you on what should be done.  Weapons, advisers and maybe basing agreements would be the best move.  If we have troops based there, we can offer to remove those soldiers if their redeployment is tied to a Russian redeployment out of Crimea.

[Hansmeister]

Hit my 20 years last weekend.  Don't know how much longer I'm going to play army, particularly with all the cuts.  I'm so glad the world has gotten so safe in the last 5 years that we can afford to shrink our military to pre-WW II levels.

[Viking]

As for the military help we could give Ukraine. They don't know how to use Javelins. I don't know how much training goes into operating that kind of equipment, but surely giving the Ukrainians Soviet style equipment which they are familiar with using would be much better. Surely missiles like the AT-5 or the Kornet, which they already use would be preferrible.

Rather than give them fancy new toys wouldn't giving them spare parts, ammunition and other consumables for their already existing equipment be better? Jet fuel, trucks, loan guarantees, diesel would all be of use.

[Valmy]

The islamofascist ideology is gaining in strength, continuously morphing and evolving, spreading its tentacles ever further.  We delude ourselves in believing we can simply walk away from it, their ideology won't let us.

Their ideology is bankrupt and fails spectacularly every time they are victorious.  I do not really see how such an ideology is a serious threat to us. They are a far bigger threat to themselves and their own communities to anybody else.

Yet these guys are dangerous and the second largest nuclear arsenal in the world is not?

[Queequeg]

Wouldn't most of that stuff be primarily useful in the West anyway? Throwing that stuff in RIGHT NOW throws gas on the flame without any real hope of saving Sumy, Lugansk or Chernigov in the event of an assault.

[Neil]

Jesus Fucking Christ, no.

But seeing as you want Putin to win, that means that we should do it.

[Razgovory]

Hit my 20 years last weekend.  Don't know how much longer I'm going to play army, particularly with all the cuts.  I'm so glad the world has gotten so safe in the last 5 years that we can afford to shrink our military to pre-WW II levels.

1920's fiscal policy will inevitably lead to a 1930's type army.

[Razgovory]

What I wonder, is that when Ukraine gets it's army into shape (they called all able bodied men to sign up for the army), will they try to push the Reds out of Crimea?