Glantz, or the reliability of Stalin-era Soviet reports on the Eastern Front

[grumbler]

Germany and Japan always made the best slide rules.

"You vill not even get on der laddah until das child in front of you is on the way down!"
and
"No child, prease, to use slide unless at least one meter tall."

Agree, those were the best rules.

[Valmy]

Interesting. I will admit I don't know much of the particulars of the French lack of interest in fighting WW2, just kind of know that they didn't have the cultural or political will/unity necessary. And more importantly, the Germans knew it as well.

Well the Germans presumed that about everybody.  Even the Russians.

I guess I think the French soldiers would have fought reasonably well if they had confidence in their commanders.  They showed themselves well at times in the Battle of France but they were so decisively and quickly beaten strategically it was hard to have very high morale.

[Drakken]

Let's necro this thread.

I purchased Glantz's Operation Barbarossa for under 10 bucks on kobostore, straight to my e-reader.

Also, now that I've found a job that I like and in which I have possibilites for the future I've finally decided to complete my dissertation to obtain my master's degree in International Relations - Strategic Studies, which is long, long, long overdue (like 10 years overdue). I can work on it part-time during the weekend, it's "only" between 50 and 100 pages long.

My tentative subject would be a comparative survey on the current state debate among academics/military specialists on whether the failure of Operation Barbarossa was unavoidable for the Germans. Was Germany's only good move not to play or, despite its huge logistical and operational limitations, could the Wehrmacht pull a favourable position, even a win?

On the former I know David Stahel is a firm author who argues that Germany lost the war as soon as the first German soldier put his foot on Soviet soil on June 22nd, 1941, so he is on my reading list. But what about the latter category? Do you guys have authors who argue that Germany's defeat was avoidable?

[jimmy olsen]

They could have taken Lenningrad if a few more things went there way, but more than that? Nope, don't think so. So yeah, without an earlier change they were doomed as soon as they crossed the border.

Now, if Britain threw in the towell after France, then maybe they could have pulled it off.

[11B4V]

IIRC this was originally published as Before Stalingrad, that's the one I have.

IMO in order for the Germans to have done anything resembling a victory, you would have to change too much in their favor. Was it doomed from the start... yes. However, they did make a good go of it.

Bad planning, logistical system, and intellegence. They didn't have a grasp of the breadth, depth, and the undeveloped transportation network of the Russia theater. Benefit of hind sight

Also, had they have went for Moscow instead of encircling Kirponos (Kiev Pocket), it would have ended in a bigger disaster. They had to clear the right flank of AG Center before attempting Moscow.


Stahl's books are worth a read, but he does make some claims, not backed up, about the German high command dynamic.

However Glantz and Stahl seem to run parallel that Barbarossa was lost at Smolensk.

Other recommendations

The Viaz'ma Catastrophe, 1941: The Red Army's Disastrous Stand against Operation Typhoon
by Lev Lopuk

Defense of Moscow 1941, The: The Northern Flank January 1, 2014
by Jack Radey

[The Brain]

Let's necro this thread.

I purchased Glantz's Operation Barbarossa for under 10 bucks on kobostore, straight to my e-reader.

Also, now that I've found a job that I like and in which I have possibilites for the future I've finally decided to complete my dissertation to obtain my master's degree in International Relations - Strategic Studies, which is long, long, long overdue (like 10 years overdue). I can work on it part-time during the weekend, it's "only" between 50 and 100 pages long.

My tentative subject would be a comparative survey on the current state debate among academics/military specialists on whether the failure of Operation Barbarossa was unavoidable for the Germans. Was Germany's only good move not to play or, despite its huge logistical and operational limitations, could the Wehrmacht pull a favourable position, even a win?

On the former I know David Stahel is a firm author who argues that Germany lost the war as soon as the first German soldier put his foot on Soviet soil on June 22nd, 1941, so he is on my reading list. But what about the latter category? Do you guys have authors who argue that Germany's defeat was avoidable?

It seems weird to me to claim that Germany had no chance against Russia in WW2 when they beat Russia in WW1.

[11B4V]

Let's necro this thread.

I purchased Glantz's Operation Barbarossa for under 10 bucks on kobostore, straight to my e-reader.

Also, now that I've found a job that I like and in which I have possibilites for the future I've finally decided to complete my dissertation to obtain my master's degree in International Relations - Strategic Studies, which is long, long, long overdue (like 10 years overdue). I can work on it part-time during the weekend, it's "only" between 50 and 100 pages long.

My tentative subject would be a comparative survey on the current state debate among academics/military specialists on whether the failure of Operation Barbarossa was unavoidable for the Germans. Was Germany's only good move not to play or, despite its huge logistical and operational limitations, could the Wehrmacht pull a favourable position, even a win?

On the former I know David Stahel is a firm author who argues that Germany lost the war as soon as the first German soldier put his foot on Soviet soil on June 22nd, 1941, so he is on my reading list. But what about the latter category? Do you guys have authors who argue that Germany's defeat was avoidable?

It seems weird to me to claim that Germany had no chance against Russia in WW2 when they beat Russia in WW1.

Hell, a runner with no legs has a chance at winning a foot race. Doesn't mean he's going to, though.

[Crazy_Ivan80]

they might have a better chance at it had they gone in as liberators from soviet yoke rather than Einsatztruppen-wielding exterminators. Might have helped with the partisans (i.e. less of them) But for that to happen pigs would have had to magically grow wings and jetpacks.

[grumbler]

Do you guys have authors who argue that Germany's defeat was avoidable?

Paul Carell. 

[Syt]

(My dad read him a fair bit, but then again he was an avid reader of Der Landser)

[Berkut]

I think it depends on how you define "winning".

Also, the discussion seems to leave out the Soviets - as if Germanies chances were only dependent on what Germany did, or did not do. The Germans could have executed better, and the Soviets could have executed worse.

I don't think it was within a reasonable set of outcomes for Germany to conuer the USSR. I do think it is possible that the outcome could have been much more nuanced than it was (utter defeat for Germany).

[11B4V]

Do you guys have authors who argue that Germany's defeat was avoidable?

Paul Carell. 

I saw that.

[DGuller]

All these references to EU3 multiplayer games become quickly dated. 

[Drakken]

Paul Carell. 

By authors/academics, I meant credible authors/academics.

If no authors argue whether Barbarossa was doomed from the start, I'm fully willing to adapt my subject to perhaps make a survey/analysis or why ultimately the planning and execution of Barbarossa failed on the political, operational, and logistical level. In other words, a comparative study on how the Germans and the Soviets, each on their side, tried to cope and adapt to an urgency crisis situation - and the latter succeeded while the former didn't.

It's a master's dissertation - I only have to show I can make a proper research and write a paper on the subject.

[Drakken]

I think it depends on how you define "winning".

Also, the discussion seems to leave out the Soviets - as if Germanies chances were only dependent on what Germany did, or did not do. The Germans could have executed better, and the Soviets could have executed worse.

I don't think it was within a reasonable set of outcomes for Germany to conuer the USSR. I do think it is possible that the outcome could have been much more nuanced than it was (utter defeat for Germany).

It's a good question : What, short of taking Leningrad, Moscow, and Rostov/Kharkov/Don Basin, would constitute "winning" for Germany in 1941? What could a "reasonable" Hitler ask for a peace treaty he if sued for it in early 1942?

I'd say that in real life, Germany had a minor advantage`by early 1942. It was able to bite and hold the ground despite Soviet winter counterattacks in the Center, avoiding a complete collapse of the front. Leningrad was besieged, the Axis still held the initiative, but there was so much reserve left for one local major offensive. The Red Army was simply not ready to launch a coordinated offensive without marching itself on its own feet, and Moscow was still techically under threat. However Germany's economy was  woefully left unprepared for war and no strategic reserve was left for a second push - it would have taken a major reorganization as soon as later 1941 to put Germany's production to a war footing for late 1942 at best.

Germany's best chance of a favourable peace would be inside this window - Winter to Summer 1942. But then, do what next? Had alt-Hitler not had this fixated idea of no retreat and allowed his commanders to do what they were trained to do - initiative and defensive flexibility - the war could have drawn out a lot longer.