Historical query: Grand Fleet, outbreak of WW1

[Warspite]

I'm trying to fact-check a document: my net connection sucks and I'm away from all my reference books for the next few days.

Do any naval grognards here (*cough* grumbler) know whether the Grand Fleet assumed action stations at Scapa Flow on 31 July 1914, or on 1 August 1914?

First correct answer gets an internet pint on me.

[grumbler]

I'm trying to fact-check a document: my net connection sucks and I'm away from all my reference books for the next few days.

Do any naval grognards here (*cough* grumbler) know whether the Grand Fleet assumed action stations at Scapa Flow on 31 July 1914, or on 1 August 1914?

First correct answer gets an internet pint on me.

The Royal navy went on a war footing on 28 July, transferred to war stations the night of the 209th/30th, and was declared ready for war on the 31st (i.e. First Fleet was at Scapa).  "actions stations' are something assumed by individual ships.  I believe "war footing" or "fully mobilized" is the phrase you are looking for; if the latter, the date is 3 August.

See The Royal Navy: an illustrated history p. 87 (available via google books when you have a connection).

[Neil]

The Home Fleet left Portsmouth July 29th, entered Scapa Flow on July 31st.  However, the Grand Fleet did not do anything until August 4th, as it came into existence with Jellicoe's appointment.

[Warspite]

Very useful, thank you both.

[Neil]

That's what we're here for.

[Threviel]

But cwhat would have happened if the HSF had used the window of late '14 early '15 when there was something at least resembling even numbers in the fleets? Could they have succeeded with an early aggressive strategy?

[The Brain]

Depends on the Confederacy.

[grumbler]

But cwhat would have happened if the HSF had used the window of late '14 early '15 when there was something at least resembling even numbers in the fleets? Could they have succeeded with an early aggressive strategy?

Had they know how crappy the British shells and flashproofing were, they might have.  The German near-parity wasn't as near parity as raw numbers would suggest, though, because the HSF lacked the scouting and screening elements they needed.

[Neil]

But cwhat would have happened if the HSF had used the window of late '14 early '15 when there was something at least resembling even numbers in the fleets? Could they have succeeded with an early aggressive strategy?

Had they know how crappy the British shells and flashproofing were, they might have.  The German near-parity wasn't as near parity as raw numbers would suggest, though, because the HSF lacked the scouting and screening elements they needed.

Yeah, the German scouts were out commerce raiding under Spee, and their annihilation was costly.

And even then, the battlefleet had the Deutchlands and the Nassaus hanging around its neck.  At the beginning of the war, the Germans only had the 5 Kaisers and the 4 Ostfrieslands that were ready for action and not seriously compromised, and even the Ostfrieslands were a bit vulnerable because of the hex turret layout.

[Threviel]

Wouldn't german flash-protection be equally bad without the experience of a battlecruiser almost blowing up?

[grumbler]

Wouldn't german flash-protection be equally bad without the experience of a battlecruiser almost blowing up?

The Germans used a more stable powder than the British cordite formulation and had better anti-flash protection from the start (not being as focused on rate of fire), though their measures were not adequate (as Seydlitz found at Dogger bank).  The Germans always stored powder lowest in the magazine; the Brits stored shells lowest until after Jutland.

The Brits lost more than just the battle cruisers due to their ammunition and magazine policies; Good Hope at Coronel suffered a fatal ammunition fire, Defence was lost with all hands when an initially small magazine fire spread throughout the ship and blew it open, and several battleships were almost lost due to secondary magazine fires.

[jimmy olsen]

Defence was lost with all hands when an initially small magazine fire spread throughout the ship and blew it open, and several battleships were almost lost due to secondary magazine fires.

That would have been an interesting turn of events.

[Warspite]

The Brits lost more than just the battle cruisers due to their ammunition and magazine policies; Good Hope at Coronel suffered a fatal ammunition fire, Defence was lost with all hands when an initially small magazine fire spread throughout the ship and blew it open, and several battleships were almost lost due to secondary magazine fires.

What was the reason for this series of potentially devestating flaws? Design by committee? Design by retards? Bad luck of having to learn these lessons in wartime?

[Threviel]

Wouldn't german flash-protection be equally bad without the experience of a battlecruiser almost blowing up?

The Germans used a more stable powder than the British cordite formulation and had better anti-flash protection from the start (not being as focused on rate of fire), though their measures were not adequate (as Seydlitz found at Dogger bank).  The Germans always stored powder lowest in the magazine; the Brits stored shells lowest until after Jutland.

The Brits lost more than just the battle cruisers due to their ammunition and magazine policies; Good Hope at Coronel suffered a fatal ammunition fire, Defence was lost with all hands when an initially small magazine fire spread throughout the ship and blew it open, and several battleships were almost lost due to secondary magazine fires.

How did other navies handle this? I know the japs lost at least one battleship in WW2 to magazine explosion, but I don't know the reasons behind. How good flash-protection did the austrians, french and italians have? Were their ships sound in construction?

[grumbler]

What was the reason for this series of potentially devestating flaws? Design by committee? Design by retards? Bad luck of having to learn these lessons in wartime?

Lack of thinking things through.  Powder was much better-protected if lower in the magazine, but also more susceptible to damp.  So, "logic" said to stow powder above the shells, where it would be less exposed to damp. 

The RN worshiped at the alter of firepower at this time, and so created the fastest-firing guns using the most powerful (and quick-burning) powder available.  The thought of what this would do to ship safety wasn't sexy, so wasn't pursued.  Given the aggressive mindset that had served the RN so well (and would serve them well again in WW2), this was understandable.