Brexit and the waning days of the United Kingdom

[garbon]

I'm not sure if the UK had been willing that means Obama intervenes.

[Sheilbh]

Maybe and I think the US could have intervened without Britain - that was pushed by France and Chuck Hagel. But the immediate response was Obama's Administration reaching out to Congressional leaders who were divided on this and he cited the British vote as part of the reason he was going to go to Congress to get a narrow, specific authorisation for the use of force (with no ground troops). That ultimately didn't go anywhere as it didn't have the support.

It was seen as very unlikely that the government would lose (and it was very close - I think less than 10 votes) - indeed arguably that's why Miliband thought he could risk tryingto exorcise Iraq by getting Labour to oppose. I don't know if it was quite this complacent but I think it was seen as basically a formality. I think that even the dependably loyal (or poodle-like depending on your taste ) UK not going along did possibly have an impact on Congress as the UK's expected participation was mentioned before the vote.

[crazy canuck]

This was then used by Obama as a reason to not intervene without Congressional authorisation, which was proposed a week later - though so opposed it never even reached a vote. (Worth noting on our theme of de Gaulle and the French that the French absolutely thought the West needed to intervene as a punishment for the use of chemical weapons).

Obama had a number of other reasons to not enforce his red line.  Miliban's view of it being long down that list.

[Sheilbh]

Obama had a number of other reasons to not enforce his red line.  Miliban's view of it being long down that list.

That's not quite what I was saying.


Miliband's view is why parliament voted (I checked) 282-275 against participating and the UK government announced it would respect that vote and not join in any intervention in Syria.

At the time that was reported in the NYT and New Yorker and elsewhere as having a significant impact on the Administration and Congress. It was cited in the reporting by the time as part of the feeling they needed to go to Congress, and actually called out by Obama as part of the reason he was going to go to Congress. Now he may have just been looking for an excuse - he may not have gone for it anyway and could have without the UK. But I think it's a plausible butterfly.

[crazy canuck]

Obama had a number of other reasons to not enforce his red line.  Miliban's view of it being long down that list.

That's not quite what I was saying.


Miliband's view is why parliament voted (I checked) 282-275 against participating and the UK government announced it would respect that vote and not join in any intervention in Syria.

At the time that was reported in the NYT and New Yorker and elsewhere as having a significant impact on the Administration and Congress. It was cited in the reporting by the time as part of the feeling they needed to go to Congress, and actually called out by Obama as part of the reason he was going to go to Congress. Now he may have just been looking for an excuse - he may not have gone for it anyway and could have without the UK. But I think it's a plausible butterfly.

I hate to break it to you but what the UK parliament thought about it didn't decide the issue in anyway for the Americans.  There was no chance they were going to go into Syria to enforce Obama's red line.

There's a big difference between the politics of framing the reason and the real reason.  There's just no way the American public would have supported another war in the Middle East.

You can rest easy, knowing that Miliband did not cause the prolonged reign of the Assad regime.

[Sheilbh]

Again not quite what I'm saying and also not how it was reported at the time if you look back.

[garbon]

Again not quite what I'm saying and also not how it was reported at the time if you look back.

I'm not sure what you are saying. I will say it did read at first glance as overstating Britain's role in the event.

[Sheilbh]

I'm not sure what you are saying. I will say it did read at first glance as overstating Britain's role in the event.

I think that did matter - and again this is not new, it was how it was reported at the time. I think it was very, very finely balanced in the US but the reporting at the time was that strikes were planned on Saturday (the vote was on Thursday) and then cancelled. On Sunday Obama said it was that assets were in place but it wasn't time sensitive and he'd go to Congress for approval.

That's not because of Britain really - but that there was suddenly a bump in the otherwise smooth road to military action (which had momentum behind it). It was an unexpected, unplanned for obstacle which took the sail out of the winds and so attackes planned for two days after the vote were postponed unexpectedly and the NYT reported it as an abrupt change of course by Obama announcing he'd seek Congressional approval. Again I don't think that's because of the vote in itself, but that along with that bump in the road it also probably bolstered arguments against in the Administration and Congress (and including in Obama's own mind).

I think at least it seems to have been part of why the attacks two days later were cancelled (which would have included British forces) - and I think had they gone ahead that would generate its own momentum.

I think it was very contingent - there was momentum towards some form of strikes and competing views and lots of moving parts. Parliament's vote - which went the way it did, possibly because Miliband didn't think he'd win and purely for the reason of trying to exorcise Iraq - wasn't important because of what it was but because it was a grain of sand thrown into those cogs unexpectedly.

I think if you're starting point is that Obama was never going to intervene (as he ultimately did after the Bataclan attacks and as he did in Libya - having been talked into it against his better judgement by Cameron and Sarko), and you work backwards from there then obviously none of this matters. But I think that's looking back from what happened to explain a decision that was always going to be made. I think it's also wrong in this case - I think it was absolutely a possibility, there will always be enough momentum and support in the US system for that sort of action (particularly back then) and it was highly contingent. I think this actually isn't just a Syria thing - I think there's been a wider incredibly rapid closing of historical possibilities around the Arab Spring uprisings in general.

Edit: So for example I think if the perception was Britain's support was a bit 50/50 and no point planning with them being included it wouldn't matter. It was that everyone thought the parliamentary vote was a formality and British forces were part of the planned attacks for two days later - and then, suddenly, it wasn't mattered. It's not the nature of the obstacle but that it was unexpected in that system with lots of moving parts with a momentum towards action suddenly having to recalibrate giving space and forcing a bit of pause.

[garbon]

I'm sorry that is a lot of words and I'm still unclear what you are arguing.

[Grey Fox]

That it's all Ed Miliband's fault.

[Sheilbh]

Perhaps the crux is the vote didn't matter on its own terms. But it did matter because of how it interacted with all the other moving parts heading towards intervention and just introducing a little friction into the momentum towards action.

Again in terms of the assumption that the US was never going to intervene I think the nature of the vote is relevant. That is standard here - with Iraq and Libya there is a vote in parliament and within a couple of days the attacks start. The planning is done, everything is in place and is going ahead. The UK will be participating and almost as a formality goes to parliament 24-48 hours beforehand (for example with Iraq, parliament approved on 18 March, the invasion began on 20 March). The military stuff is not dependent on the UK being in or out, it's ready and then the UK does its democratic tidying up. It's the dotting of the is and crossing of the ts that's already been determined.

So the counter-factual here is that was not the case here, which in its own way increases the argument that there was contingency. And that instead in those two days between that vote and the attack Obama announces that he's cancelled them. That seems to me less plausible. In part because you don't get to the stage of your ally doing a vote and spending their political capital on getting it over the line 48 hours out from launching bombs if you don't fully expect to be launching bombs in 48 hours.

[crazy canuck]

Again not quite what I'm saying and also not how it was reported at the time if you look back.

I remember how Obama's decision was reported back in the day and again I'm here to tell you that your view about the impact the UK had or the impact that Miller band had was not widely shared

I'm not sure what you are saying. I will say it did read at first glance as overstating Britain's role in the event.

I think that did matter - and again this is not new, it was how it was reported at the time. I think it was very, very finely balanced in the US but the reporting at the time was that strikes were planned on Saturday (the vote was on Thursday) and then cancelled. On Sunday Obama said it was that assets were in place but it wasn't time sensitive and he'd go to Congress for approval.

That's not because of Britain really - but that there was suddenly a bump in the otherwise smooth road to military action (which had momentum behind it). It was an unexpected, unplanned for obstacle which took the sail out of the winds and so attackes planned for two days after the vote were postponed unexpectedly and the NYT reported it as an abrupt change of course by Obama announcing he'd seek Congressional approval. Again I don't think that's because of the vote in itself, but that along with that bump in the road it also probably bolstered arguments against in the Administration and Congress (and including in Obama's own mind).

I think at least it seems to have been part of why the attacks two days later were cancelled (which would have included British forces) - and I think had they gone ahead that would generate its own momentum.

I think it was very contingent - there was momentum towards some form of strikes and competing views and lots of moving parts. Parliament's vote - which went the way it did, possibly because Miliband didn't think he'd win and purely for the reason of trying to exorcise Iraq - wasn't important because of what it was but because it was a grain of sand thrown into those cogs unexpectedly.

I think if you're starting point is that Obama was never going to intervene (as he ultimately did after the Bataclan attacks and as he did in Libya - having been talked into it against his better judgement by Cameron and Sarko), and you work backwards from there then obviously none of this matters. But I think that's looking back from what happened to explain a decision that was always going to be made. I think it's also wrong in this case - I think it was absolutely a possibility, there will always be enough momentum and support in the US system for that sort of action (particularly back then) and it was highly contingent. I think this actually isn't just a Syria thing - I think there's been a wider incredibly rapid closing of historical possibilities around the Arab Spring uprisings in general.

Edit: So for example I think if the perception was Britain's support was a bit 50/50 and no point planning with them being included it wouldn't matter. It was that everyone thought the parliamentary vote was a formality and British forces were part of the planned attacks for two days later - and then, suddenly, it wasn't mattered. It's not the nature of the obstacle but that it was unexpected in that system with lots of moving parts with a momentum towards action suddenly having to recalibrate giving space and forcing a bit of pause.

Your recollection is very different from mine.

Nobody thought Obama was going to be going to war over this.  All of the Sunday new show shows at the time we're talking about what a mistake. It was for Obama to draw a red line that he never intended to enforce.

I think what you're doing is going back in cherry picking news articles that are consistent with your view, but you need to take a much wider reading of everything thing that was happening at the time.

[mongers]

Between 1804 and 1971, one hundred and ten thousand steam locomotives were built in Britain.   

[Sheilbh]

I remember how Obama's decision was reported back in the day and again I'm here to tell you that your view about the impact the UK had or the impact that Miller band had was not widely shared

[..]

Your recollection is very different from mine.

Nobody thought Obama was going to be going to war over this.  All of the Sunday new show shows at the time we're talking about what a mistake. It was for Obama to draw a red line that he never intended to enforce.

I think what you're doing is going back in cherry picking news articles that are consistent with your view, but you need to take a much wider reading of everything thing that was happening at the time.

And I still disagree

Obviously no-one was talking about war, it would be a strike at most like Libya 2011 or Syria 2015.

But to go back to the timeline from that point - on 27 August a "wide range of officials" in the administration including the State Department and White House were briefing what targets they were planning to hit - which would be plenty of missiles for a few days aimed at military units, rockets and HQs. Far more limited even than Libya and, explicitly, "not about regime change. At that time the US has given up on UN approval. There are American ships in the area ready to go and the only ally present (and, according to the government, intending to participate were British forces).

The next day parliament rejects action and the government says it will follow that decision - having fully supported a strike until that point, including moving forces into place.

The day after that the French say they will participate in strikes - they just need to get forces in place (the previous French and German position was wait for the UN report). The US position being briefed in the press was that they still intended to strike - the framing from administration officials was that setback and eroding support "would not deter" Obama. And all indications were that strikes would start on Saturday or Sunday (after UN inspectors left Damascus). Going ahead without Britain was described as "remarkable" because there wouldn't be any foreign forces, no international participation - so no UN backing and not even the figleaf of a "coalition of the willing" until the French could get in place which would not be for a bit. But by the next day it was noted that the only ally willing to cooperate with the US was France - and they weren't ready. However the briefing was still that unilateral action was likely.

The following day, the Sunday, is when Obama postpones a decision and says he's going to postpone any action and seek Congressional approval.

I think in that chain of events, the US's only participating ally dropping out was important, or - to frame it around the counterfactual - had everything been moved in place to strike and your only participating ally has got a vote approving their participation, I think the momentum for a strike would have been pretty irresistible. Less perhaps that the decision mattered, but that one of the Guns of August style railway mobilisation plans unexpectedly didn't start. It created space - it was the sand in the gears of that momentum which caused a moment's delay and shifted the space for opponents and also the nature of the attack from a figleaf of internationalism to unilateral. I think collectively that's important.

In terms of the framing of the reason and the real reason, I think the timeline and facts at that time make that the more likely reason. I think Obama's subsequent description of this as one of the proudest moments of his presidency as, surrounded by hawks, he pulled America back from the brink is very much a framing of what I think he probably recognises may have been the big mistake- not unlike the way Merkel is attempting to frame the reasons behind her policy towards Russia.

[HVC]

UK meals confound and horrify the Chinese. Makes a viral celebrity of old English dude.

https://www.instagram.com/reel/DCzRMVIIQhC