The End of History

[Malthus]

Sure. And pleny of people, apparently, consider Putin a master statesman, with a superior vision of society. And plenty of people, seemingly, think political Islam is the answer.

As late as the 1970s and early 80s, it certainly looked like Communism was viable political model - the post-Stalinist USSR recorded very impressive macroeconomic numbers, had impressive technological achievements in high profile areas like rocketry, and had a high profile culturally, from sport to music to film.  Meanwhile the capitalist countries were experiencing stagflation and culture wars.  There had been two decades of former colonies breaking away and adopting various forms of "democratic socialism" in imitation of the Soviet or Yugoslav models.

Putinism doesn't present anything like the ideological challenge that Communism did.

My impression in the early 80s was that the second world was widely regarded as a dreary shit-hole. Sure, it financed third world former colonies (as did the CIA) with arms - but such places were, by and large, even more dreary shit-holes.

People in the West feared the USSR, but mostly because they feared a nuke exchange. They did not fear that it represented "the future". Outside of some ivory tower academics and lunatic-fringers, no-one much believed it had 'ideological attractions'. Mostly, people were impressed by learing about the Communist horrors of the 70s that was comming into popular understanding - the "cultural revolution" and Pol Pot's lunacy.

[Sheilbh]

And in the last ten years the "democratic authoritarian" model displayed by China has also shown impressive growth, with a number of people around the world do appear to consider it a viable model, even if as you say the Chinese don't go around trying to export it.  Similarly political islam continues to be very attractive, with an islamist government in Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Hamas in Gaza.

I don't think the Chinese model is exportable except to other Communist countries. I can't see how you can achieve that without starting from an even higher level of state control.

Similarly I agree with Joan on Islamism. I don't think there's a state model yet. Iran and Saudi are sui generis. The Brothers failed in a failing transitional democracy. Hamas is maybe the only one there that is arguably exportable.

Where I worry about Putinism is that I think that combination of managed democracy, traditional values and growth-producing crony capitalism is appealing and exportable. I think it's already happening in Hungary and Turkey, arguably something similar is present in East Africa. Most worryingly I wouldn't be amazed if Modi went down a similar path in India.

And, on Malthus, last point I kind of do worry that it's a future. I don't think we're invulnerable to it.

[Malthus]

And in the last ten years the "democratic authoritarian" model displayed by China has also shown impressive growth, with a number of people around the world do appear to consider it a viable model, even if as you say the Chinese don't go around trying to export it.  Similarly political islam continues to be very attractive, with an islamist government in Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Hamas in Gaza.

I don't think the Chinese model is exportable except to other Communist countries. I can't see how you can achieve that without starting from an even higher level of state control.

Similarly I agree with Joan on Islamism. I don't think there's a state model yet. Iran and Saudi are sui generis. The Brothers failed in a failing transitional democracy. Hamas is maybe the only one there that is arguably exportable.

Where I worry about Putinism is that I think that combination of managed democracy, traditional values and growth-producing crony capitalism is appealing and exportable. I think it's already happening in Hungary and Turkey, arguably something similar is present in East Africa. Most worryingly I wouldn't be amazed if Modi went down a similar path in India.

And, on Malthus, last point I kind of do worry that it's a future. I don't think we're invulnerable to it.

I think the point is that it isn't a future that people find attractive or appealing in the West. It has the look of a backwater in the making. Sure, it is appealing to local elites who want to capitalize on it and know-nothings. Same with political Islam.

My point is that the same was true of Communism pre-fall of the USSR. Most people saw it as unattractive (though they may not have put it like that). It appealed to know-nothings and local elites who wanted to capitalize on it. The only difference is that it also appealed to some ivory-tower intellectuals. Not sure if this difference is enough to justify a grandiloquent 'end of history' moniker.   

[Jacob]

I don't think it qualifies as a coherent political ideology in the Hegelian sense that Fukuyama was talking about.  And radicalized political Islam simply hasn't gotten much traction as an actual form of governance (as opposed to an animating principle of a political movement outside the state).  No one seems to be jumping to the Saudi model; the Muslim Brotherhood's attempt at governance was a fiasco; the Iranians have recruited militias abroad but no one seems much interested in replicating their model either.

I think that ultimately my issue with the "end of history" thesis is that I don't think history is a Hegelian dialectic process that ultimately ends, but rather "one damn thing after another" a la Hubbard and Toynbee.

Even if we are looking at it in a Hegelian sense, wouldn't it make more sense to conclude that we're in a period of transition from synthesis to thesis (liberalism has adapted the better parts of socialism, and this liberal democracy is what seems the unassailable ideal), and that another point of antithesis will arise eventually (whether it be from the bosoms of corruptocrats, religious radicals, environmental and resource constraints, or some other source of disagreement with the liberal democratic ideal)?

Or have I misunderstood something?

[Razgovory]

I think Shelf has a point.  Illiberal democracy isn't attractive to us, but we aren't the ones who are going to be choosing it for our selves.  It's what seems viable to up-and-coming third world states.  I do agree that these these ideas aren't as coherent as liberal democracy or Marxist communism.  They seem to take a variety of forms for each locality but there are many things in common such as traditional values.  Putin's patronage of the Orthodox church, Singapore's "Asian values", Erdogan's political Islam.  I also wouldn't discount Islamist theocracy.  It hasn't spread very far party because it first came to Islam.  But recall it took a while before liberal democracy spread or and for 20 years there were only two Marxist states in the world.

[mongers]

Throughout recored history if someone had made this statement, they'd have been 'wrong'*, so why in the last few years has this ceased to be the case?


* in terms of triumph of current day western liberalism.

[Razgovory]

I don't think it qualifies as a coherent political ideology in the Hegelian sense that Fukuyama was talking about.  And radicalized political Islam simply hasn't gotten much traction as an actual form of governance (as opposed to an animating principle of a political movement outside the state).  No one seems to be jumping to the Saudi model; the Muslim Brotherhood's attempt at governance was a fiasco; the Iranians have recruited militias abroad but no one seems much interested in replicating their model either.

I think that ultimately my issue with the "end of history" thesis is that I don't think history is a Hegelian dialectic process that ultimately ends, but rather "one damn thing after another" a la Hubbard and Toynbee.

Even if we are looking at it in a Hegelian sense, wouldn't it make more sense to conclude that we're in a period of transition from synthesis to thesis (liberalism has adapted the better parts of socialism, and this liberal democracy is what seems the unassailable ideal), and that another point of antithesis will arise eventually (whether it be from the bosoms of corruptocrats, religious radicals, environmental and resource constraints, or some other source of disagreement with the liberal democratic ideal)?

Or have I misunderstood something?

Never did completely grasp German Idealism.

[Jacob]

I don't think the Chinese model is exportable except to other Communist countries. I can't see how you can achieve that without starting from an even higher level of state control.

I think most attempts at implementing the Chinese model will turn into something similar to what Putin is doing.

Similarly I agree with Joan on Islamism. I don't think there's a state model yet. Iran and Saudi are sui generis. The Brothers failed in a failing transitional democracy. Hamas is maybe the only one there that is arguably exportable.

I'm not sure that we can rightly confine our analysis of ideologies and history to states, especially since there are a number of failed states and near failed states out there. Also, not state actors and ideologies have frequently initiated significant change in history and the actions of states.

Radical Islamism may not provide a successful model for setting up states competing with liberal democratic states. But it may turn states into basically failed states a la Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sudan etc, acting directly counter to the supposed trend towards the spread of liberal democracy. It may cause liberal states to turn more reactionary in response to external threats, and it may serve as a justification for states to embrace reactionary corruption in democratic clothes as an alternative to actual liberal democracy.

As such, even if history is only measured by the professed ideologies of states, radical islamism seems pretty significant (and other fundamentalist religious values, I don't think islamism is the only expression of this tendency).

Where I worry about Putinism is that I think that combination of managed democracy, traditional values and growth-producing crony capitalism is appealing and exportable. I think it's already happening in Hungary and Turkey, arguably something similar is present in East Africa. Most worryingly I wouldn't be amazed if Modi went down a similar path in India.

And, on Malthus, last point I kind of do worry that it's a future. I don't think we're invulnerable to it.

Isn't that one of the classical critiques of democracy?

[The Minsky Moment]

Even if we are looking at it in a Hegelian sense, wouldn't it make more sense to conclude that we're in a period of transition from synthesis to thesis (liberalism has adapted the better parts of socialism, and this liberal democracy is what seems the unassailable ideal), and that another point of antithesis will arise eventually (whether it be from the bosoms of corruptocrats, religious radicals, environmental and resource constraints, or some other source of disagreement with the liberal democratic ideal)

It might make sense to say that "something else" may come, it just doesn't appear that is has come.

Even before socialism was ever adopted as a governing form, it presented a clear and rather compelling ideological alternative.  It presented competing ideals of egalitarianism and the elimination of poverty, it could lay claim to superiority in material provision by remedying the seemingly intractable cyclical crises of capitalism.  It exposed real "contradictions" of the emerging classical liberal order in the claim that formal equality of dignity was meaningless in the presence of dire poverty, and unrealized because the liberal order was grafted on to the aristocratic order it succeeded, thus preserving the very class distinctions in fact that it denied in theory.

As you say, it was compelling enough ultimately to dissolve the classical liberal order in synthesis.

I don't see anything out there compelling enough to drive such a fundamental programmatic adjustment.  Religious fundamentalists are this sense a regression, an echo of a superseded order - political luddism.  Kleptocracy is not an ideology, in any sense.  Environmental zero growthism hit its peak into the 1970s and has been in eclipse ever sense.  I don't think it will return in that form.

The one true ideological challenge that could I see emerge is a movement for effective global governance, as many of the most severe problems we face from global warming to depletion of fisheries or water resources or other commons, to spreads of infectious diseases, to disruptive migratory flows to the struggles of states to control transnational capital, stem from the limitations of the national state form.  But we are so far away from any viable expression of such an ideology - on the contrary the trend to be towards a strengthening of nationalism.

[The Minsky Moment]

Where I worry about Putinism is that I think that combination of managed democracy, traditional values and growth-producing crony capitalism is appealing and exportable. I think it's already happening in Hungary and Turkey, arguably something similar is present in East Africa. Most worryingly I wouldn't be amazed if Modi went down a similar path in India.

The "market test" hasn't been kind to Putin.  If you look at the old Warsaw Pact states plus the states of the old Soviet Union the draw of the European Union, despite all of its problems, has been very powerful.  In contrast, the Russian led customs union counts two other members, the Russian led economic community four members, and the Russian led treaty organization five members.   The same names crop up: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan - basically weak, landlocked countries, often with significant Russian ethnic presence.  I.e. countries that don't have a lot of other viable options.

Erdogan isn't following Putin, he is just Islamizing Kemalism, even if the some of the end results look similar.  In so doing he has split that society down the middle and generated dissension in his own party, while cementing a permanent majority by keeping the Kurdish minority on his side.

As for Modi, I agree he is personally inclined in that direction but I very much doubt he will be able to run roughshod over all the powerful regional governments and localized interests and herd all those cats to the end.

[Jacob]

It might make sense to say that "something else" may come, it just doesn't appear that is has come.

That's fair enough. I expect that it will.

Even before socialism was ever adopted as a governing form, it presented a clear and rather compelling ideological alternative.  It presented competing ideals of egalitarianism and the elimination of poverty, it could lay claim to superiority in material provision by remedying the seemingly intractable cyclical crises of capitalism.  It exposed real "contradictions" of the emerging classical liberal order in the claim that formal equality of dignity was meaningless in the presence of dire poverty, and unrealized because the liberal order was grafted on to the aristocratic order it succeeded, thus preserving the very class distinctions in fact that it denied in theory.

As you say, it was compelling enough ultimately to dissolve the classical liberal order in synthesis.

I don't see anything out there compelling enough to drive such a fundamental programmatic adjustment.

Yeah, I don't think there's a coherent competitive alternative out there at this point, but I don't think things are quiet enough that they won't be sought out and/ or evolve, nor that the seeds of the next alternative isn't already sprouting somewhere. It seems to me that in many cases, identifying a particular dialectic is easier in retrospective.

I mean, sure, Capitalism vs Communism was particularly stark and obvious at the time, but I think earlier ideological conflicts were less so; I don't think that the lack of such start contrast necessarily implies a lack of conflict.

Religious fundamentalists are this sense a regression, an echo of a superseded order - political luddism.  Kleptocracy is not an ideology, in any sense. 

Fundementalism and kleptocracies - and the potential marriage of the two - may not be particularly intellectually robust, but I don't think intellectual robustness is as important as popularity.

Environmental zero growthism hit its peak into the 1970s and has been in eclipse ever sense.  I don't think it will return in that form.

The one true ideological challenge that could I see emerge is a movement for effective global governance, as many of the most severe problems we face from global warming to depletion of fisheries or water resources or other commons, to spreads of infectious diseases, to disruptive migratory flows to the struggles of states to control transnational capital, stem from the limitations of the national state form.  But we are so far away from any viable expression of such an ideology - on the contrary the trend to be towards a strengthening of nationalism.

That's more along the lines of what I meant. I don't think environmentalists are going to band together and create an ideology that will provide a credible alternative to liberal democracy. I'm more considering the possibility of some sort of environmentally triggered shit hitting the fan and causing a significant shift in how we - or at least some people - approach governance. Well, that and causing significant cultural shifts and conflicts - that's history to me too.

If, say, resource scarcity causes the displacement of tens or hundreds of millions of people, with attendant cultural upheaval and wars and death, I'd consider that history even if there isn't an underlying ideological dialectic going on other than "we want to live" vs "we don't want you downgrading our quality of life".

[Admiral Yi]

Was reading a book review, maybe in the NYT, about life at the end of the Soviet Union.  Author said the worst thing about Communism was there was absolutely nothing to do.  You worked, you ate, and you slept.

Friend of mine who visited East Germany had a similar observation: what Communists really needed was video games.

He also told me that the parts of East Germany that recieved West German TV had much lower rates of defection.

[MadImmortalMan]

Even the western democracies have strong illiberal undercurrents. It's foolish to think any ideology has "won".

[Tonitrus]

Was reading a book review, maybe in the NYT, about life at the end of the Soviet Union.  Author said the worst thing about Communism was there was absolutely nothing to do.  You worked, you ate, and you slept.

You left out...

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z-Ecy9KUN2s

[Grallon]

There is only one prevailing and consistent social order throughout History: the 'Have' rule - the 'Have Not' are being ruled.  What changes are the modalities which enable one to be a member of the former group rather than to be confined to the latter one.  Everything else is merely window dressing - no matter what ideologues may prattle about it at any given time.



G.