Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-23 and Invasion

[Jacob]

To take one hypothetical but conceivable example, if h Russian conventional forces in the south collapsed and began retreating in disorder to Crimea and beyond, the doctrine would be implicated.

I guess this was the real point of the annexation of the occupied territories into the Russian Federation, as it potentially allows the use of tactical nukes to prevent their loss under Russian doctrine?

[The Minsky Moment]

I guess this was the real point of the annexation of the occupied territories into the Russian Federation, as it potentially allows the use of tactical nukes to prevent their loss under Russian doctrine?

I don't know if that was the main point; but that implication does exist.  I don't think most outside observers would find it credible that Russia would deem the potential loss of those newly annexed territories as a critical threat to Russian national security.  I do think Crimea would be viewed differently as the perception is that Russia's commitment to sovereignty over that territory is much greater.

[crazy canuck]

This is the third video I have now seen from this guy which you have posted in which he makes dubious claims completely unsupported by evidence.

I don't remember what the first one was, as it's a while ago. The second video had the advantage of making predictions which can be evaluated against how things actually transpired.

At the time the video was made, the Russians had been making gains, there was a bit of a media panic, and some folks were bandying about scenarios like "Ukrainian collapse".

Puck Nielsen made the observation that Russian gains were tactical in scale. While not documented specifically in the video, that's easy enough to fact check and turns out to be true.

Secondly, he made the prediction that the Russian offensive was going to stall without further gains and that momentum would slowly swing towards the Ukrainians over the coming months as newly announced Western materiel made its way to the frontlines. In other words, the Russian offensive was about to culminate without having a major impact and there was no need to panic.

So far events have developed pretty much as Puck Nielsen predicted. The folks who were fretting about a Ukrainian collapse and worried about major Russian offensives and gains can relax as those scenarios did not materialize.

I watch all his videos. Typically when he's talked about how the conflict is likely developing in the next few months he's been pretty much right on the money. So I tend to hold his analysis in high regard.

This most recent video I shared is a bit outside of the "events on the ground" analysis, and therefore I'm more inclined to question it. Nonetheless, again it has the advantage that we can see how future events conforms to the hypothesis - will the support from the Biden administration (and Western allies, or at least those who take their cues from the Biden administration) surge and provide a hard stop when Ukraine is on its back foot? And will it continue to keep restrictions in place that prevent Ukraine from delivering its objectives of regaining all its lost territory and hurting Russia enough that it gives up its imperial ambitions in Ukraine?

Time will tell.

His first video was filled with speculations about why the Russians could not mount a further invasion of Ukraine.  His second video was a justification for him being wrong in his first video.

His second video also spent about 15 minutes claiming that reporters didn't understand what a tactical victory was and then he went on to claim he was the only one who understood that the Russians didn't have the ability to press their offensive past those strategic victories.  As I pointed out at the time, there was absolutely no evidence that any reporters did not understand what a tactical victory was. The reporters were in fact quoting Ukranian military sources, who presumably do know what they are talking about.

He did predict the Russian invasion would stall but that that is only remarkable to people who were not reading what actual news sources were saying about the strategic goal of the Russian offensive was.  All the reporting at the time was that the Russians were trying to carve out a boundary area with the Russian border, something they have actually been successful in doing.  I note that your social media expert also claimed the Russians would not be able to achieve what they clearly now have done.  And to the extent the Russian efforts have now (thankfully) been thwarted, it has a lot more to do with the American decision to allow wider use of their weaponry then any of the factors this self proclaimed expert claimed.


I know you don't like me continually saying this.  But read real newspapers.  They have journalistic rules and standards.

[Sheilbh]

Yeah that's their military doctrine, but that would also interact with their nuclear deterrence doctrine which reserves the right to use nuclear weapons and other WMD "in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is threatened."

My understanding is that "very existence of the state" has been interpreted as an invasion of Russia or absolutely critical (but still a significantly lower threshold) destruction of Russian military capability. I believe there's been leaked secret documents referring to either invasion or destruction of x% of Russia's submarine fleet. Attacks on Russia's nuclear infrastructure are also part of that. I believe those two headings broadly cover the examples given in the official statement on when Russia might use nukes.

Although I believe the "escalate to de-escalate" concept is contested by experts and whether or not it's part of Russia's doctrine.

I think everything we can see from the current conflict indicates that despite what Putin has done, Novorossiya is not truly seen as part of the state - I think the one exception to that, as you say, is possibly Crimea. Though there I'm unsure if the threat to the "very existence" of the state would be because of the risk of invasion or, possibly, Sevastopol in the long run.

It's absolutely right that we have interests, which are distinct from Ukraine's and that there are risks as Russia can escalate further. There are risks and that needs to be acknowledged and managed. I also think (and I'm guilty of this), that on Ukraine there's a bit of a pendulum swing in Western discourse from panic to over excitement. But I'm not convinced that at a time when Putin is not making nuclear threats and is actually downplaying that in public forums in Russia (although acknowledging that they may update their doctrine) that that's actually foremost in mind at the minute.

One other possibility is what I mentioned about Poland and her planes early in the war. I've said before my assumption for US backing away from things is either some form of credible escalatory threat that they're worried about by Russia, or senior communications from China on their red lines. I also wonder if at this point (and for the last six months) there's a role Syria are playing as another point of Russian leverage.

[Jacob]

I know you don't like me continually saying this.  But read real newspapers.  They have journalistic rules and standards.

It's funny you say this, because "this guy" is frequently quoted by actual journalists as an expert, which seems reasonable enough since military analysis is his profession.

But fair enough, I'll stop posting his videos here

[crazy canuck]

I know you don't like me continually saying this.  But read real newspapers.  They have journalistic rules and standards.

It's funny you say this, because "this guy" is frequently quoted by actual journalists as an expert, which seems reasonable enough since military analysis is his profession.

But fair enough, I'll stop posting his videos here

Hey feel free to continue to post what he has to say. It is often worth a laugh.  But please don't say that his claims are consistent with all known facts.

I have to admit I have never seen him quoted as a source in the newspapers I read. 

[grumbler]

It exploits the reality that the US lacks both the equipment and doctrine for proportional response to low yield battlefield nuclear weapons, and thus would face a difficult choice of either escalating further up the nuclear ladder or adopting some non-nuclear response.

The US has both the equipment and doctrine to employ low-yield nuclear weapons (the B61 has a selectable yield, one setting being 0.3KT, lower than that of any Russian nuclear weapon).  I would agree that the US doctrine favors, wherever possible, prompt precise conventional counterforce attacks to destroy enemy launchers and weapons, rather then relying solely on a nuclear response.  However, a low-yield US nuclear response is also part of that doctrine and is exercised (by NATO as well as the US).  The NATO nations just don't use nuclear training as an element of foreign policy.

[Jacob]

Hey feel free to continue to post what he has to say. It is often worth a laugh.  But please don't say that his claims are consistent with all known facts.

No problem. I haven't made any claims about all known facts, and I won't.

I have to admit I have never seen him quoted as a source in the newspapers I read

Unsurprising. You primarily consume English language media. I see him quoted in Danish, Swedish, and Norwegian media (including newspapers) with some frequency.

[crazy canuck]

Yeah.

The advantage of the theory is that it is coherent and fits the available evidence reasonably well. It doesn't mean it's correct, however.

Here is what you said, you did not say all, but isn't it fair to suggest that was the implication of your post?

[Jacob]

Yeah.

The advantage of the theory is that it is coherent and fits the available evidence reasonably well. It doesn't mean it's correct, however.

Here is what you said, you did not say all, but isn't it fair to suggest that was the implication of your post?

No, I don't think it's fair at all to suggest that was the implication.

I do not presume that the evidence I have available to me is perfect and complete. I don't read the same newspapers as you, as you have clearly established

When I wrote "fits the available evidence reasonably well" I intended it as an invitation to add to or correct the available evidence, not as a rhetorical device to say "so if you don't agree you don't understand the facts."

I'll also note that in this case what I meant by "the available evidence" referred to the American modus for providing US originated armaments as well as the limitations on their usage. I think that generally speaking the volume, timing, and nature of the support - and the attached rules of engagement - are fairly well established parts of the public record and not subject to much controversy (in terms of fact, that is. There's some controversy regarding the reasons and the correctness of the policy).

[Josquius]

I'm reading some rumours that Ukraine might have a good F16 plan agreed - arm them for missions at Ukrainian bases but when they're not being used and need maintainance they're outside of Ukraine.
Potentially big if true and does make them far more useful than they otherwise promised to be.

[crazy canuck]

Yeah.

The advantage of the theory is that it is coherent and fits the available evidence reasonably well. It doesn't mean it's correct, however.

Here is what you said, you did not say all, but isn't it fair to suggest that was the implication of your post?

No, I don't think it's fair at all to suggest that was the implication.

I do not presume that the evidence I have available to me is perfect and complete. I don't read the same newspapers as you, as you have clearly established

When I wrote "fits the available evidence reasonably well" I intended it as an invitation to add to or correct the available evidence, not as a rhetorical device to say "so if you don't agree you don't understand the facts."

I'll also note that in this case what I meant by "the available evidence" referred to the American modus for providing US originated armaments as well as the limitations on their usage. I think that generally speaking the volume, timing, and nature of the support - and the attached rules of engagement - are fairly well established parts of the public record and not subject to much controversy (in terms of fact, that is. There's some controversy regarding the reasons and the correctness of the policy).

So when you say something is consistent with the evidence, you are just saying it's consistent the information you uniquely have.

That is an interesting take. 

[grumbler]

So when you say something is consistent with the evidence, you are just saying it's consistent the information you uniquely have.

That is an interesting take. 

I think that this is another one of those "separated by a common language" issues.  In US English, the phrase "consistent with the evidence" does not at all imply that the speaker has unique knowledge.  Ditto for UK English.  I suspect that Jake is using the US or UK meaning of the term, not the much more particular Canadian English meaning.

[crazy canuck]

So when you say something is consistent with the evidence, you are just saying it's consistent the information you uniquely have.

That is an interesting take. 

I think that this is another one of those "separated by a common language" issues.  In US English, the phrase "consistent with the evidence" does not at all imply that the speaker has unique knowledge.  Ditto for UK English.  I suspect that Jake is using the US or UK meaning of the term, not the much more particular Canadian English meaning.

I suppose there is a language barrier because if you read Jacob's explanation of what he meant he said the information available to him. 

Now we could go down the rabbit who of what information available to him but it seems pretty clear in most English speaking countries it means the information he has seen.

The problem of course goes beyond there semantics you have raised.  Rather the statements he makes about the accuracy of anything becomes meaningless because it is based on an entirely subjective view of what might be accurate.

Make a claim that something is consistent with the evidence has got to have some objective standard or it is entirely meaningless.  It simply  becomes a statement that this is what the person believes to be true based on who knows what information or misinformation they have seen.

[Tamas]

Who can tell Jacob what he really meant, CC or Grumbler? Stay tuned!