Were heavy tanks worth the cost in WWII?

[Capetan Mihali]

Soviet MBTs descended from T-34, not IS.  The IS line eventually died out, along with heavy tanks in general.

Not sure I'd totally agree with that.  The IS series had a lot of influence-- lower silhouette, turret design to name a couple things.  And the Soviets kept heavy tanks in service for most of the Cold War.

[DGuller]

 

[Ideologue]

I concede.

[Berkut]

I think arguing that the MBT came from the medium tank or the heavy tank is pretty much completely misunderstanding the very concept of what a MBT was...

Heavy tanks were not "worth it" or not worth it - some were effective at what they were intended to do, and others were not.

The basic WW2 idea though that tanks in general were kind of like ships, and you wanted to have all these "roles" for which various classes would fit was pretty much an error, I think. Generalization was the better way to go, but the post-war evolution of tanks showed that the generalization tended towards larger, heavier tanks, rather than more mid-sized ones. It wasn't just the "heavy" tank that went away as a concept, so did the light tank, tank destroyer, scout tank, and even the medium tank.

[Razgovory]

Light tanks are still manufactured, and are still maintained in armies that no longer produce them. The role of a light tank is still needed, and the MBT has not filled it.  In many armies the role has been filled by IFVs, like the Bradley.

[DGuller]

I think arguing that the MBT came from the medium tank or the heavy tank is pretty much completely misunderstanding the very concept of what a MBT was...

Heavy tanks were not "worth it" or not worth it - some were effective at what they were intended to do, and others were not.

The basic WW2 idea though that tanks in general were kind of like ships, and you wanted to have all these "roles" for which various classes would fit was pretty much an error, I think. Generalization was the better way to go, but the post-war evolution of tanks showed that the generalization tended towards larger, heavier tanks, rather than more mid-sized ones. It wasn't just the "heavy" tank that went away as a concept, so did the light tank, tank destroyer, scout tank, and even the medium tank.

I'm not sure it was an error at the time.  I think there were a lot more compromises to be made in tank design back then, which promoted more specialization.  I think what removed that need was the widespread adoption of HEAT ammunition, which removed the need to compromise around the size of the gun if you wanted to have firepower.

[Berkut]

I think arguing that the MBT came from the medium tank or the heavy tank is pretty much completely misunderstanding the very concept of what a MBT was...

Heavy tanks were not "worth it" or not worth it - some were effective at what they were intended to do, and others were not.

The basic WW2 idea though that tanks in general were kind of like ships, and you wanted to have all these "roles" for which various classes would fit was pretty much an error, I think. Generalization was the better way to go, but the post-war evolution of tanks showed that the generalization tended towards larger, heavier tanks, rather than more mid-sized ones. It wasn't just the "heavy" tank that went away as a concept, so did the light tank, tank destroyer, scout tank, and even the medium tank.

I'm not sure it was an error at the time.  I think there were a lot more compromises to be made in tank design back then, which promoted more specialization.  I think what removed that need was the widespread adoption of HEAT ammunition, which removed the need to compromise around the size of the gun if you wanted to have firepower.

There is some debate here, certainly, but I much more come down on the side of the fundamental change in tank design was more one of operational understanding of what actually worked, rather than technology.

In other words, I think the US (for example) would have been better off to simply decide to build the best MBT possible in 1942, whatever the technology allowed at that time, and then simply upgraded/replaced that design over time, and never once built a single TD. Germany would have been better off to just build as many Panthers as possible, and forget the Tigers and TDs and SPGs. Or a Panther with a 88, if that is what they decided the MBT ought to be. Or a PzIV for that matter.

But the key to what a MBT must be capable of doing is pretty simple:

1. It must be mobile enough to actually succeed in the shock role that the tank was designed for - this excludes the traditional "heavy" tanks with poor mobility, like the Tiger.
2. It should have a gun capable of engaging the primary targets it is going to see from the other sides "MBT". This excludes poorly armed tanks like the Sherman in '44.
3. It needs enough armor to be able to reliably attack enemy non-armored assets without excessive fear of being destroyed.

The key to the MBY concept, IMO, was the realization that the practical realities of the battlefield simply do not consistently allow for specialization in armored roles. The reality is that in most cases, you have to fight the enemy with what is at hand, and rarely have the luxury of the opponent giving you the opportunity to be able to bring your paper when he shows up with his rock. More often than not, you have to fight them with whatever armor is available. If the enemy counter-attacks with their armor, it is your armor that is going to have to fight them, and demands that only dedicated AT assets should fight enemy armor leaving your armor free to fight an exploitation battle are simply not realistic. Therefore, even in 1942, everyone would be better off with a well crafted mix "jack of all trades" tank rather than a hodge podge of special purpose tanks that almost never get the luxury of only being used for their designed purpose.

Technology certainly did change, but fundamentally, the role of the tank never really changed. Is what a tank is supposed to do somehow different from 1943 to 1963, such that in 1963 you no longer needed these incredible numbers of roles you thought you needed in 1943? I don't think so.

I think the Germans actually started to understand this - the Panther is, IMO, the first true attempt to create a MBT, with a weapon system that combined mobility, firepower, and a reasonable amount of protection with the intent of being a general purpose vehicle. But their procurement chain was such a mess they were never really able to put it into real practice. Plus Hitler loved his toys, of course.

The Soviets almost hit on it pretty much by accident in the T-34 line, but they were also rather reactionary in their designs in WW2, and kept building bigger and heavier tanks to counter the monster German tanks, almost completely unsuccessfully.

The Brits...they were a mess. They never had a rational (in hindsight) idea of what their tanks should do - or rather, some of them did, but it was pretty much just a mess overall.

The Americans had plenty of people who understood it, I think, but none of them were people making the decisions. So they kept building failures like the M-10/18/36 despite the fact that they clearly didn't work.

But all of them could be forgiven - trying to forge a coherent procurement strategy in the middle of a world war is probably pretty much impossible.

[Ideologue]

The reality is that in most cases, you have to fight the enemy with what is at hand, and rarely have the luxury of the opponent giving you the opportunity to be able to bring your paper when he shows up with his rock.

This is a really, really nice turn of phrase, Berk.

[Ed Anger]

I like Michael Wittman. Lolz Villers-Bocage.

[Malthus]

I think arguing that the MBT came from the medium tank or the heavy tank is pretty much completely misunderstanding the very concept of what a MBT was...

Heavy tanks were not "worth it" or not worth it - some were effective at what they were intended to do, and others were not.

The basic WW2 idea though that tanks in general were kind of like ships, and you wanted to have all these "roles" for which various classes would fit was pretty much an error, I think. Generalization was the better way to go, but the post-war evolution of tanks showed that the generalization tended towards larger, heavier tanks, rather than more mid-sized ones. It wasn't just the "heavy" tank that went away as a concept, so did the light tank, tank destroyer, scout tank, and even the medium tank.

I'm not sure it was an error at the time.  I think there were a lot more compromises to be made in tank design back then, which promoted more specialization.  I think what removed that need was the widespread adoption of HEAT ammunition, which removed the need to compromise around the size of the gun if you wanted to have firepower.

There is some debate here, certainly, but I much more come down on the side of the fundamental change in tank design was more one of operational understanding of what actually worked, rather than technology.

In other words, I think the US (for example) would have been better off to simply decide to build the best MBT possible in 1942, whatever the technology allowed at that time, and then simply upgraded/replaced that design over time, and never once built a single TD. Germany would have been better off to just build as many Panthers as possible, and forget the Tigers and TDs and SPGs. Or a Panther with a 88, if that is what they decided the MBT ought to be. Or a PzIV for that matter.

But the key to what a MBT must be capable of doing is pretty simple:

1. It must be mobile enough to actually succeed in the shock role that the tank was designed for - this excludes the traditional "heavy" tanks with poor mobility, like the Tiger.
2. It should have a gun capable of engaging the primary targets it is going to see from the other sides "MBT". This excludes poorly armed tanks like the Sherman in '44.
3. It needs enough armor to be able to reliably attack enemy non-armored assets without excessive fear of being destroyed.

The key to the MBY concept, IMO, was the realization that the practical realities of the battlefield simply do not consistently allow for specialization in armored roles. The reality is that in most cases, you have to fight the enemy with what is at hand, and rarely have the luxury of the opponent giving you the opportunity to be able to bring your paper when he shows up with his rock. More often than not, you have to fight them with whatever armor is available. If the enemy counter-attacks with their armor, it is your armor that is going to have to fight them, and demands that only dedicated AT assets should fight enemy armor leaving your armor free to fight an exploitation battle are simply not realistic. Therefore, even in 1942, everyone would be better off with a well crafted mix "jack of all trades" tank rather than a hodge podge of special purpose tanks that almost never get the luxury of only being used for their designed purpose.

Technology certainly did change, but fundamentally, the role of the tank never really changed. Is what a tank is supposed to do somehow different from 1943 to 1963, such that in 1963 you no longer needed these incredible numbers of roles you thought you needed in 1943? I don't think so.

I think the Germans actually started to understand this - the Panther is, IMO, the first true attempt to create a MBT, with a weapon system that combined mobility, firepower, and a reasonable amount of protection with the intent of being a general purpose vehicle. But their procurement chain was such a mess they were never really able to put it into real practice. Plus Hitler loved his toys, of course.

The Soviets almost hit on it pretty much by accident in the T-34 line, but they were also rather reactionary in their designs in WW2, and kept building bigger and heavier tanks to counter the monster German tanks, almost completely unsuccessfully.

The Brits...they were a mess. They never had a rational (in hindsight) idea of what their tanks should do - or rather, some of them did, but it was pretty much just a mess overall.

The Americans had plenty of people who understood it, I think, but none of them were people making the decisions. So they kept building failures like the M-10/18/36 despite the fact that they clearly didn't work.

But all of them could be forgiven - trying to forge a coherent procurement strategy in the middle of a world war is probably pretty much impossible.

Just wanted to say - very informative post. 

[Capetan Mihali]

IMO, the British should have deployed more of these:

[DGuller]

That thing has crappy side armor.

[PDH]

A lot of the heavy tanks were not really worth the investment, but were produced for reasons other than they were the best out there.  The KV-1, with a gun the same size as the T34 was heavily armored, but it was a mechanical nightmare.  Read about the shifting problems for one thing.  It was produced because stopping the production in 1941 would have meant too many delays, but in 1943 the attempts to make it faster only lightened the armor (though this did get rid of the weird rear facing machine gun in the turret), and still resulted in a tank functionally no better than the T34.

The IS tanks were upgrades, but also compromises.  The 122mm gun was a space-waster, with separate projectile and propellant (read about the ammo limitations on the IS2, for instance), and the more maneuverable T34/85 still fitted the roles that Berkut talks about better and more often.

The story of the over-designed, too expensive, and at times problematic Tiger is well known.  The expense did not justify the resources taken from other tanks.  Even the Panther, the prototype of the MBT was over designed with a bad engine choice and too expensive.  The Germans liked bigger, but the tanks were not ready in enough numbers (and couldn't fight off the hordes of "lesser" tanks that were cheaper).  A redesigned Pz IV, or the copy of the T34 would have been cheaper and likely easier to mass produce.

The Western Allies never made many heavy tanks - there were early show pieces, the British Infantry Tanks sort of qualified in 1939-41, and more often than not the real designs called heavy tanks were MBT prototypes as well.

Eventually the upgraded T34 would become the T44, then the T54 tank.  The M26 Pershing (called a heavy tank, though really not) would be the basis for the M48 line.  The Centurion would end up being the first really well thought out British tank, but arrive too late for the war, but still the first MBT of Great Britain.

[Warspite]

To what extent did the MBT concept also need associated technical advances before it could mature?

The Centurion, for example, really comes into its own post-war with the Royal Ordnance L7 gun.

But for the right blend of mobility and protection, you also need powerful engines of some degree of efficiency.

I don't know the answer or if this is even a pertinent question, so would be very interested to hear thoughts.

[PDH]

I think the US could have fielded a far better tank than the M4 earlier in the war, but both the decision to have the Tank + Tank Destroyer forces as well as the "all out" on the Sherman production meant that was impeded.  The engines (look at all the experimentation on the M4 powerplants), better tracks, understanding (if not implementation) of better armor schemes were all there by 1942.

Still, the MBT appears at the very end of the war for a good reason, it took hard earned lessons to realize what was wrong and what was right.