http://www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=10461 (http://www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=10461)
QuoteWar Game: The Hours following an Attack on Iran's Nuclear Infrastructures - The Policies of the Actors and Principal Insights INSS Insight No. 382, November 4, 2012
Dekel, Udi and Lerner, Yonathan
The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) held a war game (simulation) focusing on the first 48 hours after an Israeli aerial attack on Iran's nuclear infrastructures.
The Scenario
After midnight on November 9, al-Jazeera reports that Israeli airplanes have attacked Iran's nuclear facilities in three waves of attack. As reports multiply, Israel officially announces it has attacked Iran's nuclear sites because it had no other choice. According to the scenario, Israel did not coordinate the attack with the United States in advance, and only informed the US once the planes were already en route to the Iranian targets. Initial assessments estimate that the Iranian nuclear program has been set back by nearly three years.
Following the successful attack, Iran decides to react with maximal force, launching missiles from within its borders and urging its proxies – Hizbollah, Hamas, and other radical elements – to attack Israel. Nonetheless, it is careful to avoid attacking American targets. Israel attempts to contain the attacks and works to attain a state of calm as rapidly as possible. The international community is paralyzed, largely because Russia tries to exploit the situation for its own strategic objectives. At the end of the first 48 hours, Iran continues to attack Israel, as do their proxies, albeit to a lesser extent. At this point in the simulation, the crisis does not seem to be close to a resolution.
Main Policies of the Various Actors
Israel: After achieving its operational goals, Israel showed restraint in the face of provocations and reactions by the radical players spurred by Iran. In parallel, Israel conducted an additional aerial attack to complete destruction of one of the major targets in Iran. Israel's strategic objective focused on preventing regional escalation and achieving as fast as possible a level of events that was controllable and of low intensity.
The United States: Although not informed before the event, the United States clearly stood by Israel's side and did not expose its differences of opinion with Israel, in order to present a united front against any possible regional escalation. The United States demonstrated willingness to return to the negotiating table and even relax the sanctions, provided Iran showed restraint and in exchange for an Iranian declaration it was ending its military nuclear program. The United States decided it would take military action against Iran only if Iran were to close to the Strait of Hormuz or attack American allies and assets in the Gulf. Similarly, the United States activated economic measures to control the rise in oil prices.
Iran: In light of the outcome of the Israeli attack, Iran felt it had no choice but to react strongly and militarily against Israel, launching some 100 Shehab missiles right away (and another 100 in round two) at Tel Aviv, the Negev Nuclear Research Center in Dimona, and various cities. Iran also pressured its proxies to act against Israel and launch rocket and missiles at Israeli targets, as well as engage in multi-front acts of terrorism. At the same time, Iran appealed to the international community to grant legitimacy to its enrichment program and revoke the sanctions against it. At first, Iran chose not to attack American targets and assets to keep the United States from joining the fight against it. But the more Iran felt it was cornered and its freedom of action was curtailed, it realized that its strongest card lay in acting against America's allies in the Gulf and closing the Strait of Hormuz.
Russia chose to promote its objectives in the Caucasus and Europe. Russia also viewed the attack as an opportunity to position itself as the leading actor in the international community because of its ability to communicate with all the actors involved. However, the gap between the US and the Russian positions led to a paralysis of the international community's ability to act. In turn, and in the absence of American leadership, China, with access to all the relevant actors, became a key player on the international field.
Syria preferred to focus on its domestic upheaval, maintain a low profile, and not be dragged into combat against Israel.
Hizbollah found itself in a quandary. On the one hand, Hizbollah came under heavy Iranian pressure to begin a massive launch of missiles and rockets at Israel, this being the "day of reckoning" for which Iran had furnished Hizbollah with 50,000 missiles and rockets. On the other hand, Hizbollah was wary about causing heavy damage in Lebanon yet again. It therefore chose to respond to Iran's demands selectively by launching rockets at Israeli military targets, especially airfields and active anti-missile defense systems. Israel's restrained response intensified Hizbollah's dilemma and supported its decision to attack to a relatively limited degree and focus on military targets.
Hamas chose to walk a fine line by demonstrating some commitment towards Iran, while making sure not to provide Israel with an excuse for a large scale attack in the Gaza Strip. Hamas' limited ability to control rogue and radical elements in Gaza was evident, and Hamas was forced to ask the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt for help in restraining the rogue elements it lacked the power to control.
The other actors – Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, Turkey, and the international community: Each chose to operate on the basis of its own particular interests, distance itself from the events, and prevent widespread regional escalation.
Insights from the War Game
a. The war game staged the first 48 hours after the attack. The intention was not to predict developments, rather to examine the significance and implications of one possible scenario. The players acted very rationally, demonstrating preventive policies and motivated by crucial interests alone, and ignored domestic and external constraints.
b. The Israeli actor assessed that the Israeli public possesses the stamina and fortitude to absorb the blows because it was convinced that for Israel, this was a war of no choice that had achieved is operational goals. The policy of restraint was based primarily on this assumption.
c. Iran has only limited tools and a limited ability to hit Israel directly, and therefore must operate its proxies against it. Iran has tools that are more relevant in the Persian Gulf sector, capable of hurting American interests and causing global oil prices to spike. Nonetheless, Iran clearly understood the cost it would have to pay should it ignite the Persian Gulf, especially the United States joining the fighting. This would only incur greater damage to its nuclear infrastructures and greater destruction to a wide array of quality targets in Iran.
d. A successful Israeli attack with clear cut results and the meeting of the operational objectives would lead to two contradictory trends: on the one hand, Iran would be obligated to respond militarily and via its proxies; on the other hand its dependence on proxies would allow deterrence of the relevant actors and insertion of a wedge between Iran and its regional allies, thereby preventing regional escalation and encouraging containment.
e. Two other important elements likely to help contain the events are America's clear resolve to stand with Israel and a restrained policy on Israel's part, especially if the strategic objectives of the attack were met in the initial attack.
f. The simulation again raised the disadvantage of having no access to Iran's Supreme Leader and the limited levers of influence. In general, it became clear that there are no reliable lines of communication with the Iranian leadership. While Russia cannot serve as a credible channel for dialogue, it emerged that China may be capable of serving as a mediator.
g. In planning the exit strategy and a mechanism to contain and mitigate negative developments, Israel cannot rely on the international community. It is highly probable that the deepening of the divide between the United States and Russia would paralyze the international community. Some of the players on the international arena would like to see Israel "bleed" in order to pay for attacking Iran, regardless of the interests of others, and to restrain its actions in the future. If the crisis were prolonged, it could generate unintended consequences with the risk of regional escalation. Efforts by regional and international elements to end the event may involve a cost to Israel in the area of arms control.
Conclusion
When the simulation was planned, it appeared that the fall of 2012 would be a critical period, and therefore it was decided to examine the possible developments subsequent to an Israeli attack. This sense of an imminent decision has since abated somewhat, but after the US and Israeli elections, the question of an attack will undoubtedly resurface. It is therefore critical to continue to examine the potential ramifications of an attack.
The scenario of an Israeli attack immediately after the US elections does not reflect the position of the Institute for National Security Studies. The possibility of an Israeli attack at any time is complex and has been analyzed in many INSS publications. Overall, there are two opposing assessments of the implications of an Israeli attack. One anticipates the outbreak of World War III, while the other envisions containment and restraint, and presumes that in practice, Iran's capabilities to ignite the Middle East are limited. The war game that took place developed in the direction of containment and restraint, with the actors motivated mainly by rational considerations and critical interests.
You trying to give me a murder boner Sal?
Quote from: Ed Anger on November 07, 2012, 10:47:26 AM
You trying to give me a murder boner Sal?
I aim to please. ;)
Hi Sal :hug:
This whole attack Iran thing I think is just a troll, this thing has supposedly been imminent for at least five years.
Unsurprisingly, many other militaries run exercises based around Israel attacking Irans' nuclear sites :bowler:
Soo.. the takeaway is
Israelis are willing to suffer the retaliation since they know that the attack is necessary
Iran can only retaliate against Israel through proxies (Hizbullah/Hamas) who are already deterred despite a desire to kill all isrealis.
Iran can retaliate directly only against Israeli allies such as the US by attacking oil trade i the gulf which would presumably bankrupt the iranian state in the process.
Wait... Saladin?
Are you the Kurd living in Sweden?
If so welcome back. :hug:
Quote from: Brazen on November 07, 2012, 11:05:20 AM
Unsurprisingly, many other militaries run exercises based around Israel attacking Irans' nuclear sites :bowler:
Who's side is Britain on?
It was reported over here that in 2010 the heads of Mossad and the Israeli army refused to obey orders from Netanyahu to prepare for an attack to Iran, was it reported in the forum?
Quote from: The Larch on November 07, 2012, 12:57:13 PM
It was reported over here that in 2010 the heads of Mossad and the Israeli army refused to obey orders from Netanyahu to prepare for an attack to Iran, was it reported in the forum?
No.
Quote from: mongers on November 07, 2012, 02:10:13 PM
Quote from: The Larch on November 07, 2012, 12:57:13 PM
It was reported over here that in 2010 the heads of Mossad and the Israeli army refused to obey orders from Netanyahu to prepare for an attack to Iran, was it reported in the forum?
No.
I can only find it in English from non mainstream media, so I'd take it with a pinch of salt just in case. It quotes a documentary broadcasted in Israel this week about the issue.. Here's an article from the Jerusalem Post, no idea about how reliable it is:
http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Article.aspx?id=290473 (http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Article.aspx?id=290473)
Quote'PM ordered IDF on alert for Iran strike in 2010'
Channel 2 reports move was met with virulent objections from both IDF, Mossad chiefs, who called the move "illegal."
Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak ordered the IDF to raise its alert level ahead of a possible attack on Iranian nuclear facilities in 2010, a move which drew virulent objections from both the IDF and Mossad chiefs, according to a Channel 2 investigative report previewed on Sunday evening.
During a meeting of select senior ministers in 2010, Netanyahu allegedly ordered the IDF to raise its state of alert to "P-plus," reserved for an imminent state of war, according to the report.
Then-IDF chief of staff Gabi Ashkenazi and then-Mossad chief Meir Dagan considered the order "illegal" and resisted it.
"This is not something you do unless you're certain you want to see it through," Channel 2 quoted Ashkenazi as saying.
The report cited "sources close to Ashkenazi" as explaining that such a move would create "facts on the ground" that invariably would lead to war.
Citing a number of people present at the meeting, Dagan stated unequivocally that such a move would be "illegal," adding that it would require cabinet approval.
The report quoted him as saying after the meeting that "the prime minister and defense minister are simply trying to steal a war."
In an interview broadcast Thursday on Channel 2, Barak accused Ashkenazi of not having adequately prepared the military for such a scenario, revealing a serious rift between Israel's political and military echelons.
Barak also denied the claim made by both Ashkenazi and Dagan that the command would necessarily have led Israel to war with Iran.
"A chief of staff must create the operational capacity. He must provide his professional recommendation on whether or not to enact a given order, and we must even take this opinion into account. But we can also proceed in opposition to his recommendation," Barak said.
Quote from: The Larch on November 07, 2012, 02:50:28 PM
Quote from: mongers on November 07, 2012, 02:10:13 PM
Quote from: The Larch on November 07, 2012, 12:57:13 PM
It was reported over here that in 2010 the heads of Mossad and the Israeli army refused to obey orders from Netanyahu to prepare for an attack to Iran, was it reported in the forum?
No.
I can only find it in English from non mainstream media, so I'd take it with a pinch of salt just in case. It quotes a documentary broadcasted in Israel this week about the issue.. Here's an article from the Jerusalem Post, no idea about how reliable it is:
http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Article.aspx?id=290473 (http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Article.aspx?id=290473)
Quote'PM ordered IDF on alert for Iran strike in 2010'
Channel 2 reports move was met with virulent objections from both IDF, Mossad chiefs, who called the move "illegal."
Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak ordered the IDF to raise its alert level ahead of a possible attack on Iranian nuclear facilities in 2010, a move which drew virulent objections from both the IDF and Mossad chiefs, according to a Channel 2 investigative report previewed on Sunday evening.
During a meeting of select senior ministers in 2010, Netanyahu allegedly ordered the IDF to raise its state of alert to "P-plus," reserved for an imminent state of war, according to the report.
Then-IDF chief of staff Gabi Ashkenazi and then-Mossad chief Meir Dagan considered the order "illegal" and resisted it.
"This is not something you do unless you're certain you want to see it through," Channel 2 quoted Ashkenazi as saying.
The report cited "sources close to Ashkenazi" as explaining that such a move would create "facts on the ground" that invariably would lead to war.
Citing a number of people present at the meeting, Dagan stated unequivocally that such a move would be "illegal," adding that it would require cabinet approval.
The report quoted him as saying after the meeting that "the prime minister and defense minister are simply trying to steal a war."
In an interview broadcast Thursday on Channel 2, Barak accused Ashkenazi of not having adequately prepared the military for such a scenario, revealing a serious rift between Israel's political and military echelons.
Barak also denied the claim made by both Ashkenazi and Dagan that the command would necessarily have led Israel to war with Iran.
"A chief of staff must create the operational capacity. He must provide his professional recommendation on whether or not to enact a given order, and we must even take this opinion into account. But we can also proceed in opposition to his recommendation," Barak said.
The Guardian ran a piece on it the other day.
Obama does not need to worry about re-election anymore, so he is free to support a strike on Iran. I hope CdM is prodding the right people.
Quote from: Solmyr on November 07, 2012, 06:36:56 PM
Obama does not need to worry about re-election anymore, so he is free to support a strike on Iran. I hope CdM is prodding the right people.
Eh, if he was really worried that he might lose, he would have bombed Iran before the elections.
Quote from: Solmyr on November 07, 2012, 06:36:56 PM
Obama does not need to worry about re-election anymore, so he is free to support a strike on Iran. I hope CdM is prodding the right people.
I can only yell so much.
It'll come, one way or another. The only real difference between Romney's and Obama's positions were whether it's going to be sooner or later.
QuoteDoes Obama's victory mean defeat for Netanyahu?
WashingtonPost.com
By Max Fisher and the Washington Post Foreign Staff
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made little secret of his preference for Mitt Romney in the U.S. presidential election, part of a very public push against President Obama that went back to an early 2011 "truth tour" in which the Israeli leader lectured his most important ally from the floor of the U.S. Congress. It was an odd and potentially risky bit of diplomacy from Netanyahu.
Now that Obama has won reelection, many in the U.S. and in Israel see bad news for Bibi. "This is probably not a very good morning for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu," his interior minister told a reporter today. It's difficult to imagine, though, that Obama would seek "payback" or "punishment" against his Israeli counterpart. The U.S.-Israel alliance has been so institutionalized (to borrow Steven Cook's word), the U.S. and Israel share so many mutual interests, and so much of the U.S.-Israeli relationship goes through Congress, that Obama doesn't really have many opportunities or incentives for payback.
But there is a more plausible way that Obama's victory could effect Netanyahu: by strengthening his opponents in domestic Israeli politics. The conservative leader's coalition is expected to retain power in an early 2013 election, prevailing over fractured political opposition. The big question is whether Israeli voters perceive Netanyahu as so badly mishandling the alliance with America, a crucial issue in Israel, that they push Netanyahu's coalition to the left, or out of leadership altogether. I asked some Israel-watchers about this, and they seem to think it's plausible but unlikely that Obama's victory will ultimately mean Netanyahu's defeat.
"Israelis believe it is their [prime minister]'s job to maintain good relations with the U.S. above almost anything else," The Atlantic's Jeffrey Goldberg told me when I noted that Israeli voters are not particularly enamored with Obama. Tamara Cofman Wittes, a former Obama administration official now at the Brookings Institution, asked whether voters would "punish Bibi in elex for his management of the relationship." Still, in order for Israeli voters to do so, they'd need to see "a unified and strong opposition party to exploit Netanyahu's maladroit handling of the American file," Goldberg said.
So far, though, there's not much of an opposition in place to champion any public backlash. Israeli columnist Larry Derfner sees this as the opportunity for one to coalesce. "The Israeli right is vulnerable as it hasn't been in 12 years," he wrote at Israeli news site 972, going through possible candidates and parties. But Derfner is in some ways rooting for his own team. Some analysts don't see, as Wittes put it, an Israeli opposition figure "who can play this card effectively against Bibi." In any case, "this [strategy] only works if Israelis see tangible consequences resulting from Bibi's behavior," writer Michael Koplow predicts. And Goldberg warned it could be politically "dangerous" for Israeli politicians to hit Netanyahu "too hard" on the issue.
As for whether or not the U.S. president could inch the politics away from Netanyahu if he wanted to, Koplow has written, "Obama does not have the popularity, credibility, or familiarity with Israeli voters" to guide their votes. Though this potential Israeli political skirmish centers on the relationship with America, it is still a fundamentally Israeli issue that will likely be determined by Israeli, not American, politicians and voters.
Bibi's been rowing back for a few months. But his congratulations today were very awkward, I think he knows he made a mistake in trying to play internal US politics against a President. Also Ehud Barak seems to be pushing that he has a very good relationship with Obama (he apparently spent this morning e-mailing journalists photos and videos of him and Obama).
I think the subtext of that is perhaps that the Bibi-Lieberman party alliance is dangerous, I'm a steady pair of hands.
There's also rumours that this could help push Olmert back into politics.
I'd love to see Bibi tossed out on his ass. Guy has been a fucking tool.
I'd like to see the tanker from Chinese Farm back in the picture myself. Barak is level-headed.
QuoteSeveral news agencies are reporting that the British Ministry of Defense is considering deploying Eurofighter Typhoons to Al Dhafra airbase, in the United Arab Emirates, on a long term basis.
The British Newspaper The Independent ran an article quoting MOD sources as saying that the aircraft not only are to deploy to the region, but could be part funded by the UAE themselves.
The French Air Force already have a presence at the base and that presence is funded by the UAE and is also home to the 380th Air Expeditionary Wing of the U.S. Air Force with jets (including the stealthy F-22 Raptor) and Patriot missile batteries.
The Typhoons could be used to protect the Strait of Hormuz, should the Iranians decide to blockade the strategically important bottle neck for 40% of the worlds oil, should they come under attack.
However the official line from the Ministry of Defense in London came in the form of a press release which said: "The UK regularly deploys Typhoon to UAE as part of our routine exercise programme and to demonstrate our military commitment to UAE and the security of the wider region. We have a mutual interest with our GCC [Gulf] partners in ensuring peace and stability in the region, and exercises such as this allow us to practice working together."
The MoD added: "These deployments are not due to our concerns over Iran's nuclear programme. As we continue to make clear, the Government does not believe military action against Iran is the right course of action at this time, although no option is off the table."
Although its clear the decision hasn't been made, in public at least, it does look with the funding possibly sorted that this will come about.
It may just be a case of timing the announcement, as it happens British Prime Minsiter David Cameron is currently in Dubai trying to drum up trade for British defense contractors and Eurofighter; it could be announced whilst Cameron is in the area and be a bit of a deal sweetener for sales of Eurofighter jets to UAE.
Richard Clements for TheAviationist.com
Fuckers fired on one of drones in the gulf.
There's gonna be a lot of that.
Quote from: CountDeMoney on November 08, 2012, 07:06:00 PM
There's gonna be a lot of that.
Time to erase one of their airbases.
I wonder why the military is making a big deal out the drone thing. I mean, they are drones, they are suppose to be disposable. Maybe we are about to do something. That would be cool.
Laying the groundwork?
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/09/world/middleeast/pentagon-says-iran-fired-at-surveillance-drone-last-week.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
Quote from: Razgovory on November 08, 2012, 07:08:02 PM
I wonder why the military is making a big deal out the drone thing. I mean, they are drones, they are suppose to be disposable. Maybe we are about to do something. That would be cool.
Just putting it out there, not for public discourse, but public preparation. America doesn't like to wake up in the morning and find out there's been an exchange of fire that just "came out of nowhere".
One morning, I'd like to wake up to news of B-52 strikes on Iran.
Amen, brother. JDAMS with "Remember '79" in chalk.
Quote from: CountDeMoney on November 09, 2012, 08:03:12 AM
Quote from: Razgovory on November 08, 2012, 07:08:02 PM
I wonder why the military is making a big deal out the drone thing. I mean, they are drones, they are suppose to be disposable. Maybe we are about to do something. That would be cool.
Just putting it out there, not for public discourse, but public preparation. America doesn't like to wake up in the morning and find out there's been an exchange of fire that just "came out of nowhere".
That's kinda what I've been expecting. I imagine I'll just wake up one morning and find out there is now a bombing campaign in Iran.
Sell Iran to EA.
On Bibi's bad bets:
QuoteIsrael's prime minister
Bad bets
Nov 9th 2012, 16:11 by D.L. | JERUSALEM
ISRAEL'S prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, suffered not one but two vicarious electoral defeats on Tuesday. Twice this week he has had to swallow hard and congratulate candidates he hoped would lose. The winners were equally cordial to him on the phone. If they enjoyed his discomfiture, they concealed it well. Politics is about interests, not likes and dislikes, and Mr Netanyahu is firmly on course to victory in Israel's upcoming election, on January 22.
Bibi's more famous wrong horse, of course, was Barack Obama. The Israeli leader is taking flak at home and abroad for his unconcealed preference for Mitt Romney, an old friend and political kindred spirit.
Less resonant around the world, but no less stinging in Israel, was the bad bet Mr Netanyahu placed in the leadership election of a small but important Israeli party, Habayit Hayehudi [The Jewish Home]. The challenger, Naftali Bennett, served as bureau chief to Mr Netanyahu when he led the opposition from 2006-2008. Mr Bennett managed to fall foul both of his boss and his powerful wife, Sara. The Netanyahus pulled every string they could to foil Mr Bennett's bid to enter politics, but to no avail. He won by a margin of 2-1 among Habayit Hayehudi's 54,000 members. "It reminded me of my own victory in the Likud primaries in 1993," Mr Netanyahu cooed down the line to Mr Bennett on Wednesday. It was the first time they had talked in more than three years.
Both presume they will be talking a great deal across the cabinet table after the January election. Habayit, with its three Knesset seats, is a junior partner in Mr Netanyahu's coalition. Mr Bennett intends to transform it into a major one, becoming a senior minister himself along the way. "You'll be prime minister again," he told Mr Netanyahu. "No doubt about that now that you've teamed up with [Avigdor] Lieberman."
Mr Netanyahu and Mr Lieberman, the foreign minister, recently surprised Israeli pundits and public alike by announcing that their two parties, Likud and Yisrael Beitenu, would merge and run in the election as a single block. Their purpose is to ensure that Mr Netanyahu emerges as the head of the largest faction, giving the president, Shimon Peres, no pretext to call on a more moderate contender to try and form a government. (So far the 89-year-old Mr Peres has resisted pressure to stand down as president and run in the election at the head of a list of centre-left parties which might beat Mr Netanyahu's block.)
Mr Bennett has told his supporters that while in government he intends to make sure that Mr Netanyahu makes no mistakes: "the Land of Israel is not up for trading or concession." A one-time head of the Judea and Samaria Settlers Council, he is an unabashed annexationist. Under his leadership, Habayit Hayehudi (formerly called the National Religious Party) will unequivocally oppose the two-state solution.
Mr Netanyahu, who professes to support the establishment of a Palestinian state, will be able to argue that he is hemmed in by his hardline coalition partners and so unable to offer any concessions to the Palestinians, or even negotiate with them. He has hewed to much the same line over the past four years. Mr Obama, after some early attempts to budge him, gave up trying. Now, free of political and electoral pressures, he will have to decide whether to try again.
Abbas recently made two interesting comments in an interview on Israeli TV. One was that he would like to return to the village in Israel that he's from but that he'd only do so as a tourist, he seemed to apply the Palestinians may give in on the right of return (probably along the lines of the almost Abbas-Olmert deal which included symbolic return). Second was his firm declaration, with some adjustments (again Abbas-Olmert), that 'Palestine for me is the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as the capital. This is Palestine.' He repeated the line on Egyptian TV a couple of days later firmly stating that Palestine aspires to 1967 borders and accepts Israel's existence. For both remarks he's being vilified by Hamas.
Meanwhile Lieberman, who's called for Abbas's resignation, has apparently told EU and US officials that if the PA applies for UN recognition again then he will do everything in his power to dismantle the Palestinian Authority. Given that he's Foreign Minister and presumed heir to Bibi - if the merger works - that's a fair bit of power.
Here's the Economist again:
QuoteFor him, the wrong American
Binyamin Netanyahu looks a bit less impregnable since America's election
Nov 10th 2012 | JERUSALEM | from the print edition
WITH polls in Israel ten weeks away, Binyamin Netanyahu's Likud party fears the influence on Israeli voters of a resurgent Barack Obama back in the White House. "Say Obama appointed Bill Clinton his Middle East peace envoy before the Israeli election," mused a seasoned observer. A fresh effort by Mr Obama to revive the moribund peace process might well stir even worse blood between Washington and Jerusalem if in January Mr Netanyahu were also returned to office.
Messrs Obama and Netanyahu were at odds virtually throughout the president's first term. Their relations were often sour. Mr Netanyahu uninhibitedly hoped his old friend Mitt Romney would win the American presidency. Both men have been lavishly backed by Sheldon Adelson, a Jewish-American casino magnate who promotes Israel's hawks and settlers.
Mr Obama's victory also presents a moment of truth for Ehud Olmert and Tzipi Livni, respectively prime minister and foreign minister in the previous Israeli government (2006-09). They have been pondering separately and together whether to lead the challenge against Mr Netanyahu in the coming election or sit it out on the sidelines. Mr Olmert, though acquitted recently of most charges in a corruption trial, is still facing an appeal by the state prosecutor and is still embroiled in a separate bribery case. Ms Livni was defeated earlier this year as leader of the Kadima party, which won the last election but failed to form a ruling coalition.
If one or both of them take the plunge, the campaign will focus to a much greater degree than at present on the frozen peace process. Mr Netanyahu has steered clear of it, preferring to dwell on Iran's perceived nuclear threat and his determination to thwart it, by military means if need be. The Labour party, second in the opinion polls behind the Likud, has preferred to campaign on the economy rather than peace with the Palestinians.
This lacuna at the heart of Israeli politics was starkly highlighted on November 1st, when Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian president, said on Israeli television that he considered he had a right to visit his hometown, Safed, in northern Israel, but not to live there. He was immediately accused by fellow Palestinians of forgoing their hallowed "right of return"—to live in any part of the former Palestine mandate in what is now Israel.
In the Gaza Strip, ruled by the fundamentalist Hamas movement, Mr Abbas's image was burned on the streets in angry demonstrations. He nevertheless repeated the substance of his remarks on Egyptian television, spelling out again that a Palestinian state would arise on the West Bank and Gaza, but not in Israel as internationally defined before the war of 1967.
Mr Netanyahu dismissed the Palestinian leader's remarks as disingenuous. But Mr Olmert and Ms Livni, as well as Israel's president and former prime minister, Shimon Peres, issued statements praising them. "Whoever is interested in preserving a secure Jewish and democratic state, should embrace this interview," Ms Livni urged. "But peace has been turned into a dirty word...We must work together to bring down Netanyahu."
If only I had lasted longer...
Mr Olmert accused the prime minister of "trying to prove to the Israeli public that there is no partner on the Palestinian side," which, he said, was demonstrably untrue. Messrs Olmert and Abbas have both said they might well have won a comprehensive peace agreement, had Mr Olmert been able to stay in office two or three months longer; he was forced to quit amid corruption allegations. Their discussions were based on accepting the 1967 borders with adjustments and minor land swaps to accommodate the biggest Jewish settlement blocks on the West Bank. The ancient heart of Jerusalem and its holy places were to be administered by an international regime. Mr Netanyahu has always refused to reopen negotiations with Mr Abbas on such a basis.
If Mr Netanyahu, like Mr Obama, retains his post, as is widely predicted, some foresee the revival of an old idea to link a deal with the Palestinians to one with Iran: the Americans would increase their pressure on Iran to curb its nuclear plans while insisting more forcefully, as a quid pro quo, that Israel stops stalling on its talks with the Palestinians. Mr Netanyahu might not like that either. But he might have to go along with it.
How much authority does Abbas still have these days?
Quote from: Razgovory on November 09, 2012, 09:20:57 PM
How much authority does Abbas still have these days?
He's still the head of the PA (with the PM a former IMF technocrat who's been widely praised for reforming the Palestinian authority). They're in control of the bits of the West Bank Israel allows them to be in charge of - or I think they're in charge of the civilian aspects of government in all of the non-settlement areas of the West Bank, but that certain areas Israel retains security control of outside of the settlements, then there's areas where the PA are in charge of both the civilian and security. As I've said for the last few years the PA's security services (supported by the EU, Russia and the US) have emerged as a reasonably useful and credible support for Israel.