I'm trying to fact-check a document: my net connection sucks and I'm away from all my reference books for the next few days.
Do any naval grognards here (*cough* grumbler) know whether the Grand Fleet assumed action stations at Scapa Flow on 31 July 1914, or on 1 August 1914?
First correct answer gets an internet pint on me.
Quote from: Warspite on April 14, 2011, 07:31:57 AM
I'm trying to fact-check a document: my net connection sucks and I'm away from all my reference books for the next few days.
Do any naval grognards here (*cough* grumbler) know whether the Grand Fleet assumed action stations at Scapa Flow on 31 July 1914, or on 1 August 1914?
First correct answer gets an internet pint on me.
The Royal navy went on a war footing on 28 July, transferred to war stations the night of the 209th/30th, and was declared ready for war on the 31st (i.e. First Fleet was at Scapa). "actions stations' are something assumed by individual ships. I believe "war footing" or "fully mobilized" is the phrase you are looking for; if the latter, the date is 3 August.
See
The Royal Navy: an illustrated history p. 87 (available via google books when you have a connection).
The Home Fleet left Portsmouth July 29th, entered Scapa Flow on July 31st. However, the Grand Fleet did not do anything until August 4th, as it came into existence with Jellicoe's appointment.
Very useful, thank you both.
That's what we're here for.
But cwhat would have happened if the HSF had used the window of late '14 early '15 when there was something at least resembling even numbers in the fleets? Could they have succeeded with an early aggressive strategy?
Depends on the Confederacy.
Quote from: Threviel on April 14, 2011, 02:46:51 PM
But cwhat would have happened if the HSF had used the window of late '14 early '15 when there was something at least resembling even numbers in the fleets? Could they have succeeded with an early aggressive strategy?
Had they know how crappy the British shells and flashproofing were, they might have. The German near-parity wasn't as near parity as raw numbers would suggest, though, because the HSF lacked the scouting and screening elements they needed.
Quote from: grumbler on April 14, 2011, 03:17:14 PM
Quote from: Threviel on April 14, 2011, 02:46:51 PM
But cwhat would have happened if the HSF had used the window of late '14 early '15 when there was something at least resembling even numbers in the fleets? Could they have succeeded with an early aggressive strategy?
Had they know how crappy the British shells and flashproofing were, they might have. The German near-parity wasn't as near parity as raw numbers would suggest, though, because the HSF lacked the scouting and screening elements they needed.
Yeah, the German scouts were out commerce raiding under Spee, and their annihilation was costly.
And even then, the battlefleet had the Deutchlands and the Nassaus hanging around its neck. At the beginning of the war, the Germans only had the 5 Kaisers and the 4 Ostfrieslands that were ready for action and not seriously compromised, and even the Ostfrieslands were a bit vulnerable because of the hex turret layout.
Wouldn't german flash-protection be equally bad without the experience of a battlecruiser almost blowing up?
Quote from: Threviel on April 15, 2011, 08:09:27 AM
Wouldn't german flash-protection be equally bad without the experience of a battlecruiser almost blowing up?
The Germans used a more stable powder than the British cordite formulation and had better anti-flash protection from the start (not being as focused on rate of fire), though their measures were not adequate (as Seydlitz found at Dogger bank). The Germans always stored powder lowest in the magazine; the Brits stored shells lowest until after Jutland.
The Brits lost more than just the battle cruisers due to their ammunition and magazine policies; Good Hope at Coronel suffered a fatal ammunition fire, Defence was lost with all hands when an initially small magazine fire spread throughout the ship and blew it open, and several battleships were almost lost due to secondary magazine fires.
Quote from: grumbler on April 15, 2011, 08:37:59 AMDefence was lost with all hands when an initially small magazine fire spread throughout the ship and blew it open, and several battleships were almost lost due to secondary magazine fires.
That would have been an interesting turn of events.
Quote from: grumbler on April 15, 2011, 08:37:59 AM
The Brits lost more than just the battle cruisers due to their ammunition and magazine policies; Good Hope at Coronel suffered a fatal ammunition fire, Defence was lost with all hands when an initially small magazine fire spread throughout the ship and blew it open, and several battleships were almost lost due to secondary magazine fires.
What was the reason for this series of potentially devestating flaws? Design by committee? Design by retards? Bad luck of having to learn these lessons in wartime?
Quote from: grumbler on April 15, 2011, 08:37:59 AM
Quote from: Threviel on April 15, 2011, 08:09:27 AM
Wouldn't german flash-protection be equally bad without the experience of a battlecruiser almost blowing up?
The Germans used a more stable powder than the British cordite formulation and had better anti-flash protection from the start (not being as focused on rate of fire), though their measures were not adequate (as Seydlitz found at Dogger bank). The Germans always stored powder lowest in the magazine; the Brits stored shells lowest until after Jutland.
The Brits lost more than just the battle cruisers due to their ammunition and magazine policies; Good Hope at Coronel suffered a fatal ammunition fire, Defence was lost with all hands when an initially small magazine fire spread throughout the ship and blew it open, and several battleships were almost lost due to secondary magazine fires.
How did other navies handle this? I know the japs lost at least one battleship in WW2 to magazine explosion, but I don't know the reasons behind. How good flash-protection did the austrians, french and italians have? Were their ships sound in construction?
Quote from: Warspite on April 15, 2011, 10:59:29 AM
What was the reason for this series of potentially devestating flaws? Design by committee? Design by retards? Bad luck of having to learn these lessons in wartime?
Lack of thinking things through. Powder was much better-protected if lower in the magazine, but also more susceptible to damp. So, "logic" said to stow powder above the shells, where it would be less exposed to damp.
The RN worshiped at the alter of firepower at this time, and so created the fastest-firing guns using the most powerful (and quick-burning) powder available. The thought of what this would do to ship safety wasn't sexy, so wasn't pursued. Given the aggressive mindset that had served the RN so well (and would serve them well again in WW2), this was understandable.
Quote from: Threviel on April 15, 2011, 11:03:24 AM
How did other navies handle this? I know the japs lost at least one battleship in WW2 to magazine explosion, but I don't know the reasons behind. How good flash-protection did the austrians, french and italians have? Were their ships sound in construction?
Dunno about the Austrians, but the Italians had largely the same philosophy as the British. I don't recall the French position, but if I had to guess, I'd guess they erred on the side of caution. The Russians, as I recall, had the best flash protection systems prewar, followed but he Japanese. Both had seen the necessity after the Russo-Japanese War. Since the Germans built the prewar Russian ships and Britain the prewar Japanese, one would think their designers would have looked at the issue again because of their customers' requirements, but that appears to have not been the case in the British case, at least.
No one but the Brits stowed powder above shells.
Whoa, finally an intreesting thread in Languish.
Can anyone recommend a good naval forum by the way? Navweaps is boring and Hennemans battlecruiser forum seems dead for good.
And what would you have done to win the war if you commanded the HSF? Is it winnable from a german perspective?
Quote from: Threviel on April 16, 2011, 12:36:24 PM
And what would you have done to win the war if you commanded the HSF? Is it winnable from a german perspective?
IIRC, the Germans basically tried (or rather, hoped) to catch the British fleet with its pants down, to cut it to size piecemal, right? I think this was the most sensible, and only viable strategy, especially since they did not plan for a long war.
Quote from: Threviel on April 16, 2011, 12:25:22 PM
Can anyone recommend a good naval forum by the way? Navweaps is boring and Hennemans battlecruiser forum seems dead for good.
http://warships1discussionboards.yuku.com/forums/63/Battleship-Vs-Battleship Warships has always been the gold standard, as far as I am concerned.
Quote from: Threviel on April 16, 2011, 12:36:24 PM
And what would you have done to win the war if you commanded the HSF? Is it winnable from a german perspective?
It was possibly winnable in the first few months, when the force ratios were not too detrimental. Unfortunately for the Germans, Jellicoe was too smart to fall into a trap at that point, and the HSF lacked the scouting capability to position their ships to win a battle with the Grand Fleet. Maybe a Jutland-style lure with the battlecruisers would have worked, since Beattie was more aggressive and Jellicoe would have felt honor-bound to support Beattie with the heavy metal, but the Germans would have been operating blind and this would have been more likely a German disaster than a British one. In hindsight, this would still have been a gamble worth taking, but as HSf commander in 1914 I wouldn't have hindsight. I would be far more aware of my limitations than my opportunities.
Quote from: grumbler on April 16, 2011, 03:10:05 PM
Quote from: Threviel on April 16, 2011, 12:25:22 PM
Can anyone recommend a good naval forum by the way? Navweaps is boring and Hennemans battlecruiser forum seems dead for good.
http://warships1discussionboards.yuku.com/forums/63/Battleship-Vs-Battleship Warships has always been the gold standard, as far as I am concerned.
And, BTW, the stuff on the loss of the
Kirishima is golden. It demonstrates rather convincingly that, contrary to Japanese claims,
Kirishima wasn't scuttled, but was hammered to the bottom.
Washington hit her with 20 16" shells in five minutes (for a hit rate of something like 36%), and that was that. Good shoot, Wash.
(https://languish.org/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fcf.geekdo-images.com%2Fimages%2Fpic970880.jpg&hash=8c9c4a136920e9652b49faa2df8f5151bb1eba14)
It seems strange in some ways that the Germans didn't give it a go, their fleet didn't do them much good bottled up in port. But, OTOH, think of the shame of being the Admiral that lost the fleet on a bad odds gamble :huh:
Quote from: Richard Hakluyt on April 16, 2011, 04:15:17 PM
It seems strange in some ways that the Germans didn't give it a go, their fleet didn't do them much good bottled up in port. But, OTOH, think of the shame of being the Admiral that lost the fleet on a bad odds gamble :huh:
The Germans were quite aware of the issues that made their early Dreadnoughts mediocre designs at best. They had no idea of the problems that made British designs even less effective. The German strategy of a "fleet in being" made their navy more valuable, in their eyes, as a token in the foreseen 1915 version of the Vienna Conference than as an actual force to win the war. Remember that no one was in the habit of thinking the RN was actually defeatable. The HSF was not seen as an actual military asset so much as a political one. I don't even think the German had a plan to win a war at sea. Thus, they started WW1 with even fewer submarines (and less effective ones) than the British, and a mindset that the Army would win the war while the Navy just made trouble for the British and served as a token.
Where the German applied effort, they were very successful at the start of the war; the Navy was not the area where they applied much effort, except in commerce-raiding 9where they enjoyed a lot of success). Hindsight is marvelous, but not much use to those lacking it.
(https://languish.org/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fforums.justcommodores.com.au%2Fattachments%2Fjokes-humour%2F107665d1293463842-motivational-posters-potential-teamwork-motivational-poster-1-.jpg&hash=17ccc69c9075ebde6599ef5f1f000253c2db8d8f)
Quote from: grumbler on April 16, 2011, 05:11:36 PM
Quote from: Richard Hakluyt on April 16, 2011, 04:15:17 PM
It seems strange in some ways that the Germans didn't give it a go, their fleet didn't do them much good bottled up in port. But, OTOH, think of the shame of being the Admiral that lost the fleet on a bad odds gamble :huh:
The Germans were quite aware of the issues that made their early Dreadnoughts mediocre designs at best. They had no idea of the problems that made British designs even less effective. The German strategy of a "fleet in being" made their navy more valuable, in their eyes, as a token in the foreseen 1915 version of the Vienna Conference than as an actual force to win the war. Remember that no one was in the habit of thinking the RN was actually defeatable. The HSF was not seen as an actual military asset so much as a political one. I don't even think the German had a plan to win a war at sea. Thus, they started WW1 with even fewer submarines (and less effective ones) than the British, and a mindset that the Army would win the war while the Navy just made trouble for the British and served as a token.
Where the German applied effort, they were very successful at the start of the war; the Navy was not the area where they applied much effort, except in commerce-raiding 9where they enjoyed a lot of success). Hindsight is marvelous, but not much use to those lacking it.
And there was always the fact that until early 1915, it was 'a few more months before we get our new, more powerful ships', as the later Konigs were just becoming operational through the first fall and winter of the war. Then again, for Grosser Kurfust, Markgraf and Kronprinz, the British added Marlborough, Benbow and Emperor of India, not to mentioning acquiring (by hook or by crook) Agincourt, Canada and Erin.
You have to wonder what the results would have been of forcing 'Der Tag' by rushing the channel in August 1914 would have been.
My great grandfather served on Grosser Kürfürst by the way, so I am very happy that the germans didn't try anything serious early in the war.
Beyond anything else, the German naval commanders didn't think that there was any reason to do anything risky in 1914. The Germans had planned for a quick war--"home before the leaves fall" and all that".