http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/25/world/europe/25agincourt.html?hp=&pagewanted=print
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Henry V's Greatest Victory Is Besieged by Academia
By JAMES GLANZ
MAISONCELLE, France — The heavy clay-laced mud behind the cattle pen on Antoine Renault's farm looks as treacherous as it must have been nearly 600 years ago, when King Henry V rode from a spot near here to lead a sodden and exhausted English Army against a French force that was said to outnumber his by as much as five to one.
No one can ever take away the shocking victory by Henry and his "band of brothers," as Shakespeare would famously call them, on St. Crispin's Day, Oct. 25, 1415. They devastated a force of heavily armored French nobles who had gotten bogged down in the region's sucking mud, riddled by thousands of arrows from English longbowmen and outmaneuvered by common soldiers with much lighter gear. It would become known as the Battle of Agincourt.
But Agincourt's status as perhaps the greatest victory against overwhelming odds in military history — and a keystone of the English self-image — has been called into doubt by a group of historians in Britain and France who have painstakingly combed an array of military and tax records from that time and now take a skeptical view of the figures handed down by medieval chroniclers.
The historians have concluded that the English could not have been outnumbered by more than about two to one. And depending on how the math is carried out, Henry may well have faced something closer to an even fight, said Anne Curry, a professor at the University of Southampton who is leading the study.
Those cold figures threaten an image of the battle that even professional researchers and academics have been reluctant to challenge in the face of Shakespearean prose and centuries of English pride, Ms. Curry said.
"It's just a myth, but it's a myth that's part of the British psyche," Ms. Curry said.
The work, which has received both glowing praise and sharp criticism from other historians in the United States and Europe, is the most striking of the revisionist accounts to emerge from a new science of military history. The new accounts tend to be not only more quantitative but also more attuned to political, cultural and technological factors, and focus more on the experience of the common soldier than on grand strategies and heroic deeds.
The approach has drastically changed views on everything from Roman battles with Germanic tribes, to Napoleon's disastrous occupation of Spain, to the Tet offensive in the Vietnam War. But the most telling gauge of the respect being given to the new historians and their penchant for tearing down established wisdom is that it has now become almost routine for American commanders to call on them for advice on strategy and tactics in Afghanistan, Iraq and other present-day conflicts.
The most influential example is the "Counterinsurgency Field Manual" adopted in 2006 by the United States Army and Marines and smack in the middle of the debate over whether to increase troop levels in Afghanistan. Gen. David H. Petraeus, who oversees the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as the head of the United States Central Command, drew on dozens of academic historians and other experts to create the manual. And he named Conrad Crane, director of the United States Army Military History Institute at the Army War College, as the lead writer.
Drawing on dozens of historical conflicts, the manual's prime conclusion is the assertion that insurgencies cannot be defeated without protecting and winning over the general population, regardless of how effective direct strikes on enemy fighters may be. Mr. Crane said that some of his own early historical research involved a comparison of strategic bombing campaigns with attacks on civilians by rampaging armies during the Hundred Years' War, when England tried and ultimately failed to assert control over continental France. Agincourt was perhaps the most stirring victory the English would ever achieve on French soil during the conflict.
The Hundred Years' War never made it into the field manual — the name itself may have served as a deterrent — but after sounding numerous cautions on the vast differences in time, technology and political aims, historians working in the area say that there are some uncanny parallels with contemporary foreign conflicts.
For one thing, by the time Henry landed near the mouth of the Seine on Aug. 14, 1415, and began a rather uninspiring siege of a town called Harfleur, France was on the verge of a civil war, with factions called the Burgundians and the Armagnacs at loggerheads. Henry would eventually forge an alliance with the Burgundians, who in today's terms would become his "local security forces" in Normandy, and he cultivated the support of local merchants and clerics, all practices that would have been heartily endorsed by the counterinsurgency manual.
"I'm not one who sees history repeating itself, but I think a lot of attitudes do," said Kelly DeVries, a professor of history at Loyola College in Maryland who has written extensively on medieval warfare. Mr. DeVries said that fighters from across the region began filtering toward the Armagnac camp as soon as Henry became allied with their enemies. "Very much like Al Qaeda in Iraq, there were very diverse forces coming from very, very different places to fight," Mr. DeVries said.
But first Henry would have his chance at Agincourt. After taking Harfleur, he marched rapidly north and crossed the Somme River east of Calais, his army depleted by dysentery and battle losses and growing hungry and fatigued.
At the same time, the fractious French forces hastily gathered to meet him.
It is here that historians themselves begin fighting, and several take exception to the new scholarship by Ms. Curry's team.
Based on chronicles that he considers to be broadly accurate, Clifford J. Rogers, a professor of history at the United States Military Academy at West Point, argues that Henry was in fact vastly outnumbered. For the English, there were about 1,000 so-called men-at-arms in heavy steel armor from head to toe and 5,000 lightly armored men with longbows. The French assembled roughly 10,000 men-at-arms, each with an attendant called a gros valet who could also fight, and around 4,000 men with crossbows and other fighters.
Although Mr. Rogers writes in a recent paper that the French crossbowmen were "completely outclassed" by the English archers, who could send deadly volleys farther and more frequently, the grand totals would result in a ratio of four to one, close to the traditional figures. Mr. Rogers said in an interview that he regarded the archival records as too incomplete to substantially change those estimates.
Still, several French historians said in interviews this month that they seriously doubted that France, riven by factional strife and drawing from a populace severely depleted by the plague, could have raised an army that large in so short a time. The French king, Charles VI, was also suffering from bouts of insanity.
"It was not the complete French power at Agincourt," said Bertrand Schnerb, a professor of medieval history at the University of Lille, who estimated that there were 12,000 to 15,000 French soldiers.
Ms. Curry, the Southampton historian, said she was comfortable with something close to that lower figure, based on her reading of historical archives, including military pay records, muster rolls, ships' logs, published rosters of the wounded and dead, wartime tax levies and other surviving documents.
On the English side, Ms. Curry calculates that Henry probably had at least 8,680 soldiers with him on his march to Agincourt. She names thousands of the likely troopers, from Adam Adrya, a man-at-arms, to Philip Zevan, an archer.
And an extraordinary online database listing around a quarter-million names of men who served in the Hundred Years' War, compiled by Ms. Curry and her collaborators at the universities in Southampton and Reading, shows that whatever the numbers, Henry's army really was a band of brothers: many of the soldiers were veterans who had served on multiple campaigns together.
"You see tremendous continuity with people who knew and trusted each other," Ms. Curry said.
That trust must have come in handy after Henry, through a series of brilliant tactical moves, provoked the French cavalry — mounted men-at-arms — into charging the masses of longbowmen positioned on the English flanks in a relatively narrow field between two sets of woods that still exist not far from Mr. Renault's farm in Maisoncelle.
The series of events that followed as the French men-at-arms slogged through the muddy, tilled fields behind the cavalry were quick and murderous. Volley after volley of English arrow fire maddened the horses, killed many of the riders and forced the advancing men-at-arms into a mass so dense that many of them could not even lift their arms.
When the heavily armored French men-at-arms fell wounded, many could not get up and simply drowned in the mud as other men stumbled over them. And as order on the French lines broke down completely and panic set in, the much nimbler archers ran forward, killing thousands by stabbing them in the neck, eyes, armpits and groin through gaps in the armor, or simply ganged up and bludgeoned the Frenchmen to death.
"The situation was beyond grisly; it was horrific in the extreme," Mr. Rogers wrote in his paper.
King Henry V had emerged victorious, and as some historians see it, the English crown then mounted a public relations effort to magnify the victory by exaggerating the disparity in numbers.
Whatever the magnitude of the victory, it would not last. The French populace gradually soured on the English occupation as the fighting continued and the civil war remained unresolved in the decades after Henry's death in 1422, Mr. Schnerb said.
"They came into France saying, 'You Frenchmen have civil war, and now our king is coming to give you peace,' " Mr. Schnerb said. "It was a failure."
Unwilling to blame a failed counterinsurgency strategy, Shakespeare pinned the loss on poor Henry VI:
"Whose state so many had the managing, That they lost France and made his England bleed."
Question 1: Is skepticism to the number of each side's forces recent, as the NYT implies? I have my doubts on that
Question 2: How appropriate is it to interpret the Hundred Years War using COIN principles? It's a cool concept, but I don't buy it 100%.
Also, there was a pretty cool link in the original article: http://www.icmacentre.ac.uk/soldier/database/ .
Which side was the insurgency?
Damn activist historians and their secular-humanist pro-commie frog viewpoints.
medieval numbers are always suspect, of course, and any good modern multi-source examination of the records (especially English records) is useful. However, the numbers skew both ways as well.
I personally think that such a debate, while not really earth shattering, does show that the range of data collection is by no means over.
However, the problem is, as so often is the case in academia that positions are staked out in the extreme in order to create noise of one's thesis. As with many things, the consensus is likely closer to the center of the opposing camps.
(my one caveat is that the English DID keep very good record for the 15th century, and this new research raising the total numbers up is likely a good thing - if not as high as it is being made)
Are we even supposed to talk about English and French? I thought it was red team and blue team, as per Trafalgar.
#1. This is the first time that I've heard of the orders of magnitude being challenged seriously. And frankly, the arguments advanced in the article for why the French could not have numbered what they are believed to have numbered are not very compelling.
#2. Some small relevance I suppose. The Duke of Burgundy threw in with the English in the hopes of improving his position, much like the Afghan war lords. The tide turned in the 100 Years War when Joan of Arc inspired the idea of French nationalism. It's theoretically possible that a similar idea of Afghan nationalism could develop, either in support or in opposition to the US agenda.
It happened, case closed.
Just because some francophile historians want to twist things around now doesn't mean we should listen.
Wouldn't that still be a great victory even if the forces were numerically equal?
Quote from: Sahib on October 24, 2009, 05:15:25 PM
Wouldn't that still be a great victory even if the forces were numerically equal?
No. The past changes day to day. Only the future is certain.
I didn't think there was some popular uprising against the English in France so much as French field armies defeated English ones. The war struck me as a poorer but better organized England defeated a rich but poorly organized France until the French Kings got better control of their country and could collect and direct their resources better.
Quote from: Sahib on October 24, 2009, 05:15:25 PM
Wouldn't that still be a great victory even if the forces were numerically equal?
I'd argue that the way they were defeated makes the victory just as important as the numbers of the battle. Wasn't it one of the first times that the English bowmen were used coupled with the infantry flanking in that fashion?
Quote from: PDH on October 24, 2009, 03:52:57 PM
medieval numbers are always suspect, of course, and any good modern multi-source examination of the records (especially English records) is useful. However, the numbers skew both ways as well.
I personally think that such a debate, while not really earth shattering, does show that the range of data collection is by no means over.
However, the problem is, as so often is the case in academia that positions are staked out in the extreme in order to create noise of one's thesis. As with many things, the consensus is likely closer to the center of the opposing camps.
(my one caveat is that the English DID keep very good record for the 15th century, and this new research raising the total numbers up is likely a good thing - if not as high as it is being made)
I read an article on this dispute before this new research. The thrust of it was that we can know with some certainty the size of the English army, but the size of the French is harder to pin down. The author was of the opinion that if you look just at the French records you may come to a conclusion that there was parity, but that would render all the descriptions of the battle from both sides as incorrect and the strategies would no longer make sense.
Quote from: alfred russel on October 24, 2009, 11:48:20 PM
I read an article on this dispute before this new research. The thrust of it was that we can know with some certainty the size of the English army, but the size of the French is harder to pin down. The author was of the opinion that if you look just at the French records you may come to a conclusion that there was parity, but that would render all the descriptions of the battle from both sides as incorrect and the strategies would no longer make sense.
A nonsensical strategy would explain the French defeat, no? :contract:
Quote from: merithyn on October 24, 2009, 10:33:29 PM
Quote from: Sahib on October 24, 2009, 05:15:25 PM
Wouldn't that still be a great victory even if the forces were numerically equal?
I'd argue that the way they were defeated makes the victory just as important as the numbers of the battle. Wasn't it one of the first times that the English bowmen were used coupled with the infantry flanking in that fashion?
It was by the book. Crecy, some 80 years earlier, had a similar deployment. Note that Crecy had a similar ratio of conventional numbers (at least 3-1). *
later, Poitiers was really innovative. The Archers used hedges for flanking cover, and as a coup de grace, the English/Gascons charged the French rear with their own cavalry.
* Many other battles in the 116 years war had similar force numbers. I don't think Agincourt was that anomalous. It was French territory, and.France's population was 5-10 times that of England. Rather easy to raise men, especially for short campaigns..
Quote from: saskganesh on October 25, 2009, 01:04:13 AM
It was by the book. Crecy, some 80 years earlier, had a similar deployment. Note that Crecy had a similar ratio of conventional numbers (at least 3-1). *
later, Poitiers was really innovative. The Archers used hedges for flanking cover, and as a coup de grace, the English/Gascons charged the French rear with their own cavalry.
* Many other battles in the 116 years war had similar force numbers. I don't think Agincourt was that anomalous. It was French territory, and.France's population was 5-10 times that of England. Rather easy to raise men, especially for short campaigns..
Ah, okay.
... one of the most understudied aspects of Agincourt was that because of the dysentery, the longbowmen fought without pants. and there was shit everywhere.
Quote from: saskganesh on October 25, 2009, 09:25:16 AM
... one of the most understudied aspects of Agincourt was that because of the dysentery, the longbowmen fought without pants. and there was shit everywhere.
This is probably what led the French to a false sense of superiority. They saw the English shitting themselves and thought it was because of them.
Quote from: saskganesh on October 25, 2009, 09:25:16 AM
... one of the most understudied aspects of Agincourt was that because of the dysentery, the longbowmen fought without pants. and there was shit everywhere.
Too bad they didn't have kilts
From what I've read, of prime strategic importance at Agincourt was - mud.
The mud (caused by nasty wet weather) badly hampered the French knight's mobility.
While it is true that riding in full armour, or even walking about, is not as difficult as some believe - the weight is reasonably well distributed and some athletes can even do hand-stands wearing it - heavy armour combined with thick mud makes for poor mobility; and it was fatally easy, once tired by the trudge to the front, to be knocked over.
As in many medieval battles, what was really fatal was to get too crowded together to effectivel wield one's weapons. If that happens, and panic sets in, having large numbers won't help any more than having large numbers of soccer fans makes a stadium disaster better. Apparently, the attack of the archers - lightly armoured and so more manuverable in the mud - on the flanks of the french attack, knocking over knights in the slippery mud with mallets & stabbing 'em through their visors as they sprawled on the ground, had the effect of crowding the main attack together into a more or less helpless mass. They could not smash their way through the English men at arms to their front because the ones in front could not effectively fight due to the pressure from in back - - the English were not as tired from tramping to the front, did not have bodies underfoot to deal with, and had room to swing their weapons.
Once this set in, more reinforcements just made the problem worse as they crowded and pushed forward.
Some such as Keegan suggest that part of the reason for the disaster was that the French simply did not wish to fight archers, who were not their social equals. I suspect that they were simply fixated on moving to their front. They mostly had visors down because of the lingering threat of arrows, and so their vision would be pretty limited anyway, which may have had something to do with it.
Armour or no attacking through thick mud is always going to be a hell of a lot harder than just having to stand and defend your position.
Is this true on the pantsless archers?
I've never heard that before...sounds cool though.
Quote from: Tyr on October 25, 2009, 10:48:56 AM
Armour or no attacking through thick mud is always going to be a hell of a lot harder than just having to stand and defend your position.
Is this true on the pantsless archers?
I've never heard that before...sounds cool though.
Yeah, it's true. I've heard of it.
in many other battles, nobles had no compunctions about slaughtering their social lessers. this is one of the fundamentals of feudalism after all so I really doubt that's a factor.
Quote from: saskganesh on October 25, 2009, 01:04:13 AM
It was French territory, and.France's population was 5-10 times that of England. Rather easy to raise men, especially for short campaigns.
Say
what? Even if it were sensible to talk about "France" in this period, this is way too extreme. What is now modern France probably had a population of around 20 million at the start of this period, and England+Wales maybe 1/3 that. Only about half of Modern France was under the control of the Valois at the start of the war. By the end of the war both countries were probably only 70-80% of their pre-war populations, due to the war, famine, and disease (they would not regain their 1300 populations until the 1700s).
You may be able to argue that the Kings of France had ready cash reserves 5-10 times that of England. The accounts of the war are full of stories about the English kings being desperate for coin.
Quote from: saskganesh on October 25, 2009, 10:51:58 AM
in many other battles, nobles had no compunctions about slaughtering their social lessers. this is one of the fundamentals of feudalism after all so I really doubt that's a factor.
Yeah, my suspicion is that if someone is coming to kill you, you are likely to deal with him first and ask his pedigree later. :D
My theory is that the knights simply were not aware of the flank attacks until it was too late. Battle is a confusing thing and visibilty pretty limited, they probably mostly only were aware of what was immediately in front of them.
Quote from: Tyr on October 25, 2009, 10:48:56 AM
Armour or no attacking through thick mud is always going to be a hell of a lot harder than just having to stand and defend your position.
Is this true on the pantsless archers?
I've never heard that before...sounds cool though.
Well, certainly; but by all acounts the English archers counter-attacked on the flanks. The fact that they were more lightly armoured probably made that easier to do.
Quote from: Malthus on October 25, 2009, 11:22:48 AM
Yeah, my suspicion is that if someone is coming to kill you, you are likely to deal with him first and ask his pedigree later. :D
My theory is that the knights simply were not aware of the flank attacks until it was too late. Battle is a confusing thing and visibilty pretty limited, they probably mostly only were aware of what was immediately in front of them.
Also agree, and agree with your earlier comment about the limited visibility being due, in part, to the visors being closed for fear of arrow-fire. It would be interesting to go back and see if the main contribution of the arrow-fire was the casualties inflicted or the cohesion loss inflicted.
Quote from: grumbler on October 25, 2009, 11:26:45 AM
Quote from: Malthus on October 25, 2009, 11:22:48 AM
Yeah, my suspicion is that if someone is coming to kill you, you are likely to deal with him first and ask his pedigree later. :D
My theory is that the knights simply were not aware of the flank attacks until it was too late. Battle is a confusing thing and visibilty pretty limited, they probably mostly only were aware of what was immediately in front of them.
Also agree, and agree with your earlier comment about the limited visibility being due, in part, to the visors being closed for fear of arrow-fire. It would be interesting to go back and see if the main contribution of the arrow-fire was the casualties inflicted or the cohesion loss inflicted.
My vote is for the latter. From what I've read, the archers fired off all of their arrows and the french still came on, in spite of taking reasonably heavy casualties, in numbers much greater than the English defenders. It was only when the archers threw down their bows, picked up their mallets and swarmed out from behind their stakes and started smashing into the french flanks that the battle turned into a massacre.
The French certainly should have prevented that by directing attacks on the flanks as well as the front. But is seems by that time the french leaders had seemingly lost any ability to control the battle.
The trick seems to have been that once the knights are herded or crowded together, only the ones on the outside edge of the crowd can fight. If this happens, to a point it effectively doesn't matter how many of them there are - more and more knights crowding in behind just make the problem worse.
Quote from: grumbler on October 25, 2009, 11:08:16 AM
Quote from: saskganesh on October 25, 2009, 01:04:13 AM
It was French territory, and.France's population was 5-10 times that of England. Rather easy to raise men, especially for short campaigns.
Say what? Even if it were sensible to talk about "France" in this period, this is way too extreme. What is now modern France probably had a population of around 20 million at the start of this period, and England+Wales maybe 1/3 that. Only about half of Modern France was under the control of the Valois at the start of the war. By the end of the war both countries were probably only 70-80% of their pre-war populations, due to the war, famine, and disease (they would not regain their 1300 populations until the 1700s).
You may be able to argue that the Kings of France had ready cash reserves 5-10 times that of England. The accounts of the war are full of stories about the English kings being desperate for coin.
est stats I have read are that England's pop in the 15th century was about 3 million, down form six pre Black Plague.
OK you are right about France. I checked some. tho it was more heavily populated, it's likely under 20 million. not sure if those pre or post Plague.
Quote from: grumbler on October 25, 2009, 11:08:16 AM
Say what? Even if it were sensible to talk about "France" in this period, this is way too extreme. What is now modern France probably had a population of around 20 million at the start of this period, and England+Wales maybe 1/3 that. Only about half of Modern France was under the control of the Valois at the start of the war. By the end of the war both countries were probably only 70-80% of their pre-war populations, due to the war, famine, and disease (they would not regain their 1300 populations until the 1700s).
You may be able to argue that the Kings of France had ready cash reserves 5-10 times that of England. The accounts of the war are full of stories about the English kings being desperate for coin.
"France" was certainly thought to be much richer and more populous (though as far as I know, there is no way of quantifying that). But as you know, it was famously riven by divisions; at one point or another, much of it fought for the English.
I read somewhere that Frances I of France was once shown the remains of John the Fearless, Duke of Burgundy, and a monk opening the tomb pointed to the pole-axe scar in the skull from his assasination and said "...that's the hole through which the English entered France ...".
Quote from: grumbler on October 25, 2009, 11:08:16 AM
You may be able to argue that the Kings of France had ready cash reserves 5-10 times that of England. The accounts of the war are full of stories about the English kings being desperate for coin.
I'm not sure you could even argue that. The Kings of England was always begging parliament for more cash, but he may not have been that much poorer then the King of France. The France was much wealthier then England but the King couldn't direct most of those resources due to poor government and civil wars. The middle class uprisings, wandering bands of mercenaries and the English armies burning and looting across France probably didn't help his fiances.
Also it was probably more expensive for the English to operate since they had to cross a sea to get to France and I think their army was closer to a professional force of paid soldiers as oppose to the more feudal French military. A french army could probably be raised fairly quickly by ordering up all the local knights and other feudal warriors. While each would be a very skilled warrior they may be unused to fighting together and might not be as good soldiers. Though I'm not sure on this.
I think the main problem the French had was their tendency to surrender all the time. Surrender.
Quote from: The Brain on October 25, 2009, 12:42:26 PM
I think the main problem the French had was their tendency to surrender all the time. Surrender.
The main problem the French had was to zergrush the English lines with fully armored men-at-arms, three ranks deep, in muddy terrain, in a funnel space about a few hundred yards wide. Hilarity ensured. Monty Python wouldn't do any better in absurdity.
The "truth" is even more humiliating to the French. The English didn't beat the French at Agincourt, the French defeated themselves at Agincourt.
Quote from: Razgovory on October 25, 2009, 12:39:45 PM
Quote from: grumbler on October 25, 2009, 11:08:16 AM
You may be able to argue that the Kings of France had ready cash reserves 5-10 times that of England. The accounts of the war are full of stories about the English kings being desperate for coin.
I'm not sure you could even argue that. The Kings of England was always begging parliament for more cash, but he may not have been that much poorer then the King of France. The France was much wealthier then England but the King couldn't direct most of those resources due to poor government and civil wars. The middle class uprisings, wandering bands of mercenaries and the English armies burning and looting across France probably didn't help his fiances.
Right in part IIRC. A politically skillful king that could persuade parliament to the wars neccessity could wield economical might similar or even greater to that of the french king. On the flipside an unwilling parliament could make any military moves completely impossible. This explains part of the rising and ebbing fortunes of the english during the war. The english system of taxation was a lot more efficient as well rather than that of france which was a hodgepodge of weird taxes and dues. A lot of french coin during much of the war came from reducing the amount of gold and silver in the coins since the king had control of the mint and technically he owned all of the coins in circulation. Obviously this didnt do any good for the economy or for the popularity of the french royals, quite a few local troubles they had originated in the debasement of the currency. My memory is a bit shaky on the exact circumstances though as its been some time since I read about it.
Quote from: Cecil on October 25, 2009, 03:20:18 PM
Right in part IIRC. A politically skillful king that could persuade parliament to the wars neccessity could wield economical might similar or even greater to that of the french king. On the flipside an unwilling parliament could make any military moves completely impossible. This explains part of the rising and ebbing fortunes of the english during the war. The english system of taxation was a lot more efficient as well rather than that of france which was a hodgepodge of weird taxes and dues. A lot of french coin during much of the war came from reducing the amount of gold and silver in the coins since the king had control of the mint and technically he owned all of the coins in circulation. Obviously this didnt do any good for the economy or for the popularity of the french royals, quite a few local troubles they had originated in the debasement of the currency. My memory is a bit shaky on the exact circumstances though as its been some time since I read about it.
Actually, from the histories I have read, the English military fortunes were tied to the ability of the British king to borrow, not tax.
Yes, the English tax system was more efficient than the French, but the direct expenses of the crown were greater, too. It seems at every turn the French can afford mercenaries and the English could not (or had just lost them) and that speaks of cash: "No money, no Swiss."
Quote from: The Brain on October 25, 2009, 12:42:26 PM
I think the main problem the French had was their tendency to surrender all the time. Surrender.
Well, some would say 116 years of intermittent war should be enough to put to rest that stale piece of English propaganda. By way of contrast, each time an enemy army has landed on England it has been to stay. And the last two times, 1066 and 1688, they conquered the whole country quite swiftly too. One would say English are a piece of cake, consistently outclassed on land by everyone but Scots...
Quote from: Alatriste on October 26, 2009, 02:51:07 AM
Quote from: The Brain on October 25, 2009, 12:42:26 PM
I think the main problem the French had was their tendency to surrender all the time. Surrender.
Well, some would say 116 years of intermittent war should be enough to put to rest that stale piece of English propaganda. By way of contrast, each time an enemy army has landed on England it has been to stay. And the last two times, 1066 and 1688, they conquered the whole country quite swiftly too. One would say English are a piece of cake, consistently outclassed on land by everyone but Scots...
not to barrage your thesis but there were two other invasions that need to be recognised and accounted
1215 (Prince Louis captures London, proclaimed King, but can't crack Dover and is forced to leave by defecting nobles by 1217)
and 1485 (a welshman invades from France, kills King Dick in battle ... thanks to defecting nobles ... and becomes Henry VII)
Quote from: Alatriste on October 26, 2009, 02:51:07 AM
Quote from: The Brain on October 25, 2009, 12:42:26 PM
I think the main problem the French had was their tendency to surrender all the time. Surrender.
Well, some would say 116 years of intermittent war should be enough to put to rest that stale piece of English propaganda. By way of contrast, each time an enemy army has landed on England it has been to stay. And the last two times, 1066 and 1688, they conquered the whole country quite swiftly too. One would say English are a piece of cake, consistently outclassed on land by everyone but Scots...
1066 was a pretty hard fought thing.
And to call 1688 a foreign invasion is a bit of a stretch.
Quote from: Tyr on October 26, 2009, 03:40:58 AM
And to call 1688 a foreign invasion is a bit of a stretch.
How extensive were the foreign forces involved?
Quote from: citizen k on October 26, 2009, 03:42:47 AM
Quote from: Tyr on October 26, 2009, 03:40:58 AM
And to call 1688 a foreign invasion is a bit of a stretch.
How extensive were the foreign forces involved?
I've no clue. A thousand or so?
Its not too relevant as they didn't do very much, there were just one or two minor scuffles. It was the English parliament deciding it wanted a new king, not a foreigner invading.
But anyway, not too relevant, I'm not trying to sound all "England will never loooooooooose" here.
With the HYW though I would regard that too as far more of a French internal conflict where the leaders of one side just so happened to also be king of England.
No, the invasion force was essentially the Dutch army. But, William III was married to James II's protestant daughter Mary; and James was not in fine form during the crisis, essentially he ran away and few people were prepared to stick thier necks out to look after his rights.
Quote from: saskganesh on October 26, 2009, 03:25:24 AM
Quote from: Alatriste on October 26, 2009, 02:51:07 AM
Quote from: The Brain on October 25, 2009, 12:42:26 PM
I think the main problem the French had was their tendency to surrender all the time. Surrender.
Well, some would say 116 years of intermittent war should be enough to put to rest that stale piece of English propaganda. By way of contrast, each time an enemy army has landed on England it has been to stay. And the last two times, 1066 and 1688, they conquered the whole country quite swiftly too. One would say English are a piece of cake, consistently outclassed on land by everyone but Scots...
not to barrage your thesis but there were two other invasions that need to be recognised and accounted
1215 (Prince Louis captures London, proclaimed King, but can't crack Dover and is forced to leave by defecting nobles by 1217)
and 1485 (a welshman invades from France, kills King Dick in battle ... thanks to defecting nobles ... and becomes Henry VII)
There were plenty of other small "invasions" where an enemy force landed and burned a town and left.
Quote from: Tyr on October 26, 2009, 03:40:58 AM
Quote from: Alatriste on October 26, 2009, 02:51:07 AM
Quote from: The Brain on October 25, 2009, 12:42:26 PM
I think the main problem the French had was their tendency to surrender all the time. Surrender.
Well, some would say 116 years of intermittent war should be enough to put to rest that stale piece of English propaganda. By way of contrast, each time an enemy army has landed on England it has been to stay. And the last two times, 1066 and 1688, they conquered the whole country quite swiftly too. One would say English are a piece of cake, consistently outclassed on land by everyone but Scots...
1066 was a pretty hard fought thing.
And to call 1688 a foreign invasion is a bit of a stretch.
1066? Well, yeah,
one lost battle and the whole kingdom falls in pieces. Three or four years of crushing rebellions and afterwards William is so sure of his position that he spends 75% of his time in France. Hard? Perhaps. But brief indeed...
And regarding 1688... What can one call it but a Dutch invasion? William didn't land alone, rather the opposite, he assembled a huge fleet and a big, veteran army (according to the Wikipedia, the invading army was 20,000 strong - 15,000–18,000 on foot and 3,660 cavalry - and the fleet four times bigger than the 1588 Armada). That the English army disintegrated with very limited fight is a fact, but a fact worthy of a motto: 'beer-drinking surrender monkeys', for example. :P
@Sakganesh
You are right. I didn't know French participation had been so important in both occasions (actually I didn't know they had been involved at all in the war of King John and the barons)
Quote from: saskganesh on October 26, 2009, 03:25:24 AM
Quote from: Alatriste on October 26, 2009, 02:51:07 AM
Quote from: The Brain on October 25, 2009, 12:42:26 PM
I think the main problem the French had was their tendency to surrender all the time. Surrender.
Well, some would say 116 years of intermittent war should be enough to put to rest that stale piece of English propaganda. By way of contrast, each time an enemy army has landed on England it has been to stay. And the last two times, 1066 and 1688, they conquered the whole country quite swiftly too. One would say English are a piece of cake, consistently outclassed on land by everyone but Scots...
not to barrage your thesis but there were two other invasions that need to be recognised and accounted
1215 (Prince Louis captures London, proclaimed King, but can't crack Dover and is forced to leave by defecting nobles by 1217)
and 1485 (a welshman invades from France, kills King Dick in battle ... thanks to defecting nobles ... and becomes Henry VII)
Recurring theme? No sense of loyalty amongst those at the top. The nobility seems far more willing to defect or negotiate with the new power than to wage a concerted effort to save England as it was.
Quote from: Alatriste on October 26, 2009, 04:14:33 AM
And regarding 1688... What can one call it but a Dutch invasion? William didn't land alone, rather the opposite, he assembled a huge fleet and a big, veteran army (according to the Wikipedia, the invading army was 20,000 strong - 15,000–18,000 on foot and 3,660 cavalry - and the fleet four times bigger than the 1588 Armada). That the English army disintegrated with very limited fight is a fact, but a fact worthy of a motto: 'beer-drinking surrender monkeys', for example. :P
They were the army of the king of England even if they were the army under his Dutch hat instead of his English one.
You don't call the British army in France in WW1 an invasion, they were meant to be there and had the full encouragment of the French government.
Quote from: Tyr on October 26, 2009, 04:24:05 AM
Quote from: Alatriste on October 26, 2009, 04:14:33 AM
And regarding 1688... What can one call it but a Dutch invasion? William didn't land alone, rather the opposite, he assembled a huge fleet and a big, veteran army (according to the Wikipedia, the invading army was 20,000 strong - 15,000–18,000 on foot and 3,660 cavalry - and the fleet four times bigger than the 1588 Armada). That the English army disintegrated with very limited fight is a fact, but a fact worthy of a motto: 'beer-drinking surrender monkeys', for example. :P
They were the army of the king of England even if they were the army under his Dutch hat instead of his English one.
You don't call the British army in France in WW1 an invasion, they were meant to be there and had the full encouragment of the French government.
That's, quite simply, mistaken. There was only one King of England, James II. Actually, not only William hadn't claimed the crown when he landed, but did announce the opposite, that he didn't mean to depose James.
Quote
Embarkations, started on September 22 (Gregorian calendar), had been completed on October 8 and the expedition was that day openly approved by the States of Holland; the same day James issued a proclamation to the English nation that it should prepare for a Dutch invasion to ward off conquest. On October 10 William issued the Declaration of The Hague (actually written by Fagel), of which 60,000 copies of the English translation by Gilbert Burnet were distributed after the landing in England,[19] in which he assured that his only aim was to maintain the Protestant religion, install a free parliament and investigate the legitimacy of the Prince of Wales. He would respect the position of James. On October 14 he responded to the allegations by James in a second declaration, denying any intention to become king or conquer England. Whether he had any at that moment is still controversial.
His army was, plainly and simply, the Dutch army, composed by "Dutch" soldiers ("dutch" because they were in pay of the States... as usual for the Dutch, the soldiers actually included Dutch, Germans, Swiss, English, Scots, French Huguenots... )
Quote from: Alatriste on October 26, 2009, 04:14:33 AM
And regarding 1688... What can one call it but a Dutch invasion? William didn't land alone, rather the opposite, he assembled a huge fleet and a big, veteran army (according to the Wikipedia, the invading army was 20,000 strong - 15,000–18,000 on foot and 3,660 cavalry - and the fleet four times bigger than the 1588 Armada). That the English army disintegrated with very limited fight is a fact, but a fact worthy of a motto: 'beer-drinking surrender monkeys', for example. :P
If Wikipedia is neglecting to note that this army is just a bodyguard for William and Mary, then Wikipedia, once again, has its head up its ass. Calling it a "Dutch invasion" is absurd - they were invited. Cake was served!
Quote from: Alatriste on October 26, 2009, 06:15:41 AM
That's, quite simply, mistaken. There was only one King of England, James II. Actually, not only William hadn't claimed the crown when he landed, but did announce the opposite, that he didn't mean to depose James.
This is a misunderstanding of what was happening. William wasn't deposing James, Parliament was. William was there with an army to protect the interests of his wife, the daughter and heir of James II.
QuoteWilliam wasn't deposing James, Parliament was. William was there with an army to protect the interests of his wife, the daughter and heir of James II.
Quote from: grumbler on October 26, 2009, 06:26:23 AM
Quote from: Alatriste on October 26, 2009, 06:15:41 AM
That's, quite simply, mistaken. There was only one King of England, James II. Actually, not only William hadn't claimed the crown when he landed, but did announce the opposite, that he didn't mean to depose James.
This is a misunderstanding of what was happening. William wasn't deposing James, Parliament was. William was there with an army to protect the interests of his wife, the daughter and heir of James II.
QuoteWilliam wasn't deposing James, Parliament was. William was there with an army to protect the interests of his wife, the daughter and heir of James II.
Excuse me, but... are you quoting yourself? Color me confused.
Anyway, the better way in this kind of debate is going to the original source. In this case, William's own words in "The Declaration of His Highness William Henry, by the Grace of God, Prince of Orange, etc., of the reasons inducing him to appear in arms in the Kingdom of England, and for preserving the Protestant religion, and for restoring the laws and liberties of England, Scotland, and Ireland."
A transcript
http://www.jacobite.ca/documents/16881010.htm
And a non-complete facsimile
http://www.bl.uk/learning/histcitizen/uk/will3/willact/will1688.html
Shrewd readers will notice that 'King' and 'His Majesty" is used in this document for James II, not William... the invaders didn't present themselves as an English army, and his general didn't land as an English general or King.
Indeed the declaration says
Quote
Therefore it is, that we have thought fit to go over into England, and to carry over with us a force sufficient, by the blessing of God, to defend us from the violence of these evil counsellors. And we, being desirous that our intentions in this matter be rightly understood, have for this end prepared this Declaration...
Which sounds quite reasonable... until one learns the 'bodyguard' was at least as big as the royal army (18,660 to 21,660 against roughly 19,000 men) and far more experienced, not to mention that they were reliable, unlike the English forces. Some 'bodyguard'...
William's operations, in essence, followed the same plan Philip II had had (and for very good reasons). Cross an army from the continent to England, land, and get local support to depose the monarch... only William counted on protestant support against a Catholic monarch, and Philip II had relied on Catholic support against Elisabeth I.
The "invasion" of William and Mary is generally not counted as such, since although the pair arrived with a large army, it was by invitation. In essence parliament contracted out for a better monarch. :lol:
Quote from: Alatriste on October 26, 2009, 06:35:04 AM
Excuse me, but... are you quoting yourself? Color me confused.
Why not quote mysel;f. I am at least as authoritative as Wikipedia (which you were quoting).
QuoteAnyway, the better way in this kind of debate is going to the original source. In this case, William's own words in "The Declaration of His Highness William Henry, by the Grace of God, Prince of Orange, etc., of the reasons inducing him to appear in arms in the Kingdom of England, and for preserving the Protestant religion, and for restoring the laws and liberties of England, Scotland, and Ireland."
You would be correct, if this declaration was made without any kind of bias or hidden purpose. This whole attack on "evil counselors" rather than the King is typical of the writing of the period (and even before - look at the proclamations coming out of the Pilgrimage of Grace).
Nevertheless, this document confirms, as I pointed out, that William was acting in the interests of his wife (and thus himself). he cannot argue for the illegitimacy of James, of course, because the legitimacy of james is the legitimacy of Mary.
QuoteAnd since our dearest and most entirely beloved consort, the Princess, and likewise we ourself, have so great an interest in this matter, and such a right, as all the world knows, to the succession of the Crown; ... we cannot excuse ourself from espousing their interest in a matter of so high consequence, and from contributing all that lies in us for the maintaining both the Protestant religion and the laws and liberties of these Kingdoms,
QuoteShrewd readers will notice that 'King' and 'His Majesty" is used in this document for James II, not William... the invaders didn't present themselves as an English army, and his general didn't land as an English general or King.
Correct. William landed as the consort of the heir to the throne of Britain, not as a dutch general or leader.
QuoteWhich sounds quite reasonable... until one learns the 'bodyguard' was at least as big as the royal army (18,660 to 21,660 against roughly 19,000 men) and far more experienced, not to mention that they were reliable, unlike the English forces. Some 'bodyguard'...
My point sounds quite reasonable no matter the size of the contingent or its foes. Whether a force is a bodyguard depends on its function, not its size.
QuoteWilliam's operations, in essence, followed the same plan Philip II had had (and for very good reasons). Cross an army from the continent to England, land, and get local support to depose the monarch... only William counted on protestant support against a Catholic monarch, and Philip II had relied on Catholic support against Elisabeth I.
This is true in the sense that every invasion follows this plan to some extent. Operation Barbarossa intended to get local support for the overthrow of the Soviet Union. This doesn't make Philip II's plan essentially the same as Hitler's, though. William's plan, unlike those of Phillip or Hitler, was dependent on his being invited by the parliament to intervene in James's "suppression of the faith" and also dependent on the fact that the English army favored his cause.
Quote from: Malthus on October 26, 2009, 08:32:21 AM
The "invasion" of William and Mary is generally not counted as such, since although the pair arrived with a large army, it was by invitation. In essence parliament contracted out for a better monarch. :lol:
Or one could argue that Parliament simply offered to accelerate the succession (and james remembered how they did that the last time). "Charles I was not the shortest British monarch when he took the throne, but he was when he left it."
Quote from: Alatriste on October 26, 2009, 02:51:07 AM
Quote from: The Brain on October 25, 2009, 12:42:26 PM
I think the main problem the French had was their tendency to surrender all the time. Surrender.
Well, some would say 116 years of intermittent war should be enough to put to rest that stale piece of English propaganda. By way of contrast, each time an enemy army has landed on England it has been to stay. And the last two times, 1066 and 1688, they conquered the whole country quite swiftly too. One would say English are a piece of cake, consistently outclassed on land by everyone but Scots...
Well, duh, they never upgrade their level 1 forts.
Quote from: Razgovory on October 26, 2009, 04:11:34 AM
Quote from: saskganesh on October 26, 2009, 03:25:24 AM
Quote from: Alatriste on October 26, 2009, 02:51:07 AM
Quote from: The Brain on October 25, 2009, 12:42:26 PM
I think the main problem the French had was their tendency to surrender all the time. Surrender.
Well, some would say 116 years of intermittent war should be enough to put to rest that stale piece of English propaganda. By way of contrast, each time an enemy army has landed on England it has been to stay. And the last two times, 1066 and 1688, they conquered the whole country quite swiftly too. One would say English are a piece of cake, consistently outclassed on land by everyone but Scots...
not to barrage your thesis but there were two other invasions that need to be recognised and accounted
1215 (Prince Louis captures London, proclaimed King, but can't crack Dover and is forced to leave by defecting nobles by 1217)
and 1485 (a welshman invades from France, kills King Dick in battle ... thanks to defecting nobles ... and becomes Henry VII)
There were plenty of other small "invasions" where an enemy force landed and burned a town and left.
yeah but these ones were during civil wars where both protagonists became kings. not raids, they were there to stay. Louis was not successful, largely due to William Marshall's defensive, and political skills, but Henry VII, who had a relatively removed claim to the throne, was able to make it stick.
Quote from: grumbler on October 25, 2009, 05:18:47 PM
Quote from: Cecil on October 25, 2009, 03:20:18 PM
Right in part IIRC. A politically skillful king that could persuade parliament to the wars neccessity could wield economical might similar or even greater to that of the french king. On the flipside an unwilling parliament could make any military moves completely impossible. This explains part of the rising and ebbing fortunes of the english during the war. The english system of taxation was a lot more efficient as well rather than that of france which was a hodgepodge of weird taxes and dues. A lot of french coin during much of the war came from reducing the amount of gold and silver in the coins since the king had control of the mint and technically he owned all of the coins in circulation. Obviously this didnt do any good for the economy or for the popularity of the french royals, quite a few local troubles they had originated in the debasement of the currency. My memory is a bit shaky on the exact circumstances though as its been some time since I read about it.
Actually, from the histories I have read, the English military fortunes were tied to the ability of the British king to borrow, not tax.
Yes, the English tax system was more efficient than the French, but the direct expenses of the crown were greater, too. It seems at every turn the French can afford mercenaries and the English could not (or had just lost them) and that speaks of cash: "No money, no Swiss."
You are correct of course since taxes at the time took a long time to collect and were not always in ready coin. Only the great banking houses had the amount of currency avaliable to pay for an army. What the english kings at least during the first half of the war did (since thats the part I´ve read most about) was to guarantee the loans against future tax receipts avaliable from the wool sold mostly to Flandres and other taxes. This of course had to be approved by parliament since they controlled the purse.
Was the swiss much used in the hundred years? I recall mostly the french using genoese sailors/crossbowmen which was avaliable due to the close location of France and their usually good relations.
Didn't French slaughter their own Genoese mercenaries in one of their battles?
Quote from: DGuller on October 26, 2009, 11:41:59 AM
Didn't French slaughter their own Genoese mercenaries in one of their battles?
The charging knights ran over and dispersed the Genoese crossbowen at Agincourt. So slaughter is not right.
Quote from: Admiral Yi on October 26, 2009, 12:02:43 PM
Quote from: DGuller on October 26, 2009, 11:41:59 AM
Didn't French slaughter their own Genoese mercenaries in one of their battles?
The charging knights ran over and dispersed the Genoese crossbowen at Agincourt. So slaughter is not right.
I think it was at Crecy, not Agincourt, and they deliberately attacked the retreating Genoese.
Quote from: DGuller on October 26, 2009, 12:08:39 PM
Quote from: Admiral Yi on October 26, 2009, 12:02:43 PM
Quote from: DGuller on October 26, 2009, 11:41:59 AM
Didn't French slaughter their own Genoese mercenaries in one of their battles?
The charging knights ran over and dispersed the Genoese crossbowen at Agincourt. So slaughter is not right.
I think it was at Crecy, not Agincourt, and they deliberately attacked the retreating Genoese.
Piétaille... :frog:
it was Crecy. the French attacked from their line of march, and the Genoese were in the way.
they had crossbowmen at Agincourt but IRC they deployed between the first and second battles (lines) so they could not get clear shots through the melee. they probably deserted
as the outcome came clear.
Quote from: Cecil on October 26, 2009, 11:05:09 AM
Was the swiss much used in the hundred years? I recall mostly the french using genoese sailors/crossbowmen which was avaliable due to the close location of France and their usually good relations.
No. That was a joke about mercenaries in general. It postdates the period but is valid in sentiment.
I want to play the Agincourt scenario from Men of Iron now. I'd get stuck playing the french though. :(
Bring in a unit of Char B1 Bis from ASL and fuck the mud and the shitty English.
Quote from: Ed Anger on October 26, 2009, 07:52:52 PM
I want to play the Agincourt scenario from Men of Iron now. I'd get stuck playing the french though. :(
PBEM? :)
Interesting discussion.
Quote from: PDH on October 26, 2009, 10:37:07 PM
Bring in a unit of Char B1 Bis from ASL and fuck the mud and the shitty English.
It would be like that one desert storm game with the joke Godzilla counter. Since the game was so hideously unbalanced.
Quote from: Malthus on October 26, 2009, 08:32:21 AM
The "invasion" of William and Mary is generally not counted as such, since although the pair arrived with a large army, it was by invitation. In essence parliament contracted out for a better monarch. :lol:
First of all, neither the Parliament nor the Commons invited William and Mary to England... the "Inmortal Seven" (just one bishop and six noblemen) did! Actually, they had no trust at all in that Parliament, the cornerstone of their plan was the election of a new one (read William's proclamation) Second, "generally" must mean "generally in England" because the Dutch themselves certainly aren't included...
Quote from: Alatriste on October 28, 2009, 05:23:10 AM
First of all, neither the Parliament nor the Commons invited William and Mary to England... the "Inmortal Seven" (just one bishop and six noblemen) did! Actually, they had no trust at all in that Parliament, the cornerstone of their plan was the election of a new one (read William's proclamation) Second, "generally" must mean "generally in England" because the Dutch themselves certainly aren't included...
First of all, Parliament itself couldn't meet and issue the invitation, because James has dismissed it. The "Immortal Seven" included, in fact, the leaders of the Tory and Whig wings of Parliament! Had Parliament actually been in session, there is no question that they would have approved, and they certainly approved retroactively.
Second, "generally" must mean more than just inn England, because the Dutch themselves consider this to be a friendly act and not an invasion, and it is viewed as such in the US as well. maybe it is not taught that way in Spanish schools, but I think the evidence is abundant that the overwhelming majority of the English of the time considered this a friendly act (though many Scots and Irish might disagree).
Quote from: Alatriste on October 28, 2009, 05:23:10 AM
Quote from: Malthus on October 26, 2009, 08:32:21 AM
The "invasion" of William and Mary is generally not counted as such, since although the pair arrived with a large army, it was by invitation. In essence parliament contracted out for a better monarch. :lol:
First of all, neither the Parliament nor the Commons invited William and Mary to England... the "Inmortal Seven" (just one bishop and six noblemen) did! Actually, they had no trust at all in that Parliament, the cornerstone of their plan was the election of a new one (read William's proclamation) Second, "generally" must mean "generally in England" because the Dutch themselves certainly aren't included...
James had lost all credibility in England. The "invitation" was generally approved; certainly the army and navy made no objections. Hence the usual title "Glorious Revolution" rather than "Dutch Invasion".
The fact that the former title is appropriate is demonstrated by the subsequent events - the creation of a limited, constitutional monarchy, complete with an effective bill of rights.
Apparently, William was opposed to this (it provided for severe limitations on his rights and effectively imposed parliamentary supremacy on him). Odd then, if his rule was the result of a successful invasion by force of arms, that its effect was to make the monarch abide by parliament - something parliament could never get its Stewart monarchs to do! :lol:
His coercing by Parliament speaks volumes about what really went on. Certainly *he* was under no illusions that he was there by dint of military might alone.