QuoteEmerging Goal for Afghanistan: Weaken, Not Vanquish, Taliban
By Scott Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, October 9, 2009
As it reviews its Afghanistan policy for the second time this year, the Obama administration has concluded that the Taliban cannot be eliminated as a political or military movement, regardless of how many combat forces are sent into battle.
The Taliban and the question of how the administration should regard the Islamist movement have assumed a central place in the policy deliberations underway at the White House, according to administration officials participating in the meetings.
Based on a stark assessment by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, and six hours of debate among the senior national security staff members so far, the administration has established guidelines on its strategy to confront the group.
The goal, senior administration officials said Thursday, is to weaken the Taliban to the degree that it cannot challenge the Afghan government or reestablish the haven it provided for al-Qaeda before the 2001 U.S. invasion. Those objectives appear largely consistent with McChrystal's strategy, which he says "cannot be focused on seizing terrain or destroying insurgent forces" but should center on persuading the population to support the government.
"The Taliban is a deeply rooted political movement in Afghanistan, so that requires a different approach than al-Qaeda," said a senior administration official who has participated in the meetings but has not advocated a particular strategy.
Some inside the White House have cited Hezbollah, the armed Lebanese political movement, as an example of what the Taliban could become. Hezbollah is considered a terrorist organization by the U.S. government, but the group has political support within Lebanon and participates, sometimes through intimidation, in the political process.
Some White House advisers have noted that although Hezbollah is a source of regional instability, it is not a threat to the United States. The senior administration official said the Hezbollah example has not been cited specifically to President Obama and has been raised only informally outside the Situation Room meetings.
"People who study Islamist movements have made the connection," said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations.
Obama identified al-Qaeda as the chief target of his Afghanistan policy in March, when he announced that he would dispatch an additional 21,000 U.S. troops to the region, and his advisers have emphasized during the policy review that the administration views al-Qaeda and the Taliban as philosophically distinct organizations. White House press secretary Robert Gibbs said Thursday that "there is clearly a difference between" the Taliban and "an entity that, through a global, transnational jihadist network, would seek to strike the U.S. homeland."
"I think the Taliban are, obviously, exceedingly bad people that have done awful things," Gibbs said. "Their capability is somewhat different, though, on that continuum of transnational threats."
While some White House officials are advocating a narrower approach in Afghanistan focused first on al-Qaeda, some senior military leaders have endorsed McChrystal's call to vastly expand the war effort against insurgents, including those from the Taliban. The general is seeking tens of thousands of additional troops to carry out his strategy, and Obama will take up the specifics of that request for the first time Friday during a meeting at the White House with his national security team.
In his 66-page assessment of the war, McChrystal warns that the next 12 months will probably determine whether U.S. and international forces can regain the initiative from the Taliban.
McChrystal, whom Obama named in May as commander of the 100,000 U.S. and international forces in Afghanistan, writes that "most insurgents are Afghans" and "are directed by a small number of Afghan senior leaders based in Pakistan." He says in the report that the Taliban operates a "shadow government" that "actively seeks to control the population and displace the national government and traditional power structures."
But weakening the Taliban politically, as McChrystal and the emerging White House strategy calls for, has been complicated by recent events on the ground.
For example, McChrystal's strategy relies on building an effective Afghan government as an alternative to the Taliban. But that goal has been undermined by widespread allegations of electoral fraud appearing to benefit President Hamid Karzai. Such allegations have raised questions about the legitimacy of his government.At the same time, McChrystal is redeploying troops to towns and cities to better protect the Afghan population. The decision effectively leaves large stretches of territory to the Taliban, made up of a variety of groups united by an opposition to the international military presence. McChrystal argues in his assessment that securing the population and building a viable political alternative to the Taliban are at times more important than holding territory in such a counterinsurgency campaign.
Asked how many troops would be needed to weaken the Taliban to an acceptable degree, the senior administration official said, "That's the question. That's the sweet spot we're looking for." About 68,000 U.S. troops are already scheduled to be on the ground in Afghanistan by the end of the year.
Obama has informed staff members and congressional leaders that he does not contemplate reducing the U.S. military presence there in the near term, and even those within the administration who argue against additional combat forces support maintaining the number of troops already there.
Saying that additional troops would provide the Taliban with fodder for further propaganda, Vice President Biden and some other senior White House officials have pushed an alternative. They have outlined a plan that would maintain current combat troop levels, speed up training of Afghan forces, intensify drone strikes against al-Qaeda operatives and help the nuclear-armed government of Pakistan counter the Taliban within its borders.
"If you accept as a premise that you will not eradicate every last element of the Taliban, preventing it from providing sanctuary to al-Qaeda or threatening the government will still require resources," the official said. "That's why we're not talking about only a counterterrorism campaign."
QuoteOfficials: Obama advisers are downplaying Afghan dangers
By Jonathan S. Landay, John Walcott and Nancy A. Youssef, McClatchy NewspapersWASHINGTON — As the Obama administration reconsiders its Afghanistan policy, White House officials are minimizing warnings from the intelligence community, the military and the State Department about the risks of adopting a limited strategy focused on al Qaida , U.S. intelligence, diplomatic and military officials told McClatchy .
Recent U.S. intelligence assessments have found that the Taliban and other Pakistan -based groups that are fighting U.S.-led forces have much closer ties to al Qaida now than they did before 9/11, would allow the terrorist network to re-establish bases in Afghanistan and would help Osama bin Laden export his radical brand of Islam to Afghanistan's neighbors and beyond, the officials said.
McClatchy interviewed more than 15 senior and mid-level U.S. intelligence, military and diplomatic officials, all of whom said they concurred with the assessments. All of them requested anonymity because the assessments are classified and the officials weren't authorized to speak publicly.
The officials said the White House is searching for an alternative to the broader counterinsurgency strategy favored by Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal , the U.S. military commander in Afghanistan , and Gen. David Petraeus , the head of the U.S. Central Command.
White House officials, they said, have concluded that McChrystal's approach could be doomed by election fraud, corruption and other problems in Afghanistan ; by continued Pakistani covert support for the insurgency; by the strains on the Army , Marine Corps and the federal budget; and by a lack of political and public support at home, which they fear could also undermine the president's domestic priorities.One phrase that always comes up in the administration's strategy sessions is "public opinion," one participant told McClatchy .
However, the officials said, in their effort to muster domestic support for a more limited counterterrorism strategy that would concentrate on disrupting and dismantling al Qaida , White House officials are neglecting warnings from their own experts about the dangers of a more modest approach.
"McChrystal and Petraeus are ignoring the problems their (counterinsurgency) approach would face in Afghanistan and here at home," said one intelligence official with extensive experience in South Asia and counterterrorism. "We don't have a reliable partner in Afghanistan or Pakistan ; doubling the size of the Afghan army is a pipedream, given the corruption and literacy problems; and neither Congress or the American people are likely to give it the money, the troops or the decade or so it would need to work, if it would work.
"Now the White House is downplaying the dangers of doing the only thing that they think Congress and the public will support -- a limited war against the guys who hit us on 9/11. The truth is, both approaches have huge problems, and neither one's likely to work."
The White House , as well as Congress and U.S. military, "have got to level with the American people, and they are not doing it," said Marvin Weinbaum , a former State Department intelligence analyst now with the Middle East Institute . "They are taking the easy way out by focusing on the narrow interest of protecting the homeland" from al Qaida .
Some U.S. intelligence and military officials expressed deep frustration with what they see as the administration's single-minded focus on al Qaida's threat to the U.S., saying it's not discussing publicly other, more serious consequences of a U.S. failure in Afghanistan as identified in some assessments.
A U.S. withdrawal or failure could permit al Qaida and other groups export their violence from Afghanistan into Pakistan's heartland, the Indian-controlled side of the disputed Kashmir region and former Soviet republics in Central Asia whose autocrats have been repressing Islam for decades, the U.S. officials said.
Allowing the Taliban to prevail, the officials said, could reignite Afghanistan's civil war, which was fought largely on ethnic lines, and draw nuclear-armed India and Pakistan into backing opposing sides of the conflict.
"It is our belief that the primary focus of the Taliban is regional, that is Afghanistan and Pakistan ," one senior U.S. intelligence official said. "At the same time, there is no reason to believe that the Taliban are abandoning their connections to al Qaida , which has its sights set beyond the region."
"The two groups . . . maintain the kind of close relationship that — if the Taliban were able to take effective control over parts of Afghanistan — would probably give al Qaida expanded room to operate," the official added.
Pakistan has long patronized Afghanistan's dominant Pashtun ethnic group, which constitutes the Taliban . India — whose Kabul embassy was hit on Oct. 8 by a car bomb for the second time in 16 months — supports the U.S.-backed Afghan government of President Hamid Karzai . New Delhi backed the ethnic minorities who fought the Taliban before the 2001 U.S. invasion.
"The region right now is as volatile as I have ever seen it. The tension is not waning; it is on the rise," another senior U.S. intelligence official said. "The Indo-Pakistan issue looms like a dark cloud on a horizon that might look clear blue, but it is actually a tidal wave that is rushing in."
Finally, failure in Afghanistan would deal a massive blow to U.S. international standing to the benefit of Iran , Russia and China , and undermine the NATO alliance, the U.S. officials said.
The intelligence assessments and the U.S. officials' views are in stark contrast to briefings and statements made last week by administration officials who downplayed the threat al Qaida that could pose if the Taliban regained control of Afghanistan .The administration officials said the Taliban are focused on Afghanistan and don't share al Qaida's goals of striking the U.S. and forcing its brand of extreme Islam on the Muslim world.
"There simply is a difference in intent among these groups," White House spokesman Robert Gibbs said Thursday. "Our primary focus is to protect our homeland and . . . help to protect our allies."
"Anyone who . . . believes what the Taliban says today is fooling themselves," countered one senior U.S. intelligence official, referring to an Internet statement in which the Islamic militia claimed that its sole goal is driving foreign forces from Afghanistan .
The official said he's worried that the Afghanistan strategy debate isn't focused on "the rise of Islamist extremism in a way that would shadow what we saw building up prior to 9/11."
The more limited counterterrorism approach promoted by Vice President Joe Biden would require fewer than the 20,000 to 45,000 additional soldiers sought by McChrystal. In August, McChrystal submitted a 60-day assessment that called the situation in Afghanistan "dire" and said that without more troops, the mission could fail.
"Here we go again," a veteran U.S. intelligence official said. "The Bush administration ignored anything that didn't support its arguments for invading Iraq and exaggerated the threat from Saddam Hussein . This administration is minimizing the threat from radical Islam in South and Central Asia , which is much worse today than it was eight years ago, in order to defend a minimalist policy that it's settling on for domestic political reasons."
This official said that the White House has been "spoon-feeding distorted information" to a few news organizations in an effort to build public and congressional support for a policy that another U.S. official said "rests on the nonsensical notion that you can separate some of the Taliban from other Taliban , al Qaida and other groups, when in reality those groups are more closely allied today than they've ever been."
"I read in the paper that there are only 100 al Qaida fighters in Afghanistan ," said another U.S. intelligence official, referring to an Oct. 4 CNN interview with National Security Adviser Jim Jones, a retired Marine general. "That might be true at a particular point in time, but an hour later there might be 200 or 250. The distinction between Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan is meaningless because as a practical matter, the border between them doesn't exist, and all the groups share sources of financing, training and weapons."
The intelligence assessments based their conclusions that the Taliban and related groups would back al Qaida's global agenda on the fact that the Afghan insurgents not only continue to greatly admire bin Laden and his Arab followers, but also are indebted to them for financial, military and technical assistance.
Moreover, the Taliban and allied groups are also indebted to the jihadists in the Middle East who've helped fund their insurgency, and they remain wedded to Pashtunwali, the centuries-old Pashtun tribal code that mandates protection of fellow Muslims.
Does the U.S. double down or scale back?
:huh:
QuoteSome inside the White House have cited Hezbollah, the armed Lebanese political movement, as an example of what the Taliban could become.
:bleeding: :bleeding: :bleeding: NOT. RIGHT. ANSWER.
The Taliban are a threat to the US? :unsure:
Quote from: Tyr on October 12, 2009, 07:14:20 AM
The Taliban are a threat to the US? :unsure:
Remember that time they provided safe haven to train A-Q? That was awesome.
Quote from: CountDeMoney on October 12, 2009, 04:56:53 AM
QuoteSome inside the White House have cited Hezbollah, the armed Lebanese political movement, as an example of what the Taliban could become.
:bleeding: :bleeding: :bleeding: NOT. RIGHT. ANSWER.
Watching the continuing disillusionment of Seedy with his Great Black Hope is the only thing that makes Obama's continuing global meltdown remotely interesting.
Quote from: Berkut on October 12, 2009, 08:26:04 AM
Watching the continuing disillusionment of Seedy with his Great Black Hope is the only thing that makes Obama's continuing global meltdown remotely interesting.
Yeah well I clearly misjudged Obama on the Afghan thing. His rhetoric suggested he was committed to the war there. Pity.
I'm very concerned that high-ranking advisers think Afghanstan is in danger of falling back into civil war. What have the last twenty years been?
The Norwegian head of the UN mission held a press conference to defend himself against accusations from his (since fired) US deputy that he was soft on election fraud.
Is this story getting much coverage in the rest of the world? The US dude, Galbraith, is firing off articles right left and center.
We're also seeing a re-do of the classic COIN vs. CT argument, between McChrystal and Biden.
Quote from: AnchorClanker on October 12, 2009, 10:30:50 AM
We're also seeing a re-do of the classic COIN vs. CT argument, between McChrystal and Biden.
Well I think searching Afghanistan for rare coins is a rather poor use of military resources myself.
It's actually pretty worrying, from the news and what my friends over there say as well. I think McChrystal knows what he's doing, but I really don't think hearts and minds is going to have the same effect as it did in Iraq...
It's really kind of shocking how badly we let Afghanistan get out of hand in the last two years.
Turns out Pashtuns aren't really all that much into kite flying after all.
Quote from: Alcibiades on October 12, 2009, 10:33:57 AM
It's actually pretty worrying, from the news and what my friends over there say as well. I think McChrystal knows what he's doing, but I really don't think hearts and minds is going to have the same effect as it did in Iraq...
It's really kind of shocking how badly we let Afghanistan get out of hand in the last two years.
Ahem, at least SIX years. Iraq ate Afghanistan's lunch - but attempting to make AF a liberal democracy is a fool's errand in any case... when are we gonna learn that they are going to have to sort things out for themselves? Afghanistan is more of a mess in an ethnic identity sense than Iraq ever was, and Pakistan is playing the 'meddling neighbor' role in much the same manner as Iran play(ed) and play(s) in Iraq. Problem - Pakistan can't even control her own generals and ISI, much less the insurgents / Kashmir militants / Pashtun tribesmen. Have fun with that.
That funny Ank, since the lefty CW during the Iraq war was that Iraq was hopeless, while Afghanistan was not, and we should be spending our efforts in Afghanistan rather than Iraq.
Now that Iraq has actually turned out much better than anyone thought it would in the dark days, and Afghanistan is turning into a mess under the expert direction of Obama, suddenly Afghanistan is hopeless, and to the extent that there could be any hope, Iraq ruined it.
Which of course makes no damn sense - if it is hopeless, it is hopeless regardless of Iraq.
To people who want more war in Afghanistan, what's the end game? That's the greatest thing that seems to be missing from the picture. Invading Afghanistan was the right thing to do, and we're justified in staying there, but I just don't see where this is going. At least Iraq is civilized and used to the idea of strong central government. By comparison, Afghanistan is an ungovernable wasteland. On the other hand, abandoning wastelands creates safe heavens for the people that are or would eventually become a danger to us, so it's not an easy option either.
It's one thing to remove the Taliban from power, punish them for AQ connections - and quite another to pretend that the government that will replace them will be a modern, democratic institution with all the hallmarks of a Western Liberal Democracy. There is no contradiction in supporting the 'taming' of the Taliban and the belief that a realistic endgame in Afghanistan does not include making it a Belgium of the 'Stans.
That being said, it's unfortunate that General McChrystal is taking over at this time - the political climate makes it difficult for 40,000 troops to be sent - his COIN strategy is probably the most likely shot we (as the West) have at making the situation in Afghanistan reasonably acceptable (with a functional government with some degree of control, stability and popular support) - this may or may not be a model government - it probably won't be, but we must shoot for stability first and hope for positive developments to come after that.
Also, at some point, any government - Karzai's or not - will have to deal with the Pashtuns, and that will also mean some degree of accomodation for the Taliban. This is distasteful, but probably inevitable.
PS for Berkut - Afghanistan was a defensible war, Iraq wasn't - from a 'casus belli' angle.
I still think that in both cases, we were far too complacent about our ability to control the situations to our liking, and became prisoners of our own unrealistic conditions for 'victory'.
Quote from: DGuller on October 12, 2009, 11:10:00 AM
To people who want more war in Afghanistan, what's the end game? That's the greatest thing that seems to be missing from the picture. Invading Afghanistan was the right thing to do, and we're justified in staying there, but I just don't see where this is going. At least Iraq is civilized and used to the idea of strong central government. By comparison, Afghanistan is an ungovernable wasteland. On the other hand, abandoning wastelands creates safe heavens for the people that are or would eventually become a danger to us, so it's not an easy option either.
The only possible "eng game" I could see is the US using adequate force to pacify and weaken the anti-government forces while building up the government military/police to a point that they can maintain some semblance of control themselves.
The problem is that that end game has no end part. Afghanistan will never be able to afford the amount of military and police that will need, so we will have to bankroll their defense spending for the foreseeable future, and have advisors, reaction foces, support, etc., etc. there.
Why are the Pashtuns 100% behind a group that blows up schools for educating girls? They have no other group worth supporting than that one?
Berk - bang on with that last post. I have no idea how AF can make a reliable, national force AND pay for it.
Quote from: Valmy on October 12, 2009, 11:14:19 AM
Why are the Pashtuns 100% behind a group that blows up schools for educating girls? They have no other group worth supporting than that one?
Uh, it's not that they necessarily agree with all the religious issues - it's a question of ethnic identity.
Think of the Tamil relationship with the Tigers and you have a reasonable analogy.
Quote from: Berkut on October 12, 2009, 11:13:24 AM
The only possible "eng game" I could see is the US using adequate force to pacify and weaken the anti-government forces while building up the government military/police to a point that they can maintain some semblance of control themselves.
The problem is that that end game has no end part. Afghanistan will never be able to afford the amount of military and police that will need, so we will have to bankroll their defense spending for the foreseeable future, and have advisors, reaction foces, support, etc., etc. there.
Yep we are going to be stuck in Aghanistan for the forseeable future.
Quote from: AnchorClanker on October 12, 2009, 11:17:01 AM
Uh, it's not that they necessarily agree with all the religious issues - it's a question of ethnic identity.
Think of the Tamil relationship with the Tigers and you have a reasonable analogy.
This is why ethnicity is such a fucked up way to identify yourself. People should support people based on ideology and not just support whatever jackass nutcase their ethnic group embraces.
Quote from: Valmy on October 12, 2009, 11:20:43 AM
Quote from: AnchorClanker on October 12, 2009, 11:17:01 AM
Uh, it's not that they necessarily agree with all the religious issues - it's a question of ethnic identity.
Think of the Tamil relationship with the Tigers and you have a reasonable analogy.
This is why ethnicity is such a fucked up way to identify yourself. People should support people based on ideology and not just support whatever jackass nutcase their ethnic group embraces.
Perhaps - but we have to work with reality. The NA was non-Pashtun. The Taliban were Pashtun. Both sides were nasty in their own ways, nobody in AF wears a white hat. Karzai rigging the elections isn't going to help with the stability and legitimacy issue, either. I'm glad I'm not General McChrystal. I don't envy his job.
Quote from: Berkut on October 12, 2009, 11:04:46 AM
That funny Ank, since the lefty CW during the Iraq war was that Iraq was hopeless, while Afghanistan was not, and we should be spending our efforts in Afghanistan rather than Iraq.
Now that Iraq has actually turned out much better than anyone thought it would in the dark days, and Afghanistan is turning into a mess under the expert direction of Obama, suddenly Afghanistan is hopeless, and to the extent that there could be any hope, Iraq ruined it.
Which of course makes no damn sense - if it is hopeless, it is hopeless regardless of Iraq.
I wish we still had the old languish since that is a point i made several years ago: Iraq is a far easier nut to crack than Afghanistan. The only reason the left was talking up their committment to the "good war" in Afghanistan as opposed to the "bad war" in iraq is that they wanted to sound like they're really committed to defend the US and didn't want to admit to the public that they'll never defend the US no matter what. The moment the "unwinnable" war in Iraq was won they now proclaim Afghanistan unwinnable and are preparing for surrender. No surprise there.
Quote from: AnchorClanker on October 12, 2009, 11:12:55 AM
PS for Berkut - Afghanistan was a defensible war, Iraq wasn't - from a 'casus belli' angle.
I still think that in both cases, we were far too complacent about our ability to control the situations to our liking, and became prisoners of our own unrealistic conditions for 'victory'.
Nonsense, we had a perfect casus belli against Iraq as well - its continuous refusal to abide by the cease fire agreement was all that was ever needed to justify a return to a state of war.
Quote from: Berkut on October 12, 2009, 11:13:24 AM
Quote from: DGuller on October 12, 2009, 11:10:00 AM
To people who want more war in Afghanistan, what's the end game? That's the greatest thing that seems to be missing from the picture. Invading Afghanistan was the right thing to do, and we're justified in staying there, but I just don't see where this is going. At least Iraq is civilized and used to the idea of strong central government. By comparison, Afghanistan is an ungovernable wasteland. On the other hand, abandoning wastelands creates safe heavens for the people that are or would eventually become a danger to us, so it's not an easy option either.
The only possible "eng game" I could see is the US using adequate force to pacify and weaken the anti-government forces while building up the government military/police to a point that they can maintain some semblance of control themselves.
The problem is that that end game has no end part. Afghanistan will never be able to afford the amount of military and police that will need, so we will have to bankroll their defense spending for the foreseeable future, and have advisors, reaction foces, support, etc., etc. there.
There needs to be less of an emphasys on building up a central gov't and more focus on building up local governance - that is where the war will be won or lost. The afghani gov't is far too centralized as it is currently constituted, it's a recipe for disaster.
Quote from: Hansmeister on October 12, 2009, 11:54:21 AM
Quote from: AnchorClanker on October 12, 2009, 11:12:55 AM
PS for Berkut - Afghanistan was a defensible war, Iraq wasn't - from a 'casus belli' angle.
I still think that in both cases, we were far too complacent about our ability to control the situations to our liking, and became prisoners of our own unrealistic conditions for 'victory'.
Nonsense, we had a perfect casus belli against Iraq as well - its continuous refusal to abide by the cease fire agreement was all that was ever needed to justify a return to a state of war.
Well from a legalistic point of view that is true.
You do have to admit it was far easier to justify the Afghanistan involvement at the time. In any case I am against any sort of retreat right now. We have this rather undeserved reputation for cutting and running and I would prefer we not give our enemies a chance to think they can just outlast us. In the end that will create more problems than staying in Afghanistan would.
Quote from: Hansmeister on October 12, 2009, 11:57:23 AM
There needs to be less of an emphasys on building up a central gov't and more focus on building up local governance - that is where the war will be won or lost. The afghani gov't is far too centralized as it is currently constituted, it's a recipe for disaster.
Well what were the factors that enabled Afghanistan to be rather stable and peaceful during the monarchy? Can those elements be recreated?
Quote from: Valmy on October 12, 2009, 11:59:03 AM
Quote from: Hansmeister on October 12, 2009, 11:57:23 AM
There needs to be less of an emphasys on building up a central gov't and more focus on building up local governance - that is where the war will be won or lost. The afghani gov't is far too centralized as it is currently constituted, it's a recipe for disaster.
Well what were the factors that enabled Afghanistan to be rather stable and peaceful during the monarchy? Can those elements be recreated?
From Wiki.....
"By 1921, banditry was dramatically curtailed in Afghanistan by harsh punishment, such as being imprisoned in suspended cages and left to die."(https://languish.org/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fupload.wikimedia.org%2Fwikipedia%2Fcommons%2F0%2F07%2FMancage_in_Afghanistan_1921.JPG&hash=3cb33f062ac300681ca3341183bb6b881cbd3963)
QuoteIraq ate Afghanistan's lunch
I think you mean it stole its sandwiches.
Quote from: Tonitrus on October 12, 2009, 12:02:45 PM
From Wiki.....
"By 1921, banditry was dramatically curtailed in Afghanistan by harsh punishment, such as being imprisoned in suspended cages and left to die."
Whatever works!
Quote from: Valmy on October 12, 2009, 12:04:08 PM
Quote from: Tonitrus on October 12, 2009, 12:02:45 PM
From Wiki.....
"By 1921, banditry was dramatically curtailed in Afghanistan by harsh punishment, such as being imprisoned in suspended cages and left to die."
Whatever works!
We could call it "Operation Madmartigan".
Quote from: Valmy on October 12, 2009, 11:58:05 AMWell from a legalistic point of view that is true.
You do have to admit it was far easier to justify the Afghanistan involvement at the time. In any case I am against any sort of retreat right now. We have this rather undeserved reputation for cutting and running and I would prefer we not give our enemies a chance to think they can just outlast us. In the end that will create more problems than staying in Afghanistan would.
3,000 dead American civilians make a pretty persuasive argument, though not persuasive enough for the Obamateur apparently. Cutting and running would be a trainwreck, so would anything less than full support for McCrystal's strategy. It'll be hard to convince the American public that Joe Biden is smarter and more competent than General McCrystal on COIN and CT, or, heck, on any issue at all. And how quickly will our NATO allies bail if they sense we're not committed to victory? If Obama thinks that Afghanistan is causing him trouble now just wait if he continues to dither or reject McCrystal's request. The public will not tolerate a war that we're not even planning on winning.
Quote from: Hansmeister on October 12, 2009, 12:08:31 PM
It'll be hard to convince the American public that Joe Biden is smarter and more competent than General McCrystal on COIN and CT, or, heck, on any issue at all.
Hairplugs.
Quote from: Valmy on October 12, 2009, 11:59:03 AM
Quote from: Hansmeister on October 12, 2009, 11:57:23 AM
There needs to be less of an emphasys on building up a central gov't and more focus on building up local governance - that is where the war will be won or lost. The afghani gov't is far too centralized as it is currently constituted, it's a recipe for disaster.
Well what were the factors that enabled Afghanistan to be rather stable and peaceful during the monarchy? Can those elements be recreated?
Not without recreating British India and the Russian presence in Central Asia. When tribes needed browbeating, they could be used as "the big threat", and when tribes would not be browbeaten, they could be used as places to raid and get the idiot hotheads killed.
Quote from: Hansmeister on October 12, 2009, 11:52:39 AM
The only reason the left was talking up their committment to the "good war" in Afghanistan as opposed to the "bad war" in iraq is that they wanted to sound like they're really committed to defend the US and didn't want to admit to the public that they'll never defend the US no matter what.
Sometimes, Hansy, you're doing fine in a thread, and then you suffer a Haneurysm.
http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2009/10/an_early_account_of_the_battle.php
Quote
An early account of the battle at Camp Keating
At The Best Defense, Tom Ricks published an "earwitness account" of the battle at Camp Keating in Kamdish in Nuristan province. The account comes via General Barry McCaffrey, and is given by an unnamed military officer serving in nearby Laghman province whose position is not identified, and I won't speculate further. The full account is published below, with permission of Mr. Ricks. I'll define the acronyms and other confusing terms in brackets.
Just a few notes:
• The troop commander seemed to be very level-headed during the battle, and adjusted in a professional manner to several serious setbacks, such as losing his command post and ammunition dump. Only at one point did he appear to be rattled, early on when urging the helicopter to get on the scene as soon as possible lest the camp be fully overrun. The Squadron commander let his troop commander manage the battle and got the troop commander whatever resources he could.
• The base was nearly overrun. As mentioned, the US troops temporarily lost control of the command post and ammunition dump, and the troop commander lost contact with some of his troops. The Afghan Army and Afghan security guards' checkpoints were completely overrun and set aflame.
• The US troops fought hard, and lost eight of their brothers. It could have been much worse. The helicopter and air support was the great equalizer against the massed Taliban assault.
• The US troops lost nearly everything they owned during the battle save the clothes on their backs. You can help them out by donating to the American Legion, which has set up a program, called the COP Keating Relief Fund to specifically help these men. Follow this link to help.
Here are the facts, without revealing sensitive information. I feel compelled to write this because I heard some very fine, brave Americans fought for their very lives Saturday, 03 OCT 09. They fought magnificently.
Eight of them made the Ultimate Sacrifice. I don't know their names, only their call signs. Though it may have been smaller in scale, and shorter in duration, their battle was no less heroic than the exploits of their ancestors, in places like LZ Xray or Fire Base Ripcord in Vietnam. I want people to know that there are still some GREAT Americans who serve in the US Army, fighting for Freedom, who will probably never be given the due they deserve. I don't know ALL the facts, only what I overheard on the satellite radio.
COP [Combat Outpost] Keating was (past tense) located on low ground, near a river, surrounded by mountains - a poor place to have to defend to begin with. The village of Kamdesh was nearby, as was a mosque. About two platoons and a cavalry troop headquarters occupied the COP - Combat Outpost. If you Google COP Keating, you will find a Washington Times article describing the austere conditions there, written earlier this year. I was on duty from 0600-1800 (6 a.m. until 6 p.m.) on Saturday, 03 OCT 09, and heard, first-hand, the events I am about to recount transpire. I took notes as the battle unfolded.
Things were relatively quiet when I came on shift at 0600. Not too long afterward, I heard a call sign describing taking small arms fire at his position. (That in itself is not alarming - I hear that frequently because I hear satellite radio transmissions from all sorts of units who operate in Nangahar, Kunar, Laghman (where I am) and in Nuristan Provinces, where this happened.) The situation, then began to deteriorate. The Troop Commander - urgently - requested rotary wing gunships to support him. He was told they were 45 minutes away, and that he should use his 120 mm mortars. He replied that the mortar pit was pinned down, and that the could not employ his 120 mm mortars. I did not know until I saw an aerial photo later that day, after I got off shift, that the COP was located in a "bowl," surrounded on nearly all sides by high ground. The insurgents were shooting down into the mortar pit from above. The 120 mm mortars from OP [Outpost] Fritshe, a few kilometers away were able to help a little, but it was not enough. Not too long after the fight started, the Troop Commander said that he had a KIA [Killed in Action], and several wounded.
Uh-Oh - now this is getting serious. Not too much longer after that, the Troop Commander, in a voice that was not panic'd, but which had a sense of urgency said, "We've got people inside our wire!!!" He said that he had lost communications with some of his elements at different places on the COP. He had had to abandon his Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and all the various means of redundant communications there (MIRC Chat, Blue Force Tracker, tactical FM radios, etc.) His only means of communication was the satellite radio he was using. He said he urgently needed air support. The number of KIA began to climb.
He kept asking about the helicopters - his higher headquarters said they were "30 minutes out..." He said that if he did not get help soon, they were going to be overrun. He had consolidated the Soldiers he had, to include dead and wounded, in a tight perimeter on part of his COP. He advised that the Afghan National Army (ANA) side of the COP was completely overrun and was on fire. The insurgents had gotten into his perimeter where the ANA latrine bordered his perimeter, after they had overrun the ANA camp. His Entry Control Point (ECP) where some Afghan Security Guards (ASG) had been had been overrun.
The ANP Police Checkpoint had been overrun and he was taking a heavy volume of fire from that. He was taking a lot of RPG [Rocket Propelled Grenade] fire from the mosque. His Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) was under insurgent control. He kept asking about the helicopters.He was told, "Passing Checkpoint 12..." He said, "I'm telling you that if they don't get here f***in' soon, we're all going to f***in' die!!!" Shortly after that, his Squadron Commander came up on the radio and told him that he was going to be OK, that help was on the way. The SCO [Squadron Commander] said that he needed to come up on FM and talk to the helicopters, who should be arriving very soon. The Troop Commander said that the Harris was all he had at the moment, and asked that the Squadron relay. It was, obviously, a very anxious time. I was afraid that at any moment, the Troop commander would just stop transmitting, and that would mean that they were likely all dead and dying. Someone asked the Troop commander what his target priorities were, and he said that "anything outside the wire" was controlled by bad guys. He mentioned that he needed gun runs at a particular wall, and mentioned certain Target Reference Points (TRP's) such as "the putting green" and "the diving board." Finally, the helicopters arrived and began killing insurgents. It became clear, however, that it was such a target-rich environment that much more air support was needed. The helicopters gave the defenders enough breathing room to better position themselves, reload, etc. Under the umbrella of the gunships, the Troop Commander said that he was going to try to re-take some of his camp. The SCO calmly encouraged him to "fire and maneuver." As they regained some lost ground, the Troop Commander said that he was finding some of his unaccounted for Soldiers, and that they were KIA. He gave their battle roster numbers. Things were looking better, but it was still a fierce fight. I could hear a cacophony of machine gun fire when the Troop Commander keyed that microphone to talk. The mortars were still pinned won, with one KIA and wounded in the mortar pit. After only a short time, gunships had to leave to rearm and refuel, heading to FOB Bostic. (FOB Bostic was hit with indirect fire, also, throughout the day.) The weather in the high passes interfered with the helicopters. Close Air Support in the form of jets were on the way, and the Troop Commander was asked to provide Target Numbers, which he did. He was still being pressed on all sides, still taking a heavy volume of small arms fire and RPG's. He had regained some buildings, but had not been able to re-capture all his perimeter. He found at least one MBITR and was able to communicate with aircraft a little better.
Once the jets arrived overhead, they began to drop bombs on the masses, the swarms of insurgents. Usually, the insurgents conduct a raid at dawn, do their damage, and flee. Not this day. I looked at my watch, and it was after 1000 and the insurgents were still attacking, even though it should have become clear to them after the close air arrived that they could no longer hope to completely overrun the camp. The Close Air was on station continuously after that, and as soon as one plane dropped its bombs and strafed, another came down to hit targets - some very close to camp. The mosque was hit by a Hellfire, and open source now reports that a high profile insurgent named Dost Mohammad was killed there. A target described as a "switchback" was bombed repeatedly and the insurgents seemed to simply re-occupy it only to be bombed out of it again. (Several pieces of weapons and equipment has since been found there.) The "North Face" was also repeatedly bombed and strafed.
A plan was developed to get reinforcements to COP Keating. Because it was still "too hot" to land helicopters, they were flown to OP Fritshe and had to walk to COP Keating. Asked about his ammunition (Class 5) at about 1300, the Troop commander said that he was "red" on 7.62 link and MK19 ammunition [the MK19 is a belt-fed automatic 40 mm grenade launcher, the 7.62 ammo would be used in M240 machineguns]. Not too long after that, he stated that he was "black" (supply exhausted) on 7.62, but still had a lot of .50 caliber. More KIA were found, and the Troop Commander said that they were missing their sensitive items (weapons, night vision, MBITR radios - things like that.) The KIA number rose to 5. There were constant updates on a particular wounded Soldier who had a broken leg and a crushed pelvis. They said that he had lost a lot of blood, but was on an IV, and was "hanging in there." The Troop Commander said that he had two ANA KIA, and several wounded, still with him. He said that a lot of the ANA - about 12 - had broken and run when the COP began to be overrun. (Some of their bodies were found nearby the next day, along with some ASG who were wounded.) The Troop Commander said that the insurgents had made off with the ANA's B-10 Rocket Launcher. Throughout the day, the air support targeted a B-10 launch site, but it was unclear if it was the same system that the ANA had lost of not.
The SCO got on the net and said that there was a plan to bring in a CH-47 Chinook as soon as it got dark, with attack helicopters overhead, and that they would bring in ammo and Soldiers and evacuate the wounded and dead. The SCO said that he would fly in, also. During the battle, the SCO always seemed calm and gave a lot of encouragement to the Troop Commander on the ground. He asked for updates (Situation Reports - "SITREPS") but he did not nag the Troop Commander for it every 5 minutes. He let the Troop Commander fight the fight, frequently asking him what he needed and asking him how he and his Soldiers were doing, offering encouragement, but not micromanaging.
The fighting continued all day, even though it was not as intense as it had been in the early morning. As the relief column approached from OP Fritshe, it got into a brief fight, quickly killing two insurgents and capturing their ICOM radios and RPG's. Then, they continued on toward COP Keating. The fire that had completely leveled the ANA side of the COP was spreading from building to building, and was setting the COP on fire. The Troop Commander and his Soldiers had to evacuate their TOC again, because it caught on fire.
Many of the barracks buildings caught on fire and burned, taking the Soldiers' possessions with them. Only one or two buildings were left by the time it was over. As night approached, the Troop Commander told someone (S-3? FSO?) [the S-3 is the supply officer, the FSO is the Fire Support Officer, who would coordinate with the attack helos] that if the air cover were lost, and if they were attacked again, they were "done." The Troop Commander was assured that he would have adequate air support. The CSM [Command Sergeant Major] came up on the net and asked the Troop Commander to try to expand his perimeter in order to try to get accountability of everyone. The Troop Commander said that he "just can't do it, I just don't have enough people. I have too many wounded." The CSM said that he understood, but that he was looking at a cold body on the Predator feed near the maintenance building, and thought that that might be the final missing soldier. (It was later determined that that was not him.) The Troop Commander said that there were "a lot" of dead insurgents lying dead inside his perimeter, and he could be seeing one of those.
I went off shift at 1800. At that time, there were 6 US KIA, and one missing, later found and determined to be KIA. I do not know where the 8th KIA came from: either one of the wounded died, or earlier there was a mistake in regard to accountability.
The next day (Sunday, 4 OCT) when I came to work, I learned that they had found the unaccounted-for Soldier(s) and had made it through the night. During the late morning, the SCO came up on the net and briefed someone about the situation. He said that of five (5) HMMWV's, only one was still running. They had counted eight (8) RPG impacts on one HMMWV {Humvee] alone. He said that the HMMWV's were shot all to pieces. The camp Bobcat had a window shot out, but was still running, and they were still using it to move things.
There was a lot of UXO's (unexploded ordnance) that made the area hazardous, such as unexploded US mortar rounds that had been scattered, as well as AT-4's and Javelin's [rocket launchers]. Most of the Soldiers on the COP had lost all their possessions except for what they were wearing. A plan was already being developed to get them new TA-50, uniforms, boots, toiletries, etc. once they were extracted. There were a lot of sensitive items that needed to be lifted out, because they are serial numbered items that needed to be accounted for, but most everything was ruined. They discussed whether to insert engineers with a lot of explosive to blow everything up, or whether to call in air strikes after everyone was evacuated and try to destroy what was left that way. Even at this point, they were still taking the occasional odd, angry shot or rocket fire. As I type this, I am still listening to the folks who are left at COP Keating, figuring out what to destroy, how best to destroy it (demo vs. aerial bombs or rockets) what to fly out, and making a plan on how best to get that done so they can abandon and close the COP.
Was really rough reading this actually, especially knowing the implications of some of the smaller things being said most people would miss. Real rough.
Quote from: Alcibiades on October 12, 2009, 06:41:03 PM
http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2009/10/an_early_account_of_the_battle.php (http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2009/10/an_early_account_of_the_battle.php)
Was really rough reading this actually, especially knowing the implications of some of the smaller things being said most people would miss. Real rough.
:cry:
Fill us in on the small things that we're missing please.
Well besides the obvious of hearing guys in the wire, or experiencing it. Losing communications with your guys, "finding" your soldiers that are KIA, whether they were dead when they were overwhelmed.
When he's speaking about having all their sensitive items, radios etc. God knows what was done to their bodies, or in their final seconds.
Can't imagine how things completely went down, I doubt they were all in body armor even, most were probably sleeping when it started. But if the TOC and ammo supply point are overrun, usually these are the most heavily defended areas and are strong points.
The guys were most likely fighting in small groups, not even coordinated for the most part in a situation like that, and training is hard to use when you're never supposed to be exposed to a situation like that against overwhelming odds practically by yourself. The guys that died must have been terrified and and felt very alone.
I mean honestly, it has to have been the scariest thing you can ever encounter. I mean my cop was attacked several times, but nothing like this, let alone numbers. And I've been in heavy combat for a hours at a time , and it felt like forever, and you're exhausted after. I can't imagine being in combat for upwards of 20 hours straight. And if a commander is freaking out over the radio, which he definitely was....these guys are supposed to be the cool of cool, regardless of situation, must have been blood chilling to hear over the radio. I'm sure it looked like hell.
Hearing of the battle rosters being called over the radios, been there, brings back terrible memories. Hearing KIA over the radio and then listening for the initials to hear if it's someone you know or are really good friends with.... can't really describe it.
Being overrun is really the scariest thing you can think of as a soldier, especially by our current enemy...Don't really know what else to say besides that.
Lots of little stuff like that I guess, brings back some things I guess.
Quote from: Hansmeister on October 12, 2009, 12:08:31 PM
Quote from: Valmy on October 12, 2009, 11:58:05 AMWell from a legalistic point of view that is true.
You do have to admit it was far easier to justify the Afghanistan involvement at the time. In any case I am against any sort of retreat right now. We have this rather undeserved reputation for cutting and running and I would prefer we not give our enemies a chance to think they can just outlast us. In the end that will create more problems than staying in Afghanistan would.
3,000 dead American civilians make a pretty persuasive argument, though not persuasive enough for the Obamateur apparently. Cutting and running would be a trainwreck, so would anything less than full support for McCrystal's strategy. It'll be hard to convince the American public that Joe Biden is smarter and more competent than General McCrystal on COIN and CT, or, heck, on any issue at all. And how quickly will our NATO allies bail if they sense we're not committed to victory? If Obama thinks that Afghanistan is causing him trouble now just wait if he continues to dither or reject McCrystal's request. The public will not tolerate a war that we're not even planning on winning.
A few years ago you were saying that Afghanistan was pretty much a lost cause anyway.
Quote from: AnchorClanker on October 12, 2009, 11:15:34 AM
Berk - bang on with that last post. I have no idea how AF can make a reliable, national force AND pay for it.
Legalize heroin worldwide?
(https://languish.org/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fd.yimg.com%2Fa%2Fp%2Fap%2F20091011%2Fcapt.f9d7851463d44110b981f2570c14a7d9.afghanistan_downward_spiral_ny331.jpg&hash=8d61ca1eff1692beff749f315d3a72a5e38a5a07)
U.S. soldiers from the 2nd Battalion, 87th Infantry Regiment, 10th Mountain Division, cajole an Afghan donkey to carry supplies to their mountaintop post in southern Afghanistan. (AP Photo/Rodrigo Abd, File)
Metaphor for U.S. in Afghanistan?
Kicking ass?
Quote from: sbr on October 12, 2009, 10:37:25 PM
Quote from: AnchorClanker on October 12, 2009, 11:15:34 AM
Berk - bang on with that last post. I have no idea how AF can make a reliable, national force AND pay for it.
Legalize heroin worldwide?
Wouldn't that cause prices to crash once agribuissness jumps on the bandwagon?
Quote from: Razgovory on October 13, 2009, 01:21:58 AM
Kicking ass?
More like, it's an uphill battle and the Afghans have to be dragged along kicking and braying.
Isn't it time to think about non-military solutions?
An example: people who know afghanistan say it has a closed economy, mainly producing agricultural products and opium. The trade of those product is controlled by the warlords, who have all the reason to keep that system in place. Farmers are mainly dependent of those warlords.
So you could undermine this system, by giving the farmers a guaranteed price for their products. It gives them the economic security, so they produce less opium, and make them less dependent of the warlord. Also it pumps money from below in economy, not from above through the corrupt government. It would undermine Taliban activities, who get their money from opium production. And it would make farmers and their families far more positive to the US.
It would also cost probably a lot less money and lives.
Quote from: Armyknife on October 12, 2009, 08:06:54 PM
I'm going with Alci. assessment over whatever agiprop. Hansie comes up with
I don't think Alci and I have a differenting position on the situation in Afghanistan.
Quote from: Razgovory on October 12, 2009, 07:26:00 PM
A few years ago you were saying that Afghanistan was pretty much a lost cause anyway.
It's always cute when you make shit up.
Quote from: Hansmeister on October 13, 2009, 07:00:00 AM
Quote from: Razgovory on October 12, 2009, 07:26:00 PM
A few years ago you were saying that Afghanistan was pretty much a lost cause anyway.
It's always cute when you make shit up.
I always hear that high pitched voice when I read your posts. ^_^
Quote from: Hansmeister on October 13, 2009, 07:00:00 AM
Quote from: Razgovory on October 12, 2009, 07:26:00 PM
A few years ago you were saying that Afghanistan was pretty much a lost cause anyway.
It's always cute when you make shit up.
What ever you say. :rolleyes:
There was this caricature in my local paper this morning. :P
http://photos.cyberpresse.ca/caricatures/#enVedette/0/recherche/Rechercher%20un%20album/0/onglets/51/0/album/7017/170155/
The general says: "Without reinforcements we will quickly lose the war! With 40 thousand soldiers more we will lose it very slowly".
This sums up the afghan debate IMO. We should pull out.
G.
You already are. :mellow:
Quote from: Alcibiades on October 13, 2009, 11:47:30 AM
You already are. :mellow:
If you mean canadians - most certainly not; 2011 is the last estimated date for redeployment. That is unless Harper doesn't justify an extension.
If you were talking about something else than be more clear.
G.
Quote from: Grallon on October 13, 2009, 08:45:25 AM
There was this caricature in my local paper this morning. :P
http://photos.cyberpresse.ca/caricatures/#enVedette/0/recherche/Rechercher%20un%20album/0/onglets/51/0/album/7017/170155/
The general says: "Without reinforcements we will quickly lose the war! With 40 thousand soldiers more we will lose it very slowly".
This sums up the afghan debate IMO. We should pull out.
Personally, I fund newspaper cartoonists to be a poor source of strategic advice, but YMMV.
Quote from: Alcibiades on October 12, 2009, 07:20:04 PM
Well besides the obvious of hearing guys in the wire, or experiencing it. Losing communications with your guys, "finding" your soldiers that are KIA, whether they were dead when they were overwhelmed.
When he's speaking about having all their sensitive items, radios etc. God knows what was done to their bodies, or in their final seconds.
Can't imagine how things completely went down, I doubt they were all in body armor even, most were probably sleeping when it started. But if the TOC and ammo supply point are overrun, usually these are the most heavily defended areas and are strong points.
The guys were most likely fighting in small groups, not even coordinated for the most part in a situation like that, and training is hard to use when you're never supposed to be exposed to a situation like that against overwhelming odds practically by yourself. The guys that died must have been terrified and and felt very alone.
I mean honestly, it has to have been the scariest thing you can ever encounter. I mean my cop was attacked several times, but nothing like this, let alone numbers. And I've been in heavy combat for a hours at a time , and it felt like forever, and you're exhausted after. I can't imagine being in combat for upwards of 20 hours straight. And if a commander is freaking out over the radio, which he definitely was....these guys are supposed to be the cool of cool, regardless of situation, must have been blood chilling to hear over the radio. I'm sure it looked like hell.
Hearing of the battle rosters being called over the radios, been there, brings back terrible memories. Hearing KIA over the radio and then listening for the initials to hear if it's someone you know or are really good friends with.... can't really describe it.
Being overrun is really the scariest thing you can think of as a soldier, especially by our current enemy...Don't really know what else to say besides that.
Lots of little stuff like that I guess, brings back some things I guess.
Thanks for the info and insight. That article was a pretty harrowing account to read. :(
Quote from: The Minsky Moment on October 13, 2009, 12:00:54 PM
Personally, I fund newspaper cartoonists to be a poor source of strategic advice, but YMMV.
We had our little snide moment of the day? We are feeling better now?
-----
At this point I look at the results in the field and they are very limited - diminishing in fact considering the talibans are gaining ground. Another quick military victory turned sour for lack of long term planning. But beyond there's the fact these 'people' aren't interested in changing so why waste time, money, lives? Ah yes... to prevent terrorism from gaining a foothold. Too late since they have it next door in (nuclear) Pakistan.
Will there be another war with that sir?
G.
Quote from: Hansmeister on October 12, 2009, 11:52:39 AMThe moment the "unwinnable" war in Iraq was won they now proclaim Afghanistan unwinnable and are preparing for surrender. No surprise there.
I think you go too far here by a little bit. Its a fairly complex mixture of isolationism, various misconceptions about Afghanistan and Afghan history (its unconquerable, its a culture less wasteland that's never produced anyone/anything of value) and some stupid Euro idea that America is the source of all evil in the world.
That said, I mostly agree with Hansmeister here, which is making me question my own position.
Quote from: Grallon on October 13, 2009, 12:07:44 PM
But beyond there's the fact these 'people' aren't interested in changing
Changing what?
It is very unlikely that any group of people is committed to living their lives in poverty, misery, and violence.
Quote from: The Minsky Moment on October 13, 2009, 04:37:04 PM
Quote from: Grallon on October 13, 2009, 12:07:44 PM
But beyond there's the fact these 'people' aren't interested in changing
Changing what?
It is very unlikely that any group of people is committed to living their lives in poverty, misery, and violence.
I should bring you up to a few neighborhoods in Whitehorse...
Chronic alchoholism is probably not one of Afghanistan's top 10 problems . . .
Quote from: The Minsky Moment on October 13, 2009, 04:43:13 PM
Chronic alchoholism is probably not one of Afghanistan's top 10 problems . . .
Dragon chasing, and breeding dragons<bottle emptying, and production of bottles. Sadly.
Quote from: Queequeg on October 13, 2009, 04:46:25 PM
Quote from: The Minsky Moment on October 13, 2009, 04:43:13 PM
Chronic alchoholism is probably not one of Afghanistan's top 10 problems . . .
Dragon chasing, and breeding dragons<bottle emptying, and production of bottles. Sadly.
What???
Quote from: Barrister on October 13, 2009, 04:50:42 PM
Quote from: Queequeg on October 13, 2009, 04:46:25 PM
Quote from: The Minsky Moment on October 13, 2009, 04:43:13 PM
Chronic alchoholism is probably not one of Afghanistan's top 10 problems . . .
Dragon chasing, and breeding dragons<bottle emptying, and production of bottles. Sadly.
What???
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chasing_the_Dragon
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=chasing%20the%20dragon
Liquidate the Eburones, and crush the Nervii.
Oh wait...
Quote from: ulmont on October 13, 2009, 04:54:17 PM
Quote from: Barrister on October 13, 2009, 04:50:42 PM
Quote from: Queequeg on October 13, 2009, 04:46:25 PM
Quote from: The Minsky Moment on October 13, 2009, 04:43:13 PM
Chronic alchoholism is probably not one of Afghanistan's top 10 problems . . .
Dragon chasing, and breeding dragons<bottle emptying, and production of bottles. Sadly.
What???
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chasing_the_Dragon
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=chasing%20the%20dragon
That much I understood...
And yes Minsky, I suppose radical Islam is pretty good at keeping alcoholism in check if nothing else. :)
Quote from: Barrister on October 13, 2009, 05:07:50 PM
Quote from: ulmont on October 13, 2009, 04:54:17 PM
Quote from: Barrister on October 13, 2009, 04:50:42 PM
Quote from: Queequeg on October 13, 2009, 04:46:25 PM
Quote from: The Minsky Moment on October 13, 2009, 04:43:13 PM
Chronic alchoholism is probably not one of Afghanistan's top 10 problems . . .
Dragon chasing, and breeding dragons<bottle emptying, and production of bottles. Sadly.
What???
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chasing_the_Dragon
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=chasing%20the%20dragon
That much I understood...
And yes Minsky, I suppose radical Islam is pretty good at keeping alcoholism in check if nothing else. :)
Then why the "What???"? Seems like if you got the heroin and radical Islam references, there wasn't a whole lot left to misunderstand...
Quote from: Barrister on October 13, 2009, 04:50:42 PM
What???
Russia, an alcoholic nation if ever there was one, is at least reasonably stable. Afghanistan and Mexico certainly aren't, and neither was Colombia for decades.
Quote from: Queequeg on October 13, 2009, 04:26:59 PM
That said, I mostly agree with Hansmeister here, which is making me question my own position.
I think you're required to hang yourself in your shower after agreeing with me. It's a languish rule enforced by CdM.
Quote from: Hansmeister on October 13, 2009, 06:45:34 PM
Quote from: Queequeg on October 13, 2009, 04:26:59 PM
That said, I mostly agree with Hansmeister here, which is making me question my own position.
I think you're required to hang yourself in your shower after agreeing with me. It's a languish rule enforced by CdM.
:lol:
To be fair, I never advocated getting out of Iraq, was for both wars initially, and in all honesty agreed with you and OVB far more often than with Jacob or Joan back in the day. My politics have changed on most things, though.
Quote from: Queequeg on October 13, 2009, 06:49:19 PM
My politics have changed on most things, though.
Heavy drug use will do that to a man.
Quote from: Queequeg on October 13, 2009, 06:49:19 PM
Quote from: Hansmeister on October 13, 2009, 06:45:34 PM
Quote from: Queequeg on October 13, 2009, 04:26:59 PM
That said, I mostly agree with Hansmeister here, which is making me question my own position.
I think you're required to hang yourself in your shower after agreeing with me. It's a languish rule enforced by CdM.
:lol:
To be fair, I never advocated getting out of Iraq, was for both wars initially, and in all honesty agreed with you and OVB far more often than with Jacob or Joan back in the day. My politics have changed on most things, though.
Because you abandoned the One True Faith, you apostate.
Quote from: Barrister on October 13, 2009, 06:50:21 PM
Heavy drug use will do that to a man.
:lol:
I gave up everything but ganja over a year ago, and have not had any of that in maybe 3 months, and before that in about 8 months. Guess again.
Quote from: Hansmeister on October 13, 2009, 06:52:14 PM
Quote from: Queequeg on October 13, 2009, 06:49:19 PM
Quote from: Hansmeister on October 13, 2009, 06:45:34 PM
Quote from: Queequeg on October 13, 2009, 04:26:59 PM
That said, I mostly agree with Hansmeister here, which is making me question my own position.
I think you're required to hang yourself in your shower after agreeing with me. It's a languish rule enforced by CdM.
:lol:
To be fair, I never advocated getting out of Iraq, was for both wars initially, and in all honesty agreed with you and OVB far more often than with Jacob or Joan back in the day. My politics have changed on most things, though.
Because you abandoned the One True Faith, you apostate.
Mormonism?
QuoteTaliban strength in Afghanistan nears military proportion
By Jonathan S. Landay and Hal Bernton, McClatchy Newspapers
WASHINGTON -- A recent U.S. intelligence assessment has raised the estimated number of full-time Taliban -led insurgents fighting in Afghanistan to at least 25,000, underscoring how the crisis has worsened even as the U.S. and its allies have beefed up their military forces, a U.S. official said Thursday.
The U.S. official, who requested anonymity because the assessment is classified, said the estimate represented an increase of at least 5,000 fighters, or 25 percent, over what an estimate found last year.
On Wednesday, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry assured Afghans that America would continue to fight until "extremists and insurgents" were defeated in the war-torn nation.
The new intelligence estimate suggests that such a fight would be difficult. Not included in the 25,000 tally are the part-time fighters -- those Afghans who plant bombs or support the insurgents in other ways in return for money -- and also the criminal gangs who sometimes make common cause with the Taliban or other Pakistan -based groups.
The assessment attributed the growth in the Taliban and their major allies, such as the Haqqani Network and Hezb-e-Islami, to a number of factors, including a growing sense among many Afghans that the insurgents are gaining ground over U.S.-led NATO troops and Afghan security forces.
"The rise can be attributed to, among other things, a sense that the central government in Kabul isn't delivering (on services), increased local support for insurgent groups, and the perception that the Taliban and others are gaining a firmer foothold and expanding their capabilities," the U.S. official said.
"They (the insurgents) don't need to win a popularity contest," said Michael O'Hanlon , a military analyst at the center-left Brookings Institution in Washington . "They are actually doing a good job in creating a complex psychological brew. The first part is building on frustration with the government. The second part is increasing their own appeal or at least taking the edge off of the hatred that people had felt for them before. But on top of that they are selectively using intimidation to stoke a climate of fear. And on top of that they have momentum."
James Dobbins , a retired ambassador who served as the first U.S. special envoy to Afghanistan , said the new estimate shows how the war, which entered its ninth year this month, has been intensifying.
"It tells you that things are getting worse, and that would suggest that the current (U.S.-led troop) levels are inadequate," Dobbins said. "But it doesn't lead you to a formula that tells you what the adequate troop levels should be."
The estimated increase in the insurgents' ranks occurred as the numbers of U.S., British and other Western troops also increased, possibly suggesting that the growth in international forces is bolstering an impression among many Afghans that they're under foreign occupation.
The new estimate comes as the Obama administration debates its new strategy for Afghanistan amid public divisions between senior officials and military commanders.
Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal , the U.S. commander in Afghanistan , is seeking as many as 45,000 additional U.S. troops, which would bring the number of U.S. soldiers to more than 100,000. There are 39,000 forces from other countries and an effort is under way to double the size of the Afghan army to 134,000 by 2011.
Administration critics of McChrystal's assessment -- led by Vice President Joe Biden -- are promoting a more limited strategy that would require far fewer U.S. troops.
Eikenberry's remarks came at a ceremony honoring the more than 5,500 Afghan police and soldiers who've died since the war began.
"We will continue to stand side-by-side, shoulder-to-shoulder with you and the brave members of your security forces," said Eikenberry at a wreath-laying ceremony in a courtyard of Afghanistan's National Assembly . "We will fight with you, grieve with you, and build a future with you."
Eikenberry is a former U.S. military commander who as ambassador has taken a key role in the Obama administration's efforts to partner with Afghan President Hamid Karzai to try to beat back the Taliban insurgency and stabilize the country.
However, the administration's relationship with Karzai has frayed amid allegations of widespread corruption in the Afghan government. In recent weeks, Karzai's relationship with the U.S. has been further strained by mounting evidence of large-scale fraud on his behalf during the Aug. 20 presidential election.
Karzai didn't attend Wednesday's ceremony, and some of his recent public statements have reflected increased tensions with Western diplomats.
At a Sunday news conference, Karzai accused some foreign diplomats of trying to interfere in Afghan affairs. He also said that his government was investigating reports that unidentified foreign helicopters were flying in insurgent-controlled areas in northern provinces.
Karzai never said what nation might be providing those helicopters, but his remarks helped stir speculation that somehow the U.S. was involved.
Eikenberry said Wednesday he'd heard rumors and read articles that the U.S. was secretly helping Afghanistan's enemy with weapons and helicopters. He denounced those reports "as outrageous and baseless. We would never aid the terrorists that attacked us on September 11 , that are killing our soldiers, your soldiers, and innocent Afghan civilians every day."
A Karzai campaign team member said Karzai never meant to imply that the helicopters were American.
"We believe what the American ambassador has said, and that the helicopters don't belong to America," said Moen Marastyal, an Afghan parliament member who's worked on the Karzai re-election campaign.
The election has yet to yield a final tally as an electoral complaints commission, which includes three United Nations appointees, reviews about 10 percent of the polling sites for fraudulent ballots. A final tally had been expected this week but it now appears that those results won't come until later this month.
In a preliminary tally, Karzai had more than 54 percent of the vote, and under Afghan electoral law, he'd win the election outright if his final tally remains above 50 percent. If it falls to 50 percent or less, Karzai would face a run-off with the second-place finisher, former foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah .
As the vote review drags on, some Western diplomats have proposed that Karzai and his main rival form a coalition government.
Marastyal said that Karzai has been told he has two options: Either agree to form a coalition government or be forced into a runoff election as the final tally tosses out fraudulent votes.
In contrast, Marastyal said that Karzai is under pressure from his own supporters not to forge a coalition government.
"We would have divisions in the government, and there would not be a good result," Marastyal said.
Sarwar Jawadi , an Abdullah spokesman, said his candidate has not agreed to join in a coalition government.
On Wednesday, Eikenberry's public remarks didn't mention any proposals for a coalition government. He said that the U.S. seeks a "reliable Afghan partner," and that the "long, but important election process" should yield a government elected upon the genuine votes of the people."
If we're willing to do what it takes to utterly destroy the Taliban, then we should stay. If we're not willing to do that, we should leave. Continued half-measures is the worst possible option.
I didn't even know we had an afghan strategy.
Quote from: Kleves on October 15, 2009, 02:19:50 AM
If we're willing to do what it takes to utterly destroy the Taliban, then we should stay. If we're not willing to do that, we should leave. Continued half-measures is the worst possible option.
Agreed.
Quote from: Razgovory on October 15, 2009, 02:59:04 AM
I didn't even know we had an afghan strategy.
We have since the stimulus bill included supplemental appropriations for enhancing our national knitting capabilities.
Quote from: Kleves on October 15, 2009, 02:19:50 AM
If we're willing to do what it takes to utterly destroy the Taliban, then we should stay. If we're not willing to do that, we should leave. Continued half-measures is the worst possible option.
These two wars are jokes, side-shows, entertainment. Should they begin to be treated seriously that would entail sacrifices on the part of the consumer-voters - which isn't profitable politically, especially not after years of blundering and half-hearted efforts. Another reason to pull out.
G.
I like Sarkozy's stance.
"Should we stay in Afghanistan? Yes we should stay, and we should fight the Talebans until we win. But we're not sending one more soldier in Afghanistan".
Great thinking there.
Quote from: Armyknife on October 15, 2009, 07:47:22 PM
Being in Afghanistan is like doing a reverse-Cambodia, were in a country which is a sideshow to the real combat zone - Pakistan.
I could have sworn you said the exact same thing about Iraq and Afghanistan not too long ago.
Quote from: viper37 on October 15, 2009, 02:57:01 PM
I like Sarkozy's stance.
"Should we stay in Afghanistan? Yes we should stay, and we should fight the Talebans until we win. But we're not sending one more soldier in Afghanistan".
Great thinking there.
Hey just staying there with the troops they have committed is helpful.
Quote from: Valmy on October 16, 2009, 08:28:25 AM
Hey just staying there with the troops they have committed is helpful.
They have already withdrawn most of their troops for Afghanistan.
Imagine if the US decided to withdraw all but 2000 troops and then says "we should all remain in Afghanistan". That would be a comparable situation to France dragging its feet over its NATO commitments.
QuotePentagon ramps up direct military aid to Pakistan
By Adam Entous Adam Entous Fri Oct 16, 2:27 pm ET
WASHINGTON (Reuters) – The Pentagon is ramping up delivery of military equipment long sought by the Pakistani army to fight militants, U.S. officials said on Friday.
Some $200 million worth of equipment and services already in the pipeline for Pakistan has started to arrive but officials declined to provide full details, saying many of the more sophisticated items were classified.
Some programs have run into resistance from Islamabad, which is wary of appearing too close to Washington, they said.
The U.S. military aid is meant to help Pakistan mount a long-awaited ground offensive against Taliban fighters in their South Waziristan stronghold along the border with Afghanistan, where U.S. and NATO forces are fighting a growing insurgency.
Hit by string of brazen militant attacks in the past 11 days that have killed about 150 people, Islamabad says a ground offensive by its troops is imminent.
"Each one of these attacks is troublesome," Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman said. "But the Pakistan government remains committed to addressing the threat there."
Direct military aid from the Pentagon, officials said, would come on top of the equipment that Pakistan receives through normal foreign military sales overseen by the State Department. Officials say those sales vary year to year but generally total around $300 million annually.
U.S. government aid is a highly contentious issue in Pakistan, where anti-American sentiment runs high, and Islamabad has thrown up obstacles to some of the Pentagon's proposals, including one to expand counter-insurgency training for the Frontier Corps paramilitary force, officials said.
SENSITIVITIES
Underscoring those sensitivities, when President Barack Obama signed legislation this week giving $7.5 billion in nonmilitary aid to Pakistan over five years, he did so behind closed doors after Pakistani critics said provisions in the law violated the country's sovereignty.
While pointing to growing military-to-military cooperation to counter the threat militants pose to the nuclear-armed state, U.S. officials say many of Pakistan's top commanders remain focused on expanding conventional capabilities to counter long-time foe India.
"It is frustrating," one official said. "We want to do more."
A special counterinsurgency fund approved by Congress earlier this year gave the Pentagon the authorization to speed delivery of military equipment to the Pakistani army.
Pentagon officials say equipment provided under the program can be delivered quickly because it bypasses normal "peacetime" rules governing foreign military sales that can take three to five years to process.
Congressional aides say the $200 million worth of equipment and services in the pipeline can arrive more quickly, in as little as 60-90 days, because much of it is not sophisticated and comes from readily available supplies.
In contrast, the delivery of F-16 fighter jets has been held up for years because it depends on production line schedules.
Another $200 million worth of equipment for fiscal year 2009, which ended on September 30, remains available for Pakistan, and the Pentagon plans to nearly double the amount of direct military aid for fiscal 2010 to $700 million, officials said.
Shipments in recent months have included hundreds of night vision goggles, day and night scopes for rifles and radios to improve communications, as well as thousands of bullet-proof vests. Officials said armor-plated all-terrain vehicles were a priority item.
DRONE REQUEST
Pakistan has requested precision-guided weapons as well as pilotless "drone" aircraft, whose increasing use by the CIA to attack Taliban and al Qaeda targets in Pakistani tribal areas has fanned anti-American sentiment.
Pentagon officials refused to release the list of the items authorized for Pakistan or to comment on the drone request. But many U.S. lawmakers are skeptical of Pakistan's intentions and transferring drone technology would face Indian resistance.
Officials said a portion of the $200 million currently in the pipeline was already being used to overhaul Pakistan's fleet of Mi-17 helicopters, critical for the planned operation in the mountainous Waziristan region.
Officials acknowledge getting the Mi-17s to Pakistan has been a difficult and time-consuming process. They are in short supply and the ones Pakistan has now have been heavily used in other operations and poorly maintained, the officials said.
To free up just 10 of the helicopters requested by Pakistan in June and July, the Pentagon had to "borrow" two from a training program for the Afghan military, sources said.
"We are doing everything within our power to assist Pakistan in improving its counter-insurgency capabilities," Pentagon spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Mark Wright said.
He said the counterinsurgency fund "put military assistance to Pakistan on a wartime footing," much like the way the United States supplies the security forces of Iraq and Afghanistan.
(Additional reporting by Sue Pleming; Editing by John O'Callaghan)
Why can't the Russians help with the Mi-17s?
Quote from: citizen k on October 17, 2009, 01:41:28 AM
Why can't the Russians help with the Mi-17s?
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Why should they?