Here's what I've read:
A military junta put the democratically elected president Mohamed Bazoum under house arrest last week, and took over running the country.
As I understand it Niger is of strategic importance due to its uranium production, is relevant to the Islamicist political contest, and is a key stop in important migration routes to North Africa and the Mediterranean region.
The union of West African countries - ECOWAS - has attempted to put pressure on the coup-makers to reinstall Bazoum, but the junta refused to meet a Nigerian delegation. Niger's airspace is closed, electricity form Nigeria (which provides ~70%) has been cut off, and ECOWAS has put a deadline in place for the reinstallation of Bazoum and have said they'll militarily intervene if it is not met. That deadline is about to expire in the next 24 hours.
France and the US are supportive of democracy and ECOWAS' efforts - and both countries have troops stationed in Niger (after withdrawing them from Mali). Senegal, Nigeria, and Cote D'Ivoire are supporting the reinstatement of Bazoum, but Burkina Faso and Mali have said that a military intervention against the new military junta will be taken as a declaration of war (both of those countries are governed by military regimes).
Meanwhile, the coup-makers have apparently appealed to the Wagner group for support.
Yeah. From what I've no idea what will happen and I think there's lots of moving parts.
I think this is very tie to the unravelling of France's war on terror - it has been more than just French troops being stationed in the region. They've had troops, with some European allies, and some logistical support from the US, UK etc (without putting boots on the ground) in the Sahel for 10 years on active operations to suppress jihadis in the region. At it's peak I think France had about 6,000 troops deployed (for context that's almost twice the deployment of UK troops for the occupation of Iraq, but less than Afghanistan) across Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Mauritania. The French tried regularly to "Europeanise" this operation but had basically very little interest from most EU partners of, from France's perspective, "sharing the burden".
That operation has now ended and fundamentally, it's failed. French-led forces didn't really manage to suppress the jihadi groups in the region. Their presence and their operations was causing increasing instability as well as incidents that are reminiscent of the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq - accidentally bombing or raiding civilians, collateral damage etc.
That is, I think, an important part of the context behind the coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and possibly Niger - it's also part of why they've called in Wagner. Although my understanding is they're not Islamist coups, that part of the reason they've called in Wagner is for even more violent suppression of jihadis. I believe Mali and Burkina Faso have also both bought Bayraktars from Turkey. And there is an argument there. One of the sides of French policy in the Sahel was it had the close security relationship with these countries (and the military bases to strengthen them) - they've had ten years of operating across these countries in theory to restore order/improve security and they have failed. To an extent it is understandable that the militaries are looking for other states/forces who can provide them with the "tools" they want to suppress the jihadis - the US has zero interest in getting involved (but would back France a bit), no-one else in Europe is interested, it's a bit more dynamic than UN peacekeeping. Who is left?
There is also, I think an anti-colonial, element. Francafrique has meant France has been far more actively involved in its former African colonies than most post-imperial powers. Mali, Niger and Burkino Faso are all part of the West African CFA Franc (and there are benefits to this, but it is also, arguably a tool of control for France) - so there's a fixed exchange rate with the Euro and a French guarantee of free conversion of the CFA Franc into Euros. Most controversially all members and the central bank are required to have an "operating account" with the French Treasury. At independence this was 100% of their foreign reserves, I believe it's now at 50% - Macron is reducing the requirement. Historically stability of the currency zones have taken priority over democracy and France has not hesitated in backing coups to install friendly leaders. There is an argument - some would say it's a neo-colonial tool that has also encouraged massive looting and capital outflows (often spent in France) and that about 2/3s of the member states are among the least developed countries. The counter-argument is that it provides a stable, credible, easily convertible currency zone with French backing (I'm very, very dubious about saying France is "supportive of democracy" in any meaningful sense in Francafrique for that reason - not sure I'd give the US that benefit of the doubt in Africa either, or indeed, any European/Western power).
But there's been increasing movements among elites against this - it's also, interestingly, been picked up in Europe, Meloni has a riff basically saying French "neo-colonialism" is keeping West Africa poor and increasing migration to Europe and that France should give back Africa's gold so they can develop and don't need to migrate. From what I've read across the region, but also in other states in Francafrique, like Senegal there's been increasing anti-French sentiment since the end of the Cold War and French corporations (who obviously benefit from a fixed and easily convertible currency) are regular targets during unrest - in both democratic and non-democratic states.
In that context it is striking that Mali has removed French as an official language (though it's still a working language) and instead making several indigenous languages official languages of the state. As well as ordering the removal of French troops and advisors they've also banned French NGOs.
I thtink the emergence of the ECOWAS view is really interesting. Not least because one of the options for a post CFA Franc currency, at least for West Africa, was an African run and led currency with ECOWAS that would have none of the pillars of the CFA France. But also because, especially Nigeria, is a bit of a sleeping giant so it's interesting to see it take a leadership role. It would also be intereseting to see what that would look like and a more assertive Nigeria or ECOWAS - there's lots of calls, understandably, for African solutions to African problems, which I think is right. But, I wonder if the EU, US, Russia or China are particularly ready for what that might look like?
I could be wrong (and in a way I hope I am), but my guess is that militaries plus Wagner and Bayraktar are probably going to be no more able to suppress the jihadis than French forces and local militaries were able to; but they will have (maybe fatally) weakened the state - so I wouldn't be surprised if the result is even more instability, possibly disintegration and the implications that has, for example, for Nigeria which could be quite severe and again my lead to a more active role for ECOWAS. I suspect it could also have a knock on effect on migration to Europe, Europe's migration politics - especially in France where I imagine most would want to go - and Europe's deals with Libya and Tunisia.
And I look at the French presence across the Sahel and think it's a bit: European military presence in Africa, the solution to and cause of all its problems. Again my instinct is there is no justification for any European (or US or Chinese) bases in Africa, including Wagnerites, so maybe one way or the other at some point ECOWAS (or other regional powers and groups) doing more would be a good thing?
Quote from: Sheilbh on August 06, 2023, 01:19:56 PMI think this is very tie to the unravelling of France's war on terror - it has been more than just French troops being stationed in the region. They've had troops, with some European allies, and some logistical support from the US, UK etc (without putting boots on the ground) in the Sahel for 10 years on active operations to suppress jihadis in the region. At it's peak I think France had about 6,000 troops deployed (for context that's almost twice the deployment of UK troops for the occupation of Iraq, but less than Afghanistan) across Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Mauritania. The French tried regularly to "Europeanise" this operation but had basically very little interest from most EU partners of, from France's perspective, "sharing the burden".
One of the slightly interesting/touchy aspects to the politics of this coup is that there ARE about 1,000 US troops in Niger right now as part of the force working against terrorism.
Quote from: Tonitrus on August 06, 2023, 02:44:34 PMOne of the slightly interesting/touchy aspects to the politics of this coup is that there IS about 1,000 US troops in Niger right now as part of the force working against terrorism.
Oh interesting - I didn't know. Is that part of the French operations or supporting them in some way, or separate US mission?
https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/which-western-countries-have-foreign-forces-niger-2023-07-28/
It looks like the US forces are mostly there providing drone support to the French and training for the local forces.
Thanks for that write-up Sheilbh - very informative.
What role does Wagner play in Africa? Are they just mercenaries for hire that would do whatever you ask them to do, or are they essentially Russian colonizers entrenching themselves with local African governments?
Plausibly (but not really, unless you're a dope) deniable tools of Russian foreign policy.
I think both?
They're your first call if you need extra muscle to do shifty things, especially if that muscle is to do things the West doesn't approve of.
Making money while pulling actors away from Western norms and influence is a two-for-one for Russian foreign policy.
Not that I'm an expert but that's my read.
Quote from: Tonitrus on August 06, 2023, 07:57:22 PMPlausibly (but not really, unless you're a dope) deniable tools of Russian foreign policy.
Also same purpose as any other outsourcing - it's off the books for Russia. So they have a tool of foreign policy that they are not having to pay for because often Wagner get paid through mining contracts etc. From my understanding the "elite" Wagner forces operate abroad and have never been involved in Ukraine, it was just dregs and prisoners put into that meat grinder.
I've heard Mark Galeotti on this flag that Wagner is part of the wider Concord group. Some of the PMCs are just mercernaries for hire but Concord provide what he called wider "authoritarian support services". So there's a bit that does political and PR consulting, they've got troll farms for your social media, they can help astro-turf supportive crowds etc - they also have people (as you'd expect from an economy like Russia) that can help with resource extraction (and, I imagine, subsequently extracting the cash out of country and into some safe assets).
Although on that astro-turfing I've heard African reporters slightly query Wagner's role - or at least they've noted that Wagner are very good at making sure they are prominently involved. So Wagner very obviously flew someone in in the first day or two of this coup, they made sure there were lots of Russian (and Wagner) flags for the crowd etc - and the journalist slightly questioned how much Wagner is involved and how much is just spin that helps them and the local forces they're working with.
QuoteThey're your first call if you need extra muscle to do shifty things, especially if that muscle is to do things the West doesn't approve of.
Making money while pulling actors away from Western norms and influence is a two-for-one for Russian foreign policy.
Yes - although I think there's maybe less of a contrast between West and Russia here. There's French and British mercenary forces in Africa (who have participated in civil wars, similarly largely paid for by extraction) and post-Iraq, I think Blackwater started working in the DRC, which obviously is hugely mineral rich. In terms of "private security" more broadly, as well as the French, British and Americans there's Germans in Sudan, Libya, Mauritania and Egypt, South Africans also in Mozambique (also against jihadi groups) and, before the war, there were Ukrainians. I imagine that like Wagner those forces maybe also provide other services like lobbying in Western capitals for your force.
And one of the reasons isn't necessarily even that you want to do shifty things - from what I've heard part of it is just that these mercenary tend to be better motivated than poorly paid not particularly ideologically motivated conscript forces. Some of it's definitely shady but I think part of it is as simple as if you need to take a position held by jihadis who have some defences conscripts might struggle.
I think like Wagner those companies won't get involved if it oppose their home state's interests and will sometimes support it directly (like in Syria). I think the difference is Russia is more likely to "adopt" Wagner operation - so they have a role in state propaganda and also probably help form connections so Mali and Burkina Faso military leaders were at the recent Navy Day parade in Russia.
The Western mercernaries are more of an embarrassment - although obviously Erik Prince of Blackwater is Betsy DeVos' brother so...
Separately thought this was interesting from a Georgetown professor of African Studies:
https://kenopalo.substack.com/p/putting-the-recent-coups-in-the-sahel
Nigerian senators have rejected Tinubu's request to deploy forces - "Senators opposed to military action pointed out that our military is highly ill-equipped and not prepared to fight any war.They said that we have fragile peace in Nigeria and that Niger is the highest arms market in Africa."
Seems like a fair point - apparently they also asked the government to focus on beating Boko Haram before they want to use the military for potentially destabilising deployments in a neighbouring country. Which, again, seems very sensible. They're apparently commending the ECOWAS stance generally though and would support other measures.
Feels like a sad dead end for countries in the Sahel though because I very much doubt the coup is going to deliver what people want.
And on the point of security forces taking control and bringing in Wagner to fight jihadi groups, those groups have announced that they're blocking all routes into Timbuktu. As I say, not sure these coup regimes, are going to be any better at suppressing jihadi activity which is their justification and I'm not sure where that'll leave things.
Wagner's not there to fight jihadis, they are there to facilitate the transmission of graft money into overseas accounts (while taking their cut) and liquidate any pain-in-the-ass civilians bold enough to complain about it.
Indeed, because more jihadis means more refugees for Europe (where they're not wanted) and thus more problems
Sure, but it's the justification for the coups after ten years of increasing instability (and increasing militarisation/power to the security forces) - and order and stability are normally pretty core to military regimes.
As it is feels like they've undermined the state, can't deliver security so may well end up being victims of other coups etc and the region seems like it could be stuck in a vicious cycle - with Wagner, I imagine, trying to pivot to keep their position.
Quote from: Sheilbh on August 09, 2023, 01:09:53 PMSure, but it's the justification for the coups after ten years of increasing instability (and increasing militarisation/power to the security forces) - and order and stability are normally pretty core to military regimes.
As it is feels like they've undermined the state, can't deliver security so may well end up being victims of other coups etc and the region seems like it could be stuck in a vicious cycle - with Wagner, I imagine, trying to pivot to keep their position.
I don't think we should concern ourselves with coup justifications. Africa especially has been choke full of various very democratically-named "organisations" grabbing/fighting for autocratic power. Of course it is nonsense.
Quote from: Tamas on August 10, 2023, 06:40:18 AMQuote from: Sheilbh on August 09, 2023, 01:09:53 PMSure, but it's the justification for the coups after ten years of increasing instability (and increasing militarisation/power to the security forces) - and order and stability are normally pretty core to military regimes.
As it is feels like they've undermined the state, can't deliver security so may well end up being victims of other coups etc and the region seems like it could be stuck in a vicious cycle - with Wagner, I imagine, trying to pivot to keep their position.
I don't think we should concern ourselves with coup justifications. Africa especially has been choke full of various very democratically-named "organisations" grabbing/fighting for autocratic power. Of course it is nonsense.
But that is what makes Niger worth a discussion. It has been viewed as different from many other countries in Africa. That fact that it too has experienced a coup is noteworthy.
Quote from: Tamas on August 10, 2023, 06:40:18 AMI don't think we should concern ourselves with coup justifications. Africa especially has been choke full of various very democratically-named "organisations" grabbing/fighting for autocratic power. Of course it is nonsense.
I disagree. All political systems have (or don't have) legitimacy by reference to what they are promising or how they justify themselves. That goes for coup regimes as much as any other system - it's normally restoring order, or stability, or protecting the constitution.
On it's own that won't necessarily be enough for a system to survive. But I think if they fail at delivering their core promise it makes them more vulnerable to a challenge. Not least because while I agree with Minsky's point I'm also not sure Wagner are there to die in a ditch to defend these regimes as opposed to ride out any instability and work with the replacements too - it's not Syria.
The fact that these regimes have not been and, I think, are probably unlikely to be able to deliver stability and security makes me think they're probably going to be relatively transient. So I expect we'll see further coups by rival groups, or maybe jihadis challenging urban areas or taking over (like Afghanistan) - honestly, I can't think of a good result/alternative that seems likely at this point - rather than this as a new normal state.
Obviously could be totally wrong on all of this.
I find your analysis persuasive, Sheilbh.
Quote from: Sheilbh on August 10, 2023, 12:14:37 PMQuote from: Tamas on August 10, 2023, 06:40:18 AMI don't think we should concern ourselves with coup justifications. Africa especially has been choke full of various very democratically-named "organisations" grabbing/fighting for autocratic power. Of course it is nonsense.
I disagree. All political systems have (or don't have) legitimacy by reference to what they are promising or how they justify themselves. That goes for coup regimes as much as any other system - it's normally restoring order, or stability, or protecting the constitution.
On it's own that won't necessarily be enough for a system to survive. But I think if they fail at delivering their core promise it makes them more vulnerable to a challenge. Not least because while I agree with Minsky's point I'm also not sure Wagner are there to die in a ditch to defend these regimes as opposed to ride out any instability and work with the replacements too - it's not Syria.
The fact that these regimes have not been and, I think, are probably unlikely to be able to deliver stability and security makes me think they're probably going to be relatively transient. So I expect we'll see further coups by rival groups, or maybe jihadis challenging urban areas or taking over (like Afghanistan) - honestly, I can't think of a good result/alternative that seems likely at this point - rather than this as a new normal state.
Obviously could be totally wrong on all of this.
I am not sure the justification for the coup is important. It could be so much bullshit. What is important is getting to the actual reasons the coup occurred.
Afghanistan is a good example of the distinction. Much ink has been spilled describing the policy failures which created the circumstances in which it was inevitable the Taliban would return.
Quote from: crazy canuck on August 10, 2023, 01:22:10 PMI am not sure the justification for the coup is important. It could be so much bullshit. What is important is getting to the actual reasons the coup occurred.
Afghanistan is a good example of the distinction. Much ink has been spilled describing the policy failures which created the circumstances in which it was inevitable the Taliban would return.
I think they tend to be very closely linked. The conditions which enable a coup seems likely to form the justification or ideological reasoning presented by that next regime.
But I thought the first part of that Ken Opalo piece I linked to is good on this - though on the wider "coup belt" not just Niger (and his emphasis):
QuoteI: How did we get here?
The recent spate of coups (or serious attempts) in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, and Sudan are not just about democratic backsliding. They are also symptoms state-building failures, elite complacency, perceived failures of democratic government, and the shaky sovereignty of these states. Unfortunately for the citizens of these countries, the constellation of pivotal actors that will shape their immediate future — from ruling elites, to regional and global organizations, to donor countries and major powers — have conflicting incentives and are unlikely to make the investments needed to cycle out of the coup trap.
(https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F80d5fa25-5b17-4081-a401-11341048bd95_1248x690.png)
A map depicting countries from Guinea-Bissau to Sudan (the so-called "coup belt") that have recently experienced coup activity. Map created on MapChart.
This post attempts to put the recent coups in the so-called "coup belt" in perspective and provides some thoughts on potential ways forward for affected countries. Having a firm understanding of how we got here is important for making sure that 1) everyone has a realistic understanding of the problem at hand; and 2) pivotal actors do not keep repeating the same mistakes.
Perhaps with the exception of Guinea, all affected countries experienced coups partially as a by-product of the imbalanced aggrandizement of their armed forces in the face of serious security threats — whether from domestic insurgencies, organized crime, or the spread of militancy related to the global "war on terror" and/or insecurity contagion from failing neighboring states. Geographic diffusion has since locked in strong negative neighborhood effects, especially since affected countries typically are also involved in proxy conflicts with each other. It follows that the coup risk in affected states will most likely not subside unless their domestic elites serious invest in the painstaking tasks of state-building, repairing their social contracts, and tackling overall regional drivers of insecurity.
The usual formula of add deeply-flawed elections, sprinkle some foreign aid, stir, and then leave — beloved by the "the international community" — will not work. If anything, it will likely multiply the list of grievances fueling political instability within and across countries in the region. Unfortunately for everyone involved, there are no easy solutions to the problem of state weakness. State-building in socio-politically fractious low-income states is one of the biggest challenges of our time. Plus the current international system's tolerance of weak states means that there are no structural incentives to invest in state-building. Finally, it doesn't help that a lot of experts out there prefer to hide behind the dangerous delusion that weak states wracked by systemic instability and unbelievable levels of violence can simply elect their way to political order and economic prosperity.
A number of the coups were met by jubilant crowds. Such scenes occasioned intellectual pearl-clutching across Africa and beyond. For example, a naive reader of much of the commentary on Niger so far would be forgiven for thinking that the country was a bastion of democracy before last week's coup. Forget Niger's barely functional state, government suppression of dissent and free speech, arbitrary arrests, and documented cases of security forces murdering civilians in the name of fighting insurgents. Briefly stated, "democracy" in Niger and other countries in the region was not delivering on its promises. It should therefore not come as a surprise that a section of the country celebrated the coup. In the most recent Afrobarometer survey, 67% of respondents supported military intervention in politics (see comparative image below). It is possible that some of the respondents genuinely prefer autocratic military rule. But I bet the vast majority are simply frustrated by the chronic failures of whatever they keep being served as democracy by their elites and the international community. In the same Afrobarometer survey, about 61.4% of respondents expressed a preference for democracy over other forms of government.
(https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F3fc73a37-31c2-4dfb-9de8-13700f2623ff_946x1086.png)
Data on openness to military intervention in politics across 36 African states. Data from Afrobarometer.
The point here is not to justify extra-constitutional power grabs in imperfect democracies. It is to remind us all that browbeating the victims of mis-governance in service to abstract principles that aren't backed by tangible material outcomes will not work. You can't eat the idea of democracy and associated rituals of electoralism. Invariably, juntas that promise better material conditions will show up and win enough people's hearts and minds. Supporters of much-needed democracy promotion efforts in the region should understand that the best way to secure democracy is to demonstrate that it works. As Howard French reminds us in an excellent piece in Foreign Policy, what the international community has so far aspired for in Niger and the wider Sahel is not real democracy but client states that can cheaply be coopted into wider global agendas — whether it is defeating jihadis, countering geopolitical competitors, hoarding vital resources, or stemming migrant flows.
To reiterate, democracy promotion for the benefit of regular citizens in these countries has not always been a top priority. Complacent local elites have principally focused on ascending to power and dominating networks funded by resource rents, illicit trade, and foreign aid. Their foreign security/development partners have mainly been interested in stemming the flows of migrants, accessing natural resources, fighting jihadist in the Sahel so they don't have to fight them in Western cities, and maintaining overall geopolitical influence in the region. Democracy and economic development have mostly been subordinated to these larger objectives, and often get abandoned whenever there is a conflict over means towards the other goals.
The resulting perceived subordination to foreign interests fuels the intense sovereignty discourse that remains to be an under-appreciated subplot in the current crisis. Much ado has been made about Russian influence in the Sahel at the expense of France and other Western powers. However, only willful ignorance would lead one to conclude that the sporadic waving of Russian flags that have followed coups in Bamako, Ouagadougou, Conakry, and Niamey are well-considered mass expressions of love for Putin. Instead, these acts (and accompanying expressions of anti-French sentiment) should be viewed as rejections of more than a century of brutal French colonialism and neocolonial influence in the region. They are also sentiments that the coup leaders have been more than willing to harness for their own designs.
The recent speech in St. Petersburg by Ibrahim Traoré of Burkina Faso perfectly encapsulates this fact. The speech went viral in WhatsApp groups across Africa precisely because it spoke to a reality that few so far have been willing to discuss publicly.
Those who dismiss Traoré's message as the empty rants of a misguided tyrant cosplaying Sankara but in reality carrying water for Putin/Prigozhin do so at their own peril. He and his fellow coup leaders in Mali and Guinea may be deeply flawed messengers, but their message on the region's century-long unquenched thirst for real self-determination has legs.
Importantly, it is a message that should be internalized by African political elites and democracy activists. While one should expect that foreign actors will always act to advance their own interests, what has become clear is that the wider region is increasingly hostile to leaders who perpetuate the historical unholy alliance between complacent ruling elites and foreign neocolonial interests. Obviously, publics in these countries are not rejecting all forms of collaboration with outside actors — many understand that African states need all the friends they can get. Rather, they want such collaboration to meaningfully address their concerns and respect their sovereignty. Accepting the realities of the hierarchy of states in the international system ought not lead one to ignore the fact that the absence of meaningful self-determination is inimical to democratic consolidation.
I think the section on the growth of security services is an example of what I mean by the conditions and the justification normally being tied. In order to fight jihadis (or stem migrant flows, or for regional cooperation), states (with Western backing and support) have increased the size and power of the armed forces. But they've failed to achieve their goal, while increasing instability - which means the armed forces are in a position to organise a coup and instability/restoring order is a plausible justification (plus kick out the French). I don't think it's a million miles off to describe the Sahel as France's own Afghanistan - and the endgame may ultimately be the same.
Not directly on topic but it's one of the reasons I worry about China is I think they have an example and a model of lifting people out of poverty and improving material conditions for their citizens - I'm not sure the West has a similar model we can point to.
The problem is the West's "development" phase largely meant very limited democracy with strong control by some version of a landed gentry or aristocracy. But most modern developing nations don't have that, and Western powers would also view attempts to entrench one as..antidemocratic. Not saying it's a great system either, but the West did have a system for development, it just...got done developing before WW2.
Quote from: Sheilbh on August 10, 2023, 01:56:59 PMQuote from: crazy canuck on August 10, 2023, 01:22:10 PMI am not sure the justification for the coup is important. It could be so much bullshit. What is important is getting to the actual reasons the coup occurred.
Afghanistan is a good example of the distinction. Much ink has been spilled describing the policy failures which created the circumstances in which it was inevitable the Taliban would return.
I think they tend to be very closely linked. The conditions which enable a coup seems likely to form the justification or ideological reasoning presented by that next regime.
But I thought the first part of that Ken Opalo piece I linked to is good on this - though on the wider "coup belt" not just Niger (and his emphasis):
QuoteI: How did we get here?
The recent spate of coups (or serious attempts) in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, and Sudan are not just about democratic backsliding. They are also symptoms state-building failures, elite complacency, perceived failures of democratic government, and the shaky sovereignty of these states. Unfortunately for the citizens of these countries, the constellation of pivotal actors that will shape their immediate future — from ruling elites, to regional and global organizations, to donor countries and major powers — have conflicting incentives and are unlikely to make the investments needed to cycle out of the coup trap.
(https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/w_1456,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F80d5fa25-5b17-4081-a401-11341048bd95_1248x690.png)
A map depicting countries from Guinea-Bissau to Sudan (the so-called "coup belt") that have recently experienced coup activity. Map created on MapChart.
This post attempts to put the recent coups in the so-called "coup belt" in perspective and provides some thoughts on potential ways forward for affected countries. Having a firm understanding of how we got here is important for making sure that 1) everyone has a realistic understanding of the problem at hand; and 2) pivotal actors do not keep repeating the same mistakes.
Perhaps with the exception of Guinea, all affected countries experienced coups partially as a by-product of the imbalanced aggrandizement of their armed forces in the face of serious security threats — whether from domestic insurgencies, organized crime, or the spread of militancy related to the global "war on terror" and/or insecurity contagion from failing neighboring states. Geographic diffusion has since locked in strong negative neighborhood effects, especially since affected countries typically are also involved in proxy conflicts with each other. It follows that the coup risk in affected states will most likely not subside unless their domestic elites serious invest in the painstaking tasks of state-building, repairing their social contracts, and tackling overall regional drivers of insecurity.
The usual formula of add deeply-flawed elections, sprinkle some foreign aid, stir, and then leave — beloved by the "the international community" — will not work. If anything, it will likely multiply the list of grievances fueling political instability within and across countries in the region. Unfortunately for everyone involved, there are no easy solutions to the problem of state weakness. State-building in socio-politically fractious low-income states is one of the biggest challenges of our time. Plus the current international system's tolerance of weak states means that there are no structural incentives to invest in state-building. Finally, it doesn't help that a lot of experts out there prefer to hide behind the dangerous delusion that weak states wracked by systemic instability and unbelievable levels of violence can simply elect their way to political order and economic prosperity.
A number of the coups were met by jubilant crowds. Such scenes occasioned intellectual pearl-clutching across Africa and beyond. For example, a naive reader of much of the commentary on Niger so far would be forgiven for thinking that the country was a bastion of democracy before last week's coup. Forget Niger's barely functional state, government suppression of dissent and free speech, arbitrary arrests, and documented cases of security forces murdering civilians in the name of fighting insurgents. Briefly stated, "democracy" in Niger and other countries in the region was not delivering on its promises. It should therefore not come as a surprise that a section of the country celebrated the coup. In the most recent Afrobarometer survey, 67% of respondents supported military intervention in politics (see comparative image below). It is possible that some of the respondents genuinely prefer autocratic military rule. But I bet the vast majority are simply frustrated by the chronic failures of whatever they keep being served as democracy by their elites and the international community. In the same Afrobarometer survey, about 61.4% of respondents expressed a preference for democracy over other forms of government.
(https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F3fc73a37-31c2-4dfb-9de8-13700f2623ff_946x1086.png)
Data on openness to military intervention in politics across 36 African states. Data from Afrobarometer.
The point here is not to justify extra-constitutional power grabs in imperfect democracies. It is to remind us all that browbeating the victims of mis-governance in service to abstract principles that aren't backed by tangible material outcomes will not work. You can't eat the idea of democracy and associated rituals of electoralism. Invariably, juntas that promise better material conditions will show up and win enough people's hearts and minds. Supporters of much-needed democracy promotion efforts in the region should understand that the best way to secure democracy is to demonstrate that it works. As Howard French reminds us in an excellent piece in Foreign Policy, what the international community has so far aspired for in Niger and the wider Sahel is not real democracy but client states that can cheaply be coopted into wider global agendas — whether it is defeating jihadis, countering geopolitical competitors, hoarding vital resources, or stemming migrant flows.
To reiterate, democracy promotion for the benefit of regular citizens in these countries has not always been a top priority. Complacent local elites have principally focused on ascending to power and dominating networks funded by resource rents, illicit trade, and foreign aid. Their foreign security/development partners have mainly been interested in stemming the flows of migrants, accessing natural resources, fighting jihadist in the Sahel so they don't have to fight them in Western cities, and maintaining overall geopolitical influence in the region. Democracy and economic development have mostly been subordinated to these larger objectives, and often get abandoned whenever there is a conflict over means towards the other goals.
The resulting perceived subordination to foreign interests fuels the intense sovereignty discourse that remains to be an under-appreciated subplot in the current crisis. Much ado has been made about Russian influence in the Sahel at the expense of France and other Western powers. However, only willful ignorance would lead one to conclude that the sporadic waving of Russian flags that have followed coups in Bamako, Ouagadougou, Conakry, and Niamey are well-considered mass expressions of love for Putin. Instead, these acts (and accompanying expressions of anti-French sentiment) should be viewed as rejections of more than a century of brutal French colonialism and neocolonial influence in the region. They are also sentiments that the coup leaders have been more than willing to harness for their own designs.
The recent speech in St. Petersburg by Ibrahim Traoré of Burkina Faso perfectly encapsulates this fact. The speech went viral in WhatsApp groups across Africa precisely because it spoke to a reality that few so far have been willing to discuss publicly.
Those who dismiss Traoré's message as the empty rants of a misguided tyrant cosplaying Sankara but in reality carrying water for Putin/Prigozhin do so at their own peril. He and his fellow coup leaders in Mali and Guinea may be deeply flawed messengers, but their message on the region's century-long unquenched thirst for real self-determination has legs.
Importantly, it is a message that should be internalized by African political elites and democracy activists. While one should expect that foreign actors will always act to advance their own interests, what has become clear is that the wider region is increasingly hostile to leaders who perpetuate the historical unholy alliance between complacent ruling elites and foreign neocolonial interests. Obviously, publics in these countries are not rejecting all forms of collaboration with outside actors — many understand that African states need all the friends they can get. Rather, they want such collaboration to meaningfully address their concerns and respect their sovereignty. Accepting the realities of the hierarchy of states in the international system ought not lead one to ignore the fact that the absence of meaningful self-determination is inimical to democratic consolidation.
I think the section on the growth of security services is an example of what I mean by the conditions and the justification normally being tied. In order to fight jihadis (or stem migrant flows, or for regional cooperation), states (with Western backing and support) have increased the size and power of the armed forces. But they've failed to achieve their goal, while increasing instability - which means the armed forces are in a position to organise a coup and instability/restoring order is a plausible justification (plus kick out the French). I don't think it's a million miles off to describe the Sahel as France's own Afghanistan - and the endgame may ultimately be the same.
Not directly on topic but it's one of the reasons I worry about China is I think they have an example and a model of lifting people out of poverty and improving material conditions for their citizens - I'm not sure the West has a similar model we can point to.
Thanks, that makes sense.
on your last point, I am not sure China is that great of an example of a stable model either though. To Otto's point, China had no propertied elite and so in place of that was the party. And that necessarily means corruption in the absence of the Rule of Law as the means of working out disputes both regarding property and regulatory matters.
Quote from: OttoVonBismarck on August 10, 2023, 06:56:08 PMThe problem is the West's "development" phase largely meant very limited democracy with strong control by some version of a landed gentry or aristocracy. But most modern developing nations don't have that, and Western powers would also view attempts to entrench one as..antidemocratic. Not saying it's a great system either, but the West did have a system for development, it just...got done developing before WW2.
Yeah I think that's part of the problem that the examples of development in the West. Even in post-war world they seem either pretty particular (be a borderline emerging market in Europe and join the EU, or post-war Europe and Japan) or ones that are challenging to our "values" (the Tiger economies) - although in both cases possibly shaped by the needs of the Cold War too. I don't necessarily think that type of politics is necessary for growth - but I think the lack of a development model makes our pitch for support internationally challenging. I think it is really important that we somehow demonstrate that our values and political system can deliver for developing economies now, not just for countries that have, as you said, already "developed".
I have a friend who worked in NGOs in the "coup belt" region where China was also very involved. Some of the criticisms he had of Western development approaches seem fair. Although worth saying that his experience was Western aid agencies are very good at humanitarian aid, it's the rest/BAU stuff they're not great at.
In particular he complained that the West was very faddish and driven by strategies and initiatives in Europe or America (less so Japan who are a big donor) - so one year they want all project proposals to be really big on sustainable development, the next it's about inclusive growth, then it's about public health. Meeting those donor needs/KPIs drive a lot of the project development, from my understanding. That was basically his job - looking at RfP style documents from Western aid agencies and trying to shoe-horn his organisation's projects into this year's objectives to win the funding. China very much has their own needs and goals in their development aid but his view was its focus seems to change less and his impression was also a bit more consultative with the recipient country - i.e. where do you need a road. Chances are it's normally for good economic reasons and aligns with China's interests.
Possibly relatedly he complained that a lot of money also actually ends up circulating in Western countries - with consultancies, professional advisors, vendors etc. On that point it struck me that if it was happening at the recipient end we'd probably call it corruption and it would fall foul of all sorts of monitoring.
Quoteon your last point, I am not sure China is that great of an example of a stable model either though. To Otto's point, China had no propertied elite and so in place of that was the party. And that necessarily means corruption in the absence of the Rule of Law as the means of working out disputes both regarding property and regulatory matters.
I don't disagree with any of that - although the propertied class was not immune from corruption in the West. I think there's maybe an argument that corruption might play a role in early stages of democracy developing (and delivering for citizens in a very direct way) but also that it has often run parallel, not necessarily contrary, to the development of the rule of law. As ever my instinct is that politics is primary - so I think it's also maybe the case that reform movements develop within a democratic system against that earlier democratic model (spoils systems, patronage, machine politics) and use the law as a tool to destroy it.
But I take your point on China. I just think that China has largely replaced the US and EU as the major trading partner for much of the world and they can say, credibly, that they've got experience in lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. I think those two factors combined are enough to require a better development story from the West. And, also, they're a challenger - they're a revisionist power who wants to change the world order so they have to convince.
I think we need an answer showing our values and order do not simply entrench the already rich. I think we also need a way to say, credibly, that they can offer a way of lifting countries' populations out of poverty. In a way I think that we don't already have an alternative development model (that isn't either odd like Europe, or against our values), or an easy answer to that challenge is, in its way, slightly damning.
Wagner is not there to fight jihadis. They prop up the generals in the capital, take over mining companies and send the money offshore. That's it. It's been their playbook everywhere in Africa.
We can try to find the reason for the coup all day long. Oh, the Franc CFA, the posh NGOs, the wasteful EU, how terrible it all is. The fact is there was a peaceful transfer of power and Bazoum was democratically elected less than 3 years ago.
I find no reason to give any sort of legitimacy to the junta. Do we really think they took power through violence because of some desire to better the lives of Niger citizens? :lol:
It's almost like Jagged Alliance in real life.
China's development model relies on being a stable country of over a billion people. First attractive as a source of cheap labor, then potential consumers.
There's no country in Africa like that. Much less in the land-locked Sahel.
But most fundamentally China is not stable. Africa has demographics on its side so I am not sure the rest of your argument holds into the future.
Quote from: crazy canuck on August 11, 2023, 10:43:08 AMBut most fundamentally China is not stable.
It seems pretty stable to me.
There is no danger of a coup anytime soon. There is no major popular revolt going on, any attempt of doing so will be swiftly dealt with as in the past.
There is not threat to the regime in place.
People may or may not be happy with the regime, but they will not challenge it.
I'd say it's stable compared to Niger or Mali.
My understanding of what Sheilbh meant when he said "China's development model" was not "follow a path towards development patterned on China's", but rather "the path towards development offered by interacting with or becoming a client of China."
The argument, I think, is that China's offer of infrastructure investment and attendant other benefits in return for returns, raw materials, and compliant votes on UN resolutions may come across as more persuasive than the West's combination of NGOs, aid packages, capitalism, and attempts at implementing governance and values changes.
I don't know enough to say whether that's an accurate summation of the differences, nor if it's correct that it's more attractive, but that's what I took Sheilbh's point to be.
Quote from: viper37 on August 11, 2023, 11:14:16 AMQuote from: crazy canuck on August 11, 2023, 10:43:08 AMBut most fundamentally China is not stable.
It seems pretty stable to me.
There is no danger of a coup anytime soon. There is no major popular revolt going on, any attempt of doing so will be swiftly dealt with as in the past.
There is not threat to the regime in place.
People may or may not be happy with the regime, but they will not challenge it.
I'd say it's stable compared to Niger or Mali.
You have made a bunch of assertions of characterizations of stability. But China is at the beginning of a demographic and economic collapse. I am not sure why you think there is no risk to the present regime.
And why would you set the bar so low, requiring there to be an actual coup, in order to determine the stability of a particular political and economic structure?
Next time you criticize the Liberal government of Canada I will make sure to point out there has been no coup, so why complain - everything seems stable enough.
Quote from: Jacob on August 11, 2023, 11:53:05 AMMy understanding of what Sheilbh meant when he said "China's development model" was not "follow a path towards development patterned on China's", but rather "the path towards development offered by interacting with or becoming a client of China."
The argument, I think, is that China's offer of infrastructure investment and attendant other benefits in return for returns, raw materials, and compliant votes on UN resolutions may come across as more persuasive than the West's combination of NGOs, aid packages, capitalism, and attempts at implementing governance and values changes.
I don't know enough to say whether that's an accurate summation of the differences, nor if it's correct that it's more attractive, but that's what I took Sheilbh's point to be.
But taken at its best, the argument is still weak. Participating countries understand now how one sided and extractive those agreements are. And its not just a rogue corporation working outside the laws of the West doing it to them - it's the government of China doing it to them directly.
Quote from: crazy canuck on August 11, 2023, 01:21:35 PMQuote from: viper37 on August 11, 2023, 11:14:16 AMQuote from: crazy canuck on August 11, 2023, 10:43:08 AMBut most fundamentally China is not stable.
It seems pretty stable to me.
There is no danger of a coup anytime soon. There is no major popular revolt going on, any attempt of doing so will be swiftly dealt with as in the past.
There is not threat to the regime in place.
People may or may not be happy with the regime, but they will not challenge it.
I'd say it's stable compared to Niger or Mali.
You have made a bunch of assertions of characterizations of stability. But China is at the beginning of a demographic and economic collapse. I am not sure why you think there is no risk to the present regime.
And why would you set the bar so low, requiring there to be an actual coup, in order to determine the stability of a particular political and economic structure?
Next time you criticize the Liberal government of Canada I will make sure to point out there has been no coup, so why complain - everything seems stable enough.
When I said stable I was thinking of foreign investment. Companies seem to think China is stable enough to risk trillions on mid to long term projects. Africa ... not so much.
Quote from: Jacob on August 11, 2023, 11:53:05 AMMy understanding of what Sheilbh meant when he said "China's development model" was not "follow a path towards development patterned on China's", but rather "the path towards development offered by interacting with or becoming a client of China."
The argument, I think, is that China's offer of infrastructure investment and attendant other benefits in return for returns, raw materials, and compliant votes on UN resolutions may come across as more persuasive than the West's combination of NGOs, aid packages, capitalism, and attempts at implementing governance and values changes.
I don't know enough to say whether that's an accurate summation of the differences, nor if it's correct that it's more attractive, but that's what I took Sheilbh's point to be.
He said "
they have an example and a model of lifting people out of poverty and improving material conditions for their citizens".
All I'm saying is that example is useless in Africa.
Quote from: crazy canuck on August 11, 2023, 01:21:35 PMQuote from: viper37 on August 11, 2023, 11:14:16 AMQuote from: crazy canuck on August 11, 2023, 10:43:08 AMBut most fundamentally China is not stable.
It seems pretty stable to me.
There is no danger of a coup anytime soon. There is no major popular revolt going on, any attempt of doing so will be swiftly dealt with as in the past.
There is not threat to the regime in place.
People may or may not be happy with the regime, but they will not challenge it.
I'd say it's stable compared to Niger or Mali.
You have made a bunch of assertions of characterizations of stability. But China is at the beginning of a demographic and economic collapse. I am not sure why you think there is no risk to the present regime.
And why would you set the bar so low, requiring there to be an actual coup, in order to determine the stability of a particular political and economic structure?
Next time you criticize the Liberal government of Canada I will make sure to point out there has been no coup, so why complain - everything seems stable enough.
My criticism of the Libs is not about stability. Canada is a stable country.
We have inflation, housing crisis and a multitude of problem, but instability is not one of them. The government is not nearing collapse, we do not have government change every 6 months or coup attempt or martial law.
We have political stability just as much as China.
That China is facing huge problems is another thing. But it is not politically unstable.
We will Just have to agree to disagree as to the relative political stability of an authoritarian state that jails/executes it's dissenters and Canada.
Quote from: crazy canuck on August 11, 2023, 03:10:26 PMWe will Just have to agree to disagree as to the relative political stability of an authoritarian state that jails/executes it's dissenters and Canada.
Stability does not necessarily mean it's a nice place to live in. Both can go together
It usually means it's a nice place to invest in.
Like Iormlund said, investors are willing to pour trillion of $ into China's economy. They are not willing to accept the same risk for most of Africa.
Quote from: Jacob on August 11, 2023, 11:53:05 AMMy understanding of what Sheilbh meant when he said "China's development model" was not "follow a path towards development patterned on China's", but rather "the path towards development offered by interacting with or becoming a client of China."
The argument, I think, is that China's offer of infrastructure investment and attendant other benefits in return for returns, raw materials, and compliant votes on UN resolutions may come across as more persuasive than the West's combination of NGOs, aid packages, capitalism, and attempts at implementing governance and values changes.
I don't know enough to say whether that's an accurate summation of the differences, nor if it's correct that it's more attractive, but that's what I took Sheilbh's point to be.
Basically yes - I don't know if it's true or if it will work out. But in summary the friend who was working in East Africa, bordering this coup belt, phrased the perception of people he worked with in the relevant ministries as well as local community leaders as China will treat you with respect and build you the road or the power plant that you asked for, the Western agencies will lecture you and then do the project they want to do.
As I say, don't know how true that is or if it will work out. I think it's a defensible position if we had a great record of countries really developing with our approach (and with the compromises on sovereignty that we want whether through military bases, currencies, UN votes etc). But we don't have a record of success, so I can fully understand why China is attractive as an option (and query if it is basically replacing one compromise on sovereignty with another - for a recipient country).
I think we need to realise that we are in competition. We shouldn't just assume that China will fail an, as Opalo says in his piece, you can't eat abstract values. I think - and I don't think it's a million miles from our issues domestically - that we need to actually deliver material benefits to people. That's the key that underpins buy in to our system and our values. I don't think it's impossible and (as with domestic politics) I can't help but wonder if the last time this really happened was arguably during the Cold War. Perhaps precisely because there was competition, so maybe it will happen again but this time in Africa.
On the other hand the angle I find interesting and most hopeful about the coup in Niger is that, as the Howard French piece in Foreign Policy put it, maybe haltingly but states and leaders in the region are taking charge of the process on this. And I think they are creating their own regional rules, guard-rails as well as working on diplomatic and (potentially) military solutions. I think this looks like a moment that is pushing a meaningful sovereignty and view of mutual interest in regional developments, stability, development rather than - for want of a better phrase - a learned or encouraged dependency on external great powers. Hopefully the West will work out a better development strategy in order to compete with China - even better though would be for African states, leaders and peoples to be able to reject either as they both compromise their sovereignty and primarily want aligned and supportive "partners" in the region.
QuoteHe said "they have an example and a model of lifting people out of poverty and improving material conditions for their citizens".
All I'm saying is that example is useless in Africa.
It may not be replicable but I think that is part of the pitch to African leaders that is factually true.
As CC says, I think on a continental level there are also similarities. In 1900 the Philippines had the same population as Belgium - it's now about 10 times the size. There was a huge (especially post-war) population boom across Asia in the 20th century and current projections (which are falling) is that Africa is going to have an even larger population boom in the 21st century. I think Jake posted a thread about this and while there may not be a single state like China, across the continent (especially Nigeria and Ethiopia) are likely to hugely increase. There is already a very young population that is booming. I think integrating Africa and that population into the global economy is up there with climate and achieving net zero in terms of its significance in this century.
Also I think it is a little more than just population with China. I think I've mentioned it before but there was a World Bank report in 1983 on China - so early in the "reform and opening" period. While they discreetly aflag but don't talk about the huge impact of the Great Leap Forward on the data they were looking at, I think there were a few ways China was different than its peers in terms of income levels (like India and Indonesia). In particular China had a far higher level of basic education, they had signficantly more power generation and were also slightly more industrialised. I think that is also part of the story with China, not just a populatio boom. Although I'm also fully aware it plays into my bias that physical infrastructure and education are key to development.
I think those are the areas China is focusing on - officially they describe their priorities (and as I say, this comes with an awful lot of conditions) are building sufficient good and reliable infrastructure, enough training or educating personnel and helping address the funding shortage. I'm not sure that diagnosis or solution is wrong and will help a lot even without a population boom.
QuoteBut taken at its best, the argument is still weak. Participating countries understand now how one sided and extractive those agreements are. And its not just a rogue corporation working outside the laws of the West doing it to them - it's the government of China doing it to them directly.
Yes - shouldn't that make us wonder why so many are still plumping for China, or Wagner? Perhaps because the experience of a victimised population is not of rogue corporations working outside the laws but, at best, hypocrisy of that happening with one hand while the other gives humanitarian aid or at worst complicity between those corporations and states. Western states don't exactly have clean hands - certainly not France, the UK, US or Belgium.
From the West, it may be specific companies in specific industries working with the undermanned, under-resourced, never very important second fiddle Africa desks in respective foreign offices and intelligence agencies. I think if you're on the receiving end it looks different.
Quote from: viper37 on August 11, 2023, 04:19:35 PMQuote from: crazy canuck on August 11, 2023, 03:10:26 PMWe will Just have to agree to disagree as to the relative political stability of an authoritarian state that jails/executes it's dissenters and Canada.
Stability does not necessarily mean it's a nice place to live in. Both can go together
It usually means it's a nice place to invest in.
Like Iormlund said, investors are willing to pour trillion of $ into China's economy. They are not willing to accept the same risk for most of Africa.
Not for a while now. But I am happy to be proven wrong. In the last year or so what investors have poured trillions of investment dollars into China?
It seems the smart money has been departing.
Also note that you originally defined stability by the fact they had no coup's recently.
Quote from: crazy canuck on August 11, 2023, 04:42:52 PMQuote from: viper37 on August 11, 2023, 04:19:35 PMQuote from: crazy canuck on August 11, 2023, 03:10:26 PMWe will Just have to agree to disagree as to the relative political stability of an authoritarian state that jails/executes it's dissenters and Canada.
Stability does not necessarily mean it's a nice place to live in. Both can go together
It usually means it's a nice place to invest in.
Like Iormlund said, investors are willing to pour trillion of $ into China's economy. They are not willing to accept the same risk for most of Africa.
Not for a while now. But I am happy to be proven wrong. In the last year or so what investors have poured trillions of investment dollars into China?
It seems the smart money has been departing.
Also note that you originally defined stability by the fact they had no coup's recently.
Having no coup recently also means investors are more attracted to your country. Obviously, not the only factor, but notwithstanding all other Chinese factor, if the Chinese government was experiencing regular instability, if there was civil unrest in the country like in many parts of Africa, there would be much less investments.
Quote from: Iormlund on August 11, 2023, 02:23:55 PMWhen I said stable I was thinking of foreign investment. Companies seem to think China is stable enough to risk trillions on mid to long term projects. Africa ... not so much.
Two things:
Direct foreign investment in China is down (73% on the year). (https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Foreign-investment-in-China-slumps-to-18-year-low) - though I don't think that's a reaction to perceived stability (or lack thereof), but rather about the capriciousness of the legislative environment.
Secondly, that the West finds Africa too unstable to invest in helps make Chinese investment more impactful.
Quote from: crazy canuck on August 11, 2023, 01:25:13 PMBut taken at its best, the argument is still weak. Participating countries understand now how one sided and extractive those agreements are. And its not just a rogue corporation working outside the laws of the West doing it to them - it's the government of China doing it to them directly.
I guess we'll see how much success China has with their approach. It's not us they have to persuade, but African leaders and their internal rivals.
Quote from: Jacob on August 11, 2023, 08:52:10 PMQuote from: crazy canuck on August 11, 2023, 01:25:13 PMBut taken at its best, the argument is still weak. Participating countries understand now how one sided and extractive those agreements are. And its not just a rogue corporation working outside the laws of the West doing it to them - it's the government of China doing it to them directly.
I guess we'll see how much success China has with their approach. It's not us they have to persuade, but African leaders and their internal rivals.
Fat swiss bank accounts work wonders.
Quote from: Jacob on August 11, 2023, 08:50:06 PMTwo things:
Direct foreign investment in China is down (73% on the year). (https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Foreign-investment-in-China-slumps-to-18-year-low) - though I don't think that's a reaction to perceived stability (or lack thereof), but rather about the capriciousness of the legislative environment.
Secondly, that the West finds Africa too unstable to invest in helps make Chinese investment more impactful.
Also interesting in that article is the stuff about Chinese companies de-risking their own supply chains - so a Chinese v a non-Chinese supply chain. Again that feels like a bad sign of how prepared China is going to be for confrontation - and it strikes me it's the one thing Europe hasn't really even considered the risk of China, having got the IP and know-how etc, wanting to de-couple for their own reasons :ph34r:
QuoteI guess we'll see how much success China has with their approach. It's not us they have to persuade, but African leaders and their internal rivals.
Exactly - and as with climate, it'll be an objectively good thing if it does succeed, but also bad.
As with climate, but also decoupling in that article, I think the West is maybe a little complacent and still assuming it's the main character (particularly unforgivable from any European country). It's entirely possible that on all of these issues China will fail. I'm not sure it's wise to base the West's response on that assumption though.
QuoteFat swiss bank accounts work wonders.
As with coups, I think there's parts of the world where the West can meaningfully make this distinction between them and China (or Russia for that matter). I'm not sure it's possible in Africa.
Coup in Gabon last week as well - another core part of France-Afrique. There had been an election there and France had expressed concerns when Ali Bongo won his third term in with strong allegations of fraud - that is perhaps undercut by the previous 56 years of close alliance with him and his father. Similarly despite those concerns Bongo was last in Paris on an official visit in June and France jointly hosted a maor conference on green development with Gabon in the last year.
Macron has complained of "a kind of rise in the politics of resentment, fed here by reinvented or fantasised anti-colonialism" - and to an extent that may be right. Burkina Faso's coup leadership especially love using Sankarist, anti-colonial, anti-French rhetoric. Yet I think while it may not be what is motivating these coups it feels like it must be part of what is legitimating them. It's also worth flagging that Traore, the President of Burkina Faso, gave a speech at the Russian-African forum in St Petersburg that was strongly anti-colonial (and also said they'd have failed if they still need to rely on Russia this time next year) and the Presidents of Kenya and the DRC have explicitly confronted Macron at joint events over French policy in Africa - all of those clips went viral in Africa. So while it may be reinvented or fantasised I think it is a force and I think that France-Afrique is crumbling before our eyes (which is probably a good thing).
It seems like it'd make a lot of sense for the US and, to the extent possible, the EU to de-couple their policies in West Africa and the Sahel from the French. No doubt Russia and China will try to take advantage. But I'm not sure the story is just meddling outsiders (or that those are exclusively Russian and Chinese) and that local failures are also important.
On that - shared his post on Niger but I thought this from Ken Opalo on how Ghana escaped the coup trap was also really interesting:
https://kenopalo.substack.com/p/how-ghana-escaped-the-coup-trap?r=4ugz&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=email
Not going to lie - reading that, I'm not sure there's a great deal of hope from any of these coup regimes :(
I can't help but wonder whether the nations taking Chinese investment aren't also banking on China being toothless if things go awry.
The west has a history of intervention in Africa. China doesn't. The theoretical capacity to do so is all very new to it.