Assuming some incident in the South China sea leading shots being fired in anger between China and the US followed by escalation, how does it play out?
For the purpose of this scenario, let's assume that both sides refrain from going nuclear. How much damage can China do to the US Navy in the region? How likely is it China could sink a carrier?
What's the conventional wisdom on this scenario? What's the languish consensus? And are different outcomes likely if the conflict happens ten years from now as opposed to next week?
Here's a picture of (I believe) the USS Nimitz:
(https://languish.org/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fi2.cdn.turner.com%2Fcnnnext%2Fdam%2Fassets%2F150806073249-uss-roosevelt-gulf-super-169.jpg&hash=d4b7490b458bd9a73d2348b1ffffb9f70c894880)
And here's a picture of (I believe) a bunch of Dong-Feng 26:
(https://languish.org/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Flive.china.org.cn%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2015%2F09%2F115.jpg&hash=e35e03cc02ab23779333f620f27608ea219c9a40)
It will kick off in 2027.
The US will have torpedo problems for the first year or more. The Chinese Long Dong torpedo will prove vastly superior.
I think you need to define the terms of the conflict to speculate too much.
The threat to USN assets is largely dependent on how those assets are used, and what the geopolitical circumstance forces them into doing as far as making themselves vulnerable.
Quote from: The Brain on September 07, 2016, 02:16:19 PM
The US will have torpedo problems for the first year or more. The Chinese Long Dong torpedo will prove vastly superior.
:lol:
Quote from: Jacob on September 07, 2016, 02:14:58 PM
Quote from: CountDeMoney on September 07, 2016, 02:14:31 PM
It will kick off in 2027.
How will it go?
And why 2027?
2027 is the 100-year anniversary of the founding of the People's Liberation Army--and Taiwan is the only historically sovereign Chinese soil of note that has not been reclaimed. It's the centerpiece of the Chinese revolution of military affairs.
How will it go? Depends on how much of a mess everyone is willing to make of it.
http://www.businessinsider.com/f-22-f-35-in-a-war-against-china-2016-7 (http://www.businessinsider.com/f-22-f-35-in-a-war-against-china-2016-7)
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A recent report from the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, written by Maj. Gen. Jeff Harrigian and Col. Max Marosko of the US Air Force, gives expert analysis and never before seen detail into how the US's fifth-generation aircraft would fare in a war with China.
The report starts with a broad overview of fifth-generation capabilities and their roles in the future of air combat, and it concludes with a hypothetical war in 2026 against an unnamed nemesis after "rising tensions in a key region abroad."
However, the locations mentioned in the scenario are all in the Western Pacific and clearly seem to indicate the rival is China, whose advanced radar and missile capabilities make for very interesting challenges to the US Air Force's force structure.
As the scenario takes place ten years in the future, it is assumed that all the kinks with integrating fifth generation fighters into the force have been ironed out, and that the F-35 and F-22 work seamlessly to aid legacy aircraft via datalink.
In the opening stanza of such a conflict, the Air Force officials say that the US would send its F-35s and F-22s to a wide range of bases across the Pacific, leveraging the US's vast network of bases and allies with some of the valuable warplanes.
Such a step denies China's ability to land a "knockout blow" as they normally could, because typically US jets stay stationed at larger bases, presenting a more attractive target. Also, by this time, the US's fifth-generation aircraft can find airfields on their own, without the help of air traffic controllers, allowing the force to be further spread out to present less target-rich areas.
Additionally, regional allies like Australia, who also fly the F-35, can quickly fill in for US airmen in a pinch. A US F-35 can land on an Australian airfield and receive much the same maintenance as it would at it's home base, the officials claim.
With the Pacific now a patchwork of small units of F-35s and F-22s, the Chinese would seek to leverage their impressive electronic warfare capabilities, but the officials contend that the fifth-gens would weather the storm.
"Heavy radar and communications jamming confront US and coalition forces, but fifth generation aircraft leverage their networked multi spectral sensors to detect and target enemy aircraft, while supporting a common operating picture through data links and communication architectures," the Air Force officials write.
Meanwhile, legacy platforms like F-16s, F-18s, and F-15s provide a critical layer of defense closer to the US mainland. China's formidable surface-to-air missile capabilities keep these older, more visible fighters off the front lines until the stealthier platforms, like the F-35, F-22, B-2, and the upcoming B-21 do their job.
The officials recognize the need for the fifth-gen fighters to strike quickly and get out of the heavily contested air spaces. Destruction of many of the US and allied airfields is expected, however the versatile fifth-gens continue to switch up locations as China depletes their supply of ballistic and cruise missiles on low-yield targets.
Many of China's SAM batteries are road mobile, so fifth-gen fighters will have to use their geo-location and electronic warfare capabilities to seek and destroy these sites.
The onboard sensors in the fifth-gens will provide vital leeway for the fighters to make decisions on the go.
From the report:
"Aircraft take off with minimal information—little more than a general target area that may be more than 1,000 miles away. On the way to target, the fifth generation aircraft receive minimal tanker, threat, and target information, but sufficient updates to enable them to ingress, identify, and prosecute targets successfully before returning to operating airfields."
Loses of US and allied airfields and troops would naturally follow in such a conflict, however the forces are integrated and use the same platforms, so they can quickly fill in for each other in the event of loses.
All the while, F-35s and F-22s whittle away at China's air defenses, gradually lowering the threat level from high to moderate. Eventually, the bulk of the US Air Force's fleet —legacy fighters— can operate in the area with acceptable rates of survivability.
"Once the fifth-gens pave the way for legacy fighters, it's curtains." Jim Hazeltine/US Air Force
And that's it. Once F-16s are flying over Beijing, the conflict is essentially settled. In the moderately contested airspace, fifth generation jets can essentially data-link with legacy fighters and use them as "armada planes," leveraging their increased capability to carry ordinance to eliminate whatever remains of China's air defenses.
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/china-vs-america-who-would-win-the-battle-the-south-china-16467?page=2 (http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/china-vs-america-who-would-win-the-battle-the-south-china-16467?page=2)
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The year is 2016, and two of the U.S. Navy's latest ships are backing a key ally in the tinderbox of the South China Sea. They're facing down the Chinese navy halfway across the world with the latest weapons and systems the United States can get its hands on. But is it enough?
For more than a hundred years, the U.S. Navy has been using naval wargames to test ships, tactics and strategy. Today, thanks to the ability of computers to process massive amounts of data, sharply accurate, procedural "hard" simulations are possible.
One such sim is Command: Modern Naval/Air Operations (http://www.matrixgames.com/products/483/details/Command:.Modern.Air/Naval.Operations) [3], a new game that attempts to model modern sea and air warfare as closely as a game for civilians can.
Command is particularly suited for attempting a high-fidelity simulation of modern naval combat — it included an admiral and staff from the U.S. Naval War College (http://www.informationdissemination.net/2013/09/its-game-time-command-modern-air-naval.html) [4] in the game's beta testing — and we're going to take a page from the Navy and put America's latest fighting ship to the test.
The result isn't good — and a harrowing lesson to be cautious about how we equip the U.S. military.
The post 9/11 ship
Today, we're sending the Littoral Combat Ship (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_class_littoral_combat_ship) [5] into the fray — a new class of warships developed following the 9/11 attacks.
The LCS was designed to fight close to shore, a characteristic that opens the vessel up to more missions — and challenges — than most Navy ships. For one, they have to be both versatile and agile. The vessels are lightly armed, and rely on swappable "mission modules" to increase firepower and other special capabilities such as surface warfare, minesweeping and anti-submarine warfare.
A normal LCS has a rapid-fire 57-millimeter gun (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mk_110_57_mm_gun) [6], a pair of 30-millimeter cannons and heavy machine guns. The ship also has Rolling Airframe (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RIM-116_Rolling_Airframe_Missile) [7] anti-aircraft missiles to defend against enemy jets and incoming missiles.
But compared to larger surface ships, the LCS lacks firepower — something critics of the LCS have seized upon. These critics contend the LCS should have a larger gun, longer-range self-defense missiles, and anti-ship missiles capable of taking on enemy vessels its own size.
Game on
Our scenario takes place in the South China Sea at a cluster of reefs and rocks called the Scarborough Shoal, roughly 137 miles west of the Philippines. In real life, China and The Philippines both claim the shoal as part of their territory (https://medium.com/war-is-boring/481f02939aac) [8], and tensions between the two nations have been growing.
In 2012, this dispute almost came to blows when the Philippine navy dispatched the ex-U.S. Coast Guard cutter BRP Gregorio del Pilar to inspect Chinese fishing boats near the shoal. Gregorio del Pilar was forced to withdraw when confronted by two ships of the Chinese coast guard.
In our simulation, it's 2016 and both nations have continued to press their claims. Two ships of the Philippine navy, the patrol craft BRP Emilio Jacinto (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BRP_Emilio_Jacinto_%28PS-35%29) [9] and BRP Artemio Ricarde (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BRP_Artemio_Ricarte_%28PS-37%29) [10], have arrived.
The potential for a shooting war is very high.
Note — we're not using this scenario to make a statement about the ambitions of Beijing and Manila, or what we think will happen in the real-life Scarborough Shoal. The scenario just makes a good backdrop for our test of systems on the Littoral Combat Ship.
The U.S. Navy is backing up its Philippine allies — two LCSs, USS Freedom and USS Fort Worth, are both about 30 miles south of the Emilio Jacinto and Artemio Ricarde. The USS Halsey (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Halsey_%28DDG-97%29) [11], an Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer, is behind them at an equal distance.
Shots Fired:
The ships of the Philippine navy have comparatively crude sensors — basically amounting to eyeballs and navigational radars — and are having a difficult time identifying all of the ship traffic in and around the shoal. There are a lot of surface contacts. Some are fishing boats, and some may be ... something else.
If Emilio Jacinto and Artemio Ricarde really knew what was out there, they'd turn tail and run.
I'm playing the forces of both the U.S. and The Philippines, and fortunately I have an MQ-4C Triton (http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/mq-4c-triton-bams-uas-us/) [12] in the area — the naval version of the Air Force's Global Hawk drone. I send the Triton over the shoal to get an idea of what's down there.
The Triton identifies plenty of Chinese fishing boats, but also a wolf in the fold — a Chinese Jianghu-class destroyer (http://www.sinodefence.com/navy/surface/type053h_jianghu.asp) [13] named the Changde. Twenty miles to the west is the Qinzhou, a new Type 056 corvette (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_056_corvette) [14].
Changde heads directly toward Emilio Jacinto. Uh-oh.
At 09:46:31, Changde opens fire on the Emilio Jacinto with her 100-millimeter deck gun. Emilio Jacinto immediately returns fire with her 76-millimeter gun and scores a lucky hit, starting a minor fire on Changde. A gunfight rages for more than three minutes, during which time Changde is struck several times.
Emilio Jacinto reports she is under missile attack from the west. That would make the attacker the corvette Qinzhou. Without air defense radars and advanced weapons, Emilio Jacinto is a sitting duck. Seconds later, she is hit by several Chinese YJ-83 "Eagle Strike" anti-ship missiles (http://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/chinas-eagle-strike-eight-anti-ship-cruise-missiles-the-yj-83-c803-and-the-family-tree/) [15], screaming in less than 30 feet above the ocean.
Emilio Jacinto disappears from the command screen.
Another brace of YJ-83s streaks towards BRP Artemio Ricarde. Despite the roughly 60-mile distance, Halsey attempts to intervene, launching SM-6 surface to air missiles (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RIM-174_Standard_ERAM) [16] to knock down the Chinese missiles. But the distance is too much and Artemio Ricarde is struck. The damage is catastrophic.
Freedom and Fort Worth are steaming north at flank speed. I am ordering them to engage Qinzhou and the wounded Changde, now fleeing north away from the battle zone.
It's a gamble because Littoral Combat Ships are not well-protected against anti-ship missiles, having only their 57-millimeter guns and Rolling Airframe missile launcher mounts. I believe Qinzhou is out of anti-ship missiles.Changde might still have all of her missiles, but she's also taken serious damage trading shots with Emilio Jacinto.
Moving at more than 40 knots, Fort Worth and Freedom begin closing the gap.Qinzhou and Changde both turn to face Fort Worth. Apparently they want to fight. I'll oblige them. Both LCSs are under orders to engage the enemy as soon as they come close enough to fire their Griffin surface-to-surface missiles (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AGM-176_Griffin) [17]. Between the two of them, they have 30 Griffins.
At four miles, Fort Worth opens up on Qinzhou with her 57-millimeter gun.Qinzhou immediately returns fire with her 76-millimeter gun, lightly damaging Fort Worth. Unfortunately, Fort Worth's Rolling Airframe missile launcher is destroyed early on, meaning she is out of active anti-missile defenses.
Then the Griffin missile launcher is put out of action, meaning Fort Worth's sole armament is a single 57-millimeter gun. Within moments, that too is destroyed.
Fort Worth is hurt, with a bad fire and severe flooding. She's defenseless at this range. It's time to leave. Fort Worth turns to race south at maximum speed, but it continues to be pummeled by Qinzhou's 76-millimeter gun. Laser rangefinders, gun directing radar, 30-millimeter Bushmaster guns all knocked out ... the damage reports keep coming in.
Fort Worth is doomed.
As if that weren't bad enough, Halsey detects two anti-ship missiles launched to the south, halfway between her and Fort Worth and right in the vicinity of the Scarborough Shoal. Could they be from a submarine?
Whatever they are, they're moving at 520 knots. The two mystery missiles streak north, towards Fort Worth. Not good. Halsey again tries to intervene, launching a salvo of four SM-6 air defense missiles that within moments are traveling at 2,400 knots. Will they reach the threats in time?
Suddenly, it no longer matters. Fort Worth capsizes.
Last Man Standing:
The only thing left for Freedom to do is attack. Freedom has the only anti-ship missiles within a thousand miles. Halsey has none except for a MH-60R Seahawk helicopter (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sikorsky_SH-60_Seahawk) [18] armed with Hellfire air-to-surface missiles (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hellfire_missile) [19], but I'm afraid of losing it to Qinzhou's air defenses. If Freedom wants out, she has to fight her way out.
At 5.7 miles, Freedom reports there is light damage and major flooding on the already wounded Changde. She opens fire with the 57-millimeter gun, quickly scoring several hits. Changde's gun must be damaged, because it is not opening fire.
Changde takes a lot of hits but is not going down, likely because of the small size of the 57-millimeter shell. Freedom is charging ahead at more than 40 knots, blazing away with her gun.
I'm waiting for my Griffin missiles to launch. What's the range on those things? What's taking so long?
At a distance of three miles, the Griffin missiles launch. It's about time, because the 57-millimeter gun jams. Changde already has a medium-sized fire and major flooding. Several Griffins malfunction but most score hits onChangde.
Still, they don't do any appreciable damage to the already damaged ship — Griffin missiles have a warhead that weighs as much as two laptop computers. The next largest anti-ship missile in the American inventory, Harpoon (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AGM-84) [20], has a warhead that weighs 488 pounds. But there aren't any Harpoons within hundreds of miles.
Finally, with the last of Freedom's missiles expended, Changde goes down. ButQuinzhou, the Type 056 corvette, has arrived at the shoal and engagesFreedomwith its 76-millimeter gun. Due to the short range of the 57-millimeter gun, Freedom can't return fire.
I'm faced with a serious dilemma — at the edge of the range envelope of the Chinese gun, do I run and get away, or do I close with the enemy and destroy him?
At this point I release Halsey's Hellfire-armed helicopter. It's at risk of being shot down, but I have no choice if I want to save Freedom. It can't sinkQuinzhou, but it might inflict enough damage that would allow Freedom to get away.
I waffle, and Quinzhou and Freedom are now locked in a gun battle and only one is going to sail away. Freedom has a rapid firing gun and likely better fire control, but Quinzhou's shells are larger.
Freedom catches fire. The ship begins flooding. Her gun are destroyed. I'm pulling her away, speed 41 knots, and praying Halsey's helicopter arrives in time to cover her withdraw.
The game crashes. Instead of frustration, I feel relief. The ass-kicking has ended.
Postmortem:
I was tempted to restart the entire scenario, but I quickly realized that no matter how many times I played it, the result was just going to be the same. The Littoral Combat Ships as configured were completely outclassed by their Chinese counterparts.
The worst part — the Chinese didn't even have to use missiles to defeat the Americans.
Although small for their size, the Chinese ships packed a significant punch.Changde's design dates back at least 20 years and weighs 1,000 tons less than the LCS, but it has eight anti-ship missiles and a 100-millimeter gun. The corvette Quinzhou weighs less than half as much as LCS, but had four YJ-83 anti-ship missiles and a 76-millimeter gun.
The Littoral Combat Ships had plenty of firepower ... theoretically. Each had a 57-millimeter main gun, but these were woefully underpowered for attacking surface ships.
Each had 15 Griffin missiles, but the Griffins had a range even shorter than the gun. The missiles' 13-pound warheads, while probably useful against Iranian speedboats practicing swarm tactics, were practically worthless against the Chinese.
Worst of all, in order to bring what meager firepower each had to bear against the enemy, the LCS had to bring itself within range of multiple Chinese weapon systems.
In our simulation, the Littoral Combat Ships were defeated. Is this an indictment of the LCS? It's not that simple.
The LCS as we configured them — as U.S. Navy currently plans to configure them — were defeated. But the LCS is modular in nature, and the loadout of the anti-surface warfare module they carried could be changed.
If I had, for example, a mix of Griffin and Norwegian-made Naval Strike Missiles (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naval_Strike_Missile) [21], I could have quickly destroyed both Chinese ships without things degenerating into a sword fight — where I had only a knife.
The 57-millimeter gun wasn't really a problem, because I wasn't supposed to be using it to engage other ships anyway. The decision that led me to use it in desperation against other ships was the problem.
The speed of LCS was useful, as I was able to push both ships forward at more than 40 knots. But as I was doing so, I couldn't help but think that the gain of moving an extra 10 miles an hour was not really all that useful when a Chinese YJ-83 missile had a range of 186 miles.
I would have gladly traded the speed advantage of the LCS for the ability to sense and destroy Chinese ships at 187 miles.
There's an inherent danger in reading too much out of commercial wargame simulations. As much as the game designers try to model modern air and naval warfare as accurately as possible, and that is exactly what Command's designers did, the unknown unknowns, as Donald Rumsfeld would probably put it, could tip the scenario either way.
Warfare is tragic and unpredictable. Any difference in training, maintenance or secret capabilities of both navies — things we wouldn't know until the shooting starts — could have decisively impacted the scenario.
Still, as the U.S. defense budget grows smaller and hard choices are being made, the dismal performance of the LCS's anti-surface warfare module in our simulation is food for thought.
Do we want the Littoral Combat Ship to be able to tackle ships less than half its size, and if so, how do we get there? Because we're certainly not there yet.
The LCS is the Navy's handyman, capable of doing all sorts of jobs with its mission module system. Like all handymen, it has its toolboxes to get the job done. And few handymen are really, really good at everything you might expect them to do.
With all the potential missions for the Littoral Combat Ship and a limited pool of money, what do we expect it to do really well?
One things for certain — the handyman's hammer is too small.
There's a book on this: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR392.html
Bland corporation of course.
I wonder why anyone thinks posting a wargame AAR as a news piece is really journalism.
The circumstances in which the US would have just two LCS and the distant support of a DDG against a significantly larger Chinese force, with neither side getting any air support, are hard to imagine.
Quote from: grumbler on September 07, 2016, 04:33:51 PM
I wonder why anyone thinks posting a wargame AAR as a news piece is really journalism.
A blog called,"The Buzz" should never be considered real journalism?
It is not going to happen. The fundamental goal is to strengthen the regime. Losing a real shooting war may end the regime.
#1, the regime is strengthened by liberating China--all of it.
#2, the Chinese (read: Maoist) definitions of "winning", "losing", and "shooting war" are very different than ours.
It would be an extremely grave error to define Chinese goals using western interpretations.
"Losing" is pretty straightforward. The US has unsinkable aircraft carriers off of China's coast. The Chinese on the other hand... would have trouble getting stuff to Cuba. China minus its airforce, navy, industry, and infrastructure couldn't claim to be the winner.
Quote from: citizen k on September 07, 2016, 05:16:03 PM
Quote from: grumbler on September 07, 2016, 04:33:51 PM
I wonder why anyone thinks posting a wargame AAR as a news piece is really journalism.
A blog called,"The Buzz" should never be considered real journalism?
Sorry, Timmay. I didn't realize you meant to post that AAR in the Gaming HQ and just forgot what forum you were on.
(https://languish.org/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fadaptershack.com%2Fm%2Ffiles%2Fimages.icanhascheezburger.com_completestore_2009_3_28_128827591903824587.jpg&hash=80fea6a3d4708b627567dbc7ffe5fb3749c60b96)
Quote from: CountDeMoney on September 07, 2016, 05:26:58 PM
#1, the regime is strengthened by liberating China--all of it.
#2, the Chinese (read: Maoist) definitions of "winning", "losing", and "shooting war" are very different than ours.
It would be an extremely grave error to define Chinese goals using western interpretations.
I'm with Mono. A minor strengthening of the regime isn't worth risking the existence of the regime. This is shadow play. There is the real risk that miscalculations/misunderstandings will lead to war, but not much risk that there will be malicious intent on either side to start a war.
I believe China owns a lot of the US debt right?
If it did come to war (which, for the reasons posted above by grumbler, I don't think would happen), which side could hold it over the other for benefit?
I suck at economics, especially macro. Can the US say "suckers we aint paying you back", can the Chinese say "pay us back now or we blow up your financial system"?
Even if the Chinese can sink an aircraft carrier, the US submarine fleet remain's vastly superior and will be able to enforce a blockade of the Chinese coast and sink anything they put in the water.
Bah! President Trump :x will build a wall between us and China, and he will have Mexico pay for it.
Quote from: grumbler on September 07, 2016, 06:00:51 PM
I'm with Mono. A minor strengthening of the regime isn't worth risking the existence of the regime. This is shadow play. There is the real risk that miscalculations/misunderstandings will lead to war, but not much risk that there will be malicious intent on either side to start a war.
This "shadow play" is a slicing of the salami over the course of decades; the Chinese reunification with Taiwan is going to happen, one way or the other, and positioning themselves over years of escalation is how they are going to mitigate US involvement.
As far as a war with the US is concerned, it is not about winning or losing: it is about achieving their goals by avoiding successful US intervention-or none at all--by making it too politically or militarily unpalatable for the US.
Granted, the Chinese do not possess experience in brinksmanship – which is why we see what we are seeing with increased frequency in the South China Sea – that could very well wind up getting shots fired, but maliciousness has nothing to do with reclaiming sovereign Chinese soil under the CCP.
Regarding debt: you can't put a price on nationalism.
Regarding USN aircraft carriers: I don't understand why people think they are any less fragile now than they were in 1945. They are still ships, not Death Stars.
Makes sense CdM.
Also, now I want salami.
EDIT: with the debt, I think it's something the US can hold over China if there's a full on conflict - i.e. if the US can say "we are not paying you what we owe" with sufficient reason that the full faith and credit of the US will not be questioned by others. Before then I'd imagine China could in theory play games with the US through the debt, but they'd have to be mindful not to screw over their own economy.
The carriers would be destroyed by guided missiles if they went anywhere near Mainland China. That's why land-based air from Taiwan and Japan is so important.
Quote from: Grinning_Colossus on September 07, 2016, 08:23:38 PM
The carriers would be destroyed by guided missiles if they went anywhere near Mainland China. That's why land-based air from Taiwan and Japan is so important.
How will they be guided?
Quote from: Razgovory on September 07, 2016, 08:33:19 PM
Quote from: Grinning_Colossus on September 07, 2016, 08:23:38 PM
The carriers would be destroyed by guided missiles if they went anywhere near Mainland China. That's why land-based air from Taiwan and Japan is so important.
How will they be guided?
Tiny chinese midgets in the nose.
Quote from: Grinning_Colossus on September 07, 2016, 08:23:38 PM
The carriers would be destroyed by guided missiles if they went anywhere near Mainland China. That's why land-based air from Taiwan and Japan is so important.
Carriers are not coastal craft. You are not going to find them right off China's coast if tensions are high. Out at sea, they are not nearly so vulnerable; targeting them isn't trivial, and striking them even when detected isn't easy because they won't be where they were when your weapons arrive.
The aircraft from the carrier will be more vulnerable than the carrier, unless the carrier doesn't have direct support subs. Chinese subs are a far bigger threat to the carrier, over a campaign, than cruise missiles. The US is pretty dependent on its own subs for ASW, in places like the South China Sea (in deeper water, Low Frequency Active is probably effective enough to detect most subs).
China is not a self sufficient food country, without American imports starvation looms.
While they own USA debts. :lol:
Pah!
Quote from: grumbler on September 07, 2016, 08:39:47 PM
Chinese subs are a far bigger threat to the carrier, over a campaign, than cruise missiles.
Quote from: Razgovory on September 07, 2016, 08:33:19 PM
Quote from: Grinning_Colossus on September 07, 2016, 08:23:38 PM
The carriers would be destroyed by guided missiles if they went anywhere near Mainland China. That's why land-based air from Taiwan and Japan is so important.
How will they be guided?
A lady holding a colorful little flag.
http://edition.cnn.com/2016/09/26/asia/japan-china-jet-scrambled/index.html
QuoteEast China Sea: Japan scrambles jets as China flies fleet near disputed islands
Tokyo (CNN)Japan scrambled fighter jets Sunday after China flew a fleet of aircraft near contested islands in the East China Sea.
Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga said that the jets were sent up after eight Chinese military planes crossed between Okinawa and the Miyako islands near Taiwan. He said that two of the aircraft were thought to be fighter jets.
He added that the planes didn't "trespass" into Japan's territorial airspace, although he said it was the first time that Chinese military aircraft had been seen in the Miyako Strait.
The fleet included H-6k bombers, Su-30 fighters and air tankers.
"We will continue to keep close eyes on the Chinese military activities which have been expanding and become more frequent," he said.
Shen Jinke, an official with the People's Liberation Army Air Force, said that a fleet of 40 aircraft were sent to the West Pacific via the Miyako Strait Sunday for a "routine drill on the high seas," according to China's official Xinhua news agency.
The fleet, which included H-6K bombers, Su-30 fighters and air tankers, simulated reconnaissance and early warning attacks on sea-surface targets. It also conducted in-flight refueling to test the Air Force's fighting capacity, Xinhua added.
The report added that the fleet conducted routine patrols in China's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), which the country set up in the East China Sea in 2013 despite objections from Tokyo and Washington.
Japan rejects the ADIZ, which encompasses disputed islands that are known as the Senkakus in Japan and Diaoyu in China.
Shen said the drills and patrols were conducted "in accordance with the needs of the Air Force to defend national sovereignty and security, as well as to maintain peaceful development."
Both China and Japan claim ownership of the islands and tensions have flared numerous times in recent years.
While they are uninhabited, their ownership would allow for exclusive oil, mineral and fishing rights in the surrounding waters.
In mid-2014, Japanese and Chinese jets had a tense standoff in a region where both zones overlap, with Japan's Defense Minister saying the planes at one point came within 30 feet of each other.
Japan also has an ADIZ over the islands, which it administers.
Tension over the island dispute has in the past spilled over into protests and violence against Japanese-owned businesses in China.
The Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are by no means the only islands whose ownership China disputes.
READ: South China Sea: China may establish ADIZ
Beijing claims the majority of the South China Sea as part of its territory, which has led to heightened tensions and frequent disputes with its neighbors there.
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