Excellent news
Kingsley decision creates a crucial new constitutional protection against police abuse (http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/06/supreme_court_kingsley_v_hendrickson_a_new_protection_against_police_abuse.html)
Quote
In April of 2010, five police officers put Michael Kingsley face down on a cement bunk in a holding cell, shocked him with a stun gun for five seconds, then left him alone, writhing in pain with his hands cuffed behind his back, for 15 minutes. Kingsley sued the officers, claiming they violated his constitutional rights by using excessive force. He lost.
On Monday, the Supreme Court gave Kingsley a second chance, ruling that the trial court gave the jury bad instructions. In a narrow sense, the decision turns on a technical question of intent. In a broader sense, though, the ruling is a blast of good news for opponents of police brutality—an emphatic declaration that the Constitution bars police from beating and abusing suspects in custody.
At the heart of Kingsley v. Hendrickson is a pretty straightforward question of intent. During the trial, the judge told the jury that Kingsley must lose unless he could prove the officers knew their actions could unduly harm Kingsley but went through with them anyway. Under that high standard, Kingsley lost. It's incredibly difficult to prove law enforcement intentionally deprived suspects of their constitutional rights. Just ask the family of Michael Brown.
But Kingsley argued that he shouldn't have to prove the officers were subjectively aware that their use of force was unreasonable. By forcing him to convince a jury that the officers had a malicious state of mind, Kingsley believed, the court made him clear too high a hurdle to vindicate his constitutional rights. Rather, Kingsley insisted that he should only have to prove that their use of force was objectively unreasonable to win his suit.
A bare majority of the Supreme Court agreed with Kingsley, sending the case back down to an appeals court to decide whether the error was so grave that Kingsley must be given a new trial. The dry majority opinion by Justice Stephen Breyer barely hints that the decision will have an impact beyond Kingsley's case. But in reality, Kingsley constructs a crucial new constitutional protection against police abuse—a protection especially vital in the shadow of Freddie Gray's shocking death.
Kingsley involves an application of one of the Constitution's most fundamental provisions, the due process clause. (As the justices love to remind us, the concept of due process comes from the Magna Carta itself.) This clause bars the government—or any "state actor," such as a police officer—from depriving "any person" of "life, liberty or property without due process of law." Kingsley argues that the "liberty" protected by this clause includes the right to be free from unreasonable force while awaiting trial. Thus, when police officers held down and stunned Kingsley, they violated his constitutionally protected liberty with no semblance of due process.
It might seem obvious that the constitution protects pretrial detainees—who are, of course, innocent in the eyes of the law—from police abuse. But before Kingsley, it was not at all clear just how many constitutional protections pretrial detainees were afforded. The Eighth Amendment, which forbids "cruel and unusual punishment," applies only to convicted prisoners. The Fourth Amendment's protection against "unreasonable" police mistreatment seems to apply only to free people outside of prison. People like Kingsley—who have been arrested but not convicted and cannot make bail—fall into a hazy constitutional gray zone. As Justice Sonia Sotomayor noted during oral arguments, law enforcement seemed to want authority "to get a free kick in" when dealing with pretrial detainees:
Kingsley makes the gray zone a lot less dangerous. Under the decision, any "objectively unreasonable" use of force against detainees is unconstitutional. Just as importantly, the court reaffirmed that "pretrial detainees (unlike convicted prisoners) cannot be punished at all." In other words, police cannot penalize a suspect, much less abuse him, merely because they believe he's committed a crime.
Consider the Maryland police's alleged maltreatment of Freddie Gray. As my colleague Jamelle Bouie explained, Gray's arrest itself was probably an illegal violation of the Fourth Amendment. But once Gray was taken into police custody, only the 14th Amendment's due process clause protected him from abuse. Before Kingsley, Gray's family might have had to prove that Gray's alleged killers intentionally and knowingly severed his spinal cord if it hopes to sue them. Now, with Kingsley on the books, Gray's family need only prove that the officers used objectively unreasonable force toward Kingsley in order to win a civil rights suit against them.
Writing in dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia accused the majority of being "tender-hearted" (which, to his mind, is a bad thing). But the rest of his opinion is strangely muted, as though even this famously law-and-order justice can't work up the vigor to defend brutal police officers. Kingsley was the right decision in the right case at the right time. It won't halt police overreach all at once. But it does send a powerful message that an individual's constitutional rights are not revoked the moment he is put in handcuffs.
This is one of there few cases that get to the Supreme Court where I can't relay grasp how there can be a dispute. It's nonsensical to say that there exist a free citizenry under a system of ordered liberty but that the government has a warrant to use objectively unreasonable force against its citizens.
I agree with the commentator that it is an unusually crappy dissent from Scalia, mailed this one in.
QuoteNow, with Kingsley on the books, Gray's family need only prove that the officers used objectively unreasonable force toward Kingsley in order to win a civil rights suit against them.
How would Gray's family have standing to sue the officers who were involved in the Kingsley case?
Staying in some hotel in rural Georgia, there was a sign in an elevator with the hotel rules, one of which was: "Unmarried men and women are not to socialize in the halls or rooms. That is what the lobby is for."
I considered stealing that sign.
Quote from: The Minsky Moment on June 22, 2015, 09:19:45 PM
This is one of there few cases that get to the Supreme Court where I can't relay grasp how there can be a dispute. It's nonsensical to say that there exist a free citizenry under a system of ordered liberty but that the government has a warrant to use objectively unreasonable force against its citizens.
I agree with the commentator that it is an unusually crappy dissent from Scalia, mailed this one in.
I know that Supreme Court cases are supposed to serve as precedent, and it's sacrosanct through the ages, but how much legitimacy do 5-4 cases about rather fundamental rights have? I'd like to think that some basic rights are a function of something more than just good luck that Ginsburg is still with us.
I do like protection against being tortured by sadistic turnkeys.
Is the legal question here whether, to sue the state for actions of its agents, one must show culpability on behalf of the agents or is objective liability sufficient? Or am I reading this wrong?
Quote from: Martinus on June 23, 2015, 02:19:51 PM
Is the legal question here whether, to sue the state for actions of its agents, one must show culpability on behalf of the agents or is objective liability sufficient? Or am I reading this wrong?
Basically, taking intent out of the equation. The burden of proof's been lowered from "the officers intended to cause harm" to "the behavior of the officers was likely to cause harm."
Even if the appeals court grants a retrial, this is still a contentious case- the plaintiffs and defense can't even agree that Kingsley met a standard of "harmed."
Interesting. One of the changes of Polish civil law - which is considered one of the greatest achievements of a free society - after 1989 was that, when it comes to the liability of the state for actions of its agents, it is sufficient to establish objective inconsistency with the principles of law, and intent of the agents is irrelevant (so effectively, you can sue for a wrongful conviction or arrest, for example, even if the agents of the state were not at fault, but you were objectively innocent). I would have thought this is an established principle in Western democracies.
Quote from: Martinus on June 23, 2015, 02:35:10 PM
I would have thought this is an established principle in Western democracies.
Why would you think that? We are all coming at this from different legal traditions here, especially considering Common Law vs. Civil Law.
Quote from: DGuller on June 22, 2015, 11:34:43 PM
Quote from: The Minsky Moment on June 22, 2015, 09:19:45 PM
This is one of there few cases that get to the Supreme Court where I can't relay grasp how there can be a dispute. It's nonsensical to say that there exist a free citizenry under a system of ordered liberty but that the government has a warrant to use objectively unreasonable force against its citizens.
I agree with the commentator that it is an unusually crappy dissent from Scalia, mailed this one in.
I know that Supreme Court cases are supposed to serve as precedent, and it's sacrosanct through the ages, but how much legitimacy do 5-4 cases about rather fundamental rights have? I'd like to think that some basic rights are a function of something more than just good luck that Ginsburg is still with us.
The voting often has nothing to do with the strength of the precedent.
Quote from: DGuller on June 22, 2015, 11:34:43 PM
I know that Supreme Court cases are supposed to serve as precedent, and it's sacrosanct through the ages, but how much legitimacy do 5-4 cases about rather fundamental rights have? I'd like to think that some basic rights are a function of something more than just good luck that Ginsburg is still with us.
Map v. Ohio had 3 dissents and 1 concurring judge who disagreed with the exclusionary rule for unlawful seizures.
Escobedo - the case that upheld the right to counsel during police interrogations - was a 5-4 decision.
Near v. Minnesota - the case that struck down prior restraints on the press was also 5-4.
Near was an interesting case - it involved publication of a rabidly anti-Semitic scandal rag; Justice Brandeis was in the majority (ruling for Near and his paper); Justice McReynolds - probably the most notorious anti-Semite to sit on the Court -- dissented.
Quote from: Martinus on June 23, 2015, 02:35:10 PM
I would have thought this is an established principle in Western democracies.
I thought so too. The presence of 4 dissenting justices here is puzzling to me.
I'm just glad the government can't take my raisins anymore.
I heard it through the grapevine.
Not much longer would they be mine
I heard it through the grapevine
The Feds are going to lose my rinds.
Quote from: The Minsky Moment on June 24, 2015, 10:24:28 AM
I heard it through the grapevine.
Not much longer would they be mine
I heard it through the grapevine
The Feds are going to lose my rinds.
http://www.theonion.com/article/last-living-california-raisin-dies-of-prostate-can-35761
RIP Beebop :(