Apparently the UK, Australia and the US have agreed to some kind of defense pact in the pacific called Aukus.
The pact seems sweeping but the most obvious result is that Australias new submarines will be Nukes based on UK/US technology rather than Diesel Electric based on French technology. Which to me seems like a big step up in capability and a good choice, although I would perhaps have changed the order to French Nukes since the Diesel Electric they were building were based on French nukes. That way they wouldn't have to start completely over.
From the outside this looks like American industrial policy where government intervention helped to secure a big submarine deal with Australia at the cost of the French. All the rest about tech sharing is rather vague.
What's Britain's role? Participation to secure a "Global Britain" photo op for Johnson?
Quote from: Zanza on September 16, 2021, 04:20:01 AM
From the outside this looks like American industrial policy where government intervention helped to secure a big submarine deal with Australia at the cost of the French. All the rest about tech sharing is rather vague.
What's Britain's role? Participation to secure a "Global Britain" photo op for Johnson?
Apparently they were the middlemen brokering the deal.
I think the significance is to show China the US means business and have allies arming up.
Ties with the US seems a risky strategy. What about the next Trump in the White House (by name or otherwise)?
From the UK perspective yes, big propaganda coup which will help tories appeal to the (white) commonwealth can replace the EU nutters.
Why the UK would want to be involved is a no brainer but it is a wonder what they are contributing.
I wonder if there's some sort of base sharing and mutual servicing arrangement?
From what I have read the French deal wasn't going well with a lot of arguments about where the work would be done.
Quote from: Tamas on September 16, 2021, 04:22:11 AM
I think the significance is to show China the US means business and have allies arming up.
Annoying the French is a strange move if you mean to strengthen some kind of Western alliance against China. In general Bidens foreign policy seems a bit haphazard.
Quote from: Zanza on September 16, 2021, 04:33:00 AM
Quote from: Tamas on September 16, 2021, 04:22:11 AM
I think the significance is to show China the US means business and have allies arming up.
Annoying the French is a strange move if you mean to strengthen some kind of Western alliance against China. In general Bidens foreign policy seems a bit haphazard.
I saw some mention that it had been a problematic contract with the French. No idea on details, though.
EDIT: Also I don't think France is likely to get into a shooting war with China over Pacific islands?
Quote from: Tamas on September 16, 2021, 04:35:25 AM
Quote from: Zanza on September 16, 2021, 04:33:00 AM
Quote from: Tamas on September 16, 2021, 04:22:11 AM
I think the significance is to show China the US means business and have allies arming up.
Annoying the French is a strange move if you mean to strengthen some kind of Western alliance against China. In general Bidens foreign policy seems a bit haphazard.
I saw some mention that it had been a problematic contract with the French. No idea on details, though.
EDIT: Also I don't think France is likely to get into a shooting war with China over Pacific islands?
No, France wouldn't nuke Pacific islands.
Quote from: Tamas on September 16, 2021, 04:35:25 AM
Quote from: Zanza on September 16, 2021, 04:33:00 AM
Quote from: Tamas on September 16, 2021, 04:22:11 AM
I think the significance is to show China the US means business and have allies arming up.
Annoying the French is a strange move if you mean to strengthen some kind of Western alliance against China. In general Bidens foreign policy seems a bit haphazard.
I saw some mention that it had been a problematic contract with the French. No idea on details, though.
EDIT: Also I don't think France is likely to get into a shooting war with China over Pacific islands?
Right? I doubt France will have a lot of relevance there.
French overseas territories directly neighbor Australia. What's the relevance of Britain in the South-West Pacific?
Quote from: Zanza on September 16, 2021, 04:53:22 AM
French overseas territories directly neighbor Australia. What's the relevance of Britain in the South-West Pacific?
We need to keep them on side to keep them from doing foolish things like letting Huawei build the infrastructure for its 5G network. -_-
Quote from: Zanza on September 16, 2021, 04:53:22 AM
French overseas territories directly neighbor Australia. What's the relevance of Britain in the South-West Pacific?
Anything that indicates we are not a self-isolating island stuck in a corner of the Atlantic is of significant relevance to Britain. :)
Quote from: Threviel on September 16, 2021, 12:45:13 AM
The pact seems sweeping but the most obvious result is that Australias new submarines will be Nukes based on UK/US technology rather than Diesel Electric based on French technology. Which to me seems like a big step up in capability and a good choice, although I would perhaps have changed the order to French Nukes since the Diesel Electric they were building were based on French nukes. That way they wouldn't have to start completely over.
Yeah so I think it would be a little bit misplaced to see it as just a defence pact - if anything it's a military-industrial pact. I think the wider tech sharing and joint work could actually be as important if less eye-catching. Especially with the apparent focus on inter-operability. I think the real benefit will be in that area of tech sharing and joint developments/investments on inter-operable defence - for the UK and Australia especially (though they have their own expertise) access to/working with the Americans on that will be a huge benefit.
The next stages will be basing rights/ports, joint operations and then gradually other regional partners (such as Japan, France, maybe New Zealand) to join. This is a start and may flop but I think it's a decent idea.
It is unfortunate about France - though as Tyr that deal was becoming increasingly unpopular/contentious in Australia because there was a perception that not enough work was being done in Australia. But that in itself is a useful reminder that the European country that did its "Indo-Pacfic tilt" first and that has been encouraging others to join it is France. I really hope in other ways the US (and less importantly Australia and the UK) are taking steps to try and make good that.
QuoteI think the significance is to show China the US means business and have allies arming up.
Maybe - for me the most important thing is that China has been ratchetting up the pressure on Australia for the last two years. I think it's largely been over things like Hong Kong and covid comments but also just the sense that Australia has been too assertive. China's a huge market for Australia so there have been bans on certain types of imports, restrictions on others. I think this is important to show allies backing up and supporting each other when facing that type of pressure - that Australia still has the support of the US who is willing to make commmitments.
It's not a million miles away from the type of pressure China's trying to use on Lithuania just because of how important China is to Australia, significantly stronger.
QuoteApparently they were the middlemen brokering the deal.
I don't know about the role - the bit that struck me as possibly an area where Britain is perceived as very strong is cyber. I know that in terms of the "Indo-Pacific tilt" obviously a small group of Royal Navy ships don't necessarily matter, they are mainly symbolic - but my understanding is Japan, South Korea and Australia were very happy to see British commitment because they hoped it would lead to engagement with the UK cyber and space sectors which are very strong and would help boost regional capacity in those areas those areas that have been specifically called out and I think the tech angle of working with China is key.
It's why vdL yesterday mentioned supporting and building up European semiconductor manufacturing in the defence/foreign policy section of her speech, but it's also things like innovative western companies being bought up and then their IP moved wholesale to China. As I say I think there needs to be a nuanced policy towards China with lots of different angles of where we're working together, where there's competition and where there's just not movement on issues - containment is a nonsense framing of this - but I think protecting certain tech sectors from Chinese purchase or access and working with other allies on those areas is very sensible.
QuoteAnnoying the French is a strange move if you mean to strengthen some kind of Western alliance against China. In general Bidens foreign policy seems a bit haphazard.
I think a Western alliance is the wrong way of looking at it - I think the US is looking to strengthen/deepen relations in the Pacific mainly. Australia, but also the increased involvement of Korea and the quad with Japan and Australia. I think that is increasingly going to be the focus of US foreign policy - as has been signposted since Obama's "pivot" this is the first real move in that direction.
France is an important Pacific player. But I think what the US wants out of the Western alliance/NATO generally is support in the Pacific when they can, taking more responsibility at home so the US doesn't have to spend time and troops and money on those issues and some caution in engagement with China especially around tech.
Edit: And from a UK perspective this sort of aligns with the integrated review - the very first section of which was about science and technology. One of the goals of which was a network of partnerships (civil and military) in that area, which this clearly links into.
I am greatly annoyed by cyber security just referred to as "cyber" in this country. :P Last evening the lady on the TV news was the same. "Cyber". I always have to pause.
This is cyber:
(https://images-na.ssl-images-amazon.com/images/I/51tPv2dKt1L._SX373_BO1,204,203,200_.jpg)
Quote from: Tamas on September 16, 2021, 05:22:01 AM
I am greatly annoyed by cyber security just referred to as "cyber" in this country. :P Last evening the lady on the TV news was the same. "Cyber". I always have to pause.
This is cyber:
(https://images-na.ssl-images-amazon.com/images/I/51tPv2dKt1L._SX373_BO1,204,203,200_.jpg)
:lol: Fair.
Although maybe they're both cyber and it's just a matter of time :ph34r:
wanna cyber
Cybersex?
Cyberbullying?
What happened to Cyberia btw?
Wouldn't it be reasonable to assume that the designs will be based on Astutes rather than the Virginias? The Astutes seem cheaper to build and man and would presumably be the better choice for a smaller navy?
Last arms deal upset of this magnitude I remember of, was the helicopter deal with Poland, cancelled when the potato twin party and its allies assumed power, and went for an "Atlantist" solution.
PS: quite a hit for the small normand city of Cherbourg (30,000 people).
According to Le Monde, New Zealand, ally of Australia already said that nuclear submarines won't be allowed to visit its ports or even NZ waters. A policy decision dating from 1985.
Duque, none of these Rest of the World people will know who you mean by Potato Twin.
Good one, tho.
Who on languish doesn't know who the potato twins were?
Quote from: Grey Fox on September 16, 2021, 08:17:09 AM
Duque, none of these Rest of the World people will know who you mean by Potato Twin.
Good one, tho.
It's easier to understand than your typical Yi-ism.
So the obvious question from this part of the world is why wasn't Canada involved. I mean - we're a pacific nation, we have conflicts with China, we have long-standing ties to all three countries...
Three options come to mind:
1. This is largely about nuclear subs. Canada does not have nuclear subs, and no plans to build new subs.
2. We have an election going on, so they don't want to interfere
3. They just don't trust us. :ph34r:
We have 2 submarines.
We're the surface navy partner if anything.
Quote from: Duque de Bragança on September 16, 2021, 07:49:45 AM
Last arms deal upset of this magnitude I remember of, was the helicopter deal with Poland, cancelled when the potato twin party and its allies assumed power, and went for an "Atlantist" solution.
PS: quite a hit for the small normand city of Cherbourg (30,000 people).
According to Le Monde, New Zealand, ally of Australia already said that nuclear submarines won't be allowed to visit its ports or even NZ waters. A policy decision dating from 1985.
FWIW I don't think they plan to invade NZ.
Quote from: Barrister on September 16, 2021, 10:07:09 AMSo the obvious question from this part of the world is why wasn't Canada involved. I mean - we're a pacific nation, we have conflicts with China, we have long-standing ties to all three countries...
Three options come to mind:
1. This is largely about nuclear subs. Canada does not have nuclear subs, and no plans to build new subs.
2. We have an election going on, so they don't want to interfere
3. They just don't trust us. :ph34r:
My guess is number 2. From a UK perspective I'm not sure it would be considered acceptable for a government to agree to or announce something like this during an election campaign - generally major decisions on policy have to be postponed until a new government has formed but I don't know if there's the same tradition in Canada.
It has been striking over the last year that Australia, Canada and the UK have issued so many joint statements on issues around China (but also Belarus, Armenia etc) - so I think they're clearly aligned which was particularly noteworthy while Trump was still in office. I think there is an emerging difference with New Zealand - and obviously they don't let nuclear subs in their waters. But I wouldn't be surprised if Canada joined that agreement.
Quote from: Barrister on September 16, 2021, 10:07:09 AM
So the obvious question from this part of the world is why wasn't Canada involved. I mean - we're a pacific nation, we have conflicts with China, we have long-standing ties to all three countries...
Three options come to mind:
1. This is largely about nuclear subs. Canada does not have nuclear subs, and no plans to build new subs.
2. We have an election going on, so they don't want to interfere
3. They just don't trust us. :ph34r:
4. They forgot.
Quote from: Grey Fox on September 16, 2021, 10:28:23 AM
We have 2 submarines.
We're the surface navy partner if anything.
But not nuclear submarines.
In one way this can just be seen as a transfer of nuclear sub tech from US/UK to Aus. Canada has nothing to contribute in such a transaction.
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 16, 2021, 10:34:09 AM
Quote from: Barrister on September 16, 2021, 10:07:09 AMSo the obvious question from this part of the world is why wasn't Canada involved. I mean - we're a pacific nation, we have conflicts with China, we have long-standing ties to all three countries...
Three options come to mind:
1. This is largely about nuclear subs. Canada does not have nuclear subs, and no plans to build new subs.
2. We have an election going on, so they don't want to interfere
3. They just don't trust us. :ph34r:
My guess is number 2. From a UK perspective I'm not sure it would be considered acceptable for a government to agree to or announce something like this during an election campaign - generally major decisions on policy have to be postponed until a new government has formed but I don't know if there's the same tradition in Canada.
It has been striking over the last year that Australia, Canada and the UK have issued so many joint statements on issues around China (but also Belarus, Armenia etc) - so I think they're clearly aligned which was particularly noteworthy while Trump was still in office. I think there is an emerging difference with New Zealand - and obviously they don't let nuclear subs in their waters. But I wouldn't be surprised if Canada joined that agreement.
I think it far more likely that this was about something Canada cannot help with. Tech to allow the Aussies to put nuclear powered subs in the water. Canada cannot help at all with that.
Quote from: crazy canuck on September 16, 2021, 10:50:17 AM
I think it far more likely that this was about something Canada cannot help with. Tech to allow the Aussies to put nuclear powered subs in the water. Canada cannot help at all with that.
Yeah - as I say I think that's the start and the biggest piece and they're still working out how to do it over the next 18 months. But the other bits on cyber, quantum computing, AI and apparently sensors and underwater drones may be areas that Canada can help with/wants to get involved with.
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 16, 2021, 10:53:09 AM
Quote from: crazy canuck on September 16, 2021, 10:50:17 AM
I think it far more likely that this was about something Canada cannot help with. Tech to allow the Aussies to put nuclear powered subs in the water. Canada cannot help at all with that.
Yeah - as I say I think that's the start and the biggest piece and they're still working out how to do it over the next 18 months. But the other bits on cyber, quantum computing, AI and apparently sensors and underwater drones may be areas that Canada can help with/wants to get involved with.
Not really, we got all our sub stuff from the Brits - and it was shite
edit: plus the Americans don't want to really help us establish our claim to arctic waters....
Quote from: The Brain on September 16, 2021, 10:31:55 AM
Quote from: Duque de Bragança on September 16, 2021, 07:49:45 AM
Last arms deal upset of this magnitude I remember of, was the helicopter deal with Poland, cancelled when the potato twin party and its allies assumed power, and went for an "Atlantist" solution.
PS: quite a hit for the small normand city of Cherbourg (30,000 people).
According to Le Monde, New Zealand, ally of Australia already said that nuclear submarines won't be allowed to visit its ports or even NZ waters. A policy decision dating from 1985.
FWIW I don't think they plan to invade NZ.
I am willing to trust you on this one.
:lol: We got all our nuclear sub stuff from the US and it was one of the triumphs of MacMillan's premiership and took years of negotiating (admittedly the Americans may have been scarred by their experience of sharing nuclear information with the UK only to discover that everybody who had access to it was a committed Communist). Apparently the Aussies started to talk about this in March which is very quick - though feels like something they were probably considering for a while and just waiting for Trump to leave office.
Apparently Australia has no civilian nuclear power plants, and some level of opposition to nuclear power. I wonder if the idea of developing nuclear-powered submarines is going to be controversial...
I've seen suggestions it might be connected to Canada's (and New Zealand which together wuth the AUKUS countries comprises Five Eyes) refusal to ban Huawei.
If Canada was involved it'd be caukus.
Definitely election related that. :p
Quote from: Tamas on September 16, 2021, 05:22:01 AM
I am greatly annoyed by cyber security just referred to as "cyber" in this country. :P Last evening the lady on the TV news was the same. "Cyber". I always have to pause.
This is cyber:
(https://images-na.ssl-images-amazon.com/images/I/51tPv2dKt1L._SX373_BO1,204,203,200_.jpg)
I, too, love games set in the recent past.
Quote from: Tyr on September 16, 2021, 12:37:49 PM
If Canada was involved it'd be caukus.
Definitely election related that. :p
Our political parties do caucus.
Quote
Jilted France cancels events over lost submarine deal
French embassy in Washington canceled in protest a reception it was hosting to mark a military victory 240 years ago.
BY RYM MOMTAZ
September 16, 2021 11:42 pm
PARIS — Apoplectic. Blindsided. Jilted.
Paris was a swirl of enraged adjectives Thursday, after Australia, the U.S. and the U.K announced they were coming together in a trilateral strategic partnership that stole away a multibillion-euro submarine contract Paris had signed with Canberra. The move prompted France to issue harsh statements in response and cancel events with both American and Australian allies.
Rarely have French officials been so acerbic in their statements, toward an ally or a foe. For them, the U.S. under President Joe Biden is still Trumpian, Australia is disloyal and untrustworthy, and the U.K. so scorned as to not even be worth mentioning.
"This unilateral, brutal, unpredictable decision is a lot like what Mr. Trump did," French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian said on national television Thursday morning. "We learned brutally through a statement by President Biden that the contract that the Australians signed with France is over and the U.S. will make a nuclear [submarines] offer to the Australians."
The only difference for Paris is that the American disregard for allies is now expressed through press conferences rather than tweets.
Australia was forced on the defensive after Le Drian described its decision to walk away from the deal as a "stab in the back."
"This difficult decision was taken only in response to a rapid evolution of the strategic environment with which Australia is confronted," a communiqué published by the Australian embassy in France said. "France remains a first-rate strategic partner for Australia.
Yet Australia's tossing aside of France was a loud signal that, despite the Trump years and the botched Afghanistan withdrawal, the American security guarantee still reigns supreme.
Worse than the disregard for elementary diplomatic protocol among close allies, or the loss of a deal so massive it was dubbed the "contract of the century," the Australian-American-British alliance is a cruel reminder to France that partners and allies still do not perceive it as a credible partner with whom they can build an alternative to the U.S.
It is also a blow to French President Emmanuel Macron's Indo-Pacific strategy and for his push for European strategic autonomy, despite having one of the most capable militaries in the world.
This all puts a squeeze on Macron seven months ahead of the French presidential election in which he is expected to seek a second mandate. The loss of the contract raises big questions about French shipbuilder the Naval Group's financial situation, and possible layoffs. And it gives fodder to those in opposition who want even closer ties with Russia and greater distance from the transatlantic alliance.
Multiple French officials with direct knowledge of the situation, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issues, say Australia informed France it was ending the contract to buy 12 conventional submarines mere hours before Biden, Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson held a joint press conference to announce the new trilateral partnership.
The U.S. made no attempt to hold substantive consultations ahead of time to allow Macron to save face. French officials learned of the impending announcement from a POLITICO article.
Meanwhile, Biden's one-line of praise for France during his announcement was perceived in Paris more as a patronizing slight than as a mark of appreciation.
"France, in particular, already has a substantial Indo-Pacific presence and is a key partner and ally in strengthening
the security and prosperity of the region," Biden said. "The United States looks forward to working closely with France and other key countries as we go forward."
On Thursday evening, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and U.S. Press Secretary Jen Psaki separately asserted the U.S. was in touch with French officials ahead of the announcement.
Anger at the US
Even though it was Australia that canceled the massive contract, the bulk of French ire was squarely directed at the U.S.
"The American choice to push aside a European ally and partner like France ... shows a lack of coherence that France can only note and regret," according to a joint statement from Defense Minister Florence Parly and Le Drian that was France's first official response to the announcement.
Nevertheless, French officials admit that the core tenets of the Franco-American relationship will remain unchanged given the importance of the issues on which they cooperate. An hour after the new trilateral partnership was announced, France, through Macron's Twitter account, announced it had killed the leader of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara — an area where the French get vital assistance from U.S. military intelligence.
In a sign of how lopsided the power balance is between the historic allies, the French embassy in Washington canceled in protest a reception it was hosting on Friday to mark the 240th anniversary of the Battle of the Chesapeake, which commemorates a French naval victory over a British fleet during the American Revolution.
In private, the French derided the U.K. as an interloper in the new trilateral partnership, desperately trying to show it had global diplomatic sway post Brexit.
On Thursday evening, Macron hosted German Chancellor Angela Merkel at the Elysée Palace. Neither mentioned the new Australian-U.S.-U.K. partnership in their statements to the press. Instead, they both mentioned the Indo-Pacific region in general terms as part of a long list of issues they would discuss during their one-on-one and working dinner.
In June, Morrison visited Macron in Paris and the French president affirmed he was personally following the submarine deal. Just two weeks ago, French and Australian foreign and defense ministers held their first-ever ministerial consultations, and the Australian side never brought up their desire to exit the deal, according to the aforementioned officials.
"Both sides committed to deepen defense industry cooperation and enhance their capability edge in the region. Ministers underlined the importance of the Future Submarine program," the ministers said in the joint statement on August 30.
On Thursday, French officials held calls with their counterparts about the turn of events in which they were incandescent with rage.
Australian, French and Indian foreign ministers were scheduled to hold a trilateral meeting on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly next week in New York. That meeting was canceled as a direct response to Australia's decision. Advisers had still been preparing the meeting on Wednesday.
Officials foresee relations with Australia will cool in the immediate future and intend to seek proper compensation.
"We will look into the contractual clauses very carefully," Parly said Thursday. "We will protect our interest and we will defend them."
https://www.politico.eu/article/jilted-france-fumes-and-takes-some-retaliatory-measures/
What say we? Is this bad form from Biden?
Already being discussed here:
http://languish.org/forums/index.php/topic,16434.0.html (http://languish.org/forums/index.php/topic,16434.0.html)
Ah my bad.
Merged
The french seem to like the word brutal.
I think the handling of it was bad, France should have been given notice and informed why. The story I've seen that someone in the Biden administration saying they didn't tell the French about this in advance "because they knew they wouldn't take it well" - which is pathetic and absurd in foreign relations between allies. It's not high school :blink:
But I do think there's a bit of overexcitement here - the Le Drian statement talked about this being more than an arms deal but a "50 year marriage" between Australia and France. But there were a significant number of issues from the Australian perspective about how that was going (https://www.politico.eu/article/why-australia-wanted-out-of-its-french-sub-deal/) and I think some of the French official commentary, which entirely focuses on the US without much emphasis of Australian agency, may suggest why the Australians wanted something else (and perhaps why the French weren't alive to their dissatisfaction).
Apparently it was the Australians who told the US they wanted to do this in March - in April they wouldn't sign the contracts for the next phase of work with the French company. And I think the simple truth is if you're any other Western power and the US offers to support your defence industry and get involved in tech sharing, then you sign up because the savings you can make from US economies of scale and leveraging off their knowledge and R&D is just immense.
Having said that I think it's a bit rich for Le Drian to talk about how insufferable it is for allies to behave like this given that, as Alexander Clarkson has pointed out, French diplomats, spies, oil executives and arms dealers have screwed over French allies many times in pursuit of French national interest in Francophone Africa.
But Franco-American (and Franco-British and Franco-Australian) relations have recovered from worse, not least Iraq. Although that might depend on the impact on Macron both because of his political project - but also just if this has an impact on very good jobs a year out from an election that's not ideal.
It looks like the French diplomatic reaction is "extreme anger" including canceling of an event France was hosting at its Washington Embassy:
https://www.politico.eu/article/jilted-france-fumes-and-takes-some-retaliatory-measures/
Generally, I think France and by extension the EU are "decent" allies, and obviously we shouldn't needlessly antagonize them. But I also don't have any real issue with Biden having made this decision. The very fact Australia was willing to go with us over France, whom it has signed contracts with, to my mind simply reflects a brutal reality--despite 60 years of trying to "go its own way" it is broadly understood if shit gets serious you want American power on your side a lot more than French. The Americans are much more capable of deploying force around the entire world, and are broadly more committed to using their military for internationalist purpose.
I have to think at least some part of the reason Biden was in favor of something like this is he doesn't see the EU as being very trustworthy in trying to build a "21st century" alliance of democratic countries to counter entrenched autocracies such as Russia and China. The reality is the continental Euros have found few trading, economic or etc agreements with Russia or China they didn't enthusiastically wish to embrace, and show a startling lack of skepticism about letting Huawei infrastructure in their countries when it offers Chinese state intelligence many potential ways to conduct espionage. None proven or anything and as best we know Huawei chips and infrastructure shipped to the West are "clean" of anything that could be used that way, but it's a complicated technological area and what could be slipped in where and when and with what capabilities--would be hard to fully vet everything.
If you want to put it in Cold War terms the Anglosphere is a lot more like the Western/Anti-Capitalist bloc, while the EU is a lot closer in behavior to the Non-Aligned Movement. By talking about the Cold War though it's easy to exaggerate the situation. Unlike the Cold War where trade with the USSR was at persistently minimal levels, everyone does a ton of business with China, the U.S.'s third largest trading partner. It's a weird world we're moving into because you can clearly see the camps emerging, if you were summarizing for a high school textbook, you'd argue there is the "West" with a focus on democratic government, international institutions, and there are the Autocrats who prefer a world governed more by "spheres of influence" and where international organizations stay out of criticizing domestic political actions. No one wants to admit this is turning into "two camps" and there appears to be a strong desire to avoid the development of Cold War type systems, and everyone wants to keep making money with everyone else--an important difference of now versus the 20th century. At the same time both sides kind of realize we're moving towards a two camps situation and wanting to "get things in place" if relationships get more acrimonious.
I don't think there's anything wrong with the arrangement itself, but it sounds like it could've been rolled out to the French a bit better.
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 16, 2021, 05:53:25 PM
I think the handling of it was bad, France should have been given notice and informed why. The story I've seen that someone in the Biden administration saying they didn't tell the French about this in advance "because they knew they wouldn't take it well" - which is pathetic and absurd in foreign relations between allies. It's not high school :blink:
But I do think there's a bit of overexcitement here - the Le Drian statement talked about this being more than an arms deal but a "50 year marriage" between Australia and France. But there were a significant number of issues from the Australian perspective about how that was going (https://www.politico.eu/article/why-australia-wanted-out-of-its-french-sub-deal/) and I think some of the French official commentary, which entirely focuses on the US without much emphasis of Australian agency, may suggest why the Australians wanted something else (and perhaps why the French weren't alive to their dissatisfaction).
Apparently it was the Australians who told the US they wanted to do this in March - in April they wouldn't sign the contracts for the next phase of work with the French company. And I think the simple truth is if you're any other Western power and the US offers to support your defence industry and get involved in tech sharing, then you sign up because the savings you can make from US economies of scale and leveraging off their knowledge and R&D is just immense.
Having said that I think it's a bit rich for Le Drian to talk about how insufferable it is for allies to behave like this given that, as Alexander Clarkson has pointed out, French diplomats, spies, oil executives and arms dealers have screwed over French allies many times in pursuit of French national interest in Francophone Africa.
But Franco-American (and Franco-British and Franco-Australian) relations have recovered from worse, not least Iraq. Although that might depend on the impact on Macron both because of his political project - but also just if this has an impact on very good jobs a year out from an election that's not ideal.
I don't know how much Biden's hands were on this but I've heard consistent rumors he has a petty streak, and he had tried to get the EU to back off on its last trade deal with China, and was reportedly furious when they ignored him. I would not consider it entirely out of character for Biden to have done it this way as a punch back. I don't think Biden would pursue a
policy like this for petty revenge, I think he and his advisors view this deal as good for the United States, but I could see him choosing to do it a way that embarrasses the French out of pettiness, yes.
It's actually interesting to me that Biden was portrayed during the campaign and in the early days of his Presidency as a good anti-Trump for the cross-Atlantic relationship. But I frankly never understood that narrative. Better than Trump? Sure. But even George W. Bush was better for that relationship than Trump.
Biden was picked in part for Obama's VP because he was seen as being "more experienced at foreign policy", but Biden actually didn't have much foreign policy experience outside of being on the Foreign Affairs committee. Which certainly means you spend some time "thinking about foreign policy", but it's not the same as actual foreign policy experience.
The actual history of Biden the Senator and Vice President is that he's a man prone to anger and resentment, and easily pissed off, and not amazing at hiding it when he is pissed off. But he also is more of a deal maker and politician than Trump, so he has a much better control of his ego (for example people were wondering if Biden had trouble tapping Kamala as VP after she went at him during the primary debates--reports are he had zero issue with that, as an actual politician he doesn't hold grudges over shit like debate attacks.) But even still "better control of your ego than Trump" is an extremely low bar to clear, and leaves a lot of room for angry old man Joe to let pride influence his behavior--and this isn't out of line with how he acted in the last 40 years of his political career, either.
Quote from: Jacob on September 16, 2021, 06:00:39 PM
I don't think there's anything wrong with the arrangement itself, but it sounds like it could've been rolled out to the French a bit better.
Yeah and as I say I think this, from the NYT, is pathetic:
QuoteOne U.S. official conceded that the administration did not tell the French about the deal before it was announced because they knew they weren't going to like it. The official, who asked for anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly about the discussions, said the Biden administration decided that it was up to Australia to tell the French since they were the ones with a contract with them. The official acknowledged the French are right to be annoyed and that the decision is likely to fuel France's continued desire for E.U. defense independence.
You know I wouldn't tell a flatmate that I think they could do with losing some weight or I hate their outfit because they wouldn't like it, if me and another flatmate were replacing them on the lease I'd let them know :lol:
And the US, Australia and the UK should have sort of jointly rolled the pitch on this and informed the French and ideally have worked out ways to work with the French.
I am still a bit mystified: why are the French cancelling events in Washington DC to protest actions taken by the Australian government? Do the French really feel that the Australians will be more hurt by cancelled events in DC than Canberra?
I understand that the French are unhappy, and especially that the US didn't take on the responsibility of the Australians to notify the French about change in Franco-Australian relations, but, seriously, fuck France if it thinks that the US owes it any special advance tips in regards to its relations with Australia.
Quote from: Barrister on September 16, 2021, 12:15:34 PM
I've seen suggestions it might be connected to Canada's (and New Zealand which together wuth the AUKUS countries comprises Five Eyes) refusal to ban Huawei.
New Zealand is out largely because we don't strategically see them as an important ally due to their 1985 decision to no longer allow U.S. ships to dock in their harbors. Under the ANZUS treaty, Australia/NZ/US had a "non-binding collective security agreement", obviously a lower commitment than NATO--NATO has the provision that an "attack on one member is an attack on all", while ANZUS simply says "an attack on any member is dangerous to the others" and that the other members should endeavor to respond.
After Zealand's 1985 decision, the U.S. formally stated it no longer viewed New Zealand as being part of the collective security agreement in ANZUS, essentially saying it New Zealand were to be attacked the U.S. would have no particular reason to respond. It also formally downgraded NZ from "major non-NATO ally" to "friend." Bill Clinton later re-promoted them to "major non-NATO ally" but the rest of the treaty remains out of effect between the US/NZ and is likely to remain so as long as NZ maintains its anti-nuclear position. For this reason it is highly unlikely we'll ever do any serious close defense agreements with the New Zealanders.
Things did improve further under Obama, the 2011 Wellington Declaration and the 2012 Washington Declaration further repaired some of the relationship and allows for limited military cooperation again, but NZ's position on nuclear weapons means there will always be a barrier to the relationship going past a certain point in terms of defense cooperation.
The bigger issue with the 1985 NZ declaration isn't just nuclear powered / nuclear armed ships. The United States had a policy then and now of not disclosing which of its ships are carrying nuclear weapons, so its 1985 decision to not allow ships carrying nukes means no U.S. Naval vessel could enter New Zealand territorial waters since in theory any U.S. Naval vessel could be carrying nuclear weapons. Under Obama after our diplomatic declarations with them, a symbolic U.S. naval vessel that had pre-certified with the New Zealand defense minister it was not carrying nuclear weapons entered New Zealand's waters--the first time a U.S. ship did so in 33 years. But it hasn't become a routine occurrence since, because aside from symbolic staged events like that, the U.S. is still not disclosing with regularity which ships carry nuclear weapons and which do not.
I'm not sure I read all too much in Canada's absence from the arrangement though. Canada has a number of military treaties with the United States that already involve the highest level of military cooperation possible in most respects--hell under NORAD Canadian planes can technically perform combat air patrol over the United States, although I don't think that's part of ordinary operations (I think some Canadian planes did just that during the 9/11 attacks though.) NORAD itself is arguably one of, if not the, closest military agreements between two sovereign countries. Canada is also in the Five Eyes, NATO etc. I think it's just much more likely since Canada isn't in any kind of market for submarines it had no immediate reason to be in this--the presence of the United Kingdom in the arrangement is a little weird, and I'm not sure politically or diplomatically that anything between the United States and United Kingdom changes at all from them being in the agreement.
Quote from: grumbler on September 16, 2021, 06:25:50 PM
I am still a bit mystified: why are the French cancelling events in Washington DC to protest actions taken by the Australian government? Do the French really feel that the Australians will be more hurt by cancelled events in DC than Canberra?
I understand that the French are unhappy, and especially that the US didn't take on the responsibility of the Australians to notify the French about change in Franco-Australian relations, but, seriously, fuck France if it thinks that the US owes it any special advance tips in regards to its relations with Australia.
Because playing that they're mad at Australia won't do anything for them domestically.
US surface ships no longer have a nuclear capability (neither ASROC nor Tomahawk are any longer certified to carry nuclear weapons, and I don't think that there is a US surface warship with a nuclear magazine any more), so the "cannot confirm nor deny" policy on nukes doesn't apply to them. It was that policy that blocked all US naval vessels from visiting New Zealand.
Quote from: HVC on September 16, 2021, 06:32:00 PM
Quote from: grumbler on September 16, 2021, 06:25:50 PM
I am still a bit mystified: why are the French cancelling events in Washington DC to protest actions taken by the Australian government? Do the French really feel that the Australians will be more hurt by cancelled events in DC than Canberra?
I understand that the French are unhappy, and especially that the US didn't take on the responsibility of the Australians to notify the French about change in Franco-Australian relations, but, seriously, fuck France if it thinks that the US owes it any special advance tips in regards to its relations with Australia.
Because playing that they're mad at Australia won't do anything for them domestically.
Gotcha.
Quote from: grumbler on September 16, 2021, 06:37:35 PM
US surface ships no longer have a nuclear capability (neither ASROC nor Tomahawk are any longer certified to carry nuclear weapons, and I don't think that there is a US surface warship with a nuclear magazine any more), so the "cannot confirm nor deny" policy on nukes doesn't apply to them. It was that policy that blocked all US naval vessels from visiting New Zealand.
I can understand not wanting nuclear ships in your docks if you're a tiny nation, but what's the rational for no ships? Did the ever give one. Fear of getting first striked seems like it might be one, but that's just my guess
Quote from: grumbler on September 16, 2021, 06:37:35 PM
US surface ships no longer have a nuclear capability (neither ASROC nor Tomahawk are any longer certified to carry nuclear weapons, and I don't think that there is a US surface warship with a nuclear magazine any more), so the "cannot confirm nor deny" policy on nukes doesn't apply to them. It was that policy that blocked all US naval vessels from visiting New Zealand.
Most ships that couldn't dock in New Zealand since 1985 didn't have that capacity either AFAIK, it's just the fact we weren't willing to affirm a specific ship was
not carrying nuclear weapons, as I understand it. Likely there were many ships the NZs knew would never be carrying nuclear weapons anyway that haven't docked there since. The first ship to be blocked, the USS Buchanan, was capable of carrying nuclear depth charges, but AFAIK the policy after that denial was that all U.S. ships would be denied port access if they weren't willing to confirm they weren't carrying nuclear weapons. Since the U.S. generally hasn't been willing to confirm that--even on ships that obviously wouldn't be carrying them, we've only had the one symbolic ship enter NZ waters since. Maybe it's become more common afterwards though, but that was the last that I saw anything about it.
It looks like according to this the U.S. ban on NZ ships and policy against certifying an American ship is nuclear free remains official policy and still regularly blocks port access between the two nations. After the Obama symbolic gesture, it looks like a few case by case exemptions have been granted, but the underlying policy remains in effect. A USCG ship was granted access to NZ after complying with its policy on confirming it was nuclear free, and three NZ ships were allowed port access in Hawaii for some naval exercises (in a previous Rim of the Pacific exercise Russia was allowed port access in Hawaii but NZ was not, which the article calls out as somewhat out of line.)
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2019/july/lift-ban-new-zealand-port-visits
Quote from: grumbler on September 16, 2021, 06:25:50 PM
I am still a bit mystified: why are the French cancelling events in Washington DC to protest actions taken by the Australian government? Do the French really feel that the Australians will be more hurt by cancelled events in DC than Canberra?
I understand that the French are unhappy, and especially that the US didn't take on the responsibility of the Australians to notify the French about change in Franco-Australian relations, but, seriously, fuck France if it thinks that the US owes it any special advance tips in regards to its relations with Australia.
There's four sides I can think of. - and I imagine it's probably a combo.
The sort of France focused ones are - one, as I mentioned that the French are sort of removing Australian agency in some of their reaction - and that might reflect exactly the sort of mindset that caused Canberra to look for alternatives. But basically France doesn't really see Australia as an actor but a piece that is acted on previously by France and now by the US. An alternative is that I think Macron has pitched himself as the anti-populist candidate and figure on the world stage (I don't think that's actually true but I think it's how he presents and imagines himself), I think he probably feels this more from the US because Biden was the restorationist candidate ("America is back"). And I think in Europe there has always been a slight conflation between what is "Trumpian" and what is simply the US prioritising its own interests - especially as the bipartisan consensus formed on China I think there's probably more overlap than European capitals expected. Plus I think Biden's speech on Afghanistan is really important as I think he really means to move to a sort of liberal realist approach of only committing troops and money for "vital interests" and focusing on great power competition in the Pacific, which is perhaps not the America Europe thought it was getting "back" after Trump.
The two US focused ones are that France knows that if the US is willing to share tech and military industrial capacity to a medium power like Australia (or the UK), they can't really turn that down. Alterantely they know that the US relationship is so important and essential that it can take a bit of strain.
I think the motivation from Australia is really interesting and important - how much is because of the issues they were having with the French contract (price had almost doubled on what was already Australia's largest ever defence contract, timelines were pushed out etc) and how much is driven by a feeling they need further range subs/their assessment of the security picture in the Pacific?
Edit: And the de Gaulle move I can see happening now would be if Macron popped up in Delhi to announce a contract to help build/support India in constructing nuclear powered subs...:ph34r: :wub:
Edit: And I suppose the other reasoning from Australia's perspective is just that they realised this was, in Le Drian's phrase, a 50 year marriage and they weren't seeing eye-to-eye with France on China which is the most important security issue for Australia, but were with the US.
I think this is about 90% Australia asking itself "Who is more important to have on our side, I mean REALLY on our side, when it comes to our primary future threat (China) and threat area (the Pacific).
The answer is obvious. AFAICT, Europe has not and will not lift a single finger to do anything to oppose China at all.
(Not that plenty in the US have not been bending over with enthusiasm to Xi)
Quote from: Syt on September 16, 2021, 10:38:15 AM
Quote from: Barrister on September 16, 2021, 10:07:09 AM
So the obvious question from this part of the world is why wasn't Canada involved. I mean - we're a pacific nation, we have conflicts with China, we have long-standing ties to all three countries...
Three options come to mind:
1. This is largely about nuclear subs. Canada does not have nuclear subs, and no plans to build new subs.
2. We have an election going on, so they don't want to interfere
3. They just don't trust us. :ph34r:
4. They forgot.
5. They didn't care.
The US is the real guarantor of Australian security. Everybody knows that. France or the UK are just friends, but not indispensable. Under Trump it was openly communicated policy that US security guarantees come with the expectation to buy US military equipment. Might be that Biden is just more tacit about it. As Australia was unhappy with the French submarine deal, this was an area where the US could offer an alternative and they took it.
Quote from: Zanza on September 17, 2021, 04:05:40 AM
The US is the real guarantor of Australian security. Everybody knows that. France or the UK are just friends, but not indispensable. Under Trump it was openly communicated policy that US security guarantees come with the expectation to buy US military equipment. Might be that Biden is just more tacit about it. As Australia was unhappy with the French submarine deal, this was an area where the US could offer an alternative and they took it.
The other side of that is that until Trump the US was planning to amend their law to include the UK and Australia in "NTIB" which is the "national technology and industrial base". Trump stopped that. I think Canada is already covered.
So in some ways it might be reverting to policies that were planned/in place before Trump.
I think they should have done this in a way that France could save face and not make it clear that they just ignored them.
Then again, maybe that was the initial plan but France insisted the deal stays as it was, who knows.
Looks like Freedom Fries is back on the menu, boys!!
Quote from: HVC on September 16, 2021, 06:32:00 PM
Quote from: grumbler on September 16, 2021, 06:25:50 PM
I am still a bit mystified: why are the French cancelling events in Washington DC to protest actions taken by the Australian government? Do the French really feel that the Australians will be more hurt by cancelled events in DC than Canberra?
I understand that the French are unhappy, and especially that the US didn't take on the responsibility of the Australians to notify the French about change in Franco-Australian relations, but, seriously, fuck France if it thinks that the US owes it any special advance tips in regards to its relations with Australia.
Because playing that they're mad at Australia won't do anything for them domestically.
Still won't do much for Jupin domestically, as the Atlantist he is. I don't see much fuss in French media, it's covered, with titles speaking of a crisis but far from Freedom Fries level.
I don't think it will be that important for the presidential election campaign next year. Some candidates already declared themselves and Jupin uses every visit or opportunity now to prepare for it.
1. I think France is perfectly within in rights to be furious as they thought they had a valuable deal in place that was critical to them in maintaining the viability of their national military-industrial base. And is is totally understandable they would view this as a betrayal by trusted allies.
2. At the same time, it is perfectly within Australia's rights to reconsider its naval defense posture in light of events and for the US to encourage that reconsideration. For the first time since before WW2 we have a old-style naval arms race in the making and the US-NATO bloc now faces the prospect of the first potentially legit blue-water naval competitor since 1943. Given Australia's geographic position, did it make sense to replace their existing diesel fleet with an upgrade that would add another 10 days of endurance, or make the leap to nuclear? Perhaps a debatable question but from the limited standpoint of countering the growth of Chinese power, there's a pretty good argument for the latter.
3. Once the decision was made, it made little sense to tip off France in advance because France would still be really angry but given enough time might have been have sought to exert undesired political pressure to get it reversed. Better to present a fait accompli.
4. On the other hand, it is understandable that pissed of France even more.
5. Given that France remains a Pacific power of sorts, it would have been nice if this could have been handled better, but I'm at loss to figure out how.
The other two angles of this are if Australia had made the decision that they need to move to nuclear because their perception of risks in the Pacific has change, that rules out France as a supplier. Lots of people are pointing out that the subs the French were providing were adapted at Australia's request to diesel, which is true. But in addition, my understanding (from Bruno Tertrais of the Institut Montaigne) is that France as a policy will not share nuclear propulsion technology. It's possible there'd be an exception for Australia but that can't be assumed.
The other point is this didn't leak which is very surprising and I imagine the talks were sensitive to the very end. Ultimately if you notify the French then, as an understandably aggrieved party, it would leak.
Separately - interesting piece from an Aussie. In particular that the Labor Party are supportive which, again, I think indicates the Australian assessment of the threat they're facing in the region:
QuoteWhat does the new AUKUS alliance mean for global relations?
The new pact between the UK, US and Australia could lead to nothing less than a merger of military, industrial and scientific capabilities.
By Rory Medcalf
Britain has just become part of something momentous in the Indo-Pacific, the super-region centred on maritime Asia and Australasia where China has been fast-expanding its coercive military power.
Not only has the UK's Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier "strike group" recently completed warlike exercises with Japanese, American and other navies in the Pacific, but Prime Minister Boris Johnson has now joined the leaders of Australia and the United States to launch a powerful new security triangle.
This augments the longstanding Australia-US and UK-US alliances with a new tripartite grouping called AUKUS, launched in a virtual meeting last night (15 September) between Johnson, Australian PM Scott Morrison and US president Joe Biden.
AUKUS's initial priority will be to pool US and British expertise and technology to develop a nuclear-powered submarine fleet for Australia over the decades ahead. This has cascading significance for Australia and the Indo-Pacific; for China – the power this is largely about keeping at bay; and for Britain, the United States and Europe.
For Australia, it's a huge deal, and in a military sense almost existential. Anxieties about Chinese power have intensified with Beijing's totalitarian turn, aggression in the South China Sea and political interference campaigns.
This low point has also come with economic bullying, following Canberra's bluntness in being the first to call for an inquiry into the origins of Covid-19.
As an island continent, reliant on seaborne trade, Australia needs a strong navy. But in the undersea domain – which is vital for naval deterrence and intelligence collection – it has increasingly made do with six Swedish-designed submarines of 1990s vintage. Their conventional (diesel-electric) propulsion limits their ability to stay stealthily deployed around one of the largest maritime zones in the world.
Meanwhile, the waters of the Indo-Pacific have become starkly contested, as the modernisation of China's navy has overtaken those of Japan, India, Australia and all others, except America's, with which it now contends for dominance.
Since 2009, when the then Labor prime minister Kevin Rudd promised Australia would fix this vulnerability with a regionally superior fleet of 12 submarines, the question has been "how"?
That seemed answered in 2016, when the conservative government of Malcolm Turnbull agreed to a huge deal for the "future submarines" to be designed and built in Australia by French state contractor Naval Group. Japan had expected to win the bid, but moved on.
The Australia-France arrangement soon struggled, however, with shifting understandings on price, timelines and capability. Canberra wanted a diesel-electric submarine with the performance of a nuclear one. All the while, China's assertiveness and Australia's angst were rising.
At the same time, then US president Donald Trump's abusive attitude to allies reinforced Canberra's interest in diversifying its security partners, whether with Asian powers such as its "Quad" friends India and Japan, or with France – or, it turns out, a Britain seeking its own post-Brexit way in the world.
Biden's America and Johnson's Britain have become focused on the risks to their interests and values from China's assertive power, including in the far-flung Indo-Pacific – the global centre of gravity for economic growth and strategic tensions alike.
This has dovetailed with Australia's quest for security. Thus, on the sidelines of the Cornwall G7 summit in June – the elements of a new plan were struck.
Nuclear submarine cooperation is the headline, because the sudden American and British willingness to share their technology was what persuaded Australia to take the difficult decision to drop the French connection.
But there is much more in play. This new triple near-alliance is based on capability, convergent interest and, above all, trust. It will be easy enough to caricature as an outmoded Anglosphere. Yet these are three of the world's most multicultural democracies, now defining their identity more by shared liberal ideals than heritage.
The trio have hinted at a larger commitment to one another: nothing less than a merger of military, industrial and scientific capabilities (a point applauded publicly by Tom Tugendhat, the chair of the British parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee) in the new commanding heights of cyber, artificial intelligence and quantum computing.
But the hard work begins now, as do the hard questions. Australia can't afford to get this one wrong, so all three countries need to be serious, and committed for the long haul. The three governments have set an 18-month deadline to map out the specifics of the nuclear submarine plan. This involves the enormous task of sharing advanced nuclear technology with a country that has no civilian nuclear sector. One surprise is that Australia's Labor opposition seems largely on board, now assenting to the need for a technology it had long regarded as taboo.
Difficult diplomacy lies ahead. Relations with France are going to go through a tough period. Paris is understandably aggrieved at all three powers over the cancellation of its contract. Whatever the commercial imperatives, this deal was emblematic of President Macron's wider play for an influential French role in the Indo-Pacific – where France has been welcomed and encouraged by Australia as a resident power and diplomatic partner.
Australia and France – indeed the whole EU – have a real convergence of interests in a rules-based Indo-Pacific region dominated by no single power. It would be a tragedy if, in strengthening their own ability to balance China, the AUKUS trio have discouraged the admittedly more cautious solidarity that other democracies have begun to show.
On the other hand, there will likely be little rush to allay China's professed alarm, given that this is about Australia's friends helping it acquire its own share of the kind of naval power that China has been building up for years.
Professor Rory Medcalf is head of the National Security College at the Australian National University and author of "Indo-Pacific Empire: China, America and the Contest for the World's Pivotal Region" (Manchester University Press).
Should have invited in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan as well. :sleep:
https://twitter.com/BBCJonSopel/status/1438957622145830933
QuoteJon Sopel
@BBCJonSopel
Can't quite believe I'm writing this, but:
France is recalling its ambassador to the US and to Australia over submarine deal and #AUKUS agreement.
For such close allies, this is an extraordinary step
10:06 PM · Sep 17, 2021·Twitter for iPhone
They're a lot more butt hurt then i'd thought they'd be. also, what's the end game? the contract won't come back. so unless france plans to keep the ambassadors away eventually they'll have to slink back. which is a way worse look.
The art of the gesture
Quote from: Syt on September 17, 2021, 03:29:25 PM
https://twitter.com/BBCJonSopel/status/1438957622145830933
QuoteJon Sopel
@BBCJonSopel
Can't quite believe I'm writing this, but:
France is recalling its ambassador to the US and to Australia over submarine deal and #AUKUS agreement.
For such close allies, this is an extraordinary step
10:06 PM · Sep 17, 2021·Twitter for iPhone
Confirmed by French media:
https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/crise-des-sous-marins-paris-rappelle-ses-ambassadeurs-aux-etats-unis-et-en-australie-20210917 (https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/crise-des-sous-marins-paris-rappelle-ses-ambassadeurs-aux-etats-unis-et-en-australie-20210917)
Right on the same site, another link saying how Americans torpedoed (pun intended) a contract that was not going well. :hmm:
https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/sous-marins-australiens-comment-les-americains-ont-torpille-un-contrat-deja-mal-en-point-20210916 (https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/sous-marins-australiens-comment-les-americains-ont-torpille-un-contrat-deja-mal-en-point-20210916)
Quote from: Syt on September 17, 2021, 03:29:25 PM
https://twitter.com/BBCJonSopel/status/1438957622145830933
QuoteJon Sopel
@BBCJonSopel
Can't quite believe I'm writing this, but:
France is recalling its ambassador to the US and to Australia over submarine deal and #AUKUS agreement.
For such close allies, this is an extraordinary step
10:06 PM · Sep 17, 2021·Twitter for iPhone
They didn't withdraw their ambassador from Moscow despite Russia trying to interfere with their election. The silence from other European capitals is also pretty striking.
I think this is heading into overreaction territory now.
Withdrawing one's ambassador is an extremely portentous move in international diplomacy. It is the warning shot in severing diplomatic relations.
Recalling the ambassador to the home country "for consultations" is a medium-serious step but just a gesture. I wonder if that's actually what is happening. I can't believe that France would essentially issue an ultimatum threatening to severe diplomatic relations over something like this, which is what actually withdrawing an ambassador is (a new or returning ambassador would have to go through all the accreditation ceremonies, I believe).
The furia francese in action.
Unless the French were lied to or cheated in some I don't see how the butthurt is warranted.
Interesting timing from a UK defence journalist :hmm:
QuoteGeorge Allison
@geoallison
BAE, Rolls-Royce and Babcock will design a new class of nuclear powered attack submarines for the Royal Navy to replace the Astute class - currently referred to as SSN-Replacement (SSN-R).
Two contracts worth £85 million each have been awarded to BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce to deliver design and concept work for SSN-R.
Quote from: grumbler on September 17, 2021, 05:16:55 PM
Recalling the ambassador to the home country "for consultations" is a medium-serious step but just a gesture. I wonder if that's actually what is happening. I can't believe that France would essentially issue an ultimatum threatening to severe diplomatic relations over something like this, which is what actually withdrawing an ambassador is (a new or returning ambassador would have to go through all the accreditation ceremonies, I believe).
That's what the French link I gave says and what I imagined, following the tweet.
QuoteL'ambassadeur de France aux États-Unis, Philippe Etienne, a été rappelé vendredi soir à Paris pour consultations, de même que son homologue en Australie, Jean-Pierre Thébault.
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 17, 2021, 05:02:00 PM
I think this is heading into overreaction territory now.
From you at least. :P
Quote from: Admiral Yi on September 17, 2021, 05:27:00 PM
Unless the French were lied to or cheated in some I don't see how the butthurt is warranted.
We are all supposed to be allies. It was reported today that Canada was not even told this was happening. France was not either. France had a deal in the works.
Either someone in the US State Department (or whatever department is supposed to be in charge of talking to allies) dropped the ball or the decision not to keep allies in the loop was a deliberate decision. The first is excusable - concerning but excusable. The second signals that the US is continuing down the path of basically saying fuck you to its allies.
Incidentally further details announced today by Australia and they've announced that "throughout the 2020s, Australia will rapidly acquire long-range strike capabilities to enhance the ADF's ability to deliver strike effects across our air, land and maritime domains".
Some will be investing in their own manufacture, then Tomahawk missiles, long range anti-ship missiles (extended range), joint air-to-suface standoff missiles (extended range), hypersonic missiles (development with the US for the air force) and precision guided missiles for land forces. I don't really know what any of that means - but it seems probably more important and immediate than the sub point.
Again, the thing I find really striking is the sense of threat/risk from the Australian government that's requiring this type of spending on this type of defence deal - with bipartisan support (and getting the French diesel subs was a big controversial issue apparently). I don't know if sort of feels like if Poland reached a point where they felt a need to heavily invest in tanks and stuff they'd need to defend against Russia we would/should notice. It might be nothing and it may be an over-reaction by Canberra but it seems like something that matters.
Quote from: crazy canuck on September 17, 2021, 05:49:10 PM
Quote from: Admiral Yi on September 17, 2021, 05:27:00 PM
Unless the French were lied to or cheated in some I don't see how the butthurt is warranted.
We are all supposed to be allies. It was reported today that Canada was not even told this was happening. France was not either. France had a deal in the works.
Either someone in the US State Department (or whatever department is supposed to be in charge of talking to allies) dropped the ball or the decision not to keep allies in the loop was a deliberate decision. The first is excusable - concerning but excusable. The second signals that the US is continuing down the path of basically saying fuck you to its allies.
The United States had no deal with France, and no obligation to inform France about every diplomatic or military initiative it is undertaking.
France can be mad at Australia for pulling out of the deal the two countries had, but hat probably doesn't have the same political rewards as blaming the US for the failure of the French themselves to maintain the contract. Of course, the nation at fault is as likely to be France as it is Australia, but in no way is the failure of the French to keep their contract the fault of the US. Being allies doesn't mean that contracts cannot be cancelled.
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 17, 2021, 06:09:07 PM
Incidentally further details announced today by Australia and they've announced that "throughout the 2020s, Australia will rapidly acquire long-range strike capabilities to enhance the ADF's ability to deliver strike effects across our air, land and maritime domains".
Some will be investing in their own manufacture, then Tomahawk missiles, long range anti-ship missiles (extended range), joint air-to-suface standoff missiles (extended range), hypersonic missiles (development with the US for the air force) and precision guided missiles for land forces. I don't really know what any of that means - but it seems probably more important and immediate than the sub point.
Again, the thing I find really striking is the sense of threat/risk from the Australian government that's requiring this type of spending on this type of defence deal - with bipartisan support (and getting the French diesel subs was a big controversial issue apparently). I don't know if sort of feels like if Poland reached a point where they felt a need to heavily invest in tanks and stuff they'd need to defend against Russia we would/should notice. It might be nothing and it may be an over-reaction by Canberra but it seems like something that matters.
Yeah, the more we learn about this the more it sounds like it is really the US deciding to go with just two allies.
From the Globe article I mentioned:
QuoteHe said he was surprised to hear Mr. Trudeau play down the pact as merely a submarine purchase deal. "I think it's misleading and concerning ... I would like to believe he was poorly briefed by his staff," Mr. Norman said.
The retired naval flag officer said that, if Mr. Trudeau was fully briefed, "he doesn't understand what is going on internationally and he doesn't understand what the significance of an arrangement like this is as it relates to international security."
He said the agreement goes far beyond access to U.S. submarine technology.
"This is about accessing both current and emerging technologies, from cyber and artificial intelligence, to acoustics and underwater warfare – a whole range of very important strategic capabilities."
Quote from: grumbler on September 17, 2021, 06:14:11 PM
Quote from: crazy canuck on September 17, 2021, 05:49:10 PM
Quote from: Admiral Yi on September 17, 2021, 05:27:00 PM
Unless the French were lied to or cheated in some I don't see how the butthurt is warranted.
We are all supposed to be allies. It was reported today that Canada was not even told this was happening. France was not either. France had a deal in the works.
Either someone in the US State Department (or whatever department is supposed to be in charge of talking to allies) dropped the ball or the decision not to keep allies in the loop was a deliberate decision. The first is excusable - concerning but excusable. The second signals that the US is continuing down the path of basically saying fuck you to its allies.
The United States had no deal with France, and no obligation to inform France about every diplomatic or military initiative it is undertaking.
France can be mad at Australia for pulling out of the deal the two countries had, but hat probably doesn't have the same political rewards as blaming the US for the failure of the French themselves to maintain the contract. Of course, the nation at fault is as likely to be France as it is Australia, but in no way is the failure of the French to keep their contract the fault of the US. Being allies doesn't mean that contracts cannot be cancelled.
Thanks for confirming its a big Fuck You to US allies.
An alternate Canadian perspective:
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-canadas-exclusion-from-three-eyes-only-confirms-what-was-already-the/
Of course the UK is just thrilled to be involved I think - but more practically given the new UK subs announcement it feels likely that we'll be sharing the tech (for that bit) and we rely heavily on the US so need them to go along with it.
Edit: Incidentally I totally get why the French are angry and think that's fair enough. But I think JR's points are true and also I don't think the countries involved could have risked it leaking before getting an agreement - which it would have had they told the French in advance. I think Le Drian's language and pulling ambassadors (especially when there's crickets from the rest of Europe) is a little bit much.
Quote from: crazy canuck on September 17, 2021, 06:16:27 PM
Quote from: grumbler on September 17, 2021, 06:14:11 PM
Quote from: crazy canuck on September 17, 2021, 05:49:10 PM
Quote from: Admiral Yi on September 17, 2021, 05:27:00 PM
Unless the French were lied to or cheated in some I don't see how the butthurt is warranted.
We are all supposed to be allies. It was reported today that Canada was not even told this was happening. France was not either. France had a deal in the works.
Either someone in the US State Department (or whatever department is supposed to be in charge of talking to allies) dropped the ball or the decision not to keep allies in the loop was a deliberate decision. The first is excusable - concerning but excusable. The second signals that the US is continuing down the path of basically saying fuck you to its allies.
The United States had no deal with France, and no obligation to inform France about every diplomatic or military initiative it is undertaking.
France can be mad at Australia for pulling out of the deal the two countries had, but hat probably doesn't have the same political rewards as blaming the US for the failure of the French themselves to maintain the contract. Of course, the nation at fault is as likely to be France as it is Australia, but in no way is the failure of the French to keep their contract the fault of the US. Being allies doesn't mean that contracts cannot be cancelled.
Thanks for confirming its a big Fuck You to US allies.
Thanks for confirming that your reaction is just emo.
I don't get how it's screwing over Canada. It's not like we're going steady and the us can't see other people. We weren't even trying to negotiate our own deal with Australia that America screwed over.
As for France, the ordeal started with a huge data leak from DCNS that got Australia antsy enough to demand the same level of protection the us gives for military procurement (in 2016). Then the budget doubles and a promise to produce 90% in Australia get cut to 60% without any guarantees against further cuts. Australia also has to spend billions to repair some of their current sub fleet because the new ones won't be done on time. These concerns weren't taken seriously when Australia played the delay game in 2019 when signing further contracts. Contracts with clauses to void if " fundamentally impacted ", which I think the aforementioned examples should cover. Hell if it wasn't America, Australia would have been smart to renegotiate with Germany or Japan (who lost the original bid).
Canada has four subs that spend more time in dry dock then the water (thanks uk), and hasn't shown any interest in replacing them. Not sure what our part in a sub deal would be. As for general intelligence and tech, I thought we already have those treaties with the states.
As far as I can tell Trudeau is right- its basically a tech sharing deal for nuclear powered attack subs. I haven't seen any written pact document but going by the statements of 3 leaders and the reporting it appears that's the main event, and everything else is ancillary.
How in Gods name is CANADA mad at us over this?????
Quote from: Berkut on September 17, 2021, 08:33:33 PM
How in Gods name is CANADA mad at us over this?????
We went down to the Mall with the UK and Australia and the three of us smoked and wore eye shadow and talked about how we hate our parents. Nobody called Canada and they had to stay at home listening to Bryan Adams CDs.
Quote from: HVC on September 17, 2021, 06:54:37 PM
Canada has four subs that spend more time in dry dock then the water (thanks uk), and hasn't shown any interest in replacing them. Not sure what our part in a sub deal would be. As for general intelligence and tech, I thought we already have those treaties with the states.
Maybe Canada could have joined to instruct Australia on what not to do. :P
Quote from: Berkut on September 17, 2021, 08:33:33 PM
How in Gods name is CANADA mad at us over this?????
Not the outgoing government. Our analyst are butthurt & can't figure out while we were left out. Some think it's because we won't ban Huawei.
Quote from: Berkut on September 17, 2021, 08:33:33 PM
How in Gods name is CANADA mad at us over this?????
CANADA is not mad. Trudeau is saying "it's about nuclear subs, we're not getting nuclear subs, so no biggie."
But some analysts (who may or may not be partisan, I don't know) are saying "it's a big deal we were left out" and some are saying "if Trudeau doesn't realize it's a big deal that means he's either misinformed or trying to put a good face on this big slight."
Personally I think it's not the biggest deal, and that we can get a seat at the table at such a time where it makes sense for us to want it... but I don't believe nuclear subs is a table we have expressed an interest in being at at this point.
CC, for his part, is obviously with the analysts that are saying it's a big deal but I'm not sure it represents the general outlook in Canada at this point.
Basically, I think if Canada says "oh hey, yeah we're willing to commit however many billions of dollars to get some nuclear submarines" that we can join and/ or get a similar arrangement. But I don't think we're going to get access to everything unless we agree to spend some money.
Maybe there's a scenario where we can say "we don't want subs, but we're willing to spend however many hundreds of millions or billions to acquire some of the related tech for non-sub related military uses, can we play" and get a yes.
Personally at this point I can in fact see the case for Canada having nuclear subs... but I'm not sure the Canadian public would necessarily be on board with the costs. And I don't think the Liberals were particularly interested in making billion dollar subs an election issue either.
Why would we want to be tying ourselves to those warmonger imperialists in the US any further than we already are? We should be pursuing a more independent path in international relations in any event.
Quote from: Barrister on September 18, 2021, 12:36:05 AM
Why would we want to be tying ourselves to those warmonger imperialists in the US any further than we already are? We should be pursuing a more independent path in international relations in any event.
Do you have anything particular in mind?
Trolling is just as tiring in the 2020s.
What would be the advantage of nuclear subs for Canada?
Surely the range of conventional ones is good enough for patrolling the Arctic?
https://www.dw.com/en/eu-unveils-indo-pacific-strategy-in-response-to-us-led-pact/a-59203426
QuoteEU unveils Indo-Pacific strategy in response to US-led pact
EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell has said the bloc was "not informed" about the "AUKUS" security pact in the Indo-Pacific and took it as a sign the EU needs to develop its own strategy for the region.
The European Union announced its own strategy to boost political and defense ties in the Indo-Pacific on Thursday.
It comes a day after the United States, UK and Australia unveiled a new tri-lateral defense pact for the region.
EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell said Thursday that Brussels had not been consulted on the pact, which has been dubbed "AUKUS."
"We regret not having been informed, not having been part of these talks," Borrell said as he presented the strategy.
"We must survive on our own, as others do," he added.
A particular sore spot of the pact is a new deal for the US to help Australia build a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines. That canceled a previous $40-billion (€34-billion) diesel submarine deal with France, which drew the ire of Paris.
"I understand the extent to which the French government must be disappointed," Borrell said.
What will the plan entail?
The EU plan also includes "exploring ways to ensure enhanced naval deployments by EU Member States to help protect the sea lines of communication and freedom of navigation," a statement said.
Other areas the plan intends to address include building cooperation with countries in the region on trade, health, data, infrastructure, and the environment.
The new strategy could also beef up the EU diplomatic profile on issues important to the region, and increase the military presence of EU countries in the Indo-Pacific.
This could also involve deploying EU personnel and security presence to assist on international missions, including sailing EU-flagged ships on patrols in the South China Sea.
European Council chief Charles Michel wrote on Twitter Thursday that the "The AUKUS security partnership further demonstrates the need for a common EU approach in a region of strategic interest."
Michel added that the Indo Pacific plan would be further discussed by EU heads of state at the leaders' summit in October.
Why is the Indo-Pacific important to the EU?
The Indo-Pacific is a region conceived as spanning India and China, Japan to Southeast Asia and past Australia into the Pacific.
The AUKUS alliance, and the EU announcement, come amid ongoing tensions between Western countries and China as Beijing increases the size of its navy and continues to build military outposts on man-made islands in the South China Sea.
Beijing claims most of the international waters in the sea as Chinese territory, which has caused concern over critical sea lanes that carry a sizeable portion of global trade each year.
"Given the importance of a meaningful European naval presence in the Indo-Pacific, the EU will explore ways to ensure enhanced naval deployments by its member states in the region," the statement said.
However, Borrell said Thursday that the EU plan was "one of cooperation, not confrontation" with China.
(https://external-preview.redd.it/N-My9pInQRZ1nqfI6EGQqJsG128y--eMr8ST1gvqRkE.jpg?width=640&height=904&crop=smart&auto=webp&s=a39c6c0c1c32c25da7c0a203abc326df9f0d21bc)
https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/peter-dutton/statements/inaugural-australia-france-22-ministerial-consultations
The French and Australian foreign and defence ministers met on August 30th and even specifically discussed the submarine topic, but it looks like the Australians did not say a word about this.
Sounds like big, but seemingly deliberate failure of Australian diplomacy. They reinforced their alliance with the US, but extremely pissed off France. The US can to a degree ignore the feelings of its allies as they are indispensable. Not sure if Australia is well served with pissing off their neighbour France. I guess their desired FTA with the EU is no longer on the agenda.
Quote from: Syt on September 18, 2021, 01:54:30 AM
https://www.dw.com/en/eu-unveils-indo-pacific-strategy-in-response-to-us-led-pact/a-59203426
QuoteEU unveils Indo-Pacific strategy in response to US-led pact
EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell has said the bloc was "not informed" about the "AUKUS" security pact in the Indo-Pacific and took it as a sign the EU needs to develop its own strategy for the region.
The European Union announced its own strategy to boost political and defense ties in the Indo-Pacific on Thursday.
It comes a day after the United States, UK and Australia unveiled a new tri-lateral defense pact for the region.
EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell said Thursday that Brussels had not been consulted on the pact, which has been dubbed "AUKUS."
"We regret not having been informed, not having been part of these talks," Borrell said as he presented the strategy.
"We must survive on our own, as others do," he added.
A particular sore spot of the pact is a new deal for the US to help Australia build a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines. That canceled a previous $40-billion (€34-billion) diesel submarine deal with France, which drew the ire of Paris.
"I understand the extent to which the French government must be disappointed," Borrell said.
What will the plan entail?
The EU plan also includes "exploring ways to ensure enhanced naval deployments by EU Member States to help protect the sea lines of communication and freedom of navigation," a statement said.
Other areas the plan intends to address include building cooperation with countries in the region on trade, health, data, infrastructure, and the environment.
The new strategy could also beef up the EU diplomatic profile on issues important to the region, and increase the military presence of EU countries in the Indo-Pacific.
This could also involve deploying EU personnel and security presence to assist on international missions, including sailing EU-flagged ships on patrols in the South China Sea.
European Council chief Charles Michel wrote on Twitter Thursday that the "The AUKUS security partnership further demonstrates the need for a common EU approach in a region of strategic interest."
Michel added that the Indo Pacific plan would be further discussed by EU heads of state at the leaders' summit in October.
Why is the Indo-Pacific important to the EU?
The Indo-Pacific is a region conceived as spanning India and China, Japan to Southeast Asia and past Australia into the Pacific.
The AUKUS alliance, and the EU announcement, come amid ongoing tensions between Western countries and China as Beijing increases the size of its navy and continues to build military outposts on man-made islands in the South China Sea.
Beijing claims most of the international waters in the sea as Chinese territory, which has caused concern over critical sea lanes that carry a sizeable portion of global trade each year.
"Given the importance of a meaningful European naval presence in the Indo-Pacific, the EU will explore ways to ensure enhanced naval deployments by its member states in the region," the statement said.
However, Borrell said Thursday that the EU plan was "one of cooperation, not confrontation" with China.
So there currently is no EU strategy? :unsure:
The strategy is sending the Baltic fleet to sort things out.
The EU does not even have a strategy for Europe - neither within the EU, nor with third countries like Britain, Switzerland or the West Balkans. Or Russia. Of course the EU has no viable Indo-Pacific strategy. In the end, EU foreign policy is ineffective because it is only in addition to national foreign policy and interests. Where all countries agree - and that's rare - it can amplify the power of the member states. Elsewhere it is fairly toothless.
The EU is fairly strong in some areas - trade, regulation, development, international institutions etc. - but not at all in others. Because its members want it that way or else they would pool their sovereignty.
Edit: I am also not convinced that putting much focus on the Indo-Pacific makes sense for the EU. I feel we should concentrate on our own neighborhood. There are plenty of things to solve with West Balkans, Maghreb/Sahel, Middle East/Iran, Turkey, Caucasus, Ukraine/Russia, Switzerland, United Kingdom. And of course "domestic" issues like rule of law in Hungary and Poland.
Quote from: Tyr on September 18, 2021, 01:53:02 AM
What would be the advantage of nuclear subs for Canada?
Surely the range of conventional ones is good enough for patrolling the Arctic?
It is not just range, as i understand it diesel-powered subs are still reliant on batteries when underwater, which limits them a lot. Meanwhile nuclear-powered subs can stay underwater indefinitely and also move very fast while underwater.
Quote from: Zanza on September 18, 2021, 02:14:14 AM
https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/peter-dutton/statements/inaugural-australia-france-22-ministerial-consultations
The French and Australian foreign and defence ministers met on August 30th and even specifically discussed the submarine topic, but it looks like the Australians did not say a word about this.
Sounds like big, but seemingly deliberate failure of Australian diplomacy. They reinforced their alliance with the US, but extremely pissed off France. The US can to a degree ignore the feelings of its allies as they are indispensable. Not sure if Australia is well served with pissing off their neighbour France. I guess their desired FTA with the EU is no longer on the agenda.
I don't really agree it was a failure, to be honest. If the decision has been made to go with American nuclear subs, there is actually not a good reason for giving France any real advance notice--it allows France to make threats for example, and to position it as "Australia had better not do this or else", which makes everything more difficult. What has France pissed is the decision which costs their defense industry $40bn and lots of ancillary work in downstream manufacturing etc, and undermines France's attempts at building its own Indo-Pacific sphere of influence. None of that is better because Australia gives France advanced notice--and based on France's overreaction towards the United States I'm not sure France wouldn't behave stupidly if given advance notice, threaten Australia in various ways and then be boxed into a corner where it has to follow through on those threats.
France is mad they lost the contracts, it's a red herring that somehow the notification timing is what has them angry.
Quote from: garbon on September 18, 2021, 02:58:25 AM
So there currently is no EU strategy? :unsure:
I think describing it as "in response to" is wrong. This was in the diary from the EU for a while - one criticism I've seen is that the AUKUS announcement should have been more sensitive to the EU about to announce its strategy and moved to avoid sort of clashing/overshadowing it.
QuoteThe EU does not even have a strategy for Europe - neither within the EU, nor with third countries like Britain, Switzerland or the West Balkans. Or Russia. Of course the EU has no viable Indo-Pacific strategy. In the end, EU foreign policy is ineffective because it is only in addition to national foreign policy and interests. Where all countries agree - and that's rare - it can amplify the power of the member states. Elsewhere it is fairly toothless.
I totally agree with your post - I'd add that I also think the Commission has taken, in my view, the wrong approach in building EU foreign policy credibility which I think actually just exposes their weakness in that area. I think since the High Representative role was created the approach has been that the way to show the EU's role is to get involved in the biggest issues (Iran is the biggest example) - in my view that probably just exposes the EU's weakness for all the other participants to see, because those are precisely the issues where the member states (especially the bigger ones) are most likely to be doing their own thing.
I think the EU's approach should be to start with its neighbourhood and become a credible actor by doing, then as its credibility grows it will become more involved in the big issues like the Iran deal or whatever. It wouldn't be easy - there are clearly splits between member states over policy with Turkey, Ukraine/Belarus/Russia and North Africa which might take a while to resolve - but if the EU could get common positions and strategy for, say the West Balkans and the Caucas first, so they are the main interlocutor with local bodies I think that would be a huge step forward in terms of building actual foreign policy capacity.
QuoteEdit: I am also not convinced that putting much focus on the Indo-Pacific makes sense for the EU. I feel we should concentrate on our own neighborhood. There are plenty of things to solve with West Balkans, Maghreb/Sahel, Middle East/Iran, Turkey, Caucasus, Ukraine/Russia, Switzerland, United Kingdom. And of course "domestic" issues like rule of law in Hungary and Poland.
France has been pushing for more engagement by European allies in the Indo-Pacific, so I think that was probably a big driver. France was the first European country to start talking and thinking about an Indo-Pacific tilt which I think is probably part of the reason they are so angered by this.
QuoteSounds like big, but seemingly deliberate failure of Australian diplomacy. They reinforced their alliance with the US, but extremely pissed off France. The US can to a degree ignore the feelings of its allies as they are indispensable. Not sure if Australia is well served with pissing off their neighbour France. I guess their desired FTA with the EU is no longer on the agenda.
I agree and I've got a lot of sympathy for the French position - the other side which I have a lot of sympathy for is the Australian and why they lacked/lost confidence in their deal with France because I don't think they took that step lightly.
The Australians were talking publicly about looking for contingency plans, Morrison says he told Macron in June that they had very big concerns about the subs and might need to move in Australia's national security interests. So I think the other failure is that France was interpreting Australian dissatisfaction as basically being standard big defence contract haggling, while Australia felt it was raising issues that were sort of existential to the program (basically they'd end up with subs that were later, less capable and more expensive than nuclear subs that, in their view, might not have a useful life beyond the 2030s).
And looking at French foreign policy figures, like Gerard Araud, talking about re-calibrating their policy to China and emphasising cooperation in response to losing a submarine contract and not being invited to a defence agreement might go some way to explaining why the Australians decided to make that change and why the French weren't included in the agreement. Obviously it's unlikely to happen because France has focused on building relations with India, Japan and, until now, Australia.
QuoteFrance is mad they lost the contracts, it's a red herring that somehow the notification timing is what has them angry.
I think it's bigger and deeper than that. I think there's probably personal stuff - from Macron being very warm at the G7 with Biden and doing a press conference on the Indo-Pacific where he talked about the importance of Franco-Australian meetings, when that was the summit where this was being hammered in trilaterals.
But also one point made by a French commentator is that there's been a generation of French foreign policy thinkers and policy makers who have basicaly spent their entire career trying to get France to work more and better with London and Washington and to move away from the Gaullist tradition (across all Presidencies in the last 15-20 years), who may now feel this as a sort of betrayal/failure of their professional life's work.
But surely they must recognise (though they won't admit it) that it was France's error in not letting Australia have nuclear subs?
If that's what Australia was after it should be expected the British or a sane American government could be open to negotiations there.
Quote from: Tyr on September 18, 2021, 08:41:42 AM
But surely they must recognise (though they won't admit it) that it was France's error in not letting Australia have nuclear subs?
If that's what Australia was after it should be expected the British or a sane American government could be open to negotiations there.
It isn't what Australia was after in 2016 when the French won their contract - my understanding is the French as a policy will not share nuclear propulsion technology with anyone, but they weren't asked.
This is what I find most important and striking about this. Either the proposed submarines were really sub-par, or the Australian asessment of the threat from China's naval build up has really shifted in the last five years to the point where they now feel they need nuclear subs. If it's the former - then that's really on the French and Australians not working together and it doesn't mean much - and my understanding is issues with this contract have been leading the nightly news in Australia for years because it's their biggest ever defence contract with lots of issues. But I think it's the latter because this deal is supported by Labor and going for nuclear subs in 2016 was a big issue - and that's concerning.
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 18, 2021, 08:38:20 AM
Quote from: garbon on September 18, 2021, 02:58:25 AM
So there currently is no EU strategy? :unsure:
I think describing it as "in response to" is wrong. This was in the diary from the EU for a while - one criticism I've seen is that the AUKUS announcement should have been more sensitive to the EU about to announce its strategy and moved to avoid sort of clashing/overshadowing it.
This is silly. Unlike the EU, the United States actually has security and defense policies and powers, that have meaningful real impacts. EU activities along these lines are largely little more than symbolic. The EU has no military and no strategic force projection capability. Its strategy in the Indo-Pacific isn't front page news, the United States is--and that's because the United States matters in matters military in the Pacific and frankly the EU does not. The EU's policies in the Pacific along diplomatic lines, are such minimal news compared to American strategic positioning that suggesting the US should have "made room" for the EU announcement is like the owner of the Brooklyn Cyclones Minor League team complaining that a press release he had planned about the introduction of a new polish sausage at his concessions was overshadowed by the New York Yankees announcing they'd signed a new pitcher to a $150m contract.
Quote
I think the EU's approach should be to start with its neighbourhood and become a credible actor by doing, then as its credibility grows it will become more involved in the big issues like the Iran deal or whatever. It wouldn't be easy - there are clearly splits between member states over policy with Turkey, Ukraine/Belarus/Russia and North Africa which might take a while to resolve - but if the EU could get common positions and strategy for, say the West Balkans and the Caucas first, so they are the main interlocutor with local bodies I think that would be a huge step forward in terms of building actual foreign policy capacity.
The U.S. is credible because it has hard power. The EU is not credible because it doesn't. Dealing with issues in Ukraine, North Africa, etc--ultimately will require more hard power than the EU has. The idea you can have anywhere comparable to U.S. influence by running a "Diplomatic Victory" strategy ala Civ 5, isn't reality in the real world. Mixtures of trade deals / arms deals / the occasional economic sanction etc don't translate to very much power.
France is arguably the only EU country that realizes this and maintains credible hard power of its own, but France isn't the EU.
Quote
France has been pushing for more engagement by European allies in the Indo-Pacific, so I think that was probably a big driver. France was the first European country to start talking and thinking about an Indo-Pacific tilt which I think is probably part of the reason they are so angered by this.
The U.S. has been significantly active, strategically, economically and diplomatically in the Pacific for over 100 years. The idea that France should be "angry" because of our strategic moves in the Pacific is kind of insane. We're an actual Pacific country, France is not in any serious sense. France is not entitled to American "deference" to its plans in the Pacific. Frankly if France wants to work with us in the Pacific they should hitch their wagon to our train--they will never seriously be an alternative to American power in the Pacific, nor should they want to be. Frankly their separate efforts are likely not a good use of resources compared to better synergies that could be attained with them working in concert with the U.S. in the region.
Quote
I think it's bigger and deeper than that. I think there's probably personal stuff - from Macron being very warm at the G7 with Biden and doing a press conference on the Indo-Pacific where he talked about the importance of Franco-Australian meetings, when that was the summit where this was being hammered in trilaterals.
But also one point made by a French commentator is that there's been a generation of French foreign policy thinkers and policy makers who have basicaly spent their entire career trying to get France to work more and better with London and Washington and to move away from the Gaullist tradition (across all Presidencies in the last 15-20 years), who may now feel this as a sort of betrayal/failure of their professional life's work.
I think it should generally be understood by the EU and its member states:
1. The United States operates in its own interests. Trumpism is the abandoning of alliances and multilateral institutions. Biden has reversed that. But Trump was not the first American President to act in American self-interest, nor will he be the last. The EU have made themselves less valuable allies over time, so they should expect less active consideration when America is pursuing strategies in its own interest. This is no different from the EU continuing to enmesh itself economically with Russia, sign trade deals with China etc. You can't expect a country like the United States to be less interested in its own affairs than EU countries are.
2. The United States power is largely based on a serious and long term project to build and maintain a powerful military. The EU seems to do a lot of talking these days about how to "replace" American influence or stand up without American. There is no answer to replacing what America does that doesn't include significant militarization. I'm not saying that's the path the EU should follow, but if it doesn't, it shouldn't expect to walk where we walk or how we walk. And it should be unsurprising when countries with more serious and immediate security concerns will consistently choose security relationships with us in preference to those with the EU and EU member states.
Quote from: OttoVonBismarck on September 18, 2021, 09:32:40 AM
The U.S. is credible because it has hard power. The EU is not credible because it doesn't. Dealing with issues in Ukraine, North Africa, etc--ultimately will require more hard power than the EU has. The idea you can have anywhere comparable to U.S. influence by running a "Diplomatic Victory" strategy ala Civ 5, isn't reality in the real world. Mixtures of trade deals / arms deals / the occasional economic sanction etc don't translate to very much power.
France is arguably the only EU country that realizes this and maintains credible hard power of its own, but France isn't the EU.
Yes but only to an extent I think - Italy and Greece play a role in the Med, similarly I think Poland and the Baltics in different ways and adjusted for their size are credible actors in Eastern Europe. I think one of the biggest mistakes in the French push for European strategic autonomy is the focus on Germany. I think Germany is always going to be reluctant on that and during the Merkel era Germany's foreign policy has basically been about creating coalitions for the status quo. If France wants European strategic autonomy - then I'd start with meetings in Rome, Athens, Warsaw and probably London if they're willing to go out of the EU framework - rather than Berlin.
Of course I think there's an open question of how much the French really want that. In the same as the US wants the EU to do more and have stronger defence capabilities - I don't know if it would trade that for an EU that acted independently and possibly not in line with what the US wants. I think France wants strategic autonomy, I query if they're willing to accept decisions made in Rome overriding France in what the French consider "their" regions/areas where they have interests.
But I think my point is actually that even before that stage the EU is not particularly credible in foreign policy within its neighbourhood that isn't framed around accession or trade negotiations - and I do think the EU has soft power in the region and could build credibility by using that and coordinating member states. But I think High Representatives have decided that, given the EU's economic and regulatory power - which is real - they should be involved in the Iran negotiations and having summits in Moscow, rather than slumming it and problem solving in Baku and Kyiv and Tunis. So I think there's a huge gap between goals and means - I think by focusing on where they can deliver results they'd increase their capacity and member state trust in the EU in this are would increase and it would become more involved in the bigger issues because it would have a proven track record.
QuoteThe U.S. has been significantly active, strategically, economically and diplomatically in the Pacific for over 100 years. The idea that France should be "angry" because of our strategic moves in the Pacific is kind of insane. We're an actual Pacific country, France is not in any serious sense. France is not entitled to American "deference" to its plans in the Pacific. Frankly if France wants to work with us in the Pacific they should hitch their wagon to our train--they will never seriously be an alternative to American power in the Pacific, nor should they want to be. Frankly their separate efforts are likely not a good use of resources compared to better synergies that could be attained with them working in concert with the U.S. in the region.
But France has been doing that. There is the often cited stats that France has around 1.5 million citizens (as does the EU) in the Pacific and 3/4s of France's maritime territory is in the Pacific. They have been working with the US, Australia, Japan, India and others. This has been something France has been working on for ten years.
The reason for the anger I think is that two of those partners France has been working with have done a deal that, in their view, cuts France out despite the last ten years of working with the Aussies and in concert with the US. This, in their view, undermines the last ten years of policy - and is by two allies. They weren't really acting separately from the US (except to the extent that we all were during the Trump years).
QuoteI think it should generally be understood by the EU and its member states:
1. The United States operates in its own interests. Trumpism is the abandoning of alliances and multilateral institutions. Biden has reversed that. But Trump was not the first American President to act in American self-interest, nor will he be the last. The EU have made themselves less valuable allies over time, so they should expect less active consideration when America is pursuing strategies in its own interest. This is no different from the EU continuing to enmesh itself economically with Russia, sign trade deals with China etc. You can't expect a country like the United States to be less interested in its own affairs than EU countries are.
2. The United States power is largely based on a serious and long term project to build and maintain a powerful military. The EU seems to do a lot of talking these days about how to "replace" American influence or stand up without American. There is no answer to replacing what America does that doesn't include significant militarization. I'm not saying that's the path the EU should follow, but if it doesn't, it shouldn't expect to walk where we walk or how we walk. And it should be unsurprising when countries with more serious and immediate security concerns will consistently choose security relationships with us in preference to those with the EU and EU member states.
I've not seen any talk about the EU "replacing" the US. There's been talk about "strategic autonomy" but that's slightly different.
I don't disagree - I think the key is actually that I think Biden's Afghanistan speech is really important. He said that the US would be focusing on great power competition, it would not be committing forces or resources except for the US's "vital interests" and I think we now see what the pivot to Asia means. From a European perspective I think that means reccognising that the interests of the EU/Western allies in Europe may be vital to them but we can no longer assume they are vital to the US. I also don't think the regions around Europe are anywhere near as important to Biden as has historically been the case, because it's clear the great power competition is in the Pacific.
I think that should raise serious questions across Europe of how to respond to that strategic re-alignment and shift of assessment of interests by the US, because I think the US is less reliable for Europe not because it's Trump but because it's re-assessed its strategy. I don't expect much, however.
Quote from: OttoVonBismarck on September 18, 2021, 09:32:40 AM
The U.S. is credible because it has hard power. The EU is not credible because it doesn't. Dealing with issues in Ukraine, North Africa, etc--ultimately will require more hard power than the EU has. The idea you can have anywhere comparable to U.S. influence by running a "Diplomatic Victory" strategy ala Civ 5, isn't reality in the real world. Mixtures of trade deals / arms deals / the occasional economic sanction etc don't translate to very much power.
France is arguably the only EU country that realizes this and maintains credible hard power of its own, but France isn't the EU.
The main weakness of the EU is not their lack of hard power. China for example does not use its hard power anywhere except arguably in the South China Sea and is yet supremely influential around the world these days.
The EU is weak because of its inherent internal divisons. As I mentioned, the members are sovereign with their own foreign policy and jealously guard that. Then you have very different foreign policy goals among the members: France is actually looking at hard power projection, but Germany is completely mercantilist and will rarely act against its economic interests, some countries consider themselves neutral and obviously Russia is seen rather differently in the Baltics and in Malta or Portugal...
I would go so far and argue that the main strength of the US is also not its hard power as Iraq and Afghanistan have shown the very real limits that hard power has even against third rate nations. US power comes from its control of the world financial system, being the biggest market in the world, having a broad network of alliances with similar minded countries etc. Hard power helps, but it's the soft power that makes the US so strong.
Quote from: OttoVonBismarck on September 18, 2021, 09:32:40 AM
1. The United States operates in its own interests. Trumpism is the abandoning of alliances and multilateral institutions. Biden has reversed that.
Biden is not sucking up to dictators like Trump and his tone is much nicer, but other than that, what meaningful difference has he made regarding international institutions and the rules-based order?
Quote from: OttoVonBismarck on September 18, 2021, 08:01:55 AM
France is mad they lost the contracts, it's a red herring that somehow the notification timing is what has them angry.
Not at all from what I read. The commercial-industrial side is not what annoys them greatly, it's the strategic/diplomacy side where they feel betrayed.
Quote from: Zanza on September 18, 2021, 10:03:21 AMThe main weakness of the EU is not their lack of hard power. China for example does not use its hard power anywhere except arguably in the South China Sea and is yet supremely influential around the world these days.
I'm not sure if China is yet supremely influential and I can't think of an area where it's policy has shaped things - possibly the Chinese response to the financial crisis.
I think it probably will in climate - I think that may be the first space we see true Chinese influence on a global level. Because we all have to do important things in our own countries to reduce emissions, but we are ultimately a sideshow compared to China. Even the US is far less significant - I think the "West" could have devised a climate strategy and helped roll it out around the world 10-15 years ago. Obviously we'd need China to be on-board with that. But now I think climate politics will at least run through, if not be designed by Beijing.
QuoteI would go so far and argue that the main strength of the US is also not its hard power as Iraq and Afghanistan have shown the very real limits that hard power has even against third rate nations. US power comes from its control of the world financial system, being the biggest market in the world, having a broad network of alliances with similar minded countries etc. Hard power helps, but it's the soft power that makes the US so strong.
I agree on the financial and monetary system being key to US power - to an extent that I think you could almost consider it a hard power. If the US decides to freeze you out, then that makes it very difficult to act within international monetary system which is still not solely, but relatively unipolar. And I think the moment that things started to shift in relation to China was the financial crisis in part because of Chinese, European and US actions in response to that. I think that is more key to where we are and emerging competition with China than Trump or the pivot to Asia or Biden or Xi.
But on alliances - the basis of those is US hard power and their military guarantee. NATO and Japan and Korea are not all in alliances with the US because we share the same values but because of the military power of the US. Those alliances are then a sort of multiplier of American power into other areas - so America assumes leadership (because of hard power) but it then has the soft power backing and strategic depth of the alliance network.
Quote from: Zanza on September 18, 2021, 10:10:54 AMBiden is not sucking up to dictators like Trump and his tone is much nicer, but other than that, what meaningful difference has he made regarding international institutions and the rules-based order?
I don't think American leaders/elites view international institutions and the "rules-based order" as something external to American leadership. I think this is probably an issue of perspective - from London or Berlin - the international order is something we participate in and benefit from. From DC or New York it is something America created and runs (through financial/monetary power, alliance networks etc).
There's those Larry Summmers questions from 2018:
"Can the US imagine a viable global economic system" in which it is no longer the dominant player? Could an American "political leader acknowledge that reality in a way that permits negotiation over what such a world would look like?... Can China be held down without inviting conflict?"
Based on the Biden administration I'm not convinced American leaders can envision a pluralist order in which America is not dominant - I'm not even sure they can even imagine that in the Pacific.
Edit: And of course this is an institutional framework - that's part of the purpose I imagine is to try and Trump-proof it a little bit. Interesting Rana Mitter piece in the Guardian which sort of mentions that actually there is a proliferation of new "minilateral" institutions being created - this, the Quad etc. But I think it is insane to think the Atlantic framework is going to necessarily be a model for another bit of the world, or central to the Indo-Pacific which is the more important region now.
Quote from: HVC on September 17, 2021, 06:51:06 PM
I don't get how it's screwing over Canada.
If you subscribe to the Globe there is are is an article and an opinion piece answering that question. They are behind a paywall which is why I reproduced just a small bit above. I will also reproduce that same portion below in response to Grumbler's post.
Quote from: grumbler on September 17, 2021, 06:29:16 PM
Quote from: crazy canuck on September 17, 2021, 06:16:27 PM
Quote from: grumbler on September 17, 2021, 06:14:11 PM
Quote from: crazy canuck on September 17, 2021, 05:49:10 PM
Quote from: Admiral Yi on September 17, 2021, 05:27:00 PM
Unless the French were lied to or cheated in some I don't see how the butthurt is warranted.
We are all supposed to be allies. It was reported today that Canada was not even told this was happening. France was not either. France had a deal in the works.
Either someone in the US State Department (or whatever department is supposed to be in charge of talking to allies) dropped the ball or the decision not to keep allies in the loop was a deliberate decision. The first is excusable - concerning but excusable. The second signals that the US is continuing down the path of basically saying fuck you to its allies.
The United States had no deal with France, and no obligation to inform France about every diplomatic or military initiative it is undertaking.
France can be mad at Australia for pulling out of the deal the two countries had, but hat probably doesn't have the same political rewards as blaming the US for the failure of the French themselves to maintain the contract. Of course, the nation at fault is as likely to be France as it is Australia, but in no way is the failure of the French to keep their contract the fault of the US. Being allies doesn't mean that contracts cannot be cancelled.
Thanks for confirming its a big Fuck You to US allies.
Thanks for confirming that your reaction is just emo.
From the Globe article mentioned above and edited to respond to Grumber.
He said he was I am surprised to hear
Mr. Trudeau Grumbles play down the pact as merely a submarine purchase deal. "I think it's misleading and concerning ... I would like to believe he was poorly
briefed by his staff informed,"
Mr. Norman said.The retired naval flag officer said that, if
Mr. Trudeau was fully briefed Grumbles does know the content of the deal "he doesn't understand what is going on internationally and he doesn't understand what the significance of an arrangement like this is as it relates to international security."
He said the agreement goes far beyond access to U.S. submarine technology.
"This is about accessing both current and emerging technologies, from cyber and artificial intelligence, to acoustics and underwater warfare – a whole range of very important strategic capabilities."
Quote from: Zanza on September 18, 2021, 10:03:21 AM
Quote from: OttoVonBismarck on September 18, 2021, 09:32:40 AM
The U.S. is credible because it has hard power. The EU is not credible because it doesn't. Dealing with issues in Ukraine, North Africa, etc--ultimately will require more hard power than the EU has. The idea you can have anywhere comparable to U.S. influence by running a "Diplomatic Victory" strategy ala Civ 5, isn't reality in the real world. Mixtures of trade deals / arms deals / the occasional economic sanction etc don't translate to very much power.
France is arguably the only EU country that realizes this and maintains credible hard power of its own, but France isn't the EU.
The main weakness of the EU is not their lack of hard power. China for example does not use its hard power anywhere except arguably in the South China Sea and is yet supremely influential around the world these days.
The EU is weak because of its inherent internal divisons. As I mentioned, the members are sovereign with their own foreign policy and jealously guard that. Then you have very different foreign policy goals among the members: France is actually looking at hard power projection, but Germany is completely mercantilist and will rarely act against its economic interests, some countries consider themselves neutral and obviously Russia is seen rather differently in the Baltics and in Malta or Portugal...
I would go so far and argue that the main strength of the US is also not its hard power as Iraq and Afghanistan have shown the very real limits that hard power has even against third rate nations. US power comes from its control of the world financial system, being the biggest market in the world, having a broad network of alliances with similar minded countries etc. Hard power helps, but it's the soft power that makes the US so strong.
Agreed. The main risk the US faces is that it is behaving as if Otto's view of the world is accurate.
Quote from: crazy canuck on September 18, 2021, 10:58:52 AM
Quote from: grumbler on September 17, 2021, 06:29:16 PM
Quote from: crazy canuck on September 17, 2021, 06:16:27 PM
Thanks for confirming its a big Fuck You to US allies.
Thanks for confirming that your reaction is just emo.
From the Globe article mentioned above and edited to respond to Grumber.
He said he was I am surprised to hear Mr. Trudeau Grumbles play down the pact as merely a submarine purchase deal. "I think it's misleading and concerning ... I would like to believe he was poorly briefed by his staff informed," Mr. Norman said.
The retired naval flag officer said that, if Mr. Trudeau was fully briefed Grumbles does know the content of the deal "he doesn't understand what is going on internationally and he doesn't understand what the significance of an arrangement like this is as it relates to international security."
He said the agreement goes far beyond access to U.S. submarine technology.
"This is about accessing both current and emerging technologies, from cyber and artificial intelligence, to acoustics and underwater warfare – a whole range of very important strategic capabilities."
:lmfao: First Rule of Holes, my friend. The best response to the observation that you are being emo is not, as here, to double down on the emo.
Canadian national security is exactly the same today as it was before the Aukus agreement was made. The butthurt is different, but, since you are The Boy Who Cried Butthurt, we no longer take you seriously.
Canada's access to "both current and emerging technologies, from cyber and artificial intelligence, to acoustics and underwater warfare – a whole range of very important strategic capabilities" is not even mentioned in the Aukus agreement, let alone been damaged by it.
Just to pick up on the ambassador point an Italian Professor of War Studies at KCL has pointed this isn't without precedent with allies under Macron. At different points France has recalled their ambassadors to Italy, Turkey and now Australia and the US. I don't think France did it under recent previous presidents I can think of but seems to be a thing with Macron.
Quote from: grumbler on September 18, 2021, 11:15:19 AM
Canada's access to "both current and emerging technologies, from cyber and artificial intelligence, to acoustics and underwater warfare – a whole range of very important strategic capabilities" is not even mentioned in the Aukus agreement, let alone been damaged by it.
Thanks but I prefer to accept the judgment of a retired Canadian rear admiral who has more knowledge in this particular area than you likely have.
As is typically the case, crazy canuck has very little of any value to say, and just defaults to idiotic anti-americanism, he's been playing this schtick for many years.
I do however think you guys are just seriously underestimating the important of American hard power, and it's also frankly difficult to separate our control of the global financial system and a number of other systems from that hard power. Institutions that we have a lot of influence over (like the UNSC) or even outright control over, were largely setup in an era when the vast majority of the world's economic activity was operating under the literal aegis of American military protection. Japan + Western Europe was a huge % of the overall global GDP in the 50s/60s/70s before the rise of continental East Asian economies began apace, not to mention India + Brazil were also economic backwaters in that era.
The United States has been an essential economic partner since WWII due to having the largest economy in the world basically the entire time until very recently (and even that gets into which formula for GDP you use when comparing to China), but it is highly unlikely that so many of the world's wealthy economies would have basically submitted to the level of control we have over the current financial and economic system had we not been the most powerful country on earth after WWII that was providing direct and massive, security guarantees to those countries--not to mention early on we were funneling huge amounts of money into rebuilding those countries from damage suffered in WWII.
America didn't become what it is today through something like the "Belt and Road Initiative" nor do I think it could have. We didn't trade and diplomacy our way to being the world's superpower. I'll note before someone stupid attempts to make the argument--this is not me saying our economic activities and diplomatic activities the last 70 years had nothing to do with it--they absolutely did. You could argue they are three legs of a tripod, you can't establish the sort of American-centric system we have without each of the three legs, but I'd argue even that they aren't three "equal" legs. Neither configuration of two could stand stable on their own, but arguably the military element is what produced the conditions that the other two could even be leveraged to the degree they have been.
FWIW, I made it clear I don't think a massive hard power build up by every wealthy country is ideal or even their best path forward. I'm simply saying if you really don't think hard power was essential to American supremacy I think you're bonkers.
Quote from: OttoVonBismarck on September 18, 2021, 12:00:42 PM
As is typically the case, crazy canuck has very little of any value to say, and just defaults to idiotic anti-americanism, he's been playing this schtick for many years.
sorry to have bruised your sensitive ego.
I think I understand your perspective, but I disagree. I still remain convinced that the Greenback, not the GI is the biggest source of American power. I think American military power is just a reflection of its economic might. And that it is this economic might that has won WWII and shaped the postwar order to this day.
Quote from: crazy canuck on September 18, 2021, 11:49:53 AM
Thanks but I prefer to accept the judgment of a retired Canadian rear admiral who has more knowledge in this particular area than you likely have.
Ah, the appeal to authority fallacy. Haven't seen that one from you in several days. It's good that you rotate through your fallacious statements so frequently and thoroughly. It keeps us amused.
Quote from: Zanza on September 18, 2021, 12:23:12 PM
I think I understand your perspective, but I disagree. I still remain convinced that the Greenback, not the GI is the biggest source of American power. I think American military power is just a reflection of its economic might. And that it is this economic might that has won WWII and shaped the postwar order to this day.
Germany and Japan didn't get trade dealed and "strategic agreemented" to death. They got beat by guys with guns willing to use them and die using them. There's a big difference between economic power and the willingness to convert it into, and to then use, military power.
There's also frankly a reason Russia hits above the weight of any European power, or even the EU, in most matters of force projection--because they maintain a sizable military. There's a reason that China is actively working hard to convert its massive economic power into having a first tier military. It's simply obvious some things cannot be achieved through diplomacy and trade deals.
Quote from: Zanza on September 18, 2021, 02:14:14 AM
Sounds like big, but seemingly deliberate failure of Australian diplomacy. They reinforced their alliance with the US, but extremely pissed off France. The US can to a degree ignore the feelings of its allies as they are indispensable. Not sure if Australia is well served with pissing off their neighbour France.
I have some geographical questions based off of this characterization.
Quote from: ulmont on September 18, 2021, 02:48:40 PM
Quote from: Zanza on September 18, 2021, 02:14:14 AM
Sounds like big, but seemingly deliberate failure of Australian diplomacy. They reinforced their alliance with the US, but extremely pissed off France. The US can to a degree ignore the feelings of its allies as they are indispensable. Not sure if Australia is well served with pissing off their neighbour France.
I have some geographical questions based off of this characterization.
They're bordering in Antarctica :P
(https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/proxy/6hi2ix4Ya7xjJUDFCL0ya3Ws-88J2Ll0NOLEg8Ux6OuVKEhEX7RRGX3wlyc4hrc136l9RlyTTcLjLpK23jNnwX1ooGKQr0KDF2y6TvZLgaJXHCP_o4kmyAqqLnPZxuAlp1u7yfTl7TrLrhUtfRCTAhGa6NNWKMFhvGeIPYItV1pleXUMeKAu2VTuN4U)
(And France has some Pacific territories.)
Also, isn't France's longest land border with Brazil?
Quote from: ulmont on September 18, 2021, 02:48:40 PM
Quote from: Zanza on September 18, 2021, 02:14:14 AM
Sounds like big, but seemingly deliberate failure of Australian diplomacy. They reinforced their alliance with the US, but extremely pissed off France. The US can to a degree ignore the feelings of its allies as they are indispensable. Not sure if Australia is well served with pissing off their neighbour France.
I have some geographical questions based off of this characterization.
Neighbors across the Coral Sea.
(https://languish.org/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.axl.cefan.ulaval.ca%2Fpacifique%2Fimages%2Fncal-carte-PS.gif&hash=799611cadeb97f983fab0cc3b40357b7723dbc60)
Quote from: Zanza on September 18, 2021, 02:58:55 PM
Neighbors across the Coral Sea.
(https://languish.org/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.axl.cefan.ulaval.ca%2Fpacifique%2Fimages%2Fncal-carte-PS.gif&hash=799611cadeb97f983fab0cc3b40357b7723dbc60)
Huh. I had no idea that New Caledonia was still a colony of France. It has to be in a much better position for independence than 90% of the post-WW2-independent Pacific nations.
They voted against independence twice in the last four years.
Quote from: Syt on September 18, 2021, 02:52:11 PM
(And France has some Pacific territories.)
I suspected the Pacific territories - which I'm sure have the same salience in the minds of metropolitans as Paris - would be the answer. But c'mon, man.
Quote from: Zanza on September 18, 2021, 02:58:55 PM
Neighbors across the Coral Sea.
Yes, when I think "neighbor", I too think of them being "2000km* across the ocean."
*Approximate Sydney.
Quote from: Syt on September 18, 2021, 02:52:11 PM
Also, isn't France's longest land border with Brazil?
Yes re: France's longest land border being with Brazil. Neither of which are near Australia, I hasten to note.
Quote from: ulmont on September 18, 2021, 03:06:34 PM
Quote from: Zanza on September 18, 2021, 02:58:55 PM
Neighbors across the Coral Sea.
Yes, when I think "neighbor", I too think of them being "2000km* across the ocean."
*Approximate Sydney.
New Zealand and Australia are typically considered neighbours, no? Auckland is further away from Sydney than Noumea is.
The fact that India has reacted very positively to the announcement of AUKUS in my opinion is pretty good news; India is the essential partner in Asia to countering China. India takes this as the Anglosphere committing itself more fully to working against Chinese negative behavior in the region.
There are likely to be long term beneficial economies of scale for Australia being able to lean on the United States for these systems, and greater interoperability between the operations of Australian and American fleets will be a benefit. I'm still a little curious to see the nature of nuclear propulsion cooperation with the British--will this mean increased cooperation in future reactor systems or more of the "arms-length" collaboration we've always had. The Rolls-Royce reactors currently powering the British nuclear submarines are primarily British design and entirely British made, albeit they did get design help from General Dynamics under the existing nuclear information sharing treaties between the US/UK; my understanding is if the British move to the newer Rolls-Royce PWR3 reactors they'll be operating a design much more American influenced, that is likely to have much lower maintenance costs over their lifetime.
Frankly I think it's a good thing if AUKUS leads to even more material collaboration in nuclear propulsion systems between the US/UK; at the end of the day for close allies working to a common purpose, it is in the interests of the United States for the UK and Australia to be able to field nuclear submarines cheaper and more efficiently, as smaller countries the whole alliance essentially can field more firepower by sharing in US economies of scale.
The announcement has been quite vague on what exactly is meant by greater cooperation on "AI, cyber and quantum computing", but I'll note that cooperation on those things is not necessarily linked with nuclear cooperation. We could easily create a separate framework between the US / Japan / UK / Canada / Australia that would bring those other countries on board for the cooperation in those fields but not in nuclear--Canada has flirted with nuclear submarines a few times since the 80s, but frankly I don't see much future along those lines, and Japan has understandable aversion to any militarized nuclear technology, but would be a major contributor in cooperation in those other areas.
Quote from: Zanza on September 18, 2021, 03:04:39 PM
They voted against independence twice in the last four years.
I'm not saying that they should be independent, especially against their will. I am just saying that I am surprised that they are not independent.
Quote from: OttoVonBismarck on September 18, 2021, 02:47:22 PM
There's also frankly a reason Russia hits above the weight of any European power, or even the EU, in most matters of force projection--because they maintain a sizable military. There's a reason that China is actively working hard to convert its massive economic power into having a first tier military. It's simply obvious some things cannot be achieved through diplomacy and trade deals.
I think what has happened with the US is that we go so damn good at "hard power" that
1. People forget it's there. It is so dominant, that the idea of trying to contend with it has been largely abandoned. There is no modern equivalent of the London Naval Treaty for example, because there aren't any countries that would even contemplate the idea of trying to build a navy that is even 50% the power of the USN, and hence no need for a treaty. Instead, US dominance in traditional hard power nation comparisons is just a given, and ironically, that is just not even seen as a sphere of contention anymore. The USSR tried for a while, but failed.
2. The US tends to forget that all the hard power in the world doesn't actually accomplish a lot of things. Sure, you can destroy Japan and Germany, and contain the USSR. But you can't force Vietnam to be Western, and it won't help you build a nation in the western sense no matter how many bombs you drop on them.
3. The ROTW wants to pretend that hard power doesn't matter anymore - that something has changed outside of the US just being dominant that means that somehow it just doesn't really matter. And to the extent that something HAS changed, they are right, just not in the way they think. The thing that changed is that the US just did it better then everyone else (and yes, our economy drove that, but also innovation and technology). But they are wrong in the idea that many seem to really, really, really want to believe is that something ELSE changed that makes hard power just not really relevant anymore, and hence they can look at the US as just a big ogre stomping around that doesn't realize none of that matters anymore.
The EU is, IMO, just the crystallization of this idea that the world is beyond violence, and everything can just be handled by diplomacy or trade talks or a well timed sanction - at worst, maybe an occasional drone strike. The reality is that we still live in a world that has shitty actors, willing to use their own hard power to get what they want. Russia and China both are in fact constrained by US military dominance. The fact that they are constrained is taken as evidence that no such constraint is actually needed, sadly enough.
There is nothing stopping France or the EU from becoming a relevant player in global force projection. They have the economy, technology, and infrastructure to do so if they wish. It is just a question of the will to do it. But it is incredibly expensive.
Quote from: Zanza on September 18, 2021, 12:23:12 PM
I think I understand your perspective, but I disagree. I still remain convinced that the Greenback, not the GI is the biggest source of American power. I think American military power is just a reflection of its economic might. And that it is this economic might that has won WWII and shaped the postwar order to this day.
I think it's very difficult to untangle. The financial/monetary system was devised by the Americans in opposition to the Soviet alternative because they were the two big powers left standing at the end of WW2. They won WW2 because of their ability to leverage immensive economic powers of production. But using that for hard power was (for the US) really its military and political influence catching up with its economic heft since the end of WW1. And it keeps going back (the Soviet Union is the more interesting less obviously explicable case I think).
I think the ultimate point is that in general economic power has normally equated to hard power because it has an impact on the forces you can maintain and the influence you can have/push overseas. Part of what's happening now is America is trying I think to stop that equation for China as China becomes more and more economically powerful - I don't know if that'll be successful or is necessarily wise.
It doesn't necessarily equate directly - Germany for historical reasons does not have that equation, but I think the UK, France and maybe Italy do and are roughly where you'd expect them to be. Other countries like Turkey, Russia, Greece seem to have outsized force (that they're all to some extent or other willing to use) compared to their economy.
I think the monetary system is slightly different and I don't really understand how the monetary policy makers (where there's a clear global hierarchy) interacts with other forms of power.
And I was thinking about this - and no doubt there are millions of IR books on this already, but I feel like hard/soft is not necessarily the most useful distinction especially given the almost hard power effects of being frozen out of the global financial system (which is largely in the power of the US). Perhaps coercive/attractive power is a better framing?
QuoteThe EU is, IMO, just the crystallization of this idea that the world is beyond violence, and everything can just be handled by diplomacy or trade talks or a well timed sanction - at worst, maybe an occasional drone strike. The reality is that we still live in a world that has shitty actors, willing to use their own hard power to get what they want. Russia and China both are in fact constrained by US military dominance. The fact that they are constrained is taken as evidence that no such constraint is actually needed, sadly enough.
I think just to go back to Zanza's point - I think the EU is an economic, trade and regulatory superpower and can get disappointed that it doesn't translate into other forms of power or influence, but member states (crucially Germany) aren't willing and don't want to take the steps to do that. Even now the talk of autonomous European defence policy is still focused - as it was 15 years ago - on the idea of a "rapid reaction forces", which is basically something that might help with a crisis in the Balkans. I'm not sure that's the nature of the issues Europe is facing or what it needs.
In a way I thnk that Europeans are the only people in the world who think there is such a thing as an international rules based order. It is neither international, nor rules based. I think if you asked China, Russia, any country in the global south they would laugh at that idea - and I think American leaders when they're being honest (as in the Larry Summers questions) would also acknowledge it is an American led order and while there are rules in general and principle there is also a rule of exception when necessary for America. You know it was the American order during the Cold War and it then became international in the end of history.
As I say I think part of the key challenge right now is China is large enough economically, and building up its hard power too, to not just take a subordinate position in an American based order - so can America accept/re-shape its order to deal with pluralism at the top or is it going to be a competition of an American based order v China's version of an "international rules based order".
Quote from: Syt on September 18, 2021, 02:52:11 PM(And France has some Pacific territories.)
Yeah - I've seen French people point out that they have 1.5 million citizens in the Indo-Pacific and three quarters of French territorial waters are in the Pacific so it is the most Pacific European power, which is true.
I still find it kind of weird that Europeans are confused with how colonial British overseas territories (where the UK is only responsible for defence and foreign policy and they're not part of our domestic politics are) while accepting that the EU has a border with Brazil and territorial waters from Africa to Tahiti because of French territories :lol:
Edit: Incidentally I absolutely love the French comments on why they didn't recall their ambassador to London and the UK position:
QuoteMacron did not recall the UK ambassador, apparently, according to sources close to the Elysee, "for the same reason that when the cooking in a restaurant is not first class, you sack the chef, not the guy who washes the dishes."
From Le Drian:
Quote"No need to call back our ambassador in the UK. We are familiar with Britain's permanent opportunism - and in this case they're the "spare wheel on the carriage"
From Clement Beaune:
QuoteFrance didn't pull its ambassador to London despite the UK's role in the sub deal, but they're not off the hook: "[Britain] is hiding in the American bosom," said France's minister for European affairs. "This is a return to the American fold and a form of accepted vassalization."
I'm very glad the Skybolt crisis didn't happen during 24 rolling news and Twitter :ph34r: But also I think these points would have more weight when this was first announced as it has subsequently seemed like the UK was actually more involved (Australia came to the UK with the request, the UK helped work out the deal with the US - it sounds like it'll be UK nuclear tech that's being transferred with US support etc). It's all very high Gaullist at the minute - which, personally, I generally approve of.
As Sam Freedman put it - the Macron line especially is the most magnificently high-handed insult since de Gaulle said of Churchill that "I get angry when I'm right. He gets angry when he's wrong. We are angry with each other a lot of the time."
Gotta hand it to them, the French do know how to hilariously insult people
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 18, 2021, 07:01:29 PM
The financial/monetary system was devised by the Americans in opposition to the Soviet alternative because they were the two big powers left standing at the end of WW2.
The Bretton Woods architecture was devised in collaboration with the UK.
Quote from: Admiral Yi on September 18, 2021, 07:21:18 PM
The Bretton Woods architecture was devised in collaboration with the UK.
Which was very kind of you and no doubt Keynes did some good work - but if it relied in any substantial way on the British economy we'd probably all still be on rations :P I mean how many Sterling and balance of payments crises did we have in the Bretton Woods era - I want to say 5 off the top of my head.
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 18, 2021, 07:01:29 PM
In a way I thnk that Europeans are the only people in the world who think there is such a thing as an international rules based order. It is neither international, nor rules based.
Ironically, I actually think there IS an international, rules based order.
It is just only honored among western liberal nations. The post-WW2 era of peace between the western nations is kind of amazing, if you know any history at all.
It is only NOT amazing because it is just so taken for granted now.
The problem is that the rest of the world doesn't appear to be interested, or rather, significant parts don't appear to be interested. A lot of parts ARE interested, which is great.
But Russia seems to have rejected it out of hand, and China pretty clearly thinks they have a better way. At least better for them anyway.
Yeah I suppose my view is that the US didn't become so great at hard power, but built an order around, in support of and supported/defended by American power.
It was clear this wasn't a neutral objective international rules based order in the Cold War - I think we fooled ourselves that it was during the end of history and we're now possibly going to return to confronting the fact it's not. I think as America moves more into a confrontational against China it will become even clearer especially to Europeans (I think particularly Germany) who are still I think a little end of history - that the order they participate is not neutral and value free, but ultimately an American order.
And I think in terms of China - you know, I think there's areas we'll need to work together, there's areas where there'll be natural competition, there's areas we should protect and we should absolutely have red lines and support regional allies. But I mean you say they think they have an idea for a better way - given the bipartisan views on China and the view from the Pentagon - what would China need to do to prove it could join the international rules based order? What would be sufficient?
Edit: Incidentally on the French reaction to the UK - there was a bit of me that found it weirdly appropriate that while a "Jupiterian" leader in Paris was making these comments and clearly frustrated that the Dutch PM was on a visit to London :ph34r: :lol:
I don't know, its an interesting question.
Basically, the success of the post WW2 international rules based order at avoiding violent confict has been pretty much entirely limited to western liberalism. Is that correlation or causation?
Can an authoritarian, populist, ultra-nationalistic nation that thinks genocide is a pretty reasonable tool of statecraft fit into that liberal world order that eschews the use of force to resolve disputes between themselves?
It doesn't feel like it would. I don't think they've evidenced anything that suggests that is something they even contemplate, much less are capable of.
The biggest thing China would need would be to abandon the idea that anywhere a Chinese person ever lived is part of "Greater China", a lot of the other stuff can be somewhat reconciled with the liberal world order. Russia has essentially the same problem--just because Tsar or Stalin once ruled over it, doesn't meant it is part of Russia.
Much of the heart of the order we built after WWII was to dissuade and act against wars of territorial expansionism, since such wars had lead directly to the greatest conflagration in human history. By tacitly rejecting that, both Russia and China are forever outside unless they abandon that.
Like as self-interested as Germany or America might be, I can't imagine either going to war to annex land, now or anytime in our lifetimes. That's a very important core difference between us and the Chinese/Russians.
I don't actually think either of them care about that, really.
It is just an excuse to grab some more territory, really.
Quote from: Berkut on September 18, 2021, 09:04:33 PM
I don't actually think either of them care about that, really.
It is just an excuse to grab some more territory, really.
I don't really know what you mean, much of China and Russia's behavior the last 20 years has specifically been around creating scenarios where they can either acquire territory or bring it under their "dominion." And the idea that "just grabbing territory" is some little thing is insane. That's literally what lead to WWII. You have heard about that, right? The shit about China being mean authoritarians has little to do with the international order, and frankly doesn't matter. Lots of authoritarian countries are part of the accepted world order and play by the post-WWII rules. One has nothing to do with the other. The post-WWII order was not about everyone being a liberal democracy. That may have been the goal of some areas of foreign policy in some contexts, but was not the heart of the system.
Quote from: grumbler on September 18, 2021, 12:41:54 PM
Quote from: crazy canuck on September 18, 2021, 11:49:53 AM
Thanks but I prefer to accept the judgment of a retired Canadian rear admiral who has more knowledge in this particular area than you likely have.
Ah, the appeal to authority fallacy. Haven't seen that one from you in several days. It's good that you rotate through your fallacious statements so frequently and thoroughly. It keeps us amused.
Interesting he chooses a retired sailor over his country's prime minister in determining a diplomatic slight has occurred.
Both countries also have ultra-nationalist governments that use territorial grievances to both stay in power and keep their people in a state of frenzy over territory that doesn't belong to them, that is the core serious area of conflict we could face with Russia or China in the 21st century. The rest of our disputes with them fall into the category of "not that big of a deal."
And maybe I shouldn't leave it unstated--the reason territorial expansionism is so scary is because eventually it might involve territory a great power isn't willing to allow Russia or China to take, to the point of being willing to fight a full scale war over it. The more territorial annexations and encroachments we allow from Russia/China, the more we run the risk of just this scenario happening.
Quote from: Berkut on September 18, 2021, 08:59:49 PM
Basically, the success of the post WW2 international rules based order at avoiding violent confict has been pretty much entirely limited to western liberalism. Is that correlation or causation.
Can an authoritarian, populist, ultra-nationalistic nation that thinks genocide is a pretty reasonable tool of statecraft fit into that liberal world order that eschews the use of force to resolve disputes between themselves?
It doesn't feel like it would. I don't think they've evidenced anything that suggests that is something they even contemplate, much less are capable of.
Has it though? Doesn't the international rules based order include Brazil, for example, or Gulf countries or most Latin American countries that have not always had liberal governments, or for that matter Suharto's Indonesia? I think the same goes for many African states - historically both apartheid South Africa was part of that order as was Mobutu's Zaire.
I think it's possible that perhaps it has transformed from when it was a Cold War order and now you need to be a liberal state, but I don't know how true that is and there are some massive edge cases of whether it's a liberal state - such as Modi's India - plus the Gulf (or part of the order).
This is part of the reason why I'm not convinced there is an external sort of politically neutral legalist international rules based order - I think it reflects (as it did in the Cold War) American power and American hard power in particular.
QuoteMuch of the heart of the order we built after WWII was to dissuade and act against wars of territorial expansionism, since such wars had lead directly to the greatest conflagration in human history. By tacitly rejecting that, both Russia and China are forever outside unless they abandon that.
That's a fair point - although China isn't sending "little green men" to occupy territory of its neighbours.
I suppose the point I'm trying to think about is that as you say there are lots of other very unpleasant authoritarian regimes in the rules based order. There's also lots of behaviour from China that is really bad - espionage, repression, sparring with India over their frontier, sparring with foreign fishing fleets over their maritime frontier - but is stuff that has been tolerated by other states within the international order, and frankly, is stuff big, confident countries do.
So I'm wondering what the red-lines are and why - I think Xinjiang is possibly one, I think your point on territorial claims (basically Taiwan) is another. I think perhaps more important than the claims themsleves is China's military build up that could help realise those claims. Basically what amount is just a challenge of can this order accommodate another large, assertive nation staking a leadership claim and what extent it's specific to this China (and is that PRC, or just Xi I suppose)?
Quote from: OttoVonBismarck on September 18, 2021, 09:08:42 PM
Quote from: Berkut on September 18, 2021, 09:04:33 PM
I don't actually think either of them care about that, really.
It is just an excuse to grab some more territory, really.
I don't really know what you mean, much of China and Russia's behavior the last 20 years has specifically been around creating scenarios where they can either acquire territory or bring it under their "dominion." And the idea that "just grabbing territory" is some little thing is insane. That's literally what lead to WWII. You have heard about that, right? The shit about China being mean authoritarians has little to do with the international order, and frankly doesn't matter. Lots of authoritarian countries are part of the accepted world order and play by the post-WWII rules. One has nothing to do with the other. The post-WWII order was not about everyone being a liberal democracy. That may have been the goal of some areas of foreign policy in some contexts, but was not the heart of the system.
I was referencing your pre-edit post where you mentioned them wanting to think any place there was ever someone Chinese needs to be part of China, and the same with Russia.
I think that is just an excuse - they want to grab territory, and that is just the fig leaf to justify it.
And I think that is a very, very big deal. Like you said, it's what triggered most of the really violent wars.
I don't quite agree w/that either. Putin is a true believer in shit like the glory of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, he genuinely thinks it's a terrible thing the central Asian-stans, and the Eastern European Republics broke away.
China I think is absolutely engaged in some stupid shit around things like small parts of India and the fake islands in the South China sea--I don't think they have any serious ideological investment in those, they just have desires. But Taiwan I think is a genuine nationalist red line for China--largely because China has made it so, they have fed their populace nationalist rhetoric on Taiwan for 70 years and there is no scenario in any kind of near term future where any Chinese leader I can imagine could back down from that. That being said in the grand scheme of things China's direct territorial ambitions are probably more limited than Russia's, but China's capacity to some day use force to achieve them is likely much higher than Russia's. Russia for example likely couldn't absorb any of the large Soviet Republics that broke away via force--they could certainly beat those countries in wars but wars vs occupations are very different things. Russia could easily defeat and subjugate the small Baltic Republics, which is a little scary because that would very likely lead to full scale war between NATO and Russia that likely would not be settled any way other than definitively--fwiw I don't think it'd go nuclear, but it'd be very, very bad. The worst war since WW2, easily.
Also not for nothing but one of my biggest criticisms of Obama was how little he did about annexation of Crimea. I think we should have pushed that to the point of war--not to war itself, but been willing to suggest that we'd go to war over it. Basically Cuban Missile Crisis level of stand down. Why? Because Crimea was a deliberate, actual annexation of territory by Russia, using force. It's a red line that had not really been meaningfully crossed by a country since Saddam in Kuwait, and not standing up for it was in a sense conceding we aren't willing to redline territorial annexations.
I'll note that a lot of the "proxy wars" that have been going on for ages are in a sense a reflection of that power of that world order--proxy wars represent a country not willing to openly violate the order. But when you cross into real annexation you've crossed that final line.
It's not that Crimea is worth war with Russia, it's that it's worth risking war with Russia to signal to Russia we will go to war over territorial aggression. I fear a scenario where Putin seeks to test us in the Baltics, because I think he'd be making the classic WWII mistake the Axis Powers made--they confused earlier concessions with a complete unwillingness to fight, but I genuinely think we would go to full scale war over the NATO member states in the Baltic, basically we would be at war until they were liberated or Russia had defeated our armies, and I think through that scenario and it's not a pretty situation.
I don't think it's all that likely, but like, if I rank various catastrophes like: major asteroid strike, the Yellowstone supervolcano erupting--I could see a general war between us and Russia over the Baltics happening before those scenarios.
The Guardian has decided to go all Appeasement-like on this alliance. "Global Britain went rogue" and all that kinds of nonesense
Quote from: Tamas on September 19, 2021, 03:04:37 AM
The Guardian has decided to go all Appeasement-like on this alliance. "Global Britain went rogue" and all that kinds of nonesense
Of course - it's the Guardian :wub: :lol:
I'm slightly more worried by the BBC's framing - and I'm not a BBC-basher - which is very much around China's hypothetical response and not provoking China, but has very little context on, for example, non-Chinese Asian states' views which are not uniformally positive.
Quote from: OttoVonBismarck on September 18, 2021, 09:57:25 PM
I don't quite agree w/that either. Putin is a true believer in shit like the glory of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, he genuinely thinks it's a terrible thing the central Asian-stans, and the Eastern European Republics broke away.
China I think is absolutely engaged in some stupid shit around things like small parts of India and the fake islands in the South China sea--I don't think they have any serious ideological investment in those, they just have desires. But Taiwan I think is a genuine nationalist red line for China--largely because China has made it so, they have fed their populace nationalist rhetoric on Taiwan for 70 years and there is no scenario in any kind of near term future where any Chinese leader I can imagine could back down from that. That being said in the grand scheme of things China's direct territorial ambitions are probably more limited than Russia's, but China's capacity to some day use force to achieve them is likely much higher than Russia's. Russia for example likely couldn't absorb any of the large Soviet Republics that broke away via force--they could certainly beat those countries in wars but wars vs occupations are very different things. Russia could easily defeat and subjugate the small Baltic Republics, which is a little scary because that would very likely lead to full scale war between NATO and Russia that likely would not be settled any way other than definitively--fwiw I don't think it'd go nuclear, but it'd be very, very bad. The worst war since WW2, easily.
I think it's probably both genuine idealist belief and opportunism - because I think all politics is probably a combination of both of those.
I agree I don't think China is as bad in terms of revanchism as current Russian leadership is, and I think only Taiwan is truly ideological/central for China. I think the Spratley's and clashes with India in the Himalaya are broadly stuff I'd put in the category of big, assertive, confident, slightly dick swinging country. I don't think that side of things is particularly unique to China or some existential threat to the global order - on a smaller scale a lot of Spratley's/maritime border stuff reminds me of the mess in the Eastern Med between Greece, Turkey, both Cypruses, Lebanon and Israel - it's a similarly congested area with a lot of economic potential.
Edit: And apparently Macron's cancelled a meeting with the Swiss because they've decided to buy American fighter jets. Starting to think that France is a defence industry with a state attched :blink:
FWIW a lot of reporting I'm seeing from Asia seems to find AUKUS a rational response to "poor Chinese diplomacy" toward Australia, and several years of Chinese diplomatic malpractice. China literally launched a trade embargo over an Australian request to investigate the origins of covid19, for example.
It didn't get the headlines but Vietnam and Japan actually signed a defense cooperation agreement this week as well. I think countries like Australia, Vietnam, Japan, and India aren't interested in trying to hold China back economically. China is the largest country on earth (at least for a bit longer, probably), it is going to be a major economic power forever and it's not productive or even desirable to resist that.
But that doesn't mean ignoring when China acts badly, and China has been acting badly. As strong and as big as China is, a collection of states like India / Vietnam / Japan / Australia / United States acting in concert to resist the worst of Chinese excesses, is formidable. There's nothing like an alliance or commitment to collective action between those 5 countries as a group, but there's definitely the framework being built out of a lot of significant Asian powers + the United States being interested in pushing back against the worst of Chinese behavior. There will be broader disagreement on pushing back against other areas, for example the United States is probably more upset about things like the treatment of the Uighurs and Chinese intellectual property offenses than is say, India or Vietnam. But when it comes to territorial aggression that seems to be something a good chunk of Asian powers are not really happy with Chinese actions--even if many of them are mostly symbolic for now.
I mentioned it before but it's why I think Rana Mitter's take is particularly interesting - especially the example of the Vietnman-Japan agreement:
QuoteThe Aukus pact is a sign of a new global order
Rana Mitter
The deal has upset China, but it also binds the US into European security, in a world where Nato may be less relevant
Fri 17 Sep 2021 15.55 BST
France is furious. Theresa May is worried. The announcement of the new Australia-UK-US alliance (Aukus) and the ditching of a previous French-Australian submarine deal has led France's foreign minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian, to term the pact "a stab in the back", while the former British prime minister is concerned about Britain being dragged into a war over the future of Taiwan.
Oddly enough, Beijing's reaction has been rather muted. Yes, it has accused the west of a "cold war mentality", and Xi Jinping has warned foreigners not to interfere in the region, but its warning that China would "closely monitor the situation" was close to a "cut and paste" outrage.
Aukus is more significant for what it reveals about the three partners' thinking than the actual content of the pact. Some observers are calling it a "nuclear" deal when it is nothing of the sort; the submarines are not the nuclear weapon-carrying Tridents seen on the BBC drama Vigil, but vessels powered by nuclear energy, giving them longer range. For the west, Aukus shows the real fear that the next president of the US might be either Donald Trump or one of his apostles. Boris Johnson has spoken in firm tones about Aukus lasting for "decades": the unstated implication is, regardless of who the presidents of the US are over that period, Aukus is about binding the US into Asia-Pacific security for the long term.
Less obviously, it is also about binding the US into European security in a world where Nato may be less relevant. This week France has every reason to be angry about losing its Australian alliance and submarine contract. But over the next decade, expect to see a rather different arrangement: the UK and France will both be pillars of a European security order (along with a nascent EU force). And association with Aukus brings the most important stabilising prize – the presence of the US allied firmly to a major European power (albeit a non-EU one).
China's rhetoric about the cold war misses an important point: the structures of that era were binary and rigid. But Aukus suggests that the liberal order can reconstitute itself through "minilateral" deals, in which different constellations of powers act together over different issues. The "Quad" of Japan, Australia, India and the US is the best-known example of this so far, but Aukus may be a sign of more to come. Those deals may anger individual members of that order in the short term (British anger at the US over Afghanistan, French anger at Australia over Aukus), but they actually show that the liberal order is more robust than surface noise suggests. It's not a cold war, but a series of constantly changing adaptations.
Beijing seems to know this, which may be why its response has sounded so half-hearted. China will be less concerned about the specifics of Aukus, as there is plenty of western military hardware in the region already. The real challenge to China is, why do so few of its neighbours back its complaints about the new pact? Singapore, a country that has spent decades balancing between the US and China in the region, expressed hopes that Aukus would "complement the regional architecture", which made it sound more like an elegant Georgian fireplace than a deal over deadly weapons. China's failure over the past two decades has not been its failure to remove the US from the region, but its continuing inability to persuade local countries that American departure would be a good idea.
The achilles heel of Aukus may not be in security, but in a different area: trade. China is the biggest partner for all its neighbours and is outside only one major trading bloc in the region, the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership. A British Foreign Policy Group report this week, which I co-authored, predicted that a move to join the CPTPP would be part of China's strategy to improve the regional narrative around itself. The day after Aukus was announced, Beijing declared its formal bid to join the partnership.
This is a smart move but also a risky one. The CPTPP demands a range of standards for trade and, crucially, labour, which are certainly weaker than EU rules but still more exacting than those in China itself. Beijing has heft, and may be able to negotiate its own terms more freely than smaller members. But its entry may well include discussions with what seems likely to be the partnership's newest member in 2022 – the UK, which will be, after Japan, the second biggest economy in this grouping. If the UK can work out how to contribute to a process that moves China into higher standards of trade and labour rights, at the same time as keeping Aukus alive, that would be a genuine contribution to the idea of "global Britain".
It was Donald Trump who took the US out of the TPP, the pact's predecessor. China's attempt at entry might just tempt the Americans back in; which would mean that the greatest irony of Aukus could be that the world's two biggest economies become more divided on security, and simultaneously more thoroughly entwined through trade.
Rana Mitter is professor of the history and politics of modern China, University of Oxford, and co-author (with Sophia Gaston) of the report Resetting UK-China Engagement: 2021 update
Quote from: OttoVonBismarck on September 19, 2021, 09:49:25 AM
But that doesn't mean ignoring when China acts badly, and China has been acting badly. As strong and as big as China is, a collection of states like India / Vietnam / Japan / Australia / United States acting in concert to resist the worst of Chinese excesses, is formidable. There's nothing like an alliance or commitment to collective action between those 5 countries as a group, but there's definitely the framework being built out of a lot of significant Asian powers + the United States being interested in pushing back against the worst of Chinese behavior. There will be broader disagreement on pushing back against other areas, for example the United States is probably more upset about things like the treatment of the Uighurs and Chinese intellectual property offenses than is say, India or Vietnam. But when it comes to territorial aggression that seems to be something a good chunk of Asian powers are not really happy with Chinese actions--even if many of them are mostly symbolic for now.
I think this is spot on.
It is why Trump was such a cancer as well - the way to deal with China is to present a united, calm, and rational front against their bullshit.
There is no need for belligerence, except in response to Chinese belligerence. China is going to be a world power, that is just simple economics. They can do so with or without being assholes towards their neighbors. The way for the neighbors to make sure they are not assholes, is to simply get together and present a united front on the military side of things, AND on the economic side when it comes to bullshit there as well.
Necessary for that to work is strong alliances with your friends. Trump was incapable of that - he saw every alliance as a sucker deal. Which is why China and Russia loved him so much - they want a system where each neighbour can be dealt with individually.
The other thing we need to figure out is how to oppose China's soft power bullshit as well. The way Hollywood has basically bent over for China when it comes to censoring content as an example. That seems like a harder problem to solve.
It's actually interesting how nationalists often discard the possibility that other countries can have national pride and nationalist sentiment, as well. I think it's that sort of thinking that has China "surprised" that despite the many ways Vietnam's relationship with China is very important, Vietnam has been willing to stand up to China and even act oppositionally to China. The Chinese don't understand that the Vietnamese are a proud people, and there's no level of economic stick and carrot that will make them prostate Vietnam's national honor and rights to that of China just because China makes economic threats.
Xi is old enough that he should remember China's disastrous war with Vietnam in the late 1970s, but he seems to have forgotten the lessons that China's leaders of the time learned from it. Mainly that the Vietnamese are kind of like a badger, you really don't want to fight one in its den, and they generally defend their interests vigorously.
One in five humans lives in China and an even higher share of the global middle class. The economic rationale for Hollywood to cater to these customers is something you will not be able to fight. It's all about profits.
Quote from: Zanza on September 19, 2021, 10:18:25 AM
One in five humans lives in China and an even higher share of the global middle class. The economic rationale for Hollywood to cater to these customers is something you will not be able to fight. It's all about profits.
Yeah - I mean that's not Chinese soft power that's just business being business and I wouldn't worry about Hollywood. I would look a lot more closely at Facebook, Google and Apple etc because I think the things those companies are willing to accept for access to the Chinese market are more problematic than Hollywood including a map with the nine-dash line.
It's like if the BBC was installing machinery to block their broadcasts over the iron curtain.
Yeah, I think Hollywood isn't something to worry about. For a long time now global box office has been really important for big budget movies. Even aside from China, the movies that do best overseas are ones that aren't bogged down with so much cultural and linguistic baggage that they become difficult to market and adapt for foreign audiences. Different countries have very different cultural taboos, values, and of course even with dubbing and subtitles--some quirks of language are hard to translate to other languages.
It means that the biggest budget "event" movies, are likely to keep getting pumped out where the focus is on special effects, non-verbal action sequences, minimal dialogue etc. A lot of these movies are "fun" and people like them. But there's nothing stopping smaller budget serious films getting made, they just aren't going to have $200m budgets, but a lot of great films can be made without $200m and ultra-expensive action sequences.
Quote from: Zanza on September 18, 2021, 02:14:14 AM
https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/minister/peter-dutton/statements/inaugural-australia-france-22-ministerial-consultations
The French and Australian foreign and defence ministers met on August 30th and even specifically discussed the submarine topic, but it looks like the Australians did not say a word about this.
Sounds like big, but seemingly deliberate failure of Australian diplomacy. They reinforced their alliance with the US, but extremely pissed off France. The US can to a degree ignore the feelings of its allies as they are indispensable. Not sure if Australia is well served with pissing off their neighbour France. I guess their desired FTA with the EU is no longer on the agenda.
If the Australians have revealed this fact before the official announcement, could they have trusted that France would keep their anger to themselves and not leak? Rhetorical question.
To the extent Australia is seeking counterweights to Chinese power, the fact that New Caledonia is closer to Canberra than Oahu seems of little relevance. The single frigate ported out of Point Chaleix is not likely to do as much good even with the shorter distances than the USN vessels home ported out of Pearl - on their own safely superior to the entire French navy.
As for economics and soft power, the Australians are seeing the solidifying political consensus in the USA in standing up to Chinese over-reaching - one of the few policy areas that remains truly bipartisan. Whereas France signed a huge trade deal with China just before COVID. Can Australia trust France to consistently back Australia even at the cost of losing billions in commercial contracts? The fact that France is so upset about the loss of the sub contact is not a good indicator in that score.
Quote from: Berkut on September 18, 2021, 07:45:39 PM
Ironically, I actually think there IS an international, rules based order.
Yes of course there is.
There are clearly delineated rules governing conduct between and among nations and much it is formally written out in treaties and conventions. That's why for example there could be international arbitration over say China-Philippines maritime disputes and you can have a set of clearly understood principles applied in a law-like manner to reach a predictable result under the rules.
If the complaint is that the application of the order is weak in inconsistent as compared to most national orders, that is obviously true for the obvious reason that enforcement and the credibility of enforcement is weaker. And that is why (continuing the example) the Philippines could win their case and yet still pursue a diplomatically conciliatory line with China. But a weak order is still an order.
The Europeans for the most part deserve credit for adhering to the rules-based international order and using their own influence to promote it at as a norm. That's a valuable service and compares favorable to the US, which continues to "bend" the rules at times for some perceived short term gain or do stupid things like refusing to sign the LoS convention. However, the real reason why the order is weak is not because of occasional superpower hypocrisy but because enforcement is weak, and Europe has not done much about that.
Quote from: The Minsky Moment on September 19, 2021, 11:12:49 AMAs for economics and soft power, the Australians are seeing the solidifying political consensus in the USA in standing up to Chinese over-reaching - one of the few policy areas that remains truly bipartisan. Whereas France signed a huge trade deal with China just before COVID. Can Australia trust France to consistently back Australia even at the cost of losing billions in commercial contracts? The fact that France is so upset about the loss of the sub contact is not a good indicator in that score.
Not just that but the fact that you've got French foreign policy figures saying France should change its entire approach on China and the Indo-Pacific because of this, sort of indicates why Australia may have wanted a different partner.
Quote from: Zanza on September 19, 2021, 10:18:25 AM
One in five humans lives in China and an even higher share of the global middle class. The economic rationale for Hollywood to cater to these customers is something you will not be able to fight. It's all about profits.
True.
But 1/5 of the population is in Africa, 1/5 in India, 1/5 in Western countries (probably needing to include Latin America) .
China's share sounds a lot...but it is just one share. With how difficult doing business there is becoming I would expect Hollywood to back track on this a little before too long in the future.
@Minsky:
No disagreement that Australia's security interests can only be served by an alliance with the United States and apparently only with nuclear subs.
But it's my impression that this could have been done on a more face-saving way for France or that it could have been possible to include them somehow.
Quote from: Zanza on September 19, 2021, 01:13:14 PM
@Minsky:
No disagreement that Australia's security interests can only be served by an alliance with the United States and apparently only with nuclear subs.
But it's my impression that this could have been done on a more face-saving way for France or that it could have been possible to include them somehow.
I struggle to see how, to be honest. We could just write France a $40bn check I guess. Other than that I'm not sure what could be done. They are offering diesel subs and wanted Australia to use them to promote a closer relationship with Australia and a big purchase order for the French defense industry. Australia made the decision to pursue nuclear subs instead--something France isn't willing to offer, and could not offer competitively to the United States even if it was willing to do the technology sharing.
The desires of Australia and France were in fundamental misalignment, and the French reaction frankly shows anything that resulted in the loss of that diesel submarine order was going to come with extreme anger from the French side.
The French sources all say this anger is not about the commercial side, but about being left out from the alliance. I know that you see that different from earlier in the thread. But if the French anger is really about being left out from the alliance, not the commercial, it would have been feasible to include France. If it really is about the commercial side, you are right and there is no way to keep France happy.
Quote from: Zanza on September 19, 2021, 01:27:56 PM
The French sources all say this anger is not about the commercial side, but about being left out from the alliance. I know that you see that different from earlier in the thread. But if the French anger is really about being left out from the alliance, not the commercial, it would have been feasible to include France. If it really is about the commercial side, youbare right and there is no way to keep France happy.
I think there should be outreach to France when things have settled down. I agree that I think it could have been handled better, but I'm not actually fully sure how.
Practically speaking though I don't see how you go about that. "We're about to screw out of a mega-project, would you like a minor role in ours instead?" But also this isn't a new alliance - there's already an alliance between the UK, US and Australia, it is about deepening that and sharing of sensitive technology which will need to go through Congress. I think it's an easier ask for Australia and UK given 5 eyes and UK-US nuclear cooperation. It may be possible to get France on that list (though I'd note that France has been identified as behind only Russia and China in industrial espionage), or it may be seen as too much of an ask.
But also I think it may depend on the Australian perception - if part of the reason they made this move is because they do not think France is strategically aligned with them on a huge issue for Australia, it makes no sense to include France in the replacement because they're still not strategically aligned. I think in that context Macron's comments, the CAI etc probably did not help.
At the end of the day you can't be close allies with everyone. Sometimes you have to choose which one you take to the prom.
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 19, 2021, 01:54:51 PM
Practically speaking though I don't see how you go about that. "We're about to screw out of a mega-project, would you like a minor role in ours instead?" But also this isn't a new alliance - there's already an alliance between the UK, US and Australia, it is about deepening that and sharing of sensitive technology which will need to go through Congress.
My impression was that it was deliberately presented as "new" and as more than just tech-sharing. And yes, a minor role might have been better than nothing.
QuoteBut also I think it may depend on the Australian perception - if part of the reason they made this move is because they do not think France is strategically aligned with them on a huge issue for Australia, it makes no sense to include France in the replacement because they're still not strategically aligned. I think in that context Macron's comments, the CAI etc probably did not help.
I linked a ministerial statement from Australia from three weeks ago where Australia said that:
"Ministers reaffirmed the shared values, interests and principles that underpin the bilateral relationship, as reflected in the Joint Statement of Enhanced Strategic Partnership between Australia and France, and the Vision Statement on the Australia-France Relationship."
I guess if there was fundamental disagreements in values and Strategic goals, they could have communicated that then.
Quote from: Zanza on September 19, 2021, 01:27:56 PM
The French sources all say this anger is not about the commercial side, but about being left out from the alliance. I know that you see that different from earlier in the thread. But if the French anger is really about being left out from the alliance, not the commercial, it would have been feasible to include France. If it really is about the commercial side, youbare right and there is no way to keep France happy.
I don't see that France would have anything to offer in this particular technology alliance over submarines. The French certainly have the tech expertise, but not more than the US and UK. The remaining technology goals to be sought subsequent to this treaty can easily include additional countries. Aukus itself just sets the goal of improving technological exchange at some future time.
Quote from: Zanza on September 19, 2021, 01:13:14 PM
@Minsky:
No disagreement that Australia's security interests can only be served by an alliance with the United States and apparently only with nuclear subs.
But it's my impression that this could have been done on a more face-saving way for France or that it could have been possible to include them somehow.
It doesn't make a ton of sense to include them in *this* particular arrangement. France is a power and has a Pacific presence but that doesn't make them a Pacific power. And it doesn't make much sense for France to concentrate limited defense resources in the region in any case.
What the US could do is pursue more diplomatic and defense related initiatives with France in Europe and the Med. France is the only major EU nation with significant military spending and it is in the US interest generally that France succeed in maintaining its defense-industrial capacity. As an example, when Macron calls for greater European military and defense "autonomy" I don't think that is necessarily something the US should discourage. An EU military capability could be complementary to NATO and to the extent it revitalizes the EU's moribund defense establishment it could be a positive good. There is a tendancy for US foreign policy and defense planners to focus on Germany because of its economic and diplomatic clout within the Union, the presence of US bases and the fact that German leaders tend to be less prickly and easier to deal with. But in terms of a domestic military capacity Germany is a bit of basket case whereas France is still in the game.
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 19, 2021, 09:53:17 AM
I mentioned it before but it's why I think Rana Mitter's take is particularly interesting - especially the example of the Vietnman-Japan agreement:
QuoteThe Aukus pact is a sign of a new global order
...Aukus is about binding the US into Asia-Pacific security for the long term...
:huh: This is an interestingly insular way of looking at it. The US is a Pacific power with a history of being central to Asia-Pacific security for over 150 years. No new treaty could more closely bind the US into Asia-Pacific security for the future, because essential US interests already do that. It's like arguing that the US-japan mutual defense treaty is "about binding Japan into Asia-Pacific security for the long term." Treaties cannot accomplish more than interests, and treaties without interests are mere symbolic gestures.
Quote from: grumbler on September 19, 2021, 02:29:42 PM
:huh: This is an interestingly insular way of looking at it. The US is a Pacific power with a history of being central to Asia-Pacific security for over 150 years. No new treaty could more closely bind the US into Asia-Pacific security for the future, because essential US interests already do that. It's like arguing that the US-japan mutual defense treaty is "about binding Japan into Asia-Pacific security for the long term." Treaties cannot accomplish more than interests, and treaties without interests are mere symbolic gestures.
Isn't the key point the first part of that sentence: "
the unstated implication is, regardless of who the presidents of the US are over that period, Aukus is about binding the US into Asia-Pacific security for the long term."
From an Aussie perspective they've faced a lot from China in recent years and there's not been a huge amount of support for them beyond the symbolic from the US while Trump was in charge (I think Mike Pompeo tweeted about buying Australian wine in solidarity) so this is about deepening the formal institutional ties, so even if there's another Trump Australian has another string tying it to the US (and vice-versa). I think the timing of the first approach to the UK in March-April this year suggests this is something the Australians wanted to move on ASAP once Trump was gone.
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 19, 2021, 02:36:25 PM
Isn't the key point the first part of that sentence: "the unstated implication is, regardless of who the presidents of the US are over that period, Aukus is about binding the US into Asia-Pacific security for the long term."
From an Aussie perspective they've faced a lot from China in recent years and there's not been a huge amount of support for them beyond the symbolic from the US while Trump was in charge (I think Mike Pompeo tweeted about buying Australian wine in solidarity) so this is about deepening the formal institutional ties, so even if there's another Trump Australian has another string tying it to the US (and vice-versa). I think the timing of the first approach to the UK in March-April this year suggests this is something the Australians wanted to move on ASAP once Trump was gone.
There's never been a US president that pulled the US out of the Asia-Pacific security realm. Not even Trump. Under Trump, the US Seventh Fleet remained the same strength, the US maintained its forces in Korea, Japan, Guam, etc...
Now, of the professor just mis-typed US when she meant UK and president when she meant prime minister, the statement would make sense. The UK, unlike the US, has been very uneven in its participation in Asia-Pacific security.
Quote from: grumbler on September 19, 2021, 02:47:15 PMThere's never been a US president that pulled the US out of the Asia-Pacific security realm. Not even Trump. Under Trump, the US Seventh Fleet remained the same strength, the US maintained its forces in Korea, Japan, Guam, etc...
I don't think that's quite what he means as the alternative - but I don't think it's controversial to say that US allies including in the Pacific and Europe felt the US as less committed and reliable under Trump. The US didn't pull its forces out of Europe but I don't know that it was felt to have the same meaning under Trump and there is a difference between being in Asia-Pacific from the perspective of the US and its location and from the perspective of Australia and its location. As I say my guess in the next step will be US fleets spending more time in Austrlian ports.
It's going to take at least 20 years for these subs, but in the meantime there's a framework for Australia to thicken its ties to the US.
QuoteNow, of the professor just mis-typed US when she meant UK and president when she meant prime minister, the statement would make sense. The UK, unlike the US, has been very uneven in its participation in Asia-Pacific security.
The UK's very much a bit part player on that :lol: You're absolutely right on the UK (unlike France) but I don't think that's the appeal for Australia - the UK is just helpful in terms of technology transfer and cooperation with some of the tech but we're nothing compared to the US (or France) in the region.
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 19, 2021, 02:53:56 PM
Quote from: grumbler on September 19, 2021, 02:47:15 PMThere's never been a US president that pulled the US out of the Asia-Pacific security realm. Not even Trump. Under Trump, the US Seventh Fleet remained the same strength, the US maintained its forces in Korea, Japan, Guam, etc...
I don't think that's quite what he means as the alternative - but I don't think it's controversial to say that US allies including in the Pacific and Europe felt the US as less committed and reliable under Trump. The US didn't pull its forces out of Europe but I don't know that it was felt to have the same meaning under Trump and there is a difference between being in Asia-Pacific from the perspective of the US and its location and from the perspective of Australia and its location. As I say my guess in the next step will be US fleets spending more time in Austrlian ports.
It's going to take at least 20 years for these subs, but in the meantime there's a framework for Australia to thicken its ties to the US.
I think that it IS controversial to argue that the treaty can "[bind] the US into Asia-Pacific security for the long term" regardless of who the POTUS is. If US interests (even if only as seen by the US Administration) call for the US to withdraw from the Asia-Pacific security structure, then it will, treaty or not. If US interests call for the US to remain bound into Asia-Pacific security, it will do so, treaty or not (and, indeed, has been doing for over a century without this treaty).
Your point about the agreement providing an in for Australia to thicken ties to the US in areas other than the subs is, IMO, the correct take, and Prof Mitter's is wrong.
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 19, 2021, 11:37:48 AM
Quote from: The Minsky Moment on September 19, 2021, 11:12:49 AMAs for economics and soft power, the Australians are seeing the solidifying political consensus in the USA in standing up to Chinese over-reaching - one of the few policy areas that remains truly bipartisan. Whereas France signed a huge trade deal with China just before COVID. Can Australia trust France to consistently back Australia even at the cost of losing billions in commercial contracts? The fact that France is so upset about the loss of the sub contact is not a good indicator in that score.
Not just that but the fact that you've got French foreign policy figures saying France should change its entire approach on China and the Indo-Pacific because of this, sort of indicates why Australia may have wanted a different partner.
"We just fucked you over royally. How come you're reacting like that? See? That's exactly why we fucked you over!"
I mean what did you expect exactly? That we grin and smile through the black eye?
I didn't realize you were a defense contractor.
Quote from: Zoupa on September 19, 2021, 04:07:05 PM"We just fucked you over royally. How come you're reacting like that? See? That's exactly why we fucked you over!"
I mean what did you expect exactly? That we grin and smile through the black eye?
That France's interests and strategy don't spin on a sixpence. I think the anger's fair - my point is just that response is possibly part of the reason why Australia didn't feel aligned/wanted a different option when they feel the threat from China is increasing.
I think France is probably going to re-emphasise ties with India and Japan, because I don't think arranging meetings with China and Russia as some have suggested is the right response (and doing that with Russia would torpedo any chance of using the EU to build strategic autonomy because a lot of the CEE states and most other EU and NATO members wouldn't be thrilled by it).
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 19, 2021, 05:20:28 PM
I think the anger's fair
Please help me understand how the anger is fair.
Quote from: Admiral Yi on September 19, 2021, 06:25:32 PM
Please help me understand how the anger is fair.
Combination of personal, policy and political reasons. There's been a generational project to re-orient France from a Gaullist perspective towards engaging with the US and the UK (and other "Anglo-Saxons") as the core of France's foreign policy. Related to that is that the US wanted European nations to engage more in the Indo-Pacific - France was the first country to do so and has been regularly doing freedom of navigation patrols and building relations with other partners in the region like Australia, India and Japan. France was pleased to see the UK engaging more in the Indo-Pacific but it was late to the party compared to France. Just last month there was a US, UK, Japan, Australia, France and NZ common naval exercise - France felt part of that framework. One of the participants was actually planning to replace France with two of the others.
Macron has invested a lot in building personal rapport with Biden and Morrison - he made a big deal of the Franco-Australian relationship being the cornerstone of France's strategy in the region at the G7 and a big deal of welcoming Biden (most of the time with Johnson was spent on Brexit/Northern Ireland Protocol issues). At the summit those three were meeting separately to hammer out this deal. And it does sort of confirm that perhaps the Gaullists are right and fundamentally you can't trust the Anglos who'll always work with each other over France.
And, on a purely political level losing a AUS$90 billion contract and up to 30,000 jobs in an election year is not great.
I think the anger is totally fair and we should look to engage France on other issues. But I also think it's entirely fair if Australia didn't think the deal was working and didn't feel aligned with France to move elsewhere - and there is a chasm between how clearly the Australians felt they were communicating about this and what the French understood (as I say I think one of the minor points in this is the Australians were expressing issues that to their view went to the very core of the viability of the project, while the French understood that it was just standard defence contract haggling). But, as I say, I'm not sure how it could have been handled differently - which perhaps makes the anger even more justifiable.
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 19, 2021, 06:40:11 PM
And it does sort of confirm that perhaps the Gaullists are right and fundamentally you can't trust the Anglos who'll always work with each other over France.
This to me is the nub of the issue. If you can't trust someone that means they broke their word or welched on a deal.
Do you feel that there was an understanding involving France, the US, and Australia, that if France increased its presence in the Pacific Australia would buy French subs? Or some other form of quid pro quo?
Quote from: Admiral Yi on September 19, 2021, 06:57:15 PMThis to me is the nub of the issue. If you can't trust someone that means they broke their word or welched on a deal.
Do you feel that there was an understanding involving France, the US, and Australia, that if France increased its presence in the Pacific Australia would buy French subs? Or some other form of quid pro quo?
No I don't think there was a quid pro quo. But I also think that's an incredibly narrow understanding of trust. I don't think trust is just broke their word or welched on a deal - there's loads of people who I don't trust because I think they're shady or I think they're blowhards or bullshitters (wouldn't trust them as far as I could throw them). They don't need to have broken their word for me to not trust them. I certainly think trust is a significantly broader concept among allies than sort of contractual obligations - or in everyday life: friends, family, loved ones. Both in terms of what you'll tolerate and how much it hurts.
I think in this context I think France understood that it was the first country responding to the US call for Europe to engage more in the Indo-Pacific, it was really building its strategy around its relationship with Australia - and I think France thought it was making those choices in good faith. I think they'd invested a lot in them and the really mattered to France. And they now feel they weren't treated with good faith/were being led up the garden path by the Anglos who would always do their own thing and dump the French as soon as they could.
Edit: So I suppose it's not you can't trust them because they'll break their word or some similarly legalist definition, but you can't trust them because they're not reliable and they're not honest and up-front.
So dishonest in the non-legalistic sense. I see.
Not really.
Losing a 90 billion dollar contract sucks. Sucks more for Australia that I started at half that amount. The fact that Naval Group is way over budget and reducing the amount of work being done in Australia ( lowering it from 90% local input to 60%) and trying to lower it more seems to be being wholly ignored. France owns a majority share in Naval Group so they're losing a chunk of money, but as a supplier they're less then ideal partners.
Are there any French politicians who are not owned by their industries? I find it surprising that the French government is taking harsh diplomatic action to lash out at anyone deemed to be part of the Australian decision to move on from a troublesome contract that it had signed with a French company.
This all seems to me to be counterproductive. If the French government is going to lean on the customers of French companies when the customers grow dissatisfied with the service they are getting, maybe its best to avoid dealing with French companies at all.
And it's double ironic that the French government is asserting both that the UK is just "the spare wheel on the carriage" and is engaged in "a form of accepted vassalization" while, at the same time, complaining that they were not made part of the treaty... so they are jealous that the cannot also be a spare wheel "hiding in the American bosom?"
Frankly, the French government has been overly emo several times in their history, but seldom this shamelessly. Some of the stories out of France sound like they are from The Onion.
Quote from: grumbler on September 19, 2021, 07:34:24 PM
Are there any French politicians who are not owned by their industries? I find it surprising that the French government is taking harsh diplomatic action to lash out at anyone deemed to be part of the Australian decision to move on from a troublesome contract that it had signed with a French company.
In terms of harsh diplomatic action, France's Europe Minister has said it's "unthinkable" that the EU will continue to negotiate a free trade agreement with Australia. France would have a veto in any deal so that may be inevitable anyway but, given the general silence from the rest of Europe so far, it'll be interesting to see whether other member states are entirely thrilled at this decision.
QuoteAnd it's double ironic that the French government is asserting both that the UK is just "the spare wheel on the carriage" and is engaged in "a form of accepted vassalization" while, at the same time, complaining that they were not made part of the treaty... so they are jealous that the cannot also be a spare wheel "hiding in the American bosom?"
Not just that, Le Drian's also said of Australia "I do not understand the logic of this agreement [...] It illustrates Australia's willingness to be a surrogate for the United States and to abandon its sovereignty".
And Xavier Bertrand, best polling right wing candidate for President (and I think any lost jobs would be in his area so more understandable) has called for an extraordinary NATO summit and if France doesn't get answers from the US should "put on the table France's" participation in NATO's command structure. He's also said that France should open talks with China and Russia (which would thrill the rest of the EU): "France is not intended to be treated like an American servant" for whom "it is always 'America First'. It is time that we have the same vission for France."
It is pretty extraordinary - especially given that until Russia literally invaded Crimea France was agreeing to supply them with jets and warships over US, UK and EU partners' objections - and while I think the anger is justifiable, I don't really get the level it's reached.
Quote from: Zanza on September 19, 2021, 10:18:25 AM
One in five humans lives in China and an even higher share of the global middle class. The economic rationale for Hollywood to cater to these customers is something you will not be able to fight. It's all about profits.
The issue has nothing to do with Hollywood catering to Chinese customers.
Quote from: Admiral Yi on September 19, 2021, 07:22:44 PM
So dishonest in the non-legalistic sense. I see.
Not really.
Imagine you have a friend that has spent the last 6 months saving up allowance to buy a rare comic book he really likes, that has only one copy.
The day before the last allowance payment, you go into the store and buy it yourself.
You haven't broken a deal or been dishonest in terms of lying. But might have just lost that friend.
I get why France is pissed off. But the world is also not a 4th grade playground. There are issues beyond the immediate matter at stake.
Perhaps a more directly applicable example would be the anger many Americans felt when Chirac did not support the US over the 2003 Iraq War. That was also a situation where there was no direct legal or treaty obligation but many Americans including the government at the time felt betrayed.
Quote from: The Minsky Moment on September 19, 2021, 08:42:58 PM
Imagine you have a friend that has spent the last 6 months saving up allowance to buy a rare comic book he really likes, that has only one copy.
The day before the last allowance payment, you go into the store and buy it yourself.
You haven't broken a deal or been dishonest in terms of lying. But might have just lost that friend.
I get why France is pissed off. But the world is also not a 4th grade playground. There are issues beyond the immediate matter at stake.
So you're saying because the US just wanted their nuclear sub deal, whereas France really, really wanted their diesel sub deal something fierce, and France was their first, France has some grounds to be pissed off? Sort of like the love triangle in Fast Times at Ridgemont High?
Quote from: The Minsky Moment on September 19, 2021, 08:47:20 PM
Perhaps a more directly applicable example would be the anger many Americans felt when Chirac did not support the US over the 2003 Iraq War. That was also a situation where there was no direct legal or treaty obligation but many Americans including the government at the time felt betrayed.
And Languish made fun of those people. Freedom fries and whatnot.
Quote from: The Minsky Moment on September 19, 2021, 08:47:20 PM
Perhaps a more directly applicable example would be the anger many Americans felt when Chirac did not support the US over the 2003 Iraq War. That was also a situation where there was no direct legal or treaty obligation but many Americans including the government at the time felt betrayed.
Well,it took 18 years, but revenge is best served cold....
Quote from: Berkut on September 19, 2021, 10:22:26 PM
Quote from: The Minsky Moment on September 19, 2021, 08:47:20 PM
Perhaps a more directly applicable example would be the anger many Americans felt when Chirac did not support the US over the 2003 Iraq War. That was also a situation where there was no direct legal or treaty obligation but many Americans including the government at the time felt betrayed.
Well,it took 18 years, but revenge is best served cold....
I know it's a quip, but those 2 things are apples and oranges.
In any case, much of the brouhaha is about the manner in which this story developed. Yi can compare it to high school all he wants, but the definition of diplomatic is showing an ability to deal with people in a sensitive and effective way.
And I'm sure all you anglos would be totally ok if the situation was reversed right? If at the last minute another allied country would swoop in and take a huge defense contract away?
Actually swoop in is not a correct qualifier, which makes it even more duplicitous. The state department must have been working this reversal for months, these things don't happen in a vacuum.
Just another crack in Nato. The US shows itself an unreliable ally, whoever is President.
The last minute before what? What was due to happen the minute after the US swooped in?
Quote from: Eddie Teach on September 19, 2021, 09:33:05 PM
And Languish made fun of those people. Freedom fries and whatnot.
Let's wait until the Elysee canteen re-names hamburgers Strategic Autonomy Sandwiches before we make that comparison.
QuoteJust another crack in Nato. The US shows itself an unreliable ally, whoever is President.
I'm not sure that would be the view from a lot of the rest of Europe such as Poland - as I say the silence from the rest of Europe is pretty telling.
But I think whoever is President - the centre of the American world is not the Atlantic and NATO for the first time in ages. This has been underway since 2011 but, I think, combined with the withdrawal from Afghanistan is now a proper "pivot". Which is going to be a jarring shift for Europe not so much because the fundamental mutual defence bit but seeing the world through the prism of the Atlantic and Europe.
The more telling thing will be whether the Americans continue to support French operations in the Sahel - and American support is essential for those operations.
Yeah... This isn't the US swooping in at the last minute from what I've seen. The French - Australian deal was a long protracted mess that was on the brink of collapse.
At worst its Australia starting to have a look on Tinder before the break up is absolutely official.
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 20, 2021, 03:43:23 AM
Let's wait until the Elysee canteen re-names hamburgers Strategic Autonomy Sandwiches before we make that comparison.
Unofficial "Union des Suppositoires Atomiques" already exists, but is not that common anymore. :D
Quote
I'm not sure that would be the view from a lot of the rest of Europe such as Poland - as I say the silence from the rest of Europe is pretty telling.
That or the rest of the EU not having (anymore in the case of Portugal) any possessions in the "Indo-Pacific" area.
Quote
But I think whoever is President - the centre of the American world is not the Atlantic and NATO for the first time in ages. This has been underway since 2011 but, I think, combined with the withdrawal from Afghanistan is now a proper "pivot". Which is going to be a jarring shift for Europe not so much because the fundamental mutual defence bit but seeing the world through the prism of the Atlantic and Europe.
Be ut for countries who wish they were Switzerland. :P or even others who have a troublesome non-EU neighbor.
Quote
The more telling thing will be whether the Americans continue to support French operations in the Sahel - and American support is essential for those operations.
I don't think Americans will stop, that would be really against their interests.
I'm still fascinated that the French seem to view this as something "America did" instead of "Australia did", while obviously a lot of this happened behind closed doors all the reporting we've gotten thus far suggests the genesis for this was Australia reaching out to the U.S. months ago to see if we'd be able to bail them out of a submarine deal that wasn't working for them. Apparently the great sin wasn't trying to get out of that deal, but agreeing to help do it, which is strange.
Quote from: Zoupa on September 20, 2021, 12:49:16 AM
Quote from: Berkut on September 19, 2021, 10:22:26 PM
Quote from: The Minsky Moment on September 19, 2021, 08:47:20 PM
Perhaps a more directly applicable example would be the anger many Americans felt when Chirac did not support the US over the 2003 Iraq War. That was also a situation where there was no direct legal or treaty obligation but many Americans including the government at the time felt betrayed.
Well,it took 18 years, but revenge is best served cold....
I know it's a quip, but those 2 things are apples and oranges.
In any case, much of the brouhaha is about the manner in which this story developed. Yi can compare it to high school all he wants, but the definition of diplomatic is showing an ability to deal with people in a sensitive and effective way.
And I'm sure all you anglos would be totally ok if the situation was reversed right? If at the last minute another allied country would swoop in and take a huge defense contract away?
Actually swoop in is not a correct qualifier, which makes it even more duplicitous. The state department must have been working this reversal for months, these things don't happen in a vacuum.
Just another crack in Nato. The US shows itself an unreliable ally, whoever is President.
Of course they are apples and oranges.
And no, you are actually incorrect. I don't think I would at all relate some other country deciding to go with some other option for a defense contract as any kind of diplomatic issues at all. I certainly would not take it as any sort of indicator of their dedication to another, entirely separate alliance that the customer in question is not even a member of! Australia isn't even a part of NATO!
FWIW we've seen Boeing lose out to Airbus before and I don't remember the U.S. having a shit fit. Hell, we had a lot of problems with the French in the early 2000s and we never came close to the sort of diplomatic temper tantrum that France is throwing right now over the loss of a defense contract.
I do wonder to what extent current bad feeling with the US not consulting anyone on Afghanistan and the UK being an arse hole over brexit related matters have made this worse than it would otherwise be.
Quote from: OttoVonBismarck on September 20, 2021, 07:36:14 AM
I'm still fascinated that the French seem to view this as something "America did" instead of "Australia did", while obviously a lot of this happened behind closed doors all the reporting we've gotten thus far suggests the genesis for this was Australia reaching out to the U.S. months ago to see if we'd be able to bail them out of a submarine deal that wasn't working for them. Apparently the great sin wasn't trying to get out of that deal, but agreeing to help do it, which is strange.
It really makes no sense.
If this is just about the defense contract, then it makes sense that France is upset, as that is a huge economic hit. But if that is it, they should be mad, in order, at:
1. France. Who fucked this up so bad? Who let the deal fall to pieces like that? When a company loses a big deal to some other company, you don't get mad at the other company! You figure out what went wrong with YOUR company.
2. Australia. I mean...barely here. They are a potential customer. It's your job to keep them happy, and if they are not happy, then...well how is that THEIR fault? They should just go ahead and pay twice as much as was agreed and not get what they were promised when promised and be good little customers and smile and say thank you and shell out the cash? But I guess you can get mad at them if you want.
That is if this is just about the economics of a huge defense contract. If that is what this is about, then all this anger, IMO, is 100% about France being pretty desperate to not examine their own disaster, and trying pretty hard to find someone else to be mad at - oh look! The USA! Why, you can always make hay bitching about them! Let's blame them!
If this is about more then economic factors - if it is about the strategic implications of a shift in alliances and a "new" US-AUS-UK pacific alliance, then....getting all pissed off and pulling ambassadors or insulting everyone...well, THAT doesn't really seem like a very effective way to argue that you ought and want to be part of a new alliance structure, is it? If the concern about a country like Australia hitching its security wagon to France is based (in part) on not being really sure of France's commitment to opposing China on principle, then seeing them throw a temper tantrum over this does, as someone mentioned, make it kind of clear that it was the right move. A sober, realpolitik analysis of this from France's perspective makes it pretty clear that the "tempter tantrum" response has no upside to it at all.
I have zero doubt that the US, Australia, and the UK for that matter would welcome a genuine interest from France in a trans-Pacific alliance with actual teeth and dedication. Their response to this makes it pretty clear that they have no such priority. But it is still early. Perhaps this is all just domestic posturing for the French audience while real diplomacy is happening behind closed doors....?
Quote from: Berkut on September 20, 2021, 07:44:06 AM
And no, you are actually incorrect. I don't think I would at all relate some other country deciding to go with some other option for a defense contract as any kind of diplomatic issues at all.
There was the tussle with Turkey over buying the S-400. However the issue there was not that Turkey was not buying American but that they were buying non-NATO. I doubt the US would have cared much if Turkey had gone with a European system.
Quote from: Tyr on September 20, 2021, 07:49:09 AM
I do wonder to what extent current bad feeling with the US not consulting anyone on Afghanistan and the UK being an arse hole over brexit related matters have made this worse than it would otherwise be.
What do you mean by "not consulted?" It was discussed in a meeting of top allies back in March, withdrawal had been announced many months in advance etc. What level of consultation is expected for us deciding where to deploy our military?
Germany withdrew from the F-35 consortium and went with Eurofighter, even though all of the analysis said that the F-35 was the better deal. The US ambassador is still there.
As Berkut argued, the French temper tantrum has no upside for France. I'd go further and argue that it demonstrates that there's serious diplomatic baggage attached to deals a government might make with a French company; maybe it's worth paying a little more to go Japanese and not risk a major diplomatic crisis over a business deal.
Quote from: OttoVonBismarck on September 20, 2021, 08:06:02 AM
Quote from: Tyr on September 20, 2021, 07:49:09 AM
I do wonder to what extent current bad feeling with the US not consulting anyone on Afghanistan and the UK being an arse hole over brexit related matters have made this worse than it would otherwise be.
What do you mean by "not consulted?" It was discussed in a meeting of top allies back in March, withdrawal had been announced many months in advance etc. What level of consultation is expected for us deciding where to deploy our military?
It was pretty big news.
https://www.ft.com/content/3ea7e87e-ab3a-4e14-8396-8061420942b0
There's a difference between "not consulted" and "didn't give NATO allies a veto over our withdrawal." We didn't do the latter, but nor should we be expected to give them such a veto. But we certainly discussed it with our allies before hand.
Quote from: Duque de Bragança on September 20, 2021, 06:18:43 AM
I don't think Americans will stop, that would be really against their interests.
This is part of my point. I think since the war when the centre of American attention has been Europe there has been an extension of Europe's interests are America's. I don't think that's necessarily the case in the future. American focus is on Asia and Biden's description of re-trenching is the US is only engaging in areas of "vital interests". It may be that they're convinced the Sahel is worth supporting - in America's vital interests - but if it's not then I think they'll be looking at the benefit from supporting France in this region outweighs the sort of resource and attention cost that takes that could be better spent in Asia and Europe should be able to look after its own neighbourhood.
QuoteI do wonder to what extent current bad feeling with the US not consulting anyone on Afghanistan and the UK being an arse hole over brexit related matters have made this worse than it would otherwise be.
My understanding is that of all the European allies the French are least bothered by Afghanistan - the allies pushing for Biden to stay were Italy and the UK. The French largely pulled out in March/April because their assessment was the government wouldn't survive without American forces. They were right.
On Brexit I think it's probably the other way round - I imagine there is zero sympathy in offical circles in London given that France either pushed the hardest line within the EU on Brexit talks on a number of submarine sized issues (Galileo, equivalence, fishing etc) or they were very happy to tell the media that the French government was pushing the hardest line. I'm not sure that it's a great ongoing approach as it will ultimately mutually weaken us - so I'd like a lot of effort made to putting the relationship back on track and re-invigorating it. At the moment though I'd expect France to push for retaliation through EU measures - I believe since the deal was announced they've already said they're not happy with Jersey on fisheries and are pushing to raise that issue again.
The other Brexit side that I find slightly striking is that for all the talk of the UK being empire-nostalgic and "not finding a role" etc is this feels like the latest example of what's been true since 1956 (if not 1942) - that the UK is an ally of the US, is a middle power and very much the junior ally who hopes to have influence by being close to the US. The press may get pathetically neurotic about our relationship with the US (and I think a bust of Churchill is aiming low - we should aspire to a life-size portrait of Jim Callaghan in the Oval Office) but I don't think there's much angst about our global role or has been for at least the last 65 years. This is just the latest example of that.
QuoteThere's a difference between "not consulted" and "didn't give NATO allies a veto over our withdrawal." We didn't do the latter, but nor should we be expected to give them such a veto. But we certainly discussed it with our allies before hand.
I think the bigger issue from the UK perspective was the US was still saying in mid-August that they intended to keep their embassy open and the airport open - that changed very rapidly and the UK (and other European countries who were following the American lead) felt blindsided by how sudden the US change was and weren't ready to start evacuating civilians.
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 20, 2021, 09:37:13 AM
I think the bigger issue from the UK perspective was the US was still saying in mid-August that they intended to keep their embassy open and the airport open - that changed very rapidly and the UK (and other European countries who were following the American lead) felt blindsided by how sudden the US change was and weren't ready to start evacuating civilians.
The US embassy was closed on August 15 (mid-August) so the US wasn't telling anyone that it would remain open. The US claimed that same day that the US troops would hold the airport only to evacuate US citizens and those visa holders and applicants who could get there.
The reason that the situation changed rapidly was that the Afghan government collapsed rapidly, and the US was as blindsided by that as the UK, so the UK making a "bigger issue" of blaming the US for the Afghan government's betrayal just shows how anxious the UK is to escape their own blame for not evacuating earlier.
Quote from: grumbler on September 20, 2021, 09:48:48 AM
The US embassy was closed on August 15 (mid-August) so the US wasn't telling anyone that it would remain open. The US claimed that same day that the US troops would hold the airport only to evacuate US citizens and those visa holders and applicants who could get there.
Right - and according to reporting in Europe on 12 August (also mid-August :P) the US was telling European partners they were keeping the embassy and the airport open.
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 20, 2021, 09:51:49 AM
Quote from: grumbler on September 20, 2021, 09:48:48 AM
The US embassy was closed on August 15 (mid-August) so the US wasn't telling anyone that it would remain open. The US claimed that same day that the US troops would hold the airport only to evacuate US citizens and those visa holders and applicants who could get there.
Right - and according to reporting in Europe on 12 August (also mid-August :P) the US was telling European partners they were keeping the embassy and the airport open.
So the UK is blaming the US because the situation changed between August 12th and mid-August? It would be great if the US government was as omniscient as some of our European allies seem to believe, but that's not possible in the real world.
Quote from: grumbler on September 20, 2021, 10:19:06 AM
So the UK is blaming the US because the situation changed between August 12th and mid-August? It would be great if the US government was as omniscient as some of our European allies seem to believe, but that's not possible in the real world.
No I think the furstration was not being in the loop as, presumably, the US position changed and emergency contingency measures were put in place. So they were planning on the basis of the US keeping its embassy open etc (and not just the UK, it was other allies, Dutch, Italian etc) which changed rapidly and, because they weren't in the loop, abruptly.
Edit: Incidentally - re. silence from European capitals - Germany and Australia have today announced a new defence agreement for military cooperation in space (primarily around sensor data), which is possibly not the sort of signal Paris would want to see at this point.
Other than the fat contract, what is it that France actually WANTS?
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 20, 2021, 10:32:01 AM
Quote from: grumbler on September 20, 2021, 10:19:06 AM
So the UK is blaming the US because the situation changed between August 12th and mid-August? It would be great if the US government was as omniscient as some of our European allies seem to believe, but that's not possible in the real world.
No I think the furstration was not being in the loop as, presumably, the US position changed and emergency contingency measures were put in place. So they were planning on the basis of the US keeping its embassy open etc (and not just the UK, it was other allies, Dutch, Italian etc) which changed rapidly and, because they weren't in the loop, abruptly.
Edit: Incidentally - re. silence from European capitals - Germany and Australia have today announced a new defence agreement for military cooperation in space (primarily around sensor data), which is possibly not the sort of signal Paris would want to see at this point.
And thus the Federation is born.
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 20, 2021, 10:32:01 AM
No I think the furstration was not being in the loop as, presumably, the US position changed and emergency contingency measures were put in place. So they were planning on the basis of the US keeping its embassy open etc (and not just the UK, it was other allies, Dutch, Italian etc) which changed rapidly and, because they weren't in the loop, abruptly.
The US made the decision to evacuate the remaining US embassy personnel when Taliban troops arrive in Kabul, August 15th. There was no loop for the UK to be in, as far as the documentation I have seen goes. Maybe you can point me to a source that explains in some detail what the UK expected versus what it got, because I can't find anything.
Quote from: Berkut on September 20, 2021, 10:42:31 AM
Other than the fat contract, what is it that France actually WANTS?
A reliable partner in the Pacific would be my guess. US is seen as unreliable lately, and I'm not sure I disagree entirely with that assessment. Not that Australia can replace US firepower, but it can serve as an antenna, share intelligence and coordinate defense plans if it comes to that, due to proximity of some of France's Pacific islands with Australia. I think France wanted this deal to further develop New Caledonia, to sign other cooperative agreements with Australia, and possibly New Zealand, to help in case of disasters, that kind of things. Maybe even through in something for La Réunion, much farther away, but still closer to Australia than mainland France.
I don't really understand how they can be so upset just for the monetary part of the contract. Maybe I haven't read enough about it, but the reaction does seem disproportionate to what is actually in play.
As for Australia, if they had wanted to go nuclear instead of diesel, I'm sure it could have been arranged. As I'm told, France has a deal with Brazil to upgrade their submarine fleet to a nuclear one. So there must be other reasons than this on Australia's side.
I suspect there was a lot of pressure from the UK to make Australia change their mind. When in doubt, blame the British. Can't ever be far from the truth :P :P
Yeah, I expect there's some element we don't have full visibility on. The level of French upset doesn't seem proportional to a purely economic issue, and I don't find "oh they're just being emo" a particularly satisfactory explanation.
Quote from: Jacob on September 20, 2021, 12:03:37 PM
Yeah, I expect there's some element we don't have full visibility on. The level of French upset doesn't seem proportional to a purely economic issue, and I don't find "oh they're just being emo" a particularly satisfactory explanation.
I dunno - 50 billion euros is a hell of a lot of money. Maybe it puts the French shipyard at risk of closing or something.
Was there a deal? If there was then surely the relevant clauses will provide at least some compensation?
French press quotes figures between 250 and 400 millions euros,
Australia had already spent between 2 or 3 billions euros for the project.
Quote from: Berkut on September 20, 2021, 10:42:31 AM
Other than the fat contract, what is it that France actually WANTS?
What they always want. Same as Aretha Franklin.
Everyone wants all you can eat dessert.
Quote from: viper37 on September 20, 2021, 11:58:26 AM
I think France wanted this deal to further develop New Caledonia, to sign other cooperative agreements with Australia, and possibly New Zealand, to help in case of disasters, that kind of things. Maybe even through in something for La Réunion, much farther away, but still closer to Australia than mainland France.
Except that as I said earlier, France may a power and France may be in the Pacific but it's not a Pacific power.
The core security concerns for France are Europe, the Med, and North/Northwest Africa. France has made a negligible defense commitment to its Pacific possessions - essentially enough to keep local order and deter piracy. That is a rational use of limited resources.
From a strictly rational perspective, the only defense policy that makes sense for France's Pacific possessions with respect to outside threats is to free ride on the US security umbrella. There is nothing shameful about that - hell it's part of what being in NATO is for. France can carry its weight and more elsewhere. The corollary to that principle is that - putting aside the lost contract and lack of prior consultation - from the strict POV of security of those islands, the AUKUS arrangement is beneficial.
Quote from: The Brain on September 20, 2021, 12:09:39 PM
Was there a deal? If there was then surely the relevant clauses will provide at least some compensation?
Yeah - the Australians haven't signed a contract for the next phase of work, which they were meant to in April. My understanding is it will cost them to get out of the contracts.
QuoteYeah, I expect there's some element we don't have full visibility on. The level of French upset doesn't seem proportional to a purely economic issue, and I don't find "oh they're just being emo" a particularly satisfactory explanation.
As I say I think a lot of it is a lot of French leaders who spent 20+ years internally fighting Gaullists for a more Atlanticist foreign policy - I think to an extent they feel that project, their career's work has been ruined by this and their opponents will be crowing that they were right all along.
So I think it's a combination of the commercial (not insignificant in an election year), the sense of betrayal, the personal for Macron and many around him of a project they were invested in and losing domestically to another faction/side - although actually I think it is a little bit of emo. Macron recalled ambassadors from Rome (first time since WW2) and Ankara (I believe first time since Ataturk) - at the time thpse were called "highly unusual" and "unprecedented". I don't know if it is anymore. Macron's recalled ambassadors from four treaty allies in as many years and I think it's losing the effectiveness of that as a move - OvB said Biden has a petty streak, I think the same could be said for Macron.
More cynically - if it didn't happen great France is doing well in the Indo-Pacfic, as it's happened France can get into a massive row with the Anglo-Saxons in an election year which never hurts.
I'd also note - as Ulrich Speck - said that MAcron's big ideas for foreign policy have sort of failed in his first term and he might need a bit of a reset. The big ideas were to pacify the Sahel (still ongoing), reset relations with Russia (blocked by the rest of Europe), become Europe's leader on strategic affairs (a work in progress), become America's key European partner on a level with Five Eyes (not helped by the last week) and reassert independent French power in the Indo-Pacific (also not helped by the last week). I think part of the response probably reflects frustration at that. Especially because I imagine he would have thought Trump was to an extent the blocker on many of his goals because he imagines and positions himself as the embodiment of anti-populism and Biden is restoring America to the status quo before Trump - so I think there's shock there too.
Not to shit on France at all, but just to compare briefly French naval presence in the Pacific with American--the U.S. Pacific Fleet has two numbered fleets--Third and Seventh, the Naval Submarine Force, Pacific, and a number of other assets (independently operating warships, a number of Task Forces involving Naval special operations units etc etc.)
Just the 7th Fleet, that is only one of two numbered fleets in the Pacific--likely compares very favorably to the entire French Navy.
The 7th Fleet has:
1 Nimitz Class Air Craft Carrier (compared to 1 French carrier in existence) -- the USS Ronald Reagan is a 101,400 ton ship vs the Charles de Gaulle ~42,000 ton
3 Ticonderoga Class Cruisers (the U.S. is essentially one of the last navies to still operate ships in this class, the French Navy doesn't have a comparable vessel) - these are 9600 ton vessels
8 Arleigh Burke Class Destroyers (6900-9000 ton vessels)
The French Navy operates the de Gaulle and 21 smaller vessels (note I'm talking proper warships here and excluding things like mobile dock ships, tender ships, intelligence, survey, coast patrol, amphibious warfare etc support ships)--they have:
2 Horizon Class Destroyers (7000 ton)
7 Aquitaine Class Destroyers (6000 ton)
1 Georges Leygues Class Destroyer - (4900 ton)
5 La Fayette Class Frigates (3800 ton)
6 Floreal Class Frigates (2950 ton)
That's just the 7th Fleet. We have a whole second numbered Fleet just as large. On top of that the U.S. Pacific Fleet operates 38 nuclear submarines tasked to the region--versus 10 nuclear subs that the French have in their entire navy.
Edit to add: I forgot to mention the USS Blue Ridge--the 7th Fleet's Flagship in the count, it's a 19600 ton Blue Ridge Class Command Ship--if we count that as a warship, which is probably a push.
Quote from: OttoVonBismarck on September 20, 2021, 01:02:22 PM
(the U.S. is essentially one of the last navies to still operate ships in this class, the French Navy doesn't have a comparable vessel)
The Russians still have one of their Cold War cruisers active.
China has built and is building their "Type 055" destroyer which is significantly bigger than the Ticonderogas. It is a cruiser in all but name.
Quote from: OttoVonBismarck on September 20, 2021, 01:02:22 PM
Not to shit on France at all
Which, of course no offense intended, means you are going to shit on France.
Interesting piece in the Guardian on Japan's attitude (pre-AUKUS announcement):
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/20/japan-urges-europe-to-speak-out-against-chinas-military-expansion
I also think Gideon Rachman's piece today was right that what matters most/is most indicative is the positive reception the deal got from Japan and India. As, to an extent, French anger and Chinese cut and paste outrage is sort of a given.
Quote from: PDH on September 20, 2021, 02:18:20 PM
Quote from: OttoVonBismarck on September 20, 2021, 01:02:22 PM
Not to shit on France at all
Which, of course no offense intended, means you are going to shit on France.
I mean I'm not unfamiliar with recreational France bashing--but it's more to point that it should be understood there is like an order of magnitude difference in France as an Indo-Pacific ally and the United States.
One of the few things I don't usually shit on France too much for is their military--unlike a lot of European countries I admire the fact France vigorously maintains a capacity for independent military action (even when it has undermined NATO, but I can respect it even if I don't necessarily like some of its ancillary effects), and I think France invests a respectable amount into their military and gets good value for what they do invest. If you compare it to the German military--which is actually as well funded as the French, but frankly I think the German military is probably the least functional military in the world per dollar spent, and would probably struggle to conduct even the simplest of military operations by itself. Some of that is deliberate strategic positioning, some of it is multi-generational incompetence.
FWIW despite Sheilbh's common self-deprecating British nature, the British have a more capable military than France, particularly in naval operations. While the size of their surface and submarine forces seems very close, the British navy is built for genuine, sustained long term action if necessary. The RFA is bigger than all the auxiliary fleets of the other European countries combined, and this would be very important in any sustained military conflict as a fighting Navy requires supply ships, tender ships etc etc to stay at sea.
Quote from: OttoVonBismarck on September 20, 2021, 03:27:01 PM
... there is like an order of magnitude difference in France as an Indo-Pacific ally and the United States.
Absolutely. Still, it would be ideal if Australia, France, and the US were all allies in the Indo-Pacific.
Quote from: Jacob on September 20, 2021, 03:57:06 PM
Absolutely. Still, it would be ideal if Australia, France, and the US were all allies in the Indo-Pacific.
I agree - but in that context Macron has said the EU needs "independence when it comes to our strategy with regard to China" and cannot be expected to automatically side with America, saying "Europe is not simply an obect or a territory for the distribution of influences. We are a subject of international geopolitics and we need to assert ourselves as such." I totally agree with him on rejecting a return to the "logic of the Cold War" - but I think that is an easier thing to say from London or Paris than Canberra. That's why I think that is part of what drove Australia to make the move it did: that it thinks its position is closer to the US than France and that it's become more urgent in the last five years.
I'd add I'm not convinced that Europe or any European country can act as a subject or assert itself if the sort of centre of gravity of global politics moves to the Pacific, which I think it is.
Edit: Or as Antoine Bondaz put it following Borrell's comments this evening (that he "regrets the partnership excludes European partners who have a strong presence in the Pacific"): neither the EU nor France want to align with the US in the Indo-Pacific, but they regret that an alliance (or rather Australia aligning with the US) excludes them. I think you can have one of those.
Yeah by far the biggest barrier to countries like France and the US, or other EU states, being allies in the Indo-Pacific are France and the EU consistently prioritizing their desires for warm trade relations with China over most other concerns about China. That isn't a foundation to work with the United States. It's also why all of those countries will seem less credible as a bulwark against China from the perspective of countries like India / Japan / South Korea / Australia etc.
It will somewhat be interesting to see how the CPTPP works out--probably one of Trump's worst policy decisions was withdrawing us from the treaty. Also bad was his logic behind it, which can be summed up as "Obama bad." Many of the provisions of the TPP were specifically crafted to address many of the concerns traditional anti-trade forces in the United States frequently have with free trade agreements. Additionally our not being in the treaty disadvantages many of our agricultural exporters in any number of markets, a group that is also fairly Trumpy in its politics.
Those are fair points Sheilbh and Otto.
And there's the next stage - the Times reporting that Britain's nuclear subs will be allowed to use Australia as a base with "deep maintenance" facilities to have a more persisitent presence in the region.
Obviously these facilities will also be necessary for Australia's new subs, but I imagine they'll also be used for American subs to have a semi-permanent base in the South Pacific. I could be wrong but I imagine that's the next stage.
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 21, 2021, 05:45:46 AM
And there's the next stage - the Times reporting that Britain's nuclear subs will be allowed to use Australia as a base with "deep maintenance" facilities to have a more persisitent presence in the region.
Obviously these facilities will also be necessary for Australia's new subs, but I imagine they'll also be used for American subs to have a semi-permanent base in the South Pacific. I could be wrong but I imagine that's the next stage.
Also makes it more likely that the speculation that the Australian Subs will be Astute variants (with more American systems) is correct.
Quote from: Jacob on September 20, 2021, 05:04:25 PM
Those are fair points Sheilbh and Otto.
Something maybe worth pointing out--I don't think it is wrong for France to vigorously maintain "strategic independence", there are pros and cons to that stance for France or for any country and it will always be somewhat subjective where the balance lies. If you hitch to the United States as the United Kingdom / Australia have--and arguably as have countries like Canada albeit they aren't in AUKUS, there are many benefits, but there is also one big systemic risk--you don't control the United States or its activities. Trump highlighted this risk very well; a government could come in power in the United States that simply abandoned those shared strategic commitments. When you've been running your military for 50 years designed to integrate into a larger force structure with the United States at its head, if that head disappears, you're suddenly in a very bad place.
The big con of maintaining strategic independence is for all but the very largest countries the cost of doing it at scale is very, very high. When I was listing out the comparisons earlier between the French Navy and the USN (or a small portion of it), what I didn't mention is our Navy has a $200bn+ annual budget, and about $50-60bn every single year is for procurement. So something like the Australian sub deal it had with France was a $50bn deal that was to be paid out over many years. We basically are disbursing money equal to that
every single year on Naval procurement. That adds up over time to a huge amount of resources at our disposal, but it came at a significant cost.
Quote from: Agelastus on September 21, 2021, 07:41:07 AM
Also makes it more likely that the speculation that the Australian Subs will be Astute variants (with more American systems) is correct.
That would make sense. The Virginia class is more than the RAN needs, an an Astute with PWR3 would be quite capable and could be started soonest.
Quote from: OttoVonBismarck on September 21, 2021, 07:46:38 AM
Something maybe worth pointing out--I don't think it is wrong for France to vigorously maintain "strategic independence", there are pros and cons to that stance for France or for any country and it will always be somewhat subjective where the balance lies. If you hitch to the United States as the United Kingdom / Australia have--and arguably as have countries like Canada albeit they aren't in AUKUS, there are many benefits, but there is also one big systemic risk--you don't control the United States or its activities. Trump highlighted this risk very well; a government could come in power in the United States that simply abandoned those shared strategic commitments. When you've been running your military for 50 years designed to integrate into a larger force structure with the United States at its head, if that head disappears, you're suddenly in a very bad place.
I agree there is a decision here - I think the UK one for the last 65 years at least makes sense, even if I'm slightly jealous of the French. But it definitely has consequences.
The big issue I think France has is their idea of European strategic independence always involves a middle course/re-set of the relationship with Russia. That means it won't include the UK or most CEE states who are probably, broadly essential, to European strategic autonomy - because those states don't think there is a plausible middle course with Russia so they would rather stay close to the US. Because of that policy France is sort of left with working with Germany (which isn't that interested) and Italy (with whom they strongly disagree on the Med) which isn't enough for strategic autonomy. I think there's probably a similar factor at play in the Indo-Pacific.
If France really wants strategic autonomy it should invest time and energy in convincing CEE that it shares their risk assessment of Russia and that an independent, French-led European defence arrangement is the best way to address that risk.
Macron, as the Atlantis he is, is not really interested with a middle course with Russia. He tried that earlier on (à la Obama reset) but it did not work. The country relying on Russia is Germany, not France (Nordstream Schröder etc.). Even Poland and other CEE countries, with all their very polluting lignite or coal resources, still rely on Russian gas to a great extent.
Macron's Atlantist policy failed though but now he is more interested in the presidential campaign next year.
France still has its nuclear power plants, unlike German, despite Macron closing the odd one (the old one) in an attempt to appease the Greens but then he squandered it by slashing the prices of hunting licenses, for pure electoral motives. Hunting lobby is quite strong in France.
A bit late to the party, some symbolic pro-France EU statements by Josep Borrell and Ursula von der Leyen came eventually about the submarine dispute.
The negotiations between the EU and Australia about a free trade pact won't be be affected for now it seems.
Quote from: Duque de Bragança on September 21, 2021, 08:19:19 AM
Macron, as the Atlantis he is, is not really interested with a middle course with Russia. He tried that earlier on (à la Obama reset) but it did not work. The country relying on Russia is Germany, not France (Nordstream Schröder etc.). Even Poland and other CEE countries, with all their very polluting lignite or coal resources, still rely on Russian gas to a great extent.
I don't think that's the perception from the CEE - there's been repeated references to resets and diplomatic outreach to Moscow. Even earlier this year Macron and Merkel were proposing regular EU summits. I think Parly has acknowledged that in terms of concrete results from the diplomatic overtures to Russia there aren't any yet and instead we've had the poisoning of Navalny, poisoning of Skripal on the soil of another European country, continued meddling in Ukraine and Russian policy increasingly using Belarus.
It's not that France is dependent or reliant on Russia but that Macron as a matter of policy wants to re-frame European relations with Russia. I think as long as that's the French attitude then a block of countries will prefer working with and trust the Americans over France.
I also think there's something to the comment made by a British or French diplomat that the UK consistently romanticises Turkey and doesn't appreciate the threats Turkey's neighbours feel/is naive about it, and France does the same for Russia.
QuoteA bit late to the party, some symbolic pro-France EU statements by Josep Borrell and Ursula von der Leyen came eventually about the submarine dispute.
The negotiations between the EU and Australia about a free trade pact won't be be affected for now it seems.
Yeah and we'll see on the EU-US technology and trade meeting in Pittsburgh next week. Apparently the French government have requested this is delayed/postponed, but there's some resistance from the Commission and other member states.
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 21, 2021, 08:27:54 AM
Quote from: Duque de Bragança on September 21, 2021, 08:19:19 AM
Macron, as the Atlantis he is, is not really interested with a middle course with Russia. He tried that earlier on (à la Obama reset) but it did not work. The country relying on Russia is Germany, not France (Nordstream Schröder etc.). Even Poland and other CEE countries, with all their very polluting lignite or coal resources, still rely on Russian gas to a great extent.
I don't think that's the perception from the CEE - there's been repeated references to resets and diplomatic outreach to Moscow. Even earlier this year Macron and Merkel were proposing regular EU summits. I think Parly has acknowledged that in terms of concrete results from the diplomatic overtures to Russia there aren't any yet and instead we've had the poisoning of Navalny, poisoning of Skripal on the soil of another European country, continued meddling in Ukraine and Russian policy increasingly using Belarus.
It's not that France is dependent or reliant on Russia but that Macron as a matter of policy wants to re-frame European relations with Russia. I think as long as that's the French attitude then a block of countries will prefer working with and trust the Americans over France.
Even CEE vastly differs in perception towards Russia. Case in point: Poland vs Hungary. Countries such as Bulgaria are not specially anti-Putin to say the least without being tempted by a return to the Moscow umbrella.
I was not speaking about perception though. Energy is more about than perception.
One element that could help towards CEE would be the end of unrealistic demands on CEE countries to accept mass immigration of unassimilable illegal migrants under the thing guise of the latter being refugees.
Lukashenko already saw the possible wedge and now sends illegals towards Lithuania or Poland to put pressure on these countries.
I still don't see Jupin willing to be realist and acting accordingly. Some vague theatricals entirely for French internal consumption notwithstanding.
He is now doing is best Trudeau impersonation by apologizing for France, as long as he does not have to apologize for his own behavior.
From colonisation being a "crime against humanity" to now the shameful treatments of harkis (native muslim auxiliary troops during the Algerian war) he has been showing he is quite the opportunist.
Quote
I also think there's something to the comment made by a British or French diplomat that the UK consistently romanticises Turkey and doesn't appreciate the threats Turkey's neighbours feel/is naive about it, and France does the same for Russia.
The old Tory tactic of using Turkey to undermine the EU. :P
The one country supporting Greece during the squabble with Turkey was France. The one move by Jupin supported by all in France, even Marine. It also had benefits for the French armaments industry.
Germany, with so many Turks, with a sizable portion of them as a potential fifth column for Merdogan has no such margin.
QuoteA bit late to the party, some symbolic pro-France EU statements by Josep Borrell and Ursula von der Leyen came eventually about the submarine dispute.
The negotiations between the EU and Australia about a free trade pact won't be be affected for now it seems.
Quote
Yeah and we'll see on the EU-US technology and trade meeting in Pittsburgh next week. Apparently the French government have requested this is delayed/postponed, but there's some resistance from the Commission and other member states.
Jupin is also supposed to speak with Biden on the phone these days about this matter.
PS: there are talks/rumours about Naval Group selling nuclear subs to India now though given India's finances and technology transfer considerations it is too early if it will amount to something.
Zemmour now has given his opinion on the whole submarine debacle. More details later. :P
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 21, 2021, 08:00:14 AM
The big issue I think France has is their idea of European strategic independence always involves a middle course/re-set of the relationship with Russia.
To what end? It's not like the reset game has never been played before with Putin. You can reset, re-engage, do the hokey-pokey and turn yourself around. You'll still end up on the same place. Putin is who he is and he's not changing. Talking about "resets" with him just signals weakness. And what is the payoff - what does Russia have to give? Oil and gas contracts?
Quote from: The Minsky Moment on September 21, 2021, 09:54:55 AM
And what is the payoff - what does Russia have to give? Oil and gas contracts?
That is an offensive lie. It also offers post-political-career sinecures.
Quote from: The Minsky Moment on September 21, 2021, 09:54:55 AM
To what end? It's not like the reset game has never been played before with Putin. You can reset, re-engage, do the hokey-pokey and turn yourself around. You'll still end up on the same place. Putin is who he is and he's not changing. Talking about "resets" with him just signals weakness. And what is the payoff - what does Russia have to give? Oil and gas contracts?
I agree.
My point is just not only is all of that true but it undermines France's desire for European strategic autonomy (especially within the EU) because it alienates the Baltic States, Poland, Czechia and Romania who all, instead, identify the US as the best partner for their security.
It's part of the issue of European strategic autonomy doesn't necessarily mean being un-aligned with the US and would mainly support European goals in the Middle East, North Africa and the Sahel. But because of French policy towards Russia (and I think something similar happened with Australia), other important European parties don't think France is aligned with them on security so aren't as willing to align with/fall in behind French leadership on other issues. I think it's a sort of paradox for France but to actually achieve more autonomy they probably have to align more with the US not because of the US, but the European nations who look to them for security.
Edit: And I think this by Helen Thompson is very insightful on the problem for France or Macron more specifically:
QuoteThe crux of the French problem is that Macron wants something that Germany ensures is not on offer: European strategic autonomy. Macron is then prone to making decisions as if their consequences flow from the idea and not the reality of its absence.
If you already have everyone in Europe on board and working together and trusting French interests/attitudes - you can chart a compromise in the Indo-Pacific, or attempt a middle way with Russia. If you don't you're just further undermining the lack of trust and reinforcing the unwillingness to work together that is the problem to begin with.
It seems like France wants to not rely on the US, and be more autonomous, and then gets mad when the US does not include them in the latest Pacific security arrangement.
It really sucks to have to cater to your populace where you have been leveraging anti-American bullshit for the last 50 years.
Kind of like how it sucks that the American politicians have to cater to their own ati-immigrant, anti-equality morons THEY have been stroking for the last 50 years.
Apparently Vietnam and Japan just signed a defense procurement deal as well:
QuoteIn a significant development, Vietnam and Japan have inked a defence equipment and technology transfer deal that will enable the export of Japanese-made defence platforms to Hanoi. The agreement came during Japanese defence minister Nobuo Kishi's recent visit to Vietnam and is expected to elevate the two countries' defence partnership to a new level. Of course, Japan and Vietnam deepening their defence cooperation has to be seen in the context of the strategic-security situation in East Asia. And China's growing assertiveness in this region – particularly in the South and East China Seas – is the main catalyst for the adjustments.
In fact, Japan has been making some interesting moves of late which are bound to have an impact on the larger geopolitics of East Asia. Reports have surfaced of Japan's plans to ramp up the defence of its remote southwestern islands that will also help boost Taiwan's defence vis-à-vis an aggressive China. The move will see the stationing of anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles as well as hundreds of troops on Ishigaki island which is just 300 km from Taiwan. There are also plans afoot to put a Japanese electronic warfare unit on the island of Yonaguni, just 110 km from Taiwan.
Once these plans fructify, it should be difficult for China to launch a pincer attack on Taiwan with Japanese and Taiwanese defence syncing on the eastern flank. Add to this Japan claiming in its defence white paper published in July that stability in the Taiwan Strait is more important than ever. Then in late August, Taiwan and Japan's ruling parties effectively held the two sides' first 2+2 dialogue involving defence and foreign office officials.
Taken together, it is clear that Japan is going to play a crucial role in counterbalancing China in the days ahead. Of course, this is congruent with the larger US strategy in the region. As I had mentioned in one of my previous articles, a part of the reason that the US pulled out of Afghanistan was to focus on China. And we clearly see that with the Washington-Tokyo joint statement issued in April that included a direct reference to Taiwan and the recently unveiled AUKUS trilateral security partnership between Australia, US and UK whose first agenda would be to deliver nuclear submarines to Canberra.
Thus, it is clear that the US is back to deploying smart strategy along with its allies to counterbalance China instead of the rather naïve 'America First' policy adopted by the previous Trump administration. For, China today presents a systemic challenge for the US. And it can only be countered through systemic approaches with allies. This also creates options for Asean nations like Vietnam which are economically reliant on China. After all, Asean is central to Southeast Asia. But China has been weaponising economic interdependencies with regional nations. In other words, Asean nations don't have a problem with economic relations with China. But when these relations are leveraged by Beijing to press its aggressive maritime and territorial claims in the South China Sea, it becomes a problem.
With US's latest moves, Japan is playing an increasingly active regional security role, Taiwan has become a prominent regional security agenda, Australia is getting strengthened as a regional defence player, the Quad (US, Japan, Australia, India group) is growing with each step, and Asean is getting options to resist Chinese belligerence. That's quite a lot for China to think about.
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/talkingturkey/great-game-in-east-asia-from-japan-vietnam-defence-pact-to-aukus-us-and-allies-get-serious-about-countering-china/
Looks like the EU is lining up strongly behind France:
https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-charles-michel-biden-disloyalty-allies-aukus/
Quote
EU leaders accuse Biden of disloyalty to allies
Charles Michel says Trump was 'clear' about disliking Europe, Ursula von der Leyen says 'business as usual' can't continue.
BY DAVID M. HERSZENHORN
September 21, 2021 4:36 am
NEW YORK — The EU's top leaders on Monday bluntly accused U.S. President Joe Biden of disloyalty to the transatlantic alliance, and demanded he explain why he misled France and other European partners in forging a new strategic tie-up with the U.K. and Australia in the Indo-Pacific.
The extraordinary rebuke of the new American president, whose election was celebrated across Europe as an opportunity to rejuvenate ties after the four years of belligerence and combativeness of Donald J. Trump, raised the prospect of a grave and prolonged breach among Western powers.
"With the new Joe Biden administration, America is back," European Council President Charles Michel told reporters in New York, as world leaders convened for the high-level debate of the U.N. General Assembly. "What does it mean America is back? Is America back in America or somewhere else? We don't know."
By failing to consult EU nations about the new Indo-Pacific strategy, under which Australia canceled a blockbuster contract to buy French submarines, Michel said Biden had discarded an agreement reached by leaders after many hours of talks at the G7 summit in Britain in June to remain united in confronting authoritarian regimes, particularly China.
"The elementary principles for an alliance are loyalty and transparency," Michel said, adding: "We are observing a clear lack of transparency and loyalty."
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen voiced her own dismay during an interview with CNN, in which she called the treatment of France "unacceptable" and demanded Biden provide an explanation.
"There are a lot of open questions that have to be answered," von der Leyen said. "One of our member states has been treated in a way that is not acceptable, so we want to know what happened and why. And therefore you first clarify that before you keep going with business as usual."
Michel said that the 27 EU heads of state and government would discuss the rift with the U.S. over dinner on October 5 in Slovenia, ahead of a summit focused on the Western Balkans.
And von der Leyen's comment signaled potential disruption of the planned first meeting of a new EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council in Pittsburgh next week — an event that was supposed to showcase the renewed policy partnerships between Brussels and Washington.
But despite the irate rhetoric, it was unclear what, if anything, EU leaders could say or do about the matter, which some EU diplomats and officials suggested was more of a commercial dispute between Paris and Canberra, and a matter of wounded French pride, than a genuine cause for rupturing relations with the U.S. and sowing divisions that could weaken NATO.
By coming in so squarely behind French President Emmanuel Macron — who still has said nothing publicly and is not attending the U.N. meetings — Michel and von der Leyen seemed to elevate the risk of a prolonged dispute that could be exploited by China, Russia and other rivals, and to increase the difficulty in finding a face-saving exit for the Western allies.
Michel insisted the feud should not be viewed narrowly as a matter of French economic interests, but rather as part of a pattern of disregard for European allies and their interests by four U.S. presidents, beginning when George W. Bush decided to wage war in Iraq and Afghanistan.
"Obama with charisma, very polished, took important decisions in Syria with negative consequences for Europe, and we could observe also a lack of coordination, of consultation between the United States and European governments," Michel said. "At least with Donald Trump it was very, very clear that he was not in favor of the European integration, that for him Europe doesn't matter, but it was clear."
Biden, on the other hand, talked a big game about renewing transatlantic ties, according to Michel, but then railroaded European allies with his decision about following through on Trump's plan to withdraw from Afghanistan, "and," he added, "a few days ago with this strange announcement."
"When the transatlantic alliance is less robust and less solid, this is not good for the security in Europe and everywhere in the world," Michel said, adding: "This is more than a bilateral trade or industrial topic. It's more than that."
Arriving in New York City on Monday, French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian said all EU countries should be worried about the disregard the U.S. had shown its allies.
"Europeans shouldn't be the rejects of the strategy chosen by the United States," Le Drian said. "We are in this new state of mind, which means the Europeans need to identify their own strategic issues and to have a discussion with the United States on this topic."
Le Drian said that conversation was likely to occur in the context of the development of a new "strategic concept" at NATO, a tacit acknowledgment that addressing the affront by the Americans would take quite a bit of time, and some convincing of EU countries heavily reliant on the U.S. for security guarantees.
A Scandinavian diplomat said Germany "shares the French concern about the U.S. disregard of the EU in this matter" — a point that was confirmed by Manfred Weber, the German leader of the dominant conservative European People's Party (EPP) in the European Parliament.
"I think all Europeans should stand next to France because the main problem in this regard is whether we can really have with America a partnership-oriented, a trustful relationship," Weber said at a meeting of party officials in Rome. "That is at stake."
Fighting Paris' battle
While Macron has remained silent, France has moved swiftly to retaliate by recalling ambassadors and also vowing to scuttle a proposed free-trade agreement between the EU and Australia.
But despite the very public pronouncements by the EU's top presidents, some EU diplomats and officials expressed concern that France was dragging the rest of the Continent into an unnecessary fight largely because its own national ego was bruised.
"What's of concern is that Paris is presenting something which was essentially a bilateral business deal as a blow to the EU as such," said one Central European official. "I understand Paris might be offended and taken by surprise, but seriously?"
An EU diplomat from Western Europe reiterated the point: "It's seen mainly as a bilateral issue, not an European one."
The Scandinavian diplomat said there was some concern that Paris was blowing the matter out of proportion. "I think there's a little bit of surprise about the harshness of the French reaction," the diplomat said. "Is it mainly for domestic consumption? Is there a cool-headed foreign policy rationale .... or is it, plain and simple, hurt pride?"
Such misgivings, however, seemed all but certain to remain a minority view. With German Chancellor Angela Merkel about to retire, the EU is losing its most authoritative political figure, and many of the other 26 EU capitals are urgently looking to Macron, leader of the EU's second-largest member country, to help fill some of the gap.
Earlier on Monday, some EU officials and diplomats said they were wondering how far the Elysée would go in trying to reframe the fallout as a call for greater EU unity, and to push for improving joint security and military capabilities, often referred to as "strategic autonomy."
But as the day went on, that question seemed to be answered.
"I am convinced more than ever in the strategic autonomy," Michel said, adding: "The announcement made by the United States, Australia and United Kingdom of this new military alliance in the Indo-Pacific, it's only strengthening my personal opinion that we need to develop our own capacity to act,"
Weber echoed that point.
"It's another wake-up call for strengthening the European defense, European foreign affairs," Weber told POLITICO in Rome. "Everybody recognizes step-by-step that alone, as individual countries, we have no impact, no grip anymore on a global level."
Still, EU countries have long harbored doubts about France's true motivations in pushing for strategic autonomy, which many believe was cover for a "Buy French" economic development campaign on behalf of its defense contractors.
Eastern European countries in particular have long viewed the idea of strategic autonomy as dangerous and unrealistic, arguing it could undermine NATO and that Europe could never defend itself against threats, especially from Russia, without the U.S.
While the U.S. might be viewed as too important to lose, officials and diplomats said there was little reason for the EU to temper its wrath against Australia.
"Australia will pay a hefty price in terms of its relationship with the EU," a senior EU diplomat said. "France will act in areas like trade, regulation, etc. and the Commission will not stand against France on an external matter."
Moving forward
German MEP Andreas Schwab, also of the EPP, said the EU should not "lament" any perceived insult by Washington, but that Brussels should draw swift conclusions about next steps to take in its own interests.
"Europeans must not lament, they must take into consideration the fact that their investments and capacities are not as credible as what the Americans can give," Schwab said. He added that the EU must question whether having a presence in the Indo-Pacific region is worth it, rather than focusing on areas closer to home, like Ukraine, Belarus and Africa.
Michel, however, said the EU should most assuredly have a role in confronting China.
"If we think in the United States that China is the main threat for the world," he said, "it is very strange in my opinion that the United States and some other countries would make the choice to weaken the transatlantic alliance and not to strengthen the transatlantic alliance. It's very strange to put Europe out of the game in the Indo-Pacific region."
"During the G7, we spent three days, we discussed a lot about the geopolitical challenges and especially about the Indo-Pacific region and about China," Michel continued. "We discussed a lot about it, and the main conclusion was: we need to be united."
Of the new U.S., U.K., Australia agreement, dubbed AUKUS, he said: "It's difficult to see this announcement as a sign of unity."
Lili Bayer, Jacopo Barigazzi, Maïa de la Baume, Cory Bennett, Clea Caulcutt, Stuart Lau and Rym Momtaz contributed reporting.
Frankly, my impression is the EU by action and word has shown they largely
cannot be trusted to help us confront China, and that if anything even further justifies the AUKUS move.
At the end of the day the main problem the EU is going to have is none of the countries at direct risk from Russia are ever going to sign on for vague French and Germany ideas about "strategic autonomy" that will likely not be backed up with the sort of society-changing militarization necessary to be a viable protection against Russia without U.S. assistance, so what are they really talking about at the end of the day. France and a few other EU allies going it alone? To what end?
Quote from: OttoVonBismarck on September 22, 2021, 02:30:44 PM
Looks like the EU is lining up strongly behind France:
I think verbally. In practice there were EU-US trade and technology talks in Pittsburgh planned for next week which France wanted postponed until this was all resolved. The EU agreed to push it back to early October - it seems to me they've done exactly to show solidarity with France without actually doing anything that would have an effect/consequences.
Which is about the level of support from briefings on meetings of this where several European foreign ministers basically thought it was a bilateral issue for France not the EU.
I think Duda's comments were interesting, comparing it to the US acceptance of Nordstream 2.
Although Macron and Biden have had a call now and issued a joint statement which seems enough to move on - though I agree this is interesting (and if the French extract more support for their operations in the Sahel and a tighter relation with India it's not all been a loss):
Quotelaurence norman
@laurnorman
Super interesting line in Joint @JoeBiden @EmmanuelMacron
Statement that probably won't get attention it deserves. "In the framework of their joint fight against terrorism, the United States commits to reinforcing its support to counter-terrorism operations in the Sahel..."-1-
conducted by European states." That's quite a commitment given the mess right now in the Sahel and France's struggle to prevent it spiraling out of control. Also comes amid the talk of a Mali invitation to Russia's Wagner mercenary group to provide help. -2-
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/23/aukus-australia-sent-extremely-satisfied-letter-hours-before-axing-french-contract
QuoteAustralia sent 'extremely satisfied' letter hours before axing French contract
:hmm:
Quote from: garbon on September 23, 2021, 11:17:22 AM
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/23/aukus-australia-sent-extremely-satisfied-letter-hours-before-axing-french-contract
QuoteAustralia sent 'extremely satisfied' letter hours before axing French contract
:hmm:
Australia's naval liaison apparently said that it was satisfied that the technical details of the French design were good, not that the Australians were "extremely satisfied" with the overall contract performance.
Note also that this claim is being made by Naval Group, hardly an impartial observer of the situation.
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/E_5wSvQVkAYinh7?format=png&name=small)
Let's hope Biden and Macron will be able to turn this spat into something more positive when they meet next month.
Quote from: grumbler on September 23, 2021, 12:58:59 PM
Quote from: garbon on September 23, 2021, 11:17:22 AM
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/23/aukus-australia-sent-extremely-satisfied-letter-hours-before-axing-french-contract
QuoteAustralia sent 'extremely satisfied' letter hours before axing French contract
:hmm:
Australia's naval liaison apparently said that it was satisfied that the technical details of the French design were good, not that the Australians were "extremely satisfied" with the overall contract performance.
Note also that this claim is being made by Naval Group, hardly an impartial observer of the situation.
Also Australia's action had nothing to do with the performance of the French boats, but with the decision to go to nuclear propulsion for its next gen subs. It doesn't how matter how well the fork is made if you've decided to buy a spoon instead.
Quote from: The Minsky Moment on September 23, 2021, 03:17:55 PM
Quote from: grumbler on September 23, 2021, 12:58:59 PM
Quote from: garbon on September 23, 2021, 11:17:22 AM
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/23/aukus-australia-sent-extremely-satisfied-letter-hours-before-axing-french-contract (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/23/aukus-australia-sent-extremely-satisfied-letter-hours-before-axing-french-contract)
QuoteAustralia sent 'extremely satisfied' letter hours before axing French contract
:hmm:
Australia's naval liaison apparently said that it was satisfied that the technical details of the French design were good, not that the Australians were "extremely satisfied" with the overall contract performance.
Note also that this claim is being made by Naval Group, hardly an impartial observer of the situation.
Also Australia's action had nothing to do with the performance of the French boats, but with the decision to go to nuclear propulsion for its next gen subs. It doesn't how matter how well the fork is made if you've decided to buy a spoon instead.
Australia bought nuclear submarines that had to be converted to diesel power at their request. Then they changed their mind midway through the modification process and went elsewhere to get nuclear subs.
Had they asked France for nuclear subs in the first place, France would have happily provided them, like they are doing with Brazil, even building the necessary infrastructure.
I don't think that's right on France being happy to transfer nuclear tech - I don't think that's what they're doing with Brazil and from my understanding France is very reluctant to share nuclear propulsion tech.
But yeah - I think Australia's changed their mind and in 2016 they considered nuclear subs and it was very controversial given Australia's general anti-nuclear history (which is weird given 30% of the world's uranium is in Australia - and has led instead to a massive coal sector). It's only five years later but this decision is being backed by both the Liberals and Labor.
Edit: But I wonder if France might do a deal with India - as I say I think that would be the big de Gaulle move - and frankly, the closer ties France has been encouraging with India since this happened and US commitment to Sahel is the real positive stuff here (from France's perspective), not Biden travelling to Europe for talks. It probably doesn't outweight the loss of the contract plus Australian relations but it isn't nothing.
Quote from: viper37 on September 23, 2021, 03:47:17 PM
Quote from: The Minsky Moment on September 23, 2021, 03:17:55 PM
Quote from: grumbler on September 23, 2021, 12:58:59 PM
Quote from: garbon on September 23, 2021, 11:17:22 AM
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/23/aukus-australia-sent-extremely-satisfied-letter-hours-before-axing-french-contract (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/sep/23/aukus-australia-sent-extremely-satisfied-letter-hours-before-axing-french-contract)
QuoteAustralia sent 'extremely satisfied' letter hours before axing French contract
:hmm:
Australia's naval liaison apparently said that it was satisfied that the technical details of the French design were good, not that the Australians were "extremely satisfied" with the overall contract performance.
Note also that this claim is being made by Naval Group, hardly an impartial observer of the situation.
Also Australia's action had nothing to do with the performance of the French boats, but with the decision to go to nuclear propulsion for its next gen subs. It doesn't how matter how well the fork is made if you've decided to buy a spoon instead.
Australia bought nuclear submarines that had to be converted to diesel power at their request. Then they changed their mind midway through the modification process and went elsewhere to get nuclear subs.
Had they asked France for nuclear subs in the first place, France would have happily provided them, like they are doing with Brazil, even building the necessary infrastructure.
Halfway through the modification process! Incredible!
How many of the subs had been modified already?
https://www.politico.eu/article/why-australia-wanted-out-of-its-french-sub-deal/
This has been a long time coming.
If France is shocked, SHOCKED I SAY! that Australia is walking away from a deal that is years behind schedule before production has even started, at a cost that is nearly double the original estimate, and France has already backed away from the promise of using 90% AUS labor down to 60%, and was actively in the process of trying to whittle even THAT number down lower....well, they are just utterly clueless about their own customers.
There is no great mystery here. Australia has been looking for a way out for sometime now. They found it.
Quote from: Berkut on September 23, 2021, 10:43:12 PM
https://www.politico.eu/article/why-australia-wanted-out-of-its-french-sub-deal/
This has been a long time coming.
If France is shocked, SHOCKED I SAY! that Australia is walking away from a deal that is years behind schedule before production has even started, at a cost that is nearly double the original estimate, and France has already backed away from the promise of using 90% AUS labor down to 60%, and was actively in the process of trying to whittle even THAT number down lower....well, they are just utterly clueless about their own customers.
There is no great mystery here. Australia has been looking for a way out for sometime now. They found it.
Reminds me of the F-35.
Would Virginia class boats just be too much for what Australia is looking for?
Although that would kill the idea of them being built in Australia....
https://www.forbes.com/sites/craighooper/2021/09/20/everybody-wins-if-australia-gets-new-los-angeles-class-subs-asap/?sh=25f9388d4a6b
An interesting idea.
Right now the US is planning on "refueling" the six youngest Los Angeles class subs with surplus reactors, to get another ten years out of them.
Any new Australian nuke sub is going to be a long time coming - why not have Australia lease those 6 LA class subs instead, after the US refuels them? Not a permanent solution of course, but it would then let Australia save the money they were going to spend to keep their 6 aged Collins class boats in service, and get them started on the road to building the shoreside infrastructure they will need to service, maintain, and train a nuclear navy.
The US would get to have those 6 subs still basically in service, albeit with an ally instead of directly, and it would allow the US to more quickly transition to a purely Virginia attack sub fleet, with the commensurate saving on training and maintenance for a retired class of subs.
Quote from: viper37 on September 23, 2021, 03:47:17 PM
Had they asked France for nuclear subs in the first place, France would have happily provided them, like they are doing with Brazil, even building the necessary infrastructure.
Once you decide to go nuclear though, it would be really, really stupid to choose France as your supplier over the US or the UK.
French nuclear subs are considerably less capable, and their technology is not even close to US nuke power plant designs. Or UK designs, for that matter.
Really, the US has only ever shared nuke power plant tech with the UK. And the US technology is far, far ahead of anyone else - I mean, the US has a hell of a lot more experience then anyone else, so that should come as no surprise.
The US agreeing to this means a lot more then just selling a dozen submarines. Nuclear propulsion tech is insanely jealously guarded.
Speculation is that it is very possible, maybe even likely that Australia will get Virginias:
QuoteWhich submarine the Australians end up building could also present specific workforce challenges. Most analysts noted the amount of time and money required for designing and developing a new boat from scratch makes it an unlikely option.
Instead, Bryan Clark, a fellow at the Hudson Institute, predicted the US Navy's Virginia-class submarine would be a logical choice.
Clark said the Australians' original deal with the French — which has now been scrapped — called for $66 billion to buy 12 boats. If research and development costs can be minimized due to the work already done in the US, Clark theorized the deal could include 12 Virginia-class submarines costing roughly $3 billion each, with the rest of the funds going towards building domestic infrastructure, construction and maintenance.
"Because submarines are the one part of the US Navy shipbuilding infrastructure that is maxed out right now, building 12 VA-class for the [Royal Australian Navy] will mean 12 US VA-class will not get built," Clark said. "That could be part of the administrations' plan, since arguably those are still 12 SSNs for the alliance, but they would be paid for by Australia. However, those boats cannot help with US missions elsewhere."
The announcement Wednesday evening made clear the Australian government is keen to tout job creation as a benefit of this deal. But it is not clear whether those manufacturing jobs in Australia would be for building components from scratch or whether they would complete the assembly process. Either way, US industry would be taxed either in raw manufacturing capacity or having to send experts currently working on American Virginia-class submarines to Australia.
https://breakingdefense.com/2021/09/new-australia-nuclear-sub-deal-brings-big-questions-hard-road-ahead/
My prediction:
The US sells or leases a couple Virgnias to Australia in the next decade to get their capability, training, and infrastructure going.
There is an announced plan to build the other 6 Virginias in Australia, from components manufactured in the US. There will be delays, and the first 2 or 3 end up getting built in the US, with maybe the last three being actually assembled in Australia.
The Astutes are a possibility as well, but they are not in production anymore, as I understand it? Isn't the UK starting a new design?
Quote from: Berkut on September 23, 2021, 10:57:53 PM
Would Virginia class boats just be too much for what Australia is looking for?
Although that would kill the idea of them being built in Australia....
I would've thought yes to be honest, it's very interesting that it's starting to sound like they may just get Virginia class submarines, and some portions of the manufacture done in Australia.
Quote from: Berkut on September 24, 2021, 12:13:36 AM
My prediction:
The US sells or leases a couple Virgnias to Australia in the next decade to get their capability, training, and infrastructure going.
There is an announced plan to build the other 6 Virginias in Australia, from components manufactured in the US. There will be delays, and the first 2 or 3 end up getting built in the US, with maybe the last three being actually assembled in Australia.
The Astutes are a possibility as well, but they are not in production anymore, as I understand it? Isn't the UK starting a new design?
I could be wrong but I think the Astutes are still in active production. The Dreadnought class, which are ballistic missile subs, are under construction now and use a new reactor design--The Rolls-Royce PWR3, which is basically a "Rolls-Royce version of an American design." The Rolls-Royce PWR2 was largely independently designed by RR and is what powers the current gen Astutes. The Rolls-Royce PWR1 which goes back to the 60s now, was largely developed due to large scale and comprehensive technology transfers from the United States to RR--in exchange we got a lot of sharing from the Brits back on basic sub design.
So PWR1 can be seen as basically British made but significantly designed by the U.S. Building on that expertise in the mid-80s RR produced the PWR2 which is basically British designed, albeit derived from the original American technology--General Dynamics also did do some technology transfer of U.S. nuclear reactor design for PWR2, but PWR2 is much more of a British endeavor than PWR2.
My understanding is PWR3 in a sense kind of goes back more to being more significantly designed using American nuclear reactor design.
The PWR2 is a pretty good reactor w/an expected lifespan of 30 years before it would need refueling (which is expected to be longer than the life of the ships.) The PWR2 produces 27,500 shaft horsepower. The Virignias are powered by the S9G reactor--they can go 33 years between refueling and generate 40,000 shaft horsepower.
Quote from: viper37 on September 23, 2021, 03:47:17 PM
Australia bought nuclear submarines that had to be converted to diesel power at their request. Then they changed their mind midway through the modification process and went elsewhere to get nuclear subs.
Had they asked France for nuclear subs in the first place, France would have happily provided them, like they are doing with Brazil, even building the necessary infrastructure.
Australia bought a conventional variant on a French nuclear submarine design, with the specific intention of being able to complete some of the later-built versions as nuclear submarines, if the situation warranted. Over time, though, the French design evolved to lose the nuclear alternative, which made the Australians unhappy.
The French are not providing nuclear submarine technology to Brazil; they are merely helping the Brazilians redesign their existing
Scorpène submarine design to accommodate a Brazilian-designed-and-built nuclear reactor.
The Brazilian project is nuts. They are going to be commissioning, in 2034, a sub whose design is 20 years old at a cost equivalent to the cost of a
Nimitz-class carrier.
I don't think much of anyone really understands the import of the US taking Australia into the US/UK nuclear propulsion fold.
Nuclear propulsion reactors for subs are probably the MOST tightly controlled and guarded military technology in existence outside of actual nuclear weapons.
And quite frankly, when it comes to this tech, it is the USA, and then the UK in a distant second, then France/Russia in a FAR FAR distant third, and then China/India?
The US has built hundreds of these power plants over the last half century, with a perfect safety record to boot. The latest US nuke plants are smaller, quieter, with radically greater range, and vastly safer. The US has the infrastructure and experience. They have the ability to train and the size and scale that matters.
France has no shot at a deal like this the moment the US decides to come to the table.
And the deal makes great sense from the perspective of the US, right now. It will basically allow the US to increase its effective fleet size in counter to China on Australias dime, AND will give the US sub fleet bases and support.
The US is looking at having about 30 Virginia SSNs eventually. In a potential conflict with China, that means maybe 18 or so might be available in that theater. If Australia gets an additional 8, then you could imagine 5-6 of those 8 being available in a potential conflict. That is about a 30% increase in naval projection where it matters.
This is a brilliant move by Biden.
It'll be interesting to see how Australia goes about turning its Navy into a nuclear Navy, it's a pretty big transition. I like to shit on the Navy as much as the next guy who was in the Army but even I always had a lot of respect for Naval submarine officers. They're really among the very best of the best people we have in any part of the armed forces. Every submarine officer on a sub has to go through nuclear school and understand how the reactors work--a lot of people assume it is just the ship's engineer officer who does that, which isn't accurate, every submarine officer on board in theory could serve as the ship's engineer if necessary [not every officer on the sub will be a submarine officer, there's still supply officers etc]. The Navy's nuclear power school in South Carolina, AFAIK is considered the hardest and most rigorous academic program in the U.S. military. It's 24 weeks of ~45 hours a week classroom instruction with an expected outside of class study workload of 35 hours a week. I think you only get two chances to past the exams at the end and after that your time in the submarine program comes to an end and you'd get reassigned to another part of the Navy.
The rigorous training and high standards among the U.S. nuclear submarine sailors and officers has resulted in a service record of 6200 reactor years, over 526 reactor cores, and 240 million kilometers traveled without a single occurrence of a radiological incident. For comparison during the Cold War ten different Soviet nuclear subs experienced radiological accidents, and an 11th had a criticality incident during refueling.
It makes me wonder if the entire angst from Frane is just pure posturing for domestic consumption.
Because any competent French naval authority would tell Australia "Yeah, you should definitely drop us if you can get US/UK nuke boats instead". At least, that is what they should say if they actually care about making their allies stronger....
I mean, not only are they much better subs, they are likely to end up considerably less expensive! I've been seeing numbers like $3billion per sub - they want 8. Even if they buy 12, that is $36 billion versus like the $60 billion they were going to pay France for 12 diesel boats! I know some of that is infrastructure as well, but still....it is very likely that buying Virginias from the US is both cheaper and much less risky, financially. We've built, launched and commissioned like....15 already? So the price is pretty well understood at this point.
I'd probably wait until at least the end of the 18 month technical scoping before we start talking about the price comparison - and if the primary drivers for moving were the price increases and delays Australia may be disappointed by the thrilling delights of American and British defence procurement :ph34r: :weep: Especially as I expect part of this will be not ust buying subs but building the industry around them in Australia both for - as the UK basing comments put it - "deep maintenance" for the UK and, I imagine, US fleet in the South Pacific and Australia's own fleet.
I don't think this is purely for domestic consumption at all - there may be an element of that. But this isn't a purely naval authority question or issue for France - if anything I think the Naval group would quite like everyone to calm down (not least because this may make it a little more challenging to win contracts elsewhere). The noise has been coming from foreign policy writers, the most outraged appears to have been the Foreign Minister etc - as I say the French were talking about their relationship with Australia, with the sub deal as a foundational piece, as a marriage. It was the centre of their Indo-Pacific strategy and, perhaps tellingly, developed when the American President wasn't particularly interested in building or developing alliances. As I say - I think not unrelatedly - this has been pushed by the non-Gaullist wing of the French establishment as the way of France's approach "complementing" the US's strategy and it's ended like this, so the Gaullist wing they've spent their careers fighting are now gloating.
The other side to it is probably strategic - you kick up enough of a fuss and you use it to get leverage. So the US is now committing more to the Sahel (the joint mission in Mali was also mentioned in the Johnson-Macron read out) - and France have left it open for DC and London to work out other ways to "re-build" the relationship. All of those are minor wins for France. In addition they can turn to the rest of Europe and say, with some legitimacy, the US is unpredictable, the Anglos aren't trustworthy and we need to develop European defence/strategic autonomy - that reinforces the argument Macron's been making his entire time in office. It may not lead to anything but you're able to leverage an unfortunate event (getting shafted on a big contract and not included in a new formal structure) into extracting more from the UK and US, while also using it in Europe. I don't know if they get any of that by demurely going along.
How does this show that the US is unpredictable?
The US is taking in another strategic partner into the "special relationship". This is as un-Trump as anything can be, and is clearly about the US engaging more closely with a critical regional ally in the region of the world that is clearly going to define the next century.
The US didn't break a deal with anyone, the US didn't back out of any of our commitments to Europe. How is the US unreliable NOW?
I mean, if you want to say our reliability took a huge hit from the last four years of Trump, and the new reality that if someone like him can get elected once, someone like him can get elected again, ok - that I can understand. But this move by Biden is exactly the opposite of that - this is the US tying itself to another country halfway around the globe in a manner we have not done since signing the NATO treaty.
France literally couldn't predict it - would other NATO (European members) have more advanced sight if the US decided to move in and replace them in a core part of their strategy in x part of the world. It was also an incredibly well kept secret that shocked analysts from everywhere as far as I can see. The one view I've not seen oon this is: "well that was predictable and as expected" :P As you point it's only the second time the US has shared nuclear technology with
To an extent it's a re-iteration of the Franco-British divide since Suez - both of which are pretty accurate and sort of reasonable responses to the dilemma.
For the British it reinforces the view that they can do nothing without the Americans and anything they try to do without American support can have the rug pulled from it in a second if the mood shifts in Washington (Australia came to the UK - they needed to bring the Americans on board) - so their strategy is staying as close as you can to the US to try and have sight of what's next and influence from inside a very tight alliance. For the French it reinforces their view that French interests are not necessarily American interests and they should be under no illusion about that, or that the US will sacrifice or perhaps even compromise on theirs for the sake of France's - so their strategy is to be "allied but not aligned", ensure they have a degree of ability to operate independently and work to make Adenauer's promise that Europe will be France's revenge one day come true.
That is a trite definition of the term.
Maybe - but it's why I used predictable instead of reliable.
As I mentioned I think the most interesting European (non-French) comment on this was Duda who compared it to Biden's shift on Nordstream 2, that "I understand that when they say it's a European problem, the French mean that if they can be treated this way, everyone else can be treated this way too. I can say the same about NS2 [...] It's no wonder that the French are bitter about it and are protesting. On the other hand you could say that for the US it's a way of achieving some American interests." I think that's sort of a fair summary - don't put too much of your trust in giants or at least know the risk.
I don't see how America gets blamed on NS2; that was clearly a German issue. The problem was disunity in Europe with the German half of the Franco-German engine shearing off and pursuing its own agenda. For years all the US did was talk and toss around a few meaningless sanctions. By the time Biden was inaugurated the project was a fait accompli, done and built. His choice was between grudging acceptance of a fait accompli and imposing bruising financial sanctions against a key NATO ally and the largest country in the EU. He does the former and is accused of untrustworthiness; had he done the latter, he would be accused of bullying an ally and abusing American financial power.
it's basically blaming the US for failing to use coercion to compensate for a huge failure in intra-EU diplomacy.
The core issue is France thinks it can still operate as a great power, it simply cannot. France interprets EU strategic autonomy to mean "the EU following behind France, allowing France to act as a great power through the virtue of a compliant EU following its lead." That just isn't reality. France could be the leader of creating an EU lead autonomous force, but its interests would need to be shaped around those of the broader EU, not France's. France is frankly far too "short term selfish" in its thinking. De Gaulle and Trump would have gotten along quite well I think.
Trump looked at a lot of our relationships and alliances and saw "one sided deals" because he didn't understand there was another layer to the game, and that most our "one sided" relationships, like with NATO, South Korea, Japan, are actually very significant American assets.
So you have France wanting to use the EU to promote its own strategic autonomy, which is silly and will never work. You have them wanting to leverage Australia to enhance its position in the Indo-Pacific but they were bending the Aussies over the barrel on the money and the contract. First agreeing to 90% of the construction being done in Australia (part of how Turnbull justified the deal was the Australian jobs), then reducing that to 60%, then indicating even that was too high. Let costs rocket higher etc. And France was certainly not offering to help Australia become a nuclear Navy, and it is unclear if France would be actually willing to share that technology.
If France wants to be the leading nation in an EU centric autonomous force, it is probably positioned to be--it is the most powerful military in the EU and the most outward thinking of the large economies. But that means France has to look at situations like the plight of the Eastern Europeans and realize it has to come around to satisfying the concerns of countries like Poland and the Baltics, that means doing things that short term aren't easily identified as being in France's interests, but could long term build an autonomous EU with France as its pre-eminent power.
But the France way of thinking is still clearly "we're a great power, countries like Italy, Poland, Australia, Indonesia, etc should just hitch their cars to our locomotive and we'll drive."
Quote from: The Minsky Moment on September 24, 2021, 01:46:35 PM
I don't see how America gets blamed on NS2; that was clearly a German issue. The problem was disunity in Europe with the German half of the Franco-German engine shearing off and pursuing its own agenda. For years all the US did was talk and toss around a few meaningless sanctions. By the time Biden was inaugurated the project was a fait accompli, done and built. His choice was between grudging acceptance of a fait accompli and imposing bruising financial sanctions against a key NATO ally and the largest country in the EU. He does the former and is accused of untrustworthiness; had he done the latter, he would be accused of bullying an ally and abusing American financial power.
it's basically blaming the US for failing to use coercion to compensate for a huge failure in intra-EU diplomacy.
I don't think Duda or the Poles are blaming the US for NS2 - I think they absolutely do blame Germany and sort of France, which is why Poland is still so committed to the US and NATO.
I think the point is that - from a Polish perspective - this came out of the clear blue sky from a country they thought was aligned and they were relying on. The US also, from what I can see, got very little in return. It probably made the decision probably based on the factors you've explained. It's not blaming the US or Biden for it, just noting that if American interests change then policy may change quickly and without any forewarning - and that's on an issue that's had broad bipartisan support and has been a Polish (and other NATO and EU countries') priority for a number of years.
Otto - totally agree with that. The other point I'd add is that I think part of this isn't simply France wanting to operate like a great power. A large part of it I think is saying Europe when they mean EU, saying EU when they mean France and Germany.
I think France still focuses too much on Germany and sees unlocking German support as the secret to European strategic autonomy (which is a similar delusion to British governments thinking that unlocking German support was the key to a good Brexit deal). Because of that I think France identifies its intersts with Germany, when they aren't necessarily aligned. I think that feeds into France's Russia policy, which in turn undermines support for anything like European strategic autonomy in large chunks of Europe (and chunks that are more willing to spend money on defence and use their forces overseas). I still think there is a romantic notion in the Quay d'Orsay that Paris and Moscow are somehow naturally aligned and should be settling the politics of Europe between them but that's a separate thing. Another example of this is Baltic nations threatening to pull out of the Sahel if Mali does accept Russian mercenaries.
The same sort of applies in the Med - the UK has broadly withdrawn from the Med and is not particularly interested (it is, if anything, now more focused on the Baltic and Black Seas). France should be trying to work with Italy and align policies there because Italy is a power in the Med. Instead France and Italy are funding opposing sides in Libya (France is aligned with the Gulf + Egypt, Italy with Turkey + Qatar) which makes any common European policy in North Africa difficult.
The model for France should be the way they backed up Greece against Turkey in the last few years - make the interests of Europe's periphery theirs, so they are the best partner those countries have. They should be looking to do that in Eastern Europe - I'd recommend increasing their Baltic deployment right now - and trying to work out a common approach with Italy. Instead I expect they will focus on Berlin and probably do a Franco-German-Russian summit with the new Chancellor :(
One thing that the NS2 affair shows up is a structural weakness in US foreign policy that crosses partisan boundaries and administrations; indeed the difficulties inherent in maintaining consistent policy across presidential administrations in the US system is a driver. Faced with difficult and intransigent problems like managing North Korea or containing Russia, there is a tendency to fall back on a combination of "managing" the problem by kicking it down the road and occasionally engaging in symbolic gestures like travel sanctions. The US never had a real policy on NS2 other than a rhetorical one, so the "shift" was not really a meaningful change in substance and the lack of return reflects the lack of policy impact in the first place.
Quote from: Berkut on September 24, 2021, 12:19:50 PM
How does this show that the US is unpredictable?
You just left Afghanistan rot and crumble under its own weight because that's what the population wanted. 5 years ago, a moron was elected promising to put US first and saying a big fuck you to everyone. Now, he stands ready for round 2 and still has a good chance of returning to the presidency. Then the new guy comes in and backstabs an ally.
This is why the US is unpredictable.
Keep in mind on its worst day I don't know that the U.S. has ever been as unreliable an ally as the French. I doubt the Poles have ever, or will ever, forget 1939.
France has always been the Jay Gatsby of Western diplomacy, behaves like a lout and a boor, fucks over everyone, but hey--Jay is cool, he throws the best parties and fucks the best women. You're not cool if you take issue with Jay. Likewise it's never "cool" for some reason to call out the endless examples of French diplomatic and strategic shittiness and selfishness, but even minor breaches by the United States are howled about with the fury of a typhoon.
Quote from: viper37 on September 24, 2021, 02:38:44 PM
Quote from: Berkut on September 24, 2021, 12:19:50 PM
How does this show that the US is unpredictable?
You just left Afghanistan rot and crumble under its own weight because that's what the population wanted. 5 years ago, a moron was elected promising to put US first and saying a big fuck you to everyone. Now, he stands ready for round 2 and still has a good chance of returning to the presidency. Then the new guy comes in and backstabs an ally.
This is why the US is unpredictable.
Good job repeating exactly what I said, while cutting out my saying it so you could look like you said it instead?
I don't know - I think France gets called out plenty here. I mentioned earlier the, in my view astute remark, take from a German IR academic that for France to be kicking off was a bit much given the way its spies, oil executives, arms dealers, diplomats and politicians have shafted friends and allies over the years. I mean France has literally couped countries to win back oil contracts.
I think that was the same sense in Johnson's remark that "some of our dearest friends in the world" should "donnez-moi un break" is similarly motivated by a sense that I think there's no chance France wouldn't do the exact same thing if it was in the US/UK's position. From my understand that's a position shared by officialdom and politicians alike so it's not just a Number 10 thing.
Edit: And on the British angle it looks like UK also looking to strengthen ties with Canada :hmm:
https://www.cbc.ca/amp/1.6187347
QuoteBritain is signalling its interest in working with the Canadian military in the Arctic by offering to take part in cold-weather exercises and bring in some of its more advanced capabilities — such as nuclear-powered submarines — to help with surveillance and defence in the Far North.
In a recent exclusive interview with CBC News, the United Kingdom's top military commander said his country is "keen to cooperate" and learn more about how to survive and fight in a cold, remote setting.
Gen. Sir Nick Carter said Britain would also like to "cooperate in terms of helping Canada do what Canada needs to do as an Arctic country."
Quote from: OttoVonBismarck on September 24, 2021, 02:51:19 PM
Keep in mind on its worst day I don't know that the U.S. has ever been as unreliable an ally as the French. I doubt the Poles have ever, or will ever, forget 1939.
France declared war on Germany and mobilized its army. England signed that pact too and didn't raise a finger either. Neither country was ready despite multiple signs of what would happen, eventually.
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 24, 2021, 03:27:09 PM
Edit: And on the British angle it looks like UK also looking to strengthen ties with Canada :hmm:
https://www.cbc.ca/amp/1.6187347
QuoteBritain is signalling its interest in working with the Canadian military in the Arctic by offering to take part in cold-weather exercises and bring in some of its more advanced capabilities — such as nuclear-powered submarines — to help with surveillance and defence in the Far North.
In a recent exclusive interview with CBC News, the United Kingdom's top military commander said his country is "keen to cooperate" and learn more about how to survive and fight in a cold, remote setting.
Gen. Sir Nick Carter said Britain would also like to "cooperate in terms of helping Canada do what Canada needs to do as an Arctic country."
I'm not sure any government wants to buy another batch of UK submarines :P
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 24, 2021, 03:27:09 PM
I don't know - I think France gets called out plenty here. I mentioned earlier the, in my view astute remark, take from a German IR academic that for France to be kicking off was a bit much given the way its spies, oil executives, arms dealers, diplomats and politicians have shafted friends and allies over the years. I mean France has literally couped countries to win back oil contracts.
I think that was the same sense in Johnson's remark that "some of our dearest friends in the world" should "donnez-moi un break" is similarly motivated by a sense that I think there's no chance France wouldn't do the exact same thing if it was in the US/UK's position. From my understand that's a position shared by officialdom and politicians alike so it's not just a Number 10 thing.
Edit: And on the British angle it looks like UK also looking to strengthen ties with Canada :hmm:
https://www.cbc.ca/amp/1.6187347
QuoteBritain is signalling its interest in working with the Canadian military in the Arctic by offering to take part in cold-weather exercises and bring in some of its more advanced capabilities — such as nuclear-powered submarines — to help with surveillance and defence in the Far North.
In a recent exclusive interview with CBC News, the United Kingdom's top military commander said his country is "keen to cooperate" and learn more about how to survive and fight in a cold, remote setting.
Gen. Sir Nick Carter said Britain would also like to "cooperate in terms of helping Canada do what Canada needs to do as an Arctic country."
You forgot the franglais prenez un grip adressed to France. :thumbsdown:
Very close phonetically to the French "prenez en grippe" :D
I guess he preferred Latin and Ancient Greek.
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 24, 2021, 12:33:36 PM
France literally couldn't predict it - would other NATO (European members) have more advanced sight if the US decided to move in and replace them in a core part of their strategy in x part of the world. It was also an incredibly well kept secret that shocked analysts from everywhere as far as I can see. The one view I've not seen oon this is: "well that was predictable and as expected" :P
The only people who predicted it were the Australian analysts. But, then, they had access to the actual decision-makers and knew what they were thinking.
Given that France was going to lose that contract, what would have been predictable was the Japanese picking it up, except that the Australian government unpredictably decided to go nuclear, and the US predictably agreed to share the technology. That the US predictably didn't share the technology with countries it couldn't rely on to keep its secrets safe was, predictably, not an issue with a fellow member of the Five Eyes.
Quote from: viper37 on September 24, 2021, 02:38:44 PM
You just left Afghanistan rot and crumble under its own weight because that's what the population wanted. 5 years ago, a moron was elected promising to put US first and saying a big fuck you to everyone. Now, he stands ready for round 2 and still has a good chance of returning to the presidency. Then the new guy comes in and backstabs an ally.
This is why the US is unpredictable.
Berkut did nothing of the sort. The national Government of Afghanistan, without the involvement of Berkut at all, surrendered to the Taliban with barely a whimper. The US government, predictably, didn't want to see American soldiers die for a government whose own citizens wouldn't risk death for.
That's why national interests are predictable.
France kicking up a fuss is making the best out of a bad situation. I keep hearing it's for national consumption but nobody in France cares about Australia. Imho it will have zero influence in any upcoming election.
What I believe is going on is French diplomats trying to make the case that you can't rely on the Anglos and to push for European defence. Recent and not so recent events have made the case for them.
Every crisis is an opportunity. I have every confidence in the Quai d'Orsay (and its myriad of irregulars) making the best of it.
Quote from: Zoupa on September 24, 2021, 10:21:32 PM
France kicking up a fuss is making the best out of a bad situation. I keep hearing it's for national consumption but nobody in France cares about Australia. Imho it will have zero influence in any upcoming election.
What I believe is going on is French diplomats trying to make the case that you can't rely on the Anglos and to push for European defence. Recent and not so recent events have made the case for them.
Every crisis is an opportunity. I have every confidence in the Quai d'Orsay (and its myriad of irregulars) making the best of it.
So the US radically increasing one of its allies ability to defend itself is somehow evidence that the US cannot be relied upon to defend its allies?
How does that make any sense at all?
If you broadly define the US, France, AUS, and the EU for that matter, as generally "allies" in the sense of shared values and global interests, then France (absent wanting a bunch of cash) ought to be looking at this as a net gain. Australia with a dozen Virginia class attack subs is, without question, better defended and a stronger ally then Australia with a dozen diesel Barracudas, or even a dozen nuke Barracudas at twice the cost.
So how does this outcome suggesting that the Anglos cannot be relied on?
I can see an argument to be made that France cannot be relied on to put their desire for piles of cash aside when it comes to defending their allies. That might be something for the EU to think about when the subject of Russian petro interests and Chinese markets comes up in the future.
I'm not engaging with your strawmen Berkut.
I'm simply saying that I think French diplomats will get a lot of mileage out of our allies amateurish displays.
Quote from: grumbler on September 24, 2021, 10:12:19 PM
That the US predictably didn't share the technology with countries it couldn't rely on to keep its secrets safe was,
if that was an actual worry in the US, no one would agree to work with Trump :P
Quote from: grumbler on September 24, 2021, 10:16:09 PM
Quote from: viper37 on September 24, 2021, 02:38:44 PM
You just left Afghanistan rot and crumble under its own weight because that's what the population wanted. 5 years ago, a moron was elected promising to put US first and saying a big fuck you to everyone. Now, he stands ready for round 2 and still has a good chance of returning to the presidency. Then the new guy comes in and backstabs an ally.
This is why the US is unpredictable.
Berkut did nothing of the sort. The national Government of Afghanistan, without the involvement of Berkut at all, surrendered to the Taliban with barely a whimper. The US government, predictably, didn't want to see American soldiers die for a government whose own citizens wouldn't risk death for.
That's why national interests are predictable.
The US announced a peace treaty with the Taliban without even consulting with the Afghan government.
That was after 3 years of fucking up the Afghan situation where the Talebans steadily gained ground.
Afghan was called a "failed country" for a reason. If the objective was to simply punish the Talibans, the US didn't need any NATO allies and only had to send a couple of missiles over Kabul back in 2001. Done deal, let's move on.
The moment you engage in rebuilding a country, trying to change it to become something else, it's a long term process. The US basically abandonned Afghanistan in 2003 to go fight in Iraq. Intelligence resources were no longer there, and only an handful of Airforce soldiers were left on the field.
Obama attempted a counter-surge, but it's something that can't be fixed simply by military power. If it had, the US would have been victorious two decades ago.
It's an exercise in political shaping of a non existent country, from the ground up. It takes time and dedication. And deciding on a fixed time table is simply the wrong way to attack the problem.
America lost its appetite for foreign conflicts. That makes it an unreliable ally. That others could be relied upon in the same situation is neither here nor there. The point is the US can't be relied upon to see any conflict through its ultimate resolution.
If we're talking Afghanistan specifically, it's not just the US fault, it's not a burden it should have been alone to share, and France in particular, could have done a lot more than dragging their 2003&on.
But, with regards to the contract, say what you will, but if the situation had been reveserd, and France had push a country to cancel it's F-35 contract in favour of adopting the Rafale, you and Berkut would be talking Freedom Fried and a ban on Cabernet by now. Just as you were pissed when El-Chi sent a big "fuck you" to the US when declining to participate in the Iraq war. Given how this one turned out to, I guess he was right back then, even if the wrong reason.
Plenty of countries have left the F-35 deal and no one here raised a peep.
Quote from: Berkut on September 25, 2021, 07:46:23 AM
So the US radically increasing one of its allies ability to defend itself is somehow evidence that the US cannot be relied upon to defend its allies?
I know next to nothing about nuclear submarines capabalities, but let's assume you and Grumbler are right and the US does have the best nuclear submarine technology currently in use.
If the best nuclear sub tech was French instead of American, do you think Biden's government would have talked to France, and told them: let's work together on helping Austalia develop nuclear maintenance facilities for a fleet of nuclear submarines instead of selling them diesel subs?
The answer: nah. It's a question of money first&foremost. Creating good paying jobs in the US will be infinately more popular than upgrading the military capabilities of a foreign country. It's the same in France, in Canada, in the UK, everywhere: domestic issues count for much more political gains than any kind of foreign issue.
But it's still backstabbing an ally. It's like seducing your best friend's girlfriend because you believe you are better than him.
The "chad US DESTROYING virgin France" narrative may not only be factually challenged but also less than productive.
Quote from: Zoupa on September 25, 2021, 05:16:52 PM
I'm not engaging with your strawmen Berkut.
I'm simply saying that I think French diplomats will get a lot of mileage out of our allies amateurish displays.
I totally agree - and so far they've already extracted ongoing US commitment to the Sahel, they've told London to come up with ideas to get the relationship back on some sort of course and they are pushing the strategic autonomy idea.
It's probably not enough to outweigh the loss of the contract and the Australian relationship, but it's something that France wouldn't have if they just meekly accepted this. Although, as I say, I think all the rhetoric and reason in the world won't matter in terms of European strategic autonomy for the reasons I mentioned with OvB.
QuoteAmerica lost its appetite for foreign conflicts. That makes it an unreliable ally. That others could be relied upon in the same situation is neither here nor there. The point is the US can't be relied upon to see any conflict through its ultimate resolution.
I don't think Afghanistan proves much and I don't think the US wants conflicts or that's the right barometer. But I think that US focus is going to be on the Pacific and China, so short of a full-blown Russian invasion they will care less about European relationships, unless those countries are helping in the Pacific or sort of keeping China from gaining too much influence in the European end of the continent.
Basically I think over the last decade Europe (and its neighbourhood) has gone from the heart of American foreign policy which it's been for the entire post-war to, basically, being like Pakistan or the Phillipines or Japan were in the Cold War.
Quote from: viper37 on September 25, 2021, 05:34:59 PM
The US announced a peace treaty with the Taliban without even consulting with the Afghan government.
That's not true.
QuoteThat was after 3 years of fucking up the Afghan situation where the Talebans steadily gained ground.
If by "3 years of fucking up the Afghan situation" you mean leaving troops there to defend a government no Afghan would defend, that's true - but that wasn't clear at the time.
QuoteAfghan was called a "failed country" for a reason. If the objective was to simply punish the Talibans, the US didn't need any NATO allies and only had to send a couple of missiles over Kabul back in 2001. Done deal, let's move on.
Since that wasn't the objective, your point is meaningless. And the European NATO allies themselves invoked Article 5. The US never requested it. That was probably the highest point of NATO cooperation in its history.
QuoteThe moment you engage in rebuilding a country, trying to change it to become something else, it's a long term process. The US basically abandonned Afghanistan in 2003 to go fight in Iraq. Intelligence resources were no longer there, and only an handful of Airforce soldiers were left on the field.
Again, untrue. US troop levels were 7100 at the end of 2002, 13,100 at the end of 2003, 20,300 at the end of 2004.
Exactly the reverse of the bullshit you are trying to peddle.
Try arguing with real facts, not MAGAt-level "alternate facts,"
Mr. Trump viper.
QuoteObama attempted a counter-surge, but it's something that can't be fixed simply by military power. If it had, the US would have been victorious two decades ago.
It's an exercise in political shaping of a non existent country, from the ground up. It takes time and dedication. And deciding on a fixed time table is simply the wrong way to attack the problem.
Blah, blah, blah. This has all been known since the beginning of forever. But when most of the NATO allies cut and ran, there wasn't really any way the situation would get better. The US should have pulled out right after that.
QuoteAmerica lost its appetite for foreign conflicts. That makes it an unreliable ally. That others could be relied upon in the same situation is neither here nor there. The point is the US can't be relied upon to see any conflict through its ultimate resolution.
No country can be relied on to so that, so the point is moot. If that's the standard, no country is a reliable ally to any country, and pointing that out about the US becomes a mere truism.
If we're talking Afghanistan specifically, it's not just the US fault, it's not a burden it should have been alone to share, and France in particular, could have done a lot more than dragging their 2003&on.
QuoteBut, with regards to the contract, say what you will, but if the situation had been reveserd, and France had push a country to cancel it's F-35 contract in favour of adopting the Rafale, you and Berkut would be talking Freedom Fried and a ban on Cabernet by now. Just as you were pissed when El-Chi sent a big "fuck you" to the US when declining to participate in the Iraq war. Given how this one turned out to, I guess he was right back then, even if the wrong reason.
Actually, France and Germany are doing what you claim would cause Berkut and I to "be talking Freedom Fried and a ban on Cabernet by now" and yet neither of us is doing that. Why? because we aren't crybabies. In fact, neither of us was talking like that when France declined to participate in the Iraq War, so I guess that is just another one of those "alternate facts" you and your exemplar Donald Trump like to use.
Quote from: viper37 on September 25, 2021, 05:39:40 PM
I know next to nothing about nuclear submarines capabalities, but let's assume you and Grumbler are right and the US does have the best nuclear submarine technology currently in use.
If the best nuclear sub tech was French instead of American, do you think Biden's government would have talked to France, and told them: let's work together on helping Austalia develop nuclear maintenance facilities for a fleet of nuclear submarines instead of selling them diesel subs?
The answer: nah. It's a question of money first&foremost. Creating good paying jobs in the US will be infinately more popular than upgrading the military capabilities of a foreign country. It's the same in France, in Canada, in the UK, everywhere: domestic issues count for much more political gains than any kind of foreign issue.
But it's still backstabbing an ally. It's like seducing your best friend's girlfriend because you believe you are better than him.
I've got no idea why you are so emotionally involved in this to the point of making sophomoric comparisons, but the facts of the matter aren't really in dispute; the government of Australia was increasingly concerned that the French submarine deal was becoming unaffordable and would be completed so late that it would no longer provide the capabilities Australia found that it needed. I don't think that they were ever really a formal "ally" of France, and dropping a deal they no longer thought to be in their best interests wasn't "backstabbing an ally." It was just pursuing national interests. Australia wasn't "seducing" France's "girlfriend."
The better analogy would be ordering a pepperoni and mushroom pizza online for $15, then getting a call back and being told that the place was out of pepperoni and the price for a just-mushroom pizza would be $30, and so cancelling the order and ordering your pizza from someone else.
Quote from: Admiral Yi on September 25, 2021, 05:38:41 PM
Plenty of countries have left the F-35 deal and no one here raised a peep.
How many left the F-35 for a competing model like the Typhoon or the Raphale after signing a deal to receive X number of F-35?
Quote from: grumbler on September 25, 2021, 06:37:04 PM
The better analogy would be ordering a pepperoni and mushroom pizza online for $15, then getting a call back and being told that the place was out of pepperoni and the price for a just-mushroom pizza would be $30, and so cancelling the order and ordering your pizza from someone else.
Better analogy would be ordering a pepperoni pizza and 25 minutes later cancelling your order because you realized an all-dressed pizza with bacon was better.
I am not emotionally involved, unlike some stalwart defenders of US policies here. I'm just noticing it is a backstab by the US toward an ally. US, UK and Australia are all to blame.
If delays in production & delivery in military equipment weren't the norm, I'd agree with you Australia was perfectly justified in cancelling the deal. As it is, it seems to be the norm. Whats more, Australia was influenced in changing its needs by a 3rd party. And you all think its fine, while we all know how you'd react if the French government backstabbed the US in a juicy military contract, given your past defence of all things US.
Didn't you know viper? The only thing that motivates the US is making sure allies get the very best equipment. :)
Lowly considerations like money, jobs and prestige are quite below them. They're selfless like that.
Quote from: Zoupa on September 25, 2021, 08:56:33 PM
Didn't you know viper? The only thing that motivates the US is making sure allies get the very best equipment. :)
Lowly considerations like money, jobs and prestige are quite below them. They're selfless like that.
:lol: Like France wasn't in it solely for the money, and like they didn't change the terms to be more favorable towards them because it made them more money. France is pissed because they lost some money. Boo hoo. Do a better job of satisfying your customer, and they won't drop you.
If the US watching while Australia cancels a contract with France is "backstabbing," then the term has no meaning.
The US didn't watch Australia cancel the contract and then win some competitive tender process.
In March (next phase of work contracts were due to be signed in April but weren't) the Australians went to the British and asked for help on nuclear subs as an alternative. The British and Australians worked to cobble together a plan and pitch it to the Americans. The leaders hashed out the big principles stuff at the G7 when they had a trilateral (which in retrospect does seem odd). Obviously Macron was also at that meeting standing next to Scott Morrison saying how Australia's alliance with France was central to their Indo-Pacific strategy, making a big show of welcoming Biden on his "America is back" tour and spending his time with Johnson on Northern Ireland.
At that point the Aussie defence minister says they are making contingency plans. But there's then the positive Australian-French meeting at the end of August, just a couple of weeks before the announcement.
I think it's okay to be cynical and not pretend like this was utterly innocent.
For what it's worth I don't think the US was motivated by jobs or money or prestige - though they'll get that and France will lose it - I think they were probably motivated by establishing another closer, allied institutional relationship with Australia and (I suspect) they'll end up with decent bases/using Aussie ports a lot for a lot of their fleet in the South Pacific (and France will lose those opportunities too).
Quote from: Zoupa on September 25, 2021, 05:16:52 PM
I'm not engaging with your strawmen Berkut.
I'm simply saying that I think French diplomats will get a lot of mileage out of our allies amateurish displays.
And like I said, it seems pretty clear that "your diplomats" are doing a fine job showing that they aren't actually much of allies beyond being willing to take your cash.
Quote from: viper37 on September 25, 2021, 05:34:59 PM
But, with regards to the contract, say what you will, but if the situation had been reveserd, and France had push a country to cancel it's F-35 contract in favour of adopting the Rafale, you and Berkut would be talking Freedom Fried and a ban on Cabernet by now. Just as you were pissed when El-Chi sent a big "fuck you" to the US when declining to participate in the Iraq war. Given how this one turned out to, I guess he was right back then, even if the wrong reason.
There are many countries that have chosen other suppliers for their aircraft than the F-35.
I appreciate your willingness to speak for me, but you are demonstrably wrong. I didn't cry at all when Australia signed the deal with France to begin with, for example.
And I never once said a fucking thing about "freedom fries" - I thought that was stupid.
You are just....lying your ass off here?
Quote from: Zoupa on September 25, 2021, 08:56:33 PM
Didn't you know viper? The only thing that motivates the US is making sure allies get the very best equipment. :)
Lowly considerations like money, jobs and prestige are quite below them. They're selfless like that.
Weren't you just crying about strawmen?
I guess at least this is you admitting that in fact this is just about cash, and nothing to do with "allies" at all. Which France has a pretty clear track record about "allies" and their support for them.
It's fine - it's just about cash. Money. At least for France. Which is why they are so mad.
If it was actually about allies, they would be please that their ally is getting radically better capabilities for much less money.
I was just taking a dig at your holier than thou usual attitude, which frankly is irrelevant in diplomacy. All diplomacy is cynical and backstabbing.
So, well done, the US won that round. What's amateurish is how Australia and the US won it. This is needless collateral damage. Obviously there was always going to be blow-back from France/EU, but good diplomacy, alliance-reinforcing diplomacy plays differently.
Early in the year, Morrisson and Blinken should have called the Quai d'Orsay and said listen we're going with US subs. How can we loop you guys in so it doesn't cause a row? Le Drian and Macron could have used a treaty or an agreement or joint exercises or SOMETHING as window dressing, they would have called it a realignement, an expansion of the alliance with Australia.
Instead we get "Everything is fine" til the day of. Australia and the US left very little options to France as a response.
The fact you expect France/EU to be cheering is baffling.
They still had options. They could play it up or down.
Quote from: Zoupa on September 26, 2021, 03:16:34 AM
I was just taking a dig at your holier than thou usual attitude, which frankly is irrelevant in diplomacy. All diplomacy is cynical and backstabbing.
So, well done, the US won that round. What's amateurish is how Australia and the US won it. This is needless collateral damage. Obviously there was always going to be blow-back from France/EU, but good diplomacy, alliance-reinforcing diplomacy plays differently.
Early in the year, Morrisson and Blinken should have called the Quai d'Orsay and said listen we're going with US subs. How can we loop you guys in so it doesn't cause a row? Le Drian and Macron could have used a treaty or an agreement or joint exercises or SOMETHING as window dressing, they would have called it a realignement, an expansion of the alliance with Australia.
Instead we get "Everything is fine" til the day of. Australia and the US left very little options to France as a response.
The fact you expect France/EU to be cheering is baffling.
I don't at all expect France to be cheering, since it is clear that France doesn't consider themself an ally of anyone but France. They actually believe that "all diplomacy is cynical and backstabbing" hence they would never cheer any outcome that didn't directly line their pockets or advance only their own interests. I mean, according to you, anyway.
I think if Australia had said early on they were going elsewhere, the cynical and backstabbing response from France would have been to raise a giant row about the terrible US, and what a betrayal it was, and Trump, and tried to pressure Australia to stick to the double cost, lower capability deal. That would be good for France, but nobody else involved, except I guess China. So why would Australia do that?
I mean, you just said that France's response no matter what would be backstabbing. When you recognize that you are dealing with someone who is not going to deal with you in good faith, then why would you tell them much of anything?
And France kindly, with their response (and yours aligns perfectly with it) made it clear that they were very right not to tell them anything beyond the financial aspects of the deal. And they signalled that they were unhappy with those aspects for months prior to this.
You think I am holier than thou? I suppose I am, since I think countering countries like China and Russia and other actual threats to liberal democracy is more important then "winning the round" *against the people who are actually supposed to be the allies France is pretending to be so very, very upset with*.
Quote from: Eddie Teach on September 26, 2021, 03:51:20 AM
They still had options. They could play it up or down.
Oddly enough, when the story first broke, I was surprised. I thought Biden had stepped on his dick a bit again, and right after Afghanistan.
But Zoupa and Viper have convinced me I was wrong.
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 25, 2021, 09:57:52 PM
The US didn't watch Australia cancel the contract and then win some competitive tender process.
In March (next phase of work contracts were due to be signed in April but weren't) the Australians went to the British and asked for help on nuclear subs as an alternative. The British and Australians worked to cobble together a plan and pitch it to the Americans. The leaders hashed out the big principles stuff at the G7 when they had a trilateral (which in retrospect does seem odd). Obviously Macron was also at that meeting standing next to Scott Morrison saying how Australia's alliance with France was central to their Indo-Pacific strategy, making a big show of welcoming Biden on his "America is back" tour and spending his time with Johnson on Northern Ireland.
At that point the Aussie defence minister says they are making contingency plans. But there's then the positive Australian-French meeting at the end of August, just a couple of weeks before the announcement.
I think it's okay to be cynical and not pretend like this was utterly innocent.
For what it's worth I don't think the US was motivated by jobs or money or prestige - though they'll get that and France will lose it - I think they were probably motivated by establishing another closer, allied institutional relationship with Australia and (I suspect) they'll end up with decent bases/using Aussie ports a lot for a lot of their fleet in the South Pacific (and France will lose those opportunities too).
:huh: What alliance is ever won by "some competitive tender process?"
France has never been a formal ally of Australia since SEATO was dissolved in 1977. Her "alliance" with Australia couldn't have been the "central to their Indo-Pacific strategy" (and even Macron referred to it as a "strategic partnership," not an alliance). France seems determined to ruin that strategic partnership in a fit of pique over a perceived commercial slight.
AUKUS isn't a replacement for the French submarine deal; it is an agreement to share technologies and develop a replacement for the French submarine deal. Moreover, it comes from an Australian initiative, not a British or American one. The country that France should be blaming for losing the submarine contract is France. But, of course, France can't recall its ambassadors to France.
Quote from: grumbler on September 26, 2021, 10:19:14 AM
:huh: What alliance is ever won by "some competitive tender process?"
But I think on this point you guys are being a little bit slippery.
When it comes to the benefits for Australia and the US - it is negotiating the alliance. When it comes to the damage France suffered - it's just about subs.
Your post was that France was just in it for the money - they were fiddling with contract terms, didn't satisfy their customer. The US just watched while Australia cancelled the contract. And now you flip it to being not about that, but actually about an alliance.
It's both - that's the point. I think it's on balance a good thing - I think it's good for Australia, the UK and the US. Unlike Zoupa I don't think there was another way to do it where you could loop in the French without it sort of acting as a spoiler/leaking. But at the same time it's like France got jilted at the altar and found out via text. I don't think we need to pretend that any of the AUKUS countries just innocents who want the best for each and maybe too pure for this world. This was successful, cynical and justified diplomacy - just like France reacting strongly and trying to leverage concessions out of it.
QuoteFrance has never been a formal ally of Australia since SEATO was dissolved in 1977. Her "alliance" with Australia couldn't have been the "central to their Indo-Pacific strategy" (and even Macron referred to it as a "strategic partnership," not an alliance). France seems determined to ruin that strategic partnership in a fit of pique over a perceived commercial slight.
Yeah - and as I've said the French reaction might go some way to explaining why Australia wanted an alternative.
QuoteAUKUS isn't a replacement for the French submarine deal; it is an agreement to share technologies and develop a replacement for the French submarine deal. Moreover, it comes from an Australian initiative, not a British or American one. The country that France should be blaming for losing the submarine contract is France. But, of course, France can't recall its ambassadors to France.
I totally agree on the nature of the agreement but I think that is also what France has been booted from - both in terms of the 2+2 forum (which released a "substantive" statement just two weeks before this happened but also very strong statements on Chinese coercion over Australia, joint exercises, very warm words at the G7 between Macron and Morrison. While all of that was happening the AUKUS talks, which excluded France, were ongoing.
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 26, 2021, 10:43:52 AM
Quote from: grumbler on September 26, 2021, 10:19:14 AM
:huh: What alliance is ever won by "some competitive tender process?"
But I think on this point you guys are being a little bit slippery.
When it comes to the benefits for Australia and the US - it is negotiating the alliance. When it comes to the damage France suffered - it's just about subs.
Your post was that France was just in it for the money - they were fiddling with contract terms, didn't satisfy their customer. The US just watched while Australia cancelled the contract. And now you flip it to being not about that, but actually about an alliance.
It is Zoupa that insists that it is all about money. I was simply showing him the logical conclusion of his argument - that it is all about money, that is true for France, as well.
I think that you are being overly slippery about insisting that the French sub deal and AUKUS are, essentially, the same things just with different partners. That might work for moral equivalency arguments, but not serious arguments about the real world.
The inclusion of the plan to build nuclear submarines for Australia is the only element of AUKUS that equates to the French submarine deal. An alliance and a purchase agreement are not equivalent.
QuoteIt's both - that's the point. I think it's on balance a good thing - I think it's good for Australia, the UK and the US. Unlike Zoupa I don't think there was another way to do it where you could loop in the French without it sort of acting as a spoiler/leaking. But at the same time it's like France got jilted at the altar and found out via text. I don't think we need to pretend that any of the AUKUS countries just innocents who want the best for each and maybe too pure for this world. This was successful, cynical and justified diplomacy - just like France reacting strongly and trying to leverage concessions out of it.
France is perfectly entitled to be unhappy about Australia cancelling the sub deal. That's especially true if Zoupa is correct and that was all about money in the first place. If "it's like France got jilted at the altar and found out via text," then France should be angry at her fiancé, not recalling ambassadors (for the first tie ever) from the best man, and making smarmy remarks about the caterer for the next wedding.
QuoteI totally agree on the nature of the agreement but I think that is also what France has been booted from - both in terms of the 2+2 forum (which released a "substantive" statement just two weeks before this happened but also very strong statements on Chinese coercion over Australia, joint exercises, very warm words at the G7 between Macron and Morrison. While all of that was happening the AUKUS talks, which excluded France, were ongoing.
What, exactly, has France "been booted from?" And how can you read the contempt with which France addressed the members of AUKUS and conclude that France feels bad about being excluded? None of the strategic partnerships, warm words, joint exercises, etc need be cancelled because France lost a commercial contract, unless that's what France wants. It rather makes a mockery of the claim by France that their strategic partnership with Australia was a central feature of their Asia-Pacific strategy if they throw it away so lightly, though.
Groom punches bride to be at their wedding right before the vows, in front of everybody. Groom then winks at the maid of honor who happily steps into the bride's place. Groom turns around to former bride with a black eye, asking "Why are you mad, baby? I thought you loved me, don't you want me to be happy? Can you not cause a scene on my wedding day?"
Quote from: grumbler on September 26, 2021, 02:39:32 PMI think that you are being overly slippery about insisting that the French sub deal and AUKUS are, essentially, the same things just with different partners. That might work for moral equivalency arguments, but not serious arguments about the real world.
The inclusion of the plan to build nuclear submarines for Australia is the only element of AUKUS that equates to the French submarine deal. An alliance and a purchase agreement are not equivalent.
You had an issue with me talking about the Franco-Australian "strategic partnership" as an alliance - isn't there the same problem with AUKUS? It isn't a new alliance. At the moment, from my understanding the bit that's been agreed is the subs and some language around wider tech sharing.
I think it will develop into more because of existing alliances and relationships but, it's not, from what I've read a new alliance in that sense. I think the same reasoning applies to the Franco-Australian alliance/"strategic partnership".
QuoteFrance is perfectly entitled to be unhappy about Australia cancelling the sub deal. That's especially true if Zoupa is correct and that was all about money in the first place. If "it's like France got jilted at the altar and found out via text," then France should be angry at her fiancé, not recalling ambassadors (for the first tie ever) from the best man, and making smarmy remarks about the caterer for the next wedding.
I think France is angry at Australia (the bride/groom?) - but to torture this metaphor a little more they're also annoyed at the best man and caterer because it turns out their now a throuple.
QuoteWhat, exactly, has France "been booted from?" And how can you read the contempt with which France addressed the members of AUKUS and conclude that France feels bad about being excluded? None of the strategic partnerships, warm words, joint exercises, etc need be cancelled because France lost a commercial contract, unless that's what France wants. It rather makes a mockery of the claim by France that their strategic partnership with Australia was a central feature of their Asia-Pacific strategy if they throw it away so lightly, though.
Yeah - as I say I think France's response is part of the reason why Australia was possibly looking for an alternative/way out.
Quote from: Zoupa on September 26, 2021, 02:54:08 PM
Groom punches bride to be at their wedding right before the vows, in front of everybody. Groom then winks at the maid of honor who happily steps into the bride's place. Groom turns around to former bride with a black eye, asking "Why are you mad, baby? I thought you loved me, don't you want me to be happy? Can you not cause a scene on my wedding day?"
Case in point why tortured analogies are super unhelpful.
France and Australia had a deal. France changed the terms, so Australia walked out. This happens all the time and should have been expected.
They could have prayed instead.
I like to think that I'm open to the argument that the US and Australia did something bad and France and the EU are justified in their condemnation, but analogies are not going to get me there.
Quote from: Admiral Yi on September 26, 2021, 03:42:02 PM
I like to think that I'm open to the argument that the US and Australia did something bad and France and the EU are justified in their condemnation, but analogies are not going to get me there.
Apologies for introducing that stream of chat :lol: :blush:
My basic point is I think AUKUS is, on balance good. I think it makes a lot of sense for Australia especially if their view/assessment of threats has shifted. It's good for the UK just to be involved. And it's good for the US if it leads to enhanced capabilitiy I suppose in the South Pacific.
But I don't think that just means the French should row in and cheerlead it. I think it's incredibly frustrating and a suprise to the French which is going to cause them to need to re-calibrate pretty quickly, so I sympathise with their anger and frustration about it. And I think expressing that is probably the best way to get some prizes out of it.
I think the EU has done enough to show solidarity with a member state but without actually causing any unpleasantness which I think has been their aim. Though I would note the solidarity w/ France v the notable lack with Poland and the Baltics over Nordstream or with Lithuania over Chinese bullying - I imagine it's being noticed there too and feels a little bit Chirac's take on "new Europe".
I just want to point out it's extremely rich that the French are saying the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan represents clear evidence of U.S. unreliability. Let's think about that for a second--a war that served hardly any American geopolitical interest, that we conducted for over 20 years at massive cost, and a human cost born almost entirely by our soldiers (at least in terms of the West; obviously the Afghan people bore the highest cost.)
Let's talk just a moment about French involvement in Afghanistan, something it was supposedly involved in to satisfy treaty obligations to an ally:
2001 - 21st RIMA - 640 soldiers
2003 - 500 members of the 3500-strong ISAF
2008 - "French contingent grew to 1600 men"
2010 - A deployment of 70 French soldiers to Helmand Province
2012 - Around 3400 French troops are deployed in Afghanistan
In February of 2012 in response to the unbelievable outcome of four of those soldiers being shot and killed, President Sarkozy threatened to "suspend operations in Afghanistan."
In June of 2012 incoming President Hollande announced the withdrawal of 2000 of France's 3400 troops, leaving 1400 for training and logistics, ending any active combat role in the country.
I'm not honestly sure what to make of that commitment--a reflection on how pitiably small and insignificant it was for a country that still thinks of itself as a Great Power, or how feckless the French leadership was in the face of...a few soldiers being killed (something that is common to all soldiers who fight in wars.)
I don't remember anyone shitting all over the French for that. But hey, I do remember the French...in this thread, shitting on us for withdrawing from Afghanistan 9 years later? That was rich.
Let's remember what the French have done to prove how stable and great they are at being allies--in response to AUKUS at least one leading French political figure threatened that France should withdraw from NATO operational command (going back to the pre-2008 de Gaulle status with NATO.) That's sure stable and trustworthy behavior for a major ally "our defense industry loses some money? Time to threaten to partially withdraw from the alliance."
Imagine if the U.S. had pushed to boot Turkey out of NATO over it buying Russian surface to air missile systems.
What does France need to re-calibrate quickly, other then having to figure out how not to have $60 billion of Australias money?
Other then the financial loss, what actual effect does this actually have on France?
And how does whatever that is get served by them throwing a temper tantrum about it?
What is interesting in this debate is how the "poor France" side has NOTHING to say about the actual reason Australia wants a bunch of nuclear submarines in the first place. If Zoupa represents the standard French view towards this, then Australia should be thanking god they dodged that bullet. As far as France is concerned....apparently....there is nothing interesting about his entire episode that extends beyond France at all, and that just about the money.
Note that this deal has basically zero impact on the United States from a financial standpoint - at least, nothing substantial. The two US companies building Virginia class attack subs are absolutely maxed out. They are building them as fast as they can for USN consumption. So if the US provides any of them to Australia, it will be because the US is foregoing some of the planned boats for the USN instead - General Dynamics and Electric Boat are not going to get additional orders out of this, at least not for some 2-3 decades, if you assume they will extend the Virginia production run (this is even assuming it is Virginias at all!).
The US is doing this *because* it makes sense strategically. For the US, this is entirely about our actual allies and their actual threats, and how that aligns with US security interests.
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 26, 2021, 03:00:11 PM
You had an issue with me talking about the Franco-Australian "strategic partnership" as an alliance - isn't there the same problem with AUKUS? It isn't a new alliance. At the moment, from my understanding the bit that's been agreed is the subs and some language around wider tech sharing. I think it will develop into more because of existing alliances and relationships but, it's not, from what I've read a new alliance in that sense. I think the same reasoning applies to the Franco-Australian alliance/"strategic partnership"
Except that AUKUS is an actual agreement between governments, while the Australian agreement to buy submarines (while it included an agreement by the French government to allow the sale) was between the Australian government and Naval Group. AUKUS includes no agreements to buy submarines (not anything else). It's an alliance to share technologies and take mutual action to support mutual interests.
A Franco-Australian strategic partnership is certainly possible in the absence of an Australian purchase of French submarines, but the French don't seem interested in that.
QuoteI think France is angry at Australia (the bride/groom?) - but to torture this metaphor a little more they're also annoyed at the best man and caterer because it turns out their now a throuple.
But, in this analogy, France is the mother of the caterer, not the bride.
Quote from: Zoupa on September 26, 2021, 02:54:08 PM
Groom punches bride to be at their wedding right before the vows, in front of everybody. Groom then winks at the maid of honor who happily steps into the bride's place. Groom turns around to former bride with a black eye, asking "Why are you mad, baby? I thought you loved me, don't you want me to be happy? Can you not cause a scene on my wedding day?"
Caterer announces that they've doubled prices from the contract amount. Groom fires caterer. Mother of caterer claims that she considered herself to the bride all along, and sues for custody of groom's children.
I'd point out in the original catering analogy from Macron the US and/or the Australian was the chef, France was the disappointed customer and the UK was the dish-washer.
Given the recent reporting it feels like the UK is at least the sous-chef. But I'm not sure who everyone else is :mellow:
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 26, 2021, 05:11:09 PM
I'd point out in the original catering analogy from Macron the US and/or the Australian was the chef, France was the disappointed customer and the UK was the dish-washer.
Given the recent reporting it feels like the UK is at least the sous-chef. But I'm not sure who everyone else is :mellow:
I think that we all understand that Macron's analogy was just frustrated shitposting, not an attempt to illuminate by analogy. :lol:
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 26, 2021, 03:51:24 PM
Apologies for introducing that stream of chat :lol: :blush:
Don't lead us down the garden path again. :glare:
Quote from: Admiral Yi on September 26, 2021, 06:06:02 PM
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 26, 2021, 03:51:24 PM
Apologies for introducing that stream of chat :lol: :blush:
Don't lead us down the garden path again. :glare:
:lmfao:
Quote from: Berkut on September 26, 2021, 04:53:34 PM
about the actual reason Australia wants a bunch of nuclear submarines in the first place.
they should have said so in the first place, if that's what they wanted.
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 26, 2021, 05:11:09 PM
I'd point out in the original catering analogy from Macron the US and/or the Australian was the chef, France was the disappointed customer and the UK was the dish-washer.
Given the recent reporting it feels like the UK is at least the sous-chef. But I'm not sure who everyone else is :mellow:
Because the analogy makes no sense. Australia is the customer; France and the US are the competing catering companies, and the UK is a booking agent that favors the US catering company. The customer hired France but then switched the day before the deposit became non-refundable.
The only problem with the reworked analogy is that no one would believe the Americans would provide better quality food for the event.
I can only assume you've never met an Australian.
You put beans on your toast, they put sprinkles. I'm not sure who would win ina bad catering contest :lol:
Pls give it the dignity it deserves, it's called fairy bread :contract:
French food is overrated.
Quote from: Eddie Teach on September 26, 2021, 10:02:56 PM
French food is overrated.
I mean it is pretty crazy in its variety. I am sure some of it is. There are hundreds of cheeses alone.
Quote from: Valmy on September 26, 2021, 10:16:22 PM
Quote from: Eddie Teach on September 26, 2021, 10:02:56 PM
French food is overrated.
I mean it is pretty crazy in its variety. I am sure some of it is. There are hundreds of cheeses alone.
Which might explain the difficult French politics, "...how can anyone govern a nation that has two hundred and forty-six different kinds of cheese?" as someone or other said :frog:
No cheese deserves to be alone. :(
Quote from: Richard Hakluyt on September 27, 2021, 01:05:22 AM
Which might explain the difficult French politics, "...how can anyone govern a nation that has two hundred and forty-six different kinds of cheese?" as someone or other said :frog:
I mean you could make the same argument for Germany with bread (600+ types) and beer (1500+ breweries). :P
Germany though is neither federal, German, nor a republic.
Quote from: Syt on September 27, 2021, 02:26:31 AM
Quote from: Richard Hakluyt on September 27, 2021, 01:05:22 AM
Which might explain the difficult French politics, "...how can anyone govern a nation that has two hundred and forty-six different kinds of cheese?" as someone or other said :frog:
I mean you could make the same argument for Germany with bread (600+ types) and beer (1500+ breweries). :P
Spain has 4000+ winemakers. :P
Couldn't find a census of cured meats, sadly. I suspect the fuet/longaniza divide is responsible alone for Catalan separatism.
According to this, Germany also has over 1500 types of sausage: https://charcuteria.de/wurstsorten/
There must be some algorithm to match each brewery to each sausage ...
:hmm:
I'm drawing a weird blank, but besides wine and cheese the only French cuisine I can think of is souffle and little drunk birds.
Quote from: HVC on September 27, 2021, 06:15:32 AM
I'm drawing a weird blank, but besides wine and cheese the only French cuisine I can think of is souffle and little drunk birds.
:blink:
I know I should have more but I can't recall lol. Maybe because it's early here
https://www.expatica.com/fr/lifestyle/food-drink/top-french-foods-with-recipes-106720/
Quote from: viper37 on September 26, 2021, 08:14:08 PM
Quote from: Berkut on September 26, 2021, 04:53:34 PM
about the actual reason Australia wants a bunch of nuclear submarines in the first place.
they should have said so in the first place, if that's what they wanted.
So?
I've worked for a French company and I work for a company in defence procurement that has plants & offices in France.
I would have tried to get out too if I was Australia.
Quote from: Syt on September 27, 2021, 07:09:51 AM
https://www.expatica.com/fr/lifestyle/food-drink/top-french-foods-with-recipes-106720/
Blanquette de veau too bourgeois/old-fashioned? :hmm:
Quote from: Berkut on September 27, 2021, 08:15:47 AM
Quote from: viper37 on September 26, 2021, 08:14:08 PM
Quote from: Berkut on September 26, 2021, 04:53:34 PM
about the actual reason Australia wants a bunch of nuclear submarines in the first place.
they should have said so in the first place, if that's what they wanted.
So?
Vipers response really illustrates that Australia dodged a bullet, since it seems to mirror the overall feelings from French authorities and diplomats.
His response to asking about the actual needs of Australia is simply that they made an agreement, and tough shit if anything changes, give me my money. Oh, and btw, it is twice as much money as we said earlier.
Also, if things change, we don't care. If WE change the terms, like, I don't know, doubling the cost and refusing to honor our agreement to let Australia do the bulk of the work....tough shit. Give us our money.
Still has not addressed, or even acknowledged, that there is an actual security concern driving this entire thing. Doesn't matter to them, they don't actually care about the security situation. Give us our money.
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 26, 2021, 08:32:00 PM
I can only assume you've never met an Australian.
i have relatives in Australia but none of are close to the stereotype.
Quote from: Eddie Teach on September 26, 2021, 10:02:56 PM
French food is overrated.
Nah, French food and wine are very good, give them the credit in the few areas they deserve it.
The angst is palpable :lol:
Quote from: The Brain on September 26, 2021, 03:41:33 PM
They could have prayed instead.
that they didn't change the deal any further?
Quote from: Crazy_Ivan80 on September 27, 2021, 01:15:03 PM
Quote from: The Brain on September 26, 2021, 03:41:33 PM
They could have prayed instead.
that they didn't change the deal any further?
:yes: The most powerful position is on your knees.
Quote from: Zoupa on September 27, 2021, 12:28:48 PM
The angst is palpable :lol:
:yes: Paris is ripe with it.
But that will dissipate when the political utility of pretended offense evaporates.
Quote from: OttoVonBismarck on September 27, 2021, 11:55:16 AM
Quote from: Eddie Teach on September 26, 2021, 10:02:56 PM
French food is overrated.
Nah, French food and wine are very good, give them the credit in the few areas they deserve it.
French food is overrated. All you need to survive, is a good poutine any day of the week. ;)
Poutine, beavertails, and maple syrup. you'll die young, but you'll die happy.
Quote from: HVC on September 28, 2021, 12:34:06 PM
Poutine, beavertails, and maple syrup. you'll die young, but you'll die happy.
Don't forget the tourtiere. :mmm:
Quote from: HVC on September 28, 2021, 12:34:06 PM
Poutine, beavertails, and maple syrup. you'll die young, but you'll die happy.
One of my main (and only) regrets from moving to BC... the dearth of easily obtainable decent poutine :(
if you're drunk get mcdonalds poutine :lol:. i mean no where near as good as the real thing, but for fast food poutine it does in a (drunk) pinch :D
No
I like McD's poutine. The fries are constant and there so many places with bad fries.
Quote from: Jacob on September 28, 2021, 01:05:44 PM
One of my main (and only) regrets from moving to BC... the dearth of easily obtainable decent poutine :(
How will your children know they are even Canadian?
yeah, that's why i like it too. not a regular thing, but macdonalds fries are good. add some gravy and close approximation of cheese and its not too bad. Don't be a fast food snob! :P
Quote from: HVC on September 28, 2021, 12:34:06 PM
Poutine, beavertails, and maple syrup. you'll die young, but you'll die happy.
Yes, that's worthy goal! :P
And it starts - maybe. New Zealand which obviously will never have any interest in nuclear subs has said it's been made clear other countries might participate and they would be interested in joining to participate in the non-nuclear stuff.
... so apparently Biden just acknowledged that the US handled the AUKUS and submarine thing clumsily, and apologized to Macron.
Quote from: Jacob on October 29, 2021, 12:47:22 PM
... so apparently Biden just acknowledged that the US handled the AUKUS and submarine thing clumsily, and apologized to Macron.
Makes sense. Allows for some face saving.
And a little bit blame shifting as Biden said he was under the impression that the French knew a long time before the contract wouldn't be going ahead. Which is maybe true - worst case is it's not and he's pushed responsibility to the Aussies who can handle it because they're getting new subs.
Quote from: Jacob on October 29, 2021, 12:47:22 PM
... so apparently Biden just acknowledged that the US handled the AUKUS and submarine thing clumsily, and apologized to Macron.
Say it ain't so! I was told the US handled the whole thing in a perfect manner, what with only wanting the very best for their Aussie buddies, not being concerned with anything as lowly as money.
Not like those perfidious French, who are only interested with cash and have shown themselves to be shit allies!
Why is Biden trying to repair relations with France if they're so untrustworthy? So weak.
Trump 2024.
This is derangement.
Relax, we're just shooting the shit here.
Biden? Clumsy?
That seems hard to believe.
Quote from: Zoupa on October 29, 2021, 03:17:59 PM
Relax, we're just shooting the shit here.
I don't fuck with guns.
France released their official Indo-Pacific Strategy yesterday and needless to say they're not fully over AUKUS :lol: :ph34r:
QuoteStuart Lau
@StuartKLau
Not the most urgent matter of the day, but France has officially removed Australia from its list of strategic partners.
The AUKUS deal "has led to a re-evaluation of the past strategic partnership," with future FR-AU cooperation to proceed "on a case-by-case basis."
I said I thought the most interesting angle of AUKUS was the "future project" potential and reference to new technologies. It looks like we're starting to see that being fleshed out as Australia, UK and US have announced they're working together on developing hypersonic weapons.
I also think the new weapons bit is the piece that may make this attractive/sensible to create docks for other allies interested in the region (or helping support allies in responding to China). So they may not want to get involved on nuclear subs - but new hypersonic weapons or cyber capabilites are of interest etc.
Australia almost no chance to buy any submarine from current US building program, experts say.QuoteLatest report to US Congress reveals the superpower will struggle to meet its own submarine-building targets for decades.
Australia has close to zero chance of getting a submarine from the United States' current program, experts say, as yet another report shows the US is struggling to meet its own needs.
Defence is facing a capability gap as the existing Collins-class fleet retires and hopes fade of getting a new submarine under the Aukus deal before 2040.
Under the Aukus deal, Australia will buy at least eight submarines from either the US or the United Kingdom.
Former defence minister Peter Dutton suggested the US might give Australia a couple of its boats, a suggestion that was largely dismissed.
The latest report to Congress on the progress of the US's shipbuilding efforts show the submarines "experienced cost growth" in the early part of the program, and now there's a shortage of spare parts, maintenance delays for existing boats, and concerns about the shipyards' capacity.
Complications including, but not limited to, the pandemic have seen delays in production of the US navy's Virginia-class submarines.
"Some observers have expressed concern about the industrial base's capacity for executing such a workload without encountering bottlenecks or other production problems in one or both of these programs," the report said.
The US is aiming to build its own fleet of at least 60 nuclear-powered boats, but the report released this week shows it will reach a minimum of 46 boats in 2028, 50 by 3032 and between 60 and 69 by 2052. It is trying to increase capacity, but will still struggle to meet its own targets for decades.
Shadow defence spokesperson Andrew Hastie, while in London, has challenged the UK to compete against the US to supply the first two submarines by 2030 by boosting its building capacity, but experts have also dismissed that idea.
Marcus Hellyer, a senior analyst at Australian Strategic Policy Institute said the "only way" Australia would get a nuclear-powered submarine by 2030 would be if the US gave us "one of their own boats". "But their numbers are declining when they want an increase," he said.
"The submarine taskforce [which will report in March next year] needs to look at all options, but at some point you have to draw a line and say this is just a distraction."
Hellyer said that meant any submarine Australia would buy was likely to be from the next generation of US submarines, which will start being bought in the mid 2030s and are set to be vastly more expensive.
He has estimated, based on the current model, the entire program to build eight submarines will cost $171bn in the end, including inflation.
Research presented to US Congress suggests the next model would cost at least AUD$3bn more (each) than the current model, pushing the price even higher.
Hellyer said that looking at the cost increase if Australia gets the newer boat was a way to illustrate the problem of planning to buy submarines from another country that was continually upgrading and evolving its own fleet.
"What's our philosophy here? Do we keep building one boat while the US moves on, and we're left with this orphan ... or do we move in lockstep with the US?," he said.
"That would mean our little fleet of eight boats could be different [models]."
Rex Patrick, former South Australian senator and submariner, said Australia "will not get submarines off the US line". "The US engage in operations all around the world and they're important operations and the US Navy is not going to cede a capability so that Australia can get submarines [so they can] dip their toe in the water," he said.
"All the publicly available material points to the US not providing us with a submarine."
Hellyer said there was also "no way" the UK could spare a submarine as it is only building seven of the Astute class (which is one of the options being considered for Australia) before it moves to a new model. "The UK is currently wrapping up its Astute program," he said. "They need to wrap that up to transfer the resources to the Dreadnaught program.
"They have no capacity to build us submarines."
There have been suggestions Australia could pay for the US or the UK to expand their production capacity.
"You can achieve anything with money," Patrick said. "But this is taxpayers' money."
Both Patrick and Hellyer said buying a conventional (non-nuclear powered) submarine from another country "off the shelf" would be another way to fill the capability gap.
Defence minister, Richard Marles, has consistently said he is keeping an open mind on the solution to the capability gap.
"As we go through the process now of looking at which solution we pursue, we also want not only to determine that solution but to work out is there any way in which that can be brought online much sooner than the 2040s and to the extent any capability gap is there, what are the means by which we can close it?" he said earlier this month.
"None of those questions have obvious answers. It's part of the work we're doing right now. But as we announce in the early part of next year as to what capability – or what submarine – we will be pursuing, we really want to have answers to all of those at that point in time."
Guardian Australia has contacted Marles's office for further comment.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/20/australia-almost-no-chance-to-buy-any-submarine-from-current-us-building-program-experts-say?CMP=share_btn_tw
:frog: :shutup:
Poor Australia. Screwed over first by France then the US.
Surely the UK has more than enough building capacity? Our problem tends to be more keeping the skills and facilities required to build this stuff when the numbers we need just don't support it naturally.
Well, if a politician from South Australia has weighed in on US sub production capabilities and priorities, then I guess that pretty much closes the book on what is possible. He would certainly be the expert, for sure.
They aren't being screwed over. The AUKUS deal specifically calls for 8 nuclear powered submarines to be built by Australia, with U.S. technological assistance. There was never anything in the AUKUS deal that gave Australia a guarantee to be able to buy off the line nuclear submarines from either the United States or the United Kingdom.
Maybe among politicians and pundits that was an oft-speculated option, and a desirable one because it was understood that Australian production of nuclear submarines will take many years to be feasible--but there was no agreement by the U.S. or U.K. to sell Australia a specific amount of submarines, the agreement was that the U.S. and U.K. would provide technological assistance so that Australia could build 8 of its own submarines.
The U.S. is not at all screwing anyone. Australia hoped that in light of moving away from one program, to another more complex technology, it could fill in the gap as its Collins class subs age with leased or purchased subs from the US/UK--but no guarantee of that was ever signed or offered. It's also not impossible we could set them up with something, to be honest. This article is a worst case scenario analysis.
I think we can with 100% confidence predict that there will be news articles about how impossible this will be, and other news articles about how it is definitely going to happen, for the next decade or two.
It's pretty much exactly like reading the 400 articles over the last decade or two about how the F-35 was a complete failure, will never fly, cannot do what anyone says it will do, etc., etc., etc. None of those articles actually told anyone anything, because they were all completely predictable regardless of whether or not the underlying facts were true or not.
If the F-35 was a great plane that had some entirely expected and normal cost overruns and teething problems, you would see 400 articles about how doomed it was and what a complete disaster the entire program was.
If it was the disaster the articles predicted, you would see those same articles.
Counter-example: The Seawolf attack sub project. In that case, it turned out that the doom and gloom predictions were largely correct, and overall the project was pretty much a bust. But you could not tell the difference, for the most part. In both cases, there was a happy press ready to print whatever narrative, on either side, would get people to click on their stories. And "The US fucked up procurement program X!" always gets some clicks.
Zoupa, you can be sure that there will be a ready supply of more articles about how much of a completely impossible deal this was for Australia. That will be true right up until they get their first sub operational, and will be exactly equally true if they never get a sub out of the deal at all.
What we do know is that the Virginia class boats are excellent weapons, under serial production right now, and the US has committed to including Australia in their plans for that production. What that actually ends up looking like is still unknown, and nobody (barring a leak that has not happened yet) will know what those plans are until they actually are revealed. Supposition about what the US is willing to do or not do, or what makes sense from a geopolitical standpoint or not, isn't actually "news".
The plan all along was for Australia to build the submarines, so the reports that Australia will have to build the submarines is fully in line with the plan for Australia to build the submarines. No one is getting "screwed" here.
I think that the more interesting question is: how is Australia going to get the trained crew their subs will need? Even if they started cutting steel tomorrow, their first sub would enter service after their last sub veterans retire. Joint training seems the way to go, but joint training with the USN or very different joint training with the RN?
Edit: Ninja'd
It's pretty easy to shit on defense procurement, I do not know of a country without procurement headaches. Note that the French-Australian sub deal was beset with nonstop problems and negative press as well. Some of the same Australian politicians who are decrying AUKUS actually were grilling Australian admirals over problems with the French diesel subs just a few years ago.
That doesn't mean "true failure" cannot occur, look at the USN's Zumwalt program for example. That's a "true failure." Something like the F-35 is just an example of "problematic" procurement, but it actually produced lots of ultimately high-quality planes (800+ so far, with the platform expected to be in operation until the 2070s), just probably not at a great cost margin, and it will continue to produce many more planes. Then there's programs like the B-2 stealth, which aren't really true failures, but had limited achievements.
Keep in mind, also, that Australia just announced a review of defense posture and force structure so there'll be a whole bunch of analysis and opinion floating around - both in terms of worst-case contingencies, and in terms of "I'm arguing this to push a specific policy I favour".
Quote from: Berkut on August 03, 2022, 11:04:34 AMCounter-example: The Seawolf attack sub project. In that case, it turned out that the doom and gloom predictions were largely correct, and overall the project was pretty much a bust. But you could not tell the difference, for the most part. In both cases, there was a happy press ready to print whatever narrative, on either side, would get people to click on their stories. And "The US fucked up procurement program X!" always gets some clicks.
The
Seawolf project was not a bust at all. They are incredibly capable boats with a corresponding price tag. The end of the Cold War left them without a mission, though, because they were far too expensive to build for general-purpose submarine duties. They did, however, demonstrate the validity of their technological innovations, and we (I say "we" because I was involved) used a lot of that technology, scaled down and redesigned to reduce costs, on the
Virginia-class design that replaced the
Seawolf design.
Quote from: grumbler on August 03, 2022, 11:17:26 AMQuote from: Berkut on August 03, 2022, 11:04:34 AMCounter-example: The Seawolf attack sub project. In that case, it turned out that the doom and gloom predictions were largely correct, and overall the project was pretty much a bust. But you could not tell the difference, for the most part. In both cases, there was a happy press ready to print whatever narrative, on either side, would get people to click on their stories. And "The US fucked up procurement program X!" always gets some clicks.
The Seawolf project was not a bust at all. They are incredibly capable boats with a corresponding price tag. The end of the Cold War left them without a mission, though, because they were far too expensive to build for general-purpose submarine duties. They did, however, demonstrate the validity of their technological innovations, and we (I say "we" because I was involved) used a lot of that technology, scaled down and redesigned to reduce costs, on the Virginia-class design that replaced the Seawolf design.
No argument from me. I am using the term "bust" from the standpoint of those who are going to fairly look at a project that cost a shitload of money, and resulted in 2 boats being built (or was it 3).
It is fair to note that that is a bust in that a lot of money was spent that in hindsight ought not to have been spent for two super subs.
I agree that there is just as valid, or more valid, argument to be made that the totality of the project was a net gain, and the VA class boats are the nearly direct result.
edit: Otto's Zumwalt would be a better example, but I was trying to get a sub specific counter to my F-35 example.
I think there's a slight conflation of different things going on there.
When AUKUS was announced the first stage was 18 months (which is coming up in spring 2023) to scope it technically and work out which model of next generation sub Australia wants. But the stated target for getting one was 2038. It's a big defence procurement project so that may slide and I've no doubt the Australian MoD are looking at risk of that slipping past 2040. But that's what the deal is (plus other technology sharing/cooperation).
The issue is Australia has a gap now - Dutton wanted to buy submarines before 2030 to help cover that, but it wasn't part of AUKUS which is next generation ships, and it might not be possible. It looks like a bit of domestic positioning over this too - incoming Labor government discovers SNAFU/mismanagement on big defence procurement and manages expectations v outgoing Liberals suddenly start flagging capacity gap and saying it needs to be fixed by 2030. Both of those points look to me like the parties developing attack lines on each other (and both are probably true/fair).
Reading the article, I don't think it's "Australia fucked up procurement" or "the US screwed Australia". To me it reads as a clear statement of the complex - but expected - problem space that Australia has to navigate. Decisions have to be made (with price tages in terms of $ and time), and trade-offs considered... but there doesn't seem to be anything shocking there.
Quote from: OttoVonBismarck on August 03, 2022, 11:09:38 AMIt's pretty easy to shit on defense procurement, I do not know of a country without procurement headaches. Note that the French-Australian sub deal was beset with nonstop problems and negative press as well. Some of the same Australian politicians who are decrying AUKUS actually were grilling Australian admirals over problems with the French diesel subs just a few years ago.
That doesn't mean "true failure" cannot occur, look at the USN's Zumwalt program for example. That's a "true failure." Something like the F-35 is just an example of "problematic" procurement, but it actually produced lots of ultimately high-quality planes (800+ so far, with the platform expected to be in operation until the 2070s), just probably not at a great cost margin, and it will continue to produce many more planes. Then there's programs like the B-2 stealth, which aren't really true failures, but had limited achievements.
Indeed.
I was surprised Zoupa was so naive as to give much credence to a story that used as its source a minor Australian politician.
I mean....really? You think it is newsworthy that there exists some politician in Australia who is grumbling about a defense procurement project?
Quote from: Berkut on August 03, 2022, 11:25:51 AMIndeed.
I was surprised Zoupa was so naive as to give much credence to a story that used as its source a minor Australian politician.
I mean....really? You think it is newsworthy that there exists some politician in Australia who is grumbling about a defense procurement project?
Come on... Zoupa has every right to poke every little stick he can at this, for two very solid reasons:
1. To defend the wounded pride of France :frog:
2. It generates an interesting conversation here that we'd otherwise not have had.
Quote from: Jacob on August 03, 2022, 11:17:12 AMKeep in mind, also, that Australia just announced a review of defense posture and force structure so there'll be a whole bunch of analysis and opinion floating around - both in terms of worst-case contingencies, and in terms of "I'm arguing this to push a specific policy I favour".
Yes - and there's been a huge shift in Australian politics over the last ten years from the big issue being "lucky country" politics of how to handle really solid economic growth to China and defence being central issues. I think that's the key issue that drove AUKUS and will drive fixing the short-term gap - they assessed that the risk for Australia from when it was commissioning a next generation conventional fleet has changed. That motivated moving from conventional to nuclear, but it also means that risks of a capacity gap that were seen as something you could take in the short-term are now higher and maybe need a fix.
But I think you're right - there'll be a lot of stuff going round with a new Labor government coming in and formulating a review. Particularly given that, historically, Labor have tended to be a bit more pro-China (I think Paul Keating is literally employed by several Chinese SOEs :lol:). I've heard Kevin Rudd's new book on China and the US, The Avoidable War, is pretty good but haven't read it.
Quote from: Jacob on August 03, 2022, 11:29:41 AMQuote from: Berkut on August 03, 2022, 11:25:51 AMIndeed.
I was surprised Zoupa was so naive as to give much credence to a story that used as its source a minor Australian politician.
I mean....really? You think it is newsworthy that there exists some politician in Australia who is grumbling about a defense procurement project?
Come on... Zoupa has every right to poke every little stick he can at this, for two very solid reasons:
1. To defend the wounded pride of France :frog:
2. It generates an interesting conversation here that we'd otherwise not have had.
Well sure, but then I have the same right to poke back.
And lets not kid ourselves, this is 100% about #1. It's not like he cares about Australia, since the deal they have made is pretty obviously radically better for Australia in every way.
Quote from: Jacob on August 03, 2022, 11:25:34 AMReading the article, I don't think it's "Australia fucked up procurement" or "the US screwed Australia". To me it reads as a clear statement of the complex - but expected - problem space that Australia has to navigate. Decisions have to be made (with price tages in terms of $ and time), and trade-offs considered... but there doesn't seem to be anything shocking there.
Although to be clear if Australia didn't fuck up defence procurement it would be the first country ever to have avoided that and we should all learn from it :lol:
I don't think they did - I think the risk in their region changed. It's possible that in the 2000s and early 2010s Australia (who were not alone in this) underestimated/miscalculated the risk around China.
I am a bit surprised that there is this capability problem with procuring more subs, either American or British.
I mean, it is no surprise that there isn't much capabiity to increase product tomorrow, or next year, or even a couple years from now.
But it is surprising that even with a decade of lead time, neither Brit or American builders can expand their ability to built billion dollar subs when there is a ready, waiting, and guaranteed buyer for them...?
Quote from: Sheilbh on August 03, 2022, 11:36:29 AMQuote from: Jacob on August 03, 2022, 11:25:34 AMReading the article, I don't think it's "Australia fucked up procurement" or "the US screwed Australia". To me it reads as a clear statement of the complex - but expected - problem space that Australia has to navigate. Decisions have to be made (with price tages in terms of $ and time), and trade-offs considered... but there doesn't seem to be anything shocking there.
Although to be clear if Australia didn't fuck up defence procurement it would be the first country ever to have avoided that and we should all learn from it :lol:
I don't think they did - I think the risk in their region changed. It's possible that in the 2000s and early 2010s Australia (who were not alone in this) underestimated/miscalculated the risk around China.
I think this is very, very true.
A decade or so ago, there were a lot of people saying "OMG CHINA IS GOING TO BE A SERIOUS PROBLEM MILITARLY!"
But that doesn't tell us much - if they were going to choose a militaristic stance as they grew, people would say that, and if they were going to choose a less militaristic stance, people would still say that.
Well, now we know the answer. They are in fact choosing a very militaristic stance.
Given that is true, it makes good sense for Australia to not just get more capable deterrence in the form of long ranged nuclear subs, but it also makes even more sense for them to involve themselves more tightly with the power that is actually going to be the check to that Chinese militaristic stance (or ally themselves more tightly with China).
AUKUS goes well beyond submarines. Indeed, the subs might be the lesser consideration in that new alliance structure.
Probably the fairest assessment of Australia's overall sub situation is that it is firmly Australia's fault. Their deal with France was problematic in large part because they wanted one thing, were only willing to agree/pay to another thing, and in the implementation were wanting something else entirely. A very simple deal with France would have simply bought x number of French subs.
The additional reality is Australia did not ultimately decide to back out of the French deal and sign AUKUS over the mechanics or even the price of the submarines. An American submarine deal tightly binds Australian and American interests. This is largely in line with historical Australian policy in regard to its own security--dating to WW2 when quite literally the American Navy was widely understood to be essential in keeping Australia from being invaded by Japan.
If anything, the 2016 deal was a bit of a divergence from the norm for Australia, and one probably built on wishful thinking. In moving towards France, Australia was largely saying they didn't have to be too worried about confronting China, and instead could focus on a more relaxed posture, and exit itself from some of the bellicose associations of closer ties to the Americans. In the last few years though it became obvious to many that Australia has genuine security concerns and may very well have to deal with China on more forceful terms. It is simply too small a country to do that without very powerful friends, and France simply doesn't even come close to measuring up to the United States when it comes to containing and confronting China. In fact, French strategy in the Pacific does not even attempt that--it attempts to forge a sort of "third way." Australia simply woke up to the reality that a third way in the Pacific makes sense for a regional European power like France, based many thousands of miles away, but probably does not make sense for a small country in the actual Chinese backyard.
There has been reports that Indonesia is trying to call the deal into question, on the grounds that Australia getting (or building) nuclear subs would be a violation of the UN Non-proliferation treaty. They claim the program could be converted to building nuclear weapons.
That seems, to me, rather farcical. The effort to convert nuclear power plants into nuclear weapons is non-trivial, and if Australia wanted to build nukes, the lack of nuclear subs is rather obviously not what is stopping them.
So what is the real issue here? Is Indonesia just aligning itself with China?
Quote from: Berkut on August 03, 2022, 12:24:34 PMThere has been reports that Indonesia is trying to call the deal into question, on the grounds that Australia getting (or building) nuclear subs would be a violation of the UN Non-proliferation treaty. They claim the program could be converted to building nuclear weapons.
That seems, to me, rather farcical. The effort to convert nuclear power plants into nuclear weapons is non-trivial, and if Australia wanted to build nukes, the lack of nuclear subs is rather obviously not what is stopping them.
So what is the real issue here? Is Indonesia just aligning itself with China?
I see Indonesia is participating in joint military drills with the US so it can't simply be China alignment (bar I guess balancing?).
Nah, Indonesia has had relatively close defense relationships with the United States since the 1960s, for a non-aligned country. They understand just like the Philippines that there are limits to how close they can afford to get to China. My guess is that it's actually a ploy to get attention and maybe some more defense love from the U.S. themselves.
Quote from: Berkut on August 03, 2022, 11:25:51 AMI was surprised Zoupa was so naive as to give much credence to a story that used as its source a minor Australian politician.
I mean....really? You think it is newsworthy that there exists some politician in Australia who is grumbling about a defense procurement project?
a) It's Zoupa. Facts are not his forte.
b) It's a minor Australian politician complaining that something that was never planned is not going to happen.
Quote from: OttoVonBismarck on August 03, 2022, 12:36:12 PMNah, Indonesia has had relatively close defense relationships with the United States since the 1960s, for a non-aligned country. They understand just like the Philippines that there are limits to how close they can afford to get to China. My guess is that it's actually a ploy to get attention and maybe some more defense love from the U.S. themselves.
My understanding is that Indonesia and Australia are sometimes at odds over local preeminence - I think East Timor was a particular flashpoint, but I'm pretty sure there are others as well. My guess it's less about maneuvring for US concessions and more about taking an opportunity to piss in Australia's cereals.
Quote from: Jacob on August 03, 2022, 01:27:08 PMMy understanding is that Indonesia and Australia are sometimes at odds over local preeminence - I think East Timor was a particular flashpoint, but I'm pretty sure there are others as well. My guess it's less about maneuvring for US concessions and more about taking an opportunity to piss in Australia's cereals.
Yeah - I think they're basically a little frenemy-ish. On the big stuff they might be broadly aligned but they're competitive and there are some big local disagreements.
Quote from: grumbler on August 03, 2022, 01:05:36 PMQuote from: Berkut on August 03, 2022, 11:25:51 AMI was surprised Zoupa was so naive as to give much credence to a story that used as its source a minor Australian politician.
I mean....really? You think it is newsworthy that there exists some politician in Australia who is grumbling about a defense procurement project?
a) It's Zoupa. Facts are not his forte.
b) It's a minor Australian politician complaining that something that was never planned is not going to happen.
It's not my fault Australia chose poorly. :console:
Quote from: Sheilbh on August 03, 2022, 01:29:30 PMQuote from: Jacob on August 03, 2022, 01:27:08 PMMy understanding is that Indonesia and Australia are sometimes at odds over local preeminence - I think East Timor was a particular flashpoint, but I'm pretty sure there are others as well. My guess it's less about maneuvring for US concessions and more about taking an opportunity to piss in Australia's cereals.
Yeah - I think they're basically a little frenemy-ish. On the big stuff they might be broadly aligned but they're competitive and there are some big local disagreements.
France's submarines would have been diesel. Another missed opportunity for regional harmony. :sleep:
Quote from: Zoupa on August 03, 2022, 03:10:58 PMIt's not my fault Australia chose poorly. :console:
I love watching weasels dance, so please continue. :thumbsup:
I notice the usual suspects jump right to the ad homs and the name calling. :cry:
So the decision is to be announced next week. It looks like Australia and the UK will jointly develop a "hybrid"vessel based on the UK's next-generation submarine design (to replace Astute) - from what I've read Australia's very keen on ensuring they have "vertical launch payload system". Meanwhile they'll be buying 3 Virginia subs from the US to have something this decade and for at least the next 15-20 years. It seems there are still issues with US bureaucracy but like this is likely to mean some very deeply meshed navies (and industrial bases).
Separately Sunak is in France and it seems like France and the UK have put AUKUS behind them. As well as flagging that both countries see the security of the Indo-Pacific as "indivisible from that of Europe" they're going to discuss "how to combine our strengths in the area to ensure permanent presence of likeminded European partners." In particular "establishing the backbone to a permanent European maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific through the sequencing of more persistent European carrier strike group presence - coordinating the deployment of France's Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier, and the UK's Queen Elizabeth and Prince of Wales carriers." Which I think sounds very sensible. Obviously lots on Ukraine as well - but it reminds me of that line mongers posted that Russia is the weather, China is the climate.
It's kind of amazing - maybe a little bit alarming - that again we're seeing the shape of a confrontation between China as a big continental power doing continental things like belt and road, strengthening ties with Russia etc v the US as oceanic power and allies who are willing/able/want to contribute in that space.
Also really interesting detail on the issue with diesel and the future - they need to "snort" to recharge batteries over long distances (which for Australia, is just between Australian ports). That's now more of a risk because of the ability to use AI to spot from satellite images which means their stealth is compromised against a power like China or the US.
Interesting developments for sure.
I remember a while back there was a bit of thing about former Western fighter pilots taking paycheques teaching the Chinese armed forces how to fight Western airforces. Did anything come on that?
Quote from: Jacob on March 10, 2023, 11:28:04 AMInteresting developments for sure.
I remember a while back there was a bit of thing about former Western fighter pilots taking paycheques teaching the Chinese armed forces how to fight Western airforces. Did anything come on that?
The latest seems to be recruiting US and French pilots to help train the Peoples' Liberation Army Navy Air Force in carrier operations.
Quote from: grumbler on March 10, 2023, 01:13:12 PMThe latest seems to be recruiting US and French pilots to help train the Peoples' Liberation Army Navy Air Force in carrier operations.
I'll admit being somewhat alarmed and... uhm... disappointed... in this development.
Can't something be done?
Quote from: Jacob on March 10, 2023, 02:11:11 PMQuote from: grumbler on March 10, 2023, 01:13:12 PMThe latest seems to be recruiting US and French pilots to help train the Peoples' Liberation Army Navy Air Force in carrier operations.
I'll admit being somewhat alarmed and... uhm... disappointed... in this development.
Can't something be done?
what's the punishment for treason?
Quote from: Crazy_Ivan80 on March 10, 2023, 03:01:17 PMQuote from: Jacob on March 10, 2023, 02:11:11 PMQuote from: grumbler on March 10, 2023, 01:13:12 PMThe latest seems to be recruiting US and French pilots to help train the Peoples' Liberation Army Navy Air Force in carrier operations.
I'll admit being somewhat alarmed and... uhm... disappointed... in this development.
Can't something be done?
what's the punishment for treason?
There's no state of war between China and US/France. How is this any different from going to China to teach English (or French)?
Quote from: Barrister on March 10, 2023, 03:05:03 PMQuote from: Crazy_Ivan80 on March 10, 2023, 03:01:17 PMQuote from: Jacob on March 10, 2023, 02:11:11 PMQuote from: grumbler on March 10, 2023, 01:13:12 PMThe latest seems to be recruiting US and French pilots to help train the Peoples' Liberation Army Navy Air Force in carrier operations.
I'll admit being somewhat alarmed and... uhm... disappointed... in this development.
Can't something be done?
what's the punishment for treason?
There's no state of war between China and US/France. How is this any different from going to China to teach English (or French)?
I suppose there may be a difference if the technical training discloses information the retired folks are not permitted to disclose.
Quote from: Barrister on March 10, 2023, 03:05:03 PMThere's no state of war between China and US/France. How is this any different from going to China to teach English (or French)?
In the eventuality of conflict between China and the US/France, the PLA's ability to conduct successful carrier operations is likely more harmful than a slightly improved level of English (or French) proficiency in the broad Chinese population.
Pretty obvious, I'd think.
Quote from: Barrister on March 10, 2023, 03:05:03 PMQuote from: Crazy_Ivan80 on March 10, 2023, 03:01:17 PMQuote from: Jacob on March 10, 2023, 02:11:11 PMQuote from: grumbler on March 10, 2023, 01:13:12 PMThe latest seems to be recruiting US and French pilots to help train the Peoples' Liberation Army Navy Air Force in carrier operations.
I'll admit being somewhat alarmed and... uhm... disappointed... in this development.
Can't something be done?
what's the punishment for treason?
There's no state of war between China and US/France. How is this any different from going to China to teach English (or French)?
People with a degree, a pulse, and willingness to spend a year or two working for sub minimum wage for the chance to live somewhere exotic are 2 a penny.
Elite fighter pilots that have had a huge amount of government training investment to develop skills in how to kill foreigners... Pretty radically different.
Or at least it should be.
Since it's happening I suppose the government forgot to put obvious stuff in the contracts?
Quote from: Jacob on March 10, 2023, 03:23:49 PMQuote from: Barrister on March 10, 2023, 03:05:03 PMThere's no state of war between China and US/France. How is this any different from going to China to teach English (or French)?
In the eventuality of conflict between China and the US/France, the PLA's ability to conduct successful carrier operations is likely more harmful than a slightly improved level of English (or French) proficiency in the broad Chinese population. Crazy Ivan specified treason - which might work if a war was going on, but there isn't.
Pretty obvious, I'd think.
That of course is very true, so I think you perhaps misunderstand where I was coming from.
I don't like these retired pilots going over to train PLA pilots. But legally I'm not sure what can be done about it.
I bet when you are in the navy they make you sign documents that you won't reveal certain things to foreign powers.
Quote from: Barrister on March 10, 2023, 05:14:08 PMThat of course is very true, so I think you perhaps misunderstand where I was coming from.
I don't like these retired pilots going over to train PLA pilots. But legally I'm not sure what can be done about it.
Last year the US took action to damage the Chinese chip manufacturing industry. The action included some sort of legislation making it extremely unattractive (and, I believe, some sort of offense) for American citizens and green card holders to work in the Chinese chip industry. As I understand it, a significant number of Chinese-American scientists and executives quite the industry basically overnight as a result.
I'm not sure why something similar couldn't be done for fighter pilots and other military experts.
Several of these pilots have in fact been arrested. Secrecy commitments never lapse
Quote from: grumbler on March 10, 2023, 11:33:16 PMSeveral of these pilots have in fact been arrested. Secrecy commitments never lapse
That sounds pretty reasonable. Do you have any links?
Quote from: Jacob on March 11, 2023, 12:00:00 PMQuote from: grumbler on March 10, 2023, 11:33:16 PMSeveral of these pilots have in fact been arrested. Secrecy commitments never lapse
That sounds pretty reasonable. Do you have any links?
I said "several" but the stories I read probably all referred to the one guy. Here's Al Jazeera (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/12/29/australia-to-extradite-ex-us-fighter-pilot-over-china-training)'s version
QuoteArrested in Australia in October, Daniel Duggan, 54, is accused of money laundering and conspiracy to export defence services to China by instructing Chinese military pilots in how to land on aircraft carriers, according to a 2017 indictment unsealed by a US court in December.
Obliged :cheers:
"Conspiracy to export defence services" sounds like a very fancy accusation.
The US has a detailed arms export control regime. It includes controls on providing defense services, which in turn includes things like military training of foreign forces. A US person or company wishing to offer such services must apply for a receive a license from the US government. Not surprisingly, the policy of the US government is not to approve such licenses for providing services to the PRC.
According to the allegations, Duggan didn't apply for a license. He was warned by the State Department not to supply services without a license. He ignored the warning.
Deliberate violations of the arms export control regime can be punished by criminal penalties.
Details confirmed - from Sydney Morning Herald - as it's now been announced. This seems like a pretty vast commitment for Australia specifically and a big shift in their role in the Pacific. Also it seems like almost unprecedented degree of military, strategic and industrial entanglement (that needs to survive at least four Presidential terms :ph34r:):
QuoteNew fleet of eight nuclear submarines to be built in Australia in $368 billion deal
By David Crowe
Updated March 14, 2023 — 7.36amfirst published at 7.01am
Key points
Australia will build a new fleet of eight nuclear-powered submarines in Adelaide to begin service in the 2040s.
The government expects the full cost of the program, including construction and maintenance and service, to range from $268 billion to $368 billion up to 2055.
The United States Navy and the Royal Navy will station nuclear-powered submarines in Perth from 2027 in the first step toward filling the capability gap.
Australia will buy between three and five Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines from the United States at a cost of $50 billion to $58 billion, which are expected to arrive from the early 2030s. It is not yet decided if these will be new or older submarines.
Australia's own SSN-AUKUS nuclear-powered fleet will be based on Britain's Astute-class submarines, and will be built in Adelaide from the 2040s. The first one may be built in the UK.
San Diego: Australia will build a new fleet of eight nuclear-powered submarines in Adelaide to begin service in the 2040s under a mammoth transformation in national defence that will cost up to $368 billion by 2055.
The government expects the full cost of the program, including construction and maintenance and service, to range from $268 billion to $368 billion up to 2055.
The sweeping plan will begin by hosting more visits to Australian ports by United States submarines this year and United Kingdom vessels from 2026, clearing the way for a fixed rotation of naval power in Perth.
Over time, Australia will aim to build a new fleet of nuclear-powered submarines to a joint design with the United Kingdom so that vessels made in Adelaide can enter service in the 2040s.
The long-term fleet, made in Australia with a design called the SSN-AUKUS, will consist of eight submarines and will be fitted with vertical launch systems to fire cruise missiles.
The next steps in the AUKUS alliance with the US and UK will cost $9 billion over the next four years including $2 billion for infrastructure in Adelaide and $1 billion for an expanded naval base in Perth.
Australia will contribute about $3 billion to the efforts in the US and UK to develop the submarine technology, including the design and development of the SSN-AUKUS.
The US will commit $US4.6 billion to its industry to support the Australian project, while the UK will spend 2.2 billion pounds.
With the government setting out a two-decade effort to develop the industrial capacity to build the new fleet in Australia, it will commit to hosting more foreign vessels and buying US-made submarines to fill a looming gap in the nation's defences.
While US submarines already visit Australia, the visits will increase from this year and Royal Australian Navy personnel will begin serving with the US and UK fleets.
Details of AUKUS nuclear-powered submarines plan to be unveiled by PM Anthony Albanese and US, British leaders.
The United States Navy and the Royal Navy will station nuclear-powered submarines in Perth from 2027 in the first step toward filling the capability gap. The rotational forces will include up to four Virginia-class US vessel and one Astute-class UK vessel.
Bridging the capability gap
From the early 2030s, the federal government will buy at least three and up to five Virginia-class submarines from the US, but this will depend on approval from the US Congress.
The result will give Australia an interim fleet with more capability and firepower than any Australian vessels to date, giving the country more capacity to project force throughout the region.
The three or more Virginia-class vessels will be under Australian command with Australian crews and will mark the first time the US has sold these submarines to another country.
The US and Australian governments are yet to decide whether Australia will buy new or used Virginia-class vessels.
Later in the 2030s, the UK will take delivery of new submarines from shipbuilders in the UK to a new design to replace the Astute-class and to be known as the SSN-AUKUS.
Only after this point is Australia forecast to have the shipbuilding and technology capacity to deploy the SSN-AUKUS design with vessels built in Adelaide and due to enter service in the 2040s.
The plan forecasts the delivery of a new SSN-AUKUS every two years and assumes all are built in Adelaide, but the government is not ruling out buying the first of this fleet from the UK, depending on the strategic outlook.
Prime Minister Anthony Albanese is due to announce the new steps alongside US President Joe Biden and UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak at the US Navy's Point Loma base in San Diego at 8am on Tuesday morning, AEDT, in the most significant decisions since the three nations struck the AUKUS agreement in September 2021.
At a photo opportunity with three world leaders before the speeches, Sky's Kieran Gilbert asked US President Joe Biden if the US could be relied on to honour the AUKUS deal, and the President replied: "We can always be relied upon."
All the submarines in the new plan will be powered by nuclear propulsion systems made overseas and fitted with nuclear fuel that will last the lifetime of the vessel, in the first time the US has shared the technology with another country since it agreed to do so with the United Kingdom in 1958. None of the submarines in the Royal Australian Navy will have nuclear weapons.
The new plans mark a major new step in the AUKUS pact after the intensely controversial move by then prime minister Scott Morrison and federal cabinet in September 2021 to end an agreement with France to supply conventional submarines to be built in Adelaide.
Albanese will set out a deadline for the Adelaide shipbuilding project that is in line with Morrison's assurance that Australia would build its own submarines for delivery during the 2040s, a target that triggered argument over whether it would take too long to replace the Collins-class fleet, which are powered by diesel-electric engines and entered service from 1996.
The RAN has sought a dramatic shift to a more powerful submarine design out of concern at the vulnerability of the Collins-class vessels in an era of more powerful satellite surveillance and the limitations of diesel-electric engines compared to nuclear propulsion systems that can power vessels for greater distances at faster speeds and with less noise and exposure to detection.
Searching for the next generation of submariners
The need for skilled workers has been identified as a key challenge in the AUKUS project because of the scale of the construction as well as the shortage of submariners on the existing Collins-class submarine fleet before personnel move to the nuclear-powered fleets.
The government expects to need 20,000 jobs over the next 30 years including workers supporting AUKUS in the Australian Defence Force, domestic industry and the Australian public service. This includes 8500 direct jobs in Australia's building and servicing the submarines, with jobs including scientists, engineers, project managers, operators, technicians, welders, construction workers, electricians, metal fitters and builders.
Albanese has preciously named Adelaide and Western Australia as two locations that would win work from the AUKUS project.
The $9 billion cost over the next four years will include $6 billion for Australian industry and workforce, separate from the infrastructure upgrades in Adelaide and Perth.
Overhauling our shipyards and ports
HMAS Stirling in Perth will be upgraded to host more visits by US and UK vessels and become the base for the new fleet, in a plan that assumes the creation of 3,000 jobs.The plan for Adelaide requires a mammoth investment in a new shipyard at Osborne to build the SSN-AUKUS, with up to 4,000 workers involved at its peak.
In addition, the construction of the new submarines will require 4,000 to 5,000 workers at the shipyard at the peak of the work two decades from now.
The government estimate for the decade to 2033 ranges from $50 billion to $58 billion and could include some of the cost of buying the first Virginia-class vessels in the next decade.
The cost is at least twice that of the $24 billion for the Attack-class submarines under the contract cancelled with the French.
Over the longer-term, the project will cost 0.15 per cent of GDP each year on average, highlighting the vast cost when total defence spending is forecast to surpass 2 per cent of GDP.
Australia has 900 serving submariners but needs at least 200 more as soon as possible so it can deploy personnel to US and British vessels to prepare for the transformation in the fleet. Over time, however, many more would be needed, depending on the number of submarines purchased.
The plan to be unveiled commits Australia to using propulsion systems from the US that are installed in the submarines with a supply of nuclear fuel that lasts the lifetime of the vessels, avoiding the need for a civil nuclear industry.
The nuclear reactors are to be inserted into the submarines during their construction, resulting in a fully self-contained power source with no need for refuelling - a crucial assumption in the AUKUS agreement because it means Australia would not need a civil nuclear industry to support the maintenance of the vessels.
A transformation in regional defence that will require at least $170 billion in new spending to develop an industrial base capable of building a new fleet in Adelaide over the next two decades.
The government will not disclose the cost per unit for the new submarines.
The program assumes the government will not begin the disposal of any nuclear waste until the 2050s and the government is looking for a future site for this on Australian Defence Force land at a future date.
Again the really striking thing here is how Australia's read of its strategic environment must have changed so much for this radical (and expensive) a shift in policy. Especially given that the deal was brokered by a Liberal government and is now being finalised under a Labor government.
I just googled it: 368 AUD = 245 USD
I think they could have handled the signalling involved in this announcement better, say by holding the signing ceremony onboard a USN CV 20 miles off the East coast of Tiawan.
Quote from: Zanza on March 13, 2023, 04:13:08 PMI just googled it: 368 AUD = 245 USD
Yeah - as Albanese put it from an Australian perspective the biggest single defence project in Australian history.
As I say the thing I find really striking (and alarming) is the shift in Australia's risk perception since 2012 that they've gone, I think, from a project of A$36 billion to ten times that. That in itself feels like a flashing red light on the Pacific and China's conduct and intentions.
Edit: And indicative of that just yesterday Xi used his first speech of his new term to vow to build China's military into a "great wall of steel" for the purposes of "effectively safeguarding national sovereignty, security and development interests" - later referencing "'Taiwan independence' separtists and external interference".
Yeah, my gut is that Xi's going to pull the trigger.
He's intellectually vacuous and emotionally insecure and he genuinely believes the rhetoric about China's destiny and Chinese nationalism. If he was part of the older style CCP, there'd be checks and balance and some sort of consensus driven decision making. Maybe, in that case, there'd be a chance that it'd be posturing for advantage, but I don't believe it is. Xi has consolidated power - and he'll continue to do so - which means it'll be up to one (vacuous and insecure) person's judgement.
If Xi remains in power, he'll take his shot at Taiwan. I hope I'm wrong, but all the signs are there IMO.
Its perfectly understandable that this shift happened. Back in the 2000s things did seem to year on year be getting better in China. The hope that it would open up naturally wasn't completely unfounded. Loads of articles out there from journalists comparing their experience during the summer and winter olympics.
The peak and decline seems to predate Xi becoming premier. I wonder what triggered it- surely its not so simple as the financial crisis, though that likely plays a role.
Quote from: Josquius on March 14, 2023, 04:16:37 AMIts perfectly understandable that this shift happened. Back in the 2000s things did seem to year on year be getting better in China. The hope that it would open up naturally wasn't completely unfounded. Loads of articles out there from journalists comparing their experience during the summer and winter olympics.
The peak and decline seems to predate Xi becoming premier. I wonder what triggered it- surely its not so simple as the financial crisis, though that likely plays a role.
I think there's two cycles that ended up rhyming with Xi. The Economist's Prince podcast is really good on this. But it's the thing I often wonder - to what extent was Xi exactly the type of leader the CCP wanted at that point (given that another main candidate was Bo Xilai it doesn't seem implausible) or to what extent this has all been a bit of a surprise for them.
One cycle is China's rise and I think the global financial crisis is key to that moment because I think the perception within China (and outside to an extent) is that they respond pretty effectively to that. Their success in dealing with it is contrasted with the US and the EU who in different ways get it really wrong and have a decade of relatively low growth while China continues to grow and modernise.
I think for the party and for China that isn't the only sign but is indicative of China needing a larger role in the world to reflect its power. I do think 2008-12 is really important in that. But I think the view of the financial crisis was a bit like China's covid policy (until vaccines came along). It was successful in its goals and it compared favourably with the West.
So I think regardless of who became leader China's politics were taking a turn to more assertive policy internationally. The challenge in our system is, as Lawrence Summers has pointed out, whether it is even possible for our system which is American led to include another leader. Is America capable of sharing leadership/power and I'm not sure it is. So I think more assertive policy was part of that cycle and it was likely that would lead to increasing clashes with the rest.
But I think there was another cycle that also produced/shaped Xi. I think the combination of corruption scandals, environmental scandals - a lot of which I think was perceived as coming from the various patronage networks around the leadership (like the Youth League network). Xi rose in areas that were at the heart of opening and where there was a lot of corruption. Xi was never directly implicated in those party scandals - and, in the Economist pod they talk to an old CIA China hand who says the easiest explanation might be true, he wasn't really part of it. Maybe he turned a blind eye while that was politically the best option but he was perceived not corrupt. Of course in part he didn't need to be corrupt because unlike, say, a Chinese peasant becoming a businessman or someone trying to make their way in the party, Xi is a princeling with incredible connections married to one of China's most famous singers.
Western journalists have dug around since he's come to power - there have been allegations about some relatives with huge property assets, but not much compared to your standard kleptocrat and not much directly linked to Xi. Again the CIA guy said that Western observers underestimate at their peril Xi's ideological fervour and his nostalgia for the days of a purer, cleaner Chinese revolutionary system (that profoundly punished his family). And almost as a matter of taste views the corrupt and China's nouveau riche as "debauched and undignified".
I think when you combine those two cycles you have the party and China wanting to take a more assertive, leadership role in the world; and you have within the party a desire to clean up/fear that corruption could undermine or destroy party rule so you go for someone with a relatively untainted background and the task of cleaning house. I don't think it means any leader would end up like Xi but I think it creates the domestic conditions for someone to get rid of consensus leadership and target patronage networks of other senior leaders, weakening their powerbase and creates the incentives on the world stage to take a more confrontational approach. And obviously both of those can be aligned as almost two sides of the same coin.
QuoteYeah, my gut is that Xi's going to pull the trigger.
He's intellectually vacuous and emotionally insecure and he genuinely believes the rhetoric about China's destiny and Chinese nationalism. If he was part of the older style CCP, there'd be checks and balance and some sort of consensus driven decision making. Maybe, in that case, there'd be a chance that it'd be posturing for advantage, but I don't believe it is. Xi has consolidated power - and he'll continue to do so - which means it'll be up to one (vacuous and insecure) person's judgement.
If Xi remains in power, he'll take his shot at Taiwan. I hope I'm wrong, but all the signs are there IMO.
One problem I always have with this - and I think it's probably true of most of the world in a post-colonial world - is that I think in really broad brushes the Chinese nationalist myth is kind of true. Great civilisation state, century of humiliation and chaos, CCP dominating and presiding over the rise of China back to great civilisation state strikes me as, at a very high level, a pretty accurate summary of recent Chinese history. I don't necessarily agree with the ends they use it for or at all with the way they write out other figures and movements in Chinese history to always give the CCP a starring role (which is nonsense). But I mention it just because it's something I've also thought of with India - as much as I don't like Modi - and I think one of the things Western and especially European (although in China's case also especially America) needs to do is find a way to accommodate that story in our system, because a lot of it is true.
On Taiwan though - I agree. I think US assessments are basically that something will happen in the latter half of this decade. It is striking with China's modernising it's armed forces into a "great wall of steel" is that it seems reminiscent of Putin's modernisation of Russia's armed forces (and may be just as successful).
I also thought this was interesting from the NPC - Xi formally updating China's foreign policy from Deng's. Again it's like moving on from Deng's goal of "create a moderately prosperous society" as having been achieved:
QuoteMoritz Rudolf
@MoritzRudolf
Mar 9
On Monday, Xi Jinping introduced a 24-character phrase that is likely to develop into the new 🇨🇳 foreign policy mantra.
What is it?
Why is it relevant?
Short 🧵
With risks & challenges increasing, Xi stated
沉着冷静 Be calm,
保持定力 keep determined,
稳中求进 seek progress & stability,
积极作为 be proactive & achieve things,
团结一致 unite (under the banner of the party),
敢于斗争 & dare to fight
(loose translation)
Compare this to Deng Xiaoping's 24-character strategy
冷静观察 Observe calmly
稳住阵脚 secure our position
沉着应付 cope with affairs calmly
韬 光养晦 hide our capacities and bide our time
善于守拙 be good at maintaining a low profile
决不当头 never claim leadership
The 24-characters are framed in the context of the PRC's past achievements (e.g., fight against poverty). They acknowledge the complexity of the current domestic and international environment highlighting a need to prepare for black swans (黑天鹅) and grey rhinos (灰犀牛).
A Xinhua video puts it this way: Today, it is not enough to follow (Deng's) "securing our position" (稳住阵脚) approach. There is a need to be proactive. Unity and daring to fight (& being good at it) will enable the PRC that nothing can stop it moving forward.
The 24-characters have both a domestic and a foreign policy dimension. Given the sharp contrast from and reference to Deng's 24-character strategy, I expect we will hear much more about the foreign policy dimension. The grey rhino appears to be an increasingly likely US-China war.
Here some links:
http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2023-03/07/nw.D110000renmrb_20230307_3-02.htm
http://views.ce.cn/view/ent/202303/09/t20230309_38432847.shtml
http://news.cn/politics/2023-
Shelf, what you call an America incapable of sharing power/leadership to me looks more like a ROTW unwilling to assume the burden.
Quote from: Admiral Yi on March 14, 2023, 09:42:11 AMShelf, what you call an America incapable of sharing power/leadership to me looks more like a ROTW unwilling to assume the burden.
What do you mean? I'm not sure I see the connection.
It's in response to your Lawrence Summers quote.
This is the quote:
Quote"Can the US imagine a viable global economic system" in which it is no longer the dominant player? Could an American "political leader acknowledge that reality in a way that permits negotiation over what such a world would look like?... Can China be held down without inviting conflict?"
I still don't really understand the connection with burden sharing not least because the countries sharing the burden of an American led system are, almost by definition, part of it but following American leadership. There is no potential for credible (and maybe a little bit justified) challenge to American leadership in the way I think there is with the rise of China (and maybe in the future India and Nigeria etc).
Quote from: Admiral Yi on March 14, 2023, 09:42:11 AMShelf, what you call an America incapable of sharing power/leadership to me looks more like a ROTW unwilling to assume the burden.
So you want ROTW to assume the burden of carrying out American policy. Good luck with that.
Quote from: Sheilbh on March 14, 2023, 10:23:04 AMThis is the quote:
Quote"Can the US imagine a viable global economic system" in which it is no longer the dominant player? Could an American "political leader acknowledge that reality in a way that permits negotiation over what such a world would look like?... Can China be held down without inviting conflict?"
I still don't really understand the connection with burden sharing not least because the countries sharing the burden of an American led system are, almost by definition, part of it but following American leadership. There is no potential for credible (and maybe a little bit justified) challenge to American leadership in the way I think there is with the rise of China (and maybe in the future India and Nigeria etc).
I didn't realize Larry (that's what we call him at Harvard :nerd:) was talking only about sharing power with China.
I think the issues with allowing China as an equal partner are self evident.
Quote from: Admiral Yi on March 14, 2023, 10:32:03 AMI didn't realize Larry (that's what we call him at Harvard :nerd:) was talking only about sharing power with China.
I think the issues with allowing China as an equal partner are self evident.
Right - but I think that's part of what ties the crash and Xi's rise. China sees the 2002-12 as a lost decade of a lot of missed opportunities, some from their own side. But I think the crash is the key moment because China handled it comparatively well and the central importance of China to the world economy because clear. But they were not really ushered into any form of leadership or partnership in shaping the global economic system.
I get the issues but I also think that in reality on trade and economics and, essentially, climate - nothing can happen without China. Either deliberately diverting around it or in partnership - and that's going to be a central challenge for the US as it's trying to prevent China from advancing technologically, managing a form of "de-coupling"/re-shoring next generation manufacturing and wanting to work with China on climate, stuff like nuclear non-proliferation and, actually ideally, getting China on side about Ukraine. It's a big challenge - especially if you think, as I do, that climate is key because while China's carbon per capita is still way below the US it's now at about the level of Germany (and almost double that of, say, the UK or France) but with a lot of people. Action on climate is increasingly a primarily Chinese story which needs to be integrated into any global approach. As I say my general view is that I think Biden is doing very well on this generally.
Sheilbh, I don't disagree with that analysis of Xi's rise, though as with many retrospective analyses there's a bit of an "inevitability of present conditions" air about it. I'll just note that fighting corruption may well be something the party had an appetite for (and for good reason), but it is also an incredibly useful political cudgel to wield against enemies or the merely inconvenient in a system such as the Chinese.
I also broadly agree that there are strong elements of truth in the Chinese national narrative - the century of humiliation and all that - but it is also heavily shaped and spun. This isn't really that different from most national narratives. They all have to build on something resembling reality one way or the other.
So nothing there to disagree about. As a systemic analysis what you're saying makes sense.
My assessment was more on character, and to the extent that Xi's character influences the direction of the CCP and PRC I think he's inclined towards drastic action on Taiwan whereas other hypothetical leaders might not have been.
On a personal level, I think it means we need to visit China (for family reasons) and Taiwan (for pleasure) sooner rather than later as it may not be long before such visits are impossible.
Quote from: Jacob on March 14, 2023, 11:36:18 AMSheilbh, I don't disagree with that analysis of Xi's rise, though as with many retrospective analyses there's a bit of an "inevitability of present conditions" air about it. I'll just note that fighting corruption may well be something the party had an appetite for (and for good reason), but it is also an incredibly useful political cudgel to wield against enemies or the merely inconvenient in a system such as the Chinese.
Yeah I get that and I think that's absolutely part of it with Xi. I think the party wanted and needed to fight corruption because they saw it as an increasingly existential risk. As you say the problem is that fighting corruption is a cudgel which can be used internally and externally and to fight corruption you need a degree of carte blanche to go after other entrenched interests. Which is what's happened with Xi.
It's where I think the party wanted someone like Xi in general approach but maybe hadn't fully realised/appreciated what they were getting with Xi. Especially because I always wonder about that Bo Xilai alternative and if actually the party thought they were getting (to use the CIA guy's phrase) a "sexier Hu Jintao" in contrast to the riskiness of Bo, but maybe ended up with someone even riskier on the global stage and better able to consolidate power internally.
As ever while it's not a democratic system it's still politics and there are cycles and conditions that shape the range of options - but it still takes someone's particular skills, style, ideology etc to shape what the outcome is. So while I think the broad shape of a far more assertive China and anti-corruption purges were broadly what the party leadership wanted, I think it's very definitely the case that Xi has shaped the outcome in a way maybe no other leader would've.
QuoteI also broadly agree that there are strong elements of truth in the Chinese national narrative - the century of humiliation and all that - but it is also heavily shaped and spun. This isn't really that different from most national narratives. They all have to build on something resembling reality one way or the other.
I think this is true - but I wonder where it goes because I think at some point it is going to require a reckoning with the West and our world order based on our wealth and power which in signifcant part is directly tied to or a consequence of the century of humiliation, the British in India, the impact of the Atlantic slave trade on West Africa, extractivism in Latin America. I think as countries with those (largely true) national narratives become increasingly powerful and want a bigger say, I think it will clash with our own national narratives but also world order narrative.
QuoteMy assessment was more on character, and to the extent that Xi's character influences the direction of the CCP and PRC I think he's inclined towards drastic action on Taiwan whereas other hypothetical leaders might not have been.
Yeah - although as I always wonder about Bo Xilai. But maybe he would have actually been less of a risk and less of a personality cult etc precisely because he was (incredibly) corruptible, as opposed to a true believer which it seems like Xi is. Maybe it would've all been better if they'd just gone for the crook.
QuoteOn a personal level, I think it means we need to visit China (for family reasons) and Taiwan (for pleasure) sooner rather than later as it may not be long before such visits are impossible.
:(
I don't have family connections - I've got friends who do - but I always regret not going to China and Hong Kong at earlier points in the 2000s, because I'd love to go but I don't want to go to this China (and maybe I'm just a massive hypocrite as it was still a repressive dictatorship then, Tibet etc). I plan to go to Taiwan in the next year or so for pleasure precisely for that. To have a chance to go to a China that is free and that isn't ethically as much a problem for me.
As a Canadian I'd stay far, far away from China, Jake.
Interesting observation of Bo Xilai, Sheilbh. I didn't particularly have him down as someone who was "(incredibly) corruptible." Do you mind expanding a bit on that? I feel like I might have missed something.
I was thinking of the whole situation around the murder of Neil Heywood. I remember an excellent podcast done by the BBC's then China Editor Carrie Grace about it called Murder in Lucky Holiday Hotel. But she also did a really good article about it:
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-sh/Murder_lucky_hotel
Maybe it isn't that incredible - but I'd still say pretty corruptible :lol:
Quote from: Jacob on March 14, 2023, 11:36:18 AMOn a personal level, I think it means we need to visit China (for family reasons) and Taiwan (for pleasure) sooner rather than later as it may not be long before such visits are impossible.
There have got to be easier ways to be on the news, you know... :ph34r: