The China Thread

[Tamas]

And all it took were tanks and concentration camps. 

I know what you mean and not squandering becoming the assembly line for the West (like Hungary did or how Russia failed to grab the opportunity to modernise) is an achievement, I am just reluctant to give credit to the Chinese state for anything, because they are too reprehensible. And that does not just mean a moral reluctance to praise them, but also it means there has been no transparency to judge their level of success through. Maybe (likely) a democratic China could have achieved the same or better minus the severe repression of its citizens which would make these successive Communist governments an abject failure, for example.

[Sheilbh]

Yeah. I understand that.

I think my point is that I think China is a risk precisely because it is a morally reprehensible party state and also a very effective one. Because they are bad morally doesn't mean they are bad at everything and, as I say, I think that way lies complacency.

Similarly I'm not trying to judge against a hypothetical democratic China I simply mean in the context of where China was and other similar countries (acknowledging there aren't really any given China's size etc). I always feel we're maybe a little over-confident on the inevitable triumph of democracies for something that has maybe happened once and only in the last 45 years - like I'm always struck by capitalism's place in the "natural order" of things, given it's a few hundred years old and until recently a regional phenomenon. I feel like alternatives good and bad are possible.

But, you know, it goes to CC's point around agency. I'm not sure Xi is a "great man" yet (I think Putin absolutely is) in terms of that individual altering the course of history v the broad structural shifts. But again, in a lot of ways, I think there is more continuity with Xi than is often depicted (as you'd expect given it's the system he emerged from). I always remember that most Western thinkers in the 70s were absolutely convinced the West was being outstripped by Brezhnev's Soviet Union - and I'm never sure if it was, if the collapse of the Eastern Bloc was already starting or, perhaps, even already baked in. Always the fear of the present

Edit: And on that point it is striking that there are those other echoes of the 70s for the West: conflict in the Middle East impacting our economies, geopolitical crises disrupting energy supply, inflation, a certain political exhaustion/fatigue/malaise...?

[crazy canuck]

I have a lot of difficulty accepting the proposition that the policies under Xi are a natural extension and evolution of what had come before.


Everyone I know who is doing business in China noted the dramatic change and got out.

[Josquius]

I have a lot of difficulty accepting the proposition that the policies under Xi are a natural extension and evolution of what had come before.


Everyone I know who is doing business in China noted the dramatic change and got out.

Surely that could mean either
A: as you say, that Xi was a complete change on things,
B: these people totally misread the situation and put too much faith in the power of liberalism to change China

[Tamas]

I have a lot of difficulty accepting the proposition that the policies under Xi are a natural extension and evolution of what had come before.


Everyone I know who is doing business in China noted the dramatic change and got out.

Surely that could mean either
A: as you say, that Xi was a complete change on things,
B: these people totally misread the situation and put too much faith in the power of liberalism to change China

It hasn't been difficult over the last several years to notice the different vibe coming out of China, not just becoming a loud nationalist retard like Germany cca. 1890s but also the one-man rule Xi was going for.

[Sheilbh]

Yeah. There is change for sure - and look this is the GCSE history question to the modern: continuity or change?

I'm not denying there's change and I wouldn't say that Xi's China is a natural extension of what came before. I think there are areas with greater change than others - I think the anti-corruption drive and the cult of personality are the biggest areas of difference.

But I think you often read it in terms of a revolutionary change or rupture with the near past - which then structures how you look at everything - and I'm not sure that's true. I think the other story is that since Deng, China has been working towards advancing technologically and economically (to become a "moderately prosperous society" - now achieved). Not for its own sake (though it helps legitimise party rule) but for the purpose of advancing Chinese power. That was, for want of a better phrase, the "hide your strength, bide your time" phase - and having achieved that is now in the more assertive "standing up" phase.

I think that if the first bit worked and China was able to develop then because of the nature of its state and because of the party (and, perhaps, possibly, arguably because it's just to big to fit within an American-led order; or possibly we'll see the same with India and it is likely in nations rising from the experience of colonialism or century of humiliation into great powers?) was going to end up with a policy a lot like Xi's.

It's a thing I've mentioined before and I wonder about - I've no doubt they're maybe surprised by the cult of personality stuff - but did the Chinese leadership ultimately choose Xi because they knew what they'd be getting. From the party's perspective I think it's possible they were looking for someone to "deal" with corruption because that presented an existential risk to their rule and they wanted someone to assert China's role as it "stands up".

[Josquius]

Then the question is did the party choose Xi or did he manage his career successfully enough to be chosen- I've read that he has been very shrewd from his earliest days, purposefully taking less desirable and more out of the way posts to network and build up a support base whilst at the same time giving an impression he wasn't power hungry.

[Sheilbh]

Then the question is did the party choose Xi or did he manage his career successfully enough to be chosen- I've read that he has been very shrewd from his earliest days, purposefully taking less desirable and more out of the way posts to network and build up a support base whilst at the same time giving an impression he wasn't power hungry.

Oh yeah - absolutely he's an incredibly canny operator. And as I say - I don't know how much what I've said up there is right. I just think there's a plausible case.

I've read similar to that about corruption in Xi's past too.

And also the exact oppopsite could be true. My understanding was that he had been lined up as successor early but Bo Xilai's rise, flair and popularity led to views that he might overtake Xi by the time of actually appointing the successor to Hu. So possibly Xi was the safe, steady pair of hands in contrast to the perceived danger of Bo? Though as I say I think the increasing confrontation with the West etc was probably pretty inevitable.

[Jacob]

Prior to the takeover, Xi was definitely seen as the safe, steady, non-controversial pair of hands. 100% this.

[Jacob]

I'm 50-50 on the main topic under discussion right now.

On one hand I don't want to underestimate the CCP regime because they're autocrats, so obviously we're better simply by virtue of not being autocrats. That way lies complacency.

On the other hand, I also don't want to uncritically buy into the whole "those devious Chinese and cultural propensity for generational thinking; whatever they're doing is obviously the result of a cunning long term scheme" thing either.

[celedhring]

I'm kinda not entirely sold on this idea of Xi being this shrewd forward thinker after the way he handled the whole Covid-zero mess just not to admit he was wrong (because dictators can never be wrong).

[Jacob]

A thought that's sprung from some of the conversation here...

General maxim I believe to be true: one of the weaknesses of autocratic forms of government is in succession;
1) there's a higher propensity for chaotic and destructive power struggles; and
2) if the succession ends up with an imbecile in power, it's a threat to the country and system.

A thing I thought to be true, but now I'm not sure: the CCP, post Mao, has done an excellent job managing the succession. They ended up with relatively competent people in power, and the successions were generally smooth.

However, as Sheilbh points out perhaps the post-Mao, pre-Xi years of governance can rightly be seen as an uninterrupted period of rule by Deng, with his approved successors acting as figureheads. Xi's ascent was the  first real succession. As such was marked by greater instability (tanks in the streets, the persecution of the other candidate, continued attacks on rival power centres) and the dismantling of the norms of the previous ruler (Xi now having the role of Chairman for life, rather than being a term limited representative of the party).

Therefore, the notion that the CCP might have found a way to mitigate one of the weaknesses of autocracy may be premature.

[Jacob]

I'm kinda not entirely sold on this idea of Xi being this shrewd forward thinker after the way he handled the whole Covid-zero mess just not to admit he was wrong (because dictators can never be wrong).

The prevailing view in my sphere of Chinese analysts is that Xi is a complete fucking moron. He's gifted at looking unthreatening to his superiors (in part because he's a moron), and incredibly thin-skinned (and therefore unwilling to risk looking like an idiot), which helped him rise to his current position (combined with the Red Princeling network he was born into).

He's the Chairman because he lucked into being the compromise candidate for cliques opposed to Bo Xilai rather than as a result of a clever campaign of scheming. Someone had to rise to the top, and it turned out to be him.

Now I'm not expert enough to say whether it's true or not with great confidence, but I certainly see the logic and haven't seen any clear counter indications.

[Sheilbh]

On the other hand, I also don't want to uncritically buy into the whole "those devious Chinese and cultural propensity for generational thinking; whatever they're doing is obviously the result of a cunning long term scheme" thing either.

Absolutely - and to be clear I don't really mean that. I always hate the Western short termism v Chinese long termism nonsense (on both sides ).

The relative success of the last 50 years has been, as with every other country, actually dealing with the short term and with crises. There are over-arching policies within that for a period, like reform and opening, but it is as much navigating an inflation crisis in the 80s, the fall of the USSR, Tiananmen (and the - as it turns out, limited - fallout), the emergence of the internet, the global financial crisis, covid etc. Just like Western societies or any other. My view on that I suppose is that I think it's been common to underestimate the role of ideology on China's leadership, while, perhaps, overestimating it or conversely underestimating the technocratic capability of China's party civil servants/functionaries. Indeed I think some of that success - particularly their response to the global financial crisis and covid - strongly buttressed the party's legitimacy internally but may have made them a little overconfident?

Separate from that sort of operational/technocratic ability is the leadership. And I take the point on "generational thinking" etc. Obviously a lot of the leadership is also pivoting and responding to those events in the short term. I think there is a degree of "generational" strategy within China's leadership purely because of the way they're brought into the system with the generation model and they are socialised with party elders traditionally holding onto significant power (or power networks at least). I think that does create for a degree of continuity that is - by design - absent in a democratic system.

And I do think - which is why I wonder how much Xi matters at this point - that there are structural forces about a rival power etc.

Again generally my basic point is that we should be open to the possibility that the Chinese leadership and state are competent. I think there's an interesting contrast between common perceptions of Russia's leadership v China's.

I'm kinda not entirely sold on this idea of Xi being this shrewd forward thinker after the way he handled the whole Covid-zero mess just not to admit he was wrong (because dictators can never be wrong).

Sure. Zero covid ended as a mess and a humiliation. But at the same time China never had a national lockdown, had significantly fewer deaths per capita and significantly less impact to economic activity than most of the West.

I think the narrative on China's response to covid depends on when you look at it and I'm not sure that just how it ends is the most accurate picture. It was a source of legitimacy and then a challenge to it.

A thing I thought to be true, but now I'm not sure: the CCP, post Mao, has done an excellent job managing the succession. They ended up with relatively competent people in power, and the successions were generally smooth.

However, as Sheilbh points out perhaps the post-Mao, pre-Xi years of governance can rightly be seen as an uninterrupted period of rule by Deng, with his approved successors acting as figureheads. Xi's ascent was the  first real succession. As such was marked by greater instability (tanks in the streets, the persecution of the other candidate, continued attacks on rival power centres) and the dismantling of the norms of the previous ruler (Xi now having the role of Chairman for life, rather than being a term limited representative of the party).

I need to read the new biography of Deng (and the Xi one which is meant to be excellent).

I think you're right that it's the biggest risk for autocratic regimes - not sure what the Chinese equivalent is of Swan Lake playing on TV. And I don't think Deng was necessarily running the country behind the scenes. And as I say I don't know but I just wonder if we under-estimate his role and influence in retirement. There was no cult of personality but given his prestige and what he'd accomplished and also just his sheer time at the top (with all those networks) means his power must have been immense.

On Mao-ish behaviour for example - look at Deng's Southern Tour. From what I've read the central committee was intending to pause reform and opening to retrench when the supposedly retired Deng launched it - and the central committee had no idea it was going to happen or what he was going to do or say. I think I read that Beijing refused to even comment on it while it was happening because they were just watching like everyone else. Ultimately it breathes life back into Deng's agenda which is re-launched. The thing I can't help but think of is Mao swimming the Yangtze.

I wonder if we're slightly buying Deng's own myth of himself?

[Josquius]

Hes a princeling sure. He was always going to do ok in life.
But it still must have took some talent and ability to get through all the lower levels of politics to even be in the conversation for leadership.
He isn't like trump in being able to completely just skip over everything and right to the top contest.
I could see luck explaining a lot at the earlier stages but such consistent and sustained luck?
He must have some skill somewhere.