https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/hungary-blocks-eu-statement-criticising-china-over-hong-kong-diplomats-say-2021-04-16/
QuoteHungary has blocked a European Union statement criticising China's new security law in Hong Kong, two diplomats said, in a move likely to undermine efforts to confront Beijing's curbing of freedoms in the former British colony.
The EU, which aims to support Britain and the United States in upholding human rights in Hong Kong, was due to make its statement on Monday at a meeting of EU foreign ministers, but failed to win the necessary agreement from all 27 EU states.
"Hungary's argument was that the EU already has too many issues with China," a senior EU diplomat told Reuters. A second senior diplomat confirmed the blockage and Hungary's position. An EU official said the statement had been withdrawn from the EU's approval process.
:showoff:
As corona fades the EU really needs to get cracking with post brexit reforms for kicking out those nations that drop below the standards.
Quote from: Tyr on April 16, 2021, 08:37:44 AM
As corona fades the EU really needs to get cracking with post brexit reforms for kicking out those nations that drop below the standards.
You guy keep mentioning Brexit in relation to the EU as if anyone there (apart from Ireland) give a damn. They don't.
Quote from: Tamas on April 16, 2021, 08:42:14 AM
Quote from: Tyr on April 16, 2021, 08:37:44 AM
As corona fades the EU really needs to get cracking with post brexit reforms for kicking out those nations that drop below the standards.
You guy keep mentioning Brexit in relation to the EU as if anyone there (apart from Ireland) give a damn. They don't.
You keep mentioning that you think Brexit has no impact on EU decision-making. It does. The absence of UK resistance to reform matters.
How do you reform an organization with Liberum Veto rules? Do all the big countries gang up together and threaten to leave EU and form EU2 if reforms are not accepted?
Quote from: Tamas on April 16, 2021, 08:42:14 AM
You guy keep mentioning Brexit in relation to the EU as if anyone there (apart from Ireland) give a damn. They don't.
Maybe not to ordinary people - but they definitely do. But within the EU they definitely still give a damn and will forever - it's an alternative.
I mean the UK didn't teleport to the Pacific Ocean. Brexit changes nothing in how important UK is to the other European countries and vice versa. It just changes the context.
Quote from: DGuller on April 16, 2021, 08:57:06 AM
How do you reform an organization with Liberum Veto rules? Do all the big countries gang up together and threaten to leave EU and form EU2 if reforms are not accepted?
Yes. Whenever something is desirable, but cannot be implemented due to internal resistance, it is done outside the EU structures as a international treaty between the willing countries. These countries then later vote to include this treaty into the EU mechanisms. Examples would be Schengen or the European Stability Mechanism.
Quote from: Sheilbh on April 16, 2021, 09:11:10 AM
Quote from: Tamas on April 16, 2021, 08:42:14 AM
You guy keep mentioning Brexit in relation to the EU as if anyone there (apart from Ireland) give a damn. They don't.
Maybe not to ordinary people - but they definitely do. But within the EU they definitely still give a damn and will forever - it's an alternative.
Yes but since we are talking about democracies, ordinary people's priorities matter. Just look at the jittery decision making around the AZ vaccine's blood clots, or Merkel making nuclear power verboten because of a Japanese earthquake, or the Dutch insistence on not supporting "leeching" southern Europeans - what the public does and doesn't care about do influence what happens in EU countries and as a consequence in the EU.
Hungary blocking a sternly worded message to China is not such a big problem. Hungary and Poland curtailing independent judiciary and media is a big problem. Hard to adress though, but there is growing willingness to do so.
Quote from: Tamas on April 16, 2021, 10:51:56 AM
Yes but since we are talking about democracies, ordinary people's priorities matter. Just look at the jittery decision making around the AZ vaccine's blood clots, or Merkel making nuclear power verboten because of a Japanese earthquake, or the Dutch insistence on not supporting "leeching" southern Europeans - what the public does and doesn't care about do influence what happens in EU countries and as a consequence in the EU.
Sure but ordinary people do not care about foreign policy ever anywhere. But at the elite level of policy makers and civil servants and think tankers and journalists it is an important part of the state - and something they care about, rightly. Same with dry/abstract/overly-theoretical concepts like the rule of law - that's never going to win votes but it matters.
People do matter and influence what the EU does and cares about especially because (like China, or regulators) the EU in a large part depends on output/results legitimacy. But I am confident that they are smart enough to not only care about what matters to ordinary people - same with the UK or any other democracy. So people might not care about Brexit, but I think at that elite level it matters because it does.
One failure of the EU that Brexit shows glaringly is that the EU has no good strategy for its near neighbourhood. The relations with Britain are frosty, Switzerland poor, Turkey terrible, Ukraine and Northern Africa complicated, Russia hostile but interdependent, Western Balkans no clear accession perspective...
There is hardly a neighbour that the EU has good relations with. Brexit made that more visible with a new great power neighbour.
Quote from: Zanza on April 16, 2021, 11:03:55 AM
One failure of the EU that Brexit shows glaringly is that the EU has no good strategy for its near neighbourhood. The relations with Britain are frosty, Switzerland poor, Turkey terrible, Ukraine and Northern Africa complicated, Russia hostile but interdependent, Western Balkans no clear accession perspective...
There is hardly a neighbour that the EU has good relations with. Brexit made that more visible with a new great power neighbour.
Agreed. I'd slightly phrase it differently that the EU is basically a continental system (at an extreme I wonder if it's an early stage of a civilisation state like China or India?) and that shapes the way it engages with its near-neighbours. The engagement is structured in relation to EU systems - so Schengen, Customs Union, EEA or accession.
That may not always reflect reality but can be an important part of neighbours' politics - so Georgia and Ukraine are probably never going to join the EU but aligning with and trying to accede eventually are things most political parties in those countries want. In the Western Balkans I think accession is very unlikely but they're all formally on the accession path.
I think the EU struggles to use that leverage when it has it - so for example in Georgia the EU recently sent a team to help resolve the political crisis there between two pro-European parties. It should have been an easy result for the EU, but they failed to broker a deal and the State Department have sent a team instead who are making more progress. But I also think it struggles to deal with countries on the outside of those structures (Russia, Belarus) or moving away from them (Turkey) and, as you say, I don't think has a clear view on the wider near neighbourhood. In a way that reflects member state divergences - I've mentioned it before but Italy and France backed different sides in Libya recently so a common EU position is difficult even though Libya is a near neighbour that has a big impact on migration to the EU/Frontex missions. Even if there is a clear idea there's not always an easy way to act on it because it isn't going to fall within normal EU structures.
I think part of it is to nick Macron's line again is perhaps that the EU is too rational and too rules based in its approach it engages through specific channels, in the framework of its structures and procedures etc - which doesn't always work when your near neighbourhood is the Middle East, Ukraine, Caucus and North Africa. I hope the UK ends up providing a test ground for something else - especially because the UK is a richer and more "successful" seeming neighbour than Turkey or Russia.
But there was a recent example of this just yesterday which caused a big stir in Ukraine and Brussels. VdL's chief of staff replied in his own signature declining Zelenskiy's invitation to attend events marking Ukraine's 30th independence day on 23/24 August. Apparently VdL has other commitments (which raised eyebrows in Brussels - because it's not known as a hive of activity in August), but also getting the chief of staff to send a response to a President just makes it look like far more a snub than I think was intended.
I get that they want this to be the geopolitical commission and I hope they are, but I'm not convinced yet.
Edit: The other recent examples that seem to undermine the geopolitical ambitions were Borrell's visit to Moscow and the ridiculous "sofagate" incident in Ankara and subsequent briefing war between the Council and the Commission.
Quote from: Zanza on April 16, 2021, 10:53:16 AM
Hungary blocking a sternly worded message to China is not such a big problem.
I don't know, I mean if the EU can't even write a sternly worded letter...
Quote from: garbon on April 16, 2021, 01:53:47 PM
Quote from: Zanza on April 16, 2021, 10:53:16 AM
Hungary blocking a sternly worded message to China is not such a big problem.
I don't know, I mean if the EU can't even write a sternly worded letter...
I think the foreign policy weakness is just a symptom of the domestic problems. We need to solve those first, the rest will follow.
Quote from: Zanza on April 16, 2021, 10:49:09 AM
Quote from: DGuller on April 16, 2021, 08:57:06 AM
How do you reform an organization with Liberum Veto rules? Do all the big countries gang up together and threaten to leave EU and form EU2 if reforms are not accepted?
Yes. Whenever something is desirable, but cannot be implemented due to internal resistance, it is done outside the EU structures as a international treaty between the willing countries. These countries then later vote to include this treaty into the EU mechanisms. Examples would be Schengen or the European Stability Mechanism.
It happens pretty often for "minor" stuff, too. Last example of it was the apportionment of the extra Pfizer shipment to countries in need when Austria/Czechs/Slovenia opposed the proposed formula. The "official" EU allocation process was not amended, but the remaining countries agreed among themselves to reallocate their share the extra vaccines using the new formula.
There is an impossible trinity at the heart of the EU. You can have any 2 of the following 3 characteristics:
1) Ability to take effective action
2) Ability to block action through national vetos
3) Democratic accountability of institutions
But you can't have all 3.
In the 90s the EU leaned towards dispensing with #3 with decisions being formed behind the scenes and then presented by fait accompli but there was an understandable backlash to that tendency. So the EU has moved to dispensing with #1
The obvious solution is removing national veto points but there is no political will to do that.
The Passage to Europe by van Middelaar is excellent on this - though I agree with some of Perry Anderson's critiques of it in the LRB.
I think that the EU is able to take effective action - and now with Frontex can even take coercive actions.
There are a few areas where it has almost a power that's kind of independent of member states - this is particularly the case with its traditional and long-standing competencies like trade and single market regulation. Outside of that it is still, at heart, a tool of member states. So the EU's effective areas of action in the 90s and early 2000s were regulation and social policy which reflected Europe's tilt to the third way, then in the 20101 the EU was very effective on economic policy and austerity which reflected the member states at that time. Now the areas I'd say the EU is most effective in is enforcing its borders which reflects its member states' wishes.
Foreign policy is an area where the EU can't act independently of member states. At this point that reflects divisions between member states who aren't agreed on policy in North Africa or the Middle East/East Med (though the French are trying to develop a common position). If that could be developed the EU could take effective action - but I can't think of a big foreign policy issue where there aren't divisions among member states: North Africa, Russia, Middle East, China. Which means the EU will be a little bit of a paper tiger, the real problem with that is that it may move ahead in areas like trade in a way that in a nation state like the US or China is normally linked to foreign policy.
It is still caught between two stools - and a lot of the foundations of the independent areas of European action are being challenged by these court cases in Germany, Poland and the French position on data retention. I think those are even more significant than the general challenges of the Polish/Hungarian government because they go to the core of the European project - does the European court have exclusive jurisdiction in interpreting European law and does the supremacy of European law still hold. If member states start eroding that, then I think there's a real fundamental problem.
Quote from: Sheilbh on April 17, 2021, 12:51:13 PM
If member states start eroding that, then I think there's a real fundamental problem.
alternatively the fundamental problem could be that especially at the EU level it's almost dogma that the EU needs to change into a federal state.
I'd rather not end up in a one size fits none situation, we've got enough of that in Belgium as it is. And since the EU is far too often compared to a Belgium writ large...
well, I guess you can see why that'd be a problem
Quote from: Crazy_Ivan80 on April 17, 2021, 03:35:28 PM
alternatively the fundamental problem could be that especially at the EU level it's almost dogma that the EU needs to change into a federal state.
I'd rather not end up in a one size fits none situation, we've got enough of that in Belgium as it is. And since the EU is far too often compared to a Belgium writ large...
well, I guess you can see why that'd be a problem
But if 27 domestic member state courts get to determine what European law is and whether it complies with their constitutional order the EU is meaningless. The entire basis of it - since the very early and expansive ECJ rulings in the 60s has been that solely the European courts have jurisdiction over EU law and that where there's a conflict European law applies. If that happens what's to stop, say, Hungary or France amending their constitution to subvert state aid or single market rules and then have domestic courts rule that EU law conflicts with their constitution?
As I see it you can sort of put the EU back in its box and limit it to core competencies over trade and regulation, or expand integration. But either of those needs the European courts and challenging that is the start of a disintegration into a slightly more meaningful OECD.
So it looks like Barnier is going to run as a more centrist centre-right candidate than Macron :o
Also - I feel like this should be a big story and is kind of crazy:
QuoteAnger as ex-generals warn of 'deadly civil war' in France
1 day ago
The French government has condemned an open letter signed by active soldiers that said the country was heading for "civil war" due to religious extremism.
About 1,000 servicemen and women, including some 20 retired generals, put their names to the letter.
It blamed "fanatic partisans" for creating divisions between communities, and said Islamists were taking over whole parts of the nation's territory.
Ministers have condemned the message published in a right-wing magazine.
The letter was first published on 21 April - the 60th anniversary of a failed coup d'état.
"The hour is grave, France is in peril," the signatories said.
Far-right leader Marine Le Pen, a candidate in next year's presidential election, has spoken out in support of the former generals.
But the minister in charge of the armed forces, Florence Parly, tweeted: "Two immutable principles guide the action of members of the military with regard to politics: neutrality and loyalty."
She earlier warned that any signatories still serving in the military would be punished for defying a law that requires them to remain politically neutral.
What does the letter say?
It warns French President Emmanuel Macron, his government, and MPs of "several deadly dangers" threatening France, including "Islamism and the hordes of the banlieue" - the impoverished immigrant suburbs that surround French cities.
The signatories go on to blame "a certain anti-racism" for splitting up communities, and seeking to create "racial war" by attacking statues and other aspects of French history.
They also accuse the government of seeking to use the police "as proxy agents and scapegoats" by brutally repressing the popular "gilets jaunes", or yellow vest protests of recent years.
"It is no longer the time to procrastinate, otherwise tomorrow civil war will put an end to this growing chaos and deaths - for which you will be responsible - with numbers in the thousands," the letter concludes.
In a country which pays for several thousand former generals on the retired and reserve lists, the support of just 20 of them to such explosive language does call for a sense of perspective, the BBC's Hugh Schofield in Paris says.
Nonetheless, that the letter was written at all is a sign of dangerous times, and the backing of Marine Le Pen means the themes will continue to resonate in the year of campaigning that lies ahead, our correspondent says.
What has the reaction been?
Members of the French military, whether actively serving or reservists, are forbidden from expressing public opinions on religion and politics, and Ms Parly has called for those who signed the letter to be punished.
"For who have violated the duty of reserve, sanctions are planned, and if there are active soldiers among the signatories, I asked the chief of staff of the armed forces to apply the rules... that is to say, sanctions," the minister told radio network France Info on Monday.
Ms Parly cited the case of a former general in the Foreign Legion who was expelled from the military for taking part in a protest against migrants in Calais.
Why is the timing significant?
Minister of Industry Agnès Pannier-Runacher told France Info she "unreservedly condemned" the generals "calling for an uprising... 60 years to the day after the generals' putsch against General de Gaulle".
The failed coup d'état involved generals seeking to prevent Algeria - then a French colony - from gaining independence.
But French nationalist politician Marine Le Pen welcomed the letter, calling on the generals to join her in "the battle of France".
Her response came on the same day as a fatal knife attack at a police station south-west of Paris, which is being treated as a possible terrorist attack.
France has proposed a controversial bill to tackle what President Emmanuel Macron has described as "Islamist separatism".
However, some critics in both France and abroad have accused the government of targeting Islam.
QuoteWhy Marine Le Pen backed the letter
Analysis box by Hugh Schofield, Paris correspondent
Many in the French media are expressing surprise that Marine Le Pen came out in support of the generals.
Cosying up to would-be putschists is what her father was supposed to specialise in. He was the one who was close to the anti-Gaullist hardliners of 60 years ago. He was the one who loved to flirt with illegality. Not Marine and her new-look National Rally.
So has she miscalculated? Some think so.
Coming out for a group of ex-generals - even of the armchair variety - who are so obviously overstepping the bounds and dabbling in politics - this makes it much easier for President Macron to paint her as a traditional French reactionary, heir to her father, Vichy and the rest.
Voters from the mainstream right, who might have been tempted by her apparent recent conversion to the EU and sound money, will perhaps be thinking twice.
But looked at another way, maybe Marine Le Pen felt she had no choice but to back the letter. After all, no-one thinks there is any serious chance of a military coup, so she didn't think she could be accused of encouraging insurrection.
And the analysis of France's travails was identical to her own. If - in her view - the analysis is also one shared by a silent majority of the French, then she could hardly disown it.
Technically, Algeria was not a colony, which precisely made leaving it so difficult. :nerd:
In other news, Macron needs a high RN so he can be elected in the run-off, despite his very poor quinquennat.
And again - meanwhile Barnier (who's definitely running) suggested a 3-5 year pause of all non-EU immigration to France while discussing solutions to Schengen (by which I mean Romanians and Bulgarians) with other European leaders. I've said before but I think there is a real risk of Europe taking a civilisational turn:
QuoteFrench soldiers accuse government of trying to 'silence' warnings of civil war
Second letter from military staff says threat of punishment 'quite perverse' and repeats: 'Civil war is brewing in France'
Kim Willsher in Paris
Mon 10 May 2021 11.04 BST
Last modified on Tue 11 May 2021 05.10 BST
Serving members of the French military have fired a second salvo at Emmanuel Macron's government in an open letter accusing it of "cowardice, deceit, perversion", just weeks after a first letter said the country was heading for "civil war".
Like the first letter, it appears in the rightwing magazine Valeurs Actuelles. It was reportedly signed anonymously "by active military personnel" and is appended with a petition on the magazine's website for others to sign.
The letter's signatories refer to the seventh verse of La Marseillaise, the French national anthem, that refers to the "avenging" slain elders or following them to "their coffins".
It was published in support of the first letter, published on 21 April, the 60th anniversary of a failed coup d'état against General Charles de Gaulle over his support for Algerian independence.
Signed by a number of retired generals as well as at least 18 serving soldiers, including four officers, the initial letter warned of the "disintegration" of France evoking what it called the "perils" of Islamic extremist and "the hordes from the banlieue".
It also accused anti-racism groups of creating "hatred between communities" and cautioned that "lax" government policies could spark chaos requiring military action to "protect our civilisational values".
Afterwards, furious ministers accused the signatories, who were supported by the far-right Rassemblement National party leader, Marine Le Pen, of breaking military rules and threatened legal action against them. The armed forces minister, Florence Parly, said: "The armies are not there to campaign but to defend France", while the interior minister, Gérard Darmanin, accused Le Pen of having her father Jean-Marie Le Pen's "taste" for the sound of marching boots.
The second letter, published late on Sunday evening, batted off threats of punishment and launched an all-out attack on the government, accusing it of "trampling" on veterans' honour and "sullying" their reputation "when their only fault is to love their country and mourn its visible decline".
"To quibble about the form of our elders' tribune instead of recognising the evidence of their findings, you have to be cowardly. To invoke a misinterpreted duty of reserve in order to silence French citizens, one must be very deceitful. To encourage the army's senior officers to take a stand and expose themselves, before angrily sanctioning them as soon as they write anything other than battle reports, one must be quite perverse.
"Cowardice, deceit, perversion: this is not our vision of the hierarchy. On the contrary, the army is, par excellence, the place where we speak the truth because we commit our lives."
It concluded: "Once again, civil war is brewing in France and you know it perfectly well." By 10am Monday morning, Valeurs Actuelles claimed 76,461 people had signed the petition.
It brought a swift and damning response from the French government and politicians across the spectrum. Darmanin said it was a crude manoeuvre in the run-up to regional elections next month and denounced the lack of courage of its unnamed authors.
"These are anonymous people. Is that courage? To be anonymous?" Darmanin said on BFMTV. "What a strange and courageous society that gives such a voice to anonymous people. It's like being on social networks. I think I know that when you're in the military, you don't do this kind of thing on the sly."
Former president François Hollande told France Inter: "Where is the professional code ... how can we let people think that today the army would be driven by such feelings and by such a desire to challenge the very principles of the Republic?"
Jean-Luc Mélenchon of La France Insoumise (France Unbowed) said: "They are seditious and cowardly. I'm not afraid to say my name and what I will do if I'm elected and that's to purge the army of its dissident members."
Olivier Faure of the Socialist party said the letters were worrying and that the left should "reflect on all these threats".
QuoteIt was reportedly signed anonymously
:hmm: I see.
Quote from: Sheilbh on May 11, 2021, 01:50:07 PM
And again - meanwhile Barnier (who's definitely running) suggested a 3-5 year pause of all non-EU immigration to France while discussing solutions to Schengen (by which I mean Romanians and Bulgarians) with other European leaders. I've said before but I think there is a real risk of Europe taking a civilisational turn
What sort of civilizational turn are you thinking?
Quote from: Jacob on May 11, 2021, 01:54:30 PM
What sort of civilizational turn are you thinking?
Hans Kundani had a very good piece on this:
QuoteWhat does it mean to be "pro-European" today?
As champions of the EU see a growing threat to the continent's culture and civilisation, whiteness may become even more central to European identity.
BY HANS KUNDNANI
In continental Europe and especially in Germany, people will often proudly say: "I'm European". I frequently heard this from my former colleagues at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), which has offices around Europe. I could never identify with what sounded to me like a somewhat aggressive assertion of European identity. In fact, it made me uncomfortable. Since I could not see how one could identify with, let alone love, the European Union itself as an institution or set of institutions, it seemed the idea of being European expressed identification with a culture or civilisation – or even an ethnicity.
My view of European identity is undoubtedly to a large extent a function of my Britishness. British people tend to think of themselves primarily either as British (or as English, Scottish, Welsh, etc), or perhaps as part of the English-speaking world, or alternatively, as "citizens of the world". But few think of themselves primarily as "European" as many in continental Europe do – in other words, as having something in common with other Europeans that sets them apart from the rest of the world. Few Brits see Europe as a Schicksalsgemeinschaft, or "community of fate", in the way Germans do.
In my case, though, my inability to think of myself as "European" also has to do with my ethnicity. I was born and grew up in Britain, but my father is Indian and my mother is Dutch. "European" therefore never fully captured my identity, as it excluded the Asian part of it. I think this is true for many other non-white British people too – my sense is that if you are of African, Asian or Caribbean origin you are even less likely to identify as "European" than white Brits. (What I don't know is whether non-white people in continental European countries think of themselves as "European".)
At ECFR, when I heard people call themselves European, I immediately thought of what that meant in a colonial context or, for example, in apartheid South Africa. In those contexts, "European" meant white. Whiteness seemed to me more central to European identity than it was to the identity of any individual European nation state, whose identities were defined in opposition to each other (British identity, for example, as the historian Linda Colley has shown, emerged in opposition to, and was defined against, France). So when people expressed pride in being "European", I heard an echo of a white identity.
***
Most "pro-Europeans" are baffled or outraged when I say any of this. They think of the European project – that is, European integration leading to "ever closer union" – as the opposite of a white or racist endeavour. They see the EU – and by extension European identity – as an expression of cosmopolitanism. But this is in a basic sense wrong. The EU is, of course, not a global project but a regional project. What the EU stands for is neither nationalism or cosmopolitanism but something in between: regionalism. Thus to say "I'm European" is to express a regional identity.
The misleading characterisation of the EU as a cosmopolitan project is itself an expression of a Eurocentric tendency to mistake Europe for the world. The European project has integrated and to some extent overcome differences between the countries of Europe (though in the last decade it has sometimes seemed as if European integration, in particular the single currency, was increasing conflict between EU member states). But regional integration is quite different from global integration. Although internal barriers to the movement of capital, goods and people were removed, external barriers remained – particularly to immigration from outside the EU.
The emergence of the myth of EU cosmopolitanism may lie partly in the way that, from its beginnings as the European Coal and Steel Community in the 1950s, the EU has been based on the lessons Europeans learned from the history of relations between European countries – the centuries of conflict culminating in the Second World War – rather than from Europe's relations with the rest of the world. European integration began in the 1950s – at the exact moment of decolonisation – yet the narrative of the European project is silent about the history of European colonialism and its implications.
The myth creates a blind spot in pro-European thinking, which views the European project as a way to overcome the nationalisms that had caused conflict in Europe. For Germans in particular, it is a way to overcome the nation state, with which they have had a particularly disastrous experience.
Because of this rejection of nationalism, however, pro-Europeans tend to assume that almost anything the EU does at a regional level is separate from the problematic currents in European history before 1945 – after all, it is through the EU that Europe has navigated these currents. Thus concepts considered problematic at the national level – such as the "community of fate" – magically become unproblematic at the European level. When EU member states sought to restrict exports of PPE at the beginning of the pandemic last year, it was criticised as nationalism. But when the EU itself restricted the export of PPE beyond Europe, it was viewed as a triumph of European unity.
In reality, however, regionalism can be as bad as the worst nationalism. The centrality of the nation state in the past two centuries means the world has had less experience of regionalism as a powerful force, and it does not therefore have the same negative connotations as nationalism. But a regional identity can define itself against an Other, too, and be just as exclusionary as national identities historically have been. In fact, regionalism may have the potential to be even worse because regional blocs tend to be bigger and more powerful than single countries, and so capable of doing more harm to the rest of the world.
The tendency to elide Europe with the world is also concerned with the evolution of pro-European thinking. European integration was initially driven by an internal European logic in the context of the Cold War and decolonisation. But its apparent success and the enlargement of the EU after the end of the Cold War led many pro-Europeans to see the EU as a model for the world.
Implicit in this idea was a kind of "civilising mission" – though few pro-Europeans would think of it in those terms. In other words, there was a continuity of sorts between European colonialism and the "European project". But the EU was considered a relatively benign civilising mission, seen as a "civilian power" that would elevate international politics and export its depoliticised model of regional governance along with the "European social model", which included a generous welfare state.
A good example of this in policy terms is freedom of movement. In the 1990s and 2000s, many pro-Europeans could still see the evolution of freedom of movement within the EU as a precursor to global freedom of movement – the removal of borders within Europe as a first step towards a borderless world. Even then, things looked a little different in practice – in the UK, for example, membership of the EU led to a relative decline in immigration from the former colonies and a relative increase in immigration from Europe.
However, after a decade of crises, and in a changing world which many Europeans see as increasingly hostile, the idea of the EU as a model is now giving way in pro-European thinking to the idea of the EU as a competitor, as the EU has struggled to figure out how to resolve its own deep internal problems and to respond to what appear a growing number of external threats. It is not just that as the EU has become more embattled, pro-Europeans have become more defensive. The way they think about the European project has also changed – in worrying ways.
The idea that the EU would transform international politics now looks less plausible than it did a decade or two ago. Rather, the debate among pro-Europeans now focuses on how the EU can adapt to a world in which great power politics seems to have returned. Ursula von der Leyen promised a "geopolitical [European] Commission" when she became its president in 2019. Pro-Europeans have now embraced the idea of "European sovereignty", a concept they had historically opposed. Thus the EU, which was once seen as a "normative power", in other words a model, is now aspiring to become a much more traditional power – and so pro-Europeans urge it to develop a "defence union" or even "strategic autonomy".
The idea that the EU could export its technocratic model of governance has also become less plausible during the last decade, especially since there has been a backlash within Europe against this depoliticised model. In fact, scholars such as Chris Bickerton have shown how populism is to a large extent a reaction to technocracy. The idea of a "European social model" also looks less credible; since the euro crisis began the EU, driven by Germany, has done much to dismantle the welfare state in the so-called periphery of the eurozone in the name of ensuring a "competitive" Europe.
***
Many pro-Europeans believe this rethink of the European project reflects a new realism. But against this background, the relatively benign civilising mission in earlier pro-European thinking, based on its political-economic model, appears to be giving way to a more civilisational discourse based on the uniqueness of its culture. The cultural or civilisational element of European identity has become more dominant – and is often expressed in terms of "European values". To put it another way, the EU's earlier civic regionalism is evolving into a more problematic cultural or even ethnic regionalism. Pro-Europeans increasingly think in terms of protecting the continent from threats that they view in increasingly cultural terms. Thus what has emerged is a kind of defensive civilisationalism.
The refugee crisis of 2015 may have been the critical juncture in this civilisational turn in the European project. It made it clear to Europeans, if it wasn't already, that the absence of internal borders required hard external borders. In the past five years, the EU has taken a number of measures to increase external border security, including an expansion of Frontex, the EU border agency, that many see as a militarisation of the EU's borders. Far from ushering in a borderless world, it is now clear that freedom of movement within the EU has simply meant that borders have been moved from one place to another – and further away from Germany.
The most striking expression of this pro-European civilisationalism is that, as part of Von der Leyen's "geopolitical Commission", the EU now has a Commissioner for Promoting our European Way of Life (it was originally "for Protecting our European Way of Life"), Margaritis Schinas. His main responsibility is to coordinate the Commission's approach to asylum and migration, which is largely about keeping migrants out, often using brutal methods that violate human rights. This makes the EU's civilisational turn explicit: migration is now seen not just as a difficult issue to be managed but as a threat to the "European Way of Life".
These developments reflect a growing tendency to think about international politics in civilisational terms. Europe increasingly defines its "values" against a rising China as a geopolitical threat, and against Islam, Europe's historic Other, in the form of migrants and terrorism. In his 1996 book The Clash of Civilisations, the American political scientist Samuel Huntington predicted conflict between the West and China and Islam. But even though the initial impetus for European integration came from the United States through the Marshall Plan, the EU has also long sought to define itself against the US – and as the US becomes a minority-white country in the coming decades, whiteness may become even more central to European identity.
The figure who, more than anyone, embodies this synthesis of "pro-Europeanism" and civilisationalism is the French president Emmanuel Macron. His vision of a "Europe qui protège", or "Europe that protects", initially sounded like a progressive vision – offering people protection from the market – but this has increasingly given way to a focus on cultural, rather than economic, protection. In particular, since the murder of the teacher Samuel Paty by an Islamist terrorist in October 2020, and under pressure from Marine Le Pen's Rassemblement National, Macron has taken steps to stop what he calls "Islamist separatism". Last October, he introduced measures to increase state control over mosques and imams in France to "defend the republic and its values".
Macron also sees European foreign policy in explicitly civilisational terms. In a speech to a gathering of French ambassadors in Paris in August 2019, he spoke about the need for the EU, led by France, to pursue what he called a "project of European civilisation". It should "rebuild sovereignty" and become a "balancing power", particularly between China and the US. If the EU did not take bold action, he said, "Europe will disappear".
The current debate among European foreign policy analysts almost sounds like an international political equivalent of immigration debates based on the fear of the "great replacement". In his 2011 book Le Grand Remplacement, which has influenced the far right in Europe and the US, the French writer Renaud Camus argued that the presence of Muslims threatened to destroy French culture and civilisation. When my former colleagues at ECFR say the EU must become more strategic or "sovereign" or talk about "European power", I hear the analogous idea that, unless Europeans unite and assert themselves, they will be replaced by other (non-white) powers.
Hans Kundnani is a senior research fellow at Chatham House and the author of "The Paradox of German Power"
With an equally good and thoughtful response here:
https://www.newstatesman.com/world/2021/02/meaning-pro-europeanism-response-hans-kundnani
But my basic take is the EU is neutral. It is a tool in the hands of its member states. If they're on the centre left as many were in the 90s and 2000s it will build a social Europe. If they're on the centre right as most were in the 2010s it will enforce austerity and fiscal discipline. If they're either on the populist/far-right or trying to win those votes then it will create a Fortress Europe that is increasingly intolerant - we're still waiting for the judgement but see the CJEU case on whether it's legal to discriminate against women because they wear a headscarf (the Advocate General argued it is).
And I think that one of the unfortunate lessons from Brexit, but also Orban, Poland, Italy - is that if you're on the populist/far-right that doesn't mean you need to actually leave the EU and it's quite difficult. You can, as Orban has particularly successfully, stay in the club and use it for your own ends. I think more European sovereignty is a good thing and much needed - but it needs to explicitly push back against this "protecting our European way of life" stuff.
It's why I think the real risk to Orban isn't what he's done to Hungary or the mockery he's made of European "values", but the model he provides - and as I say I can't see much stopping that brand of politics from cooperating with Denmark or Macron (or Barnier's) France. And of course it's necessary to create a multi-racial, civic European identity - a start would be having some non-white Commissioners, MEPs and European civil servants (I don't thin the EU collects stats on that type of diversity but I read estimates that Brexit cut the number in half on MEPs and civil servants). And I think this actually needs fighting for - I don't think it's a given at the current moment.
Although I need to read Afropean which came out recently about black identity in (continental) Europe - which looks really interesting:
https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/300/300186/afropean/9780141987286.html
Heh, can't say I agree with the ramifications of saying "I'm European". The affirmation was born as a way to trascend local nationalism given that one of the main things that people nagged about the EU was, precisely, that "the EU will fail because there isn't an European identity" :huh:
I think the author tries too hard to push the theory that the EU taking an identitarian turn was somehow inevitable.
I side more with Sheilbh in this, the EU will be what the governments want it to be, and we're in the middle of a resurgence of localism. I see Macron's efforts as born out of pragmatism rather than belief, a way to make a sense of identity compatible with the European project, but I think it's misguided. Not that I have great ideas about how to tackle the issue, mind.
Yes. It rings too many bells of the clever bad faith arguments some would squirm into to try and go "supporting brexit isn't racist. Europe is racist"
It does smell a bit too much of the error of thinking everyone sees the world in the same way and those that see it different actually do see it the same as you, they just support a different side.
Quote from: celedhring on May 12, 2021, 03:43:24 AM
Heh, can't say I agree with the ramifications of saying "I'm European". The affirmation was born as a way to trascend local nationalism given that one of the main things that people nagged about the EU was, precisely, that "the EU will fail because there isn't an European identity" :huh:
I think the author tries too hard to push the theory that the EU taking an identitarian turn was somehow inevitable.
Yeah, I think that that take has more to do with the author's own thoughts and neurosis about race than anything. The response article (copied below for those interested) is much closer to any "official EU line" there might be:
QuoteThe meaning of pro-Europeanism – a response to Hans Kundnani
Civic principles – from liberal democracy to international law – are the cornerstones of the EU, not a particular ethnicity, religion or culture.
One of the unexpected by-products of the 2016 Brexit referendum was the birth of an enthusiastic pro-Europeanism, which all of a sudden went from being an abstract, intellectual project to one that captured people's hearts as well as their heads. Millions took to the streets waving European flags in the UK while opinion polls showed record support for the EU across the Continent. People only understood how much their European identity meant to them when they realised it could be taken away.
Hans Kundnani, in his recent essay on pro-Europeanism, does not share this sense of loss. As a British citizen of Dutch and Indian parentage he was never able to think of himself as "European" because, to him, it is a (white) civilisational project. "When my former colleagues at [the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)] say the EU must become more strategic or 'sovereign' or talk about 'European power'," he concludes in the essay, "I hear the analogous idea that, unless Europeans unite and assert themselves, they will be replaced by other (non-white) powers."
As the director of ECFR, and so one of Kundnani's former colleagues, I read his essay with a mixture of sadness and confusion since my experience – and the accounts of non-white colleagues and friends – are so different. As the child of a British father and a German-Jewish mother who was born in hiding in France, I did not need Brexit to feel European – it is my European identity that gives shape and meaning to my fragmented family history.
National identity is difficult to disentangle from blood and soil. A multinational identity, by contrast, is much less tightly bound to ethnicity because it is by definition multi-ethnic. Kundnani argues that the EU is a "regional project", and that although "regionalism" does not "have the same negative connotations as nationalism", a "regional identity can define itself against an Other, too, and be just as exclusionary as national identities have historically been". Kundnani implies that Europe's "Other" is the non-white population.
But to the founders of the EU – and people like myself – Europe's primary "Other" is its own past. The entire European project is an elaborate attempt to transcend a history of nationalism in Europe and imperialism in the wider world. Thus the EU has in its DNA a rejection of the violent ethno-nationalism that led to the death camps. Like many across the Continent, I am a member of the first generation in my family not to face war and exile, let alone extermination. The EU deserves at least some of the credit for this.
As Kundnani points out, the EU was also founded "at the exact moment" European empires were unwinding. Just as it was a way of dealing with competitive nationalisms among its members, it also provided its constituent nations with a new focus after decolonisation, helping European governments to move on from their rapacious colonial pasts. In his history of decolonisation, the German historian Jürgen Osterhammel makes the point that the bureaucrats who might otherwise have been administering European colonies ended up building the European bureaucracy in Brussels. In that sense, the EU also has in its genetic make-up a rejection of colonialism.
It's true that the EU has done a much better job of facing up to the extermination of people within its continent than to its colonial history. Countries such as Belgium and France have struggled to come to terms with their dark imperial pasts, while institutions in Brussels rarely acknowledge them. Some central and Eastern European member states see themselves as victims of Soviet and Ottoman colonialism rather than perpetrators. Many are blighted by racism, as we have seen in the abuse hurled at footballers in recent matches. The 2015 migration crisis has also sometimes brought out the tendencies of a "Fortress Europe".
Yet while there has been a frightening upsurge of ethnic politics in Europe – as well as around the world – there is nothing intrinsic about European identity that makes it antithetical to diversity. In fact there are many reasons why it should be easier for European identity to acquire a post-colonial sensibility than the national identities within Europe.
First, every nationality is in a minority at a European level, and so a core part of the project is about protecting the rights of minorities and finding ways for them to live together in peace. Why is Viktor Orbán so critical of the EU? Precisely because it provides a platform for protecting the rights of minorities such as Roma, and the religious freedom of Muslims. To frame European-ness in ethnic terms is to ignore what Europe is today: a continent that relies on diversity and immigration.
Secondly, because European identity is not rooted in a single ethnicity, it can only be defined in terms of laws and values. ECFR has been at the forefront of defining an agenda on European sovereignty based on civic principles rather than ethnicity, religion or culture. The goal is to defend international law against power, liberal democracy against populist majoritarianism, privacy against surveillance capitalism, and human rights against surveillance states.
Kundnani characterises the EU as a regionalist, rather than cosmopolitan, project. I do not see these two categories as incompatible. It is perfectly possible to have cosmopolitan projects at a global, regional, national or local level. The EU – in keeping with its Enlightenment roots – has always been a universalist project. It is because of the pushback abroad from Putin, Trump and Xi Jinping against Enlightenment values that the EU has become more "regionalist", preoccupied with at the very least defending these values at home.
Lastly, Kundnani's critique implies the existence of a single European project, but there have always been competing conceptions of what Europe stands for. He takes the ideas of the proto-fascist Renaud Camus about whiteness as the dominant version of European identity, and then implies that this is the concept of Europeanism supported by Emmanuel Macron, Ursula von Der Leyen and even think tanks such as ECFR. Such an elision makes as much sense as allowing Nigel Farage to define what it means to be British and then accusing Sadiq Khan, Nicola Sturgeon and Caroline Lucas of supporting his Little-Englander ideology.
What it means to be "pro-European" today is not fixed but is perpetually being shaped and challenged. Identities are necessarily sites of conflict and the European story is still being written. Rather than repressing its history of colonialism, the EU needs to do more to help its member states find ways of confronting their pasts. Just as Europe has had to face and transcend the 20th-century nationalisms that destroyed the European continent, it needs to do the same with the challenges that imperialism has left in its wake in the rest of the world. A civic European identity provides a powerful framework for former imperial nations to face their own demons and instil pride in future generations.
QuoteI side more with Sheilbh in this, the EU will be what the governments want it to be, and we're in the middle of a resurgence of localism. I see Macron's efforts as born out of pragmatism rather than belief, a way to make a sense of identity compatible with the European project, but I think it's misguided. Not that I have great ideas about how to tackle the issue, mind.
Yep, at the end of the day the EU will remain a tool for its constituent countries, and thus its role will sway over time according to their whims, within the broad pre-agreed parameters that they all agree with. And this will always be a "brake" in the EU's potential.
Quote from: celedhring on May 12, 2021, 03:43:24 AM
Heh, can't say I agree with the ramifications of saying "I'm European". The affirmation was born as a way to trascend local nationalism given that one of the main things that people nagged about the EU was, precisely, that "the EU will fail because there isn't an European identity" :huh:
Yeah. But I look at discourse around Islam for example across Europe (and including the EU - Charles Michel discussing setting up a school for "European imams") and I think it's probably reasonable that when Muslims, who are probably Europe's largest minority, hear about European-ness and "our European way of life" for them to ask whether that includes them? And I think nationalism is probably a weird element of this - not least because I think sport has actually been a big driver in developing more open identities, which obviously doesn't work at a European level. Instead Europe comes up more either politically, or in categories like European thought, or European history which are quite exclusive and often created by defining Europe against others - especially the Muslim world and our neighbourhood in Turkey and North Africa.
I think that it just takes more work and engagement than that to build a civic, open, inclusive identity - and there are people in Europe who don't want that, I think Orban and Duda are always linking European culture with Christianity. I think most nations with large minority communities have seen efforts to make Britishness or Frenchness or Germanness open to minorities in different ways (and sport has been really important). There probably needs to be a similar level of effort to make European identity as open and instead I think there's an assumption it is because, Europeanness is cosmopolitan within Europe.
QuoteI side more with Sheilbh in this, the EU will be what the governments want it to be, and we're in the middle of a resurgence of localism. I see Macron's efforts as born out of pragmatism rather than belief, a way to make a sense of identity compatible with the European project, but I think it's misguided. Not that I have great ideas about how to tackle the issue, mind.
I think there's been a shift in my life of European-ness (Delors, Prodi) being about social values to a more identity driven. I think things at the minute are in a bit of a holding pattern because Merkel is still around but, once Merkel leaves offices I think there will be movements and shifts on this.
QuoteAs Kundnani points out, the EU was also founded "at the exact moment" European empires were unwinding. Just as it was a way of dealing with competitive nationalisms among its members, it also provided its constituent nations with a new focus after decolonisation, helping European governments to move on from their rapacious colonial pasts. In his history of decolonisation, the German historian Jürgen Osterhammel makes the point that the bureaucrats who might otherwise have been administering European colonies ended up building the European bureaucracy in Brussels. In that sense, the EU also has in its genetic make-up a rejection of colonialism.
I like that piece - but I'm not convinced this point means what the author necessarily thinks it means or that it necessarily supports his wider argument. But it does remind me of Louis Armand's line on the signing of the treaty of Rome that "we ought to erect a statue to Nasser. To the federator of Europe." :lol:
Don't know how to say this without perhaps sounding "wrong", so to speak, so I'll try to give a quick and rough answer and trust on our many years of virtual friendship so it's not wrongly interpreted. IMO, all those identity worries are wildly overplayed, and it's not something that most people look up at the EU for. Most EU countries don't share those worries about identity, colonialism, race, minorities, etc, (let's jokingly call them "sociological 1st world problems") those might be concerns for the UK and France (and for them they can be big issues), and to lesser degrees other EU countries with that kind of profile, but for most EU countries they're completely alien topics and stressing them can make them feel alienated from what the EU represents to most of them, that is, peace, stability and material well-being, and that's what the EU should focus on.
Quote from: The Larch on May 12, 2021, 05:14:55 AM
Don't know how to say this without perhaps sounding "wrong", so to speak, so I'll try to give a quick and rough answer and trust on our many years of virtual friendship so it's not wrongly interpreted. IMO, all those identity worries are wildly overplayed, and it's not something that most people look up at the EU for. Most EU countries don't share those worries about identity, colonialism, race, minorities, etc, (let's jokingly call them "sociological 1st world problems") those might be concerns for the UK and France (and for them they can be big issues), and to lesser degrees other EU countries with that kind of profile, but for most EU countries they're completely alien topics and stressing them can make them feel alienated from what the EU represents to most of them, that is, peace, stability and material well-being, and that's what the EU should focus on.
Agreed.
Quote from: The Larch on May 12, 2021, 05:14:55 AM
Don't know how to say this without perhaps sounding "wrong", so to speak, so I'll try to give a quick and rough answer and trust on our many years of virtual friendship so it's not wrongly interpreted. IMO, all those identity worries are wildly overplayed, and it's not something that most people look up at the EU for. Most EU countries don't share those worries about identity, colonialism, race, minorities, etc, (let's jokingly call them "sociological 1st world problems") those might be concerns for the UK and France (and for them they can be big issues), and to lesser degrees other EU countries with that kind of profile, but for most EU countries they're completely alien topics and stressing them can make them feel alienated from what the EU represents to most of them, that is, peace, stability and material well-being, and that's what the EU should focus on.
:lol: on sociological 1st world problems.
I get what you're saying and I agree on just the post-colonial angle - and I think Europe is an interesting side of that. I've never read anything about it in any history I've read, but I know that the Treaty of Rome included sections on Belgian, Dutch and French colonies. I think the imperial disentanglement and identity issues is definitely a concern in only a few states. There's a lot of cross-over with the UK, but it mainly affects Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and France. Having said that I don't think we should just think about the imperial powers at the creation of "Europe". At the height of the statues debate I read a really interesting piece by a black German - I think art historian - about German statues and in particular the way statues of the Nazi regime were treated but also touching on the contrasting treatment of Hohenzollern statues - including quite controversial colonial figures. So on the one hand Germany (or Spain or Italy) are not "imperial" powers but have a legacy.
But on the wider issue, I'm not sure. As long as I've been on these forums or at Paradox there's been discussions around integration and migration in Europe - I think that impacts all of the EU15 in one way or another because they are destination countries. There are often stories in the press about, say, Sweden and Denmark or Austria who are not countries grappling with a big global imperial legacy; it has an impact on Greece or Malta as common entry points; and it is now used as a wedge issue by, say, Poland and Hungary who have low immigration but are using it to drive a fortress Europe agenda and an identitarian agenda of Europe as having a Christian "European" identity.
So I wonder how alien they are and it seems to me that in many European countries (including the UK) there are political forces questioning the idea of integration and a multi-racial national identity, I don't see how that doesn't have an impact on European identity. I think there is a bit of a laziness/complaceny that because the EU is diverse within Europe and because it is typically on the other side of populist/far-right parties (though not always - see FdI) that it is inevitably on the liberal, cosmopolitan, diverse side of this issue. I'm not sure that's necessarily true and even if it is, I'm not sure it's enough.
But also more fundamentally - doesn't that perspective also apply to LGBT issues, which have also been used as a wedge issue by Poland especially? It seems to me that there has been far more pushback from a European level and within Western Europe on that issue. It is something we are comfortable stressing even though it is a minority issue, it isn't a big deal many countries and certainly it has less political clout in parts of Eastern Europe. But I think it's a similar part of what is European-ness - does it include modern progressive values on LGBT rights or is it the values of Europe in the 90s (the club Eastern European countries wanted to join which has since developed) or of its Christian past/past in general? Isn't it partially about putting those fundamental rights into action - as well as the more limited European vision of peace and material well-being? Is a black Spanish person or a French Muslim as able to take advantage of the benefits and rights of being a European (not least free movement and non-discrimination) as a white person? (Edit: And the impact - if they aren't, is it wrong to query if European-ness is something they're included in?) Or to put it another way - would we accept this argument or have similar doubts about the original author in the context of the US?
FWIW I don't think I've ever come across anyone in Sweden who thinks at all about a European identity, or thinks of the EU at all when discussing immigration and integration (beyond the EU making immigration from other EU countries easier). The EU is viewed as a utilitarian tool for practical matters, anything about identity is thought of at the national level.
Quote from: The Brain on May 12, 2021, 06:54:03 AM
FWIW I don't think I've ever come across anyone in Sweden who thinks at all about a European identity, or thinks of the EU at all when discussing immigration and integration (beyond the EU making immigration from other EU countries easier). The EU is viewed as a utilitarian tool for practical matters, anything about identity is thought of at the national level.
Yeah I think it's still a minority taste - it's something that Eurobarometer has done surveys on in the past. Since the referendum there's been a huge upsurge in European-identifying Brits - so we moved from one of the lowest to one of the highest :lol:
And I think the key moment for all of this was around the 2010s. I think the combination of the financial crisis, Eurozone crisis and refugee crisis combined to create a feeling of insecurity. I think the left lost the argument that the solution at a European level should be to strengthen social and economic protections, and since then things have moved in more of a cultural/identitarian idea of protection. Merkel is still a huge moderating figure who I think does restrain that - but when she goes I have fears of the direction things can go in.
In addition at the same time there is a growing emphasis on the EU as a sovereign political actor and that is almost always in the context of competition with other powers - China, India, US. I think that is a shift in understanding and emphasis from when Europe saw itself as a bit of a model.
Meanwhile - the risk I'm talking about, just seen a Fidesz MEP endorsing Barnier's proposal ("finally a sane voice from Western Europe") and talking more widely about the need for "family friendly" policies not immigration as a solution to "Europe's demographic problems". Barnier is not Le Pen, he's on the mainstream centre-right in France and Macron isn't a million miles from this sort of idea either - there's going to be a hell of a battle over the direction of Europe after Merkel leaves office.
And Italy plays a really striking role as a sort of clearing house of this sort of politics - Salvini chatting with Le Pen today and Orban last week, Meloni chatting with the Vox leadership. Edit: Plus on current polls it's relatively likely Salvini and Meloni will in some way or other be in the next Italian government.
This feels more EU than just Italy - but fascinating profile of Draghi:
https://thecritic.co.uk/issues/may-2021/the-sphinx-who-reshaped-europe/
Particularly interesting next to Adam Tooze's profile of Paul Krugman.
What material change do you expect to immigration policy? It is still mainly a domestic issue as each country has its own policies on who is accepted.
On the European level, there are no real distribution mechanisms anyway and I feel that topic is pretty dead. Beyond that, we already pay dictators and warlords money to keep refugees in camps, we have high tech borders guarded by the EU's Frontex with questionable means, we let hundreds or thousands of people drown in the Mediterranean Sea every year, there are mechanisms like Dublin II where e.g. Salvini has a very different position than Orban or Kurz. I don't see what Merkel has as a moderating influence here. Beyond her unilateral action in 2015, she has been supportive of these policies or at least not fought them.
In Germany, the topic is currently not worth a headline. Our country has many more pressing issues. Occasional mention in other contexts, e.g. migrants being antisemitic or not willing to be vaccinated. I don't expect it to be a relevant topic in our federal election this year. Let's see.
Quote from: Zanza on May 18, 2021, 01:03:42 AM
What material change do you expect to immigration policy? It is still mainly a domestic issue as each country has its own policies on who is accepted.
Oh I've no idea - the prompt for me thinking about this again was Barnier proposing a 3-5 year ban on non-EU migration in France plus discussions with European partners about Schengen. He's incredibly vague about the Schengen part.
Also Macron's general and vague stuff against "Islamist separatism" - the latest manifestation of which is forcing a Muslim candidate of his own party to stand down because she wore a headscarf on her election poster.
I think there's three elements - immigration, "geostrategic" Europe (as vdL's discussed) and internal values/identity - that interact together.
QuoteOn the European level, there are no real distribution mechanisms anyway and I feel that topic is pretty dead. Beyond that, we already pay dictators and warlords money to keep refugees in camps, we have high tech borders guarded by the EU's Frontex with questionable means, we let hundreds or thousands of people drown in the Mediterranean Sea every year, there are mechanisms like Dublin II where e.g. Salvini has a very different position than Orban or Kurz.
Yeah - I agree and I don't think it's about internal distribution. I think it's more likely to focus on Europe's borders - possibly on Europe's internal identity.
I think Frontex is really interesting - in part I think it reflects European failure to be a strategic actor. There are lots of European states doing things in the Sahel and the Middle East but it's not coordinated and I think they probably get less bang for their buck than if they were able to cooperate at a a European level on their objectives. But part of the consequences of that is increasing immigration on Europe's southern border which is helping prompt the development of Frontex and there was a really interesting look at the various bits of common security and defence policy that noted that Frontex is becoming the main agency of genuine coherent European level action.
The recent new Frontex regulation transforms it - the proposed budget for the next few years is small in global terms but unprecedented for a European security/law enforcement policy. So Frontex has gone from basically the same level of budget as Europol 5 years ago to four times that and it is becoming the dominant voice in common security policies because it has operational capabilities. In addition to the 10,000 uniformed Frontex agents (which I expect will increase) there is huge ambition in the stuff they are taking the lead on: adoption of drones and AI, technical assessments and diligence of member states, security risk assessments, it is apparently increasingly trying to elbow out Europol and Eurojust on cross-border law enforcement. All of which you'd sort of expect in a bureaucratic fight - that the agency with a growing budget will come to dominate.
I think Frontex is a really important bit of EU state-building and I think it will be deployed more and more under solidarity mechanisms. But it's similar to the way in the UK I wonder if the Home Office and internal security roles shape the way immigration enforcement is done, or in the US that mental health crises aren often dealt with by police shapes that. If Europe's main effective, operational common security agency is an immigration and law-enforcement agency, that will shape the way Europe views itself and behaves internationally. It seems more likely to focus on the symptoms of crises (immigration flows, crime, political violence) not the drivers of those crises and that more and more of Europe's focus will be on its borders and a fortress Europe. And also I wonder if there's a lowest common denominator element - it's easier to agree on measures to address consequences than to try and address causes in advance?
QuoteI don't see what Merkel has as a moderating influence here. Beyond her unilateral action in 2015, she has been supportive of these policies or at least not fought them.
I think Merkel is moderating because I think her focus is more pragmatic and more economic.
I think the wider shift is that I think Europe sees itself as in competition more and there is, I think, a sort of Huntington "civilisational" view of this - that European values and the European project is not a universal model of nations cooperating in a sort of post-sovereign way, but rather competing with China, India etc. I think in this competitive and more European/sovereign view - Merkel basically sees it as economic. It's about ensuring Europe can compete economically through structural reforms, fiscal discipline etc. I think her influence in Europe is still huge because of both her European and domestic political capital.
By contrast I think Macron's alternative, increasingly, is identitarian/civilisational and that Europe is about protecting those uniquely European values and culture. Which aligns with some far and populist right leaders on securing Europe's external border while pushing a, in my view, Islamophobic agenda domestically. (Macron is such a disappointment :weep:). Because he lost the fight over a Europe that protects from economic markets, he's shifted to a Europe that protects its culture/"our European way of life". I think he might get some goodies on this in the gap between the German election and the French election. If he wins re-election I'd also suspect that for a while at least Macron will be the central/core European leader so his vision matters.
Strengthening Fortress Europe is easily a majority opinion in every member state, so it is just a question of the details, not enough to create a major rift. That's also why Frontex is allowed to grow when otherwise member states are not very willing to pool sovereignty on security measures. As Frontex is miniscule compared to national security organizations, I doubt that it's cultural impact will matter.
Merkel has no domestic capital left, she is a lame duck and treated so by other German politicians. That's pretty obvious in our Covid response. I doubt that she still has much international weight as she has no means to deliver beyond the next few months. General German interests will be shared by whoever is her successor though.
A majority opinion albeit an incredibly ill thought out one. It's easy enough to say "stop illegal immigrants from Africa!", but international law and the right to asylum is what it is.
This would have to be taken up at an above EU level even with a fundamental change to how claiming asylum works.
But of course thought out approaches to real problems aren't what wins elections.
Quote from: Zanza on May 18, 2021, 06:49:25 AM
Strengthening Fortress Europe is easily a majority opinion in every member state, so it is just a question of the details, not enough to create a major rift. That's also why Frontex is allowed to grow when otherwise member states are not very willing to pool sovereignty on security measures. As Frontex is miniscule compared to national security organizations, I doubt that it's cultural impact will matter.
Yeah I don't think Fortress Europe will create a rift - I think it probably should.
The other benefit of Frontex is that there's still a limited European press. So I think a scandal in x country's immigration service will get picked up by that country's media and may become a political issue which causes problems for that government. I think a scandal by Frontex in x country is less likely to get picked up and less likely to have political consequences.
QuoteMerkel has no domestic capital left, she is a lame duck and treated so by other German politicians. That's pretty obvious in our Covid response. I doubt that she still has much international weight as she has no means to deliver beyond the next few months. General German interests will be shared by whoever is her successor though.
Interesting - it feels like she's leaving office with political capital. She could run again and easily win.
On a possible civilisational turn - an argument for it by Luuk van Middelaar who is, I think, one of the best writers on the EU. And of course he makes explicit the link between a European identity based on history and culture with European sovereignty in an age of civilisation states (Russia, India, China etc). Google translated:
QuoteEurope has cut itself off from its history
Luuk van Medelaar
In their cowardly meaninglessness, the euro notes are eloquent. A design competition was held for the new coin in 1996. Participants had to depict specific bridges and buildings - in a series running from the Pont du Gard in Nîmes (five euros) to the modernist Rietveld-Schröder house (the five hundred). Thus, the new currency would be anchored in European architectural history.
Designer Robert Kalina made an intervention that won him the prize: he made the bridges and buildings anonymous. As a result, the notes in our wallets show architectural styles but no individual buildings. The jury of bank governors must have feared public disapproval: "No, that's not our European bridge in Nîmes, but their French bridge!" Fear of national reflexes trumped the desire to give the euro cultural soil. A missed opportunity.
That was then. But the world is changing. China, Russia and India are also mobilizing civilization and culture under Xi, Putin and Modi for their raw power politics. The idea of 'the West', geographic umbrella and cultural hyphen for North America and Europe, is losing meaning. This is another reason why the desire for a place of its own in the world has grown in recent years - Europe not only as a beacon of universal values, but as a continent with a culture, history and story.
From Amsterdam wants The European Review of Books , a recentannounced upstart in crowd-funding phase, to initiate a European conversation between writers and intellectuals, as a successor to enlightenment philosopher Pierre Bayle 's Nouvelles de la République des Lettres . The high-quality website Le Grand Continent has been operating from Paris since 2019 , driven by people in their twenties and thirties, to keep the conversation about politics, geography, law and art "on the right scale": the continental one.
Multilingualism is the first obstacle to a European-wide public debate. Both initiatives make it a strength. The young Parisians started out in French, but are increasingly publishing in Italian and Spanish; German and Polish are on the way. The European Review - which for the time being has attracted more authors from the UK and the US than from continental Europe - wants to publish essays in English and (if different) the author's language. This doubling fits well with Europe's relationship to our national political-cultural spaces: the shelter of a common roof, not the threat of expulsion.
Naturally, the 'Europe' of culture and civilization does not coincide with that of Brussels. Britain's departure (2020) alone cuts across the EU's dream of one day spanning the continent geographically. That, too, makes Brexit so painful, even more so than cod disputes or vaccine disputes: 'Europe' as a space of imagination is losing Shakespeare, Newton and The Beatles.
Nevertheless, bridges must be built between the political-legal sphere and Europe's culture and history. The problem is not so much that the EU is blind to culture, as Review founder Sander Pleij suggested . The economic, social and cultural importance of the film industry or museums is also recognized in Brussels; billions are going there.
The real problem is that the EU has cut itself off from history. In the Brussels discourse, it sometimes seems as if Europe was 'born' on 9 May 1950 - the day on which the French minister Schuman made the proposal for its founding. After two world wars, the strong line under the past was palpable. But the states and peoples of Europe cannot build a common future on such a short, thin past.
Time to give the story a different 'main character'. Not post-war integration, with its heroes and setbacks, treaties and expansions, but rather the European Union as a follower of the State Concert between 1648 and 1914 and as a political expression of a civilization space that goes back to Athens and Rome, to Socrates, Cicero and Paul.
Of course, that would be criticized. Some accuse Europe of being a 'white' project. But a tradition of reason and doubt, of plurality and freedom, does not necessarily have to sink into guilt and shame. Let the debate begin.
The only European leader who recognizes the importance of a non-universal historical narrative is Emmanuel Macron. Just as he did not want to leave the thorny term 'sovereignty' to Europe's opponents, but has been claiming for the Union since 2017, he wants to be able to rely on civilization and history on behalf of Europe - no longer to shrink from fear of the unexploded mines in the bottom of our imagination. He is right: anyone who cuts himself off from history cannot imagine a future either.
Luuk van Middelaar is a political philosopher, historian and professor of EU law (Leiden).
Quote from: Sheilbh on May 20, 2021, 03:04:38 AMQuoteMerkel has no domestic capital left, she is a lame duck and treated so by other German politicians. That's pretty obvious in our Covid response. I doubt that she still has much international weight as she has no means to deliver beyond the next few months. General German interests will be shared by whoever is her successor though.
Interesting - it feels like she's leaving office with political capital. She could run again and easily win.
It is my impression that Merkel has a much higher reputation and influence at the EU level than within Germany, she can still be really influential for EU decissions while simultaneously being ignored at home. It seems to me that her stature is magnified outside of Germany, possibly because within Germany she's understood and interpreted within the German political context, with all the nuances and additional issues it entails, while in an EU context she's the avatar for Germany.
QuoteOn a possible civilisational turn - an argument for it by Luuk van Middelaar who is, I think, one of the best writers on the EU. And of course he makes explicit the link between a European identity based on history and culture with European sovereignty in an age of civilisation states (Russia, India, China etc). Google translated:
QuoteEurope has cut itself off from its history
Luuk van Medelaar
If that guy's big opening argument is that Euro bank notes are lame for presenting generic bridges rather than particular ones, I fear that his argument doesn't really hold any water. :P
And of course for EU purposes a post WWII context is a break from the past and is kind of a "new beginning", what the EU tries to achieve is overcoming all the situations that led to inter-European conflict, so it's only natural that their frame of reference is that, rather than the entire European history.
And what shared political past are we supposed to draw upon, the Continental System? :lol:
More seriously, all possible examples are rather horrible for different reasons. And again, I feel the whole thing's unnecessary. I'm pretty happy with building an "identity" around post-WWII ideas of liberal democracy.
Quote from: celedhring on May 20, 2021, 07:20:43 AM
And what shared political past are we supposed to draw upon, the Continental System? :lol:
More seriously, all possible examples are rather horrible for different reasons. And again, I feel the whole thing's unnecessary. I'm pretty happy with building an "identity" around post-WWII ideas of liberal democracy.
Yeah, the EU being born out of the ashes of WW2 should make for a pretty strong and useful identity, and a lot more relevant than Westphalia.
And I agree the bank notes are bland and boring as hell, but that's not much of an argument. He also conveniently leaves out the fact that the coins still have plenty of country-specific nationalism on them.
Quote from: celedhring on May 20, 2021, 07:20:43 AM
And what shared political past are we supposed to draw upon, the Continental System? :lol:
More seriously, all possible examples are rather horrible for different reasons. And again, I feel the whole thing's unnecessary. I'm pretty happy with building an "identity" around post-WWII ideas of liberal democracy.
[/quote]
Yeah so I don't think he's intending to limit it to shared political history but also cultural - Cicero, Socrates and Paul plus, obviously, a reference to the Enlightenment in the values/principles he talks about.
But you're right the reason the EU sort of has a post-war year zero is, ultimately, because it is easier to talk about the shared values while the past sits like a ghost at the feast; rather than European historical idenity which includes genocides and colonialism (though the EU does slightly overlap with colonialism).
He's a very interesting writer and thinker about Europe - I think he used to be an advisor to van Rompuy and Bolkestein - so he has a bit of inside and outside thinking about him. But in The Passage to Europe his final section is about the EU's quest for legitimacy and he basically says the German model (common identity/symbols) and Roman model (output legitimacy - roads or no roaming charges) have hit their limits and the future is now the Greek model (democracy). But obviously the old issue re-occurs of there being no European people - and whether the post-war escape from history is sufficient to build a more shared democratic (primarily through national parliaments) and robust union capable of dealing with the rise of more assertive powers.
I think he does also play into Kundnani's point a little in his mention of China, India and Russia - it's a little End of History v Clash of Civilisations.
QuoteAnd of course for EU purposes a post WWII context is a break from the past and is kind of a "new beginning", what the EU tries to achieve is overcoming all the situations that led to inter-European conflict, so it's only natural that their frame of reference is that, rather than the entire European history.
Yes - although I think inter-European conflict is interesting because I think Europe's internal violent past has been an impetus for the EU and thinking about it. To an extent I think that focus and commemoration has possibly covered a forgetfulness about Europe's external violent past - which is, in any event, more relevant to almost every member state of the EU15.
Even the mention in his article of the concert of states 1648 - 1914, would be profoundly incomplete if it didn't cover the Congress of Berlin. One of the previous ways that Europe did avoid conflict was by diverting that energy and those conflicts into the rest of the world.
Edit: And interesting takes on this article from Twitter by both Kundnani and van Middelaar - in part it seems like grappling with the return of history:
QuoteHans Kundnani
@hanskundnani
I don't think the problem is that the EU has cut itself off from European history, as @LuukvMiddelaar writes, but that it remembers it selectively. "Pro-Europeans" constantly bang on about the Enlightenment, but have nothing to say about colonialism.
QuoteLuuk van Middelaar
@LuukvMiddelaar
Thanks, Hans. I see 2 different issues. You talk about worldview of "pro-Europeans". I agree with that. I talk about EU's self-image, built on caesura of 1945 and dream of New Beginning - the end to power, to borders, identities. In sum: after Shoah, Habermas. That's over.
Looks like Switzerland is the next country to leave the Single Market after Britain. They are unwilling to ratify the negotiated framework agreement, so the EU will no longer do any deals with Switzerland on any topic. Due to lack of dynamic alignment, Switzerland will drop out of the Single Market sector by sector whenever the EU updates any directives or regulations. First will be medical devices, rail traffic and participation in ghe Horizon program. Switzerland will then face the usual third country non-tariff barriers, e.g. on documentation or necessity to have an EU distributor.
Is that a deliberate action by Swiss political actors, or is it some sort of dysfunction that's preventing the ratification?
Deliberate action by the Swiss Federal Council and the European Commission.
https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/rumours-abound-over-swiss-government-s-eu--framework-deal-/46642662
QuoteRumours abound over Swiss government's EU 'framework deal'
The Swiss government is apparently set to abandon negotiations with the European Union about an umbrella accord regulating bilateral relations.
Several Sunday newspapers quoted unnamed sources saying that none of the seven ministers saw any chance of winning over parliament or voters for the so-called framework agreement.
Negotiations on such a deal formally ended in 2018 but the Swiss government demanded 'clarifications' on three points, including the protection of salary levels, access to the Swiss social security system as well as state subsidies.
Following talks with EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in Brussels last month, the Swiss president, Guy Parmelin, said fundamental differences remained with the 27-nation bloc about the future of bilateral relations.
Both sides insist on concessions to break an impasse and reach an acceptable solution after more seven years of talks.
The SonntagsBlick newspaper also reports that the EU is apparently willing to make some compromise offers.
It is widely expected that the Swiss government will decide next Wednesday about its position amid concerns about possible retaliatory measures by Brussels over access to the European electricity market and research projects.
Efforts to appease Brussels apparently include the payment of CHF1 billion ($1.1 billion) to an EU fund to ensure Switzerland's participation in the Erasmus student exchange and research programmes, says the NZZ am Sonntag newspaper.
Switzerland has concluded more than 120 bilateral agreements with its main trading partner, but the EU wants an overarching institutional agreement to simplify relations.
Switzerland is not a member of the EU and voters in 1992 rejected a proposal to join the European Economic Area Treaty.
Quote
No 'status quo' without Swiss-EU framework deal, EU envoy warns
Without a framework agreement there is no possible status quo in relations between Switzerland and the European Union, according to the bloc's envoy in Bern.
EU Ambassador Petros Mavromichalis warns there will be no new deals on access to the EU single market and that expiring agreements will not be renewed.
"It is the chronicle of a death foretold," he told French-language newspaper Le Temps in an interview published Saturday.
Switzerland can certainly reject the institutional agreement, the ambassador points out, "but we are also sovereign and can say 'no' to the continuation of the current bilateral path".
[...]
So it's the ongoing saga started with that stupid referendum in 2015.
I thought they'd sorted that with making legal the already standard hiring practice of prioritising locals.
Really cant see it totally falling apart. As much as the UK is damaged by brexit chexit would crush Switzerland.
The UK chose a single hard cut with an unprecedented change in level of integration and trade barriers. Switzerland would be more piecemeal. There are currently 120 sectoral agreements, each of which could eventually be impacted by lack of future alignment. The way the Swiss-EU relationship is structured is actually what some Brexiteers hoped for. The EU is not willing to continue that approach though.
When reading the Swiss press, there is both an expectation of EU compromise (without acknowledging EU interests) and a perception that the Swiss government completely fucked up the alignment of internal and external negotiations.
This seems like good background summary of the situation. I was a bit lost on what this fight is regarding.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/22/the-eus-next-big-problem-is-switzerland/
QuoteThe EU's Next Big Problem Is Switzerland
One Sunday, not long after he moved to Bern, Switzerland, Michael Flügger, the German ambassador to Switzerland, walked from his residence to a bakery. On the street, he saw a far-right campaign poster showing a man wearing a European Union flag as a belt sitting on a tiny depiction of Switzerland, crushing it under his weight.
"I was shocked," Flügger recently told a Swiss newspaper. During a previous posting in Geneva, he had never encountered such animosity toward the EU, Switzerland's main trading—and often like-minded—partner. But now, "the atmosphere about the EU has become so negative," he said. "In some media and social networks, it is depicted as a monster."
This growing animosity serves as the backdrop for Swiss President Guy Parmelin's first official visit to Brussels on Friday for an important meeting with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. With Switzerland unable to implement a new institutional agreement with the EU, relations between the two have reached a dead end.
This will be the ultimate stress test for the bilateral relationship between these two neighbors—and, after Brexit, an indication of how tough the EU wants to be with nearby countries. At least Parmelin assured his fellow countrymen he "was not going to do a Boris Johnson" and slam doors behind him.
The comparison with Brexit looms over the fraught relationship, but it isn't entirely apt: While the United Kingdom is distancing itself from the EU, Switzerland is getting closer to it. Switzerland, not a member of the EU, is eager to expand its extensive relations with the 27 member countries. The problem is, like the U.K., it wants to keep sovereignty at the same time. This circle is difficult to square. Brussels does not tolerate what it calls "cherry-picking" rights claims without the acceptance of obligations: It cannot give nonmembers privileges that even members do not have. With the world in turmoil, however, the EU does have a great interest in maintaining a good relationship with like-minded countries like Switzerland for a variety of reasons.
In a 1992 referendum, the Swiss rejected EU membership. They negotiated a trade agreement with Brussels soon afterward and built on this ever since, with gusto: They currently have at least 120 bilateral agreements that function well. These secure market access for Swiss pharmaceuticals, metals, and chemicals in exchange for Swiss adherence to internal market rules and a modest financial contribution to poor EU regions. Switzerland is a member of the Schengen Area in which there are no border controls. It participates in Erasmus student exchanges, in EU scientific research, and in police cooperation. Access to the EU health system and electricity market are high on the Swiss wish list.
Some say Switzerland has the best of two worlds: access to the largest single market in the world and freedom to play the sovereignty card whenever it wants.
According to a 2019 study, no country profits more from the EU single market than Switzerland: Although its added value to the average EU citizen is $1,008 extra per year, the average Swiss gets $3,499. In Swiss border regions close to Basel or Geneva, tens of thousands of citizens commute to work on the other side of the border. Hospitals, restaurants and other businesses rely on this. Switzerland, some argue, has a kind of "passive EU membership."
In Brussels, however, the Swiss are known as difficult customers. While Norway, another nonmember with extensive market access, never questions its financial contribution to the EU, Switzerland regularly withholds it to get its way on some issue. Swiss referendums are also a source of friction. The popular vote for an immigration quota in 2014, for example, violated bilateral agreements with the EU to safeguard the free movement of people.
The 2014 referendum was the last straw for the EU. It realized how difficult it was to manage the bilateral agreements. They constantly need to be renewed or updated like an iPhone that otherwise can't handle new apps. This means permanent negotiations between the two sides. Moreover, if one of the parties cancels or violates one bilateral agreement, others automatically collapse too. That is why, after the 2014 immigration quota referendum, Bern and Brussels began negotiating a new institutional framework to encapsulate and stabilize all existing agreements and reduce political tensions while providing room for future agreements. In 2018, they agreed on a text.
Today, the 27 EU member states still support this text—but on the Swiss side, there is trouble. In 2018, the Swiss government asked for some time to consult political parties, social partners, and its citizens. These groups started criticizing the draft and demanding changes. This went on for more than two years. Remarkably, the Swiss government never defended the text.
It formulated three additional demands instead, which the EU finds impossible to satisfy. Bern wants exceptions on EU state aid rules, exceptions on social benefits for EU citizens (which Swiss in the EU will also get), and special labor law restrictions that would make EU companies operating in Switzerland less competitive against Swiss companies. All three demands involve exceptions for Switzerland that EU countries themselves would never be granted.
This is where the Brexit parallel comes in. Last year, when London also tried to secure maximum EU market access against minimum adherence to the rules, the 27 member states refused. They wanted to preserve the single market. They also wanted to set an example for other nonmember countries who would otherwise demand the same thing. Because of Brexit, the EU has become less flexible. This now deprives Switzerland to get the tailor-made arrangement it feels entitled to.
As soon as the withdrawal agreement between the EU and the U.K. was concluded in December 2020, the Swiss combed the text. They found two things that made them jealous. The first is the European Court of Justice—or "foreign judges"—gets no direct role in disputes between London and Brussels. The second is the British don't have to "dynamically" follow European rules like Switzerland does. Within days, Swiss politicians and citizens were urging their government to go to Brussels, Brexit deal in hand, and get those two things too. Some even thanked the U.K. for "helping the dwarf beyond the seven mountains."
The EU has tried to explain that Switzerland can't have them because its relationship with the EU is much closer than the British one. Disputes with Switzerland, for instance, almost always involve market issues. The only court capable of dealing with EU market issues is the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg. But many Swiss are not convinced. In this sense, Brexit has definitely made the EU-Swiss relationship more difficult to manage. The Swiss even have a word for it: "Brexit-envy."
For many months, Swiss talk shows have mostly been about two things: COVID-19 measures and its framework agreement with the EU. For many Swiss, the government's reticence about the agreement means it is probably not worth defending. The Swiss government is divided. According to media reports, ministers can't even agree on the message Parmelin should take to Brussels: whether Switzerland should ditch the new agreement or try renegotiation. There is no plan B. Former Swiss President Micheline Calmy-Rey recently said: "The Brexit deal shows politicians need to know what they want. Switzerland doesn't know it. In that respect, we could learn something from Boris Johnson."
Meanwhile, political entrepreneurs are having a field day. Billionaire Alfred Gantner started a movement against the framework agreement: Allianz Kompass/Europa, backed by companies, farmers, and even trade unions. He wants a "Brexit deal plus"—trade, and nothing else. The radical right Swiss People's Party, of which Parmelin is a member, and entrepreneurs platform Autonomiesuisse are also against the agreement. The social democrats and liberals are split. Pro-EU groups have also sprung up. Suddenly, there is new political momentum in Switzerland. Party discipline evaporates, and debates become more interesting.
But although the dispute may reinvigorate national politics, some captains of industry finally started to sound the alarm this week. In several newspapers, they reminded their fellow citizens that substantial portions of Swiss wealth are earned in the European single market—and that Switzerland, almost a semi-member state, is obliged to follow more European rules than the United Kingdom. Philip Mosimann, CEO of Bucher Industries, accused the government of being "orientierungslos" or disoriented.
Meanwhile, a leaked report of a meeting between the European Commission and member state representatives in Brussels accused the Swiss government of sitting idly by while the debate goes off the rails. "There is no commitment from Switzerland. The commission cannot negotiate on its own," Swiss television quoted from the report.
This is a deep crisis. Without the new framework agreement, existing bilateral agreements remain in force. But Brussels refuses to update them if Switzerland keeps stalling the new agreement. If the EU stands firm, Switzerland could already lose access for new medical devices to the EU in May. More sectors would get locked out progressively. Brussels has ruled out Swiss access to the EU's electricity and health market as well.
Benjamin Franklin once warned against throwing "stones at your neighbors if your own windows are glass." Both Parmelin and von der Leyen have nothing to gain from further escalation. But finding a way out will not be easy.
Most conflicts around the EU, both within and with its neighbours are about the balance of rights and obligations created by the treaties between the partially sovereign EU, sovereign members and sovereign third countries. The exact detail where a particular country values its sovereignty higher than the benefits from cooperation with its neighbours are always specific though.
Quote from: Tyr on May 24, 2021, 01:52:58 AM
So it's the ongoing saga started with that stupid referendum in 2015.
I thought they'd sorted that with making legal the already standard hiring practice of prioritising locals.
Really cant see it totally falling apart. As much as the UK is damaged by brexit chexit would crush Switzerland.
It is part of general retreat and discrediting of liberalism. But this is not unusual. Every once in a while we revolt against international cooperation and then remember why we keep going back to it over and over again.
Quote from: Valmy on May 24, 2021, 10:56:06 AM
Quote from: Tyr on May 24, 2021, 01:52:58 AM
So it's the ongoing saga started with that stupid referendum in 2015.
I thought they'd sorted that with making legal the already standard hiring practice of prioritising locals.
Really cant see it totally falling apart. As much as the UK is damaged by brexit chexit would crush Switzerland.
It is part of general retreat and discrediting of liberalism. But this is not unusual. Every once in a while we revolt against international cooperation and then remember why we keep going back to it over and over again.
Sadly there's usually some huge mess involved that motivates that u-turn.
Don't have a French thread - maybe we should in the run-up to the election? :hmm:
But Macron as a liberal continues to disappoint. After proposing a law that would criminalise filming the police, the interior minister is now suing the head of the PS list in Ile de France for "defaming the police" after she made comments about her concerns that police unions were organising a protest that was backed by far-right groups.
It feels like Macron gets a bit of a free pass on this because he's a liberal/anti-populist/on the side of the angels - but this is judicial harassment of an opposition politician and part of a trend about protecting/limiting criticism of the police. It's clearly dodgy and hopefully the courts just dismiss it but I also hope their liberal allies in other countries or the European institutions notice.
Quote from: Sheilbh on May 25, 2021, 03:51:09 AM
Don't have a French thread - maybe we should in the run-up to the election? :hmm:
But Macron as a liberal continues to disappoint. After proposing a law that would criminalise filming the police, the interior minister is now suing the head of the PS list in Ile de France for "defaming the police" after she made comments about her concerns that police unions were organising a protest that was backed by far-right groups.
It feels like Macron gets a bit of a free pass on this because he's a liberal/anti-populist/on the side of the angels - but this is judicial harassment of an opposition politician and part of a trend about protecting/limiting criticism of the police. It's clearly dodgy and hopefully the courts just dismiss it but I also hope their liberal allies in other countries or the European institutions notice.
Yeah but ín a European context do liberals have a better realistic French option than Macron?
I don't know if we currently have good options anywhere :hmm:
The liberal parties seem increasingly to lean rightwards and pandering to authoritarian and reactionary elements so this development by Macron is sad but not unsurprising.
Quote from: Tamas on May 25, 2021, 05:09:40 AM
Yeah but ín a European context do liberals have a better realistic French option than Macron?
Agreed - but I don't think that's an excuse to not be consistent or to give Macron a pass on this. It would be an outrage if, say, Republicans in any state in the US were trying to criminalise filming police because we know what it means: they don't want abuse of power by the police exposed. Similarly I think suing an opposition politician for "defaming the police" (or any other state institution) is clearly about shutting down debate - and signalling solidarity with the police - again if that was being done by Orban or Johnson or Duda we would have a lot of legitimate anger and criticism of it.
I think we're too willing to accept really bad things (anti-semitism in the Labour Party, Danish social democrats wanting a cap on the number of "non-westerners" living in a neighbourhood, restricting free speech around the police in France) because they are the lesser of two evils. Obviously in round two if it's Macron v Le Pen whatever your views you should hold your nose and vote Macron, but until then I hope people are looking for an alternative.
Separately really interesting coverage of the European Council in the FT. It gets what I've been thinking that we've done the easy, low cost bit of climate politics and we're now getting into the really difficult and contentious bit (both internationally and domestically) of how to distribute the costs/impact of climate policies. So apparently Poland led CEE countries who feel they will disproportionately bear the costs given their industry and energy sectors, but also that they are poorer than the West; at the same time Greece and Cyprus especially are concerned about possibly including the carbon cost of shipping/maritime industries (especially I imagine if that affects flags of convenience); and France, Italy and Spain all pointed to the quite shallow base of support by middle class/average voters in Europe - most people support climate policies that don't impact them but we may see other gilets jaunes moments.
I think it's really interesting because I think this will happen at a global and regional level and, in democratic states, is going to become one of the most important political issues.
Edit: And my suspicion is it will accelerate the decline of the left as politics becomes more and more defined by climate and the associated costs. On the one hand I think you will have individuals living in densely populated cities with public transport networks, with increased teleworking and lower home ownership who I think will continue to trend left/green (and I think a big issue here will be between building owners/service companies and tenants/property owners over upgrades to blocks); on the other people living in less densely populated areas or declining cities with more private transport and home ownership who will often have to pay higher petrol taxes and their own property upgrade costs - I suspect they will trend right and I think this will be the next area where the populist/far-right can take advantage. As ever France taking a lead with the gilets jaunes.
Just saw that Switzerland have now ended their negotiations with the EU.
I'm going to have to learn Italian for a European passport aren't I <_<
Though seriously can't see it getting too far. How tied Switzerland is to the EU can't be understated. 1/4 of the Swiss population and 1/3 of the workforce are born abroad. Huge chunks of Geneva and Basel are in France, many other frontaliers from elsewhere too.
Fuck the Swiss. It's kinda hilarious how they think they can play hardball :lol:
Oh well, the EU is not an imperial power, so if they don't want deeper cooperation, that's of course their sovereign decision.
It's an ambivalent thing for the EU. On the one hand, it needs to stay true to its own principles and implement the level playing field in the Single Market as well as possible. On the other, most of its neighbours are currently increasing distance to the EU - be it UK, Switzerland, most of the Western Balkans, Morocco, Turkey. The EU needs to review their approach towards neighbouring countries. Does not seem particularly successful.
But cherry-picking should never be permitted. I would rather have a cohesive, smaller market than a larger market with different levels of privileges that create further internal tensions.
Maybe it is time to just do the most basic administrative alignments on these foreign relations and concentrate on freezing out Hungarian, Polish (and Slovak/Czech?) authoritarian tendencies, Bulgarian corruption, generate some will to reform in Germany and Italy and support deeper European integration a la Macron first. This outreach to partners seems a waste of time and effort. Make a clear offer and then they can decide to take it or leave it.
https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/swiss-reject-framework-agreement-deal-with-eu/46651454
QuoteThe government wants this new chapter to be based on "cultivating and developing" relations on the basis of the existing bilateral agreements, and it has proposed to launch a political dialogue with Brussels to pursue common priorities for the future.
What's in it for the EU? Seems an utter waste of time.
QuoteA review of Swiss legislation will also be done, to examine the current discrepancies between EU and Swiss law and to see if alignment is possible. This review will be done "autonomously", with changes only made "where it makes sense", Justice Minister Karin Keller-Sutter clarified.
:lol: That's not how the Single Market works. They can align all they want, without a treaty their law could be word-by-word the EU directive and it would still not remove the trade barriers.
QuoteThe government has also pledged to press the parliament to give the ok for the release of Switzerland's CHF1 billion ($1.1 billion) contribution to the EU cohesion fund – a key demand of Brussels – "as soon as possible".
Pff, peanuts. That's hardly buying any goodwill. Seems low for the level of integration they have with the Single Market.
Quote from: Zanza on May 26, 2021, 11:08:52 AMOh well, the EU is not an imperial power, so if they don't want deeper cooperation, that's of course their sovereign decision.
It's an ambivalent thing for the EU. On the one hand, it needs to stay true to its own principles and implement the level playing field in the Single Market as well as possible. On the other, most of its neighbours are currently increasing distance to the EU - be it UK, Switzerland, most of the Western Balkans, Morocco, Turkey. They need to review their approach towards neighbouring countries. Does not seem particularly successful.
I think this is right but I also think part of it is because of a sort of imperial approach (a bit Middle Kingdom) of only really being able to set up a good structural relationship with neighbours in the context of some form of accession.
There are some sorts of association agreements but I think the EU does seem to have a problem in how to engage neighbours who don't want to join or become part of the EU's framework including the EEA (or can't or lose interest) - the UK, Russia, Ukraine, as you say the Western Balkans (especially since Macron blocked North Macedonian accession - because what is the point now, they know they'll get blocked), the Caucasus, Turkey, North Africa.
I don't know what that engagement looks like and it will vary based on the states around it. So the Caucasus is going to need a different relationship than Russia or Turkey. But I think the EU needs to imagine relationships outside of its own institutional infrastructure because it is either too limited for Europe's actual neighbours or the approach of the European decision-makers has been too constrained. I'm not sure which.
QuoteMaybe it is time to just do the most basic administrative alignments on these foreign relations and concentrate on freezing out Hungarian, Polish (and Slovak/Czech?) authoritarian tendencies, Bulgarian corruption, generate some will to reform in Germany and Italy and support deeper European integration a la Macron first. This outreach to partners seems a waste of time and effort. Make a clear offer and then they can decide to take it or leave it.
Slovenia is going in a very authoritarian direction too - not sure about Czech or Slovakia though.
I think what you describe is a consequence of the dual nature of the EU - the shared sovereignty between the federal and national level. Once you found a compromise between the 27 members and got EU parliament approval, there is very little space for further compromise with third countries. That's why the EU is so inflexible beyond its own rules and institutions. The internal cohesion always overrides foreign policy.
Take the UK as a counterexample. Westminster can more or less ignore the devolved administrations in its foreign policy and is thus more agile and able to find compromise, but potentially at the cost of internal cohesion.
I think that's right. The EU is between basically intergovernmental and acting like a quasi-state.
And obviously this is particularly the case with foreign policy because it's an area where the EU has incredibly limited competencies, but is a vessel through which all the member states are able to multiply their power - I'm not sure how involved the European Parliament is outside of the realm of trade and purely symbolic resolutions on foreign policy. Institutionally I think this probably has an impact as well because trade and accession are European competencies - so they are involving the Commission and the Parliament; while foreign policy is the ultimate European Council competenciy. I know there is the High Rep but ultimately if there is a decision about doing something it's - as with Belarus - a Council decision. I think that institutional infighting is possibly part of this as well in that the accession framework and frameworks based on trade agreements are securely in the remit of the Commission and Parliament so those are the preferred tools of the European institutions.
What I am less clear on is whether the EU actually has, under the treaties, the institutional tools and framework to deal with neighbours outside of accession, or whether they do have alternatives but they're not being used because of the consensus point.
Quote from: Sheilbh on May 26, 2021, 12:51:15 PM
I think that's right. The EU is between basically intergovernmental and acting like a quasi-state.
It is kind of like a new Holy Roman Empire. Europe sure loves things like this, and the fact they keep making them is good evidence they are necessary no matter how clunky.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_integration
That Wiki page shows the sheer amount of treaties, institutions, organisations, opt-outs and opt-ins that currently define European integration.
In the last decades, many such initiatives were eventually incorporated into the European Union as the overarching political framework.
Quote from: Sheilbh on May 26, 2021, 11:35:53 AM
I think this is right but I also think part of it is because of a sort of imperial approach (a bit Middle Kingdom) of only really being able to set up a good structural relationship with neighbours in the context of some form of accession.
The EU is a trade bloc. Of course it sees relationships as matters of trade and accession. It's the only way it can do so by design.
Real foreign policy is a national matter and I can't see that changing anytime soon.
Quote from: Iormlund on May 26, 2021, 01:36:17 PM
Quote from: Sheilbh on May 26, 2021, 11:35:53 AM
I think this is right but I also think part of it is because of a sort of imperial approach (a bit Middle Kingdom) of only really being able to set up a good structural relationship with neighbours in the context of some form of accession.
The EU is a trade bloc. Of course it sees relationships as matters of trade and accession. It's the only way it can do so by design.
Real foreign policy is a national matter and I can't see that changing anytime soon.
The EU has foreign policy competences as expressed in the Treaty on the EU (as amended by the Lisbon Treaty). But the relevant sections clearly state that this foreign policy is defined by the Council (i.e. national executives) and requires unanimity. So there is little practical difference between national and Union foreign policy.
Another Politico piece on Bulgaria and corruption - about which I know very little except from Politico. Which sort of makes me wonder if Orban and Duda are making a huge mistake by pushing their ideological case and they'd get away with far more and get far less attention in the rest of the world's press if they were just massively corrupt in a non-ideological way.
I don't know if the press in the rest of Europe covers Bulgaria a bit more but I don't think I've read anything about it in, say, the Guardian or the Times - only the EU Politico :hmm:
QuoteUS sanctions top Bulgarians for graft. EU does zilch.
Washington's move is the biggest one-day action under the Magnitsky Act.
By Boryana Dzhambazova and Lili Bayer
June 2, 2021 10:50 pm
The United States on Wednesday rolled out sweeping anti-graft sanctions against high-profile Bulgarian power brokers and more than 60 entities, while the EU fails to confront the Balkan country's spiraling rule of law crisis.
America's unusually wide-reaching step is an embarrassment for the EU as it exposes the bloc's inability to police its own backyard over a welter of corruption scandals often tied to EU funds that end up in the hands of Bulgaria's mafia and powerful oligarchs. The move constitutes America's biggest-ever action in one day under the country's Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, which targets perpetrators of corruption and human rights abuses around the globe.
"The United States stands with all Bulgarians who strive to root out corruption by promoting accountability for corrupt officials who undermine the economic functions and democratic institutions of Bulgaria," Office of Foreign Assets Control Director Andrea M. Gacki said.
By contrast, the EU has conspicuously chosen not to stand with Bulgarians fighting corruption.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and German Chancellor Angela Merkel have turned a blind eye to a rule-of-law meltdown in the EU's poorest state in recent years. Former Prime Minister Boyko Borissov, who dominated the country's politics for the best part of a decade, was their close ally on the EU political stage in the center-right European People's Party and was never challenged over his country's judicial failings. Although the former firefighter and karate champion lost power in an indecisive election in April, his GERB party is still ahead in polls ahead of another election on July 11.
While corruption has long been identified as a problem in Bulgaria, the scale of unfolding graft scandals over the past year has laid bare how an oligarchic mafia has effectively captured the state by exercising control through institutions such as the judiciary, security services and media.
The most high-profile tycoon to be sanctioned is Delyan Peevski, a controversial media mogul and former member of parliament.
Peevski "regularly engaged in corruption, using influence peddling and bribes to protect himself from public scrutiny and exert control over key institutions and sectors in Bulgarian society," the U.S. Department of the Treasury wrote in its sanctions decision.
Peevski, who is affiliated with the Movement for Rights and Freedom, a member of the liberal Renew Europe grouping, has emerged as one of the symbols of the country's corruption woes. The U.S. said he "worked to negatively influence the Bulgarian political process" in elections in 2019.
The department has also sanctioned fugitive casino baron Vasil "the skull" Bozhkov, one of Bulgaria's wealthiest citizens, and Ilko Zhelyazkov, who currently serves on the National Bureau for Control on Special Intelligence-Gathering Devices— as well as 64 entities connected to the men, cutting off their access to the American financial system.
In parallel, the U.S. Department of State announced entry bans on an even broader list of Bulgarian public figures and their families, including a former deputy minister.
"The big question is, who did they corrupt?" said Elena Yoncheva, a member of the European Parliament, who is a leading critic of Borissov and a member of the Bulgarian Socialist Party.
Tip of the iceberg
In explaining its decision, the Treasury said that Bozhkov — who is currently a fugitive in Dubai but nonetheless registered a political party that won almost 3 percent of the votes in the April election — had "bribed government officials on several occasions," including "a current political leader."
It also said that the businessman "planned to provide a sum of money to a former Bulgarian official and a Bulgarian politician earlier this year" in order to help him "create a channel for Russian political leaders to influence Bulgarian government officials."
The Treasury Department also accused Zhelyazkov of acting as a frontman for Peevski in corrupt dealings.
"Peevski used Zhelyazkov to conduct a bribery scheme involving Bulgarian residency documents for foreign persons, as well as to bribe government officials through various means in exchange for their information and loyalty," according to the U.S. government.
Hristo Ivanov, head of the anti-corruption Yes Bulgaria party, welcomed the sanctions.
"Peevski and Bozhkov are participants in a grand corruption scheme which needs to come undone, while Borissov needs to leave the political scene," he told reporters in Sofia.
Maya Manolova, a former ombudswoman and one of the leaders of Rise Up! Out With the Crooks!, an opposition party inspired by a wave of anti-corruption protests last year, said the sanctions highlighted a dire need for reforms.
"Bulgarians would like to see their institutions finally stepping up their fight against corruption," she told online news platform Dnevnik.bg. The "Bulgarian state is the only one which has not realized the need for decisive anti-graft measures. "
In a statement late Wednesday, the Bulgarian foreign ministry did not address any specific cases but said the country is committed to the fight against corruption and that it remained ready for dialogue with Washington. Bozhkov's party declined to comment at the time of publication.
Peevski, meanwhile, rejected the U.S. move and vowed to challenge it.
In an open letter sent to Bulgarian media, he slammed the sanctions as "absolutely unacceptable, biased and violating the letter and the spirit" of the Magnitsky Act.
"I haven't done anything to violate internationally recognized human rights, I'm not a state official, and I haven't participated in acts of corruption," he said.
Washington's reasoning for imposing the sanctions "does not include a single true fact," he added.
QuoteEuropean Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and German Chancellor Angela Merkel have turned a blind eye to a rule-of-law meltdown in the EU's poorest state in recent years. Former Prime Minister Boyko Borissov, who dominated the country's politics for the best part of a decade, was their close ally on the EU political stage in the center-right European People's Party and was never challenged over his country's judicial failings.
So, Orban 2.0. It seems that the best recipe for entrenching your corrupt network in your often overlooked country is to be part of the EPP.
Depending on how this ends up I have the feeling that Merkel's legacy won't be seen with much kindness in the future.
Quote from: The Larch on June 03, 2021, 05:34:14 AM
QuoteEuropean Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and German Chancellor Angela Merkel have turned a blind eye to a rule-of-law meltdown in the EU's poorest state in recent years. Former Prime Minister Boyko Borissov, who dominated the country's politics for the best part of a decade, was their close ally on the EU political stage in the center-right European People's Party and was never challenged over his country's judicial failings.
So, Orban 2.0. It seems that the best recipe for entrenching your corrupt network in your often overlooked country is to be part of the EPP.
Well also the liberal group apparently - and obviously the Maltese Labour Party is in the PES. I think there is something to think about and look at the way the European party families have possibly been used for almost reputation laundering by corrupt states/parties.
But it does feel like we're asking a lot of European institutions to punish member states if informal associations of political parties can't even sanction one of their members.
Hope this is the right place for this piece of news:
QuoteU.S. and EU resolve 17-year Boeing-Airbus dispute
The two sides agreed to suspend for five years tariffs that stem from the dispute.
CNBC reported last week that the EU was pressing the White House to reach a deal to end trade tariffs imposed during the Trump administration.
Boeing and Airbus shares rose on the news.
LONDON — The United States and European Union said Tuesday they have resolved a 17-year-long fight over aircraft subsidies, agreeing to suspend tariffs for five years stemming from the Boeing-Airbus dispute.
"This meeting has started with a breakthrough on aircraft," said European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who met with President Joe Biden at a U.S.-EU summit in Brussels. "This really opens a new chapter in our relationship because we move from litigation to cooperation on aircraft — after 17 years of dispute."
U.S. trade representative Katherine Tai said during a videocall Tuesday that: "Today's announcement resolves a longstanding trade irritant in the U.S.-Europe relationship."
"Instead of fighting with one of our closest allies, we are finally coming together against a common threat," she added, mentioning China.
She added in a joint statement with the EU that both sides "now have time and space to find a lasting solution through our new Working Group on Aircraft, while saving billions of euros in duties for importers on both sides of the Atlantic."
CNBC reported last week that the EU was pressing the White House to reach a deal to end trade tariffs imposed during the Trump administration, in relation to the Airbus and Boeing dispute that emerged in 2004.
As part of the deal, the EU and the U.S. agreed to provide research and development funding through an open and transparent process as well as to not give specific support, such as tax breaks, to their own producers that would harm the other side.
The idea is also to collaborate in addressing non-market practices conducted by other countries, including China.
Tuesday's big announcement marked Biden's first trip to the EU's headquarters and the first EU-U.S. summit since 2014.
"This shows the new spirit of cooperation between the EU and the U.S. and that we can solve the other issues to our mutual benefit. Together we can deliver for our citizens and businesses," Valdis Dombrovskis, the EU's trade chief, said in a statement Tuesday.
WTO rulings
The EU-U.S. relationship hit a low during the previous White House administration with then-President Donald Trump accusing the EU of being worse than China with its trade practices.
Trump imposed duties worth $7.5 billion on European products after the World Trade Organization ruled that the EU had given unfair subsidies to Airbus.
Shortly afterward the EU imposed tariffs worth $4 billion on U.S. products off the back of another WTO ruling that said the U.S. had granted illegal aid to Boeing.
Boeing shares were up 0.5% in the premarket on Tuesday morning, while Paris-listed Airbus shares were trading higher by 0.5%.
Separately, the United Kingdom also said Tuesday it was hoping for a similar deal with the United States within coming days.
The U.K. was a member of the EU when the dispute emerged and was hit by the trade tensions that developed during the Trump presidency.
Quote from: The Larch on June 15, 2021, 07:45:45 AM
Hope this is the right place for this piece of news:
Makes sense - when a heavyweight fight is interrupted by a drive by shooting that takes down both boxers, it's best to call time.
Quote from: The Minsky Moment on June 15, 2021, 11:08:53 AM
Quote from: The Larch on June 15, 2021, 07:45:45 AM
Hope this is the right place for this piece of news:
Makes sense - when a heavyweight fight is interrupted by a drive by shooting that takes down both boxers, it's best to call time.
So, time to regroup against the Chinese? :P
So Germany and France want a reset of the relationship with Russia and re-launch the 27+1 meetings with Putin.
From the FT coverage and reporter's tweets below it doesn't sound like this involved much consultation with the rest of the 27:
QuoteMichael Peel
@Mikepeeljourno
A surprise Franco German push for the first EU summit with Russia since Moscow annexed Crimea in 2014 has laid bare internal divisions in the bloc. Two opponents of the move towards detente branded the idea "appalling" and "crazy". https://ft.com/content/03528026-8fa1-4910-ab26-41cd26404439
It's not even five months since the Kremlin sought to humiliate EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell during a Moscow visit. But both Germany and France have long sought outreach to Russia. And Joe Biden's summit with Putin last week normalised the idea.
QuoteHenry Foy
@HenryJFoy
BIG scoop from FT's Brussels team - Merkel and Macron want to restart EU-Russia summits with Putin and the 27 leaders, as part of a surprise proposal for a new EU strategy of closer engagement with the Kremlin https://ft.com/content/03528026-8fa1-4910-ab26-41cd26404439
Surprise proposal sprung on the rest of the EU a day before talks on how to deal with Moscow is going down down like a cup of cold sick with eastern members and others arguing against rapprochement with the Kremlin. Also comes a day after Merkel and Putin held a phone call
And, as with the Chinese CAI (also pushed by Germany and France), it feels strangely rushed and seems to be getting push back by German and French foreign policy commentators.
The main queries they have are basically what is the purpose of the meeting - what do they want to achieve with Putin. But more widely have noted that if there's to be a European policy towards Russia it can't solely be shaped by Western European countries even if including CEE may be uncomfortable/de-rail your plans. I think both of those points are correct. I can't work out what the
One thing I wonder - with China too - is why Merkel is doing this now given that she'll be out of office shortly. It seems strange to be making these moves when you're a lame duck. Is it trying to sort of lay down tracks that bind her successor - or assuming it'll be Laschet will there have been consultation on this?
I get that France basically always wants to get closer to Russia - and I think there is something to the line that the British foreign policy establishment basically naive Turkophiles while the French foreign policy establishment is basically naive Russophiles - so that's normal :lol:
Not clear what it'll all mean yet - from Mehreen Khan:
QuoteMehreen
@MehreenKhn
EU ambassadors tonight spent 90 mins (aptly) on draft #euco conclusions on Russia. Will be changes made before start of summit but will be up to leaders to decide how to tackle main sticking points on whether to retain list of areas for cooperation and possible Putin summitry Down pointing backhand index
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/E4mMNeCWUAIvb_g?format=jpg&name=small)
After initial fury at timing of the Franco German ambush on Putin, more countries now willing to accept much beefier language on Russia than was planned only 24 hours ago. Leaders will thrash out specifics of paragraph 6 over dinner on Thursday.
Benelux coming out really hard on Hungary and LGBT laws :w00t: :wub:
QuoteScott Beasley
@SkyScottBeasley
Real leadership in Europe: Netherlands Prime Minister says Hungary should no longer be in the EU following its anti-LGBT law
Mark Rutte: "For me, Hungary has no place in the EU anymore"
Rutte if they refuse to withdraw the legislation: "then as far as I am concerned, then there is nothing left for them in the EU"
"This is such a fundamental point, that if we let that go, we are nothing more than a trading block and a currency"
The EU is split on the issue- along broadly east/west and social conservative/liberal lines
As Rutte says: "But I'm not the only one to decide this: there are 26 other (EU countries). This has to be done step by step"
16 EU member states have today declared their support for defending LGBT rights. Though the letter below does not mention Hungary by name.
Rutte: "the long-term aim is to bring Hungary to its knees on this...They must realise they are part of the EU & this community of values, which means in Hungary...no one can be discriminated against & can feel free on grounds of sexuality, skin color, gender whatever"
Luxembourg's gay PM Bettel on the law: "I didn't get up one morning after having seen an advert on the TV of some brand... and say 'I'm gay'. That's not how life works. It's in me, I didn't chose it. And to accept oneself is hard enough. To be stigmatised too-that's too much."
I don't like the "bring Hungary to its knees" comments - but I find it very hard to disagree with anything Rutte's said here and it would also apply to Poland - and, in my view, it should also apply to other fundamentals such as the indepdendence of the judiciary and the freedom of the press.
Having said that I'm not sure - on a purely technical, legal basis - how this would work or what usefully can be done next.
I also wish this wasn't being presented as being against Hungary, and there was some way of showing solidarity with Hungarian liberals/opposition?
I dunno, maybe it could be read that way for Hungarians? Better not vote for the current nutters if they wish to remain in Europe.
Really don't know how the EU could manage this though with vetos et al in place and there being several who see things Hungary's way.
Quote from: Tyr on June 24, 2021, 11:09:13 AM
I dunno, maybe it could be read that way for Hungarians? Better not vote for the current nutters if they wish to remain in Europe.
Yeah I don't know, I worry that type of messaging works - too easy for Orban to generate an us v them view and it may be that a majority supports these measures in Hungary and a reasonably big minority in the rest of Europe that support them.
The video of Bettel is actually quite moving:
https://twitter.com/NaomiOhReally/status/1408003274356183041?s=20
Edit: I also slightly worry about needing to make clear that there's more to Hungary than Orban and his government, just like there's more to Russia than Putin or China than Xi or the UK than Johnson. And it's possible to really like Hungary etc even if you're opposing their government (I think about this a lot with coverage of Russia and China - I hate it when you get the sense that the reporter just doesn't like the country).
Edit: Obviously - practically I have no idea how to do that.
QuoteYeah I don't know, I worry that type of messaging works - too easy for Orban to generate an us v them view and it may be that a majority supports these measures in Hungary and a reasonably big minority in the rest of Europe that support them.
That seems fair enough to me though. If they decide despite the warning it means leaving the EU they still support this then thats them out of the EU.
If they change course then thats grand too.
Aaah, Rutte once again showing the refinement of Dutch diplomacy... :P
:lol: Fair comment.
Quote from: The Larch on June 24, 2021, 11:26:44 AM
Aaah, Rutte once again showing the refinement of Dutch diplomacy... :P
Good cop, bad cop is something that works.
Sometimes you have to have the real talk and then you get back to "looking for alignment" and smoothing things over.
It seems like the EUCO was quite explosive on the Franco-German proposal and other members successfully pushed back and ended up with a more hard-line statement - which is probably good at least until it moves from being a Franco-German proposal to something with buy in from the countries bordering Russia:
Quote
EU leaders take hard line on Russia, rebuking Merkel and Macron
Poland and the Baltics lead effort to thwart German-French initiative.
By David M. Herszenhorn and Jacopo Barigazzi
June 24, 2021 10:52 pm
EU leaders early Friday adopted a hardline stance toward Russia — but only after Poland and the Baltic countries took their own hardline stance toward Germany and France and torpedoed a proposal by the bloc's biggest powers to seek a summit with President Vladimir Putin.
The 27 heads of state and government adopted their tough conclusions on Russia at around 2 a.m. following a protracted and, at times, heated debate. The final result was remarkably humbling, if not utterly humiliating, for German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron, who normally exert the greatest sway in discussions around the European Council table.
Rather than endorsing the language proposed by Germany and France that would have floated the idea of "meetings at leaders level," akin to the one held by U.S. President Joe Biden with Putin in Geneva last week, the Council approved a statement focused on setting expectations and demands for the Kremlin, which would be a prerequisite for new diplomatic engagement. The Council also threatened new economic sanctions should Moscow persist in "malign, illegal and disruptive activity."
"The European Council expects the Russian leadership to demonstrate a more constructive engagement and political commitment and stop actions against the EU and its Member States, as well as against third countries," the leaders wrote in their conclusions.
The Council demanded that Russia "fully assume its responsibility" in ensuring the implementation of the Minsk 2 peace agreement to end the conflict in eastern Ukraine, and the leaders reiterated their support for pursuing "accountability" in the destruction of a Malaysian passenger jet that was shot down in 2014 with a Russian missile.
Rather than floating the idea of a high-level summit meeting, the leaders called on the European Commission and the EU's foreign policy chief to develop "concrete options including conditionalities and leverages" for further cooperation with Russia in various policy areas. "The European Council will explore formats and conditionalities of dialogue with Russia," they wrote.
Merkel, speaking to reporters at the end of the long night, bluntly conceded defeat, though she also made an implicit accusation that other leaders were not brave enough to back the summit proposal. "I personally would have wished for a more courageous step but this is also OK and we'll keep working," she said.
While the result marked a stunning victory over Germany and France by countries along the Russian border, the whole situation was a rather embarrassing episode for the EU, as deep divisions over relations with Russia burst into public view.
The summit, unexpectedly, turned out to be one of the most divisive gatherings of EU leaders in recent memory, as the Russia debate and another heated discussion, over Hungary's controversial anti-gay legislation, exposed deep rifts, roughly drawn between eastern and western countries.
Speaking to journalists after the meeting, Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo denied the discussion was West vs. East, noting that some Baltics and Eastern European countries supported the criticism of Budapest. And he added that now, "it's the first time there was really such an open almost confrontation between the large majority of the room with one member state."
However, in a sign of how fractious the debate over Russia had been, Council President Charles Michel canceled a planned late-night news conference with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.
Merkel-Macron mystery
Merkel and Macron offered little explanation or justification for pushing the softer approach toward Putin just a day before the Council meeting, and their surprise effort clearly infuriated other leaders, who said there was no reason to ease any diplomatic pressure on Moscow.
A sense of competition with Biden seemed to be one factor, with Merkel insisting in a speech to the Bundestag on Thursday morning that if the U.S. president could hold a meeting with Putin, there was no reason EU leaders shouldn't do the same.
Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda described the leaders' discussion as "tough" and said he was not persuaded that the EU should change its tough stance toward Moscow.
"It's too early because we so far don't see any radical changes of behavior," Nausėda said, adding that meeting Putin without preconditions "would be a very wrong signal."
Several critics of the German-French plan said they did not understand why Merkel and Macron had rushed ahead rather than waiting to see if Putin responds positively to Biden's suggestions of cooperation in some policy areas.
The reference in the leaders' conclusions to "third countries" and another reference to "ensuring coordination with partners" seemed to be nods to the U.S. and Biden's efforts to shift the dynamic between Russia and the West.
In response to a query from POLITICO, a U.S. State Department spokesperson on Thursday night suggested it would make sense to give Putin some time to respond to areas of potential cooperation that Biden identified during their conversation in Geneva.
"The United States has been clear that we and our partners must be prepared to continue to impose costs when Russia's behavior crosses boundaries that are respected by responsible nations. Our goal is to have a relationship with Russia that is predictable and stable," the spokesperson said. "There was a lot of ground covered at the June 16 Summit with Putin, but it is going to take some time to see if the areas of potential cooperation actually produce results."
The debate among EU leaders was difficult and at time impassioned.
But the EU countries located closest to Russia — such as Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania — ultimately succeeded not just in resisting heavy pressure from the EU's biggest and wealthiest powers but also in pushing their own stronger language setting demands for Moscow.
In a sign of the depth of their anger, they publicly lambasted the German-French plan on their way into the summit.
"Starting any direct dialogue on the highest political level is only possible in a situation where there's an actual de-escalation and actual withdrawal from the aggressive politics," Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki said.
"It's an unequivocal situation for us. When we see hybrid attacks on our neighbors, on us," he continued, "it's difficult to start a dialogue on the highest level."
However, the disagreements were far deeper than a simple yes-no debate. Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte took a middle tack, saying it was fine for the EU institutions to pursue a meeting with Putin but he himself wanted nothing to do with it.
"I don't mind a meeting with Vladimir Putin by the two presidents," Rutte said, referring to Council chief Michel and Commission President von der Leyen. But Rutte added, "I will not participate in a meeting with Vladimir Putin myself."
Meanwhile, countries that have long favored a conciliatory approach toward the Kremlin, including some with historic economic ties and a soft spot for Russian oligarchs and their money, cheered the German-French proposal.
"I'm very happy that there's finally movement in the direction of a dialogue with Russia," Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz told reporters.
This article has been updated.
Hans von der Burchard, Rym Momtaz, Marina Adami, Lili Bayer, Zosia Wanat and Andrew Gray contributed reporting.
In terms of motivations I found this bit from Macron (in another article), plus Merkel's comments possibly revealing:
Quote"The aberration is that we are today the power that is the harshest with Russia, but they are our neighbors," Macron said. "We saw it a few weeks ago, President Biden met with President Putin, I said it to my friends around the table 'he didn't ask you for your opinion, and you, you watch him have a summit and it doesn't shock you?'"
I feel like, as with the Chinese deal, there is a general European desire for more strategic autonomy and it feels like Macron and Merkel are perhaps emphasisng to much the need for autonomous action without - from where I'm sitting - thinking too much about the strategic bit. Aside from showing that they are an actor independent of or sort of equal to the US - I can't really see what they are aiming to get out of this - but part of that is because they haven't consulted and explained it to other EU member states. I feel like that drove the strength of pushback.
Also I saw this from Toomas Ilves who is a liberal pro-European Estonian former foreign minister and President. I've never seen him post something like this before and I think it really underlies the depth of feeling in CEE, I think primarily at the lack of consultation or involvement - like they're still New Europe who should shut up and do as they're told: "Without even talking to other EU countries. Exactly like their forebears. I say that knowing full well what I say. We do not matter. Expendable. Worse, they actually believe they know better." He has since deleted the tweets but basically said CEE was still being treated on this as an "in between place", as opposed, I imagine, to core parts of Europe/the EU. It is striking from the UK that in relation to Brexit, Ireland was rightly central in developing EU priorities and policy on Brexit, while it's clear that states bordering Russia do not feel as central when it comes to Russia policy - it feels like a mistake.
Quote from: Sheilbh on May 25, 2021, 03:51:09 AM
Don't have a French thread - maybe we should in the run-up to the election? :hmm:
No one can stop the macrononi.
Quote from: alfred russel on June 25, 2021, 04:18:19 PM
Quote from: Sheilbh on May 25, 2021, 03:51:09 AM
Don't have a French thread - maybe we should in the run-up to the election? :hmm:
No one can stop the macrononi.
I'll set up tomorrow a poll about regional elections, before that.
The French voting system is tragically flawed for this precise moment. Le Pen is leading in a bunch of polls and seems destined to be first or second with her consistent 25-30% of voters, while Macron may be unpopular overall but has a base level of support. In an open field the power of the incumbency should go far. Of course anyone who is up against Le Pen in Round 2 will be a prohibitive favorite.
A ton can happen in the next year and I certainly wouldn't say that is a lock to happen, but it seems the most likely way for things to play out.
It's a problem yes. But it beats the norm where getting 30% can give you overall victory.
Quote from: alfred russel on June 25, 2021, 06:37:32 PM
The French voting system is tragically flawed for this precise moment. Le Pen is leading in a bunch of polls and seems destined to be first or second with her consistent 25-30% of voters, while Macron may be unpopular overall but has a base level of support. In an open field the power of the incumbency should go far. Of course anyone who is up against Le Pen in Round 2 will be a prohibitive favorite.
A ton can happen in the next year and I certainly wouldn't say that is a lock to happen, but it seems the most likely way for things to play out.
Not sure I follow.
The tragic flaw in the French system is that a neo-Nazi with 25% support can't win the presidency?
Quote from: Admiral Yi on June 26, 2021, 01:10:23 AM
Quote from: alfred russel on June 25, 2021, 06:37:32 PM
The French voting system is tragically flawed for this precise moment. Le Pen is leading in a bunch of polls and seems destined to be first or second with her consistent 25-30% of voters, while Macron may be unpopular overall but has a base level of support. In an open field the power of the incumbency should go far. Of course anyone who is up against Le Pen in Round 2 will be a prohibitive favorite.
A ton can happen in the next year and I certainly wouldn't say that is a lock to happen, but it seems the most likely way for things to play out.
Not sure I follow.
The tragic flaw in the French system is that a neo-Nazi with 25% support can't win the presidency?
No--the tragic flaw is that a neo-Nazi with 25% support kind of makes the election of limited value. The neo nazi can't win because a core 25% support can't get a majority when the other 75% hates neo-Naziism--and apart from neo Naziism being bad it is a terrible outcome for democracy for a president to be elected that 75% of the electorate hates. That is good.
The problem is that in a diverse political environment like France the other candidate (the non-Nazi) that can approach 25% is going to be elected president. Macron has an approval rating in the upper 30s and a disapproval around 60. He is unpopular. But he has the power of the incumbency, and is just popular enough he will probably get that spot in the second round. He beat Le Pen by ~30% last time and probably will again. But he'd probably lose to a number of other figures in the second round if they are his opponent other than Le Pen.
Quote from: alfred russel on June 26, 2021, 07:24:10 AM
The problem is that in a diverse political environment like France the other candidate (the non-Nazi) that can approach 25% is going to be elected president. Macron has an approval rating in the upper 30s and a disapproval around 60. He is unpopular. But he has the power of the incumbency, and is just popular enough he will probably get that spot in the second round. He beat Le Pen by ~30% last time and probably will again. But he'd probably lose to a number of other figures in the second round if they are his opponent other than Le Pen.
I'm not 100% sure Macron gets through - I think there's interesting stuff happening on the right if they can manage to coalesce in some way (which is probably unlikely).
But even then I'd be astonished if Macron won by 30% again. For the last year basically the polls have floated around 55%/45%.
In part that's because of the mainstreaming of Le Pen (helped by Macron who almost appears to be trying to outflank her on "Islamic separatism", support for the police etc). But also voters from other parties appear to be less willing to switch to Macron so it's likely that more voters of the right (if they don't go through) will break more evenly and more on the left will abstain. Macron will still win but I think it's a different situation than in 2017.
But I think it all sort of feeds into each other. So the political fragmentation - especially with a Presidential model - means that fewer candidates can approach that 25%, but it also, I suspect, leads to increased tiredness/exhaustion around the political system which is dissatisfying, prompting further support for Le Pen.
Although the regional elections do who the right doing well and the left surviving in some way if they could just form a front of some sort :weep:
Quote from: alfred russel on June 26, 2021, 07:24:10 AM
No--the tragic flaw is that a neo-Nazi with 25% support kind of makes the election of limited value. The neo nazi can't win because a core 25% support can't get a majority when the other 75% hates neo-Naziism--and apart from neo Naziism being bad it is a terrible outcome for democracy for a president to be elected that 75% of the electorate hates. That is good.
The problem is that in a diverse political environment like France the other candidate (the non-Nazi) that can approach 25% is going to be elected president. Macron has an approval rating in the upper 30s and a disapproval around 60. He is unpopular. But he has the power of the incumbency, and is just popular enough he will probably get that spot in the second round. He beat Le Pen by ~30% last time and probably will again. But he'd probably lose to a number of other figures in the second round if they are his opponent other than Le Pen.
OK, I get you.
But so what if Macron wins big with crummy approval ratings. If someone else had higher ratings they would face Frau Le Pen in the second round, not Macron.
He's got pretty decent approval ratings for a French President in 4 years of their term :lol:
Quote from: Sheilbh on June 26, 2021, 07:50:51 AM
But even then I'd be astonished if Macron won by 30% again. For the last year basically the polls have floated around 55%/45%.
In part that's because of the mainstreaming of Le Pen (helped by Macron who almost appears to be trying to outflank her on "Islamic separatism", support for the police etc).
I agree on this...I was skipping past it because it opens up a lot of other questions, and the exact amount of the landslide is kind of irrelevant.
Other questions:
-can Le Pen hold her support as she mainstreams? Or will it fracture to alternatives on the far right? (which could knock her out of round 1)
-would her platform be viable if it didn't have the Le Pen brand associated to it?
Quote from: Sheilbh on June 26, 2021, 08:03:27 AM
He's got pretty decent approval ratings for a French President in 4 years of their term :lol:
Decent? He beat Hollande's impopularity records. :lol: Yellow vests, remember? Getting slapped? :D
As for Marine as neo-nazi, that's ridiculous.
Quote from: Admiral Yi on June 26, 2021, 08:01:54 AM
OK, I get you.
But so what if Macron wins big with crummy approval ratings. If someone else had higher ratings they would face Frau Le Pen in the second round, not Macron.
It is a flaw in the system that super polarizing figures have an advantage in round 1. If you end up with a landslide because you have two candidates:
#1: 35% loves, 65% hates,
#2: 25% loves, 75% despises,
The system doesn't seem to be great.
If candidate #1 was more like 50-50 on the love hate spectrum that would be a better outcome, but the system is unchanged. This isn't just a problem with France: look at the recent elections in Peru, with a similar system. You ended up with basically a fascist versus a marxist in round 2.
Quote from: Duque de Bragança on June 26, 2021, 08:09:50 AM
As for Marine as neo-nazi, that's ridiculous.
Neo Nazi is a lot easier to type than anti-immigrant anti-EU populist authoritarian right winger
Quote from: alfred russel on June 26, 2021, 08:12:41 AM
It is a flaw in the system that super polarizing figures have an advantage in round 1. If you end up with a landslide because you have two candidates:
#1: 35% loves, 65% hates,
#2: 25% loves, 75% despises,
The system doesn't seem to be great.
If candidate #1 was more like 50-50 on the love hate spectrum that would be a better outcome, but the system is unchanged. This isn't just a problem with France: look at the recent elections in Peru, with a similar system. You ended up with basically a fascist versus a marxist in round 2.
My takeaway from this is France is an ungovernable country because it's full of haters. As I said before, if there was someone with higher approval than Macron he or she would get into the second round.
Also don't see how Peru works in support of your argument because you switched from unpopularity to polarization. Macron still inhabits the broadly defined center.
Quote from: Admiral Yi on June 26, 2021, 08:16:35 AM
Quote from: Duque de Bragança on June 26, 2021, 08:09:50 AM
As for Marine as neo-nazi, that's ridiculous.
Neo Nazi is a lot easier to type than anti-immigrant anti-EU populist authoritarian right winger
Lazyness is still ridiculous.
Anti-islamist would be more accurate than anti-immigrant. Latest trend among French islamo-leftists is to blame European immigrants for the RN vote. Specially after some kind of sporting event, truth be said. :D
As for authoritarian, or even populist, fits Macron as well.
Demagogue would fit both, also.
Marine's program in 2017 read like a '70s left-wing party back to the future trip.
Quote from: Admiral Yi on June 26, 2021, 08:21:03 AM
My takeaway from this is France is an ungovernable country because it's full of haters. As I said before, if there was someone with higher approval than Macron he or she would get into the second round.
Also don't see how Peru works in support of your argument because you switched from unpopularity to polarization. Macron still inhabits the broadly defined center.
I didn't switch from unpopularity to polarization. Macron is polarizing not because he is an extremist but because he is an incumbent.
It is really hard to speak with certainty on what will happen in an election a year away. I'm talking like it is certain that Macron and Le Pen will face off in round 2 but obviously that may not happen. That said, if the election was in the coming months, I would guess that both Macron and Le Pen would get through despite both having net approval ratings lower than at least one candidate that didn't.
Quote from: alfred russel on June 26, 2021, 08:06:29 AMI agree on this...I was skipping past it because it opens up a lot of other questions, and the exact amount of the landslide is kind of irrelevant.
Other questions:
-can Le Pen hold her support as she mainstreams? Or will it fracture to alternatives on the far right? (which could knock her out of round 1)
Yes - but also the opposite. Is the presence of alternatives on the far-right a factor in the perceived "moderation"/mainstreamining of Le Pen?
So Eric Zemmour's shadow campaign - which as Ben Judah put it raises the question of whether "by running as a French nationalist Jew on a more extreme anti-EU and anti-Islam agenda he is making Le Pen look moderate." Even if he doesn't stand - which would likely stop the far-right fracturing he may have presented a stark enough contrast that benefits Le Pen anyway - and when he's included in the polls he does quite well (with the occasional appearance of Marion Marechal Le Pen at his events).
Quote-would her platform be viable if it didn't have the Le Pen brand associated to it?
I don't think so, personally - although maybe that'll change. The regionals were disappointing for RN but they will possibly have their first regional President (I think) in the South. I always think holding actual power is a really good base for someone to build a brand and that may further legitimise them but also maybe it'll move more attention to him - perhaps it's interesting that the Le Pens didn't run, so far as I'm aware, at all in this round of regional elections - maybe because they knew it would go well or maybe to build more of a sense that there is a party beyond their personal campaigns.
QuoteDecent? He beat Hollande's impopularity records. :lol: Yellow vests, remember? Getting slapped? :D
Macron's approval rating is floating around 40-50%. In year 4 Hollande's was at 15%, Sarko was at around 30%. Chirac was more popular at this point in his first term (obviously the change in term length will make comparisons tougher if Macron wins a second terms because he'll be almost unprecedented) - but Macron's approval is around the level of Mitterand.
If, after four years, your numbers are closer to Mitterand or Chirac's than Hollande or Sarko's, then I think it's fair to say that's pretty decent.
Oh, Éric Zemmour. Languish will love him. French souverainist North African Barbarian Jew (not Sepharadi sorry clueless Ashkenazis).
I loved his defense of George Marchais, former PCF leader from the '70s to the early '90s, as the last Gaullist. :D
A well-known polemicist, hated by the post-modern left, but the only way to prevent Marine from reaching the run-off by Macron's clique.
Quote from: alfred russel on June 26, 2021, 08:28:26 AM
I didn't switch from unpopularity to polarization. Macron is polarizing not because he is an extremist but because he is an incumbent.
Also his attitude and his political style - there are ways he reminds me a lot of Blair who was on the centre left but similarly polarising.
Where someone is on left to right doesn't tell you anything about what they're like as a politician or how they'll govern/behave or whether they're establishment/technocratic/populist etc. It just, at best, sort of gives an indication of some of their views maybe.
QuoteIt is really hard to speak with certainty on what will happen in an election a year away. I'm talking like it is certain that Macron and Le Pen will face off in round 2 but obviously that may not happen. That said, if the election was in the coming months, I would guess that both Macron and Le Pen would get through despite both having net approval ratings lower than at least one candidate that didn't.
Agreed I think France and the UK have consistently negative approval ratings for most politicans. Unlike the US and maybe other, more rational countries - so I think Boris Johnson had a net positive approval rating (or it may have been "is doing a good job") at one point during the pandemic but it was the first time any prime minister had one since Gordon Brown at the height of the financial crisis. So I think in the UK and France the default is generally between two unpopular options.
I really hope the French right have a long look at Bertrand given that he seems to poll quite well and he seems to have done a decent jobs in Hauts-de-France based on the election results, particularly in what I think was a strong area for the RN/FN. I think he is probably the one non-Macron/Le Pen candidate who I suspect has the best chance of getting into the second round.
Quote from: Sheilbh on June 26, 2021, 08:32:08 AM
Macron's approval rating is floating around 40-50%. In year 4 Hollande's was at 15%, Sarko was at around 30%. Chirac was more popular at this point in his first term (obviously the change in term length will make comparisons tougher if Macron wins a second terms because he'll be almost unprecedented) - but Macron's approval is around the level of Mitterand.
If, after four years, your numbers are closer to Mitterand or Chirac's than Hollande or Sarko's, then I think it's fair to say that's pretty decent.
You can see his polls here. I think the Macrononi is a bit lower than that--especially if you consider the Harris polls to be outliers.
That said...Hollandaise and Sarko were notably unpopular in my opinion, but I will concede that if i'm saying the last 3 dudes were exceptional that becomes very tough to distinguish from a national characteristic. :P
Quote from: alfred russel on June 26, 2021, 08:48:59 AM
You can see his polls here. I think the Macrononi is a bit lower than that--especially if you consider the Harris polls to be outliers.
That said...Hollandaise and Sarko were notably unpopular in my opinion, but I will concede that if i'm saying the last 3 dudes were exceptional that becomes very tough to distinguish from a national characteristic. :P
:lol:
I think the French are perhaps unique in this. I don't know if they're more miserable/cynical or just like to tell pollsters they are. But I think they're the only country in Europe that thinks the UK "won" Brexit (including the UK!). They always top the global comparison polls in terms of saying their country is on "the wrong track" - but I strongly suspect that while they might think France is awful, everywhere else is worse.
I think that applies to presidential polling (and everything else). So we should stop asking the French if they think something's good or bad and just ask, in a list of awful things, what do they think is most/least awful :lol:
Quote from: alfred russel on June 26, 2021, 08:48:59 AM
Quote from: Sheilbh on June 26, 2021, 08:32:08 AM
Macron's approval rating is floating around 40-50%. In year 4 Hollande's was at 15%, Sarko was at around 30%. Chirac was more popular at this point in his first term (obviously the change in term length will make comparisons tougher if Macron wins a second terms because he'll be almost unprecedented) - but Macron's approval is around the level of Mitterand.
If, after four years, your numbers are closer to Mitterand or Chirac's than Hollande or Sarko's, then I think it's fair to say that's pretty decent.
You can see his polls here. I think the Macrononi is a bit lower than that--especially if you consider the Harris polls to be outliers.
That said...Hollandaise and Sarko were notably unpopular in my opinion, but I will concede that if i'm saying the last 3 dudes were exceptional that becomes very tough to distinguish from a national characteristic. :P
Sarkozy was not more unpopular than Chirac.
Chirac only became popular after 2007, when he quit the French presidency.
Quote from: Duque de Bragança on June 26, 2021, 08:55:50 AMSarkozy was not more unpopular than Chirac.
Chirac only became popular after 2007, when he quit the French presidency.
Chirac consistently had approval ratings somewhere in the range of 40-60% after 97 through to 2002. I don't think Sarko got to those levels after the first year or two.
Quote from: Sheilbh on June 26, 2021, 09:42:56 AM
Quote from: Duque de Bragança on June 26, 2021, 08:55:50 AMSarkozy was not more unpopular than Chirac.
Chirac only became popular after 2007, when he quit the French presidency.
Chirac consistently had approval ratings somewhere in the range of 40-60% after 97 through to 2002. I don't think Sarko got to those levels after the first year or two.
Between 97 and 2002, that was cohabitation government, remember? He did not do much, and yes he was pretty good at it.
Right but it's the analogous period with the Sarko comparison (and the Macron comparison), no? They're all about approval/popularity in the first term after the initial honeymoon.
Chirac's popularity went down pretty quickly with massive transportation strikes in the early autumn of 95, about pension reform.
Popularity came with les Bleus' victory in '98, which he had no part in it, and opposition to the Iraq War, in 2003.
Sure political circumstances change and the popularity of political actors depend on how they respond or capture them. There's no direct like for like but we can compare in a "at this time in their Presidency" way.
So it's wrong to say that Sarko was more popular than Chirac or that Chirac only became popular post-retirement. Maybe that's because Sarko was dealt a more difficult hand, maybe it's because he played far less effectively - I've got no idea on the balance of circumstances v action, but I don't necessarily think that's very important either.
Sarko had quite a honeymoon in the beginning. Things went out of control with the Kadhafi sequence, yet Sarko managed to pass a few reforms, unlike Chirac.
Chirac, who died some time ago, is more popular now than Sarko, still alive, OTOH.
French politics thread here, just in case, for more details:
http://languish.org/forums/index.php/topic,16371.0.html (http://languish.org/forums/index.php/topic,16371.0.html)
Chirac was tall though; good French presidents are tall, the little ones fail ;)
I mean Mitterrand was 5'6
Go to the Refractory Gauls thread if you want to discuss tall presidents and/or political dwarves (?). :contract:
Quote from: alfred russel on June 26, 2021, 08:12:41 AM
Quote from: Admiral Yi on June 26, 2021, 08:01:54 AM
OK, I get you.
But so what if Macron wins big with crummy approval ratings. If someone else had higher ratings they would face Frau Le Pen in the second round, not Macron.
It is a flaw in the system that super polarizing figures have an advantage in round 1. If you end up with a landslide because you have two candidates:
#1: 35% loves, 65% hates,
#2: 25% loves, 75% despises,
The system doesn't seem to be great.
If candidate #1 was more like 50-50 on the love hate spectrum that would be a better outcome, but the system is unchanged. This isn't just a problem with France: look at the recent elections in Peru, with a similar system. You ended up with basically a fascist versus a marxist in round 2.
It's not the ideal system no. AV would be much better.
But compared to simple FPTP? It does at least have a small safety measure in place.
In the future we will probably be able to assemble a president from parts from the candidates, a respective percentage of each candidate.
Quote from: Duque de Bragança on June 26, 2021, 08:23:53 AM
Marine's program in 2017 read like a '70s left-wing party back to the future trip.
She is using her father's racist cred...it allows her to moderate the party's platform while keeping the voters (at least for now).
Wonder if it opens the door in the event someone like Mélenchon gets to round 2.
I thought this was a really interesting piece - I still don't generally agree with him but very interesting and I think perceptive takes on some points:
QuoteThe world according to Wolfgang Schäuble
President of German parliament says his country shouldn't lecture its eastern neighbors.
By Matthew Karnitschnig
June 24, 2021 10:26 pm
BERLIN — Germany needs to start showing Central and Eastern Europe more respect, and stop all the lecturing and acting as if it were the Continent's know-it-all.
The view from Budapest? Warsaw? Guess again.
"Why do Germans think they can teach Poles what democracy is?" Wolfgang Schäuble, the president of the German parliament, asks in his office overlooking the Bundestag's giant lawn, before extolling the "courage and tenacity" of Central Europe's people. "Think of Vaclav Havel!"
If it weren't for the Poles, Hungarians, Czechs, Slovaks, etc. "none of it would have been possible," he added, jabbing his index finger into the air.
By "it," Schäuble means not just the end of communism in Europe but also German reunification and the decades of peace and prosperity the region has enjoyed (notwithstanding a few bumps in the road) ever since.
So what about the rule of law being under threat in the here and now?
"It's completely legitimate to have differences of opinion," he said. "When I meet [Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor] Orbán, I tell him exactly what I think he's doing wrong."
In the end, it's up to the European courts to decide where the boundaries are, even when it comes to Germany, he added.
At a time when much of Central Europe is on Europe's naughty step for flouting democratic norms, attacking the LGBTQ+ community and generally undermining the progressive image the EU tries to project to the rest of the world, Schäuble's agree-to-disagree vibe towards the East might strike some as a bit out of touch. Yet in his world, the growing East-West divide represents a greater danger to Europe's future than anything happening in an individual member state.
"We need to change the attitude in Europe that everyone thinks he's is something better and the others are not so great," he said.
Anyone who remembers Schäuble as the bête noir of Greece and the eurozone's other fiscal delinquents during the debt crisis that nearly sank the common currency a decade ago might ask if he is now playing the pot or the kettle. Back then, as German finance minister, he was vilified across southern Europe as the quintessential tight-fisted, arrogant kraut. He even served as the Greek far left's poster boy in its successful 2015 referendum campaign to reject the terms of Greece's bailout.
But then, as now, Schäuble's actions were born of a noble impulse (at least in his own mind) — to protect and preserve Europe.
A deep sense of purpose
Whatever one thinks of Schäuble — and he has many critics both inside and outside Germany — few would dispute that the best way to describe him is duty-bound.
He has served uninterrupted as an MP since 1972, making him by far the longest-serving member of the Bundestag. Not even an assassin's bullet — fired by a mentally ill man on the campaign trail in 1990 — managed to halt his career. Though he's been in a wheelchair ever since, the attempt on his life appeared to only deepen his sense of purpose.
After the assassination attempt, Schäuble, who like many of his colleagues studied law, managed the reunification of West and East Germany, led various ministries and even served as leader of his party, the Christian Democrats (CDU). Many saw him as Helmut Kohl's crown prince. But whatever dreams Schäuble had of becoming chancellor were shattered by a party financing scandal that forced him to step down as CDU leader in 2000. He was succeeded by an ambitious up-and-comer named Angela Merkel.
Despite repeated clashes with Merkel over everything from whether to usher Greece out of the euro to refugee policy, Schäuble has remained loyal.
That devotion hasn't always been reciprocated. Merkel denied Schäuble his dream of becoming German president, repeatedly passing him over. Then, in 2017, she asked him to trade in his finance ministry job to become president of the Bundestag. Though the second-highest office in the land in terms of protocol (after the president), it's a largely administrative role that involves acting as parliament's chief referee.
Nonetheless, thanks to his stature, Schäuble has lent the office new prestige. He has also managed to curb the antics of the far-right Alternative for Germany, currently the largest opposition group in the Bundestag.
He has remained active in the CDU's internal politics too. After failing to install his one-time protégé, Friedrich Merz, as party leader this year, Schäuble went to battle for the man who won — Armin Laschet — helping him secure the conservative bloc's nomination for chancellor against a challenge from the leader of the CDU's Bavarian sister party.
Even if Schäuble embodies the proverbial good soldier in deed, he doesn't shy from telling the world how he really feels.
During the interview in his vast receiving room, decorated with the replica of a large eagle sculpture that once adorned the German Kaiser's palace, he took aim at Europe's migration policy, saying both the European Commission and member states had fallen short. Europe needs to be more flexible in its approach to the realities in individual member states, he argued, especially when it comes to rejecting certain ethnic or religious groups.
"If someone says, 'in the tradition of our country it is difficult to explain to our population that we're going to take in large numbers of Muslims, or people from Muslim countries,' one should say, 'Ok, then let's talk about how else you can contribute,'" Schäuble said.
He also reiterated his concern over how member states planned to spend the money they receive from the EU's pandemic recovery fund.
"If we use these €750 billion to plug holes in budgets instead of for investments in the future, then it won't make any difference," he warned.
Though often caricatured as the eurozone's "Dr. No" during the debt crisis, Schäuble, unlike many in his party, never ruled out issuing common debt per se, but only for as long as there isn't a common economic and fiscal policy along with adequate enforcement to ensure that countries don't spend beyond their means.
"I support more Europe, but then we have to give Europe the necessary powers," he said.
But given that such a Europe would require member states to relinquish their most potent remaining influence — the power of the purse — Schäuble's dream scenario is unlikely to be realized anytime soon.
Even so, Schäuble expressed optimism about Europe's future and welcomed the normalization of relations with the United States under President Joe Biden. He signaled support for a harder line against China than that voiced by either Merkel or Laschet.
"No one should try to rule the world," he said, saying that China needed to stick to its international agreements. "America needs more European partnership and when the Americans are right, they're right."
Schäuble is bound to make his outspoken voice heard on China, Europe and a number of other issues in years to come. His name will once again top the ballot of his home constituency in southwest Germany in September's general election.
Though more popular than ever in Germany, Schäuble was coy about whether he intended to remain president of the Bundestag, saying only: "I enjoy the work."
The couple of things that struck me as interesting were around the "lecturing" of CEE states - and I wonder if there is something to it, but not necessarily in the way that he describes. What I slightly wonder is whether the European model and vision of democratic transition is perhaps shaped by the extraordinary German transition (twice) - but that was extraordinary in both cases. I wonder if we maybe should have paid more attention to the specific circumstances of CEE during their transition and joining Europe?
Similarly which is linked to the Russia thing I do think Europe needs to be closer to and almost let CEE lead policy on Russia - again the example of Ireland sticks out, but also I was thinking of the way France and Greece have become such close allies in the Eastern Mediterranean. I think that sort of leading Europe from the peripheries is perhaps a better model - of going to where the issue is most acute and other states working with the most affected states to develop a common policy rather than the traditional Franco-German motor?
The other point was I just don't think his comment on immigration works if we are accepting as an idea that Muslims are European and will become European citizens - they will be German and French and Belgian. If countries in Europe has an issue with immigration on that ground, I don't see how that can sit alongside the reality of modern Europe :hmm:
Quote from: Sheilbh on June 29, 2021, 09:52:21 AM
The other point was I just don't think his comment on immigration works if we are accepting as an idea that Muslims are European and will become European citizens - they will be German and French and Belgian. If countries in Europe has an issue with immigration on that ground, I don't see how that can sit alongside the reality of modern Europe :hmm:
Fiscal delinquents? I hope they use that kind of language against illegal migrants. :P
I will pass on Schäuble's Stasi 2.0 background for once.
:secret:
Muslims should also accept the idea that being European means duties as well, not just rights. If the country they live in has an assimilationist policy, if they disagree, then they should reconsider their whole migration project, or get a different one.
I think this is the most interesting and convincing case for the EU's approach on China - I'm not sure how much I agree with it, but I think this is possibly the best (and most upbeat explanation):
QuoteSurprise! The EU knows how to handle China
Brussels is ahead of Washington when it comes to dealing with Beijing.
CHINA-POLITICS-CONGRESS
China's President Xi Jinping, center, fought hard to take the EU deal over the line | Noel Celis/AFP via Getty Images
By Bruno Maçães
June 22, 2021 4:03 am
"Do we need a new adversary?" With those words, Armin Laschet summed up the European response to Joe Biden's efforts to convince Europeans to get tougher on China.
As the politician best placed to become the next German chancellor, Laschet's open rebuke of the U.S. president was the latest example in a series of polite disagreements between the two pillars of the transatlantic alliance over how to deal with the rising Asian superpower.
What's usually overlooked, however, especially in Washington, is that the Europeans aren't reluctant to get on board with Biden's efforts because they don't want to confront China. They're cold on the idea because they have a plan of their own — and so far, it's working.
The plan was first devised a little over two years ago, at a time when Trump's America had turned its back on its European partners. As described by a senior official in Brussels, the decision to call China a "systemic rival" in March 2019 was everything that the EU's foreign policy strives to be, almost always unsuccessfully.
The European Council had given the European Commission and the European External Action Service a mandate to come up with a new China strategy. And the two institutions took full advantage of it, drafting a bold document that never traveled to national capitals for assent.
I was living in Beijing at the time and can attest to how much the term riled and confused Chinese officials. And that initial salvo was not an isolated move. One month later, the EU issued Beijing with an ultimatum, calling on it to conclude negotiations on the China-Europe investment agreement, known as CAI, by the end of 2020.
Those negotiations had been dragging on for five years. Brussels wanted results.
To this day, the logic behind these moves remains poorly understood. As one person closely involved in the 2019 deliberations explained this week, the words "systemic rival" were meant to denote something very different from the formulation used in Washington: "strategic rival."
With the notion of systemic rivalry, the European Union hoped to separate political differences and economic links. In strategic rivalry, conflict leads. In systemic rivalry, conflict is limited to the political sphere. It is part of the EU's political tradition to believe that politics and the economy can be insulated from each other. Even inside the bloc, political differences with Poland and Hungary are not allowed to interfere with the single market.
Performing the same trick with China is far more difficult, but the Commission has been busy putting the plan in practice. Over the past two years, it approved a barrage of new regulations limiting the Chinese state's ability to interfere with the framework of economic links between the two blocs. These include investment screening, trade defense instruments, a package against state subsidies and a public procurement tool.
At the same time, Brussels — with a push from German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who renewed the ultimatum in June 2020 — moved forward with negotiations on the CAI, finally agreed on by both sides in December. The senior official in the Commission, who requested to remain anonymous in order to speak freely, described China's assent to the agreement as "a gift from Beijing."
The deal included significant concessions from Beijing, including a greater level of market access and disciplines on state-owned enterprises, transparency of subsidies and rules prohibiting forced technology transfer. "By giving us a big gift, they hoped to prevent a united front with the Biden administration," the official said.
Beijing's hope was not to be. What surprised China is that the EU never regarded the CAI as a political agreement. Having forced Beijing to concede on key points, the bloc did not hesitate to walk over China's most salient red lines. On March 22, the EU joined the U.K. and the U.S. in imposing sanctions aimed at Chinese officials believed to be involved in human rights violations in Xinjiang province.
The move threw Beijing off balance — as evidenced by its reaction. Many in Brussels believed China would be too concerned with preserving the CAI to react or would do so within strict limits. Instead, the Chinese Foreign Ministry reacted with blind brutality.
Chinese embassies in Europe had been asked in advance to collect a list of undesirables, which included members of the European Parliament belonging to almost every political group. That list seems to have been approved by the top leadership in Zhongnanhai with little or no scrutiny, and little concern for the agreement's fate.
That reaction reveals a lot about the relationship between the EU and China, and the fact that Beijing felt it had been outplayed. While a second official in the Commission told me that the top leadership in Beijing was poorly advised, none of the Chinese officials I talked to expressed any doubt that, on March 22, the Chinese leadership decided to kill the investment agreement with the European Union. The choice was conscious and deliberate.
Since taking over the brief in August 2020, Xi Jinping had fought hard to take the deal over the line. So why did he change his mind? The clue is in something the influential academic Cui Hongjian told me this week: "Strategic partners do not sanction each other." The Chinese side had seen the CAI as a political agreement.
Like good Marxists, Chinese officials do not believe in the separation between politics and the economy. But Brussels' decision to sanction four political officials showed that "systemic rivalry" was still valid and operational. According to an official in the Chinese State Council, Xi decided that the Europeans had betrayed the spirit of the agreement and that China should put its foot down.
Liu Zuokui of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences expanded on the feeling of frustration in a conversation this week: "In other words, on the one hand, the two sides should overcome their differences and negotiate. On the other hand, the EU can punish China at any time according to its own needs, and it is estimated that China may acquiesce to such punishment."
What this means is that Brussels — not Washington or Beijing — has a clear vision of what the terms of the relationship between the West and China should be: economic integration but on a European not a Chinese model.
Chinese officials may complain about the term "systemic rivalry," but they believe in it as much as Brussels. The difference is that for Beijing, there is no separation between market and state. Interestingly, this is also the view in Washington — but Europeans are convinced they have a better plan.
They will keep insisting that to do business in their territory, China will have to do it on European terms. And indeed, Chinese officials have sent some messages that they want to continue talking. "We are very calm," said the official in Brussels.
On a purely semantic point I see systemic rival as worse than strategic rival, but apparently that's not how it's meant :lol:
Separately I think this approach works in theory but I just don't think it survives contact with reality because, as the article notes, the Chinese state does not accept the distinction of economic and political. I also think the Chinese state has a fairly embedded view that the "West" is in terminal decline - so there is no need to compromise when you can, instead, wait. So the only way I see this vision working is in some way the EU model can sort of prevail because it's how the EU behaves and reality follows, which I'm not convinced is likely.
The example he gives is Poland and Hungary who I think have not yet adhered to the EU's model and that's with all of the institutional and power structures which should give the EU leverage over those states. I don't know that it will be more able to succeed with China.
And I think I've said it before - but I think the EU has a blindspot for non-economic motivations. I think institutionally they struggle to understand motivations and actors that are not driven by rational, material concerns - and in part I think that's because it's a project to banish those motivations from Europe after centuries of war. But when they are then faced with embedded sectarian conflict, like in Northern Ireland and Bosnia (from what a friend who worked in the Western Balkans has said) the EU really struggles to use the leverage it has because the incentives etc that it cares about are irrelevant to the actors in that sphere. I think there's an element of that with China (and Russia or Poland and Hungary for that matter), except instead of sectarianism it's more around ideology/worldview.
But I could be totally wrong and I think at least this piece does make me think there is a theory shaping EU policy in this area even if I have some doubts about it.
What I don't get is that it seems to be just in Japan where you've actual government efforts to divert corporate investment away from China and towards SE Asia instead.
Sure, Japan Inc, the government and un-zaibatsu have a pretty incestuous relationship. But still, you'd think there'd be something the west could do to encourage the same more strongly than they are.
I feel like this is probably positive news, as I've always quite liked Tusk - but I'm not sure about the language of "evil". But those poll numbers don't look great and I think there's always a bit of a risk of this sort of comeback. But I hope it works:
QuoteTusk returns to Polish politics denouncing 'evil' ruling party
The battered opposition Civic Platform party sees Tusk as a potential political savior.
(https://www.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/03/GettyImages-1233780173-1320x853.jpg)
Donald Tusk speaks at a Civic Platform congress on July 3, 2021 | Wojtek Radwanski/AFP via Getty Images
By Zosia Wanat
July 3, 2021 1:54 pm
After seven years in Brussels, Donald Tusk is back in Polish politics and he's got one goal — to defeat the nationalist Law and Justice (PiS) party.
"I'm back in 100 percent," the former Polish prime minister and ex-president of the European Council told a Saturday congress of Civic Platform (PO), the troubled liberal party he founded in 2001.
He's now the head of the European People's Party, the EU's largest grouping of center-right parties, but he made clear that he's diving back into national politics to lead the charge against PiS — which has seen relations with Brussels sour thanks to accusations that it is backsliding on democracy, undermining the rule of law, curbing media freedom and unleashing attacks on the LGBTQ+ community.
"The evil that PiS is performing is evident, shameless and permanent. It's happening every day, in almost every matter," Tusk, 64, said in an emotional speech that accused the government and its backers of corruption, clashes with the EU and Poland's European partners, restriction of women's rights, mismanagement of the coronavirus pandemic and climate change denial.
The party's current chief Boris Budka stepped aside to let Tusk retake the top job. He's been accused of doing a lackluster job in leading a party that has failed to retake the political initiative since losing power to PiS in 2015.
"I put the future of the country and the future of PO above my own ambitions," Budka said. "Donald Tusk is returning to Polish politics at my invitation and at my request."
The party has long looked with longing at Tusk, who led Civic Platform to two electoral victories and ruled Poland from 2005 to 2014, seeing him as someone who could reenergize the party.
But it's not clear if the wider electorate shares the same hunger. One recent survey found that more than 60 percent of respondents said he shouldn't return to Polish politics.
Old enemies
PiS is also certain to rewarm accusations that dogged the final days of Tusk's government — that it was aloof, didn't understand the needs of ordinary Poles, had no ambitious programs and that several ministers left after being embroiled in a scandal after recordings of their conversations in a fancy restaurant were published.
His old enemy Jarosław Kaczyński, the 72-year-old leader of PiS and Poland's de facto ruler, unleashed that line of attack in an interview earlier this week. He accused Tusk of returning to Poland because he is lazy and loves Germany.
"That's the brutal truth," Kaczyński said. "All the rest with this asking and waiting is a bit of theater to sweeten this return."
PiS holds its own party congress this weekend, where Kaczyński will be reaffirmed as leader. However, he is politically vulnerable — the ruling United Right coalition led by PiS is consumed with internal battles and last week lost its formal majority in the Polish parliament.
"After almost six years can we talk about success? Yes, we can," Kaczyński told his party faithful, spelling out changes in social, international, cultural and educational policies. "We can say in every area."
Tusk denounced the PiS congress as "a grotesque group of people."
"It's quite a pitiful parody of dictatorship," he said. "This is not an overwhelming power. What's overwhelming is our lack of faith and our weakness"
That means Tusk is back at a time when the opposition sees a chance of the government imploding and being forced to hold elections earlier than the scheduled date in 2023.
Tusk will have his work cut out for him in uniting squabbling opposition parties and adding energy and optimism to a grouping that's lost faith in its ability to win. Civic Platform is trailing in opinion polls behind Poland 2050, a new grouping formed by Catholic journalist Szymon Hołownia that has succeeded in attracting some politicians from PO.
Tusk said he's back because he believes PO is still able to win. "What's the most important in politics, what's so important today, not only for PO, is to regain the faith in its own agency and the possibility to win. Those who don't believe in their own capabilities won't win; a party that doesn't believe in the meaning of its own existence won't win," he said.
The EPP did not issue a formal statement, but indicated there was no issue with Tusk staying on as the group's chief while returning to active politics in Poland.
I suspect they'll get a bump in the short term but I think the main challenge is what Tusk has identified of basically re-establishing PO as a credible winning force given the position polls has collapsed to about 15% of the vote and third place. I think there is also a risk that basically he does okay but it ends up splitting the more liberal vote with Poland 2050 and, possibly, the better route would've been to let PO decline to a clear junior partner and Poland 2050 as the new up-and-coming liberal party to keep climbing :hmm:
The response of the PiS media indicates this might well work because this is Tusk derangement syndrome:
QuoteStanley Bill
@StanleySBill
The PiS-controlled Polish public media's non-stop negative coverage of Donald Tusk's return is getting wilder and wilder. This article is entitled "Saruman pretending to be Gandalf", and warns of Tusk's plan to sell an "old evil" as "good".
https://www.tvp.info/54709244/powrot-tuska-saruman-zgrywa-gandalfa
Polish Constitutional Tribunal has handed out its ruling on the CJEU interim orders around the Polish judiciary. They found that those orders were incompatible with the Polish constitution. This follows on from the German Constitutional Court's case earlier this year (which was referenced in the hearing) and both are real threats to the EU's legal order - if the courts of member states rather than the CJEU have the power to interpret what is and isn't in accordance with European law then you'll have 27 versions of European law and 27 interpretations of the competencies of European bodies..
I'm sure there'll be more coverage and proper articles but it's a big deal and re-opening settled European law from the 60s/70s.
Edit: This is what The Economist called Europe's "Calhounian moment" and EU law academics have agreed that it's basically a nullification debate - to give a sense of why it matters so much.
Yeah, ugh.
And we've a good shot to enter another nullification crisis ourselves, from GOP/Red states, over voting rights laws (if that federal bill somehow makes it through Congress).
Quote from: Tonitrus on July 14, 2021, 11:41:29 AM
Yeah, ugh.
And we've a good shot to enter another nullification crisis ourselves, from GOP/Red states, over voting rights laws (if that federal bill somehow makes it through Congress).
Everybody is always so short sighted. If the GOP creates nullification as a principle it will destroy their ability to govern once they do get back in power in DC.
Quote from: Valmy on July 14, 2021, 01:09:30 PM
Quote from: Tonitrus on July 14, 2021, 11:41:29 AM
Yeah, ugh.
And we've a good shot to enter another nullification crisis ourselves, from GOP/Red states, over voting rights laws (if that federal bill somehow makes it through Congress).
Everybody is always so short sighted. If the GOP creates nullification as a principle it will destroy their ability to govern once they do get back in power in DC.
Thank God.
Quote from: Valmy on July 14, 2021, 01:09:30 PM
Quote from: Tonitrus on July 14, 2021, 11:41:29 AM
Yeah, ugh.
And we've a good shot to enter another nullification crisis ourselves, from GOP/Red states, over voting rights laws (if that federal bill somehow makes it through Congress).
Everybody is always so short sighted. If the GOP creates nullification as a principle it will destroy their ability to govern once they do get back in power in DC.
I think it has been well demonstrated that a failure to leverage hypocrisy is not one of their shortcomings.
I mentioned it earlier but the CJEU have ruled that employers can sack or refuse to hire Muslim women for wearing the headscarfy if it is justified in the interests of "neutrality". This is the latest in a bit of a string of cases within the EU.
I don't quite follow the thinking because they acknowledge that this could constitute direct discrimination (which is never permitted). I assume what is meant is that you can't ban the headscarf specifically but you can ban all religious, political or philosophical symbols, which will constitute indirect discrimination which can be allowed for "neutrality". In particular a genuine need to prevent "social conflicts" or present a neutral image of the employer to customers or with other workers.
Also relevant for a genuine need are the "rights and legitimate wishes of users" and more particularly parents in education to be served by/have children educated by etc individuals who "do not manifest their religion or belief".
I think it's a pretty bad ruling and I think it is going to lead to discriminatory hiring practices <_<
Not sure if this needs a separate thread yet - but Euro-news.
The background is that since Kosovo's independence Serbia has required Kosovans to change their license plate when they go into Serbia. Kosovo have now introduced the same rule for Serbs driving into Kosovo and placed a special police unit to the border to enforce it - this policy was agreed with Serbia (and the EU) two years ago. Two vehicle registration offices have been torched by Kosovo Serbs who, Kosovo alleges, have links with terrorist groups and the Serbian government.
Serbia's responded by moved troops and equipment to the border and have also had planes buzzing above Kosovan territory while the Serbian Defence Minister and the Russian Ambassador toured the border.
Vucic was Milosevic's Minister of Information so has a pretty unsavoury past but had sort of reorganised that party as broadly Orbanist rather than full blown revanchists - but they never quite gave up the rhetoric of re-taking Kosovo, splitting up BiH etc and in the last few years regional neighbours have been sounding the alarm that they're taking a "Greater Serbia" stance again.
For example the government's launched a new national holiday for the entire "Serb world" of "the Day of Serb Unity, Freedom and the National Flag". The "Serb world" should, apparently, unify politically and that includes the Serbs in Bosnia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Croatia. The Croatian President said he couldn't believe the Serbs had nothing better to do than create holidays that sort of meddle with the internal affairs of neighbours and the interior minister replied that there is "nothing more important than the preservation of the Serb identity." At the celebrations in Belgrade Vucic boasted their army was "five times stronger" than a few years ago.
Meanwhile it seems like there have been organised events on the border where you basically have army veterans from the Balkan wars whipping up a crowd of young men who seem to have been bused in - this was a thing that Milosevic used to do too (it was sort of the background to the Gazimestan speech):
QuoteSerbian troops on heightened alert at Kosovo border
Government in Belgrade accuses neighbouring Kosovo of 'provocations' by sending special police units to border.
26 Sep 2021
Serbian troops have been on a heightened state of alert after the government in Belgrade accused neighbouring Kosovo of "provocations" by sending special police units to the border.
Already tense relations between Serbia and its former breakaway region have grown worse since the ethnic Albanian-led government there despatched the police units to an area mainly populated by minority ethnic Serbs, who reject the authority of the government in Kosovo's capital Pristina.
The deployment came as hundreds of ethnic Serbs have staged daily protests against a decision to require drivers with Serbian registration plates to put on temporary ones when entering Kosovo – a "reciprocal measure", according to Pristina.
"No one here wants a conflict and I hope there won't be one," said a 45-year-old protester who identified himself as Ljubo and was camped at the Jarinje border crossing.
"We want Pristina to withdraw its forces and cancel the decision on licence plates."
Hundreds of Serbs in Kosovo have been protesting and blocking traffic with trucks on the roads leading to two border crossings.
"After the provocations by the [special police] units ... Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic gave the order to heighten the alert for some Serbian army and police units," the defence ministry in Belgrade said in a statement.
Serbian fighter jets could again be seen flying over the border region on Sunday after several sorties on Saturday, AFP news agency reported.
Diplomatic pressure
The European Union's chief diplomat Josep Borrell urged Serbia and Kosovo to reduce tensions "by immediately withdrawing special police units and dismantling of roadblocks".
"Any further provocations or unilateral and uncoordinated actions are unacceptable," he said in a statement.
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said he had spoken by phone to the Serbian president and Kosovar Prime Minister Albin Kurti.
"It's vital both Belgrade and Pristina show restraint and return to dialogue," he tweeted.
NATO troops have been deployed in Kosovo since the 1998-99 Serbian-Kosovar conflict.
Belgrade does not recognise Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence in 2008 and sees Pristina's decision on the licence plates as implying its status as a sovereign state.
Vucic deplored the lack of reaction from the international community to "the total occupation for more than a week of northern Kosovo by Pristina's armoured vehicles".
"And everyone is suddenly worried when Serbian helicopters and planes are seen over central Serbia," Vucic said in a statement, adding, however, that Serbia "will always behave responsibly and seriously".
Kurti on Saturday accused Serbia of wanting to "provoke a serious international conflict".
Early on Sunday, Serbian Defence Minister Nebojsa Stefanovic visited troops at two military bases where they are on alert, including one that is just a few kilometres from the border.
Belgrade designates border crossings between Serbia and Kosovo as "administrative".
Serbian ally Russia also does not recognise Kosovo's independence, but most Western countries do, including the United States.
For its part, NATO member Albania, "concerned by the escalation of the situation", has asked Belgrade "to withdraw the armed forces deployed on the border with Kosovo".
Kosovo President Vjosa Osmani cut short a visit to New York for the United Nations General Assembly "because of developments in the north of the country".
Kosovo's declaration of independence came a decade after a war between ethnic Albanian fighters and Serbian forces that killed 13,000 people, mostly ethnic Albanians.
The United States and the European Union have called for a de-escalation of tensions and for the two sides to return to normalisation talks, which the EU has mediated for about a decade.
The Serbian president said the normalisation process can resume only if Kosovo withdraws the special police forces from the north.
Meanwhile a tabloid with close links to the Serbian government have headlines that Putin's message to Serbia is to send tanks to Kosovo and from Lavrov saying if Serbia decides to intervene in Kosovo it can count on Russia.
Hopefully things will calm down and both sides can be convinced to return to the table (though given that the Kosovan sin is to implement a policy negotiated by the EU and agreed with Serbia two years ago I'm not convinced by both sidesing this) and de-escalate. Wonder if this is a canary in the coalmine after the US' Afghanistan withdrawal? :hmm:
Edit: Basically - I hope this doesn't need it's own thread.
I absolutely expect Putin to pull more shit in the European periphery at some point, and Serbia seems like a perfectly viable vector for it. Not that Serbia isn't able to stir things up on its own.
In terms of grand strategy, I wonder how deep the trouble in Europe would have to be to impact the current strategic shift to Asia-Pacific by the US?
Quote from: Jacob on September 26, 2021, 08:01:55 PM
I absolutely expect Putin to pull more shit in the European periphery at some point, and Serbia seems like a perfectly viable vector for it. Not that Serbia isn't able to stir things up on its own.
In terms of grand strategy, I wonder how deep the trouble in Europe would have to be to impact the current strategic shift to Asia-Pacific by the US?
Can the Euros really not handle Putin and his nonsense on their own? The EU has more than twice as many people and tons more resources. Pretty comical. It would be like Mexico pushing us around. Granted Mexico with nukes but the Euros have nukes as well.
Quote from: Valmy on September 26, 2021, 08:09:07 PM
Can the Euros really not handle Putin and his nonsense on their own? The EU has more than twice as many people and tons more resources.
I doubt it.
IMO the EU lacks the coherence, not to mention that Putin has a number of active assets like Orban inside the EU.
So what are the odds the Serbia starts another world war?
Quote from: HVC on September 26, 2021, 08:31:56 PM
So what are the odds the Serbia starts another world war?
Flo Rida can answer that one.
Quote from: Valmy on September 26, 2021, 08:09:07 PM
Quote from: Jacob on September 26, 2021, 08:01:55 PM
I absolutely expect Putin to pull more shit in the European periphery at some point, and Serbia seems like a perfectly viable vector for it. Not that Serbia isn't able to stir things up on its own.
In terms of grand strategy, I wonder how deep the trouble in Europe would have to be to impact the current strategic shift to Asia-Pacific by the US?
Can the Euros really not handle Putin and his nonsense on their own? The EU has more than twice as many people and tons more resources. Pretty comical. It would be like Mexico pushing us around. Granted Mexico with nukes but the Euros have nukes as well.
North Korea has managed to push America around a fair bit.
When one side is mad and doesn't really care about peace and stability (or at least gives off that message) then size and wealth disparities lose relevance.
I find myself thinking, "Eh, Serbia/Kosovo do these things all the time", it'll blow over again.
Which is of course dangerous, because it will keep blowing over until suddenly it doesn't.
That said, I hope Serbia who are kind of trying to balance their sugar daddies EU, Russia, and China are careful about how far they let escalate things.
However, even if they decide to take Kosovo by force, and Russia supports them and draws a line for NATO/EU to not intervene or else, Serbia would stand to lose a lot through being immediately cut off from all things EU, most likely. I can't see even Orban and PiS going against that, not without serious consequences (wishful thinking, I know :P )
Quote from: Syt on September 27, 2021, 02:30:31 AM
That said, I hope Serbia who are kind of trying to balance their sugar daddies EU, Russia, and China are careful about how far they let escalate things.
However, even if they decide to take Kosovo by force, and Russia supports them and draws a line for NATO/EU to not intervene or else, Serbia would stand to lose a lot through being immediately cut off from all things EU, most likely. I can't see even Orban and PiS going against that, not without serious consequences (wishful thinking, I know :P )
That would be tricky for Orban. His human wallet (village gas fitter turned richest man of the country) has been investing in to one of the Serbian (Hungarian) football clubs there (plus transferring Hungarian grants to the same) so I assume there's at least some cross-border oligarchic understanding. But, there's a substantial Hungarian minority living in Serbia, sabotaging EU action against a genocidal Serbian regime would NOT be easy to explain at home.
Vucic is not in it to recreate Greater Serbia but to become Serbia's autocrat. He will do knee jerk nationalistic displays like this from time to time to rile up his base or to distract from some other internal stuff but he's not crazy enough to actually start a war over anything like this.
Quote from: Jacob on September 26, 2021, 08:01:55 PM
In terms of grand strategy, I wonder how deep the trouble in Europe would have to be to impact the current strategic shift to Asia-Pacific by the US?
Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia are all in NATO - so I'd hope that any sort of direct threat to NATO members would re-focus the US (at least for a bit). Not least because I think that would go to their credibility in Asia-Pacific.
QuoteVucic is not in it to recreate Greater Serbia but to become Serbia's autocrat. He will do knee jerk nationalistic displays like this from time to time to rile up his base or to distract from some other internal stuff but he's not crazy enough to actually start a war over anything like this.
Maybe-ish. I think he's already got total dominance over Serbia. He wins elections at the first round like Putin and his party (plus allies) already have over 75% of the Serbian parliament. Opinion polls indicate they might even go from winning 50%+ of the vote to 60%+ next time.
I agree in terms of not wanting to start a war directly by invading a country. I think what's more likely is they go in on more of this "Serb world" stuff - Serbian minorities in neighbouring countries (including Republika Srpska) get very into it, go to far and that causes a crackdown by the neighbouring government. If that sort of scenario (which is sort of what's going on in Kosovo but not quite) happens it may be very difficult pull back or de-escalate - so basically the traditional route to a Balkans war involving Serbia.
I'd guess the most likely would actually be if Republika Srpska held a referendum on seceding from BiH and joining Serbia.
Edit: I always think of the pessimism of international NGO/diplomatic etc workers in Sarajevo who I'd meet and hear about from a friend working there who all thought that BiH would collapse at some point (almost certainly due to Srpska trying to leave) and descend into another war - so I may be overly pessimistic about the West Balkans :(
Why are we acting like the US has divested all interest in Europe? :huh:
Quote from: garbon on September 27, 2021, 05:12:44 AM
Why are we acting like the US has divested all interest in Europe? :huh:
Je suis France's diesel sub deal, apparently.
Quote from: Tamas on September 27, 2021, 06:19:59 AM
Je suis France's diesel sub deal, apparently.
For me it's more Biden's remarks on Afghanistan - and for all the talk about the confusion in Biden's foreign policy it seems fairly coherent to me.
The US is now focused on great power competition, overwhelmingly in the Pacific. Most of that is because of China's rise but I think Russia is still a concern for the US. However the US is only going to intervene in clear time-limited conflicts (not ongoing occupations/nation-building) for the US's "vital interests".
I think "vital interests" would definitely include NATO members (so Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia). I think it's less clear how much the US would engage in dealing with Serbia de-stabilising Kosovo or BiH and how much they'd, frankly, just expect Europeans to handle that.
But I think since the Afghan withdrawal it is likely that Putin will try to test the limits of US commitment to Europe and its neighbourhood and, as Jake says, Serbia's a possible vector for that.
Off-topic from Kosovo-Serbia, but what's going on in the Netherlands?
There was a journalist who was murdered by a drug gang in July and I just read that Rutte is going to get 24 hour police protection (which apparently isn't the normal for a Dutch PM) because they've assessed that threats against his life from a drug gang (I assume the same one) are credible. It seems pretty bad - I assume there's some big trial or some big police investigation/crackdown that's hurting their business.
Quote from: The Larch on September 27, 2021, 04:26:29 AM
Vucic is not in it to recreate Greater Serbia but to become Serbia's autocrat. He will do knee jerk nationalistic displays like this from time to time to rile up his base or to distract from some other internal stuff but he's not crazy enough to actually start a war over anything like this.
I feel reassured now, obrigado! :) As far as balkantardism goes, it is business as usual.
Quote from: garbon on September 27, 2021, 05:12:44 AM
Why are we acting like the US has divested all interest in Europe? :huh:
I don't think we are, but the question was "can't Europe handle Russia by itself?" Personally I think the answer is "no".
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 27, 2021, 06:39:38 AM
But I think since the Afghan withdrawal it is likely that Putin will try to test the limits of US commitment to Europe and its neighbourhood and, as Jake says, Serbia's a possible vector for that.
Exactly. Putin, I expect, is going to throw his weight around exactly as much as the limits of US commitments allow.
Quote from: Jacob on September 27, 2021, 10:15:15 AM
Quote from: garbon on September 27, 2021, 05:12:44 AM
Why are we acting like the US has divested all interest in Europe? :huh:
I don't think we are, but the question was "can't Europe handle Russia by itself?" Personally I think the answer is "no".
It's not just a question of what they can do if necessary, but what is the cost if it comes to that.
Europe was able to handle Germany and Austria Hungary in WW1 for example. But the cost was astronomical.
A poorly united Europe, getting all worked up over sub deals and money instead of focused on security, is vulnerable to Russia continuing to chip away where it thinks it can get away with it. That is based on the perception that the EU won't really stand up to him, even if they clearly COULD.
Maybe he is wrong about that, and there is some point where Europe would coordinate and slap him down. I would like to believe that is the case. But letting it get to that?
I mean, Europe eventually stood up to Hitler and slapped him down as well. But the cost....
Running the numbers, of course Europe could handle Russia. Hell, Germany alone could probably handle Russia if it came right down to it. But theoretical comparisons of economies and populations doesn't actually matter much when it comes to an aggressor, and the aggressor being wrong doesn't help the millions dead in the proving that they were wrong.
And now in a world with nukes....
Quote from: Valmy on September 26, 2021, 08:09:07 PM
Quote from: Jacob on September 26, 2021, 08:01:55 PM
I absolutely expect Putin to pull more shit in the European periphery at some point, and Serbia seems like a perfectly viable vector for it. Not that Serbia isn't able to stir things up on its own.
In terms of grand strategy, I wonder how deep the trouble in Europe would have to be to impact the current strategic shift to Asia-Pacific by the US?
Can the Euros really not handle Putin and his nonsense on their own?
asking the question is answering it.
Quote from: garbon on September 27, 2021, 05:12:44 AM
Why are we acting like the US has divested all interest in Europe? :huh:
Because there is a strong isolationist movement in the US at the moment. It's only a matter of time before the US has divested all interest in Europe. Trump wanted to shut down US military bases in Germany. Cooler heads prevailed. The next time he runs for President, gets elected and decided to divest all interest in Europe, who will stop him?
Quote from: Valmy on September 26, 2021, 08:09:07 PM
Quote from: Jacob on September 26, 2021, 08:01:55 PM
I absolutely expect Putin to pull more shit in the European periphery at some point, and Serbia seems like a perfectly viable vector for it. Not that Serbia isn't able to stir things up on its own.
In terms of grand strategy, I wonder how deep the trouble in Europe would have to be to impact the current strategic shift to Asia-Pacific by the US?
Can the Euros really not handle Putin and his nonsense on their own?
They lack the will to unite, and the Brits made it clear multiple times they don't want anything to do with Europe, economically, monetarily or militarily.
Outside of France, who has a strong army anyway?
Ther US has the army, but does not want to use it anymore.
France is doing its bare minimum to not alienate citizen. Other Euro countries are mostly peacenick who thinks Putin is the nice guy heating their homes.
Quote from: viper37 on September 27, 2021, 05:43:55 PM
They lack the will to unite, and the Brits made it clear multiple times they don't want anything to do with Europe, economically, monetarily or militarily.
It's really not true on the UK. For all the focus on the carrier group in the Pacific, at the same time the Royal Navy's participated in the NATO Baltic exercises, NATO-Ukraine exercises in the Black Sea (where there was also a freedom of navigation exercise near Crimea) and, separately, had RN-Baltic nation exercises too. And just this year the UK became lead of one of the NATO groups in the Baltic countries.
The UK government doesn't have any interest in engaging with the EU on foreign policy - but I'd slightly query the value of that anyway given the rest of this thread - but is still very committed to NATO and showing it by actually participating in the Baltics and with Ukraine.
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 27, 2021, 04:40:13 AM
QuoteVucic is not in it to recreate Greater Serbia but to become Serbia's autocrat. He will do knee jerk nationalistic displays like this from time to time to rile up his base or to distract from some other internal stuff but he's not crazy enough to actually start a war over anything like this.
I agree in terms of not wanting to start a war directly by invading a country. I think what's more likely is they go in on more of this "Serb world" stuff - Serbian minorities in neighbouring countries (including Republika Srpska) get very into it, go to far and that causes a crackdown by the neighbouring government. If that sort of scenario (which is sort of what's going on in Kosovo but not quite) happens it may be very difficult pull back or de-escalate - so basically the traditional route to a Balkans war involving Serbia.
I'd guess the most likely would actually be if Republika Srpska held a referendum on seceding from BiH and joining Serbia.
Edit: I always think of the pessimism of international NGO/diplomatic etc workers in Sarajevo who I'd meet and hear about from a friend working there who all thought that BiH would collapse at some point (almost certainly due to Srpska trying to leave) and descend into another war - so I may be overly pessimistic about the West Balkans :(
I agree that the most likely source of serious trouble in the area is bound to be Bosnia, as it's by far the country with the weakest state and the most fractured. Besides, the Bosnian Serbs are well organized through their own polity in the Srpska Republic, and tensions within Bosnia between the Serbs and other comunities are long standing and sometimes really close to getting messy.
In this sense for instance it'd be meaningful to point out that forces in the area are already considering behind closed doors ending the existance of Bosnia per se and dividing its territoriy between Serbia, Croatia and a rump Bosniak state, as proposed by the controversial "non-paper" by the Slovenian government earlier this year, which also proposed the unification of Albania and Kosovo, as well as other minor border adjustments to Montenegro and North Macedonia (removing Albanian majority areas, I assume).
For those interested in the "non-paper": https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balkan_non-paper (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balkan_non-paper)
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 27, 2021, 06:00:19 PM
Quote from: viper37 on September 27, 2021, 05:43:55 PM
They lack the will to unite, and the Brits made it clear multiple times they don't want anything to do with Europe, economically, monetarily or militarily.
It's really not true on the UK. For all the focus on the carrier group in the Pacific, at the same time the Royal Navy's participated in the NATO Baltic exercises, NATO-Ukraine exercises in the Black Sea (where there was also a freedom of navigation exercise near Crimea) and, separately, had RN-Baltic nation exercises too. And just this year the UK became lead of one of the NATO groups in the Baltic countries.
The UK government doesn't have any interest in engaging with the EU on foreign policy - but I'd slightly query the value of that anyway given the rest of this thread - but is still very committed to NATO and showing it by actually participating in the Baltics and with Ukraine.
NATO and Europe are different things. I'm talking about an integrated European military, at the very least, much more cooperation, independant of NATO or not. There is a certain need for all of Europe to step up its game, militarily speaking, rely much less on the US. And have a decent, coherent and mostly united foreign policy amongst EU members. Right now, half of them are looking warily at Russia while the others will bend over for Putin as soon as he asked them.
Quote from: The Larch on September 27, 2021, 07:42:47 PM
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 27, 2021, 04:40:13 AM
QuoteVucic is not in it to recreate Greater Serbia but to become Serbia's autocrat. He will do knee jerk nationalistic displays like this from time to time to rile up his base or to distract from some other internal stuff but he's not crazy enough to actually start a war over anything like this.
I agree in terms of not wanting to start a war directly by invading a country. I think what's more likely is they go in on more of this "Serb world" stuff - Serbian minorities in neighbouring countries (including Republika Srpska) get very into it, go to far and that causes a crackdown by the neighbouring government. If that sort of scenario (which is sort of what's going on in Kosovo but not quite) happens it may be very difficult pull back or de-escalate - so basically the traditional route to a Balkans war involving Serbia.
I'd guess the most likely would actually be if Republika Srpska held a referendum on seceding from BiH and joining Serbia.
Edit: I always think of the pessimism of international NGO/diplomatic etc workers in Sarajevo who I'd meet and hear about from a friend working there who all thought that BiH would collapse at some point (almost certainly due to Srpska trying to leave) and descend into another war - so I may be overly pessimistic about the West Balkans :(
I agree that the most likely source of serious trouble in the area is bound to be Bosnia, as it's by far the country with the weakest state and the most fractured. Besides, the Bosnian Serbs are well organized through their own polity in the Srpska Republic, and tensions within Bosnia between the Serbs and other comunities are long standing and sometimes really close to getting messy.
In this sense for instance it'd be meaningful to point out that forces in the area are already considering behind closed doors ending the existance of Bosnia per se and dividing its territoriy between Serbia, Croatia and a rump Bosniak state, as proposed by the controversial "non-paper" by the Slovenian government earlier this year, which also proposed the unification of Albania and Kosovo, as well as other minor border adjustments to Montenegro and North Macedonia (removing Albanian majority areas, I assume).
For those interested in the "non-paper": https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balkan_non-paper (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balkan_non-paper)
Obrigado for the link. Interesting, but not in a good way. I guess that the topic will come up sooner or later with the Albanians I know. Covid certainly played a part in the relative lack of publicity for that document.
Even so, this would still leave the Presevo Valley (Albanian majority area) in Serbia, once rumored to be included in a deal allowing the merger of Kosovo (bar the Serbian area i.e Mitrovica) and Albania.
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 27, 2021, 06:00:19 PM
The UK government doesn't have any interest in engaging with the EU on foreign policy - but I'd slightly query the value of that anyway given the rest of this thread
The feeling is mutual - given the 1000+ pages Brexit thread. :hug:
Quote from: Duque de Bragança on September 27, 2021, 09:04:23 PM
Quote from: The Larch on September 27, 2021, 07:42:47 PM
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 27, 2021, 04:40:13 AM
QuoteVucic is not in it to recreate Greater Serbia but to become Serbia's autocrat. He will do knee jerk nationalistic displays like this from time to time to rile up his base or to distract from some other internal stuff but he's not crazy enough to actually start a war over anything like this.
I agree in terms of not wanting to start a war directly by invading a country. I think what's more likely is they go in on more of this "Serb world" stuff - Serbian minorities in neighbouring countries (including Republika Srpska) get very into it, go to far and that causes a crackdown by the neighbouring government. If that sort of scenario (which is sort of what's going on in Kosovo but not quite) happens it may be very difficult pull back or de-escalate - so basically the traditional route to a Balkans war involving Serbia.
I'd guess the most likely would actually be if Republika Srpska held a referendum on seceding from BiH and joining Serbia.
Edit: I always think of the pessimism of international NGO/diplomatic etc workers in Sarajevo who I'd meet and hear about from a friend working there who all thought that BiH would collapse at some point (almost certainly due to Srpska trying to leave) and descend into another war - so I may be overly pessimistic about the West Balkans :(
I agree that the most likely source of serious trouble in the area is bound to be Bosnia, as it's by far the country with the weakest state and the most fractured. Besides, the Bosnian Serbs are well organized through their own polity in the Srpska Republic, and tensions within Bosnia between the Serbs and other comunities are long standing and sometimes really close to getting messy.
In this sense for instance it'd be meaningful to point out that forces in the area are already considering behind closed doors ending the existance of Bosnia per se and dividing its territoriy between Serbia, Croatia and a rump Bosniak state, as proposed by the controversial "non-paper" by the Slovenian government earlier this year, which also proposed the unification of Albania and Kosovo, as well as other minor border adjustments to Montenegro and North Macedonia (removing Albanian majority areas, I assume).
For those interested in the "non-paper": https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balkan_non-paper (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balkan_non-paper)
Obrigado for the link. Interesting, but not in a good way. I guess that the topic will come up sooner or later with the Albanians I know. Covid certainly played a part in the relative lack of publicity for that document.
Even so, this would still leave the Presevo Valley (Albanian majority area) in Serbia, once rumored to be included in a deal allowing the merger of Kosovo (bar the Serbian area i.e Mitrovica) and Albania.
I'd count on those areas being part of the "minor border adjustments", as they've long been rumoured to be in the cards in a possible Serbia - Kosovo settlement, in which they'd exchange border areas with majority Serbian/Albanian populations (Mitrovica & surrounding areas for the Presevo Valley)
Quote from: viper37 on September 27, 2021, 08:37:04 PM
NATO and Europe are different things. I'm talking about an integrated European military, at the very least, much more cooperation, independant of NATO or not. There is a certain need for all of Europe to step up its game, militarily speaking, rely much less on the US. And have a decent, coherent and mostly united foreign policy amongst EU members. Right now, half of them are looking warily at Russia while the others will bend over for Putin as soon as he asked them.
The EU and Europe are also different things - Ukraine is in neither.
Ultimately the options for Europe to have strategic autonomy in my view are, within the EU, France identifying its interests with and backing up the EU's periphery (Poland, the Baltics, Romania, Greece etc) to broadly support French leadership, or to look outisde the EU and involve the UK as the other reasonably decent European middle power (that identifies its interests with the periphery but through NATO). I think those are the options - I don't think building it within the curretnt structures of the EU as is will work because there are too many member states who don't really want to.
QuoteThe feeling is mutual - given the 1000+ pages Brexit thread. :hug:
:lol: Fair. But people agree the EU doesn't have a significant foreign or defence policy outside of trade - so I just don't know why any country would. Maybe politeness, I suppose.
QuoteI agree that the most likely source of serious trouble in the area is bound to be Bosnia, as it's by far the country with the weakest state and the most fractured. Besides, the Bosnian Serbs are well organized through their own polity in the Srpska Republic, and tensions within Bosnia between the Serbs and other comunities are long standing and sometimes really close to getting messy.
Yeah - but I think there is also an element of sort of slowly adjusting the region (and EU and NATO) to this type of politics. So Serbia's put tanks on the border and is flying jets overhead - over Kosovo applying the same (pre-agreed!) rules about cars to Serbia. The next time there's a flare up over something minor, instead of the response being judged against the actual issue/crisis, I think it'll likely be judged against this: did they send out tanks and planes or not?
And that cycle will continue and I think it is deliberate. It's the international version of what Orban and Vucic have done domestically in a way.
I feel like the best response would be from the region - Croatia, North Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro etc setting out a common response (the Croatian President has been fairly robust in comments). I suspect that would actually matter more than nostrums from Brussels on either EU or NATO letterhead.
An example of what I mean about France building strategic autonomy in Europe through working with willing European countries and then maybe bringing it into the EU (a la the stability mechanism), France and Greece have signed a new "strategic partnership". Greece is also buying three new frigates from France.
The Greek Prime Minister says that the obligations in this partnership is reflects a "very strong alliance that goes beyond the obligations of one to the other in the context of the EU and NATO". I think it's interesting because France and Greece worked together to confront Turkey in the Eastern Med in recent years - which is exactly what I think France should do to build autonomy. But part of the reason for it being an ad-hoc alliance so far is that, from a Greek perception, the EU doesn't back them up on Turkey enough because of Merkel/Germany especially not having the same view of the threat from Turkey to Greece and obviously NATO doesn't work because Turkey's a member.
If France starts looking at the way it can demonstrate its support for, say, Poland and the Baltics and build up to this type of relationship that could be the start of a network allowing European autonomy under French leadership.
It is just as de Gaulle predicted. The US will eventually go home or shift its attention elsewhere. Europe must look to itself.
Quote from: Valmy on September 28, 2021, 10:11:20 AM
It is just as de Gaulle predicted. The US will eventually go home or shift its attention elsewhere. Europe must look to itself.
...except he predicted that like 60 years ago.
All predictions will eventually come true, if the timeline is long enough, I suppose.
I predict France will eventually cease to exist, so Europe should look for security somewhere other then Paris.
Quote from: Berkut on September 28, 2021, 10:36:42 AM
Quote from: Valmy on September 28, 2021, 10:11:20 AM
It is just as de Gaulle predicted. The US will eventually go home or shift its attention elsewhere. Europe must look to itself.
...except he predicted that like 60 years ago.
All predictions will eventually come true, if the timeline is long enough, I suppose.
I predict France will eventually cease to exist, so Europe should look for security somewhere other then Paris.
What? That's stupid as fuck. All predictions do not eventually come true and 60 years was exactly the kind of time frame he was talking about.
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 28, 2021, 04:39:50 AM
QuoteThe feeling is mutual - given the 1000+ pages Brexit thread. :hug:
:lol: Fair. But people agree the EU doesn't have a significant foreign or defence policy outside of trade - so I just don't know why any country would. Maybe politeness, I suppose.
Britain on the other hand has no serious trade policy. It's almost as if they used to be complementary.
Quote from: Valmy on September 28, 2021, 10:44:21 AM
Quote from: Berkut on September 28, 2021, 10:36:42 AM
Quote from: Valmy on September 28, 2021, 10:11:20 AM
It is just as de Gaulle predicted. The US will eventually go home or shift its attention elsewhere. Europe must look to itself.
...except he predicted that like 60 years ago.
All predictions will eventually come true, if the timeline is long enough, I suppose.
I predict France will eventually cease to exist, so Europe should look for security somewhere other then Paris.
What? That's stupid as fuck. All predictions do not eventually come true and 60 years was exactly the kind of time frame he was talking about.
I predict Berkut will agree 100% with your last post Valmy.
Quote from: Jacob on September 28, 2021, 11:25:54 AM
Quote from: Valmy on September 28, 2021, 10:44:21 AM
Quote from: Berkut on September 28, 2021, 10:36:42 AM
Quote from: Valmy on September 28, 2021, 10:11:20 AM
It is just as de Gaulle predicted. The US will eventually go home or shift its attention elsewhere. Europe must look to itself.
...except he predicted that like 60 years ago.
All predictions will eventually come true, if the timeline is long enough, I suppose.
I predict France will eventually cease to exist, so Europe should look for security somewhere other then Paris.
What? That's stupid as fuck. All predictions do not eventually come true and 60 years was exactly the kind of time frame he was talking about.
I predict Berkut will agree 100% with your last post Valmy.
:lol:
How is Ukraine not Europe?
Quote from: Tamas on September 28, 2021, 11:58:08 AM
How is Ukraine not Europe?
Sorry that was me not being clear - I meant it is Europe but neither EU nor NATO.
Quote from: Valmy on September 28, 2021, 10:44:21 AM
Quote from: Berkut on September 28, 2021, 10:36:42 AM
Quote from: Valmy on September 28, 2021, 10:11:20 AM
It is just as de Gaulle predicted. The US will eventually go home or shift its attention elsewhere. Europe must look to itself.
...except he predicted that like 60 years ago.
All predictions will eventually come true, if the timeline is long enough, I suppose.
I predict France will eventually cease to exist, so Europe should look for security somewhere other then Paris.
What? That's stupid as fuck. All predictions do not eventually come true and 60 years was exactly the kind of time frame he was talking about.
I totally agree 100%
Of course, just to help me out, could you actually provide me with the quote from DeGaulle where he says the US would invest trillions into European defense for 6 decades but THEN would "go home"?
Well, turns out all predictions come true after all
Quote from: Berkut on September 28, 2021, 12:28:42 PM
Quote from: Valmy on September 28, 2021, 10:44:21 AM
Quote from: Berkut on September 28, 2021, 10:36:42 AM
Quote from: Valmy on September 28, 2021, 10:11:20 AM
It is just as de Gaulle predicted. The US will eventually go home or shift its attention elsewhere. Europe must look to itself.
...except he predicted that like 60 years ago.
All predictions will eventually come true, if the timeline is long enough, I suppose.
I predict France will eventually cease to exist, so Europe should look for security somewhere other then Paris.
What? That's stupid as fuck. All predictions do not eventually come true and 60 years was exactly the kind of time frame he was talking about.
I totally agree 100%
Of course, just to help me out, could you actually provide me with the quote from DeGaulle where he says the US would invest trillions into European defense for 6 decades but THEN would "go home"?
I don't get you man, do you want Europe to be dependent on trillions of our tax dollars that could better be used for the benefit of our own people? Don't you want them to see to their own defenses and own problems?
And de Gaulle was saying is that Europe could not depend on outside forces forever and eventually would need to see to itself. And 60 years is plenty eventually. I don't think having that opinion is offensive or ungrateful to the United States and what we have done, rather I think it is our interest and reflects gratitude for our efforts. That 6 trillion should result in a Europe able to fend for itself not continuing to be a strategic and economic burden. So why would you be upset or at least very sarcastic about that? I don't get it.
Quote from: crazy canuck on September 28, 2021, 05:55:51 PM
Well, turns out all predictions come true after all
So if predict the device on which you typed this post will get shoved three feet up your ass, how long until that comes true? :P
Since just by me saying it, it now becomes an inevitability apparently. The Berkut principle.
Quote from: Valmy on September 29, 2021, 11:05:57 AM
Quote from: Berkut on September 28, 2021, 12:28:42 PM
Quote from: Valmy on September 28, 2021, 10:44:21 AM
Quote from: Berkut on September 28, 2021, 10:36:42 AM
Quote from: Valmy on September 28, 2021, 10:11:20 AM
It is just as de Gaulle predicted. The US will eventually go home or shift its attention elsewhere. Europe must look to itself.
...except he predicted that like 60 years ago.
All predictions will eventually come true, if the timeline is long enough, I suppose.
I predict France will eventually cease to exist, so Europe should look for security somewhere other then Paris.
What? That's stupid as fuck. All predictions do not eventually come true and 60 years was exactly the kind of time frame he was talking about.
I totally agree 100%
Of course, just to help me out, could you actually provide me with the quote from DeGaulle where he says the US would invest trillions into European defense for 6 decades but THEN would "go home"?
I don't get you man, do you want Europe to be dependent on trillions of our tax dollars that could better be used for the benefit of our own people? Don't you want them to see to their own defenses and own problems?
And de Gaulle was saying is that Europe could not depend on outside forces forever and eventually would need to see to itself. And 60 years is plenty eventually. I don't think having that opinion is offensive or ungrateful to the United States and what we have done, rather I think it is our interest and reflects gratitude for our efforts. That 6 trillion should result in a Europe able to fend for itself not continuing to be a strategic and economic burden. So why would you be upset or at least very sarcastic about that? I don't get it.
I think the west (meaning liberal western democracies) need to cooperate against those who don't much care for liberalism or democracy.
For a long time that was the USSR.
Now it is China and Russia and to a lesser extent radical Islam.
I don't want Europe to be dependent on the US at all, I just object to the idea that they should do anything because the US cannot be counted on.
They should see to their own defense because that is prudent and sane and they should want to contribute to the collective defense of the western liberal order.
Bullshit like French Gaullist crap where they are attacking their allies in an effort to promote their specific interests, rather then the common interest, is stupid and counter productive.
This entire episode is just the latest example of where some countries seem to think the enemy is not the ACTUAL enemy of western liberalism, but other western liberal countries. This attitude is basically the mirror of Putins basic desire for a new global power structure - regional powers. France is fucking idiotically thinking "Yes, if Europe ditches the US, then WE will be the regional power because we are the strongest in the EU!". It is short sighted and narcissistic in the extreme.
I would be all for a EU that is as powerful as the US. They are a fellow western liberal power. Which is why I am all for Australia getting the best possible defense for the money. Again, they are on our broader side.
It does in fact annoy the fuck out of me that some specific countries within "our side" so clearly are willing to sink that overall alliance in favor of their narrow, self centered need to be the biggest fish in their smaller pond.
The fact that the country that seems most prone to this is the one country that in the 20th century most benefited from a western, liberal alliance I find simply fascinating. Of course, they were also the one country that was harmed the most in those wars as well (not counting Russia/the USSR), so the fact that they are "different" in their cynicism should not be surprising, I suppose. It is easy to prattle on about western liberal alliances and how grand they are when your country didn't see two generations of their youth wiped out in wars defending that alliance, even if the wars were eventually won.
Quote from: Valmy on September 29, 2021, 11:08:04 AM
Quote from: crazy canuck on September 28, 2021, 05:55:51 PM
Well, turns out all predictions come true after all
So if predict the device on which you typed this post will get shoved three feet up your ass, how long until that comes true? :P
Since just by me saying it, it now becomes an inevitability apparently. The Berkut principle.
Surely, you actually understand what I meant when I said that....right? I don't have to lay out the precise limits of said point in the context of the discussion?
I suspect you actually understand what I mean quite well.
In any case, you said something very specific - that De Gaulle meant that the US would abandon Europe "exactly" now, present day. And that was what he meant when he said it 60 years ago.
So again, do you have that quote handy where he said exactly that? That Europe should definitely be fine depending on the US, RIGHT NOW, but should be prepared not to some many decades in the future?
That seems like a politically pretty useless stance to take back in the 50s, at least to me. I suspect De Gaulle was arguing that their inability to count on the US was quite a bit more immediate then in about half a century or more....
I thought the Economist Charlemagne column was interesting on the European lessons/features from Germany's election.
I'm still thinking through what I think about the point around the decline of the EPP, and it's true: LR in France, CDU/CSU in Germany - the leaders of the EPP are now Kurz and Iohannis (if the EPP hadn't finally acted on Fidesz you could add Orban to the list). And perhaps it's just a delayed version of what happened to the centre-left.
Rather than a one-sided process of PASOKification, we're seeing broad fragmentation but the centre right has taken longer to fall apart. Ths is still the SPD's third worst result, so I'm not sure we're seeing a resurgence of the left and my suspicion is that the trend in European politics will instead be Dutchification. More fragmented national politics with the far-left to the far-right all taking somewhere between 15-20% of the vote with 20%+ looking decent, regional forces and strongly regionalised politics will also, possibly, matter more than 'national' trends.
From an EU perspective it feels like if that's the direction of travel for national politics it may be another reason to start looking at Europeanising some big policy areas :hmm:
QuoteGermany's election is revealingly European
A fractured vote, a big age divide and long coalition talks ahead
Oct 2nd 2021
GERMAN ELECTIONS are idiosyncratic affairs. Armin Laschet, the leader of the Christian Democrat Union, was grilled over his choice of bratwurst condiment (ketchup, not mustard). Annalena Baerbock, the Green candidate for chancellor, was skewered over plagiarism claims, a sin that bedevils only German politics. All politics is local, but in Germany it is parochial. The country may be Europe's hegemon, yet foreign affairs and the future of the EU were barely mentioned. An at times surreal campaign ended with Angela Merkel, the outgoing chancellor and most powerful person in Europe, being photographed with a parrot on her head.
If the campaign was unmistakably German, the result was European. A slim victory for the Social Democratic Party (SPD) over its centre-right rivals, the Christian Democratic Union and its Bavarian sister the Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU), will kick off months of coalition negotiations. German politicians struggled with the same problems as their peers across the continent; German voters behaved the same way as their neighbours. Europe was invisible in the campaign. But it is visible in the outcome.
Politics in Germany has fragmented in the past decade or so, just as in every other western European country. Five parties got more than 10% of the vote each. When Angela Merkel came to power in 2005, only two did. In that same election, the CDU/CSU and SPD won 70% of the vote. On 26th September they managed barely half. It is a familiar story. In the Netherlands, 19 different parties now sit in parliament. In Italy, four parties ranging from centre-left to far-right hover around the 20% mark. Traditionally two-party systems, such as Spain, have become complex multi-party affairs. Germany is simply catching up.
After posting the worst result in their history, the CDU/CSU can take some consolation from the fact they are not alone. Their political siblings in other countries have also lost ground. At the start of the 2010s, practically every big EU country had a centre-right government. Now, barring extremely canny negotiations from the CDU, none will. Conservative politicians used to run a continent; now they control a rump. In Germany, a bad campaign by a gaffe-prone candidate is part of the explanation. But the causes of the CDU's malaise run deeper, and stretch beyond Germany's borders.
By contrast, after a decade of losing ground, the centre-left had something to cheer. Although not too loudly. Olaf Scholz, the SPD's prospective chancellor, ran a cautious campaign based on competence, with enough radicalism to stop his party's left from leaving for the Greens. It resulted in his party's third-lowest postwar vote share, but paved a likely path to power.
Now, Mr Scholz will endure the fate suffered by his fellow leftie leaders: staying in office via rickety coalitions. In Spain the Socialist Workers' Party, another grandee of the centre left, took power with a little over a quarter of the vote. Once-mighty Scandinavian social democrats are still in government, but weaker than before. In the late 1990s centre-left parties were dominant across Europe. Their pitch was usually some variant of: "Things can only get better." Now it is more like: "Things might not get worse."
Older voters keep the big-tent parties alive, both in Germany and across the EU. Call it the boomer bulwark. While four in ten under-30s backed the liberal Free Democrats or the Greens, 70% of over-60s voted for the SPD or the CDU/CSU. In Spain younger voters swoon for challenger parties, such as Podemos or Vox. But their parents and grandparents stick to traditional ones. In France, Marine Le Pen's base is the discontented young. In Italy the far-right Lega and Brothers of Italy also rely on youthful voters. Parties now stand for young or old as much as left or right.
Fractured politics mean complicated coalition talks. Germany is used to haggling between two parties. This time three will be necessary and negotiations could drag on. In a first for Germany, the Greens and the FDP (who came third and fourth) pledged to agree to terms with each other before negotiating with SPD or CDU/CSU. Again, Germany is joining a new European norm. Negotiations in Belgium are notorious for taking years and producing cumbersome coalitions. In the Netherlands, stuck in coalition talks since elections in March, the GreenLeft and Labour party discussed their own pact. In Nordic countries, four- or five-party coalitions are common. European politics is an increasingly complex (and increasingly Belgian) beast.
Stick a pin in almost any rich, western EU country and one will find a populist party polling between 10% and 20%, offering a cocktail of immigrant- and Brussels-bashing. Germany, again, fits the norm. Alternative for Germany (Af D) won about 10% of the vote on just such a platform. Only Italy, where such parties collectively attract 40% of the vote, and France, where Marine Le Pen is a possible (though unlikely) president, buck the trend. By contrast, the alternative on offer to German voters is standard European fare.
All European life is here
When asked why Germany does not take a bigger role in running the EU, Angela Merkel argued that it was impossible, since Germany was too much like the EU. Germany was already a delicate compromise between 16 different Länder (states), with a complicated relationship between its levels of government. German leadership was simply not feasible.
But if Germany resembled the EU constitutionally, it now matches the club politically. Germany is fragmented, like its neighbours; its main centre-left and centre-right parties share the same woes as their peers. The nightmare of forming coalitions will draw sympathetic noises from Dutch, Belgian and Nordic neighbours. Old voters behave in the same way in Germany as they do in France or Italy, as do their children; fringe parties are better at causing a racket than winning power. When it comes to elections in the EU, the votes may still be national. But the politics are distinctly European.
Quote from: Berkut on September 28, 2021, 10:36:42 AM
I predict France will eventually cease to exist, so Europe should look for security somewhere other then Paris.
We'll always have Paris. :sleep:
Interesting article, Sheilbh.
Re: the whole EU should develop its own independent military operational capabilities and/ or move away from the US, the Danish Prime Minsiter has recently said the following:
- The alliance between Europe and the US is the most significant alliance globally, and it's important to maintain it as such.
- This alliance has provided security and stability to not just Europe, but the whole world.
- We (Europe) should absolutely work to improve our ability to collaborate and act on issues there are important to us (f.x. migration and terror), but this should never happen at the expense of the trans-Atlantic relationship.
- When asked about the idea of a common EU defense policy, she thinks that's "very far away." NATO is both the starting point and the central point for any defense policy, and that's going to continue being the case in the future.
- It's only natural that there'll be conflicts, twists, and turns between collaborators but we should also take care not to take issues between individual countries (like, say, France and the US) and involve everyone else, nor should they be escalated to the point where they damage the alliance. If that happens it won't benefit any of us, but it'll benefit Russia and others who have ill intentions towards us.
She's a Social Democrat, but I think there is broad agreement across the political spectrum on this.
I think this aligns pretty closely with Sheilbh's analysis earlier of where France stands in terms of leading the EU in terms of security. There's a bit of a road to be travelled before they get there.
She read my post, clearly.
Quote from: Berkut on October 06, 2021, 12:28:59 PM
She read my post, clearly.
She may have, but I think this has been Danish (and many other EU countries) policy for quite a while. I honestly don't think it's changed substantially since 1945, and I don't foresee it changing any time soon.
Quote from: Jacob on October 06, 2021, 12:36:07 PM
Quote from: Berkut on October 06, 2021, 12:28:59 PM
She read my post, clearly.
She may have, but I think this has been Danish (and many other EU countries) policy for quite a while. I honestly don't think it's changed substantially since 1945, and I don't foresee it changing any time soon.
Of course. My position here is by no means new or ground breaking.
The attempt to break up NATO in favor of specific nations getting to be a slightly bigger fish in what they imagine to be a smaller pond (but is not), has been ongoing for some time.
QuotePolish court rules that EU laws incompatible with its constitution
Serious challenge to integration comes against backdrop of rows between ruling nationalists and Brussels
Poland's constitutional court has ruled that some European Union laws are in conflict with the country's constitution, in a serious challenge to a key tenet of European integration.
The constitutional tribunal ruled that some provisions of the EU treaties and some EU court rulings go against Poland's highest law. Two judges dissented from the majority opinion.
The ruling will define the future of Poland's already troubled relationship with the 27-member bloc in the key area of law and justice.
Quote from: The Larch on October 07, 2021, 11:34:23 AM
QuotePolish court rules that EU laws incompatible with its constitution
Serious challenge to integration comes against backdrop of rows between ruling nationalists and Brussels
Poland's constitutional court has ruled that some European Union laws are in conflict with the country's constitution, in a serious challenge to a key tenet of European integration.
The constitutional tribunal ruled that some provisions of the EU treaties and some EU court rulings go against Poland's highest law. Two judges dissented from the majority opinion.
The ruling will define the future of Poland's already troubled relationship with the 27-member bloc in the key area of law and justice.
So Poland will leave the EU? God I hope the door doesn't hit it on the way out.
So Martinus will exit the EU twice.
Polexit when?
Quote from: Zanza on October 07, 2021, 11:45:16 AM
Polexit when?
If it did happen they'd probably be more rational then the UK :D
Not great.
Still not particularly keen on withholding covid recovery funds (fair game on everything else), but that feels like the thing the Commission will point towards.
Quote from: celedhring on October 07, 2021, 11:39:10 AM
So Martinus will exit the EU twice.
Hes still in London?
I wonder if the poles (and friend) being extra cunty in recent years is due to brexit making them cocky the EU doesn't want another leaver.
Didn't Germany had a similar ruling not too long ago? I mean the primacy of German law over EU law?
Quote from: Tamas on October 08, 2021, 03:47:40 AM
Didn't Germany had a similar ruling not too long ago? I mean the primacy of German law over EU law?
Yeah - not for the first time. Karlsruhe has form for this. I've always thought their position is basically contrary to EU law but it's only been in theory so far and from a position of the EU it's dangerous.
I liked John Cotter's analogy that the difference is the Polish Tribunal set out to try and burn the EU legal order down. The German Constitutional Court was playing around with matches, tried to set a controlled fire, which got out of hand. It was quickly put out quietly, some people (me) got very annoyed and most would like to pretend it never happened.
But - the German Constitutional Court still has the matches, and the Polish Tribunal looked at it and thought it was interesting.
Quote from: Sheilbh on October 08, 2021, 04:50:20 AM
Quote from: Tamas on October 08, 2021, 03:47:40 AM
Didn't Germany had a similar ruling not too long ago? I mean the primacy of German law over EU law?
Yeah - not for the first time. Karlsruhe has form for this. I've always thought their position is basically contrary to EU law but it's only been in theory so far and from a position of the EU it's dangerous.
I liked John Cotter's analogy that the difference is the Polish Tribunal set out to try and burn the EU legal order down. The German Constitutional Court was playing around with matches, tried to set a controlled fire, which got out of hand. It was quickly put out quietly, some people (me) got very annoyed and most would like to pretend it never happened.
But - the German Constitutional Court still has the matches, and the Polish Tribunal looked at it and thought it was interesting.
In other words Germany is strong enough to be let to do whatever they want without triggering a backlash, but Poland is not.
The Spanish Constitutional Court ruled the same in the 1990s. The Constitution was then amended. :P
Quote from: Tamas on October 08, 2021, 05:40:10 AM
In other words Germany is strong enough to be let to do whatever they want without triggering a backlash, but Poland is not.
Maybe. I would say the German Constitutional Court is a very good court - and there is a lot of legal scholarship backing up their approach (it's "constitutional pluralism"). That's why it's a respectable position.
I've never thought the "constitutional pluralism" approach works and I've always thought it's a problem even when it was mainly Germany. In part that might just be a bias I've had since I was at law school and we were studying the approaches of different national constitutional systems to the EU - about 2/3s of my class went on to barristers and dressed like middle-aged barristers at the age of 21 or whatever (barbours, red trousers, weekends in the country etc), I'm 90% sure they were all Brexiteers and they absolutely loved the German court's approach. So I am biased.
But I think the bigger point is that this principle works because the German court is good and won't push it too far - but not all courts are as good (they may not be as technically impressive, or as impartial etc) and if they apply the same legal principle the entire EU order collapses. Daniel Keleman said that the "constitutional pluralist" line would be that they are horrified at this decision and the fact that an idea can be abused doesn't discredit the idea - which is true but it's the "guns don't kill people, people do" of EU law.
I am not a legal scholar, but I understand there is a difference between the two cases.
In Poland, the government asked the Constitutional Court to find that the Polish Constitution is of higher legal ranking than the EU treaties in conflict. The court confirmed that. That's fundamentally incompatible with EU membership.
The German Constitutional Court does of course acknowledge that the EU treaties are of higher legal ranking than our constitution.
The case about the ECB/ECJ recently was about whether some action of the ECB was covered by the EU treaties or ultra vires, i.e. beyond what the EU treaties allow. The German Constitutional Court asked the ECJ to adjudicate, which it did. However their opinion that the ECB was not acting ultra vires was supposedly not convincing. The way the German Constitutional judges read the EU treaties, the ECB acted ultra vires and the ECJ did not reign the ECB in, thereby itself acting ultra vires. As the EU institutions operate based on the transferred sovereignty of the member states, that implies there is a limit to EU institutional powers. The ECJ is only the highest Court within the limit of these treaties, but has no jurisdiction outside. The EU institutions deciding themselves where those limits are is against the treaties. The German Court thus said that the ECJ acted outside its competence to increase EU competence that was not transferred by the member states to the EU.
Obviously the member states, being the underlying sources of sovereign power of the EU must politically decide how much power to transfer. That's not for the ECJ to decide.
So the German case is at the very edge of whether or not something is an EU competence or not. This needs a political, not a judicial solution.
Yeah - I am not a German lawyer either it should be said. So I am not an expert.
The issue with the German Constitutional Court v the CJEU on the ECB ruling - is that national constitutional courts cannot determine whether or not European institutions are operating within their powers under the European legal order and cannot decide that CJEU rulings on that matter are invalid. It is why I think the Economist piece about this being a "Calhounian"/nullification crisis moment is spot on because it's effectively about who gets to decide the competence and extent of the EU legal order.
This has been running for decades between the Constitutional Court and the CJEU without coming to a head (because the Constitutional Court is a good court). The basic issue is the CJEU says they have exclusive authority to adjudicate in cases about the boundaries of EU and national competencies; the Constitutional Court says that because it's a transfer of sovereignty they have authority to rule on those cases and that German Basic Law bans the "transfer of competence to decide on its own competence" to the EU.
For a long time the view was that as this had never actually caused a clash or a serious crisis (the ECB case is the closest and the Constitutional Court was careful about this) - there was no need to address the issue. There was no need to answer and impose a hierarchy, instead issues should be resolved through dialogue etc. This is fine as long as the Constitutional Court doesn't push it to a crisis and the other 26 constitutional courts don't assert their rights too.
Ultimately the problem is if all 27 constitutional courts (as opposed to the CJEU) are able to determine the competence of the CJEU and the competence of the EU - then the entire legal order is destroyed. It would mean different things in each country and basically each member state would pick and choose which bits of EU law they wanted to be subject to through constitutional amendments. If national courts do think the CJEU has overstepped their powers they can state that obiter or they can basically say the government must leave if the situation doesn't change (i.e. through constitutional amendment or treaty changes). What they can't do, in my view, without blowing the whole thing up is invalidate CJEU rulings on the scope of EU competence.
I do think there is a difference with Germany but that difference is just that their court is a good court - it is genuinely independent, it is technically competent etc. But what's goes for that court has to go for the courts that aren't independent etc. That's why I think the Germany was playing with matches, Poland's trying to burn the house down analogy is true.
The basic principle here is the same - whether national courts can overrule or invalidate the rulings of the CJEU and the role of the national constitutional order in relation to the European constitutional order. Even if in Germany it is only focused through "kompetenz-kompetenz" question and monetary policy, while the Polish court is taking a broader approach and going after values. There is a difference with Germany - but I basically agree with Daniel Kelemen's analysis that the Constitutional Court's position on this is the doctrinal equivalent of a loaded gun for other member states (inlcuding authoritarian ones) to use.
This was absolutely predictable and predicted with the Constitutional Court's ruling:
https://verfassungsblog.de/national-courts-cannot-override-cjeu-judgments/
Quote from: The Brain on October 07, 2021, 11:37:07 AM
Quote from: The Larch on October 07, 2021, 11:34:23 AM
QuotePolish court rules that EU laws incompatible with its constitution
Serious challenge to integration comes against backdrop of rows between ruling nationalists and Brussels
Poland's constitutional court has ruled that some European Union laws are in conflict with the country's constitution, in a serious challenge to a key tenet of European integration.
The constitutional tribunal ruled that some provisions of the EU treaties and some EU court rulings go against Poland's highest law. Two judges dissented from the majority opinion.
The ruling will define the future of Poland's already troubled relationship with the 27-member bloc in the key area of law and justice.
So Poland will leave the EU? God I hope the door doesn't hit it on the way out.
they could also stay and try to change the rules. an equally valid option
When the chips are down, it's hard to imagine that any country with any sort of power would give up its sovereignty, and making some entity's laws superior over your own is pretty much that. The only way it would work is when the big players dictate what such laws are, make sure that none of them materially differ from their own, and then bully the minor members into submission.
The reference to Calhoun shows that the German Court is right: Unlike American states (or German states), EU member states are sovereign entities and can freely leave (see Brexit). They confer power to the EU, but that is by nature limited. The entity that is created by conferred sovereign powers cannot have the power to increase its own competence. If it had that, the member states would not be sovereign anymore. The EU is not (yet) a state and the ultimate arbiter of its powers are the governments of its member states. They can add and reduce to its powers. Not the CJEU.
You know that I am a European federalist, but in its current form, the EU is in fact limited, not sovereign and so is jurisdiction of the CJEU. The member state governments should strive towards developing the "Staatenverbund" into federation.
Quote from: Crazy_Ivan80 on October 08, 2021, 09:46:41 AM
Quote from: The Brain on October 07, 2021, 11:37:07 AM
Quote from: The Larch on October 07, 2021, 11:34:23 AM
QuotePolish court rules that EU laws incompatible with its constitution
Serious challenge to integration comes against backdrop of rows between ruling nationalists and Brussels
Poland's constitutional court has ruled that some European Union laws are in conflict with the country's constitution, in a serious challenge to a key tenet of European integration.
The constitutional tribunal ruled that some provisions of the EU treaties and some EU court rulings go against Poland's highest law. Two judges dissented from the majority opinion.
The ruling will define the future of Poland's already troubled relationship with the 27-member bloc in the key area of law and justice.
So Poland will leave the EU? God I hope the door doesn't hit it on the way out.
they could also stay and try to change the rules. an equally valid option
That leaves Poland still in the EU though.
Right - but doesn't that get to the point.
The EU's competence ultimately rests with the member states and as you say that is political. The CJEU is the only court that can rule on the interpretation of European law, in particular the treaties. So it is the only court capable of deciding whether or not something is within the powers granted by states through the treaties - it has always taken an expansive view of its role and of the EU's powers. The role of national courts if they disagree and believve the EU is now acting outside of its competence and in conflict with their constitutional provisions is to say that as a matter of domestic law: x government must either amend the constitution, seek an EU political solution (such as a treaty update) or leave the EU.
What they can't do if the EU is to exist in a meaningful way is override the CJEU's position on where, as a matter of European law, the EU's competence is - did the CJEU get the treaties? They have no authority to make that judgement. The practical consequence of that would be 27 different interpretations of when EU law applies and, I think, probably the politicisation of the Polish court would become the norm across Europe as national constitutional courts become an avenue of European politics.
Quote from: The Brain on October 08, 2021, 11:52:02 AM
Quote from: Crazy_Ivan80 on October 08, 2021, 09:46:41 AM
Quote from: The Brain on October 07, 2021, 11:37:07 AM
Quote from: The Larch on October 07, 2021, 11:34:23 AM
QuotePolish court rules that EU laws incompatible with its constitution
Serious challenge to integration comes against backdrop of rows between ruling nationalists and Brussels
Poland's constitutional court has ruled that some European Union laws are in conflict with the country's constitution, in a serious challenge to a key tenet of European integration.
The constitutional tribunal ruled that some provisions of the EU treaties and some EU court rulings go against Poland's highest law. Two judges dissented from the majority opinion.
The ruling will define the future of Poland's already troubled relationship with the 27-member bloc in the key area of law and justice.
So Poland will leave the EU? God I hope the door doesn't hit it on the way out.
they could also stay and try to change the rules. an equally valid option
That leaves Poland still in the EU though.
So? It's not a bad thing that the Brussels Bozos are taken down a few pegs
Quote from: Sheilbh on October 08, 2021, 12:00:09 PM
The role of national courts if they disagree and believve the EU is now acting outside of its competence and in conflict with their constitutional provisions is to say that as a matter of domestic law: x government must either amend the constitution, seek an EU political solution (such as a treaty update) or leave the EU.
That's what the German Constitutional Court did. It stated that the German government and parliament violated their constitutional obligations towards German citizens. Their violation is that they did not act in what the court considers the ultra vires act by the ECB.
Quote from: Zanza on October 08, 2021, 12:53:12 PM
That's what the German Constitutional Court did. It stated that the German government and parliament violated their constitutional obligations towards German citizens. Their violation is that they did not act in what the court considers the ultra vires act by the ECB.
That's part of what they did - from their English translation they determined that the judgement of the CJEU exceeded its competence under the treaties so its decision was ultra vires and "thus has no binding effect [in Germany]."
It also reviewed the position under European law of the ECB's actions.
But if national courts can decide that the CJEU is acting outside of its mandate in its decisions intepreting European law then EU cannot be applied across all member states. It undermines the entire legal order of the EU.
I'd add national courts also cannot start reviewing whether European insitutions are acting in accordance with European law or not - for the same reason. The German Constitutional Court also conditioned the consequences for the German government "unless the ECB Governing Council adopts a new decision that demonstrates in a comprehensible and substantiated manner that the monetary policy objectives pursued by the ECB are not disproportionate to the economic and fiscal policy effects resulting from the programme." Again that doesn't work if all 27 member states are doing it.
Edit: For what it's worth I'm not sure the court is wrong - I think the EU institutions are at the very edge of their powers under the treaties and if they go further (as they need to and should) I think that needs a new treaty.
As long as the EU is no federation, national courts can and will act like this. The solution is political, namely establishing a true federation. That's currently not feasible though.
But so far the only courts I'm aware of that have acted like this are the German and the Polish - and it's been a principle of CJEU jurisprudence since the 60s. The German Constitutional Court's take on this - from my little law school comparative study which was really minimal - had been pretty unique to Germany.
As I say the German Constitutional Court and the CJEU have always disagreed on this. Until recently they managed to stay out of each other's way. I think it's problematic as an idea, but purely as theory repeatedly stated but never acted on it can be almost ignored - but we're not at that stage any more.
Quote from: Zanza on October 08, 2021, 01:20:13 PM
The solution is political, namely establishing a true federation. That's currently not feasible though.
and may it long remain so
Quote from: Crazy_Ivan80 on October 09, 2021, 04:06:19 AM
Quote from: Zanza on October 08, 2021, 01:20:13 PM
The solution is political, namely establishing a true federation. That's currently not feasible though.
and may it long remain so
Personally I think its all been down hill since the next village over stopped being our mortal enemies.
https://verfassungsblog.de/whoever-equals-karlsruhe-to-warsaw-is-wildly-mistaken/
QuoteWhoever equates Karlsruhe to Warsaw is wildly mistaken
In the Polish, and to some extent also in the German public discourse, the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court of 5 May 2020 on the partial unconstitutionality of the ECB's PSP programme is considered to be qualitatively comparable to the ruling of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal of 7 October 2021. In this respect, the Polish judgement is merely seen as a continuation of the established case law of the Bundesverfassungsgericht. From a legal point of view, however, this is clearly false for several reasons, which will be briefly outlined here.
Effectively, the Polish ruling – unlike the German one – calls into question a cornerstone of European integration with its sweeping rejection of the primacy of European law, up to a point where there are serious doubts as to whether Poland can continue to remain part of the EU. In detail, the following differences exist:
1..In its tenor, the Polish court establishes the unconstitutionality of central primary law norms (Art. 1 and 19 TEU) and questions in principle the established primacy of European law with regard to the Polish constitution. The Federal Constitutional Court, on the other hand, in its case law consistently accepts the primacy also over the Constitution and in its ruling only classified an individual secondary legal act of an EU institution as ultra vires by way of exception.
2. By declaring primary legislation unconstitutional, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal is breaking new legal ground. This has never been done before in any Member State, especially since Article 1 TEU, a central article, is affected. Dogmatically, this is very doubtful in any case. In any case, the BVerfG's ruling was not about primary law, but about a secondary law purchase programme.
3. The Polish Constitutional Tribunal does not follow an established and limited doctrine of reservations and does not develop such a doctrine in this judgement. In any case, the judgement is notable for its lack of reasoning, especially in comparison to the BVerfG judgement. Unlike the latter, it is not about harmonising and reconciling European law in its claim to primacy with the requirements of the national constitution in a cooperative procedure. Rather, a blanket primacy of the Polish constitution is postulated (almost somewhat defiantly). There is not even an attempt to limit this constitutional primacy to certain constellations (such as national identity) and thus not to make it absolute.
4. The Polish Constitutional Tribunal's decision, unlike in the case of the Federal Constitutional Court, is not about a single act of a single EU institution. Rather, the primacy of European law is excluded comprehensively and for all areas with regard to the constitution. Contrary to public perception, this by no means only concerns the field of legal remedies. This was quite different at the BVerfG: Here it was only about the PSP programme; other, future purchase programmes were expressly not even covered.
5. Furthermore, the provisions of the Union Treaty are also classified as unconstitutional by the Polish Constitutional Tribunal to the extent that they jeopardize the Republic of Poland's functioning ,,as a sovereign and democratic state". What this is supposed to mean is completely unclear and ultimately open to the free interpretation of the Polish government. Taken literally, the Polish government can thus oppose any obligation that follows from European law. This would be nothing less than the end of the EU as a community of law. The supranational organisation would become a weak confederation of states. Once again, nothing comparable can be found in the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court.
6. The Polish Constitutional Tribunal's judgement has an effect primarily on the future and can and probably will be used against future judgements of the ECJ and other actions of the EU. This is probably also the reason why the Polish government itself applied for this ruling in the first place. The ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court, on the other hand, explicitly referred only to the ECB's PSP programme and explicitly excluded other purchase programmes. It therefore has rather an effect on the past. Now that the dispute over the proportionality of the PSP programme has been settled, it no longer has any direct effect. How the Court will decide in future rulings remains to be seen. The established reservations have been activated once; apart from that, the primacy of European law remains completely untouched, also and especially from the perspective of the BVerfG.
7. The Polish Constitutional Tribunal resists any form of alleged encroachment by the EU in general and the ECJ in particular. In contrast, the Federal Constitutional Court explicitly calls for stricter control by the ECJ and will then retreat again to its reserve role. Whatever one thinks of the BVerfG's ruling, it is in any case not directed against the institutional order of the EU, but rather wants to see it strengthened with respect to separation of powers.
8. With regard to the design of the national judicial system, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal ultimately denies any competence of the EU. This is practically untenable, since the Polish courts are part of the European judicial network and act within this framework as functional Union courts. For this reason, non-independent national courts are incompatible with the European rule of law, which is why such an organisation of a national judiciary can and must be sanctioned by the EU. This is a matter of fundamental principles, the non-existence of which would prevent EU accession. The case of the Federal Constitutional Court, on the other hand, was about very technical questions of monetary union, which ultimately do not threaten the foundation of the EU as such from the outset. In fact, the BVerfG's ruling did not even have any serious impact on the monetary union or the ECB's ability to act (as I, among others, have already predicted here).
9. The Polish Constitutional Tribunal denies national judges the established power to review the conformity of national measures with European law themselves and to disregard conflicting provisions. This is another fundamental encroachment on basic principles of the European judicial system and the community of law. Obviously, none of this can be found in the BVerfG decision.
In this context, the Polish Constitutional Court also prohibits national judges from applying superseded national law, insofar as the new superseding law should be contrary to European law. This also massively damages the legal community with effect in the future; the EU could no longer be considered a supranational organisation. There is nothing of that sort in the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court.
The bottom line is this: Regardless of what one thinks of the BVerfG ruling, the Polish ruling has a completely different quality. It shakes the foundations of European integration, massively impairs the functioning of the supranational European judicial system and, in this respect, primarily affects the future. With the blanket rejection of the primacy of European law, European integration in its previous form is no longer possible. Strictly speaking, Poland's remaining in the EU is no longer conceivable under these circumstances; the EU would be nothing more than a weak confederation of states (like the German Confederation of 1815-1866). The BVerfG's ruling, on the other hand, does not question any of the established principles, not even and especially not the primacy of European law, but merely sees the EU outside its competences in a very specific and hardly relevant field in the future. To put it differently: In one case, integration in general becomes practically impossible, while in the other case, only selective corrections are demanded without touching the basic principles. The dispute between the ECJ and the BVerfG can be resolved, the one between the Polish Constitutional Court and the EU (and the ECJ) cannot – at least not legally. Formally, this judgement still has to be published by the Polish government. Until then, it has no formal legal force. Irrespective of this, however, the political damage has already been done.
Here is what I wanted to say better than I could say it. The Polish case is a full scale repudiation of the basic principles of the European Union. They need to withdraw if they want to keep this ruling.
I don't really disagree with much of that - but I disagree that the German Constitutional Court's ruling wasn't "directed against the institutional order of the EU". It absolutely was - it overrode a CJEU ruling and said that European Union court had got European law wrong, so was acting ultra vires and the ruling was not applicable in Germany.
I also think it's slightly misleading because there was a long line of the German Constitutional Court flagging this possibility and the CJEU disagreeing. It never came to a head, but it's a bit like Scalia or Clarence Thomas's dissents and obiter statements. The ECB case didn't happen out of nowhere on its own merits alone - there'd been this trail of breadcrumbs and comments that had not actually been tested. I think ignoring that doesn't work.
As I say I think the Constitutional Court could be right legally, I think they are a good (competent, indpendent, non-politicised) court - but their line of reasoning in this and actually taking the steps they did over the ECB was opening the door to a less independent or politicised court from doing what the tribunal in Poland's done. And given the issues the EU has had enforcing the rule of law that was always only a matter of time. There is a difference for sure - but I'd go back to that analogy the Constituional Court was playing with matches, accidentally started a fire which has been quickly put out and everyone wants to move on, Poland's tribunal is trying to burn the house down.
Edit: Not related to the Poland issue - saw the front page in the FT was aboute the Russian ambassador to the EU saying gas supply issues could be solved more quickly if the EU stopped treating Russia like an "adversary" :ph34r:
If you consider a dispute on informing about a technical decision of an EU institution somehow the same as invalidating Article 1 of the Treaty of the European Union then sure, same thing.
Quote from: Zanza on October 12, 2021, 12:06:11 AM
If you consider a dispute on informing about a technical decision of an EU institution somehow the same as invalidating Article 1 of the Treaty of the European Union then sure, same thing.
Even if the legal technicalities make it a more minor point (I have no idea so I won't argue that) in term of EU impact the German decision can (and possibly did) have the same level of impact as the Poland one. Germany is the engine of the EU. Integration can survive Poland opting out, heck even Italy opting out, but cannot survive Germany opting out. The German decision IMHO was at least equally if not more dangerous precedent, simply due to the sheer size and influence of Germany.
Quote from: Tamas on October 12, 2021, 04:03:55 AM
Even if the legal technicalities make it a more minor point (I have no idea so I won't argue that) in term of EU impact the German decision can (and possibly did) have the same level of impact as the Poland one. Germany is the engine of the EU. Integration can survive Poland opting out, heck even Italy opting out, but cannot survive Germany opting out. The German decision IMHO was at least equally if not more dangerous precedent, simply due to the sheer size and influence of Germany.
I agree - and I'd add the prestige of the German Constitutional Court is huge internationally. It's a very respected and admired court.
My point isn't that the situations or the rulings are the same. Indeed, no two legal cases ever are. The point is that the principle written about by the Constitutional Court for decades and then used by them over the ECB issue was the same principle picked up and applied by the Polish court. That's the reason that - I think posted about it - when the ECB ruling came in in 2020 lots of people said: this is unprecedented and this will be used by Poland and Hungary (see the 20-25 or so European law academics' comment I posted earlier). And I agree it came from an important country and respectable court which provided even greater cover.
Now Hungary can make a similar case and write "as the esteemed courts of Germany and Poland have already established" :lol:
But the other concern I have right now is what the EU can do about this because I've read a few pieces and basically they have financial leverage and enforcement proceedings in the CJEU etc. But that seems to be it. It was agreed that the rule of law package would be approved but suspended until the CJEU heard the Polish and Hungarian challenges to it - those challenges are only at the hearing stage now. I'm not sure how quickly the CJEU can move - I'm not sure what it's quickest turnaround is but it normally takes about six months from the hearing to get the Advocate General's opinion and the opinion of the court follows six months after that.
In terms of Withdrawsaw, I've read a couple of pieces by different EU lawyers and their view is basically that for that to happen Poland would need to use Article 50 and there's no sign they will. There's an argument that the other member states could basically use enhanced cooperation to set up a "no Homers club" within the EU. Otherwise apparently the best alternative would be for the other 26 (maybe excluding Hungary) to do Article 50 immediately and re-found an EU 2. Obviously that doesn't sound very practical but that they're reaching for that suggests there's really not really many mechanisms available to deal with it.
I, for one, would love to see some sabre-rattling from Warsaw and Budapest. They are our main competitors for new contracts.
Quote from: Sheilbh on October 12, 2021, 04:25:34 AM
Quote from: Tamas on October 12, 2021, 04:03:55 AM
Even if the legal technicalities make it a more minor point (I have no idea so I won't argue that) in term of EU impact the German decision can (and possibly did) have the same level of impact as the Poland one. Germany is the engine of the EU. Integration can survive Poland opting out, heck even Italy opting out, but cannot survive Germany opting out. The German decision IMHO was at least equally if not more dangerous precedent, simply due to the sheer size and influence of Germany.
I agree - and I'd add the prestige of the German Constitutional Court is huge internationally. It's a very respected and admired court.
My point isn't that the situations or the rulings are the same. Indeed, no two legal cases ever are. The point is that the principle written about by the Constitutional Court for decades and then used by them over the ECB issue was the same principle picked up and applied by the Polish court. That's the reason that - I think posted about it - when the ECB ruling came in in 2020 lots of people said: this is unprecedented and this will be used by Poland and Hungary (see the 20-25 or so European law academics' comment I posted earlier). And I agree it came from an important country and respectable court which provided even greater cover.
Now Hungary can make a similar case and write "as the esteemed courts of Germany and Poland have already established" :lol:
But the other concern I have right now is what the EU can do about this because I've read a few pieces and basically they have financial leverage and enforcement proceedings in the CJEU etc. But that seems to be it. It was agreed that the rule of law package would be approved but suspended until the CJEU heard the Polish and Hungarian challenges to it - those challenges are only at the hearing stage now. I'm not sure how quickly the CJEU can move - I'm not sure what it's quickest turnaround is but it normally takes about six months from the hearing to get the Advocate General's opinion and the opinion of the court follows six months after that.
In terms of Withdrawsaw, I've read a couple of pieces by different EU lawyers and their view is basically that for that to happen Poland would need to use Article 50 and there's no sign they will. There's an argument that the other member states could basically use enhanced cooperation to set up a "no Homers club" within the EU. Otherwise apparently the best alternative would be for the other 26 (maybe excluding Hungary) to do Article 50 immediately and re-found an EU 2. Obviously that doesn't sound very practical but that they're reaching for that suggests there's really not really many mechanisms available to deal with it.
from what I heard is that the Polish ruling restricts primacy of EU in those areas where the EU itself is acting outside of the compentencies given to it in the treaties.
as for withdrawsaw? maybe the western europeans needs to become a bit more tolerant of views other than those common in their federalist bubble. Other people, other ideas you know.
and a federal eu? thanks but no thanks, far too many authoritarian tendencies in the EU as it is. Wouldn't want to give them power over all the countries and peoples inside the organisation.
(https://i.redd.it/sxwiheq95nt71.jpg)
Good on ya Holland. Get your shit together Sweden.
Quote from: Admiral Yi on October 15, 2021, 01:58:03 PM
Good on ya Holland. Get your shit together Sweden.
Dude, you should see my area.
Trust in national parliament:
(https://i.redd.it/jiuybdb3b0u71.png)
Shame the UK isn't involved in these anymore. As the response is just laughter.
Intrigued by: Austria, unexpected North-South division in Italy, Berlin v rest of former GDR.
It'd be really interesting to regional UK breakdown. Last time the "Quality of Governance" surveys were done (I think 2018-19 and 2017) the UK was basically the same as western Germany/the Netherlands (and, interestingly, improved from 2013 and 2010 the previous rounds - possibly slow detoxification from expenses scandal?). But I can't see if they asked this specific question/can't get a breakdown.
Swedes must really hate each other if they trust more their parliament than other (Swedish) people. :D
Also, glad to see Castilians, Basques and Catalonians share something, if a very low trust in the Cortes Generales. :lol:
I wonder if hardcore pro-independence dudes are rating the Catalan parliament instead of the Spanish one :hmm:
Who doesn't trust the guys in Parliament?
Quote from: The Brain on October 17, 2021, 03:52:27 PM
Who doesn't trust the guys in Parliament?
Good question. Someone should make a handy map for reference.
From a Brussel correspondent:
QuoteAlex Pigman
@AlexRPigman
Germany and France have pressed upon EU council chief Charles Michel to keep rule-of-law off the agenda at the EU summit. He has (so far) acquiesced. Merkel on Friday said that careful dialogue with Warsaw should be the way and France never warms to the topic anyway.
In other words, neither of them want the LGBTI fireworks from the summit in June, where Merkel and Macron came out as dinosaurs when the summit veered into an emotional free-for-all against Viktor Orban on LGBTI rights, sparked by PM Rutte of the NL and Bettel of Lux.
Can Merkel/Macron put the genie back in the bottle? A lot will probably hang on the Polish PM's speech in Strasbourg tomorrow, and of course if Rutte and friends make rule-of-law a topic on Thursday, regardless of the agenda.
This sounds sub-optimal.
I get Merkel's point that part of the deal to get the rule of law stuff through was a promise to Poland and Hungary that it wouldn't be used while their case is still at the CJEU asking if these rule rule of law package is ultra vires (which it could be, it certainly seems beyond the treaties - though the CJEU willl never find that). But as I say the CJEU might expedite things, if not then it'll be probably a year before a decision and I feel like Duda and Orban could get a lot done in a year.
Edit: From other Brussels reporters/commentators it feels like the likely solution (which will just kick the can down the road) is that the Commission will approve the Polish recovery fund plan so Poland gets that money, but activate the rule of law mechanism which will start a fairly lengthy procedure. Everyone can say something's been done and there's enough of a compromise that everyone saves face - of course the legal situation in Poland is unchanged and uncompromised on but... :hmm:
Morawiecki was invited to speak to the European Parliament and it doesn't seem to have gone well. To begin with he was apparently asked to speak for 5 minutes (which seems short for a head of a government in a big fight with the EU) but apparently had been told he had longer beforehand. He spoke for over 30 minutes.
VdL's argument is it's a challenge to the European legal order and they won't allow common values to be put at risk. She invoked John Paul II and Walesa - that might appeal to older Poles but I imagine have less relevance for the young women protesting Poland's abortion laws.
Morawiecki talked about constituional pluralism and "judgements of courts from other EU member states" (as expected). He also had an attack on the Netherlands and Luxembourg (Benelux nations are pushing for rule of law to be on the EUCO agenda). Basically he says the EU tolerates tax havens at the heart of the EU, who are rich countries making other European countries poorer and don't address that (because it's a little bit beyond the treaties) but will go after Poland for what its doing to the judiciary (also a little bit beyond the treaties). Basically the EU is, without base in law, attacking and financially blackmailing some countries while giving others a fair ride.
He went for a European originalism/textualism that the CJEU keeps coming up with new competencies of the EU in its case law "despite what the treaties say", which isn't an entirely untrue point. He talked about establishing a new chamber of the CJEU that's composed of judge's nominated by each member state's constitutional court to help stop this.
And complained about the EU having bigger problems while they're focusing on this - particularly noting the bigger problems around Russia, energy, security in CEE which he positioned Poland as being a leader on (with some amazing historical takes like Poland saved Paris from communism in 1920).
It then took an energy detour when a German Green MEP accused Morawiecki of acting like Putin. Morawiecki responded with a comment about the German government allowing Nord Stream 2 and quoted the Polish defence minister in comparing it to a "modern day Molotov-Ribbentrop pact". VdL noted that with turning to Nord Stream "your arguments are not getting better, you are just escaping the debate."
Lots of clips on Twitter from all the MEPs having their two minutes to berate him which I get is just the parliament venting (and they can put it on their own socials for their own constituents) but I think will be something that PiS will definitely package on social media.
I also slightly worry about the fact that this fight in Poland is being led by Tusk and PO because I think it might lead to partisan identities splitting view on Europe (there's already a poll which has shown support for staying in the EU fall from 85-90% to about 2/3s) - I'd worry about Europe becoming a PO/PiS issue and it might be wise for Tusk/the opposition to take a step back and allow more obviously non-partisan pro-EU movement/protests.
Today was Merkel's 107th and likely last EU Council. She was lauded there, but I find her record mixed.
I don't think history will be as kind to Merkel as contemporaries seem to be. I keep returning to the decision on closing down the nuclear plants because of Fukushima because I have found that to be a perfect summary of her rule. A great sense and taste for immediate political benefits, actioned with an eye toward consensus and avoiding conflict. Great for day to day management but not very good for doing what needs to be done.
Quote from: Zanza on October 22, 2021, 09:08:55 AM
Today was Merkel's 107th and likely last EU Council. She was lauded there, but I find her record mixed.
Yeah. I think it's undoubted that she's incredibly valuable within the Council because she does keep dialogue open and help build towards a common solution.
But on the big, strategic European items - energy, rise of China, rise of authoritaraianism within Europe - I'm not sure her record is strong. I think with the Euro crisis there is a case that her and her government helped save the Euro, my perspective would be that they pushed it to the brink (and that might happen again post covid if the FDP get the Finance Ministry). The most difficult for me is migration because I think her response was correct and outstanding on the refugee crisis, but I think the fact it was alone possibly led to the situation we now have of a harder and more lethal border around Europe and relying on Erdogan etc to keep migrants out.
The big problem I have is that I try to think of her great achievement/legacy as a leader and I'm not sure I can think of one - possibly the refugee crisis, maybe the (German) response to the financial crisis? It's not nothing but it feels less substantive than you'd expect after 3 terms.
I also find it slightly odd that she voted against gay marriage in 2017 when it was legalised, but was still a liberal icon for many globally - I always felt it was more because of what people projected onto Merkel (and others - I think there's similar madness with RBG, with Macron, with Arden etc) rather than anything to do with her actual politics. I think I remember reading one piece in the UK that was some incredibly torturous conspiracy theory about why Merkel voted against it. It was bizarre.
QuoteI don't think history will be as kind to Merkel as contemporaries seem to be.
I think a lot of that depends on what comes next.
Norway really need to gets it's shit sorted.
Quote from: Sheilbh on October 22, 2021, 09:36:18 AM
I also find it slightly odd that she voted against gay marriage in 2017 when it was legalised, but was still a liberal icon for many globally - I always felt it was more because of what people projected onto Merkel (and others - I think there's similar madness with RBG, with Macron, with Arden etc) rather than anything to do with her actual politics. I think I remember reading one piece in the UK that was some incredibly torturous conspiracy theory about why Merkel voted against it. It was bizarre.
QuoteI don't think history will be as kind to Merkel as contemporaries seem to be.
I think a lot of that depends on what comes next.
Who the hell projected on Jupin besides you? :D
Quote from: Grey Fox on October 22, 2021, 09:47:45 AM
Norway really need to gets it's shit sorted.
What are you referring to?
Quote from: Jacob on October 22, 2021, 10:16:10 AM
Quote from: Grey Fox on October 22, 2021, 09:47:45 AM
Norway really need to gets it's shit sorted.
What are you referring to?
The previous maps, Trust in Others and Parliements. No data from Norway. As an outsider, it really seems incomplete.
Quote from: Grey Fox on October 22, 2021, 10:26:09 AM
The previous maps, Trust in Others and Parliements. No data from Norway. As an outsider, it really seems incomplete.
:lol:
Quote from: Jacob on October 22, 2021, 10:29:11 AM
Quote from: Grey Fox on October 22, 2021, 10:26:09 AM
The previous maps, Trust in Others and Parliements. No data from Norway. As an outsider, it really seems incomplete.
:lol:
Norway is such a grey zone. :lol:
Quote from: Duque de Bragança on October 22, 2021, 10:12:30 AM
Who the hell projected on Jupin besides you? :D
I think there was loads of international interest/projection on Macron - which he actively encourages/encouraged. Just do a Google search in the American press in 2017. As I say same with Arden, Trudeau etc.
Quote from: Sheilbh on October 22, 2021, 10:44:05 AM
Quote from: Duque de Bragança on October 22, 2021, 10:12:30 AM
Who the hell projected on Jupin besides you? :D
I think there was loads of international interest/projection on Macron - which he actively encourages/encouraged. Just do a Google search in the American press in 2017. As I say same with Arden, Trudeau etc.
So the Golden Veal burning phase is over?
Jupin is less worse than Trudeau. Beyond that...
Quote from: Duque de Bragança on October 22, 2021, 10:56:41 AM
Jupin is less worse than Trudeau. Beyond that...
It always surprises me when non-Canadians have opinions on Trudeau. I can broadly guess what your objections are to him given what I know of your politics, but I'm still curious about any specifics. What are you rating him on, and how is he worse than Jupin?
Partially this because I'm curious which things about Trudeau has travelled beyond Canada and which remain, and partially it'll help me understand a bit more about Jupin (whom I know very little about).
Quote from: Jacob on October 22, 2021, 11:29:01 AM
Partially this because I'm curious which things about Trudeau has travelled beyond Canada and which remain, and partially it'll help me understand a bit more about Jupin (whom I know very little about).
As I say I think it's projection in large part. In the case of Macron (unlike, I think, Merkel, Trudeau, Arden etc), deliberately courted it.
I think it was British and American liberals (particularly of the "centrist dad" variety in the UK :lol:) following Brexit, then Trump, then Johnson looking at foreign leaders with a bit of yearning/envy. I think it normally involves divorcing that leader from any relevant domestic political context or from their policies and just idealising them based on their behaviour as "adults in the room" and occasionally reported. Of course there is an irony in people frustrated at idiot voters in their own country being fooled by PR and not substance attaching their political identity to foreign leaders understood in a vacuum.
Quote from: Sheilbh on October 22, 2021, 09:36:18 AMI think with the Euro crisis there is a case that her and her government helped save the Euro ...
Heh. What case would that be?
Draghi saved the Euro. The best you can say about Merkel is that she let it happen (not that there were many alternatives at that point).
As Tamas says, she strikes me as a shrewd politician, but a mediocre stateswoman. Sadly that describes so many of our leaders ...
Quote from: Jacob on October 22, 2021, 11:29:01 AM
Quote from: Duque de Bragança on October 22, 2021, 10:56:41 AM
Jupin is less worse than Trudeau. Beyond that...
It always surprises me when non-Canadians have opinions on Trudeau. I can broadly guess what your objections are to him given what I know of your politics, but I'm still curious about any specifics. What are you rating him on, and how is he worse than Jupin?
Partially this because I'm curious which things about Trudeau has travelled beyond Canada and which remain, and partially it'll help me understand a bit more about Jupin (whom I know very little about).
Mostly multiculturalism. Even Jupin does not go that far, at least openly.
There is a Québécois columnist in the Figaro, Zemmour had been making references to Québec every now and then so Trudeau is not an unknown over here, helped by the Francophonie aspect.
https://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/societe/2017/02/22/31003-20170222ARTFIG00264-eric-zemmour-notre-avenir-s-ecrit-au-quebec.php (https://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/societe/2017/02/22/31003-20170222ARTFIG00264-eric-zemmour-notre-avenir-s-ecrit-au-quebec.php)
This goes both ways, I still remember this hilarious rant by a very right-wing Québécois about bloody French leftists
Sales GAUCHISTES ! (French only sorry), groupies of Trudeau. :D
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PHx9jbxyuXk (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PHx9jbxyuXk)
Holding Quebec up as a model of multiculturalism sounds odd to these anglo-Canadian ears.
and yet.
We're better at it than France.
And RoC confuses religion for identity.
Write that twice as large in French :P
Quote from: Zanza on October 22, 2021, 09:08:55 AM
Today was Merkel's 107th and likely last EU Council. She was lauded there, but I find her record mixed.
She really was lauded. I mean good lord man, get a grip:
QuoteJessica Parker
@MarkerJParker
#CharlesMichel has been paying tribute to #AngelaMerkel at #EUCO and it's quite something
In the room he's apparently told her: "You are a monument... EUCO without Angela is like Rome without the Vatican or Paris without the Eiffel Tower."
He's described her "extreme sobriety & simplicity" as a "powerful seduction weapon"
And said she's a "compass and a shining light of our European project."
Whatever happened to just saying "it's been nice working with you and we've had a whip-round to get you this carriage clock" <_<
Quote from: Sheilbh on October 22, 2021, 01:57:40 PM
She really was lauded. I mean good lord man, get a grip:
QuoteJessica Parker
@MarkerJParker
#CharlesMichel has been paying tribute to #AngelaMerkel at #EUCO and it's quite something
In the room he's apparently told her: "You are a monument... EUCO without Angela is like Rome without the Vatican or Paris without the Eiffel Tower."
That sounds like a Cole porter song.
QuoteQuoteHe's described her "extreme sobriety & simplicity" as a "powerful seduction weapon"
Er... what? :huh:
Quote from: Savonarola on October 22, 2021, 02:04:40 PMEr... what? :huh:
I can't even imagine how uncomfortable that must have been in the room.
It reminds me of the Christopher Hitchens piece about how Thatcher was sexy and seductive - I just feel like straight men shouldn't be allowed opinions on women politicians until they can resist the temptation to talk about their "seductiveness".
I don't know, talking about merkels seductiveness sounds like what a closeted gay man would say to overcompensate :D . Like Captain Holt from Brooklyn Nine Nine when he's under cover as a straight man :D
Quote from: Sheilbh on October 22, 2021, 02:11:15 PM
Quote from: Savonarola on October 22, 2021, 02:04:40 PMEr... what? :huh:
I can't even imagine how uncomfortable that must have been in the room.
It reminds me of the Christopher Hitchens piece about how Thatcher was sexy and seductive - I just feel like straight men shouldn't be allowed opinions on women politicians until they can resist the temptation to talk about their "seductiveness".
I was curious and googled what you were talking about.
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/margaret-thatcher-iron-lady_b_1199269
It's weird all right, but the backstory is that he was asked to answer the rather silly question "Who Are More Attractive: Left-Wing Women or Right-Wing Women?". David Brooks took the opposite position, writing as a rightie that left-wing women are more attractive.
Quote from: Savonarola on October 22, 2021, 02:04:40 PM
Er... what? :huh:
(https://static.reuters.com/resources/r/?m=02&d=20080418&t=2&i=3936139&r=img-2008-04-18T180500Z_01_NOOTR_RTRMDNC_0_India-331130-1&w=800)
:perv:
Quote from: Barrister on October 22, 2021, 02:26:11 PM
I was curious and googled what you were talking about.
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/margaret-thatcher-iron-lady_b_1199269
It's weird all right, but the backstory is that he was asked to answer the rather silly question "Who Are More Attractive: Left-Wing Women or Right-Wing Women?". David Brooks took the opposite position, writing as a rightie that left-wing women are more attractive.
For that article - but it was (at least) his second article on the sexiness of Thatcher. As he writes there:
QuoteI did once, however, reap an enormous mailbag of the "Come off it; you must be kidding; let's get out of here" sort. This was when, in New Statesman, I discoursed a bit on what to me was obvious, viz., the sexual magnetism of Margaret Hilda Roberts, the second Mrs. Denis Thatcher, and now a full-blown baroness.
The year was 1977 or so, and she was still a very provisional Leader of the Opposition. At the New Statesman, which was then the flagship journal of the British left, it was easy to share in the prevalent view, which was that the Tories had made a historic mistake. By picking that "shrill, narrow, suburban housewife," they had surrendered the all-important middle ground of politics and set themselves up for a thorough trouncing as "extremists" and "ideologues." I had other reasons for thinking this opinion to be a mistaken one, but this article is not about my foresight. It's about my political libido.
I think the 77 piece (when Brooks was a teenager) about how she was "surprisingly sexy" :ph34r: :x
Quote from: Sheilbh on October 22, 2021, 02:41:04 PM
Quote from: Barrister on October 22, 2021, 02:26:11 PM
I was curious and googled what you were talking about.
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/margaret-thatcher-iron-lady_b_1199269
It's weird all right, but the backstory is that he was asked to answer the rather silly question "Who Are More Attractive: Left-Wing Women or Right-Wing Women?". David Brooks took the opposite position, writing as a rightie that left-wing women are more attractive.
For that article - but it was (at least) his second article on the sexiness of Thatcher. As he writes there:
QuoteI did once, however, reap an enormous mailbag of the "Come off it; you must be kidding; let's get out of here" sort. This was when, in New Statesman, I discoursed a bit on what to me was obvious, viz., the sexual magnetism of Margaret Hilda Roberts, the second Mrs. Denis Thatcher, and now a full-blown baroness.
The year was 1977 or so, and she was still a very provisional Leader of the Opposition. At the New Statesman, which was then the flagship journal of the British left, it was easy to share in the prevalent view, which was that the Tories had made a historic mistake. By picking that "shrill, narrow, suburban housewife," they had surrendered the all-important middle ground of politics and set themselves up for a thorough trouncing as "extremists" and "ideologues." I had other reasons for thinking this opinion to be a mistaken one, but this article is not about my foresight. It's about my political libido.
I think the 77 piece (when Brooks was a teenager) about how she was "surprisingly sexy" :ph34r: :x
But it surely can't be as creepy as the bit in this article where he talks about being literally spanked by Thatcher back in '77...
Quote from: Duque de Bragança on October 22, 2021, 12:47:48 PM
Mostly multiculturalism. Even Jupin does not go that far, at least openly.
Ah yeah, that makes sense given what I know of your perspective. I'm not sure how much of it is fairly attributed to Trudeau on a personal level versus how much it is down to the cultural and political differences between Canada and France (and indeed, the rest of Europe). But I can see how Trudeau would compare as more committed to multiculturalism than most mainstream European politicians for sure.
Not strictly EU related, but tangential to the crisis at hand between the EU and Poland.
QuotePoland to create War Losses Institute to push for German WWII reparations.
Poland's government is to form an Institute of War Losses (Instytut Strat Wojennych) that will focus on the damage caused to the country by German and Soviet occupation in the Second World War.
The ruling party, Law and Justice (PiS), has long argued that Poland is still owed huge amounts in reparations, from Germany in particular. The Nazi-German occupation resulted in millions of deaths, the almost complete destruction of many cities, as well as large-scale looting of art and other cultural heritage.
But Berlin has rejected such claims, arguing that Poland renounced its right to reparations in the 1950s. Russia last year said "it should be Poland paying us for liberating them", referring to the Soviet Union's defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945 (six years after Stalin and Hitler had divided Poland between them).
Over two years ago, PiS claimed that a parliamentary committee it had established to calculate how much Germany still owes Poland had completed its report. Its chairman, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, a PiS MP, suggested that the bill could amount to $850 billion. Yet since then, the report has remained unpublished.
Nevertheless, the government now plans to set up an institute dedicated to the issue. "Thanks to [Prime Minister] Morawiecki, an Institute of War Losses will be established," tweeted Mularczyk on Saturday, saying that it would "carry out further work on the [financial] balance of the German and Soviet occupation during WWII."
Speaking to Polska Times, the MP said that the institute would bring together experts to research, document, analyse and present information relating to war losses. He likened it to Israel's Yad Vashem, which commemorates and researches the Holocaust.
Critics, however, have suggested that the plans are simply an effort to further draw out what they see as a political exercise rather than a genuine attempt to seek reparations from Germany.
"So PiS is withdrawing from the idea of reparations (doomed from the beginning) but, to cover that up, it is creating an institution that will employ a few greedy people," tweeted legal scholar Wojciech Sadurski. "The taxpayer pays for their stupidity."
Even a fellow MP from Poland's ruling national-conservative coalition responded to Mularczyk's announcement with surprise. "It has been six years since Poles were promised a legal battle for reparations from Germany," tweeted Janusz Kowalski. "When will Poland officially submit a diplomatic note to Germany?"
Mularczyk himself admitted last month that the decision on publishing the final report on estimated German war damages "will be related to the political decisions of the party leadership and the government", notes wPolityce.
Mularczyk's Parliamentary Group for the Estimation of Compensation Due to Poland from Germany for Damages Caused During World War II was established in 2017, two years after PiS returned to power.
The next year, Mularczyk announced that estimated losses to the Polish state caused by Nazi Germany's invasion and occupation in 1939-45 stood at $850 billion. In May 2019, Mularczyk announced that the committee's "report is ready" and that he wanted it to be made public on 1 September that year – the 80th anniversary of the German invasion.
However, after that did not happen, Mularczyk said on 2 September 2019 that work was still underway on "proofreading and translating" the report. Two years later, on the same date last month, government spokesman Piotr Müller announced that "work relating to the details of the report is just being completed".
Also speaking last month, Mularczyk told the Wprost weekly that the formation of a new ruling coalition in Germany makes this a good time to raise the issue of reparations. He noted that "both the Greens and the Free Democratic Party are groups with which there is a possibility of dialogue on this matter".
Country of origin for people in Austria not born here:
(https://i.redd.it/l6m7vbevmsv71.jpg)
Oh a to live in a place with no Americans, Brits or French.
Quote from: Grey Fox on October 26, 2021, 01:07:53 PM
Oh a to live in a place with no Americans, Brits or French.
According to Austrian statistics there were 9,313 French, 11,529 Brits and 8,542 USians in Austria at the start of 2021.
Quote from: Grey Fox on October 26, 2021, 01:07:53 PM
Oh a to live in a place with no Americans, Brits or French.
The three main imperial powers over the last couple hundred years - good luck. :D
Nordmazedonian, though obvious when you read the whole thing, at first reads like a really badass fantasy people.
(Nord)Mazedonien seems more common than (Nord)Makedonien these days in German. Makedonien being closer to the original pronunciation.
As German politics becomes more European, so the rest of Europe's politics becomes more German :lol:
Quote'Only two pages' of Luxembourg PM's university thesis were not plagiarised
Xavier Bettel admits dissertation 'should have been done differently' after investigation uncovers plagiarism
Jon Henley
@jonhenley
Wed 27 Oct 2021 17.01 BST
First published on Wed 27 Oct 2021 16.08 BST
Luxembourg's prime minister, Xavier Bettel, has admitted his university thesis "should have been done differently" after a media investigation concluded that only two of the work's 56 pages had not been plagiarised.
https://www.theguardian.com/education/2021/oct/27/luxembourg-xavier-bettel-university-thesis-was-mostly-plagiarised
(https://preview.redd.it/x6top6yl07w71.png?width=640&crop=smart&auto=webp&s=82dd3dbd0b64f1f3169f9f610814f1d346e5d4a0)
This seems to be getting worse and worse:
QuotePolish PM blames Vladimir Putin for Belarus border crisis
Mateusz Morawiecki says Russian president is mastermind behind flow of migrants towards EU borders
(https://i.guim.co.uk/img/media/b56198e497fc8f7fafb04735fd082fb00510ee9c/0_0_3072_1843/master/3072.jpg?width=620&quality=85&auto=format&fit=max&s=b1ac7e2a65c80b7df6780bec99658a67)
People at the Belarusian-Polish border in the Grodno region on Monday. Photograph: Leonid Shcheglov/Belta/AFP/Getty Images
Andrew Roth in Moscow
Wed 10 Nov 2021 10.23 GMT
Poland's prime minister has accused Vladimir Putin of "masterminding" the migrant crisis on Belarus's border with the EU, while Minsk's key ally in the Kremlin pointed the blame at Europe.
The escalating rhetoric, including claims from the Belarusian leader, Alexander Lukashenko, that Russia could join a potential conflict at the border, has underlined the role that regional alliances are playing in the standoff and ensuing humanitarian crisis.
Poland and Lithuania have declared a state of emergency on their borders with Belarus, where Lukashenko has been accused of ferrying asylum-seekers from the Middle East to the EU's borders as revenge for the bloc's criticism of his crackdown on opposition.
The arrival of more than 1,000 migrants and refugees, many from Iraqi Kurdistan, at the Polish border on Monday brought the crisis to a head. Polish border guards said on Wednesday that two groups of several dozen people had breached the borders overnight. They were arrested and expelled, they said. Lithuanian border guards said they had prevented 281 attempts to cross the border illegally on Tuesday.
At an extraordinary session of parliament on Tuesday evening, the Polish prime minister, Mateusz Morawiecki, squarely pointed the blame for the crisis at Moscow and Putin, calling the Russian leader an "enabler" of Lukashenko.
"This attack which Lukashenko is conducting has its mastermind in Moscow, the mastermind is President Putin," Morawiecki said in the Sejm, Poland's lower house of parliament, which is dominated by the rightwing Law and Justice party.
Morawiecki said Putin was determined to "rebuild the Russian empire" and called the crisis at the border "a new kind of war, in which people are used as living shields".
The remarks are the most direct accusations against Russia yet in a crisis where the Kremlin has not played an overt role. Belarusian travel agencies have issued visas and brought hundreds of people from Iraq, Syria and other countries to Minsk, from where they then travel west to try to cross the border and from Poland pass on to Germany. Many of the airlines carrying the migrants and refugees are Belarusian or based in the Middle East.
Moscow has been an increasingly crucial ally for Belarus in the past year, backing Lukashenko after his brutal crackdown on protests and after his grounding of a Ryanair flight in May that set off a fresh round of sanctions and pushed Minsk further into isolation.
EU countries have threatened new sanctions and accused Lukashenko of "human trafficking" and "gangster-style" tactics.
On Tuesday, Russia's foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, said western countries including EU member states, and Nato, were the "root" of the migrant crisis.
"They were pushing for a western-style better life and democracy the way it is interpreted by the west," he said, referring to US-led interventions and alleged western backing for the Arab spring.
Lukashenko and Putin held a phone call to discuss the border crisis on Tuesday. On Wednesday, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, a military alliance of ex-Soviet states, said it was following the crisis "very closely and with concern".
"The migrant crisis may evolve into a great disaster for thousands of civilians, including numerous women and children," the CSTO secretariat said in a statement. Dominated by Moscow, the group is seen as the Kremlin's answer to Nato.
Earlier, western media reported remarks from a Nato spokesperson that the military alliance "stands ready" to provide help to end the crisis.
Reuters reported on Wednesday that the EU was close to imposing more sanctions on Belarus, targeting 30 individuals and entities including the foreign minister and the Belarusian airline Belavia, with approval likely as early as next week.
From what I've read there are direct flights from Turkish Airlines and AeroFlot from Syria, Iraq and Lebanon for people with visas being issued by Belarus. They are then ending up between borders as Poland and Lithuania try to push them back - and there are now tens of thousands of troops and police on Poland's border - while the Belarussian guards push them forward.
My suspicion is that Morawiecki's right - though he's rejected offers of help from Frontex - about this from Russia's angle. I could be wrong but my guess is that this may link into Russia absorbing Belarus and getting European acqueisance of chaos on the borders with Lukashenko v peaceful borders with Putin/Russia.
More generally I think with gas supplies and with migration, especially with the Turkish angle, Russia is really pushing and probing at Europe's ability to respond over the places it has leverage. In retrospect I think the sanctions in response to the Ryanair flight incident was probably not enough. There should have been a stronger response. But again I'm not sure there is a strong enough response from Europe to stop Russia probing further - while there is an offer of support from the EU/Frontex there's also the standard calls for dialogue and for Putin to use his influence in Belarus to calm things down which I think is counter-productive and he will interpret as weakness.
It'd be nice if the UK other non-EU/NATO partners and the EU could work with Poland to help them deal with this because I think it's more than just migration/Schengen.
I believe that Iraq has already closed down the Belarussian embassy in their country because of all the visas they were issuing. A plane leasing company has been already warned by the EU about this, as the Belarussian state airline was using leased Irish planes to bring people from Iraq into Belarus.
Apparently Russian and Belarussian aircraft have been deployed to the border area to "patrol and inspect it".
In the videos I've seen the attitude of the Belarussian border guards is deplorable, they're basically herding the inmigrants in such a way, including intimidating "warning" shots, so they'll assault the border and enter Poland.
Yeah - I think Poland is right. This is not part of the "migration crisis" this is weaponising migrants as part of multiple attacks/challenges on Europe - including gas as well.
Quote from: Sheilbh on November 10, 2021, 08:28:07 AM
Yeah - I think Poland is right. This is not part of the "migration crisis" this is weaponising migrants as part of multiple attacks/challenges on Europe - including gas as well.
Absolutely, it is pretty clear that this is a planned and orchestrated operation, either by Belarus with Russian tacit approval/help/supervision, or directly by Russia employing Belarus as a pawn.
Quote from: The Larch on November 10, 2021, 08:29:21 AM
Quote from: Sheilbh on November 10, 2021, 08:28:07 AM
Yeah - I think Poland is right. This is not part of the "migration crisis" this is weaponising migrants as part of multiple attacks/challenges on Europe - including gas as well.
Absolutely, it is pretty clear that this is a planned and orchestrated operation, either by Belarus with Russian tacit approval/help/supervision, or directly by Russia employing Belarus as a pawn.
I am slightly puzzled by the end game though. Are they trying to orchestrate an "attack on radio towers" moment to fabricate a CB? Surely they would not pull that against Poland, not before doing it to the Baltic States.
Are they hoping to destabilise Poland? Judging by 2015, this should be a godsend to the Polish government. Back in 2015, Orban's regime was creaking under increased internal and external pressure much like the Polish one now, then the mass of migrants appeared and provided a handy enemy to keep Orban in power stably since.
I guess the most probable reason is that Lukasenko are trying to pull an Erdogan and extort tribute from the EU in exchange of holding these migrants prisoner and away from the border.
I think probably a bit of that from Lukashenko and this is way of retaliating for European sanctions over the Ryanair flight.
From a Russian perspective as I say my suspicion is they have never yet met concerted European opposition so this is just another line of attack against hostile states that is aimed at undermining the EU and NATO. Probably the same way they are currently it seems already using gas for political ends. I also wonder if he does want to move to absorb Lukashenko and get Europe to not resist by positioning at as chaos on your borders with Lukashenko, or security and stability with Putin (possibly before 2024). But once that's done, obviously, Russia will start pushing again in other areas and with other methods.
For Lukashenko it seems to be a knee-jerk way to get back at the EU for all the pressure they've started to exert on his regime after his crackdown on the country's opposition. For Putin it is maybe just another way to keep stirring the pot and creating chaos. In general from these two there's also a rhetoric of "this is what you get for supporting the Arab Spring and political opposition in other countries".
And in this case the Russian governments statements are explicitly that this is just Poland/the Baltics reaping what they sowed but participating in the invasion of Iraq.
If it is so obviously manufactured, what's the potential damage to NATO/EU?
It seems a win all round for Russia. Fucking with Poland whilst boosting support for Russia friendly anti immigrant parties elswhere in Europe.
I do wonder why Belarus is going along with it though if it is all putins doing.
It's a really shitty situation. Hope Poland grows a smudge of humanity and at the least doesnt leave kids to freeze in the forest.
Quote from: Tyr on November 10, 2021, 09:49:32 AM
I do wonder why the puppet is going along with it though if it is all the puppet master's doing.
FYP and answered the question.
Quote from: The Minsky Moment on November 10, 2021, 10:10:19 AM
Quote from: Tyr on November 10, 2021, 09:49:32 AM
I do wonder why the puppet is going along with it though if it is all the puppet master's doing.
FYP and answered the question.
Past experience shows Lushenko does hold his own with Putin.
Unless he has recently seen the writing on the wall and this is his retirement plan.
Quote from: Tyr on November 10, 2021, 10:11:32 AM
Past experience shows Lushenko does hold his own with Putin.
Those days are long gone.
Based on past records I'd think Russia/Putin hasn't thought this through past the "will it cause trouble for rivals? Yes!" point
Quote from: garbon on November 10, 2021, 09:33:41 AM
If it is so obviously manufactured, what's the potential damage to NATO/EU?
I think it weakens NATO/EU if despite being a member of those clubs if you are on the Eastern fringe Russia will still meddle with your politics through cyber attacks (the Baltics), through weaponising migrants, through using gas politics. If they keep meeting non-resistance and the value of NATO/EU is basically only if Russia literally invades you (probably), then the easy option would be to just align with Russia more and fall into their "sphere". And at that point obviously the challenge for NATO/EU is what do you do when you have member states who are basically advancing/supporting the agenda of a hostile power - we already have this issue with Hungary.
The other point is that it will probably cause dissension - there's been good statements and support from VDL and France with Poland. There needs to be more from everyone else. I think this goes to the general issue/legacy of Merkel that Berlin's statements on this have been pretty weak. Obviously it's difficult because of the coalition negotiations and status of the sitting caretaker government but while Merkel has spoken to Putin and said the use of migrants in this way is inhumane and unacceptable, she's asked Putin to use his influence with the Belarus regime to stop it. The problem with that I think is that - as has happened with other issues with Russia and China - that's either an incredibly naive or wilfully blind reading of the situation treating Putin as an uninterested party.
It might not be likely especially in Poland and the Baltics but I think that's the threat and what Russia wants/needs isn't necessarily a string of pliable client states like Belarus, but a divided and ineffective European frontier mad up of divided and ineffective border states who can't effectively resist blackmail and leverage applied capriciously.
This is the big gap in European strategic autonomy - for Poland and the Baltics this stuff and gas and the relationship with Russia is existential to them as independent democratic states. I can't see how there can be European strategic autonomy if there's no common view which would involve Western European governments getting behind Poland and the Baltics and treating this as seriously, rather than as a discrete part of the relationship with Russia and wider commercial interests.
Quote from: Tamas on November 10, 2021, 10:18:33 AM
Based on past records I'd think Russia/Putin hasn't thought this through past the "will it cause trouble for rivals? Yes!" point
That seems to be Putin's MO. There's no grand strategy that I've seen - causing troubles for your perceived enemies is it's own reward.
Quote from: Barrister on November 10, 2021, 11:42:32 AM
Quote from: Tamas on November 10, 2021, 10:18:33 AM
Based on past records I'd think Russia/Putin hasn't thought this through past the "will it cause trouble for rivals? Yes!" point
That seems to be Putin's MO. There's no grand strategy that I've seen - causing troubles for your perceived enemies is it's own reward.
I think both are true, as Sheilbh says. Keeping the EU as disunited and wrong-footed as possible is in Putin's interest because it makes it much harder for the EU to take focused action against Russian interests.
Apparently Lukashenko has already threatened to cut off gas supplies to the EU if sanctions are levied against Belarus over this crisis.
The sooner the EU stops relying on gas piped in from the East, the better.
Quote from: Jacob on November 11, 2021, 11:59:57 AM
The sooner the EU stops relying on gas piped in from the East, the better.
Spain relies on gas piped from the South and it has its host of problems, too (Algeria just closed the pipeline that goes through Morocco).
Quote from: Jacob on November 11, 2021, 11:59:57 AM
The sooner the EU stops relying on gas piped in from the East, the better.
I'm not sure on the latest but there's a big fight over the EU Taxonomy (basically a list of environmentally sustainable economic activities - so investing in them meets ESG requirements for private sector investors and supports net zero).
On the one hand you have a push by countries like France and the Czechs to get nuclear classified as sustainable - which is being very strongly opposed by Germany, Austria, Portugal, Denmark and Luxembourg.
On the other hand you have a push by other countries like Poland, Hungary and some Southern European countries to get gas classified as sustainable - which is being very opposed by the pro-nuclear countries :lol:).
Last I read the Commission's plan was to include both gas and nuclear as sustainable - the calculation is that collectively there's enough pro-nuclear and pro-gas states to get it passed while picking one or the other is more likely to fail (and the Council have been sitting on the draft since April because they can't agree).
Separately apparently VDL very reluctant to send rule of law mechanism letters to Hungary or Poland right now because of the situation on the border where Poland is at the frontline of the EU border. I'm not sure what I think - but I can sympathise that at this point Poland is the EU border and it is being challenged by Belarus and Russia so it's more a time for solidarity. I think you can probably walk and chew gum at the same time but I'm not sure if that would work in this scenario - very difficult and very political decision :hmm:
Quote from: Jacob on November 11, 2021, 11:59:57 AM
The sooner the EU stops relying on gas piped in from the East, the better.
Norway can't supply everybody in the EU unfortunately.
Nigeria, another solution is way worse, being unstable. Some countries are trying to switch to LPG (liquefied petroleum gas a bit cleaner), with a much secure supply, Nigeria still a provider among others, however.
Nuclear is taboo for some countries for political reasons.
Quote from: Tyr on November 10, 2021, 10:11:32 AM
Past experience shows Lushenko does hold his own with Putin.
Unless he has recently seen the writing on the wall and this is his retirement plan.
It's hard to hold your own when someone holds your balls. These days Lukashenka is as independent as Putin allows him to be.
Quote from: Jacob on November 11, 2021, 11:59:57 AM
The sooner the EU stops relying on gas piped in from the East, the better.
FYP.
Apparently the UK has sent a small group of Royal Engineers to support the Poles - from the UK and Polish announcements. It's not fully clear what they'll be doing - at least to me.
Obviously this goes to the strategic autonomy point. But I very much doubt this will go unnoticed in Poland and the Baltic countries and perhaps explains why they're reluctant to move away from relying on NATO and NATO partners when it comes to security. France has issued very strong statements on this which have been very good - if they want to build support for the idea of European strategic autonomy they should be speaking to all those governments (as I assume the MoD did) to work out how they can help.
Hopefully it will also - as well as the simultaneous Royal Navy exercises in the Baltic and the Black Sea earlier this year - put an end to stuff about whether Brexit means the UK is no longer interested in European defence or that its entire focus is on Asia. There's never been any reason to think that and it contradicts the defence review but it seems to have been a bit of a trope.
Edit: Apparently they're engineers being sent to support the Polish Army in strengthening their border fences.
They need help building wall? i hear trumps available.
Quote from: HVC on November 12, 2021, 12:20:17 PM
They need help building wall? i hear trumps available.
I'm sure when it gets to decor decisions they'll consider him.
Apparently Germany has temporarely suspended the approval for Nordstream 2 due to some kind of lack of compliance with German law from the operating company.
Quote from: The Larch on November 16, 2021, 07:42:53 AM
Apparently Germany has temporarely suspended the approval for Nordstream 2 due to some kind of lack of compliance with German law from the operating company.
The current (and probably the future) government will not openly oppose Nodstream 2, but of course you can always make every bureaucratic process very slow with legal means. That buys the government time.
BBC interview with Lukashenko is quite something - in the full version at one point Lukashenko just gets up to start shouting at Steve Rosenberg the BBC's Moscow correspondent:
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-59343815
It really is just thuggishness that comes across.
Edit: Another slightly longer clip - it is interesting:
https://twitter.com/BBCSteveR/status/1462685931798945800?s=20
https://www.tagblatt.ch/international/schweiz-eu-bruessel-beendet-den-sonderfall-schweiz-kommt-mit-grossbritannien-und-den-ewr-staaten-in-denselben-topf-ld.2224883
@Sheilbh: German article, but interesting development. The EU creates a new organizational unit to handle the "West European partners" to have a more consistent policy towards UK, EFTA states (Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein), Switzerland, as well as the micro states Andorra, Monaco, and San Marino. Maybe they even develop a consistent engagement model and strategy. The unit will be led by a Briton, no less. OK, double national, but still.
Poland, racking up even more reasons for the EU to come cracking down hard on it.
QuotePoland plans to set up register of pregnancies to report miscarriages
Proposed register would come into effect in January, a year after near-total ban on abortion
Poland is planning to introduce a centralised register of pregnancies that would oblige doctors to report all pregnancies and miscarriages to the government.
The proposed register would come into effect in January 2022, a year after Poland introduced a near-total ban on abortion.
This has raised serious concerns among women's rights activists, who believe that in light of the abortion ban, the register could be used to cause legal difficulties for women who have self-administered abortions.
The draft legislation is part of a wide-ranging project to update the medical information system in Poland.
"It's about control, it's about making sure that pregnancies end with birth," Natalia Broniarczyk, an activist from Aborcyjny Dream Team told the Polish weekly Gazeta Wyborcza.
The plan prompted online protests. A social media initiative titled "I'd like to politely report that I am not pregnant" encouraged Polish women to email photos of their used sanitary pads, tampons and underwear to the Polish ministry of health.
The ministry has strongly denied the project amounts to a centralised pregnancy register, with a spokesperson saying the changes are simply part of wide-ranging digitalisation project that will update the way data about a multitude of conditions, including allergies, is stored.
The spokesperson said doctors always had information on pregnancies, but before it was stored on paper by hospitals, rather than centrally by the government.
The concerns of activists about the register grew considerably after a bill proposed by the government that would establish an "institute of family and demographics" passed first reading in the Polish parliament by one vote on Thursday.
The institute would aim to monitor family policy, pass opinion on legislation and educate citizens on the "vital role of family to the social order" and the importance of "cultural-social reproduction" in the context of marriage. The institute would have access to citizens' personal data and prosecutorial powers in the realm of family law, prompting worries it could be used to enforce the country's strict abortion law.
The project has drawn widespread criticism from Polish academics and civil rights advocates.
"Maybe just call it the 'Red Center of Rachel and Leah'," a feminist organisation from Łódź said in an Instagram post, referencing Margaret Atwood's dystopian novel The Handmaid's Tale. In the novel the Rachel and Leah Center is a training facility for women designated to be "breeders" by the authoritarian regime.
The committee of demographic researchers at the Polish Academy of Sciences has issued a statement expressing concerns that the "pro-natalist propaganda" would take precedent over scientific research at the institute.
"The project aims exclusively to promote traditional model of family," Adam Bodnar, Poland's former ombudsman for citizen rights, told the Polish news website Oko.press. "It could also become a tool against those who fall outside this model, for example those who do not conform to heteronormative norms."
Not that it makes a practical difference in terms of crap like this having to be opposed, but I do wonder if this is ideological from the governing party, or serves the same purpose as the hate poured on Muslims and homosexuals/transgender people in Hungary i.e. a destructive, reckless and evil smokescreen to hide / distract from their bid to move to an authoritarian system.
Quote from: Tamas on December 07, 2021, 07:19:34 AM
Not that it makes a practical difference in terms of crap like this having to be opposed, but I do wonder if this is ideological from the governing party, or serves the same purpose as the hate poured on Muslims and homosexuals/transgender people in Hungary i.e. a destructive, reckless and evil smokescreen to hide / distract from their bid to move to an authoritarian system.
That's always something that you have to keep in the back of your mind about all these kind of nasty measures, to question if they're true ideological nastiness or strategic nastiness to hide something less strident but more nefarious.
There recently was a case in Poland where a pregnant woman died. Her fetus would not have been able to survive, but the doctors were afraid to terminate the pregnancy because of the strict abortion laws. They waited for the dfetus to die; the mother died of sepsis.
Quote from: Syt on December 07, 2021, 07:40:02 AM
There recently was a case in Poland where a pregnant woman died. Her fetus would not have been able to survive, but the doctors were afraid to terminate the pregnancy because of the strict abortion laws. They waited for the dfetus to die; the mother died of sepsis.
Depressing that such woman killing laws continue to exist.
QuoteSerbia Votes 'Yes' to Judiciary Constitution Changes
Against the urgings of many opposition parties, most Serbian voters on Sunday backed proposed changes to the constitution – announced as a way towards the depoliticisation of the judiciary, which the EU has said it wishes to see.
Serbian citizens voted to change the country's constitution and accept a judicial reform package, with 60.48 per cent voters saying "Yes" to the proposals in Sunday's referendum, according to the first results on Sunday night.
(...)
Some of the most important changes in the referendum are about the way judges and prosecutors will be elected in future. Parliament will now elect only the Supreme State Prosecutor and five out of 15 Constitutional Court judges. All other judges and prosecutors will be elected by two judicial councils.
Four members of each council will be so called "prominent lawyers", chosen by parliament. Unlike now, the justice minister will be a member only of the prosecutorial council, while representatives of parliament will not be members of either council any more.
Experts said the changes were a needed step – but were not enough to guarantee that the Serbian judiciary will be independent of political influence.
Most opposition parties and some professionals urged a "No" vote in the referendum, saying that there was not enough legitimacy when parliament – with barely any opposition parties present – adopted the amendments. They insist there is still a real possibility of political influence on the judiciary.
Serbia's 2006 constitution was adopted at a time of high tension over the future of Kosovo, a former Serbian province that was then a ward of the United Nations, but pushing for independence.
The constitution affirmed Serbia's claim to Kosovo as an integral and inviolable part of its territory, despite which Kosovo declared independence in 2008 and has since been recognised by mosty EU states.
The voted changes on Serbia's judicial system are part of the EU's requiriments for the accession process, which Serbia seems to still be keen on progressing with. The referendum seems to have passed with 60% votes in favour (still provisional results, but a clear indication on the referendum's success), albeit with a really low participation (around 30%, but there was no minimum participation requiriment for it to be valid).
Is the Zuckerbot bluffing or will they actually pull Facebook and Instagram from the EU?
QuoteMeta Renews Warning to EU It Will Be Forced to Pull Facebook
European regulators are currently re-working data regulations
Company said exit may be option if it couldn't rely on rules
Meta Platforms Inc. has once again threatened to pull Facebook and Instagram from Europe if it is unable to keep transferring user data back to the U.S., amid negotiations between regulators to replace a scrapped privacy pact.
European Union regulators have for months been stuck in negotiations with the U.S. to replace a transatlantic data transfer pact that thousands of companies relied on, but which got struck down by the EU Court of Justice in 2020 over fears citizens' data isn't safe once shipped to the U.S.
In its annual report published Thursday, Meta said that if it couldn't rely on new or existing agreements -- such as so-called standard contractual clauses -- to shift data, then it would "likely be unable to offer a number of our most significant products and services, including Facebook and Instagram, in Europe."
Meta has already warned in its previous annual report that if it is not allowed to use standard contractual clauses, it would be "unable to operate" parts of its business in Europe, without naming its two key social media platforms.
"We have absolutely no desire and no plans to withdraw from Europe, but the simple reality is that Meta, and many other businesses, organizations and services, rely on data transfers between the EU and the US in order to operate global services," a Meta spokesman said in an emailed statement.
The latest comments highlight the increasing tension between the social media company and lawmakers over the ownership of user data. The stock suffered a 26% plunge Thursday over fears about Facebook's outlook, which produced the biggest value wipeout in stock market history. Meta shares fell as much as 4.5% in trading in New York on Monday.
"Digital giants must understand that the European continent will resist and affirm its sovereignty," French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire said in Paris on Monday.
The European Commission said data transfer negotiations with Washington have intensified, but they "take time given also the complexity of the issues discussed and the need to strike a balance between privacy and national security," a commission spokesperson wrote in a statement to Bloomberg on Monday.
"Only an arrangement that is fully compliant with the requirements set by the EU court can deliver the stability and legal certainty stakeholders expect on both sides of the Atlantic," the spokesperson added.
Intensifying Discussions
Privacy campaigner Max Schrems has long been challenging Facebook in the Irish courts -- where the social media company has its European base -- arguing that EU citizens' data is at risk the moment it gets transferred to the U.S.
In 2020, Facebook sought a judicial review of the Irish Data Protection Commission's preliminary decision that the company may have to halt trans-Atlantic data transfers using standard contractual clauses. An Irish court last year rejected the social network's challenge, saying it didn't establish "any basis" for calling into question the Irish watchdog's findings.
Data protection authorities are increasingly scrutinizing these kinds of supplementary security measures that have allowed companies to send data back and forth in the absence of a new agreement, according to Patrick Van Eecke, a partner and head of cyber and data at law firm Cooley LLP.
"I am not surprised companies outside of Europe are reconsidering whether or not it makes sense to continue offering services to the European market as there are not many options left any longer," said Van Eecke.
It is not the first time Facebook has threatened to withdraw its services. In 2020 it said it plans to block people and publishers in Australia from sharing news, in an attempt to push back against a proposed law forcing the company to pay media firms for their articles.
The company has also previously affirmed its commitment to Europe.
Nick Clegg, the company's head of global affairs, said at an event in 2020: "Let me also be absolutely crystal clear. We have absolutely no desire, no wish, no plans to withdraw our services from Europe. Why would we?"
Oh no! Whatever will the EU do? Wouldn't it be a shame if some other company moved in to fill the void for a Facebook and Instagram-like platforms in Europe?
I mean, it would probably boost Tiktok, which isn't grand... but more seriously, how big a blow would this be to the EU? Does FB contribute significantly to the economy in a way that won't be replaced? Are there significant number of folks who'll be sufficiently outraged by FB leaving that it'll impact the decisionmakers?
Facebook, WhatsApp, Insta - I think there'd be plenty of users who'd be annoyed.
It is very arrogant though and assumes that there wouldn't be a replacement developed in Europe's tech scheme.
It would have a pretty huge impact on the economy of news media and publishers because FB are one of the very biggest players. On the other hand publishers want to move away from reliance on FB/Google so it's a mixed blessing - but I'm not sure how many could really afford to survive the interim period. In the industry we're at a bit of a tipping point around what online advertising looks like in the future and the reality is no-one knows - which is exciting and slightly alarming at the same time :ph34r: The other key bit of context on their report is that a lot of those losses, they say, are attributable to changes to the Apple OS that makes it easier to stop tracking.
For what it's worth - I think Europe is moving towards data localisation, which I'm not sure is a good thing generally. It's also not, in my view, what the EU legislator intended - and I've heard someone from the Commission argue this very persuasively because I think they find the regulators especially take a very academic approach to this. I remember discussing some of these issues with a Dutch lawyer who pointed out that it is also massively hypocritical because EU data protection laws, in general, do not apply to member state surveillance/monitoring by law enforcement or security agencies (there is some) because the EU has no competence over those bodies and they are broadly excluded from GDPR. So the requirement is on private companies to make sure there is an "essentially equivalent" level of protection for data leaving the EEA - but it is essentially equivalent to a theorectical level of protection that data processed in Europe doesn't actually receive.
But the direction of travel in Europe is basically towards localisation - not just here but there's also been various decisions by different regulators and about 100 complaints by privacy campaigners across the entire EEA.
Quote from: Sheilbh on February 07, 2022, 03:51:49 PMFacebook, WhatsApp, Insta - I think there'd be plenty of users who'd be annoyed.
Personally it'd be Whatsapp the one that would screw me over the most, but there's always Line. On a personal level, losing FB and IG would really hurt my ability to get in touch with many international friends, but would not have a massive day-to-day impact. For lots of businesses (advertising and media) it'd be a pretty big blow, I imagine. Even small places would be affected, as lots of hole in the wall restaurants and bars basically use their FB pages as their main website.
QuoteThe other key bit of context on their report is that a lot of those losses, they say, are attributable to changes to the Apple OS that makes it easier to stop tracking.
That's what my understanding was, that Apple's change in their tracking system (basically giving people the possibility to opt out of it) was a massive hit to FB's business model. I mean, they've just suffered the biggest one day loss in market value of a US company due to this.
let him, but he'll have to swallow a bit more then a 25% drop on the stockmarket if he does I guess.
Quote from: The Larch on February 07, 2022, 04:09:42 PMPersonally it'd be Whatsapp the one that would screw me over the most, but there's always Line. On a personal level, loosing FB and IG would really hurt my ability to get in touch with many international friends, but would not have a massive day-to-day impact. For lots of businesses (advertising and media) it'd be a pretty big blow, I imagine. Even small places would be affected, as lots of hole in the wall restaurants and bars basically use their FB pages as their main website.
Yeah - I mean the entire reason I have Instagram is to follow London food people and find new restaurants. Having a good Insta is something loads of food businesses really focus on so it must drive diners - I imagine it's even more the case in retail where you can purchase through Instagram.
Personally WhatsApp would be the big loss - I imagine people would move to Signal or Telegram (I'm not sure if they'd have similar issues around data transfers out of Europe though). I can do without Facebook. I have one friend who still uses it a lot including Facebook messenger so I keep it to keep in touch with her. Insta would be a loss for building my spreadsheet of food places but I'm sure I'd survive. And I've no doubt the European tech scheme would come up with alternatives, especially because we all know what they'd need to design/replace.
I'm not sure on numbers but as someone who works in data and media - Facebook's ad revenue disappearing would be absolutely huge. As I say the online advertising model that exists is dying but no-one quite knows what the future looks like and which of the multiple alternatives is going to win - obviously I'm hoping the publishers win. But I'm not sure and I think the adjustment will be bumpy. If Facebook also stopped being a thing at the same time it would be huge.
Quotelet him, but he'll have to swallow a bit more then a 25% drop on the stockmarket if he does I guess.
Maybe. Europe's about 25% of Meta revenue so it's not wildly off. But I think this is largely about the Apple changes which are global.
Losing WhatsApp would be briefly annoying as everyone is forced to use sms to arrange with the people they actually speak to which other app to download.
Or is whatsapp alone in linking so neatly to your phone address book?
Poland gets slapped on the wrist for ignoring EU sentences.
QuoteCommission moves to cut Polish funds over unpaid coal mine fine
Warsaw says it will use 'all possible measures' not to pay.
The European Commission has launched an unprecedented procedure to reduce budget payments for Poland over an unpaid court fine.
The budget cut, which is expected to amount to approximately €15 million, comes after Polish authorities didn't pay a €500,000 daily fine over failure to comply with an order from the Court of Justice of the EU in a dispute with the Czech Republic over the Turów open pit coal mine.
While Warsaw struck a deal with Prague last week to settle the Turów dispute, the Commission said it was still legally obligated to act on Warsaw's unpaid fines. Poland owes a total of more than €68 million.
"The Commission has informed Poland that it would proceed with the offsetting of payments for penalties due," a spokesperson for the Commission confirmed on Tuesday, adding: "The Commission will proceed with the offsetting after 10 working days from this notification."
The move comes at a sensitive moment for Warsaw's troubled relationship with Brussels.
Some Polish officials, including President Andrzej Duda, have sought to de-escalate tensions over rule-of-law problems. But the country has yet to concretely address Brussels' concerns over the independence of its judiciary, and a separate daily fine of €1 million over an illegal disciplinary regime for judges remains unpaid.
The current offsetting process in the Turów case covers penalties imposed from September 20 until October 19, the spokesperson said.
"When performing offsetting, the Commission fulfils its legal obligation to collect financial penalties imposed by the Court in accordance with its order of 20 September 2021. In this regard, the Commission follows the rules set out in the Financial Regulation, in the absence of payment by the Member State," the spokesperson added.
The Polish government, however, criticized the Commission's decision.
"Poland will use all possible legal measures to appeal against the plans of the European Commission, the more so that an agreement has been reached between the governments of Poland and the Czech Republic," government spokesperson Piotr Müller told the Polish Press Agency.
"This is particularly important in the context of the current geopolitical threats from Russia. From the very beginning, Poland emphasized that the decisions taken by the [Court of Justice] had no legal or factual basis. They go beyond the EU treaties and violate the treaty guarantees of energy security," Müller said, adding: "We want to emphasize that the smooth implementation of projects from EU funds is not threatened."
Hmm, think this is the first time I'm I've seen a government getting their wages garnished lol
I've put this in this thread because it touches on other EU policy areas - China and Turkey especially - but also I don't want to distract from the war news. But bit a barnburner on the Berlin establishment by Tyson Barker who is Head of technology and foreign policy at the German Council on Foreign Relations.
The France using (or wanting to use Europe) as an "iron man" suit and Germany using it as a cloaking device strikes particularly true:
QuoteThe Berlin elite's Ukraine dilemma
After promising a sea-change in German foreign policy — a Zeitenwende — Olaf Scholz is reverting to type.
By Tyson Barker
BERLIN – Recently the Berliner Ensemble has been staging a revival of the Bertolt Brecht-Kurt Weill classic, Threepenny Opera, at the theatre in the German capital where it first appeared in 1928. The musical play is known for the ominous line: "Erst kommt das Fressen, dann kommt die Moral." The line, roughly translated as "first comes the devouring, then come the virtues", captures a truism of human nature: that often animalistic desires precede morality in the hierarchy of needs. The interests of Germany's most adroit political animals lie in political survival, relevance and power, which often flow from party loyalty and fealty to the status quo, so the play is a fitting one in Berlin, Europe's most important political capital.
In many ways, the present moment is best clarified by the controversy around Kyiv's decision not to accept an offer by the German president, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, to visit Ukraine. Although the reasons for the decision are unclear, discontent in Berlin is less about the man or the presidency as a symbol of German democracy than the perceived attack on a political system, of which Steinmeier is the best example: the kind of party man that many in Berlin's political elite aspire to be, somebody who can survive it all and have it all. Call it the Steinmeier system.
Kyiv also struck a nerve. Germany's commitment to Ukraine has been softening and there are growing questions around the speech by Olaf Scholz, the chancellor, on 27 February proclaiming a Zeitenwende — a taboo-busting sea change in German foreign policy that set it on the path to an emergency military modernisation, defence spending, energy independence from Russia, lethal assistance for Ukraine and EU financing for weaponry. In fact, in a press conference on 19 April, Scholz decelerated Germany's provision of heavy weapons to Ukraine and cast a cloud of doubt over the Zeitenwende and its spirit.
The Steinmeier controversy is the perfect prism through which to understand Berlin's shifting posture toward Russia's war on Ukraine. Steinmeier is a totemic figure in German politics but he is, first and foremost, a party man — forged in a 30-year career in the Social Democratic Party (SPD). Steinmeier is affable, hard-working and effective, but also anodyne, ferociously loyal and morally malleable.
He is part of the so-called Hanover Mafia of protégés of the former chancellor Gerhard Schröder. He was first the director of Schröder's personal office in Lower Saxony in 1993, before accompanying him to Berlin where he would eventually become Schröder's chief of staff and then Germany's foreign minister in the first Merkel grand coalition. As such, Steinmeier criticised European missile defence and US nuclear posture as designed to give Nato first-strike capabilities against Russia. During the Merkel era he was perceived as the balancing force in German politics — an opposition leader for a party that was, in fact, part of the government. Steinmeier, like Angela Merkel but more so, embodies a consensus-based political culture with a demobilised base of voters largely satisfied with the status quo and a business elite invested in preserving Germany's privileged access to markets in authoritarian states.
During the 2014-2015 Ukraine crisis and the Russian annexation of Crimea, when he was once again foreign minister, Steinmeier played a broker role seeking to de-escalate tensions, dutifully enforcing the Euro-Atlantic consensus on sanctions and strengthening Nato in central Europe, while also keeping the door open for "change through trade" ("Wandel Durch Handel") as Germany and Russia deepened their energy relationship at the expense of Ukraine.
In February 2015 Germany, France, Russia and Ukraine drew up the second of the two Minsk agreements intended to put an end to the fighting in eastern Ukraine. It required both sides to withdraw heavy equipment from the Donbas, cauterise the Ukrainian border and ultimately set up elections to enable potential constitutional reform that could give Russian-controlled areas more autonomy within Ukraine. Within months, a consortium of companies backed by Russia and Germany signed the Nord Stream 2 (NS2) agreement.
In 2016 Steinmeier was also the architect of the so-called Steinmeier Formula. This would have allowed for elections in the Donbas under the supervision of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, but blurred the sequencing on whether elections in eastern Ukraine should be held before or after the withdrawal of Russian forces. If elections took place before the departure of Russian troops, it would have given Moscow preponderant control over their outcome, a fact clear to Kyiv, Washington and Brussels at the time. In one brisk moment, Russia's February 24 invasion of Ukraine smashed Minsk II, the Steinmeier Formula and NS2, and with them the notion of Wandel Durch Handel.
The SPD is still coming to terms with the limits of Wandel Durch Handel. More than a foreign policy, it was a moral worldview the Social Democrats had invested in for decades. It allowed them to both "do good" (transforming the lives of citizens behind the veil of authoritarianism, perhaps even the system itself) and to "do well" (making money hand over fist for Germany Inc, which became the world's largest exporter with a 7 per cent GDP current account surplus). In many ways, the moral awakening is similar to what Silicon Valley underwent in the past decade as the 2012 sheen of techno-utopianism gave way to a reality of democracy-destroying disinformation, surveillance capitalism and a new class of unaccountable American oligarchs. Steinmeier himself has half-heartedly acknowledged past mistakes in the pursuit of Russo-German ties — including NS2 gas diplomacy — which discounted the security interests of Germany's central European allies and Russia's slide into authoritarianism.
Russia's invasion of Ukraine could have opened the debate about whether or not Steinmeier has the standing to represent the moral centre of Germany. It has not. Instead, the perceived attack on Steinmeier led not only to a rally around the man and the Schröder-Merkel system of geo-economic realism he represents, but it also opened up a window for the proponents of something closer to the status quo ante in how Berlin governs.
Rather than eliciting an outpouring of self-reflection, the perceived snub generated a fierce backlash against Ukraine across the political spectrum. Scholz called Kyiv's decision "irksome". Attacks on Ukraine's ambassador to Berlin have been particularly relentless. Florian Post, a former SPD Bundestag member, tweeted: "Not a day goes by that it doesn't occur to the Ukrainian ambassador what types of weapons Germany could provide to Ukraine. I would recommend that he expand — and limit — his vocabulary to the following two words: "PLEASE and THANK YOU..."
It was not limited to the party of Steinmeier and Scholz. The Russo-curious Green politician Jürgen Trittin inexplicably called it a "propaganda victory for Vladimir Putin", before condescendingly stating that "we expect that Ukraine will win it back". Wolfgang Kubicki, deputy chairman of the Free Democratic Party and Russlandversteher, haughtily stated that sympathy with Ukraine's leadership "has its limits". Numerous others piled on.
The backlash is emblematic of several shifts in Germany's political posture. Aside from allowing Germany's most ardent Russia-sympathisers to re-enter the political debate, it precipitated a snap back to a default position of delayed action to support Ukraine — at times couched in terms of serving "European interests".
This is particularly important when compared with Germany's key European ally, France. Whereas France often uses "Europe" as a kind of Ironman suit, Germany uses "Europe" as a kind of cloaking device. France speaks about Europe as a means of power projection for French national interests on the global stage. In contrast, Germany disguises some of its most egregious pursuits of "Germany First" policies as being in the European interest — primarily aimed at pacifying German domestic public opinion. This is how German politicians sold NS2 as a "European initiative" even as Ukraine, the European Commission and central Europe passionately argued against it. It was also the case for the Comprehensive Investment Agreement with China, the capstone of Germany's 2020 EU presidency. The same is true for the morally dubious 2016 EU-Turkey deal to stem the flow of Syrian refugees, which was largely foisted on Brussels by Berlin.
And it is for this reason that Scholz regularly warns that Germany would not act unilaterally but in co-ordination with European allies and the United States when considering any delivery of heavy weapons to Ukraine. On 13 April, when pressed on this spurious line with the fact that the Czech Republic had announced it would send tanks, Slovakia S-300 long-range missile systems, and the UK, Poland and the US heavy artillery, Scholz dismissed such provisions as essentially faulty equipment that Nato allies did not want. In fact, Ukrainian troops are familiar with this equipment. The German government has since announced that it will provide an additional €2 billion to finance the Ukrainian military. However, the Scholz government continues to delay decisions on providing the tanks, anti-ship missiles, long-range artillery and helicopters the Ukrainian government has requested. Scholz repeated the false narrative that Germany would not "go it alone" without Europe in his 19 April press conference.
The Wende
Deferred action has long been the default political setting for Germany. In contrast, French politics is full of policy entrepreneurship, big ideas and grand visions. Limits are mostly imposed by the parameters of its capacities as a middling power and the French street, which works as an important brake. German politics is the opposite. Plodding and iterative, Germany has preferred to ride the brakes. In fact, Helmut Schmidt, the chain-smoking, Diet Coke-drinking former Hamburg mayor turned Social Democratic chancellor (and model for Olaf Scholz), famously said that people who have visions should get their eyes checked. Merkel was cut from the same cloth. Over the course of her 16-year chancellery, Merkel cultivated an image as a cautious Mutti, a steady hand who approached problems "schritt für schritt" (step by step).
There is a particular moment in which a brand of strong German executive leadership can punctuate the country's political equilibrium to ram through a transformative policy. Like a sword of Excalibur, the Wende is the German moment in which a strong executive wields the power of the state. It has happened at pivotal points in recent German history: the Covid-recovery EU fund that Europeanised stimulus (2020); Merkel's decision to let in more than a million Syrian and Iraqi refugees (2015); the post-Fukushima Energiewende that led to the decision to phase out nuclear energy (2011) and even the original Wende, the "Wende of all Wenden", German reunification (1989-90).
In each of these, Germany's Wendepolitik followed five basic precepts. First, it is always triggered by seismic external events rather than an ideological or political agenda. Second, it displays a bias towards action in the immediate aftermath. Third, it takes advantage of a fleeting moment in German public opinion before the riptide of public opinion knocks out. Fourth, the response is sweeping, reactive and not subject to the astringent effects of democratic debate. Finally, it mobilises the entire German political establishment to build up a strategic justification ex post facto. In the past, Wendepolitik has tended to stick.
The Zeitenwende has seemed to fit these precepts. It is closing the door to Nord Stream 2; laying the timetable for diversification away from Russian coal (now set for August), oil (now set for the end of the year) and gas (now set for 2024); implementing comprehensive changes to the German military; opening the door to support for Ukraine, a democratic European nation under siege by a dictatorial aggressor; and elevating Germany's security responsibility in Nato, the EU and Europe.
But as mentioned, it is softening. The Zeitenwende numbers do not exactly run. At €50.1 billion, the 2022 budget request keeps defence spending essentially flat as a proportion of GDP. If the €100 billion special purpose appropriation is meant to bridge the difference, it will be exhausted by 2025, the moment in the political cycle when Germany will be headed into federal elections. February's promises are inconsistent with absorption capacity issues, unanswered questions about long-term planning, a sclerotic procurement bureaucracy and even sticking points around taxation. A big point in its durability will be anchoring defence spending of 2 per cent of GDP — the target for Nato countries — in the German constitution.
Now the political basis for the Zeitenwende seems to be weakening as well. Scholz is losing both the moral high ground and cohesion within his coalition — particularly with the Greens — as he seeks to shore up his Social Democrats and the political system that has kept them in power (at times as the senior, at times the junior coalition partner) for 20 of the past 24 years. Perhaps, in his wavering, Scholz hears the dictum of Homo Berlinicus, a political twist to Bertolt Brecht's famous words: Erst kommt die Partei — und der Status Quo — dann kommt die Moral.
Interesting that it's so focused on the SPD - because I also saw this by the always interesting Alex Clarkson on the SPD/Schroeder/Lower Saxony interests etc. I saw this morning that Maas has said there is a majority for more support to Ukraine by the CDU/CSU, Greens and FDP - I imagine that's incredible unlikely - but I'm really surprised how much of Germany's "issue" on this seems tied to the SPD struggling to deal with a new reality:
https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/30482/in-buying-russian-gas-germany-were-played-for-fools
Quote from: Sheilbh on February 07, 2022, 03:51:49 PMIt is very arrogant though and assumes that there wouldn't be a replacement developed in Europe's tech scheme.
It's only arrogant if you think they're bluffing. The possibility does exist that Europe is no longer profitable for them.
Quote from: Admiral Yi on April 24, 2022, 07:38:28 AMIt's only arrogant if you think they're bluffing. The possibility does exist that Europe is no longer profitable for them.
My point on arrogance there is that their system/product is irreplaceable and something new wouldn't emerge.
But they more or less immediately walked it back, so I think they were bluffing.
More generally I think this happens with ever big American tech giant/company lobbying the EU. Microsoft learned their lesson and now very effective at lobbying in Brussels - I think Apple is broadly in that basket too. Faceebook especially, but also Google are still very aggressive in a way that just doesn't work in the EU system and, if anything, makes things worse.
Meanwhile in Euro-elections - there was one in Slovenia today too and the democratic backsliding (but very good on Ukraine) government lost.
They'll be replaced by a coalition led by a new party Freedom - which is liberal/green populist - and the social democrats.
While I like the sound of that I am intensely suspicious of a green party called "Freedom" that was founded (and is chaired) by a billionaire, one of Slovenia's richest men, who looks a little like a Bond villain :ph34r:
(https://siol.net/media/img/81/8f/8368c940e1cafa785f39-robert-golob.jpeg)
I didn't read Zuckerberg's statement as a threat, but as a statement that they can't operate services without the ability to move data back and forth between the US and Europe.
What Macron is saying makes sense, in practice it would probably only mean putting a fancy title on states with a Norway-like status, but symbolism does matter. It could also be a neat way to put countries into a second tier union (looking at you, UK, Hungary, and Poland).
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/may/09/macron-calls-for-new-european-body-and-warns-ukraine-of-eu-wait
QuoteEmmanuel Macron has called for a new political organisation to unite democracies on the European continent, as he warned that Ukraine would probably not join the EU for several decades.
Speaking two days after being sworn in for a second term as French president, Macron called for big thinking on the future of Europe, saying the war in Ukraine showed the need for a "historic process of reflection".
He proposed "a European political community ... a new European organisation [that] would enable democratic European nations who adhere to our values to find a new space for political cooperation", listing security, energy, transport, infrastructure investment and movement across borders, especially for young people, as issues that body would tackle.
Being part of this organisation would not exclude a country from joining the EU, and the organisation could include "those who have left" the bloc, he said.
Macron's intervention comes as EU states clash on how quickly to move forward with Kyiv's membership application. The question is likely to reach a crunch point in June, when EU leaders decide whether to grant Ukraine candidate status, a procedural step that normally takes years to attain.
Macron suggested he favoured a quick decision on candidate status, while dampening Kyiv's hopes of a speedy entry into the EU. The awarding of candidate status is followed by talks on accession and a process of reform so that a country meets the EU's political, economic and legal criteria.
"Even if we were to give it the status of candidate country tomorrow – I hope we move forward towards accession rapidly – even if we were to do that, we all know only too well the process for accession would take several years; in truth, it would probably take several decades. And that is the truth unless we decide to lower the standards for accession and rethink the unity of our Europe, and also partially the principles that we hold," he said.
"The European Union, given its level of integration and ambition, cannot be the only way to structure the European continent in the short term."
Ursula von der Leyen, the European Commission president, is championing a speedy processing of Ukraine's membership application, backed by central and eastern European states. Western European members, however, are wary about allowing Ukraine to proceed quickly, fearing Kyiv would not have time to complete vital political reforms, while the process would stoke tensions with six western Balkan countries that have been stuck in the EU membership queue for years.
Von der Leyen said Ukraine had submitted a 5,000-page document to Brussels answering questions on its suitability to join the bloc, and in remarks aimed at Ukrainians at an event in the European parliament to celebrate Europe Day, she said: "The future of Europe is also your future."
Macron also set out goals for the war, saying Europe had "to do everything to ensure that Ukraine will survive, Russia will never win, preserve peace on the rest of the continent of Europe and avoid any escalation".
Only Ukraine could decide on negotiating conditions with Russia, he said. And he warned against a punitive settlement on Russia when the war is over. "When peace returns to European soil, we will have to build new security balances and together we must never give into the temptation ... or the desire for revenge, because we know how much that has ravished the road to peace in the past."
The two leaders were speaking at a special session of the European parliament in Strasbourg, where they marked the end of an 11-month citizens' juries project, the Conference on the Future of Europe. At the closing ceremony, EU leaders, citizens and MEPs listened to the EU anthem and watched an interpretative dance routine performed in the aisles of the parliament's debating chamber.
Both leaders contrasted the event with the Victory Day commemorations in Moscow. Referring to a woman who appeared with her baby at the Strasbourg ceremony, Von der Leyen said she wanted to celebrate this image on 9 May, "an image far more powerful than any military parade going up and down the streets of Moscow".
The whole EU needs reorganising from the ground up to stop nations like Hungary holding the rest to ransom. The EU is the league of nations to this new bodies' UN (As it was viewed in the 50s. Sans security council bollocks.)
It could be an approach to do it from the out inwards. Though I do fear that would just lead to a revival in nonsense in the UK were it to happen anytime soon.
The big question I'd have is- why does it need to be just European? Wouldn't it make sense to add the scattered first world democracies of the world into such a body? It would be really great if we could set this up in a way to tackle anti-corruption, democracy, etc... to favourable trade rights. Might help provide a kick for some poorer nations to get their house in order so they can grow.
As ever I think Macron's pretty good at the thinking big bit - that's not his flaw as a politician - and even if he gets 10% of that he'll justifiably see it as progress. But I suspect this will go down like his Sorbonne speech and others as largely unrealised. And, from a UK perspective, it does make you wonder how much a mess could have been avoided if we'd gone for a multi-speed Europe a little while ago.
Thirteen countries have already said they don't support "unconsidered and premature attempts to launch a process towards Treaty change": Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Sweden. What is striking to me in the current context is that it includes all the countries on the EU's eastern frontier.
I think Macron's right to be honest with Ukraine. I hope it's quicker - and I'm not massively keen on the "they're already a member of our hearts" line :lol: - but I think it's right to be honest that it will take quite a while as I think there's been acrimony from over-promising in this area in the past. Having said that I think there's a fair few rhetorical cheques written early in this war, in the spirit of solidarity, that are probably going to bounce and may also sour things a little.
Not massively keen on the line about not humiliating or excluding Putin and Russia while reiterating the need to help Ukraine now, or the reference to Mitterand's European confederation, which should include Russia, though Macron noted it's probably too early to consider that. There are many countries (including in the EU) who have suffered humiliations by Russia - often worse than what we're talking about here which would be that they don't get to occupy a foreign country. But also I think the talk of needing to allow Putin to save face forgets that actually Zelensky also needs face. As Ulrich Spech put it, we can already see the argument: the West shouldn't humiliate Russia, Russia must be included, there is no security against Russia. I'm not sure setting up for an eventual post-war reset while cautioning realism on Ukraine's European ambitions should necessarily sit in the same speech.
Ultimately you can agree what you want with Germany - but if Germany and France are unable or unwilling to build European security architecture against Russia, then it will be built around them and Europe may acquire two motors - a Franco-German on political/economic integration and one which will definitely include Poland on defence/security. Which is why I think the rejection from the Eastern frontier and the Nordics is really striking. As ever with Macron it's a bit of a parson's egg.
I hated that speech. Found it tone-deaf and full of of weird ideas.
I don't think Europe needs yet another supranational body. It's a very French idea, just add a layer of government to deal with an issue.
The EU, EEA, OSCE, OECD or Council of Europe aren't enough to help organize post-war Ukraine?
Ridiculous.
Quote from: Zoupa on May 09, 2022, 06:51:10 PMI hated that speech. Found it tone-deaf and full of of weird ideas.
If you didn't like the speech, just wait till you see the interpretive dance before it :lol: :ph34r:
Just make it easier to kick the bad apples out. Although I'm not sure how plausible that is.
A French president speaking out of turn and trying to run Europe/EU as if it was a french colony.
Some things never change.
Quote from: Crazy_Ivan80 on May 10, 2022, 11:44:41 AMA French president speaking out of turn and trying to run Europe/EU as if it was a french colony.
Some things never change.
Does not work with Macron, sorry. There is not a French culture according to him. :P
Macron's made more comments about not humiliating Russia and the need to include Russia in a future European security architecture. I think that combined with this chart demonstrates why there's unlikely to be any meaningful European strategic autonomy any time soon, at least that runs through the EU. 2/3s of the support for Ukraine has come from the US - add in the UK and Canada and it's over 75% of support for Ukraine:
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FTDfc9CWAAEB1uD?format=jpg&name=small)
It looks like it's even stronger on the military support front - although I'm still a little dubious of those numbers (Poland, the Baltics and the UK look more accurate - I still think France is far too low based on reporting):
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FTBpJZ2XEAIZk9E?format=png&name=small)
I know I keep saying it but the block to Macron's ambitions in this area (which I think make sense, especially with a new Trump presidency being a possibility) is not a lack of French ideas or German commitment - but a lack of trust in France, Germany and other Western EU partners from countries on Europe's Eastern and Northern frontier, who border Russia who feel (in my view justifiably) that Russia is a serious threat to their security.
I thought Macron would change after the invasion but it seems that he cannot conceive of European security/defence arrangements that are designed to protect against Russia, as opposed to incorporating Russia. From everything I've read I think France is doing better on getting military supplies especially into Ukraine than Germany, but I think the "zeitenwende" in German thinking is more profound and more important - as time goes on it just looks more and more like France's foreign policy elite cannot make that leap. And until they do Poland, the Nordics, the Baltics are always going to prefer security discussions in a format that includes the US and other, more sympathetic allies, like the UK and Canada - because those allies seem to "get" their security fears more.
I am surprised he hasn't made that shift - and I'm not fully sure why it hasn't happened. It's surprisingly timid for Macron.
That's because the French can't conceive of the EU as anything but a vehicle for french grandeur. They still think there's this god-given right for france to rule and dominate Europe.
Quote from: Crazy_Ivan80 on May 21, 2022, 01:54:03 PMThat's because the French can't conceive of the EU as anything but a vehicle for french grandeur. They still think there's this god-given right for france to rule and dominate Europe.
For once, I share a view with Crazy Ivan. Is there any EU country other than France seriously interested in strategic autonomy, especially on the military side? I guess more countries are interested in localization of supply chains and national or European champions. But besides that? Might change if a new Trump is elected...
Anyway, I wonder if these charts count the same things. The last US package included replenishment of American stock. Or equipment for NATO partners that does not directly go to Ukraine. Is similar spending included in the figures for other countries?
Quote from: Zanza on May 21, 2022, 01:58:16 PMFor once, I share a view with Crazy Ivan. Is there any EU country other than France seriously interested in strategic autonomy, especially on the military side? I guess more countries are interested in localization of supply chains and national or European champions. But besides that? Might change if a new Trump is elected...
I agree with both of you on France.
I suppose the point I'm struggling with is that it seems obvious to me that if you want, even a French-led EU, on geostrategic and defence issues - the first necessary step is that all EU partners trust France on those issues. I don't get why there doesn't seem to be any attempt to align France with the Nordics, Baltics and Poland who feel exposed. It reminds me of the sort of old Europe/new Europe attitude and new Europe should just be quiet. It seems like a real lacuna in Macron's vision.
I find it really frustrating too because I basically think Macron's analysis is correct and Europe should probably start working on this before Trump 2024. And frankly if Trump's first term wasn't enough to shock Europe into action, I don't see any reason why his second term would - it seems more likely that Europe would keep going on its current course until there was a crisis and they realised the US wasn't coming to help. That's why I think the "zeitenwende" matters more because even if it's partial that is a realistic step to reducing that risk.
QuoteAnyway, I wonder if these charts count the same things. The last US package included replenishment of American stock. Or equipment for NATO partners that does not directly go to Ukraine. Is similar spending included in the figures for other countries?
I think so - there's details on the data and its limitations here. It does cover replacement or ciricle exchange supplies but I think it only includes ones that are new or bespoke to Ukraine. So I think it covers US-Slovakia, Germany-Slovenia and UK-Poland as well as the European Peace Facility in the EU figure (even though it's used to replenish member states), but I think excludes the Baltics replenishing supplies from their pre-existing arrangements with the US (that is: the Baltics are counted; the US isn't).:
https://www.ifw-kiel.de/publications/kiel-working-papers/2022/ukraine-tracker-17204/
I think the big inaccuracy/gap is France because from what I've read they are providing a lot of military support/equipment - but France has kept it very quiet and doesn't make announcements and hasn't provided $ figures at any point so I think their number is far lower than it should be.
Hey Europe, we're kicking y'all's asses in the Ukraine sweepstakes. Step it up man.
A few different thoughts on the current conversation re: France, the EU, Germany etc.
1) I have heard it claimed that both Scholz and Macron are co-ordinating their Putin conversations with Zelenskyy. I have seen no evidence of this, but I will note that Zelenskyy is not shy about calling out perceived shortcomings in his European allies, and IIRC he hasn't complained about the calls.
2) Denmark (post WWII) has never ever been in doubt that our security hinges on our relationship with the US via NATO. It is clearly and repeatedly stated across the political spectrum, and there is basically zero appetite to shift that to the EU in any shape or form.
3) You're right Yi, and good on you. I think when it comes to as ratio of GDP you may have competition, but in absolute terms no one else is near. I think the US will reap soft power (and thus economic) benefits from this for a long time to come.
Macron has been really off the mark.
Even if Zelensky is using him to get messages or a read on Putin, I don't understand how his public remarks are so off.
The Italians are also wildly wrong. I don't expect anything from Germany so I'm not surprised.
But this "off-ramp" BS from Macron is baffling. In the end it doesn't matter for Ukraine, as they're the ones who'll decide how best to end this war, but this is a GOLDEN opportunity for France to achieve huge, transformative changes in line with what we've always wanted for the EU, and Macron is fumbling continuously. Thoroughly disappointed.
Quote from: Jacob on May 21, 2022, 11:30:34 PMA few different thoughts on the current conversation re: France, the EU, Germany etc.
1) I have heard it claimed that both Scholz and Macron are co-ordinating their Putin conversations with Zelenskyy. I have seen no evidence of this, but I will note that Zelenskyy is not shy about calling out perceived shortcomings in his European allies, and IIRC he hasn't complained about the calls.
I think that was true. I think there's been a shift in the last week or so. Zelensky did an interview with RAI and was asked about Macron's calls with Putin - and Zelensky later shared this clip on his Telegram account:
Quote"We must not look for a way out for Russia, and Macron is doing it in vain," Zelensky told Italian television Rai 1, according to the Ukrainian president's Telegram channel.
"I know he wanted to get results from mediation between Russia and Ukraine, but he didn't get any," Zelensky said.
[...]
Zelensky said that "some European leaders think we need to find a way of talking with Putin".
"We have been looking for them for years. And today, these routes are littered with bodies, bodies of our people," the Ukrainian leader added.
Zelensky however repeated his offer to speak with Putin directly but described talks with Russian as "no longer possible".
"Today, the stage when we could sit down with Russia has passed."
The Elysee have denied that they have pressure Ukraine to make territorial concessions and said all calls have been in coordination with Zelensky. I think on around the same day Scholz spoke with Putin and called for an immediate ceasefire - the issue is that an immediate ceasefire now benefits Russia.
I've thought the calls were justified for a few reasons - I'm less sure they are now. I basically agree with the Estonian PM that after Bucha and Irpin for Putin to feel isolated because of what the West are calling war crimes, he needs to be isolated.
Obviously I think France and Germany have the right policy and are supporting Ukraine. I think France is doing far more we don't know about, just not transparently. But I think they are back in the Normandy/Minsk mindset of wanting peace more than they care about the actual terms of that peace - I think Putin with Minsk took advantage of that appetite for peace and I think he'd do the same again.
Quote3) You're right Yi, and good on you. I think when it comes to as ratio of GDP you may have competition, but in absolute terms no one else is near. I think the US will reap soft power (and thus economic) benefits from this for a long time to come.
Yeah - unsurprisingly as a % of GDP Eastern Europe is generally ahead (again with the caveat that France's numbers are far too low):
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FTBoSW6X0AApBmK?format=png&name=small)
I think the US has reaped huge soft power benefits in Eastern Europe - but Europe more widely and obviously Ukraine. Weirdly in Ukraine itself I was listening to a Ukrainian MP who said that the US and Biden have received less credit than the UK or Poland, even though it's the most important country - she put it down to Biden not having visited Kyiv yet but US visits have been escalating (Secretaries of State and Defence, Speaker, Senate Majority Leader etc) so I expect Biden will at some point.
QuoteThe Italians are also wildly wrong. I don't expect anything from Germany so I'm not surprised.
Just on this - and linked to that point - I think the visit is also relevant. Yesterday Portugal's PM was in Kyiv. In addition to him, the President of the Commission (who I think has been impressive in this crisis) and Council (who hasn't), the PMs of Spain, Denmark, all the Baltics, the UK, Poland and the UN SecGen have all been to Kyiv in recent weeks. It is striking that the leaders of France, Germany and Italy as the core big European countries haven't been yet.
From what I've read Macron doesn't think it would achieve anything. Again I can't quite understand it because I think Macron is generally really good at the politics of symbols and how symbolism/gestures matter in politics.
QuoteBut this "off-ramp" BS from Macron is baffling. In the end it doesn't matter for Ukraine, as they're the ones who'll decide how best to end this war, but this is a GOLDEN opportunity for France to achieve huge, transformative changes in line with what we've always wanted for the EU, and Macron is fumbling continuously. Thoroughly disappointed.
Yes. That's the thing I really don't understand. This was an incredible chance for France to advance its agenda and build trust in the Nordics and Eastern Europe that Europe is a route for their security. From everything I've read I think on substantive policy Macron is doing the right stuff - but it's the symbolic side of things and the way he talks about the issue that undermines all of that. It's crazy.
To add to the general French foot in mouth, today the minister for European Affairs said it'll take 15-20 years for Ukraine to join the EU.
Even if true, what's the added value of making this statement? It's crazy how disconnected it feels from the new realpolitik developing in eastern Europe.
No wonder the Balts and Poland look to Washington for defense guarantees.
France is scoring own goals after own goals. It's especially baffling as we're usually so good at the optics and symbolism. I think we haven't processed that Russia is an enemy, not an interlocutor.
I'm not sure I understand the problem there?
15-20 years does sound like a reasonable estimate all being well.
Yes but why say it now? Just shut up about it, and play up the hopes of Ukrainians. They're fighting for survival.
Quote from: Zoupa on May 22, 2022, 04:47:00 PMYes but why say it now? Just shut up about it, and play up the hopes of Ukrainians. They're fighting for survival.
Indeed, and even then some sort of protectorate status could be invented.
But first Paris needs to internalize that the Era of napoleon is over and that most people didn't really like it
Quote from: Zoupa on May 22, 2022, 04:47:00 PMYes but why say it now? Just shut up about it, and play up the hopes of Ukrainians. They're fighting for survival.
As soon as the talk of EU joining started up at the start of the invasion wasn't it said they would have to meet the criteria and there's no reward for fighting Russia and the like?
Within 2 decades you'll be part of the EU sounds quite good to me.
Quote from: Josquius on May 23, 2022, 02:34:12 AMQuote from: Zoupa on May 22, 2022, 04:47:00 PMYes but why say it now? Just shut up about it, and play up the hopes of Ukrainians. They're fighting for survival.
As soon as the talk of EU joining started up at the start of the invasion wasn't it said they would have to meet the criteria and there's no reward for fighting Russia and the like?
Within 2 decades you'll be part of the EU sounds quite good to me.
I don't think it is helpful for keeping Ukrainian spirits up to tell them most of their lives will be over by the time they might join the EU. I don't think that's the timeline they had in mind when welcoming the news of submitting their request to join.
And there is a lot that can be done and granted to Ukraine to make them benefit from the EU without becoming members. If you remind them that despite their suffering and dying protecting the EU (as well as themselves) they'll be found wanting to join for a LONG time, perhaps it would be more constructive to also mention there are ways to help them in the meantime.
It's just optics and symbolism. Crucial things when you are asking people to die.
I think on symbolism and optics there is also something of a re-founding of Europe going on. Just looking at the clip of Duda's second visit to Kyiv where he addressed the Rada in person - it's highly charged.
If Europe generation 1 was a peace project symbolised by Franco-German reconciliation, I think there is something in Ukraine's fight (and support for it) that is symbolising the independence and freedom of Central and Eastern Europe within Europe. Both, in their way, a rejection of European history and determination for something new - it's just different depending on where you are and what your post-war looks like.
I don't think that's something that is exclusive of "old Europe" but I think they've perhaps underestimated it. There is something of Kohl and Mitterrand Verdun moment on the symbolic level, I think, happening in Eastern Europe now.
On timescales - Austria has said Ukraine shouldn't join the EU, the Netherlands have made clear it will take a long time. On a symbolic level I think Macron - a profoundly European politician - should be positioning France as Ukraine's champion (while practically knowing other countries have a veto and will slow it down). But again I think there's a large dependency of traditional French policy - he vetoed North Macedonia, France is always wary of expansion as it reduces French influence (which could be changed by engaging as equals with new members) and he seems trapped on that approach. Same as he can't escape French President saying French things about Russia.
Why would it take two decades? Is there anything in the Copenhagen criteria that says "this and that condition must be fulfilled for ten years in a row" or so? Other countries joined faster. The 2004 enlargement was 14 years after the Soviet bloc fell...
Yeah, but the 2004 enlargement was problematic. Perhaps more time should have been spent fighting corruption and establishing stable rule of law and democracy in a few of those countries, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria in particular.
Lesson learned, let's not forget that Ukraine is extremely corrupt, far more than what the 2004 group were.
Quote from: Sheilbh on May 23, 2022, 03:27:42 AMIn a symbolic level I think Macron - a profoundly European politician - should be positioning France as Ukraine's champion (while practically knowing other countries have a veto and will slow it down). But again I think there's a large dependency of traditional French policy - he vetoed North Macedonia, France is always wary of expansion as it reduces French influence (which could be changed by engaging as equals with new members) and he seems trapped on that approach.
In the specific case of Ukraine, I believe that France is justifiably wary that Ukraine - a relatively largish country in the EU membership context - inevitably will be drawn into the German orbit of influence, thus upsetting from France's POV the balance of power within the EU.
Quote from: The Minsky Moment on May 23, 2022, 08:57:03 AMQuote from: Sheilbh on May 23, 2022, 03:27:42 AMIn a symbolic level I think Macron - a profoundly European politician - should be positioning France as Ukraine's champion (while practically knowing other countries have a veto and will slow it down). But again I think there's a large dependency of traditional French policy - he vetoed North Macedonia, France is always wary of expansion as it reduces French influence (which could be changed by engaging as equals with new members) and he seems trapped on that approach.
In the specific case of Ukraine, I believe that France is justifiably wary that Ukraine - a relatively largish country in the EU membership context - inevitably will be drawn into the German orbit of influence, thus upsetting from France's POV the balance of power within the EU.
Yeah, a country of the size of Ukraine would be a significant voting bloc inside the EU. I suspect France is wary of the balance of power inside the EU tilting too much towards the East.
Quote from: The Minsky Moment on May 23, 2022, 08:57:03 AMIn the specific case of Ukraine, I believe that France is justifiably wary that Ukraine - a relatively largish country in the EU membership context - inevitably will be drawn into the German orbit of influence, thus upsetting from France's POV the balance of power within the EU.
I agree. I think France's concern around expansion is broadly true - I saw Gerard Araud today describing it as France wanted an effective and decisive EU so was reluctant on expansion; the British wanted the opposite so always backed it but the British won :lol:
But I also think France maybe needs to take a look at why its voice doesn't maybe carry the weight it would like with new members and if the two issues could be linked.
In this case France has reasonable concerns and there are good reasons why it will take a long time for Ukraine to enter the EU (once it is at peace) - given that the Austrians and Dutch have loudly sounded off on that, I'm not sure there's any necessary reason for France to join in. The better response, which might earn a bit of goodwill and is probably as accurate, is that France supports Ukraine joining, they're helping Ukraine now and once there is peace they will help Ukraine to join as fast as they can.
QuoteYeah, a country of the size of Ukraine would be a significant voting bloc inside the EU. I suspect France is wary of the balance of power inside the EU tilting too much towards the East.
Yes - although a German think-tanker did note that France had either blocked or caused issues with accession of every big new country. It happened with the UK, with Spain (there was a risk of veto over agriculture/farmers), Poland etc :lol:
It's not just tilting East it's just that it might tilt anywhere away from France and the country isn't so small that they should do what they're told :P
Quote from: Threviel on May 23, 2022, 08:56:09 AMYeah, but the 2004 enlargement was problematic. Perhaps more time should have been spent fighting corruption and establishing stable rule of law and democracy in a few of those countries, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria in particular.
Lesson learned, let's not forget that Ukraine is extremely corrupt, far more than what the 2004 group were.
Romania and Bulgaria didn't join in 2004. Overall I think the 2004 expansion was a net positive development for the EU.
Quote from: Maladict on May 23, 2022, 11:30:50 AMQuote from: Threviel on May 23, 2022, 08:56:09 AMYeah, but the 2004 enlargement was problematic. Perhaps more time should have been spent fighting corruption and establishing stable rule of law and democracy in a few of those countries, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria in particular.
Lesson learned, let's not forget that Ukraine is extremely corrupt, far more than what the 2004 group were.
Romania and Bulgaria didn't join in 2004. Overall I think the 2004 expansion was a net positive development for the EU.
Absolutely, and overall I think the eastward expansion had to be done, even if some nations do still have issues. We are now seeing what happens to unaligned nations that have the misfortune of bordering Russia.
Romania and Bulgaria shouldn't have joined when they did. Even looking at it from the POV of the time I would say it was too soon. In hindsight with 2008 just around the corner- ouch.
The 2004 expansion was broadly positive however, sans 2007 I do think complaints about this could have been kept to the nutters. Though could have used some rules about dropping below the standards then you're out...sigh.
Quote from: Maladict on May 23, 2022, 11:30:50 AMQuote from: Threviel on May 23, 2022, 08:56:09 AMYeah, but the 2004 enlargement was problematic. Perhaps more time should have been spent fighting corruption and establishing stable rule of law and democracy in a few of those countries, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria in particular.
Lesson learned, let's not forget that Ukraine is extremely corrupt, far more than what the 2004 group were.
Romania and Bulgaria didn't join in 2004. Overall I think the 2004 expansion was a net positive development for the EU.
Ahh, my memory let me down. I agree, 2004 and also Romania and Bulgaria, but to a lesser extent, was a net positive. Ukraine is in an order of magnitudes worse state than Romania or Bulgaria was.
Hungary has been a failure and is a huge problem, but otherwise its going quite well. But even Poland and Slovakia (or Slovenia, one of the slo's) has democratic issues, it's not certain that that is going to end well.
So the jury is still out on 2004 and 2007, it might still go to shit.
Looks like Orban's earning his keep. No discussion of stopping using Russian oil at the next council - I suspect we're probably at the peak of European sanctions until someone can find a way around Hungary <_<
Still don't understand how the EU was created without a way to expel members.
Really interesting thread by Italian professor of politics - if this is broadly right and holds up I think that means Italy doesn't really have any mainstream social democratic party left which does seem to create an space for an opportunist :hmm:
No doubt we'll now see the re-invention of Renzi as a Bella Ciao singing, always committed leftist :lol:
QuoteDaniele Albertazzi
@DrAlbertazziUK
.@EnricoLetta must be commended for having done more to define the identity of the PD in a few months than all of his predessors put together. In short, the debate about whether the PD is a Social-Democratic party is now truly behind us.
With an eye to liberals abroad (the Italian centre-left MUST find inspiration elsewhere) we could say that the party now resembles the UK's Lib-Dems, & is happy to try and please constituencies that are already lending it their vote.
100% pro-US & pro-EU, theoretically in favour of gender equality (more work to be done in practice, of course), coherent on individual rights. It does not - & will not - try to "think big" on issues that it has contributed to create throughout the years: precarity, "flexibility"
... the erosion of rights in the workplace. It will not position itself as a socio-democratic party because it isn't one.
In time, people will digest this & get used to it. But them - at least - they will be able to pass judgement & decide whether they like this or not.
Given that Conte's M5S has also (strangely) dropped whatever left wing features it may have had for a while, & wants to occupy same space as PD (and others), this creates an opportunity for a party on the left of the PD (don't call it "radical left", please, unless it is such...)
Of course this has been tried before, & egos, rivalries & the sheer fun of engaging in civil war have always prevailed. I am not predicting this time it will be different. I am only saying that, in my view, Letta has helped clarify the situation.
It is now apparent that, with more economic hardship, squeezing of pensions & climate-induced inequalities on the horizon, the opportunity is definetely there.
Whatever passes for mainstream left in Italian politics has been getting so steadily filled with former DC peeps (Letta being one of them) that something like that was bound to happen sooner or later.
Croatia to join the Euro next year.
Quote from: HVC on May 24, 2022, 11:17:52 AMStill don't understand how the EU was created without a way to expel members.
I'll bite, and suggest exuberant optimism.
Quote from: The Larch on June 01, 2022, 01:56:22 PMCroatia to join the Euro next year.
Noted by Luka Ivan Jukic on Twitter - Croatia's now been promoted from a Balkan country :lol:
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FUL7pdpX0AMAuyZ?format=jpg&name=small)
It's like being accepted into civilization, or welcomed into polite society. :lol:
Denmark votes to get rid of it's exemption on EU defence by 66.9% for vs 33.1% against, with a 65.8% participation rate.
Quote from: HVC on May 24, 2022, 11:17:52 AMStill don't understand how the EU was created without a way to expel members.
In the early days having Eastern Bloc countries as members was unrealistic.
(https://i.redd.it/m05gmn0zq6391.png)
Inflation is higher in countries where people have to spend more on basic food expenditures anyway.
It is sad that Turkey spends so much food when it is named after poultry.
Quote from: alfred russel on June 03, 2022, 03:17:49 PMIt is sad that Turkey spends so much food when it is named after poultry.
Turkiye makes so much more sense. The government is trying to stop people thinking about food.
(https://i.redd.it/q9hahqc0xr591.png)
The French are truly the Grumpy Smurf of the EU re. enlargement.
If France is Grumpy Smurf, which EU country would be the Brainy Smurf? :hmm:
Ukraine and Moldova have been given official EU candidate status.
Quote from: The Larch on June 23, 2022, 04:18:27 PMUkraine and Moldova have been given official EU candidate status.
:yeah:
Quote from: The Larch on June 23, 2022, 04:18:27 PMUkraine and Moldova have been given official EU candidate status.
Yeah which is very good news.
Although seems to have been a bit of mixed some. Great progress (albeit largely symbolic) there, but a bit of a mess on the West Balkans - the Albanian PM was really critical at the joint press conference with Serbia and North Macedonia.
And apparently Macron's going to explain his "European Political Community" concept tonight - it'll be interesting to see reactions.
Quote from: Sheilbh on June 23, 2022, 04:26:47 PMAnd apparently Macron's going to explain his "European Political Community" concept tonight - it'll be interesting to see reactions.
It very much sounds like the EU kid's table, but I'll wait to hear further details.
I'm a little more suspicious today because while most of the West Balkans leaders seemed quite angry at the lack of progress for them, Serbia, which isn't really even a full democracy any more and is very pro-Russia, was quite enthusiastic for this idea as an alternative.
Never seems a reason for optimism when the most enthusiastic is someone who'd only ever be a spoiler.
Quote from: The Larch on June 23, 2022, 04:18:27 PMUkraine and Moldova have been given official EU candidate status.
Population wise that's a pretty good replacement for England/Wales and Scotland.
And to replace Northern Ireland we could offer those in Kalingrad a place in the EU if they left Russia, then the EU would 'own' a similar problem to the one that's dogged the UK all these years.
Although I am once again asking quite why Macron feels the need to say this stuff.
This was at his press conference immediately after they were granted candidate status. No doubt - as every time Macron says something like this - all the French foreign policy people will be explaining what he really meant which may add some clarity. But to me it sounds like he basically thinks the European Political Community is the correct "geopolitical" space for Ukraine and it will, eventually, also include Russia in his theory - which feels like a theory that won't survive contact with reality.
I get explaining it will take a long time but this seems a bit more than that:
Quotelaurence norman
@laurnorman
Macron has just said at the press conference right after Ukraine given candidate status that 1) NATO has said no to Ukraine. and that 2) over time, opening EU accession process to Ukraine is not the right geopolitical response. These are both highly problematic.
To put in context, his argument was that his political community structure is the right geopolitical response. OK, leaders will discuss that tonight. But that is NOT the NATO position. And it seems extraordinary to diss Ukraine's EU accession prospects minutes after agreeing it.
This is my translation from French. Others may have better version. But was asked by @markuspreiss about his comment 3 years ago that the only response EU had to non-members' predicament was to invite it to become a member, knowing you wouldn't have to deal with consequences...
As part of a long answer, he said, "So therefore, the geopolitical response in the context of the war is indeed to continue to give this perspective. Is it that over time, I think it's the right geopolitical perspective? I tell you frankly, as I did three years ago. No."...
"Because it will take time and because we see a phenomenon of some sort of fatigue of enlargement among the countries that have joined." Again, he's not saying Ukraine will never join or they'll stop the process. And he's pitching a broader argument to have another construct...
ie his European political community idea. But it's still a remarkable thing to say minutes after offering Ukraine candidate status. And it will do nothing to prevent Russia and its social media mob saying this is an unserious process and Ukraine will never join.
Very open to hearing if people think this is a misinterpretation of @EmmanuelMacron comments. I have now listened back several times.
And sorry to harp on this but I see lots of stereotypical tweeting on this. Macron did not say he was opposed to offering candidate status. He said that was the right response now in context of war and without alternative. But not the right "geopolitical" response over time.
Moldava is a pretty dodgy place AFAIK, even by Balkan standards.
Quote from: Admiral Yi on June 23, 2022, 06:02:59 PMMoldava is a pretty dodgy place AFAIK, even by Balkan standards.
they'll be right at home in the EU then.
QuoteEU to open accession talks with Albania, North Macedonia
The European Union's 27 members have agreed to open accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia. The two countries have long criticized the slow progress on their EU membership bids.
Czech Prime Minister Petr Fiala, whose country currently holds the European Union's rotating presidency, said on Monday that the bloc's members had agreed to open accession talks with Albania and North Macedonia.
EU accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania have been pending since 2020.
The process to to become an EU member state is a long one. But since Russia invaded Ukraine, the strategic importance of the Western Balkans to the EU has increased.
Monday's announcement also came after North Macedonia resolved a long dispute with its EU neighbor Bulgaria, which had been blocking the start of the accession talks with Skopje.
EU countries have "just agreed to open accession talks with Albania and North Macedonia!" Fiala wrote on Twitter. "We have taken another important step towards bringing the Western Balkans closer to the EU," he added.
Albania and North Macedonia's leaders will meet with Fiala on Tuesday in Brussels "to discuss the next steps on their path to the EU," he said.
Quote from: Sheilbh on June 01, 2022, 04:20:09 PMNoted by Luka Ivan Jukic on Twitter - Croatia's now been promoted from a Balkan country :lol:
Just goes to show they always belonged in a union with Austria, none of this Serbia or Hungary shit.
Quote from: Valmy on July 19, 2022, 05:59:56 PMQuote from: Sheilbh on June 01, 2022, 04:20:09 PMNoted by Luka Ivan Jukic on Twitter - Croatia's now been promoted from a Balkan country :lol:
Just goes to show they always belonged in a union with Austria, none of this Serbia or Hungary shit.
They were part of Austria as land of the crown of Saint-Stephen, with a limited autonomy from, guess whom, Hungary. :P
You may be mixing up with Slovenia.
Quote from: Duque de Bragança on July 20, 2022, 12:09:55 PMQuote from: Valmy on July 19, 2022, 05:59:56 PMQuote from: Sheilbh on June 01, 2022, 04:20:09 PMNoted by Luka Ivan Jukic on Twitter - Croatia's now been promoted from a Balkan country :lol:
Just goes to show they always belonged in a union with Austria, none of this Serbia or Hungary shit.
They were part of Austria as land of the crown of Saint-Stephen, with a limited autonomy from, guess whom, Hungary. :P
You may be mixing up with Slovenia.
What? I am well aware they were part of the Kingdom of Hungary, the fact that they were part of Hungary was what I was referring to. Why do you think I mentioned Serbia AND Hungary if I was not aware of that? But they were often played off against the Hungarians by the Austrians.
Quote from: Valmy on July 20, 2022, 09:00:57 PMQuote from: Duque de Bragança on July 20, 2022, 12:09:55 PMQuote from: Valmy on July 19, 2022, 05:59:56 PMQuote from: Sheilbh on June 01, 2022, 04:20:09 PMNoted by Luka Ivan Jukic on Twitter - Croatia's now been promoted from a Balkan country :lol:
Just goes to show they always belonged in a union with Austria, none of this Serbia or Hungary shit.
They were part of Austria as land of the crown of Saint-Stephen, with a limited autonomy from, guess whom, Hungary. :P
You may be mixing up with Slovenia.
What? I am well aware they were part of the Kingdom of Hungary, the fact that they were part of Hungary was what I was referring to. Why do you think I mentioned Serbia AND Hungary if I was not aware of that? But they were often played off against the Hungarians by the Austrians.
It was not too clear. You almost made it sound Hungary was part of the Balkans. :P
But then Habsburg Austria also included Serbia for a short time (had they successfully defended it from the Ottomans things might have been different).
Maybe let Hungary have another go at Serbia, not just Voivodina + Belgrade. :D
Quote from: Duque de Bragança on July 21, 2022, 02:28:46 PMIt was not too clear. You almost made it sound Hungary was part of the Balkans. :P
But then Habsburg Austria also included Serbia for a short time (had they successfully defended it from the Ottomans things might have been different).
Maybe let Hungary have another go at Serbia, not just Voivodina + Belgrade. :D
It was Hungary which controlled (parts) of Serbia and for a while they DID defend it from the Turks. :P 1456, remember! In Hungary we were told since that successful siege defense the whole world is ringing church bells at noon every day, because of the Papal order at the time to do so (whereas, I am fairly sure, its only us who have been doing that for the past 500 years :P )
Quote from: Tamas on July 21, 2022, 03:41:55 PMIt was Hungary which controlled (parts) of Serbia and for a while they DID defend it from the Turks. :P 1456, remember! In Hungary we were told since that successful siege defense the whole world is ringing church bells at noon every day, because of the Papal order at the time to do so (whereas, I am fairly sure, its only us who have been doing that for the past 500 years :P )
That's why I mentioned it. :P
As for Serbia, the Despotate remnant ended in 1459, so a very brief high point for Hungary (not Serbia), but fueled by helping Vlad the Impaler taking over in Wallachia in 1456 — before betraying him in 1462 —, Skanderberg in Albania and Stephen the Great in Moldavia (the latter being somewhat troublesome for Hungary as you know :D ).
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FYQ-24fWAAAibad?format=jpg&name=large)
I think Germany should take some responsibility before asking for solidarity.
Or does that only apply pre-2008? Or perhaps only applies to southern Europeans?
Sooner or later, the bill comes due.
What should we take responsibility for with what concrete measures?
What bill comes due?
On gas the National Grid here is seeking authorisation on an emergency basis to increase the pressure in the gas connector to the Netherlands which could increase exports from the UK by a third - which would allow the UK to act a little bit more as a land bridge (we have re-gasification capacity but are at the max of what can be exported to Europe through the pipelines). Also the Rough gas storage has been reopened which sounds like a sensible idea and again probably means we can store and get more to the rest of Europe ahead of winter.
Quote from: Zanza on July 23, 2022, 03:47:35 AMWhat should we take responsibility for with what concrete measures?
What bill comes due?
For being so completely besotted with cheap gas from a mass murderer?
For spending next to nothing on your military?
You're gonna be hard pressed to find accommodating European partners. No one feels sorry for Germany.
Ok, so nothing in particular.
Quote from: Zoupa on July 23, 2022, 04:38:31 AMFor being so completely besotted with cheap gas from a mass murderer?
For spending next to nothing on your military?
You're gonna be hard pressed to find accommodating European partners. No one feels sorry for Germany.
There are two countries in the EU/Nato that can point a finger at Germany about military spending.
And I don't see a bunch of countries that had a smarter energy policy.
I thought you were going to bring up the PIIGS bailouts, and was ready to argue with you on that.
I think that's fair to an extent and the complication/outer limit is Merkel. Germany's strategy for the world for thirty years boiled down to relying on Russia for energy, relying on China for trade/growth and relying on America for security. You do not need to be Cassandra to see that very little needs to go wrong in the world for that model to be at risk - as it is I think it's going wrong on all fronts.
But as you say most countries built their strategies on a similar sort of basis/approach. I think Germany is probably having to go further than others because it was more ideologically and emotionally invested in that long 90s/"end of history" worldview (and of course it was - that was the period of reunification and a great national project of making reunification work). I think it's why Merkel was celebrated by media like the NYT or Guardian for so long - though I imagine she thought it was ridiculous - as the "leader of the free world". She, and Germany, represented the before-times for the traumatised.
But my view and why I'm more critical of Merkel-era Germany (and I think Germany is and must transform from this - again I think the current government is doing a pretty good job all things considered) is that I think it was cynicism not naivety/belief. My read is that her world view is not naive about Putin or Xi but is a combination of deterministic about the decline of west and pessimistic about the west's ability to shape or stop the chaos of world events by actors such as Putin. I always think about her comments about The Sleepwalkers. The consequence is I think she fit in the model of Germany's strategy since at least Schroeder but from a different starting point - not so much "change through trade", as get yours and protect it. I never know how much to give him credence but I'd note Portugal's former Europe Minister Bruno Macaes has explicitly accused Merkel's government of helping block and organising opposition to pipelines and inter connectors with Iberia because "Russian gas comes first" - which is why it's the least affected bit of Europe but also why they can't do much to help despite re-gasification capacity.
And of course there's going to be resentment and reluctance on the part of countries who had to endure lectures and morality tales from Schaeuble.
What gives you the impression that Germany had any particular strategy regarding China, Russia, the US or even the EU? A strategy to me is something you actively pursue, whereas Germany just tried to benefit from a cozy status quo without any particular strategic goals.
I think on China and Russia, Germany has been criticised by allies and made arguments on why it followed that course. I think there is a strategy that was explained and justified in international forums and to allies.
Also I think there's been a series of decisions - when those decisions are made and they all broadly point in the same direction, having the same result/effects, then I think that's a strategy. There is a conscious decision involved, even in just trying to benefit from a cozy status quo or from inaction.
Also I think there is the example of other countries, for example with energy deciding to try and expand their re-gasification/LNG capacity and investing in relations to diversify away from Russia. While Germany has moved slowly on that and in fact increased the proportion of its gas that comes from Russia since 2014. I think that indicates a strategic decision/choice made by Germany even if it was just inaction/the status quo. I don't think strategy necessarily means change.
Quote from: Zanza on July 23, 2022, 05:18:11 AMOk, so nothing in particular.
Do you agree with Habeck that other Europeans should subsidize Germany's gas consumption?
Seems reasonable that the EU should collaborate to ensure cohesion and facilitate collective action... though as usual within the EU there should probably be some give and take.
And there will be understandable frustration and pushback from countries who, last time needed help to ensure cohesion etc, were lectured about not doing their homework and failing to live within their means.
Quote from: Sheilbh on July 23, 2022, 12:16:29 PMAnd there will be understandable frustration and pushback from countries who, last time needed help to ensure cohesion etc, were lectured about not doing their homework and failing to live within their means.
Exactly.
Quote from: Zanza on July 23, 2022, 10:04:13 AMWhat gives you the impression that Germany had any particular strategy regarding China, Russia, the US or even the EU? A strategy to me is something you actively pursue, whereas Germany just tried to benefit from a cozy status quo without any particular strategic goals.
The Economist had a good article this week about something I had long observed in my experiences in Germany and dealing with Germans on a number of issues, but had never quite been able to put into words. The way the Economist puts it--Germans have been living in a dream, and embracing fantasies.
That in and of itself isn't too shocking--most people around the world do exactly this thing, I think it just conflicts with more widespread stereotypes the West holds about Germany and Germans. When we think of Germans we think of engineers and pragmatists, people who would rather save for five weeks to buy something than buy it today on cheap credit. But on energy policy and Russia policy it is more like Germans have been living in the sort of fairy tale world of German fantasy tales of the past.
The concerted decision to "go big on Russia" involved multiple layers of delusion to be justifiable, particularly into the late 2010s and even 2020s (remember Nordstream 2 was still being vociferously defended until this very year.) Even worse though is the concerted decision--largely driven by people who believe in things that are not real, in the Green Party, to shrink other sources of energy.
Germany has around 800bcm of natural gas never exploited, and likely could quadruple or more domestic natural gas production with hydraulic fracturing. Instead, fairy tales (sometimes even promoted by Putin) deeply held by the Greens that fracking is the end of the world and causes cancer, radiation sickness, poisoned water etc etc were uncritically accepted and fracking was banned. Note that the technology had been used on a limited scale in Germany since the 1950s with no major environmental or health disasters of any kind.
After the Fukushima disaster, Germany decided to shutter all of its nuclear power plants--including three reactors to be shuttered soon that the Greens still are fairly insistent on shutting down. This was again, built upon fairy tale fears that are out of step with scientific and practical reality. Even worse, if you are concerned about the environment, much of the nuclear power production in Germany was replaced with biofuel and coal, which are unambiguously worse for the environment.
A segment of Germany's population wanted a fantasy land--one where they would have wide access to cheap energy, that bore no environmental costs because environmental harm occurring in Russia obviously aren't real in the minds of a German Green. Vladimir Putin, and Merkel were very happy to satisfy this fantasy.
Quote from: Zoupa on July 23, 2022, 11:58:55 AMQuote from: Zanza on July 23, 2022, 05:18:11 AMOk, so nothing in particular.
Do you agree with Habeck that other Europeans should subsidize Germany's gas consumption?
I think they should, but it is entirely reasonable for people in Spain and such to do so with a lot of resentment towards Germany, who bears the vast majority of blame for Putin's invasion of Ukraine and threat to peace in Europe and who were more than happy to lecture their friends when they were in need during the Euro crisis.
At the end of the day an EU bloc-wide approach to natural gas supply issues will be good for the European project as a whole, but it won't be achieved without a lot of fuss and growing pains.
Spain and Portugal are not linked to the Eurasian European gas pipelines (several projects to link them were cancelled as mentioned by Sheilbh) so Germany can pretty much forget it regarding Iberia.
They also have their LNG-ready ports, in Vasco da Gama's city for instance.
Quote from: Sheilbh on July 23, 2022, 12:16:29 PMAnd there will be understandable frustration and pushback from countries who, last time needed help to ensure cohesion etc, were lectured about not doing their homework and failing to live within their means.
Definitely. That falls under the "give and take"....
Quote from: Zoupa on July 23, 2022, 11:58:55 AMQuote from: Zanza on July 23, 2022, 05:18:11 AMOk, so nothing in particular.
Do you agree with Habeck that other Europeans should subsidize Germany's gas consumption?
No, Germany will of course pay for it. No subsidies necessary.
The gas shortage was a shared decision by the EU to not buy as much gas from Russia anymore as a reaction to the Ukraine War.
If gas supply alone was the German motive, we could just open Nord Stream 2 tomorrow and Russia would most likely sell us all the gas we might need. The rest of the EU would be rightfully outraged and common resolve gone.
Another unilateral action Germany could take would be to not export gas to our European partners anymore. Roughly half the Russian gas we import is exported downstream, e.g. to Austria, Czechia, Slovakia, even Poland. Similar consequences as above as that would be a gross violation of the common market as well.
We will not do neither of these things because we want to contribute to the common European cause of sanctioning Russia and moving towards becoming independent of them. But on the way there, as the decision to reduce Russian gas import was a shared decision, there should also be a common European policy towards alleviating the scarcity. Regardless of prior German (and Central European policies) that led to the dependency in the first place.
If such a common policy is not forthcoming, Putin has reached his goal to fracture European common resolve.
But no, we don't expect handouts. Just a common push to get over the next Winter and then get rid of Russian gas imports in 23 or 24 altogether.
Quote from: Sheilbh on July 23, 2022, 12:16:29 PMAnd there will be understandable frustration and pushback from countries who, last time needed help to ensure cohesion etc, were lectured about not doing their homework and failing to live within their means.
They are free to lecture us and as far as I can tell do so already.
The condescension certainly doesn't help your case, fyi.
Quote from: Zoupa on July 23, 2022, 02:23:05 PMThe condescension certainly doesn't help your case, fyi.
Zoupa, I love you dearly but that's clearly a shared European trait - not something unique to Zanza and the Germans :lol:
Quote from: OttoVonBismarck on July 23, 2022, 01:25:45 PMQuote from: Zanza on July 23, 2022, 10:04:13 AMWhat gives you the impression that Germany had any particular strategy regarding China, Russia, the US or even the EU? A strategy to me is something you actively pursue, whereas Germany just tried to benefit from a cozy status quo without any particular strategic goals.
The Economist had a good article this week about something I had long observed in my experiences in Germany and dealing with Germans on a number of issues, but had never quite been able to put into words. The way the Economist puts it--Germans have been living in a dream, and embracing fantasies.
That in and of itself isn't too shocking--most people around the world do exactly this thing, I think it just conflicts with more widespread stereotypes the West holds about Germany and Germans. When we think of Germans we think of engineers and pragmatists, people who would rather save for five weeks to buy something than buy it today on cheap credit. But on energy policy and Russia policy it is more like Germans have been living in the sort of fairy tale world of German fantasy tales of the past.
The concerted decision to "go big on Russia" involved multiple layers of delusion to be justifiable, particularly into the late 2010s and even 2020s (remember Nordstream 2 was still being vociferously defended until this very year.) Even worse though is the concerted decision--largely driven by people who believe in things that are not real, in the Green Party, to shrink other sources of energy.
Germany has around 800bcm of natural gas never exploited, and likely could quadruple or more domestic natural gas production with hydraulic fracturing. Instead, fairy tales (sometimes even promoted by Putin) deeply held by the Greens that fracking is the end of the world and causes cancer, radiation sickness, poisoned water etc etc were uncritically accepted and fracking was banned. Note that the technology had been used on a limited scale in Germany since the 1950s with no major environmental or health disasters of any kind.
After the Fukushima disaster, Germany decided to shutter all of its nuclear power plants--including three reactors to be shuttered soon that the Greens still are fairly insistent on shutting down. This was again, built upon fairy tale fears that are out of step with scientific and practical reality. Even worse, if you are concerned about the environment, much of the nuclear power production in Germany was replaced with biofuel and coal, which are unambiguously worse for the environment.
A segment of Germany's population wanted a fantasy land--one where they would have wide access to cheap energy, that bore no environmental costs because environmental harm occurring in Russia obviously aren't real in the minds of a German Green. Vladimir Putin, and Merkel were very happy to satisfy this fantasy.
The article was posted here on the forum and is generally a sensible description.
But your editorializing that all of that is somehow to be blamed on the Greens does at least not fit my perception of what happened.
The Conservatives ruled Germany 32 of the last 40 years. They decided - together with the Social Democrats - on foreign and energy policy. The Greens were in opposition. That said, public consensus has been against nuclear power for decades, originally driven by Greens, bit long adopted into the mainstream. Whereas gas was so far seen fairly neutral, except fracking, which was banned by the last conservative government (without any Greens involved). Not sure where this perception of German Greens comes from. They are by far the most hawkish party on Russia and China and have long criticized our dependency on fossil fuels and pushed for more renewables (which were massively harmed in the same year as the nuclear phase out after Fukushime - a double whammy by the Conservative-Liberal government of the day).
Quote from: Duque de Bragança on July 23, 2022, 02:05:29 PMSpain and Portugal are not linked to the Eurasian European gas pipelines (several projects to link them were cancelled as mentioned by Sheilbh) so Germany can pretty much forget it regarding Iberia.
They also have their LNG-ready ports, in Vasco da Gama's city for instance.
The articles I was seeing suggested Spain would more likely be able to divert some gas to Italy, with which I believe it has transit links, as Italy is also in a bad way right now due to Russian supply issues.
Quote from: Zanza on July 23, 2022, 02:18:44 PMWe will not do neither of these things because we want to contribute to the common European cause of sanctioning Russia and moving towards becoming independent of them. But on the way there, as the decision to reduce Russian gas import was a shared decision, there should also be a common European policy towards alleviating the scarcity. Regardless of prior German (and Central European policies) that led to the dependency in the first place.
I don't really think Germany could even just snatch up gas that happens to be transiting the country bound for other locations. Those flows are usually based on legally binding, long-term contracts signed by various multinational corporations. I would be shocked if a modern OECD country like Germany can even within its own laws, just legally steal a bunch of gas that under the contractual laws of the country itself do not belong to the State. At least not without some sort of special legislation or something--and it would undermine confidence in the entire German legal and business system for a generation.
Quote from: Zanza on July 23, 2022, 02:31:55 PMThe article was posted here on the forum and is generally a sensible description.
But your editorializing that all of that is somehow to be blamed on the Greens does at least not fit my perception of what happened.
The Conservatives ruled Germany 32 of the last 40 years. They decided - together with the Social Democrats - on foreign and energy policy. The Greens were in opposition. That said, public consensus has been against nuclear power for decades, originally driven by Greens, bit long adopted into the mainstream. Whereas gas was so far seen fairly neutral, except fracking, which was banned by the last conservative government (without any Greens involved). Not sure where this perception of German Greens comes from. They are by far the most hawkish party on Russia and China and have long criticized our dependency on fossil fuels and pushed for more renewables (which were massively harmed in the same year as the nuclear phase out after Fukushime - a double whammy by the Conservative-Liberal government of the day).
I mean the Greens were heavily against nuclear power and fracking, is why I bring them up. It is true they did not control the government, but the government did make a choice to accept their narratives and ideas. The government can actually help shape public perceptions, as far as I can tell no one in a position of responsibility in Germany even sought to lobby for or defend nuclear or fracking, which made it pretty easy for public opinion to turn so far against both. Given the tight business or personal ties between many leading Germans and Russia, perhaps it is unsurprising none felt the need to push back against narratives that ultimately benefitted the pro-Russia, pro-gas import desire.
Quote from: OttoVonBismarck on July 23, 2022, 02:33:56 PMI don't really think Germany could even just snatch up gas that happens to be transiting the country bound for other locations. Those flows are usually based on legally binding, long-term contracts signed by various multinational corporations. I would be shocked if a modern OECD country like Germany can even within its own laws, just legally steal a bunch of gas that under the contractual laws of the country itself do not belong to the State. At least not without some sort of special legislation or something--and it would undermine confidence in the entire German legal and business system for a generation.
Not as long as we adhere to the Common Market laws of the EU. But it was questioned whether as part of our common EU decision to cut Russian gas imports,Germany should expect solidarity from the rest of the EU. I think yes to a degree. But if we cannot expect solidarity, adherence to other EU principles surely is also in question.
By the way, we have already nationalized several gas companies (Gazprom Germania, Uniper) in the last weeks which would have been insolvent otherwise, which would have voided their delivery obligations anyway.
Quote from: OttoVonBismarck on July 23, 2022, 02:33:56 PMQuote from: Duque de Bragança on July 23, 2022, 02:05:29 PMSpain and Portugal are not linked to the Eurasian European gas pipelines (several projects to link them were cancelled as mentioned by Sheilbh) so Germany can pretty much forget it regarding Iberia.
They also have their LNG-ready ports, in Vasco da Gama's city for instance.
The articles I was seeing suggested Spain would more likely be able to divert some gas to Italy, with which I believe it has transit links, as Italy is also in a bad way right now due to Russian supply issues.
:hmm:
Italy is like, Iberia, linked to North Africa for gas (2 pipelines Greenstream and Transmediterranean) so that gives more options. As to divert gas to Italy, not directly since there are not pipelines.
Iberia has Medgas and Maghreb Europe (through Morocco so potential trouble), both from Algeria.
As to Italy being in a bad place, yes (as bad as Germany? IMO no). The once planned Galsi, through Sardinia, was abandonned following pressure from, guess whom, Gazprom pressure
(https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/7e/Gas_pipelines_across_Mediterranee_and_Sahara_map-en.svg/1024px-Gas_pipelines_across_Mediterranee_and_Sahara_map-en.svg.png)
(https://w3ask.com/img/main-pipelines-europe.gif)
Eastmed pipeline (Italy-gas fields around Cyprus) was scheduled for 2025.
The latter maps show the working or in progress pipelines.
Quote from: OttoVonBismarck on July 23, 2022, 01:25:45 PMThe Economist had a good article this week
I posted that in the ukraine war thread so it's there should people without access want to read it
Quote from: OttoVonBismarck on July 23, 2022, 02:39:04 PMI mean the Greens were heavily against nuclear power and fracking, is why I bring them up. It is true they did not control the government, but the government did make a choice to accept their narratives and ideas. The government can actually help shape public perceptions, as far as I can tell no one in a position of responsibility in Germany even sought to lobby for or defend nuclear or fracking, which made it pretty easy for public opinion to turn so far against both. Given the tight business or personal ties between many leading Germans and Russia, perhaps it is unsurprising none felt the need to push back against narratives that ultimately benefitted the pro-Russia, pro-gas import desire.
The Greens had very little personal connections to Russia, unlike Conservatives and especially Social Democrats.
Nuclear exit was of course driven by Greens, but the current phase out plan was enacted by Conservatives, who were not willing to fight for their convictions.
I honestly can't remember a big discussion on fracking. There were some reports of bad effects in the American Midwest in the late 2010s and then it was banned. Maybe the Greens played a role there, but not as prominent as in nuclear exit. Wasn't a bid debate in Germany.
However, the Greens were at the forefront to push for more new renewables, better energy conservation, less fossil fuels etc. You could make up a hypothetical were Germany would by now be mich further down the road towards energy independence through renewables had the Greens been in power.
Quote from: Zanza on July 23, 2022, 02:47:56 PMQuote from: OttoVonBismarck on July 23, 2022, 02:33:56 PMI don't really think Germany could even just snatch up gas that happens to be transiting the country bound for other locations. Those flows are usually based on legally binding, long-term contracts signed by various multinational corporations. I would be shocked if a modern OECD country like Germany can even within its own laws, just legally steal a bunch of gas that under the contractual laws of the country itself do not belong to the State. At least not without some sort of special legislation or something--and it would undermine confidence in the entire German legal and business system for a generation.
Not as long as we adhere to the Common Market laws of the EU. But it was questioned whether as part of our common EU decision to cut Russian gas imports,Germany should expect solidarity from the rest of the EU. I think yes to a degree. But if we cannot expect solidarity, adherence to other EU principles surely is also in question.
Surely.
Love the veiled blackmail. Fun.
You were questioning European solidarity, not me.
Quote from: Jacob on July 23, 2022, 02:24:34 PMQuote from: Zoupa on July 23, 2022, 02:23:05 PMThe condescension certainly doesn't help your case, fyi.
Zoupa, I love you dearly but that's clearly a shared European trait - not something unique to Zanza and the Germans :lol:
Let's just say condescension from Germans is especially irritating for other Europeans... I wonder why 🤔
Quote from: Zoupa on July 23, 2022, 03:01:50 PMLet's just say condescension from Germans is especially irritating for other Europeans... I wonder why 🤔
Pretty sure we share that with the French. :hug:
The difference is we've been guided by our mission civilisatrice for a millennium, so we're allowed. :frog:
Quote from: OttoVonBismarck on July 23, 2022, 01:27:00 PMI think they should, but it is entirely reasonable for people in Spain and such to do so with a lot of resentment towards Germany, who bears the vast majority of blame for Putin's invasion of Ukraine and threat to peace in Europe and who were more than happy to lecture their friends when they were in need during the Euro crisis.
That's silly. The vast majority of the blame for Putin's invasion of Ukraine should be assigned to Putin and his elites, maybe also common Russians. Not to Germany or any other factor.
Germany (and France) being appeasing after the first invasion of Ukraine in 2014 surely did not help dissuade him. But it is hardly the cause for Putin's view of history and the world nor for centuries of Russian imperialism, both of which drive the current Russian war.
Quote from: Zoupa on July 23, 2022, 03:10:42 PMThe difference is we've been guided by our mission civilisatrice for a millennium, so we're allowed. :frog:
:lol:
Quote from: Zoupa on July 23, 2022, 03:10:42 PMThe difference is we've been guided by our mission civilisatrice for a millennium, so we're allowed. :frog:
yeah, but no.
Yeah I think German Greens are generally great (but wrong on nuclear) :blush:
Another reason Italy is going to be less exposed is partly simply that Eni exists and continues to have close links to the state, but also that (partly because of Eni) Italy has already done deals with Gulf countries for LNG. They have previously built the relationships that has, from what I've read, allowed them to diversify their supply pretty quickly.
Quote from: Zanza on July 23, 2022, 03:51:37 PMQuote from: OttoVonBismarck on July 23, 2022, 01:27:00 PMI think they should, but it is entirely reasonable for people in Spain and such to do so with a lot of resentment towards Germany, who bears the vast majority of blame for Putin's invasion of Ukraine and threat to peace in Europe and who were more than happy to lecture their friends when they were in need during the Euro crisis.
That's silly. The vast majority of the blame for Putin's invasion of Ukraine should be assigned to Putin and his elites, maybe also common Russians. Not to Germany or any other factor.
Germany (and France) being appeasing after the first invasion of Ukraine in 2014 surely did not help dissuade him. But it is hardly the cause for Putin's view of history and the world nor for centuries of Russian imperialism, both of which drive the current Russian war.
Maybe if Scholz & al. had been more diplomatic or sent heavy weapons earlier, the electorate of the different European nations would look more kindly on helping with LNG.
I don't think there's a lot of goodwill out there, and whatever technocratic or economic reasons the Germans trot out won't get traction. Public opinion matters.
QuoteEU agrees plan to ration gas use over Russia supply fears
Despite most energy ministers backing the scheme the EU was forced to water down proposals
The EU has been forced to water down its plan to ration gas this winter in an attempt to avoid an energy crisis generated by further Russian cuts to supply.
Energy ministers from the 27 member states, except Hungary, backed a voluntary 15% reduction in gas usage over the winter, a target that could become mandatory if the Kremlin ordered a complete shutdown of gas to Europe.
[...]
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2022/jul/26/eu-agrees-plan-to-reduce-gas-use-over-russia-supply-fears
Thanks for the solidarity, European brethren! :)
:grr: :glare:
Quote from: Zoupa on July 26, 2022, 02:09:17 PM:grr: :glare:
You could always move to Hungary in solidarity :D
It's the right decision - and I think rationing may well be necessary in the end. Also strikingly (possibly deliberately?) 10 years to the day from "whatever it takes".
Hungary voted no!
Well aren't they opposed to (and opted out of?) the energy sanctions?
Quote from: Sheilbh on July 26, 2022, 02:18:17 PMIt's the right decision - and I think rationing may well be necessary in the end. Also strikingly (possibly deliberately?) 10 years to the day from "whatever it takes".
Maybe if it was actually accompanied by the famous Zeitenwende. Still waiting on that. Ukrainians are dying every day, still waiting on that.
Quote from: Zoupa on July 26, 2022, 02:29:46 PMMaybe if it was actually accompanied by the famous Zeitenwende. Still waiting on that. Ukrainians are dying every day, still waiting on that.
I think that is happening but will take time. I have more confidence in Baerbock and Habeck but I think the SPD and CDU are realising the need for the shift.
It is a huge transformation that will have lots of implications to work through - and my sense is that Germany isn't necessarily great at moving quickly. I think it'll be the same repeatedly as has been the case throughout this war of Germany resisting change for long enough to annoy everyone and then doing or agreeing to change but too late to get any credit for it.
Germany is paying a price for this in goodwill and trust from their CEE partners.
If you read the article, it looks like Spain and Portugal got their exemptions in the fine print.
Which is only logical, since we can't just send our supply north.
How long would it take to get a pipeline through France to pass along that sweet sweet North African gas?
In normal circumstances, years.
Quote from: Zoupa on July 26, 2022, 02:29:46 PMQuote from: Sheilbh on July 26, 2022, 02:18:17 PMIt's the right decision - and I think rationing may well be necessary in the end. Also strikingly (possibly deliberately?) 10 years to the day from "whatever it takes".
Maybe if it was actually accompanied by the famous Zeitenwende. Still waiting on that. Ukrainians are dying every day, still waiting on that.
What are you missing?
On directly helping Ukraine, Germany has delivered weapons within its capabilities (e.g. recently MLRS, more howitzers, flak tanks).
On energy, it is building LNG terminals, reducing gas usage, mandating heat pumps, increasing reliable construction. Even letting the remaining nuclear plants run longer is now seriously considered.
On remilitarisation, F-35, armed drones etc. are being ordered,the $100 bn extra budget was approved by parliament.
On politics, the Greens and Liberals are fairly hawkish on Russia etc. I personally find the speed frustratingly slow, bit Social Democrats and Conservatives are reevaluating their Russia (and China) policy, generally moving in the right direction.
Quote from: HVC on July 26, 2022, 02:50:07 PMHow long would it take to get a pipeline through France to pass along that sweet sweet North African gas?
Years indeed but not that critical, France has already 3 LNG ports. Norway is ahead of Russia for gas exportation to France by the way. Algeria already sends some LNG through the southern LNG port of Fos-sur-Mer.
A further terminal is planned in Le Havre.
Quote from: Duque de Bragança on July 26, 2022, 04:00:50 PMQuote from: HVC on July 26, 2022, 02:50:07 PMHow long would it take to get a pipeline through France to pass along that sweet sweet North African gas?
Years indeed but n ot that critical, France has already 3 LNG ports. Norway is ahead of Russia for gas exportation to France by the way. Algeria already sends some LNG through the southern LNG port of Fos-sur-Mer.
A further terminal is planned in Le Havre.
I was thinking more sending the gas to Germany. Though I guess Germany could use Frances infrastructure already. Start sending the gas east rather then west. At least eventually.
Considering Germany's pretty terrible recent and not so recent policy towards Russia from the past 3 chancellors and considering Germany's not so recent history in Ukraine, on could have assumed that Scholz's government would have acted incredibly swiftly in terms of financial and military support. This did not happen, and is still not happening. Everything moves at a snail's pace. Why are Guepards (2 of them...) only showing up now, 5 months into the conflict? They are by definition a defensive weapon.
Germany is the EU's biggest economy, yet maligned Poland has sent quantities more armaments, and from day 1.
It's all well and good to make nice speeches, but the urgency of the response is what's important.
Yeah it's hard to avoid thinking German leaders were hoping a swift Russian victory puts this embarrassment quickly to rest. I don't think they were going to do anything if it wasn't for the public outcry.
@Zoupa: I agree that help should have been forthcoming more quickly, especially rhetorically and financially. Not sure about military hardware. I get the impression that the state of our military and miltary-industrial complex is really so dire that they have a hard time delivering faster. But the government certainly slowed down what was already slow anyway and it is not clear why as eventually they still delivered anyway so the earlier slowdown seems nonsense.
That said, Scholz new policy is indeed a Zeitenwende for Germany, even if it may be slowed than people would like. But Scholz Was always a cautious pragmatist.
@Tamas: Some for sure (e.g. Lindner), some others certainly not (e.g. Habeck, Baerbock).
Have you guys seen any tangible stuff moving on the rearmament front? This question is for all the Yuros, not just poor Zanza besieged in Stalingrad. Budgets being passed? I think you mentioned the order for F-35s.
On a related note, how do your militaries recruit, specifically do they play ads on TV and such? I don't recall seeing any on French TV when I was there. They're all over American TV, or at least used to be when I had a TV.
Germany has published what it wants to spend the 100bn extra fund on. Besides small arms and equipment such as night vision goggles etc. the big ticket items are:
Air, about 44 bn:
- F-35 to continue being able to deliver American nukes stored in Germany
- Chinook CH47 transport helicopters
- Eurofighter Typhoon equipped for electronic combat
- Heron TP combat drones
- light support helicopters
- recon satellites
- marine recon aircraft
Command capability, about 20bn:
- More secure radio and data links, especially NATO inoperability
- Data centers
- Satellite communication
Land, about 16 bn:
- Main investment is additional PUMA IFVs
Sea, about 19 bn:
- More K130 corvettes
- More U212 submarine
- More F126 frigates
Right now, about 80 bn of the 100 bn are assigned to concrete procurement measures.
In Germany the military is doing recruitment ads in all media channels.
Quote from: Admiral Yi on July 27, 2022, 12:20:03 AMThis question is for all the Yuros, not just poor Zanza besieged in Stalingrad.
I'd chime in, but I admit I only follow the top headlines these days and feel too mentally exhausted for deep dives into hot political topics at the moment.
How is this gas consumption thing going to be calculated, anyway? I was just looking at advance figures for gas consumption in Spain and it's already down 13% year-on-year. Most surely on account of the high prices.
Quote from: Admiral Yi on July 27, 2022, 12:20:03 AMHave you guys seen any tangible stuff moving on the rearmament front? This question is for all the Yuros, not just poor Zanza besieged in Stalingrad. Budgets being passed? I think you mentioned the order for F-35s.
On a related note, how do your militaries recruit, specifically do they play ads on TV and such? I don't recall seeing any on French TV when I was there. They're all over American TV, or at least used to be when I had a TV.
I don't know much detail, but Sweden is now aiming for a military budget of 2% of GDP, which is a significant increase.
There are ads I think, but I can't remember seeing any recently.
Worth mentioning that conscription, which was completely paused in 2010, was activated again in 2018 in some fashion.
Quote from: Zanza on July 27, 2022, 01:01:28 AMGermany has published what it wants to spend the 100bn extra fund on. Besides small arms and equipment such as night vision goggles etc. the big ticket items are:
Air, about 44 bn:
- F-35 to continue being able to deliver American nukes stored in Germany
- Chinook CH47 transport helicopters
- Eurofighter Typhoon equipped for electronic combat
- Heron TP combat drones
- light support helicopters
- recon satellites
- marine recon aircraft
Command capability, about 20bn:
- More secure radio and data links, especially NATO inoperability
- Data centers
- Satellite communication
Land, about 16 bn:
- Main investment is additional PUMA IFVs
Sea, about 19 bn:
- More K130 corvettes
- More U212 submarine
- More F126 frigates
Right now, about 80 bn of the 100 bn are assigned to concrete procurement measures.
In Germany the military is doing recruitment ads in all media channels.
Might be handy if Germany reworked its procurement procedures a bit to ensure it doesn't get stuck in court for the next two decades.
My understanding is that the slowness of military procurement in Germany is caused by a) time consuming public procurement processes that take ages until awarding and b) over-engineered products that take much longer to be designed and manufactured than planned.
I am not aware that courts play a significant role.
PS: Parliament passed a "Procurement Acceleration Law" for the Bundeswehr recently
Quote from: HVC on July 26, 2022, 04:21:00 PMQuote from: Duque de Bragança on July 26, 2022, 04:00:50 PMQuote from: HVC on July 26, 2022, 02:50:07 PMHow long would it take to get a pipeline through France to pass along that sweet sweet North African gas?
Years indeed but n ot that critical, France has already 3 LNG ports. Norway is ahead of Russia for gas exportation to France by the way. Algeria already sends some LNG through the southern LNG port of Fos-sur-Mer.
A further terminal is planned in Le Havre.
I was thinking more sending the gas to Germany. Though I guess Germany could use Frances infrastructure already. Start sending the gas east rather then west. At least eventually.
A map I posted earlier shows Germany linked to Dutch and French ports, but not necessarily in a helpful order (entry and exit).
As a matter of fact, the Obergailbach interconnexion point (Mosel border with Germany) does not receive any Russian gas now.
Here is another one:
(https://media.ouest-france.fr/v1/pictures/MjAyMjA1NTRjNWQzNjg1OGM3YTc1OGYzMDBiMWFkYTk0MzI2OGU?width=630&focuspoint=50%2C25&cropresize=1&client_id=bpeditorial&sign=817fa3c56d7aee59f4f39f98a9f4c45ece166888db8094898d7c84e3345d5d7c)
Germany might have as well to change its stance on "odourised" gas. :P
No attack through the Ardennes?
Latest figure of possible gas tranfer between France and Germany:
5% (maximum) of the French consumption
https://www.lemonde.fr/international/live/2022/07/27/guerre-en-ukraine-en-direct-les-europeens-sont-ils-prets-a-se-passer-du-gaz-russe-posez-vos-questions-a-notre-journaliste_6136273_3210.html (https://www.lemonde.fr/international/live/2022/07/27/guerre-en-ukraine-en-direct-les-europeens-sont-ils-prets-a-se-passer-du-gaz-russe-posez-vos-questions-a-notre-journaliste_6136273_3210.html)
Le Monde quoting government sources
QuoteLa France est en capacité d'envoyer 5 % mde sa consommation de gaz en Allemagne
La France serait en capacité (sic) d'envoyer au maximum l'équivalent de 5 % de sa consommation de gaz en Allemagne en hiver, si cette dernière connaissait une pénurie de gaz, a appris l'agence Reuters mercredi auprès du cabinet de la ministre de la transition énergétique, Agnès Pannier-Runacher.
Conditional and newspeakish en capacité :D so careful
This is not EU specific but more a Euro point stolen from Leo Carella.
Before the Swedish election, he noted that there's not the same age polarisation for the radical right as we see in the UK and US - so "nostalgia" based explanations (which I don't find terribly convincing there) really don't work. Instead in Sweden you see an upside-down U with the lowest support among the elderly and the young:
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FcOnDr4WIAAIfYM?format=jpg&name=small)
And this isn't just a Swedish thing. The same pattern of lower support among the young and the elderly and strongest support amont peak working age people is also present in France, Spain, Italy, Germany and the Netherlands. I believe it's similar in some other Western European countries too (it'd be interesting to know about Eastern Europe).
But I was wondering if anyone had any theories? It's not "nostalgia" as is used by some to explain age-polarisation in the UK and US. I always thought the lower elderly support for the radical right in Europe was possibly linked to memories of fascism/occupation with the UK and the US having something of an "unoccupied WW2 victor" experience - but that doesn't explain the young. Maybe it's because continenta Europe has more generous state provision for young people - so young people and the elderly don't support a disruptive, radical right but peak working age voters do (but then that makes the UK and US even more interesting/outliers)?
In Sweden the Social Democrats sit on a lot of the old votes, people who remember a time when the Soc Dems were THE party in Sweden, so you're not gonna get really big AND be an old-folks party.
Quote from: The Brain on September 12, 2022, 09:25:51 AMIn Sweden the Social Democrats sit on a lot of the old votes, people who remember a time when the Soc Dems were THE party in Sweden, so you're not gonna get really big AND be an old-folks party.
Surely they have a on-ramp via mellowing left voters?
Quote from: Josquius on September 12, 2022, 09:28:56 AMQuote from: The Brain on September 12, 2022, 09:25:51 AMIn Sweden the Social Democrats sit on a lot of the old votes, people who remember a time when the Soc Dems were THE party in Sweden, so you're not gonna get really big AND be an old-folks party.
Surely they have a on-ramp via mellowing left voters?
They've grabbed a bunch of old votes, but their profile will by necessity not be old-heavy if they get big, which they have.
Didn't know wether to put this here or in the Hungary thread:
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FccTeJRWIAQ7NA1?format=jpg&name=large)
Surprised it's only 4 percent.
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 12, 2022, 07:54:13 AMThe same pattern of lower support among the young and the elderly and strongest support amont peak working age people is also present in France, Spain, Italy, Germany and the Netherlands. I believe it's similar in some other Western European countries too (it'd be interesting to know about Eastern Europe).
But I was wondering if anyone had any theories?
Competition for jobs with immigrants and net tax payers.
Quote from: Admiral Yi on September 12, 2022, 05:29:51 PMCompetition for jobs with immigrants and net tax payers.
Maybe - although it makes me wonder more about the US/UK age polarisation.
4 percent sounds extremely low. :p
It is a sad irony that Orban's regime has been built on EU funds and would not have been possible, at least not with this speed, without those grants.
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 12, 2022, 05:42:44 PMMaybe - although it makes me wonder more about the US/UK age polarisation.
It also doesn't explain the fact that the Pakibashers are strongest in east Germany, which is chalk white.
Rejoice - this is very positive and huge if it can be agreed :o :w00t:
QuoteMujtaba Rahman
@Mij_Europe
The Commission is planning to leverage cost of living crisis to propose major changes to EU fiscal rules (Stability & Growth Pact) in Oct - effectively jettisoning preventive arm, abandoning annual structural deficit targets & assessing debt sustainability over 10(not 1)yrs 1/
The core idea is to move away from top down, uniform benchmarks to a more tailored, individualised application of the rules. Member states would devise their own debt reduction plan for 10yr alongside reform & investment plans; Bxl would do DSA & make recommendation to Council 2/
-No 1/20 debt reduction rule
-No annual structural fiscal deficit reduction
-No reference to output gaps
-Only benchmark Commission wd consider wd relate to public expenditures
Will Berlin agree?
Anyone who can find delight in that announcement should really be working as a bureaucrat.
Quote from: Admiral Yi on September 22, 2022, 04:11:43 PMAnyone who can find delight in that announcement should really be working as a bureaucrat.
Is working as a lawyer that much more exciting? :P
Touche
That sounds like finally burying the austerity era measures. :hmm:
I have doubts that Christian Lindner will agree to that.
Ah, so even more debt.
Quote from: Crazy_Ivan80 on September 23, 2022, 12:45:27 AMAh, so even more debt.
20 years ago US Vice President Dick Cheney announced that Reagan showed deficits and debt don't matter and the United States has sure taken that Reaganomics lesson to heart. Follow us to endless deficit spending Euros!
I've mentioned before that I find Politico really valuable because it reports the EU as a centre of power for a global audience rather than through the focuses and interests of member state's media. This is an interesting example - have to say I've been more sympathetic to VdL following the two incidents mentioned here with Michel where I think his behaviour was not great. But also from covid to Ukraine and energy my impression is VdL has done a very good job while I'm not sure Michel seems that effective - and it's not always that way in terms of Commission v Council, I think Tusk was far more effective than Juncker for example:
QuoteEurope's odd couple: The dysfunctional relationship at the heart of the EU
Relations between European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President Charles Michel have never been so bad.
By Suzanne Lynch
November 10, 2022 4:55 am CET
When the leaders of the world's most powerful countries meet at the G20 summit in Bali next week, don't expect the European Union to present a united front.
Rather than coordinate, the bloc's top two officials — European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and European Council President Charles Michel — are more likely to avoid each other, with staffers involved in organizing the trip under strict instructions to avoid any overlap in itineraries.
In the nearly three years since their tenures began, relations between Michel and von der Leyen have undergone an extraordinary breakdown, with staff from the two institutions discouraged from communicating and the two leaders locking each other out from meetings with foreign dignitaries.
The dysfunctional partnership is not only impacting the EU's legislative and political agenda, which depends on a delicate inter-institutional balancing act. It's also threatening to undermine the EU's standing in the world.
One of the centerpieces of the G20 will be a meeting between Michel and Chinese leader Xi Jinping scheduled to take place on the fringes of the summit. Given the divisions within the EU about how to deal with Beijing, it's shaping up to be a crucial meeting. But von der Leyen hasn't been invited. The reason? Her refusal to allow Michel to attend a meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the G7 in Germany in June.
Rivalry between the Commission and the Council has long been a challenge due to an inherent structural tension within the EU's byzantine system.
The Commission is the bloc's executive arm, with the ability to propose legislation, putting its president at the heart of nearly every EU initiative. But the Council is where heads of state or government meet to hammer out the bloc's biggest decisions. Though its president plays a coordinating role, moderating the debate between the real decision-makers, the position is arguably closer to where the bloc's real power lies.
With the two roles assigned overlapping areas of responsibility the result is added confusion to the age-old question often attributed to Henry Kissinger — who do you call when you want to call Europe? (The European Parliament, with its own president, provides a third center of power, but few would argue it is anything other than a younger sibling to the other two).
The personality clash between the current incumbents has taken inter-institutional competitiveness to another level, according to multiple EU officials, including those who worked under previous administrations when Jean-Claude Juncker headed the Commission and Donald Tusk was president of the Council.
Meetings between von der Leyen and Michel are virtually nonexistent, even in the run-up to European Council summits, typically the forum where the EU makes progress on the big strategic and immediate challenges facing the bloc.
Officials from other countries and international bodies are frequently confused as to who their interlocutor should be. Staffers at the two institutions report a tit-for-tat attitude between the Commission and Council toward attendance at meetings with third parties. During rolling discussions on the global food crisis, United Nations representatives were surprised when a senior EU staffer who had previously been part of the talks was suddenly cut out of subsequent meetings.
"Communication has completely broken down," said one official who wished to remain anonymous.
Von der Leyen on the couch
When von der Leyen and Michel were picked to head the two most powerful EU institutions in 2019 they made an unlikely pair. Von der Leyen, a defense minister in German Chancellor Angela Merkel's government, had spent most of her career in domestic politics; Michel, a former Belgian prime minister from a prominent political family had more EU experience, having sat around the European Council table as leader of his country.
The two shared some biographical similarities. Both came from families steeped in politics. Von der Leyen's father was director general of the EU's competition division in the 1970s and later enjoyed a successful career in state-level German politics; Michel's father was a well-known Belgian minister of foreign affairs, an EU commissioner and a member of the European Parliament.
But in terms of personality, the two are very different. Von der Leyen, a medical doctor and mother of seven, is analytically minded and carefully controlled. Michel is a soft-spoken turtleneck-wearing leader with a penchant for poetry. When he married his long-term partner last year, he invited the spouses of EU leaders to dinner and a special viewing of an exhibition of works by the British artist David Hockney in Brussels' Bozar center for fine arts.
According to officials, the relationship started off calmly. "There were some minor hiccups, but nothing unexpected," said one EU official. In the early months, the Council's secretariat scheduled a weekly afternoon meeting between Michel and von der Leyen every Monday.
But though the meetings soon petered out, things didn't completely fall apart until April 2021 after the two leaders traveled to Turkey to meet with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
Cameras caught von der Leyen's shocked reaction when Michel quickly snagged the only chair next to the Turkish president, leaving her to sit on a couch across from the Turkish foreign minister. The Commission president, the first woman to occupy the position, later told the European Parliament she was "hurt" by the incident, blaming the snub on sexism.
Dubbed "Sofagate," the incident went viral globally, with the mutual (if not always public) recriminations driving a downward spiral in relations that has only worsened since.
At the height of the uproar, it was widely reported that Michel added insult to injury by canceling a regular Monday lunch with von der Leyen due to a conflict with a visit by an African head of state. Today, Council officials say that von der Leyen had repeatedly canceled the lunch meetings, even before Sofagate. "In reality, it never took place weekly." Commission officials say the two meet "almost" every week in various fora, though the scheduled one-to-one has been abandoned.
In contrast, von der Leyen and Michel's predecessors Juncker and Tusk met most weeks and had a good working relationship, helped by their previous acquaintance as prime ministers and despite differences over policy issues like migration.
When it comes to Sofagate, Michel appears to have been slow to learn his lesson.
In February 2022, after months of being pilloried in the press, he stood by mutely during a handshake photo-op with African officials when Uganda's foreign minister breezed past von der Leyen to seize his hand and then Emmanuel Macron's. (The French president gently suggested to the African dignitary that he might want to acknowledge the Commission president.)
Public tensions
The breakdown in relations has started to impinge on the workings of the EU, according to officials from both institutions.
Though the two leaders appear alongside each other at post-summit press conferences, dialogue on day-to-day matters between the leaders and their close staff is all but nonexistent.
During the Juncker-Tusk years, the leaders of the Council and Commission met regularly ahead of euro-summits with the presidents of the European Central Bank and the Eurogroup, the informal body of finance ministers from the eurozone. Since 2019, however, the gathering has not happened — even as the bloc's economic difficulties have mounted.
The Council staff is forced to "chase information like journalists," said one official in the institution's Europa building headquarters, complaining that the Commission does not brief Michel on its upcoming proposals, even though those initiatives will ultimately need the backing of the national governments he works with.
The Michel cabinet typically learns of the Commission proposals at the same time as the "sherpas" or representatives of member countries. "It's a constant fight to get both sides to share information," said one Council official. (Commission officials point out that it is the Commission's prerogative to propose legislation without input from the Council.)
The breakdown in communication has spurred some EU commissioners to resort to reaching out directly to Council staff to ensure that their file or portfolio is given prominence in Council conclusions, the formal documents reflecting decisions taken by national leaders during EU summits.
With private channels unused, tensions have spilled out into public ones, especially over the handling of the energy crisis. This week, in a letter seen by POLITICO, Michel dinged von der Leyen for not coming forward with a proposal for a price cap on natural gas, after national leaders called for one during their October summit.
The mistrust has also spilled into issues of security. Once, during the COVID pandemic, when von der Leyen's chief of staff Bjoern Seibert and an EU Commissioner wanted to speak to a high-level counterpart in the U.S. administration, the delegation decided to travel to the outskirts of Brussels to use the secure line in NATO headquarters rather than make use of the Council facility across the street.
It was only this year that the Commission got its own secure room to make calls to the United States.
'Both responsible'
In the contest between the two leaders, von der Leyen is seen as having the upper hand. Though Michel formally represents the EU at external events, the Commission president has emerged as the EU's most prominent leader, particularly when it comes to relations with Washington.
Since Russia's all-out assault on Ukraine, U.S. President Joe Biden's administration has cultivated a close working relationship with von der Leyen's team, cooperating closely in particular in the area of sanctions.
Michel, in contrast, struggles to break through. When Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau visited Brussels in March, protocol dictated he meet with the Council president. But the Canadian delegation insisted that he also meet with von der Leyen, an indication of her international standing.
"Frankly, the view is that Michel has disappointed, but von der Leyen has exceeded expectations in her role," said one longtime Commission official.
But when it comes to the breakdown in relations, officials generally agree that both leaders are to blame — Michel for his mishandling of incidents like Sofagate and von der Leyen for her penchant for keeping close control at the expense of collaboration.
"Honestly, they are both responsible," said an EU official. "You had tensions in the past as well, but in the end, it always came down to personalities. Their predecessors realized it was in both of their interests to find a stable working relationship."
Another longtime EU official said the inter-institutional relationship had never been so low.
"It makes no sense for the European Commission head and the European Council president to be fighting," the official said.
"In a crisis the EU is supposed to come together," the official added. "Yes, structurally the two institutions are in conflict. There is sometimes not a clear division of labor. But we need adults in the room."
Joshua Posaner and Barbara Moens contributed reporting.
Slightly interested in both of their backgrounds - I feel like that's something I've read with a few other politicians in the EU institutions and it seems to becoming more common around the world to more or less literally have a "political class". It makes me think of Helen Thompson's analysis of democratic issues in terms of the growth of "aristocratic" tendencies rather than democratic excess.
But I think it also captures something that I think is interesting about the EU which is that despite being, in theory, a fairly structured and rule-bound organisation it's incredibly flexible and personalist. If you think about both the leaps in EU integration they normally reflect responding to some crisis/event that requires European integration to lurch forward and the way that is shaped seems incredibly linked to the personalities in charge (particularly in terms of who has influence/power). If you think of Delors' Commission, Draghi's ECB and, it feels, at this point VdL's Commission.
One would assume that this clashes will make it necessary for, in the future, clearly delimitate what each position is in charge of. Having overlapping areas of competence with no clear definition of who does what is a recipe for disaster when the internal coordination of the EU is not working, in this case because of the personality clashes of the presidents. Having a clear ranking of positions would also be helpful, I guess the Commission president should be clearly stated to be the visible head of the EU, while the Council president should be more of a number 2 in charge of internal coordination stuff.
At the end of the day, as long as the different governments want to retain a direct say on how the EU is run, these kind of clashes are inevitable.
On a purely legal level the President of the Council is the representative of the EU on the world stage. It's why Trudeau would have to meet with Michel, but wanted to add VdL because at this point it's clear the Commission is in the ascendancy and VdL the more substantial actor.
According to the Lisbon treaty the President of the Council is really a more political role, while the Commission is more of a technical/operational one. In principle the theory is that the Council and President of the Council sets the strategy and the Commission implements. Of course part of the problem is as you say, while member states agreed to Lisbon, they don't really want the President of the Council to be too big a figure able to actually set strategy like that. When the role was created the talk was of someone like Blair or Gonzalez who are big political figures - while I think they had that a bit with Tusk, the other two Presidents have been relatively unimpressive. I don't think that's a coincidence. Worth noting that Blair and Gonzalez were mentioned by Sarko and that probably reflects the traditional French view that they want Europe to be political and strategi, but directed member states - ultimately the counter view (perhaps more German) of more of a mediating, coalition building but lower ambition role won.
The reality is personalities matter and so does the context. During the Eurozone crisis which was fundamentally about cash and common debt was politically impossible, the Council will have primacy because it's fundamentally about getting member states to agree and its about financial policy. Ultimately the Council flailed until the ECB stepped in and created a European response without common debt. I think in response to Covid and Ukraine there's been a more "European" response - including common debt - which means the Commission will take priority/strengthen because that's its realm.
Of course the other, not irrelevant point, is that governments have a democratic mandate - and I think the big problem is the differing views of what should be Commission v Council. Obviously, the Parliament has a mandate but limited power compared to the other institutions. I think even with more clarity in the treaties you'd have the same fundamental issue - the EU advances through crisis and which institution takes the lead on developing that response/leap forward will depend on what member states want or are willing to do (provided the institutions have a credible leader).
The EU gets everything right, but only after trying out everything wrong.
Quote from: Sheilbh on November 15, 2022, 07:28:16 PMDuring the Eurozone crisis which was fundamentally about cash and common debt ...
Ugh. Are we still banging this drum, after all these years?
The cause of the crisis was a single monetary policy without fiscal equivalent. And when it blew up the markets were simply pricing in the logical conclusion: the collapse of the Eurozone.
Draghi put a bandaid on it, which understandably nobody else wants to rip out.
But the core problem remains and might rear its ugly head again now that there's widely disparate inflation throughout the Eurozone.
Oh I totally agree - related to that problem is that the big constraint on the EU is that no-one really wants to re-open the treaties and it's really pushing at the edges of the possible. Because there were countries absolutely opposed to common debt, the Commission isn't really a relevant body and when it comes to financial policy member states are broadly pretty protective of their own policies. Similarly once the German Constitutional Court cast doubt on ECB policies - a ruling which happens during the pandemic - it becomes clear that you need common debt because you can't just rely on the ECB. Which makes the Commission a very powerful player in designing the policy and implementing it.
I'm also not clear there is democratic support for a fiscal equivalent. It's striking that while the EU has issued common debt and talked about raising taxes those taxes are effectively on external actors - they're not taxing citizens.
Given a lack of desire to legally take the next step in integration, a lack of clarity on whether it has enough democratic support (or democratic accountability within the EU to have common fiscal policy) and the constraint of the current treaties - I think it leads to creative solutions like Draghi's "whatever it takes".
The proximate cause of the crisis was buyers of sovereign bonds thinking they might not get repaid.
Quote from: Admiral Yi on November 16, 2022, 04:02:36 PMThe proximate cause of the crisis was buyers of sovereign bonds thinking they might not get repaid.
That was a consequence, not a cause.
The cause was that the ECB set interest rates for France and Germany, which were experiencing a downturn.
Meanwhile countries like Spain were experiencing high inflation (eg. house prices were going up 15-20% a year).
Here, the logical consequence of having unsuitably low rates was massive private borrowing. That was exposed when the sub-prime fiasco set the world on fire.
The reaction was to bail out private lenders at the cost of public finances. The combination of that newly acquired debt and the loss of 10% of the economy overnight (construction) with no automatic stabilizers showed the markets that Club Med countries might have to exit the Euro, which led to the sovereign bond crisis.
Only that last link in the chain was addressed when Draghi made clear that there was no risk to exit the Euro. The inability to set a monetary policy that's optimal for every Euro country remains.
Quote from: Iormlund on November 16, 2022, 04:30:02 PMThat was a consequence, not a cause.
The cause was that the ECB set interest rates for France and Germany, which were experiencing a downturn.
Meanwhile countries like Spain were experiencing high inflation (eg. house prices were going up 15-20% a year).
Here, the logical consequence of having unsuitably low rates was massive private borrowing. That was exposed when the sub-prime fiasco set the world on fire.
The reaction was to bail out private lenders at the cost of public finances. The combination of that newly acquired debt and the loss of 10% of the economy overnight (construction) with no automatic stabilizers showed the markets that Club Med countries might have to exit the Euro, which led to the sovereign bond crisis.
Only that last link in the chain was addressed when Draghi made clear that there was no risk to exit the Euro. The inability to set a monetary policy that's optimal for every Euro country remains.
That may have been the cause in Spain, Ireland, and Portugal but AFAIK that was not the cause in Greece and Italy.
And even accepting that in those countries mentioned it was originally a private debt crisis does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that the ECB set the wrong discount rate. Rather that lenders, much like with the subprime crisis, mispriced real estate lending risk.
And none of that leads inevitably to the conclusion that taxpayers in other countries should pay for the mistakes made in those real estate markets.
Quote from: Iormlund on November 16, 2022, 04:30:02 PMThat was a consequence, not a cause.
The cause was that the ECB set interest rates for France and Germany, which were experiencing a downturn.
Meanwhile countries like Spain were experiencing high inflation (eg. house prices were going up 15-20% a year).
Here, the logical consequence of having unsuitably low rates was massive private borrowing. That was exposed when the sub-prime fiasco set the world on fire.
The reaction was to bail out private lenders at the cost of public finances. The combination of that newly acquired debt and the loss of 10% of the economy overnight (construction) with no automatic stabilizers showed the markets that Club Med countries might have to exit the Euro, which led to the sovereign bond crisis.
Only that last link in the chain was addressed when Draghi made clear that there was no risk to exit the Euro. The inability to set a monetary policy that's optimal for every Euro country remains.
I think it goes back to all of Europe's attempts at exchange rate stabilisation (internally) - Helen Thompson talks about this really well in her recent book.
And in a way it is a lesson of the compromises within the EU and how EU institutions actually structure it. The justification for the Eurozone was initially driven by France as a way of escaping the requirement to follow the Bundesbank's approach within the ERM when France doesn't have, as Germany does, a broad political consensus on the central importance of keeping inflation down. Germany agreed but on condition that the ECB be given a Bundesbank style mandate focused on price stability and an aversion to "democratic money".
Given that's the policy then it leans towards a small Eurozone - see the number of countries that dropped out of ERM in the 80s and 90s because their political consensus or economic situation wasn't aligned to Germany's. But at the time Germany was itself not meeting the convergence criteria because of the costs of unification which made it difficult to justify a hardline approach. The Eurozone became a political issue with the SPD campaigning for a small Eurozone, in response Kohl turned it into a symbol of European unity in that campaign and called it an issue of "war and peace in the twenty-first century". There was also on many states' part a desire to avoid a two speed Europe and being in the "non-core" bit of Europe.
So the purpose of monetary union was to remedy the problems of the ERM, the compromise for that was to replicate the problems of the ERM. That should lead to a smaller Eurozone, but it became a symbol of commitment to European unity and Southern Eurozone countries (especially Italy) took a huge political and economic hit to join - even though the policies required to join were destabilising.
The financial crisis exposed those fundamental issues again - in particular Trichet's tightening. What ultimately followed was that the ECB was the only actor able to, in some way, square the circle (and I think the German Constitutional Court have legitimate queries about whether the ECB is acting within its mandate - though I don't think they have a legal right to answer those questions).
But I think the fundamental problems are still there - I don't think there is a consensus around debt and price stability across the Eurozone in the way there is in Germany and similar countries (or vice versa), which I think is a challenge for the ECB; I think the ECB is possibly outside its mandate already; and, on the other side, I'm not sure there is the type of convergence necessary for monetary policy across the Eurozone. At the minute it's particularly extreme because of how much inflation varies depending on exposure to Russia but I'm not sure, even before then, there was much convergence. In general I think inflation will cause more politics about monetary policy - which may reignite some issues.
But I think those fundamental flaws are still there and I think it's a not insignificant cause of the collapse of the mainstream right and left in France and Italy. The challenge is that any solution probably requires moving on one or other of those points and certainly means opening the treaties - and that will hit the old problem of another French referendum which is particularly challenging if you keep the strict Bundesbank style ECB, but I'm not sure Germany could approve an approach without that. So I think we'll continue to see, as you say, band aids from the ECB operating at the very edge of their powers.
Quote from: Admiral Yi on November 16, 2022, 04:53:56 PMThat may have been the cause in Spain, Ireland, and Portugal but AFAIK that was not the cause in Greece and Italy.
And even accepting that in those countries mentioned it was originally a private debt crisis does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that the ECB set the wrong discount rate. Rather that lenders, much like with the subprime crisis, mispriced real estate lending risk.
And none of that leads inevitably to the conclusion that taxpayers in other countries should pay for the mistakes made in those real estate markets.
I actually agree with that last bit, except probably not in the way you meant it. Those banks that financed the credit bubble should have eaten the losses first, instead of taxpayers in Ireland, Portugal and Spain.
Quote from: Sheilbh on November 16, 2022, 05:16:21 PMBut I think those fundamental flaws are still there and I think it's a not insignificant cause of the collapse of the mainstream right and left in France and Italy.
Also in Spain. Though the alternatives haven't had that much success.
Ciudadanos missed the chance of becoming kingmaker and is pretty much history.
Podemos chose identity politics instead of left-wing economics and has petered out. Also suffered from internal purges and fragmentation (splitter!). Nevertheless, it is still a (very) junior partner in government.
Vox owes its rise to the mess in Catalonia, which was an indirect result of the crisis, after the regional hegemonic party (CiU) decided to embrace nationalism as a way to misdirect anger from their government. Until then the far right was a nonentity in Spain.
Croatia will be joining the Schengen area in 2023. Romania and Bulgaria were also up for joining it but were vetoed by Austria and the Netherlands.
Belgian police has detained a number of current and former MEPs on suspicion of taking bribes from Qatar.
Sad I didn't learnt about this hot Greek EP Vice President until she's been arrested for corruption. Apparently they also caught her dad running away with bags full of cash :lol:
Anyway, I suppose a positive takeaway is that foreign governments believe the EP is relevant enough to bribe MEPs.
She looks so trustworthy.
(https://esgnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/IMG_9573.jpeg)
Also, what did Qatar want?
Quote from: The Larch on December 11, 2022, 04:06:10 PMBelgian police has detained a number of current and former MEPs on suspicion of taking bribes from Qatar.
Seems quite big - the striking thing is the way they've been using NGOs. I suspect there's a lot more of that going on. I thought this Q&A summary was helpful:
QuoteQatar scandal: What just happened at the European Parliament?
POLITICO answers all your questions about the influence scandal rocking Brussels.
By Sarah Wheaton
December 11, 2022 4:04 am CET
Watchdogs say it could be the "most serious," "most shocking," "most egregious" corruption scandal to hit Brussels in years.
A series of at least 16 raids by the Belgian federal police Friday netted five people they said had committed "alleged offenses of criminal organization, corruption and money laundering." The morning searches yielded €600,000 in cash, plus phones and computers.
Initially, the culprits weren't major names by Brussels standards: A former member of the European Parliament, a few parliamentary assistants, and a trade union boss, all allegedly on the take for World Cup host Qatar. But to what end, really? Some questioned whether �— if the charges were true — Doha had really made a smart investment.
By the evening, however, it was clear this wasn't just a story of some has-beens and wannabes lining their pockets. Eva Kaili, a vice president of the European Parliament and vocal defender of Doha, landed in police custody, according to the Belgian federal police. The case also centers around an NGO that, until recently, counted some of the biggest luminaries in left-wing politics among its board members.
"The State of Qatar categorically rejects any attempts to associate it with accusations of misconduct," said a Qatari official in a statement e-mailed Sunday morning.
As this potentially superlative scandal continues to unfold, POLITICO answers all your questions about the controversy roiling the EU capital.
Q: Who is Eva Kaili?
As one of Parliament's 14 vice presidents, Kaili is one of the institution's most powerful players — and as a former news presenter with celebrity status in her native Greece, one of Brussels' most glamorous figures.
But Kaili has also emerged as one of the most vocal defenders of Qatar. She recently called the country a "frontrunner in labor rights" after meeting with the country's labor minister, despite deep international concerns about conditions for stadium construction workers. A member of the center-left Socialist & Democrat (S&D) party, her portfolio includes special responsibilities related to the Middle East.
Kaili's partner and co-parent, Francesco Giorgi, has also been detained, according to police and people with direct knowledge. He's an adviser on the Middle East and North Africa region in the European Parliament — and a founder of an NGO called Fight Impunity, which aims to promote "accountability as a central pillar of the architecture of international justice."
Crucially, Fight Impunity's president is Pier Antonio Panzeri, a central figure in the case.
Q: Who else is involved?
Panzeri, an Italian ex-MEP also from the S&D, was among those arrested Friday morning. By the evening, his wife and daughter were also nabbed by Italian police. A warrant for their arrest, seen by POLITICO, accused Panzeri of "intervening politically with members working at the European Parliament for the benefit of Qatar and Morocco."
Former parliamentary aides, especially those with ties to Fight Impunity, are also falling under scrutiny. In addition to arresting Giorgi, police also sealed the office of another parliamentary assistant who used to work for Fight Impunity, currently serving as an aide to Belgian S&D MEP Marie Arena.
Arena, who inherited the chairmanship of the human rights subcommittee from Panzeri and works closely with Fight Impunity, confirmed that her aide's office was under seal. Arena said she herself has not been questioned by police.
According to Italian newswire Ansa, Niccolò Figà-Talamanca has also been detained. He's the director general of another NGO, No Peace Without Justice. Focused on international criminal justice, human rights and promoting democracy in the Middle East and North Africa, the organization is officially based in New York and Rome. However, it has the same Brussels address as Fight Impunity, at 41 Rue Ducale.
Emma Bonino, a former liberal MEP and foreign affairs minister for Italy, founded No Peace Without Justice. She is listed as an honorary board member of Fight Impunity. She and Figà-Talamanca did not immediately respond to requests for comment through Peace Without Justice.
In a sign of Panzeri's connections, former French Prime Minister Bernard Cazeneuve, former European Migration Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos, former EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini and former MEP Cecilia Wikström are also listed as honorary board members.
Mogherini resigned from the board on Saturday morning, according to a spokesperson for the College of Europe, where Mogherini is now rector. Avramopoulos said in an email Sunday morning that he, Cazeneuve and Wikström had also resigned "immediately when we were informed back on Friday."
The list of staff at Fight Impunity has apparently been deleted; however, web archives show Giorgi and other current parliamentary assistants holding key roles in January.
Q: Is this limited to the European Parliament?
Nope. Also detained: Luca Visentini, who just last month became secretary general of the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). Before that, he was the longtime chief of the European Trade Union Confederation. (He didn't have to move for the new role: Both the global and the European organizations are based at the same address in Brussels, on Rue Albert II.)
Builders' unions have been some of the top critics of Qatar's record on worker's rights in the lead-up to the World Cup. But even before Visentini took over, ITUC was a notable exception. Sharan Burrow, the previous ITUC chief, urged external critics of the country's labor laws to "go and have a look at a look at the change" in a video posted by the Qatari labor ministry in June.
Q: Why would Qatar want to lobby?
The Gulf emirate is hosting the World Cup, but rather than a public relations coup, the tournament turned out to shine a negative spotlight on the country. Accusations of bribery in the bidding process and slave-like conditions for foreign workers cast doubt on the choice, and liberal critics seized on the moment to attack the conservative Muslim country's position on women's and LGBTQ+ rights.
Maintaining a good reputation is crucial, as Qatar works to hash out deals with EU countries for its natural gas. A proposal to give Qataris visa-free travel to the EU's Schengen area is also moving forward in Parliament — at least, it was.
Q: How has Kaili advocated for Qatar?
Kaili has arguably been the dean of the (sizeable group of) Doha defenders within the S&D.
On November 24, for example, as the plenary passed a resolution "deplor[ing] the deaths of thousands of migrant workers," Kaili took to the floor to praise the "historical transformation" of Qatar brought on by the World Cup. Similarly, 10 days ago, she showed up to vote in favor of visa liberalization for Qatar and Kuwait in the Parliament's justice and home affairs committee — even though she's not a member of the committee.
Kaili also alienated MEPs on a panel dedicated to the Middle East when she freelanced her own trip after Doha canceled the group's visit. The Parliament's Delegation for Relations With the Arab Peninsula (DARP) had been planning to head to Qatar just ahead of the World Cup in November, to visit tournament facilities and observe labor law changes.
With barely a month's notice, however, Qatar's consultative assembly, known as the Shura Council, asked to postpone. Instead, Kaili went to Qatar the week the full delegation was supposed to be there — and gave full-throated praise to the emirate's labor reforms. According to local press, she said she was there representing 500 million European citizens who see the country's progress as representing common values.
"She was somehow going behind my back," said MEP Hannah Neumann, the German Green at the helm of DARP. Doha was "uninviting the group that would have had a balanced position" and "instead invited her, knowing that her statements would be less critical."
Repeated calls to Kaili's mobile phone Friday and Saturday went unanswered.
Q: How big a deal is this?
Watchdog groups agree on the superlatives. The Qatar scandal could be "the most egregious case" of alleged corruption Parliament has seen in years, said Transparency International chief Michiel van Hulten. Alberto Alemanno, a law professor at HEC Paris, called it the "most shocking integrity scandal in the history of the EU."
German Green MEP Daniel Freund, co-chair of the Parliament's anti-corruption intergroup, called it one of the "most serious corruption scandals in Brussels in recent decades."
Van Hulten said the Parliament has created a "culture of impunity ... with a combination of lax financial rules and controls and a complete lack of independent (or indeed any) ethics oversight." Alemmano likewise predicted this would just be the "tip of the iceberg," hoping a pile-up of scandals would create political momentum for an independent ethics system.
Q. What are people saying can be done about it?
The Commission is due to propose an independent ethics body that would apply to all EU institutions, but it almost certainly will not come with investigative or enforcement power.
Freund argued that countries that are not part of the EU should have to follow the "relatively good lobbying rules already in force" in Brussels. At the moment, countries don't have to register in the EU's transparency register of interest groups, for example, and MEPs don't need to report those contacts. "The EU must improve this immediately," Freund said.
Incidentally, Panzeri's NGO, Fight Impunity, is not listed in the transparency register. That's an apparent violation of the existing rules for EU-based groups that want to make their case in Parliament. Under the latest transparency register guidelines, NGOs are required to include extensive details about their funding.
Arena, the current chair of the human rights subcommittee, has worked closely with Panzeri and Fight Impunity, including the NGO in press conferences and traveling with Panzeri for discussions on civil liberties.
Even as she defended her own independence, Arena predicted that more revelations would come out. "If Qatar is doing so, I know that others are doing exactly the same," Arena said. "And so we have to really prevent this kind of capacity to influence."
Q: How's it going now for Qatar?
The blowback from these accusations is already coming fast.
The S&D has called for the visa liberalization proposal to be put on hold, and the Green rapporteur said he would vote against the measure if it comes up for a vote next week.
Separately, Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee planned to head to Saudi Arabia and Qatar in the coming weeks. Now the latter part has been canceled — meaning a top rival of Doha gets all the attention.
"Any association of the Qatari government with the reported claims is baseless and gravely misinformed," said the Qatari official statement issued Sunday. "The State of Qatar works through institution-to-institution engagement and operates in full compliance with international laws and regulations."
Q: What's next in the Parliament?
Late Saturday, Parliament President Roberta Metsola suspended all of Kaili's "powers, duties and tasks" related to being a vice president. To revoke the title completely would require a decision by the Parliament's conference of presidents, and then a vote in the plenary.
When the plenary gathers in Strasbourg this week, MEPs are likely to revoke Kaili's parliamentary immunity. The Left has already formally called for a debate about the incident to be added to the agenda, with a vote slated for Monday evening.
Kaili has also been suspended from the S&D group and her domestic party in Greece, Pasok.
Eddy Wax, Nektaria Stamouli, Hannah Roberts and Vincent Manancourt contributed reporting.
I'd add I totally disagree that there's relatively good lobbying rules. Only senior MEPs are required to report meetings with lobbyists, I believe that something crazy like under 100 staff working for the Commission (including the Commissioners) are required to declare their meeting with lobbyists.
That level of mandatory reporting was only instituted in 2019. Voluntary declarations vary wildly by country and political group (the Greens are very good).
Totally agree with the sense, though, that Qatar won't be the only state doing this.
Quote from: HVC on December 11, 2022, 04:27:18 PMShe looks so trustworthy.
(https://esgnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/IMG_9573.jpeg)
At first, I thought it was a picture of Tricia Hellfer and I was wondering what it was doing in that thread. :lol:
She looks like the type that would have pointy elbows.
Quote from: viper37 on December 12, 2022, 12:31:54 AMAt first, I thought it was a picture of Tricia Hellfer and I was wondering what it was doing in that thread. :lol:
You aren't the only one...
Looks like it might be spreading to the Commission now with questions about Margaritis Schinas, who's one of the Commission's vice-presidents and Commissioner for Promoting our European Way of Life (the one they had to change the job title from "Protecting our European Way of Life" given that it's the migration portfolio).
Apparently he'd been pushing Kaili to be getting top jobs, as had the Greek PM, despite the fact that they're from New Democracy while she's from PASOK. He'd also made very similar statements to Kaili about Kuwait and Qatar's "remarkable success".
Quote from: Sheilbh on December 12, 2022, 07:30:38 AMLooks like it might be spreading to the Commission now with questions about Margaritis Schinas, who's one of the Commission's vice-presidents and Commissioner for Promoting our European Way of Life (the one they had to change the job title from "Protecting our European Way of Life" given that it's the migration portfolio).
Apparently he'd been pushing Kaili to be getting top jobs, as had the Greek PM, despite the fact that they're from New Democracy while she's from PASOK. He'd also made very similar statements to Kaili about Kuwait and Qatar's "remarkable success".
Good to see some left and right consensus once in a while. :P
but is anyone really surprised about the corruption?
By Qatar or of corruption in general?
No.
Strong piece on the IRA conundrum for Europe - and I totally agree. It feels like on almost every issue the problem the EU finds itself in is discovering the French were right, but it might be too late/there's still not enough support to fix it :bleeding:
QuoteEU becomes the planet's biggest NIMBY over US climate bill
Brussels should stop complaining about Joe Biden's subsidies plan and 'get its act together,' says European Investment Bank boss.
By Karl Mathiesen
December 9, 2022 4:47 pm CET
Europe finally got what it wanted: An American president who is serious about tackling climate change. Then it turned into the world's biggest NIMBY.
After an initially muted response to Joe Biden's law that will spend an estimated $369 billion on energy and climate change — the first significant climate legislation ever passed by the U.S. Congress — Europe went into full freak-out mode over subsidies it said would harm its industry.
The pique from Brussels has raised eyebrows in Washington, coming as it does after years of unconcealed EU frustration at the U.S. failure to pass meaningful laws and spend the billions needed to cut its greenhouse gas emissions. Industry representatives and analysts said that by attacking the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), Europe was missing the broader point: that this is what a serious industrial policy for climate change looks like.
"The counter argument there is, of course, wouldn't it be great if the Europeans could get their act together," Werner Hoyer, the president of the European Investment Bank, told POLITICO on the sidelines of the COP27 climate talks last month. "I mean, we are complaining about the Americans and ... we have a tendency to look inward more and more. And we take actions on the present energy crisis which are totally dictated by national considerations. And that costs us, as a European Union, a huge degree of credibility."
The message coming back across the Atlantic is, "Europe ... you are being ridiculous," said Max Bergmann, a former senior U.S. State Department official who now leads the Europe program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "You have to start questioning, what are the priorities of European leaders? Is it to tackle the climate crisis? Or is it just the bottom line of one of their automakers ... and a bunch of bureaucrats ... that are just obsessed with maintaining free trade?"
The economic ramifications in Europe are somewhat wider than that. The IRA's subsidies for U.S.-built clean tech are far more generous than anything on offer in the EU. They are also technically limitless, meaning the amount to be paid out in tax credits and other instruments is only capped by demand.
In response, the companies that were supposed to build European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen's Green Deal are now prioritizing the investments needed to make Biden's vision of a clean jobs boom a reality.
Swedish battery developer Northvolt said it was pausing a German factory expansion and looking to the U.S. instead. Germany's Bosch has invested just shy of half a billion dollars in American electric motor and battery production since the IRA was passed in the summer. Swiss solar component manufacturer Meyer Burger is opening a plant in Arizona, raising questions about expansion of its German operations. Spanish utility Iberdrola just released a three-year €47 billion investment plan of which 47 percent will be spent in the U.S. Just 23 percent is heading for the EU.
In response, Europe lashed out. French President Emmanuel Macron called the subsidies anti-competitive and sought changes to the law from Congress (a prospect ruled out by the White House) and threatened action in the World Trade Organization. European Commissioner for the Internal Market Thierry Breton canceled his attendance at this week's U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council. A joint task force has been set up to explore options for accommodating Europe.
The implication that Europe was being targeted was wrong, Bergmann said. Most likely, the impact on Europe was simply not considered by the senators and the teams who drafted the bill.
"If the U.S. was intending to send a massive diplomatic F.U. to Europe through a climate bill, Europe would know," he said.
Victims' angst
But Europe's sense of victimization abides. The energy crisis means Europe sees itself as shouldering the burden of Russia's war while U.S. companies bank windfalls from LNG exports. EU Green Deal chief Frans Timmermans muttered darkly about the threat to a transatlantic relationship that underpinned "our security ... our values" on a call with reporters last month.
EU angst over the IRA ignores the fact that the main target of its home-grown provisions was China, a competitor the European bloc has failed to counter. Now both the U.S and China have assertive industrial strategies that recognize the massive upfront costs of the energy transition and the fact that they are both in a sprint to dominate the economy of the future.
Europe sees itself as the "global front-runner," as von der Leyen put it in a recent speech in Bruges, Belgium. In fact, it's on the brink of losing the race.
The EU is at a disadvantage to its superpower nation-state competitors. The bloc's industrial policy is fragmented across its 27 countries. The energy crisis has widened those gaps and added an additional hurdle of extreme operating costs for any prospective new project. For years the EU has relied overly on carbon pricing as its key tool for stamping out emissions, unable or unwilling to wield capital as a weapon.
"The continent's limited ability to develop a centralized industrial strategy, or implement any kind of local content requirements, lends itself poorly to making up for lost ground when it is already far behind," said an October analysis from Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF), shared with POLITICO.
BNEF found that just building the factories to supply the refined metals, electrolyzers and parts for solar panels and batteries to meet local demand by 2030 will cost $149 billion in Europe, $113 billion in the U.S. The IRA lowers the risk of those investments through tax credits, introduces deficit checks and payments to polluting industries to shut them down.
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Fjyi6-baMAcONQS?format=jpg&name=small)
"The EU should mimic these design principles rather than bleating about the protectionist elements," said Tim Sahay, senior policy manager at the Green New Deal Network.
Unlike many of its politicians, Europe's big green industrial players quite like the IRA and do plan to invest in the U.S. But that doesn't mean they are all jumping ship. The EU's legally-mandated climate goals mean "the ambition in Europe is not in question," said Iberdrola Executive Chairman Ignacio Galán. But the investment environment in Europe was unattractive long before the IRA.
"The energy transition needs clarity from policymakers everywhere," said Galán. "We need unity and ambition on energy policy to tackle the current crisis. By working together to simplify and adapt its policy frameworks, Europe can rebalance the playing field and remain a global leader in attracting investment in clean energy."
'What's done is done'
The mood music from Brussels shifted a little in recent days, as von der Leyen acknowledged that the IRA was "positive news" for the climate and that EU might need to loosen its state aid rules and provide "new and additional funding at the EU level."
"What's done is done," Breton said at a POLITICO gala dinner on Wednesday. "We have to do our own job here, to protect our companies if we need to, without entering in a subsidies race."
The hope that the transatlantic rift might signal a new dawn for green tech in Europe is clear from the optimism suddenly coursing through the solar industry, which has long been the sector's unloved cousin.
Solar is often held up as a warning for all of Europe's clean industries. Technology developed in the EU was used to build a Chinese industry that today dominates 80-95 percent of the global supply chain.
On the surface the IRA's subsidies should erode the prospects for European solar even further. But the sense in the industry is that it might have finally broken the EU's slavish adherence to carbon pricing and innovation as its main drivers of transition.
A more active industrial policy, combined with a refreshed zeal for bringing industries home to secure supply chains, could mean that even solar has a second coming in Europe, said Solar Power Europe Policy Director Dries Acke.
Solar was one of five industries highlighted in the Clean Tech Europe platform launched this month by the European Commission. This was not on the cards before the IRA. On Friday, the Commission launched a European Solar Industry Alliance.
"It's been the wake-up call that Europe needs," said Acke.
Joshua Posaner contributed reporting.
Hopefully the French win their arguments because I feel that in an age of super-power competition and capital hungry energy transition, complaining to the WTO about protectionism won't quite cut it. Frankly nothing's made me feel we're heading into something similar to a new cold war more than this article/story.
Sorry Euros. Politics in the USA today demands protectionism and jobs for Americans for any intiative. That was a crucial outcome of the 2016 election. The Democrats are terrified of losing more working class votes to right wing demagogues.
Quote from: Valmy on December 12, 2022, 03:22:27 PMSorry Euros. Politics in the USA today demands protectionism and jobs for Americans for any intiative. That was a crucial outcome of the 2016 election. The Democrats are terrified of losing more working class votes to right wing demagogues.
Also I think it's basically right in terms of China policy and climate :lol:
It would be really bad for the US (or the EU) to rely on Chinese manufacturing for energy transition - and the way to get votes in Congress for things that help the climate is to make it create jobs in the US, tie into US national security v China, or both.
On the scandal Belgian police have now seized €1.5 million - from what I've read that all seems linked to Kaili alone. 10 offices in Strasbourg have also been sealed for investigation as well as more raids in Brussels.
From Politico earlier:
QuoteA few bad apples or a whole rotten barrel? Brussels wrestles with corruption scandal
Some EU officials are adamant the Qatar corruption probe concerns 'a few individuals.' Others say the rot goes much deeper.
By Nicholas Vinocur and Nicolas Camut
December 13, 2022 4:00 am CET
As Belgian police launched a second wave of raids on the European Parliament, a stunned Brussels elite has started to grapple with an uncomfortable question at the heart of the Qatar bribery investigation: Just how deep does the rot go?
So far, police inquiries launched by Belgian prosecutor Michel Claise have landed four people in jail, including Parliament Vice President Eva Kaili, on charges of corruption, money laundering and participation in a criminal organization.
After the initial shock of those arrests wore off, several Parliament officials told POLITICO they believed the allegations would be limited to a "few individuals" who had gone astray by allegedly accepting hundreds of thousands of euros in cash from Qatari interests.
But that theory was starting to unravel by Monday evening, as Belgian police carried out another series of raids on Parliament offices just as lawmakers were gathering in Strasbourg, one of European Parliament's two sites, for their first meeting after news of the arrests broke on Friday.
With 19 residences and offices searched — in addition to Parliament — six people arrested and sums of at least around €1 million recovered, some EU officials and activists said they believed more names would be drawn into the widening dragnet — and that the Qatar bribery scandal was symptomatic of a much deeper and more widespread problem with corruption not just in the European Parliament, but across all the EU institutions.
In Parliament, lax oversight of members' financial activities and the fact that states were able to contact them without ever logging the encounters in a public register amounts to a recipe for corruption, these critics argued.
Beyond the Parliament, they pointed to the revolving door of senior officials who head off to serve private interests after a stint at the European Commission or Council as proof that tougher oversight of institutions is in order. Others invoked the legacy of the Jacques Santer Commission — which resigned en masse in 1998 — as proof that no EU institution is immune from illegal influence.
"The courts will determine who is guilty, but what's certain is that it's not just Qatar, and it's not just the individuals who have been named who are involved" in foreign influence operations, Raphaël Glucksmann, a French lawmaker from the Socialists and Democrats, who heads a committee against foreign interference in Parliament, told POLITICO in Strasbourg.
Michiel van Hulten, a former lawmaker who now heads Transparency International's EU office, said that while egregious cases of corruption involving bags of cash were rare, "it's quite likely that there are names in this scandal that we haven't heard from yet. There is undue influence on a scale we haven't seen so far. It doesn't need to involve bags of cash. It can involve trips to far-flung destinations paid for by foreign organizations — and in that sense there is a more widespread problem."
Adding to the problem was the fact that Parliament has no built-in protections for internal whistleblowers, despite having voted in favor of such protections for EU citizens, he added. Back in 1998, it was a whistleblower denouncing mismanagement in the Santer Commission who precipitated a mass resignation of the EU executive.
Glucksmann also called for "extremely profound reforms" to a system that allows lawmakers to hold more than one job, leaves oversight of personal finances up to a self-regulating committee staffed by lawmakers, and gives state actors access to lawmakers without having to register their encounters publicly.
"If Parliament wants to get out of this, we'll have to hit hard and undertake extremely profound reforms," added Glucksmann, who previously named Russia, Georgia and Azerbaijan as countries that have sought to influence political decisions in the Parliament.
To start addressing the problem, Glucksmann called for an ad hoc investigative committee to be set up in Parliament, while other left-wing and Greens lawmakers have urged reforms including naming an anti-corruption vice president to replace Kaili, who was expelled from the S&D group late Monday, and setting up an ethics committee overseeing all EU institutions.
Glass half-full
Others, however, were less convinced that the corruption probe would turn up new names, or that the facts unveiled last Friday spoke to any wider problem in the EU. Asked about the extent of the bribery scandal, one senior Parliament official who asked not to be named in order to discuss confidential deliberations said: "As serious as this is, it's a matter of individuals, of a few people who made very bad decisions. The investigation and arrests show that our systems and procedures have worked."
Valérie Hayer, a French lawmaker with the centrist Renew group, struck a similar note, saying that while she was deeply concerned about a "risk for our democracy" linked to foreign interference, she did not believe that the scandal pointed to "generalized corruption" in the EU. "Unfortunately, there are bad apples," she said.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, who's under fire over her handling of COVID-19 vaccination deals with Pfizer, declined to answer questions about her Vice President Margaritis Schinas' relations with Qatar at a press briefing, triggering fury from the Brussels press corps.
The Greek commissioner represented the EU at the opening ceremony of the World Cup last month, and has been criticized by MEPs over his tweets in recent months, lavishing praise on Qatar's labor reforms.
Asked about the Commission's response to the Qatar corruption scandal engulfing the European Parliament, and in particular the stance of Schinas, von der Leyen was silent on the Greek commissioner.
Von der Leyen did, however, appear to lend support to the creation of an independent ethics body that could investigate wrongdoing across all EU bodies.
"These rules [on lobbying by state actors] are the same in all three EU institutions," said the senior Parliament official, referring to the European Commission, Parliament and the European Council, the roundtable of EU governments.
The split over how to address corruption shows how even in the face of what appears to be an egregious example of corruption, members of the Brussels system — comprised of thousands of well-paid bureaucrats and elected officials, many of whom enjoy legal immunity as part of their jobs — seeks to shield itself against scrutiny that could threaten revenue or derail careers.
I mentioned it in the Brexit thread but I think foreign junkets paid for by, say, the Azeri government or Qatari government are a really big corruption-ish scandal that's hiding in plain sight. A lot of the details are public already - it feels like it just needs a story to link it too.
Apparently Eva Kaili's husband has admitted to a judge that the payments came from Qatar and Morocco. The whole thing seems to have been masterminded by a former Italian MEP.
Croatia joined the Euro and Schengen now. :)
A shame about Schengen for Romania and Bulgaria though.
(https://i.postimg.cc/QdMkWqyh/image.png)
Brexit seems to have achieved something at least, sapping the desire to leave the EU in every other country.
QuoteSupport for leaving EU has fallen significantly across bloc since Brexit
People less likely to vote leave in every EU member state for which data was available than in 2016-17, survey finds
Support for leaving the EU has dropped significantly, and sometimes dramatically, in member states across the bloc in the wake of the UK's Brexit referendum, according to data from a major pan-European survey.
The European Social Survey (ESS), led by City, University of London and conducted in 30 European nations every two years since 2001, found respondents were less likely to vote leave in every EU member state for which data was available.
The largest decline in leave support was in Finland, where 28.6% of respondents who declared which way they would vote in a Brexit-style referendum answered leave in 2016-2017, but only 15.4% did in 2020-2022 – a fall of 13.2 percentage points.
Similarly stark falls between 2016 and 2022 were recorded in the Netherlands (from 23% to 13.5%), Portugal (15.7% to 6.6%), Austria (26% to 16.1%) and France (24.3% to 16%), with smaller but still statistically significant falls in Hungary (16% to 10.2%), Spain (9.3% to 4.7%) Sweden (23.9% to 19.3%), and Germany (13.6% to 11%).
Support for leave in the survey's most recent round was highest in the Czech Republic (29.2%), Italy (20.1%) and Sweden (19.3%), but even in those countries it had declined by 4.5 percentage points, 9.1 points and 4.6 points respectively since 2016-2017, the survey showed. Leave was least popular in Spain (4.7%).
The period covers Britain's long and fraught negotiations to leave the EU, but also the country's ensuing political turmoil – five prime ministers in six years – and its current social and economic woes, all of which have been heavily reported on the continent and are widely interpreted as being caused at least partly by Brexit.
They also coincide with the Covid pandemic and Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which experts suggest have prompted many EU citizens to view membership more favourably, and decisions by many anti-EU parties, including in France and Italy, to abandon Frexit or Italexit policies in favour of reforming the EU from within.
Mathieu Gallard, research director of the leading French polling firm Ipsos, which regularly conducts surveys of European opinion, said the ESS numbers reflected a "veritable collapse" in support for leaving the EU in several countries.
Gallard said the fall in support for a leave vote most likely stemmed from "a cumulative effect combining the EU's attitude towards the various crises of recent years, the radical right's moderation on the subject [of leaving the EU], and the many vicissitudes of Brexit".
The ESS survey also found that respondents' emotional attachment to Europe had increased between 2016 and 2022 in most member states. Asked to rate how attached they felt to the bloc on a scale of zero to 10, 54.9% of Portuguese respondents gave responses between seven and 10 in 2020-2022, against 41.5% in 2016-2017.
Strong emotional attachment to Europe in Finland rose to 58.7% from 46% over the period, while in Hungary – engaged in an increasingly bitter rule-of-law dispute with Brussels – it increased from 60% to 70.3%. In Italy the corresponding figures were 37.2% and 44.3%, and in France 44% and 48.8%. Germany and Spain were stable.
A Pew Research Center survey of 10 EU member states conducted in spring last year also found large majorities in nearly every country surveyed held a broadly favourable opinion of the bloc, with a median of 72% viewing it in a favourable light compared with 26% who had a broadly unfavourable opinion.
The ESS data also showed that support for staying in the EU – again excluding those who said they could not or would not vote, did not know which way they would vote, or would not cast a complete or valid ballot – increased in every member state for which comparable data was available, with remain support in 2020-2022 ranging from a low of 70.8% in the Czech Republic to a high of 95.3% in Spain.
The ESS survey is normally conducted through face-to-face interviews, but due to the Covid-19 pandemic, respondents in six countries – including Austria, Germany, Poland, Sweden and Spain – were asked to complete questionnaires themselves in 2020-2022.
In those countries, the percentage of respondents who said they would not cast a vote was generally higher. Tim Hanson, a senior ESS research fellow, said this was most likely because the questionnaire presented them with that option, whereas interviewers asked people to choose between leave and remain.
The overall effect was to depress the "remain" vote in the "self-complete" countries rather than to increase the "leave" vote, Hanson said. Nonetheless, the difference in survey method meant excluding "no votes" provided a more reliable comparison between the two survey rounds.
Quote from: The Larch on January 13, 2023, 09:22:29 AMBrexit seems to have achieved something at least, sapping the desire to leave the EU in every other country.
I think that's part of it for sure and it couldn't have been done in a less adept way.
I think the other part is that far and populist right parties don't think they need to leave the EU to achieve their aims and can actually possibly use the EU to help deliver them. I think it's a story of Brexit as chaotic disaster and Orban as precedent.
For the train lovers:
(https://praza.gal/media/cache/news_article_thumbnail/uploads/mapa-4115a93.jpeg)
Sheilbh, don't book your summer holidays based on this, it is only a pilot thing and will still take several years for these routes to become reality. :P
:mmm:
Of course I think the first bit of HS2 that was cancelled was the very short line that would connect it with HS1 meaning the possibility of a single train from Manchester (or, once upon a time, Leeds) to Paris or Brussels is gone :(
Nice to see this movement for better cross border trains taking off. It is a major issue in Europe.
Quote from: Sheilbh on February 01, 2023, 07:21:34 AM:mmm:
Of course I think the first bit of HS2 that was cancelled was the very short line that would connect it with HS1 meaning the possibility of a single train from Manchester (or, once upon a time, Leeds) to Paris or Brussels is gone :(
Honestly I don't see such a big deal with this. In Japan you can't take a shinkansen direct from Osaka to Sendai, you need to change in Tokyo. And in a properly working rail system changing train isn't a big deal.
The added need for passport control in every station the HS1 connecting HS2 goes to would have been painful.
Besides, the way the lines are setup couldn't you still take a train from Manchester into St Pancras in theory? Glancing at a map the two lines don't seem to diverge so far north- the issue being of course capacity.
In terms of cost to benefits that HS1-HS2 link seemed to be just rule of cool over practicality.
Quote from: Sheilbh on February 01, 2023, 07:21:34 AM:mmm:
Of course I think the first bit of HS2 that was cancelled was the very short line that would connect it with HS1 meaning the possibility of a single train from Manchester (or, once upon a time, Leeds) to Paris or Brussels is gone :(
Back to the Future, they probably had that in 1905?
Goes off in search of a Bradshores. :bowler:
Quote from: The Larch on February 01, 2023, 07:12:23 AMFor the train lovers:
(https://praza.gal/media/cache/news_article_thumbnail/uploads/mapa-4115a93.jpeg)
Sheilbh, don't book your summer holidays based on this, it is only a pilot thing and will still take several years for these routes to become reality. :P
London-Lille is already possible. Lille-Brussels-Amsterdam as well, or do they plan to duplicate the existing high-speed line?
10 years ago, a direct Frankfurt-London link was said to be just a matter of time, not long-term. :P
For the Iberian Peninsula, it's minimalist. No Douro Valley link for instance. A Corunha seems to be placed where Vigo is, at least closer. I am sure The Larch loves it. :lol:
I see the Lisbon link, but not Sines (important deep-water harbour). Possibly for simplication purposes or just passenger trains.
Non mention of the necessary conversion to the international gauge.In theory, new lines are build in the new gauge.
Balkans get even worse treatement, despite having the international gauge, it's not great there.
Quote from: Josquius on February 01, 2023, 09:22:19 AMNice to see this movement for better cross border trains taking off. It is a major issue in Europe.
Quote from: Sheilbh on February 01, 2023, 07:21:34 AM:mmm:
Of course I think the first bit of HS2 that was cancelled was the very short line that would connect it with HS1 meaning the possibility of a single train from Manchester (or, once upon a time, Leeds) to Paris or Brussels is gone :(
Honestly I don't see such a big deal with this. In Japan you can't take a shinkansen direct from Osaka to Sendai, you need to change in Tokyo. And in a properly working rail system changing train isn't a big deal.
The added need for passport control in every station the HS1 connecting HS2 goes to would have been painful.
Besides, the way the lines are setup couldn't you still take a train from Manchester into St Pancras in theory? Glancing at a map the two lines don't seem to diverge so far north- the issue being of course capacity.
In terms of cost to benefits that HS1-HS2 link seemed to be just rule of cool over practicality.
:secret:
That kind of exists in France and other countries you know. To get direct trains from London to Marseille (in theory) or in practical terms from London to ski resorts during winter.
I am not sure if the Frankfurt-Marseille TGV is still running. It ran for a few years at least.
PS: checked it, not anymore. Have to change trains in Karlsruhe. Not that bad, but still a transfer.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LGV_Interconnexion_Est (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LGV_Interconnexion_Est)
It's really practical, think of the people living outside of the capital city centres, for once. :P
As for invoking the Japanese example and then using the passports as an excuse, make up your mind. Japan has passport issue to deal with, so it's not a good example, in this case.
Quote from: Duque de Bragança on February 01, 2023, 09:31:28 AMQuote from: Josquius on February 01, 2023, 09:22:19 AMNice to see this movement for better cross border trains taking off. It is a major issue in Europe.
Quote from: Sheilbh on February 01, 2023, 07:21:34 AM:mmm:
Of course I think the first bit of HS2 that was cancelled was the very short line that would connect it with HS1 meaning the possibility of a single train from Manchester (or, once upon a time, Leeds) to Paris or Brussels is gone :(
Honestly I don't see such a big deal with this. In Japan you can't take a shinkansen direct from Osaka to Sendai, you need to change in Tokyo. And in a properly working rail system changing train isn't a big deal.
The added need for passport control in every station the HS1 connecting HS2 goes to would have been painful.
Besides, the way the lines are setup couldn't you still take a train from Manchester into St Pancras in theory? Glancing at a map the two lines don't seem to diverge so far north- the issue being of course capacity.
In terms of cost to benefits that HS1-HS2 link seemed to be just rule of cool over practicality.
:secret:
That kind of by-passing link exists in France you know. To get direct trains from London to Marseille (or ski resorts in the winter).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LGV_Interconnexion_Est (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LGV_Interconnexion_Est)
It's really practical, think of the people living outside of the capital city centres, for once. :P
This is a link through fields north of Paris to totally bypass it.
The HS1-HS2 link was to connect the lines of two London terminus stations right next to each other - finding paths/building new lines that don't have to go into London would be the sensible way to setup a Manchester to Paris link if/when one is needed.
Quote from: Josquius on February 01, 2023, 09:22:19 AMBesides, the way the lines are setup couldn't you still take a train from Manchester into St Pancras in theory? Glancing at a map the two lines don't seem to diverge so far north- the issue being of course capacity.
I don't think so. King's Cross-St Pancras is everywhere north-east of London; Euston is everywhere to the north-west (including HS2).
Get your point but....:lol:
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FneiqF-WYAAXj0x?format=png&name=small)
QuoteNice to see this movement for better cross border trains taking off. It is a major issue in Europe.
Yes.
A lot of the work that would make life a lot easier and have a bigger impact is probably in things like timetables and some form of open market for train tickets so you can easily route across borders. That'll be slow - possibly a bit contentious - and very detailed work. But the issue with cross-border rail isn't just (or even mainly) the big lines between big cities but really simple things like the difficulty of planning or buying tickets in multiple countries/legs. I suspect that a lot of it will basically require some form of open data style reforms that are mandatory for European countries' rail systems - because that is a big issue is the extent to which they don't talk to each other :lol:
Quote from: Josquius on February 01, 2023, 09:34:39 AMThis is a link through fields north of Paris to totally bypass it.
The HS1-HS2 link was to connect the lines of two London terminus stations right next to each other - finding paths/building new lines that don't have to go into London would be the sensible way to setup a Manchester to Paris link if/when one is needed.
Not fields, it's in the suburbs. Stations in the middle of potato fields is a French "tradition" (seen in Germany and Spain) that should be avoided.
High-speeds lines are connected, not by-passed, something the HS1 and current HS2 project miss completely. That direct link between HS1 & HS2 (plus the Heathrow service gone missing as well) might have been better than the current bypass in the East of Paris (remember Paris centre is much smaller than London) but it's there, and possibly extended in the future to provide more capacity to the South "European" high-speed line to Iberian, as in when the Pyrenean link in the Basque Country is ready, which will take some more time, to say the least. :P
Quote from: Sheilbh on February 01, 2023, 09:45:53 AMI don't think so. King's Cross-St Pancras is everywhere north-east of London; Euston is everywhere to the north-west (including HS2).
Get your point but....:lol:
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FneiqF-WYAAXj0x?format=png&name=small)
So basically not very different from the East of Paris interconnexion, in theory. Josquius and his precise knowledge of London, only surpassed by his knowledge of French. :lol:
QuoteA lot of the work that would make life a lot easier and have a bigger impact is probably in things like timetables and some form of open market for train tickets so you can easily route across borders. That'll be slow - possibly a bit contentious - and very detailed work. But the issue with cross-border rail isn't just (or even mainly) the big lines between big cities but really simple things like the difficulty of planning or buying tickets in multiple countries/legs. I suspect that a lot of it will basically require some form of open data style reforms that are mandatory for European countries' rail systems - because that is a big issue is the extent to which they don't talk to each other :lol:
Disagree with that booking and timetable part. More railway services are needed. 20-30 years ago there were more. For instance, no direct link from Paris to Irun (Spanish basque country entry) due to a commercial war between SNCF and RENFE. One has to take a metro, el Topo (no Jodorowsky reference sorry) for two kilometres to cross the Franco-Spanish border, so transfers are more of than not impossible.
Most of the purely service is pretty much done. Bahn.de is pretty good at timetables. There is always . :P
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Cook_European_Timetable (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Cook_European_Timetable)
Now booking for smaller lines might be more difficult but those are seldom on advance booking early. Generally cheap. One might have to go through an international European railway service of their national railway company however (I remember seeing there clerks using the Thomas Cook timetable trying to figure out the byzantine Spanish railway network). :P
That's easily done in Paris, even before Internet. Some countries were a bit behind like Greece or Spain (surprise!) but things are better these days.
OTOH, RENFE, Deutsche Bahn and other railways having an office in Paris or big cities certainly helps.
Before that, WASTEELS travel agency (very well known to
gästarbeiter and the like). Not sure if they still exist.
What you've described is a thrilling way of planning a trip in the 1970s :P
It should be easier for users to be able to see how timetables interact, how they can use rail for cross-border/international travel and to book across multiple national companies online - maybe even via an app :o Rather than having to research multiple sites (especially in countries with a complicated system like Spain) or book through their national company's international travel office or separate offices in a big city.
As I say I think a lot could be done by just making it open data by default which would allow other companies to build apps or resources off that data.
It's not to say we don't need more cross-border rail because we do, but we also need to make it easier and more customer friendly so people who'd consider using it as an alternative to air travel can do it easily.
QuoteI don't think so. King's Cross-St Pancras is everywhere north-east of London; Euston is everywhere to the north-west (including HS2).
Get your point but....:lol:
Looking at google maps I see from South Hamstead Station and following lines east it is possible to find a route into Euston or St Pancras.
The link seems to be less something entirely new and more expanding the lines that are there already (which raises the question of why it was such an epic expensive thing)
Quote from: Duque de Bragança on February 01, 2023, 10:00:50 AMQuote from: Sheilbh on February 01, 2023, 09:45:53 AMI don't think so. King's Cross-St Pancras is everywhere north-east of London; Euston is everywhere to the north-west (including HS2).
Get your point but....:lol:
So basically not very different from the East of Paris interconnexion, in theory. Josquius and his precise knowledge of London, only surpassed by his knowledge of French. :lol:
So basically completely different.
Note the very small scale in this image. This isn't London's suburbs.
Quote from: Sheilbh on February 01, 2023, 10:13:17 AMWhat you've described is a thrilling way of planning a trip in the 1970s :P
Quite the bourgeois comment there. :D
Besides, I was not even born back then. :P
QuoteIt should be easier for users to be able to see how timetables interact, how they can use rail for cross-border/international travel and to book across multiple national companies online - maybe even via an app :o Rather than having to research multiple sites (especially in countries with a complicated system like Spain) or book through their national company's international travel office or separate offices in a big city.
Easier, yes. But believe me, me pre-Internet myself would have loved something as easy as bahn.de to check out timetables, instead of relying on WASTEELS or having to go to the SNCF International railway booking service in Paris Saint-Lazare, the one station without any international link. :lol:
As for the '70s, I was doing that in the '90s (in the '80s my parents would do it) and even the early 2000s (Internet was not necessarily adopted quickly by railways).
QuoteAs I say I think a lot could be done by just making it open data by default which would allow other companies to build apps or resources off that data.
It's not to say we don't need more cross-border rail because we do, but we also need to make it easier and more customer friendly so people who'd consider using it as an alternative to air travel can do it easily.
Not saying it could not be better, it should, but it's secondary. There are many services anyways, omio.com, mainline.com, thetrainline.com, liligo.com etc., to book internationally.
Open data is a big thing for nerds I know but we need more than mottos.
You hit the nail on the head however, with the airline travel reference. Due to the Franco-Spanish rail shenanigans at the Spanish border, it's quicker for me to book a flight to Madrid, even with the tranfer time (no bypass there) and then take a fast train (takes half time compared to the previous one), i.e 220-250 kph (not 300-350 kph high-speed train AVE) from Madrid to Sanabria/Seabra "potato field" station near the Portuguese border.
Only one true railway station till Galicia, it's at the ™Crossroads of the World™. :D
So more train services, perhaps idearly back to a '70s-like quantity, if you insist, (pre-Thatcher not just for Josquius) but with contemporary quality (still no Thatcher).
Quote from: Josquius on February 01, 2023, 10:29:30 AMQuoteI don't think so. King's Cross-St Pancras is everywhere north-east of London; Euston is everywhere to the north-west (including HS2).
Get your point but....:lol:
Looking at google maps I see from South Hamstead Station and following lines east it is possible to find a route into Euston or St Pancras.
The link seems to be less something entirely new and more expanding the lines that are there already (which raises the question of why it was such an epic expensive thing)
Quote from: Duque de Bragança on February 01, 2023, 10:00:50 AMQuote from: Sheilbh on February 01, 2023, 09:45:53 AMI don't think so. King's Cross-St Pancras is everywhere north-east of London; Euston is everywhere to the north-west (including HS2).
Get your point but....:lol:
So basically not very different from the East of Paris interconnexion, in theory. Josquius and his precise knowledge of London, only surpassed by his knowledge of French. :lol:
So basically completely different.
Note the very small scale in this image. This isn't London's suburbs.
Guess what, Paris has not annexed any suburb since 1860. Apples and oranges.
In the mean time, enjoy your lack of interconnection between high-speed lines.
Quote from: Duque de Bragança on February 01, 2023, 10:36:15 AMGuess what, Paris has not annexed any suburb since 1860. Apples and oranges.
In the mean time, enjoy your lack of interconnection between high-speed lines.
I don't see the relevance of Paris' administrative boundaries here.
You simply can't compare Camden and Coubert and that has nothing to do with whether they're officially part of a big city or not. This map shows an area completely within central London.
Quote from: Josquius on February 01, 2023, 10:40:12 AMQuote from: Duque de Bragança on February 01, 2023, 10:36:15 AMGuess what, Paris has not annexed any suburb since 1860. Apples and oranges.
In the mean time, enjoy your lack of interconnection between high-speed lines.
I don't see the relevance of Paris' administrative boundaries here.
You simply can't compare Camden and Coubert and that has nothing to do with whether they're officially part of a big city or not. This map shows an area completely within central London.
It's France, administrative borders matter in a jacobin country. :P :frog: No baron Haussman available right now to clean up and annex suburbs, sorry
In practical terms, both high-speed lines are not inter-connected, that's what matters. If you are not willing to understand that and the benefits it brings, there is no point in discussing.
In and around Paris, if that's what triggers you, the North, East, South-East and South-West high-speed lines are inter-connected. Capacity may have to be extended for the South-West, it's projected but not paid for.
Without the link HS1-HS2 in central London, both lines are not, and not even a bypass link outside of the M25 (Greater London) as in Central Paris (as defined by the périphérique) has been considered.
Quote from: Duque de Bragança on February 01, 2023, 10:33:55 AMQuite the bourgeois comment there. :D
Besides, I was not even born back then. :P
:huh:
QuoteEasier, yes. But believe me, me pre-Internet myself would have loved something as easy as bahn.de to check out timetables, instead of relying on WASTEELS or having to go to the SNCF International railway booking service in Paris Saint-Lazare, the one station without any international link. :lol:
Sure and I had to book train tickets through Germany and France at the (I believe) now closed London SNCF office. But people don't compare experiences with how it was 20 or 30 years ago - they compare with how easy it is to book alternatives, particularly low cost flights.
QuoteNot saying it could not be better, it should, but it's secondary. There are many services anyways, omio.com, mainline.com, thetrainline.com, liligo.com etc., to book internationally.
Sure but to take the Omio example - it's good and better than nothing. But if you want to go from, say, Paris to Florence you already need to know that the stages of your journey (TGV to Turin, TrenItalia to Florence) and book them as two separate journeys. But it will suggest a far longer entirely TrenItalia trip from Paris via Milan and Bologna.
Thetrainline is better at multi-company journeys in one place but that's more because of the way their system works. So they have multi-company journey planning - but they have worse data on European timetables and ticketing than Omio so it's more limited. Omio have the best data in Europe but aren't able to do multi-company trips.
To take the airline analogy again it's like making individuals work out their own connections and buy tickets separately on Omio; or be able to sell entire journey tickets but only covering certain routes.
QuoteOpen data is a big thing for nerds I know but we need more than mottos.
It's not a motto - I think (as with open banking) a standardised open data set and open API of timetabling and ticketing information would allow developers to build websites or apps that put all this in one place and make it easy for travellers. Which is why it would be challenging politically and a big technical challenge is that different national systems are built differently and I suspect all of the operators horde/siilo their data.
Again, I'm not disputing the need for more routes. But there is a barrier to entry for travellers that makes just booking train travel less attractive and more difficult.
Quote from: Sheilbh on February 01, 2023, 10:13:17 AMWhat you've described is a thrilling way of planning a trip in the 1970s :P
It should be easier for users to be able to see how timetables interact, how they can use rail for cross-border/international travel and to book across multiple national companies online - maybe even via an app :o Rather than having to research multiple sites (especially in countries with a complicated system like Spain) or book through their national company's international travel office or separate offices in a big city.
As I say I think a lot could be done by just making it open data by default which would allow other companies to build apps or resources off that data.
It's not to say we don't need more cross-border rail because we do, but we also need to make it easier and more customer friendly so people who'd consider using it as an alternative to air travel can do it easily.
This has given me a travel idea.
Quote from: Josquius on February 01, 2023, 10:29:30 AMQuoteI don't think so. King's Cross-St Pancras is everywhere north-east of London; Euston is everywhere to the north-west (including HS2).
Get your point but....:lol:
Looking at google maps I see from South Hamstead Station and following lines east it is possible to find a route into Euston or St Pancras.
The link seems to be less something entirely new and more expanding the lines that are there already (which raises the question of why it was such an epic expensive thing.
:hmm:
I only see South Hamstead Station as an Overground station?
Quote from: garbon on February 01, 2023, 11:30:40 AMQuote from: Josquius on February 01, 2023, 10:29:30 AMQuoteI don't think so. King's Cross-St Pancras is everywhere north-east of London; Euston is everywhere to the north-west (including HS2).
Get your point but....:lol:
Looking at google maps I see from South Hamstead Station and following lines east it is possible to find a route into Euston or St Pancras.
The link seems to be less something entirely new and more expanding the lines that are there already (which raises the question of why it was such an epic expensive thing.
:hmm:
I only see South Hamstead Station as an Overground station?
Yes?
I don't get your meaning.
Quote from: Duque de Bragança on February 01, 2023, 10:49:33 AMQuote from: Josquius on February 01, 2023, 10:40:12 AMQuote from: Duque de Bragança on February 01, 2023, 10:36:15 AMGuess what, Paris has not annexed any suburb since 1860. Apples and oranges.
In the mean time, enjoy your lack of interconnection between high-speed lines.
I don't see the relevance of Paris' administrative boundaries here.
You simply can't compare Camden and Coubert and that has nothing to do with whether they're officially part of a big city or not. This map shows an area completely within central London.
It's France, administrative borders matter in a jacobin country. :P :frog: No baron Haussman available right now to clean up and annex suburbs, sorry
In practical terms, both high-speed lines are not inter-connected, that's what matters. If you are not willing to understand that and the benefits it brings, there is no point in discussing.
In and around Paris, if that's what triggers you, the North, East, South-East and South-West high-speed lines are inter-connected. Capacity may have to be extended for the South-West, it's projected but not paid for.
Without the link HS1-HS2 in central London, both lines are not, and not even a bypass link outside of the M25 (Greater London) as in Central Paris (as defined by the périphérique) has been considered.
I really have no idea what has you triggered here.
Its odd that you continue to insist a short 1km link in the middle of a city to link what is basically the end of one line to another is comparable to a 90km long network in a rural area to connect high speed lines.
What you've got in France looks good. We should have something like this in the UK. Thats exactly what I'm saying. The HS1-HS2 link was not this.
Quote from: Josquius on February 01, 2023, 11:32:50 AMQuote from: garbon on February 01, 2023, 11:30:40 AMQuote from: Josquius on February 01, 2023, 10:29:30 AMQuoteI don't think so. King's Cross-St Pancras is everywhere north-east of London; Euston is everywhere to the north-west (including HS2).
Get your point but....:lol:
Looking at google maps I see from South Hamstead Station and following lines east it is possible to find a route into Euston or St Pancras.
The link seems to be less something entirely new and more expanding the lines that are there already (which raises the question of why it was such an epic expensive thing.
:hmm:
I only see South Hamstead Station as an Overground station?
Yes?
I don't get your meaning.
Would the point of a highspeed rail link be to avoid those passengers entering into the standard in city connections and therefore adding to its capacity woes?
Quote from: garbon on February 01, 2023, 11:37:25 AMWould the point of a highspeed rail link be to avoid those passengers entering into the standard in city connections and therefore adding to its capacity woes?
Yes. That's what I said- in theory its already possible to take a train from Manchester to Paris, the issue is capacity.
Though I do wonder what capacity is like on that existing Camden Road stretch and how much could be squeezed out of it- I'd be surprised if a limited service wasn't possible considering the short length of track neded, if at least a night train (but then if we're doing that there's the better idea I mentioned of just skipping central London altogether).
Quote from: Josquius on February 01, 2023, 11:51:40 AMQuote from: garbon on February 01, 2023, 11:37:25 AMWould the point of a highspeed rail link be to avoid those passengers entering into the standard in city connections and therefore adding to its capacity woes?
Yes. That's what I said- in theory its already possible to take a train from Manchester to Paris, the issue is capacity.
Though I do wonder what capacity is like on that existing Camden Road stretch and how much could be squeezed out of it- I'd be surprised if a limited service wasn't possible considering the short length of track neded, if at least a night train (but then if we're doing that there's the better idea I mentioned of just skipping central London altogether).
Yeah but the fact that it is multiple trains does lead as you say to capacity issues and individual level, changes how viable/cost effective the route is.
Quote from: garbon on February 01, 2023, 11:55:16 AMQuote from: Josquius on February 01, 2023, 11:51:40 AMQuote from: garbon on February 01, 2023, 11:37:25 AMWould the point of a highspeed rail link be to avoid those passengers entering into the standard in city connections and therefore adding to its capacity woes?
Yes. That's what I said- in theory its already possible to take a train from Manchester to Paris, the issue is capacity.
Though I do wonder what capacity is like on that existing Camden Road stretch and how much could be squeezed out of it- I'd be surprised if a limited service wasn't possible considering the short length of track neded, if at least a night train (but then if we're doing that there's the better idea I mentioned of just skipping central London altogether).
Yeah but the fact that it is multiple trains does lead as you say to capacity issues and individual level, changes how viable/cost effective the route is.
There were actual investigations into this back in the 90s/00s. Too lazy to google them right now.
It was originally planned to have links between other English cities and the continent when the channel tunnel was under construction, unfortunately its opening coincided with the boom in low cost flights.
Considering the need for passport control facilities in any UK station with services running through the tunnel, it just isn't viable even before we get to considering available paths. You'd need more than just a few trains a day to make these facilities worth operating and the demand isn't there.
Quote from: Josquius on February 01, 2023, 11:32:50 AMIts odd that you continue to exist a short 1km link in the middle of a city to link what is basically the end of one line to another is comparable to a 90km long network in a rural area to connect high speed lines.
What you've got in France looks good. We should have something like this in the UK. Thats exactly what I'm saying. The HS1-HS2 link was not this.
Continue to exist? :hmm:
It's not a really a rural area, being close to Paris, peri-urban area at best, with a mix of suburb and somewhat rural possibly (in Île-de-France true rural areas exist but not that much). Coubert has 230/km2 population density. It's not Paris obviously, but this is no hamlet.
Note about of these 90 km, the south and west branches are now shared with the LGV Sud-Est line.
The reason it was done far of the city centre was to save costs and and link several high-speed lines, at full speed.
In the UK, or rather in London :P 1 kilometre of railway in London *may* hopefully be cheaper than 90 km double-track (plus railway switches etc.), it's Greater London after all. Less of a problem for 1 km double-track (?). A link to Heathrow was considered as well. It would be more than 1 km, but would be worth it.
https://www.newcivilengineer.com/latest/aviation-expert-rues-missed-hs2-heathrow-link-opportunity-27-06-2019/ (https://www.newcivilengineer.com/latest/aviation-expert-rues-missed-hs2-heathrow-link-opportunity-27-06-2019/)
As for a high-speed railway bypass of London, good luck with that (no lines are planned to Wales and the so-called English Riviera), AFAIK.
Sill, that 1 km of track at Camden would be nice for the UK.
As for the low cost airlines boom, it's a thing of the past, with prices rising. The passport issue still stands, of course.
Incredible and quite moving footage of a woman in the protests in Tbilisi waving the EU flag while being hit with the water cannon, as a crowd rally around her to keep her going:
https://twitter.com/ThomasVLinge/status/1633161943929221122
Georgia's position on Ukraine is possibly the most extraordinary of probably one of the most pro-Ukrainian population around (including Georgian Legion fighters in Ukraine) but a government that is terrified of and supine towards Russia. Which leads to constant protests like this from the Shame Movement (which does what it says on the tin) that the government is always trying to suppress.
Separately - as with Ukraine (and I'm reminded of the very moving footage of the EU flag moving into the Rada) - I really hope the EU is able to live up to these people's aspirations.
Yes, it's very moving to see and realize how the EU flag, something that at this point we take for granted in the West and even see with some resentment sometimes, has come to symbolize the yearning for freedom of the still opressed and/or threatened populations of the East.
Quote from: Sheilbh on March 08, 2023, 08:10:14 AM(including Georgian Legion fighters in Ukraine)
I believe the current Georgian government has threatened them with forfeiting their Georgian nationality if they continue to fight in Ukraine.
QuoteSeparately - as with Ukraine (and I'm reminded of the very moving footage of the EU flag moving into the Rada) - I really hope the EU is able to live up to these people's aspirations.
It's not going to though is it, not in any timescale that'd really benefit the life of those people. Which doesn't make their stand any less heroic, it's just sad to think about.
The German transport minister has blocked the EU decision to ban sales of ICE cars starting in 2035. Which is both terrible diplomacy as the objections came too late in the process and silly because not even the German car industry wants the e-fuels he propagates.
Aren't the greens in the government in Germany?
That.. Is not good
Quote from: Tamas on March 08, 2023, 09:06:21 AMIt's not going to though is it, not in any timescale that'd really benefit the life of those people. Which doesn't make their stand any less heroic, it's just sad to think about.
I think it's a huge challenge for the EU to acknowledge and embrace these people in Ukraine and Georgia in a way that acknowledges and shares their aspirations but doesn't lead to curdled hopes as we see in the Balkans.
Weirdly - especially given the veto of North Macedonia - I think Macron is maybe the closest to getting the balance.
Quote from: Zanza on March 09, 2023, 01:31:37 PMThe German transport minister has blocked the EU decision to ban sales of ICE cars starting in 2035. Which is both terrible diplomacy as the objections came too late in the process and silly because not even the German car industry wants the e-fuels he propagates.
Zanza, can you expand on this?
QuoteGerman government in crisis over EU ban on car combustion engines
Green party accuses FDP of gambling away country's reputation after last-minute blocking of phase-out from 2035
A clash over climate protection measures is threatening to unravel Germany's three-party governing alliance, after the Green party accused its liberal coalition partners of gambling away the country's reputation by blocking a EU-wide phase-out of internal combustion engines in cars.
"You can't have a coalition of progress where only one party is in charge of progress and the others try to stop the progress," the country's vice-chancellor and economy minister, Robert Habeck, said at a meeting of the Green party's parliamentary group in Weimar on Tuesday.
The pro-business Free Democratic party's (FDP) last-minute opposition to EU plans to ban sales of new cars with internal combustion engines from 2035, which European leaders are hoping to resolve at a summit in Brussels on Thursday and Friday, had damaged Germany's standing in the bloc, Habeck said. "We are losing debates, we are getting too little support for our projects."
The German liberals' sudden rethink has caused frustration not just in the ranks of its coalition partners but in other European capitals, where there are fears that the continent's largest economy reneging on previously struck agreements will embolden other states to act in a similarly erratic fashion.
FDP politicians argue that the phase-out in its current form risks destroying a German manufacturing industry that could in the future offer viable climate-neutral fuels as an alternative to purely battery-powered electric vehicles.
"We in Germany master the technology of the combustion engine better than anyone else in the world," the FDP transport minister, Volker Wissing, said on German television on Wednesday night. "And it makes sense to keep this technology in our hands while some of the questions around climate-neutral mobility remain unanswered."
In a proposed compromise, the European Commission has reportedly suggested criteria for a new category of CO2-neutral fuel-powered vehicles that could remain on European roads after 2035. Wissing's transport ministry has not yet officially replied to the proposal.
To the surprise of its own members, the German Green party had remained relatively reserved in the debate over the combustion engine – until this week, when Habeck's intervention raised the temperature in Berlin's seats of power.
In a television interview on Tuesday night, the minister for economic affairs and climate action also accused the FDP and his senior coalition partner, the Social Democratic party (SPD) of chancellor Olaf Scholz, of deliberately leaking an early draft of a law banning new fossil fuel heaters in Germany from 2025.
In the coalition agreement in December 2021, the three parties had agreed to a ban on installing of new fossil fuel heaters from 2024, with only devices running on 65% renewable energy allowed going forward. With the war in Ukraine bringing a collapse in gas deliveries, that target was supposed to be moved forward, to the start of 2024.
Since Habeck's ministry tried to turn that policy into law, however, there has been a ferocious backlash over its cost to ordinary households, led by the mass tabloid Bild.
Habeck said the draft law had been leaked "in order to damage the trust within the government", which had made him question the other parties' will to reach a compromise at their scheduled meeting this Sunday.
The FDP and the Greens are both struggling in the polls, with the ecological party currently close to the worse-than-anticipated 15% it achieved at federal elections in September 2021. The liberals, meanwhile, are hovering just above the 5% threshold for entering parliament and have lost votes in a string of regional and state elections.
What more can I say on this? FDP lost the last few state elections and poll poorly on federal level. So they want to show their distinctiveness in the coalition. And in general, the transport minister in Germany seems to always be clowns.
The German carmakers are actually publicly opposed to this (except Porsche), but the SMEs that make much of the German car industry have a bleeak future without ICE.
The FDP also has some good politicians, like the justice minister, who has changed some old, outdated laws the conservatives never wanted to touch.
Currently, the conservatives with Merz :yuk: are leading in polls again.
WHile I am a big supported of electric vehicles, the idea that we are in a position to ban ICE vehicles is insane. There are use cases for ICE vehicles that simply can't be met by electric vehicles. And the idea you can wave a magic wand and make that distinctin disappear by 2035 is, well, magical thinking.
Quote from: Barrister on March 23, 2023, 03:02:28 PMWHile I am a big supported of electric vehicles, the idea that we are in a position to ban ICE vehicles is insane. There are use cases for ICE vehicles that simply can't be met by electric vehicles. And the idea you can wave a magic wand and make that distinctin disappear by 2035 is, well, magical thinking.
Like what?
I'm skeptical many countries will manage to meet it but to see it under siege so early with so little progress depressing.
Quote from: Josquius on March 23, 2023, 03:11:19 PMQuote from: Barrister on March 23, 2023, 03:02:28 PMWHile I am a big supported of electric vehicles, the idea that we are in a position to ban ICE vehicles is insane. There are use cases for ICE vehicles that simply can't be met by electric vehicles. And the idea you can wave a magic wand and make that distinctin disappear by 2035 is, well, magical thinking.
Like what?
The energy density of gasoline is magnitudes greater than batteries. So, any time you need to drive an extended distance without the ability to refuel.
Quote from: Barrister on March 23, 2023, 03:13:18 PMQuote from: Josquius on March 23, 2023, 03:11:19 PMQuote from: Barrister on March 23, 2023, 03:02:28 PMWHile I am a big supported of electric vehicles, the idea that we are in a position to ban ICE vehicles is insane. There are use cases for ICE vehicles that simply can't be met by electric vehicles. And the idea you can wave a magic wand and make that distinctin disappear by 2035 is, well, magical thinking.
Like what?
The energy density of gasoline is magnitudes greater than batteries. So, any time you need to drive an extended distance without the ability to refuel.
Germany isn't Canada. There aren't really any vast rural areas only reachable by spending days on end driving.
Discouraging cross country drives is a design feature, not a flaw.
Quote from: Josquius on March 23, 2023, 03:16:17 PMQuote from: Barrister on March 23, 2023, 03:13:18 PMQuote from: Josquius on March 23, 2023, 03:11:19 PMQuote from: Barrister on March 23, 2023, 03:02:28 PMWHile I am a big supported of electric vehicles, the idea that we are in a position to ban ICE vehicles is insane. There are use cases for ICE vehicles that simply can't be met by electric vehicles. And the idea you can wave a magic wand and make that distinctin disappear by 2035 is, well, magical thinking.
Like what?
The energy density of gasoline is magnitudes greater than batteries. So, any time you need to drive an extended distance without the ability to refuel.
Germany isn't Canada. There aren't really any vast rural areas only reachable by spending days on end driving.
Discouraging cross country drives is a design feature, not a flaw.
It's not only driving "days on end". Think commercial trucks. Or God forbid a vehicle sold in Germany has to travel outside of that country.
Quote from: Barrister on March 23, 2023, 03:33:10 PM]
It's not only driving "days on end". Think commercial trucks. Or God forbid a vehicle sold in Germany has to travel outside of that country.
The ban doesn't cover lorries until 2050. Things are advancing fast so that seems really conservative if anything.
And projects are underway to make cross border rail functional.
Quote from: Barrister on March 23, 2023, 03:13:18 PMQuote from: Josquius on March 23, 2023, 03:11:19 PMQuote from: Barrister on March 23, 2023, 03:02:28 PMWHile I am a big supported of electric vehicles, the idea that we are in a position to ban ICE vehicles is insane. There are use cases for ICE vehicles that simply can't be met by electric vehicles. And the idea you can wave a magic wand and make that distinctin disappear by 2035 is, well, magical thinking.
Like what?
The energy density of gasoline is magnitudes greater than batteries. So, any time you need to drive an extended distance without the ability to refuel.
they're also much cheaper than EVs, which are out of wallet range for most of the populace. Not that EU nomenklatura are bother by that given their fat wages.
It's the EU boobs trying to be holier than the pope, while running the risk of giving a big part of the EUs industry the neckshot.
9%, that's the EU share of CO2 emissions. Shutting down all activity and killing everyone alive on the continent is not going to have a significant effect.
BEV cars will be both cheaper than ICE cars and have very long range by 2035, so I doubt a ban will be meaningful as ICE cars will just not be attractive anymore.
The Euro 7 emission standard in 2025 is much more relevant for shaping the market. That makes small ICE cars prohibitively expensive.
Quote from: Zanza on March 23, 2023, 05:29:34 PMBEV cars will be both cheaper than ICE cars and have very long range by 2035, so I doubt a ban will be meaningful as ICE cars will just not be attractive anymore.
The Euro 7 emission standard in 2025 is much more relevant for shaping the market. That makes small ICE cars prohibitively expensive.
The plebs can just ride the bus after that, then.
From what I understand Canada's plan is similar and on a similar timeline:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phase-out_of_fossil_fuel_vehicles
Edit: I do think (from a British perspective) it gets to my concern around this and other plans like Labour's goal of a zero carbon grid by 2030 - it's all achievable but it's going to require a huge amount of infrastructure that we don't appear to be building. Electrifying everything is going to be a revolution in the scale of most electricity grids for most countries and I don't think many are doing it.
Quote from: Tamas on March 23, 2023, 06:40:29 PMThe plebs can just ride the bus after that, then.
Looks like it. There is a visible trend already that small car lines with base prices up to 20k Euro are discontinued with all carmakers in the EU, e.g. Smart, VW up!, Opel Karl, Fiat 500, Ford Fiesta etc. That's because of Euro 7 in 2025. Either cheap BEV replace them, probably imported from China, or larger, more expensive ICE cars. The reason is that Euro 7, as that is similarly expensive to build in a V12 Ferrari as it is in a Fiat 500.
And that's in two years, not twelve.
Quote from: Crazy_Ivan80 on March 23, 2023, 04:35:42 PM9%, that's the EU share of CO2 emissions. Shutting down all activity and killing everyone alive on the continent is not going to have a significant effect.
God I hate this argument. Not only is it reductive and ignorant, it's also wrong.
EVs being more expensive than ICE cars is economics 101.
As the share of the market shifts so too do these prices. It costs a lot less per unit if you make more, and vice versa.
EVs will hit the tipping point where they have the balance before too long.
Worth looking at for instance how much the price of renewable energy has dropped this past decade or two.
Quote from: Zanza on March 23, 2023, 11:31:17 PMQuote from: Tamas on March 23, 2023, 06:40:29 PMThe plebs can just ride the bus after that, then.
Looks like it. There is a visible trend already that small car lines with base prices up to 20k Euro are discontinued with all carmakers in the EU, e.g. Smart, VW up!, Opel Karl, Fiat 500, Ford Fiesta etc. That's because of Euro 7 in 2025. Either cheap BEV replace them, probably imported from China, or larger, more expensive ICE cars. The reason is that Euro 7, as that is similarly expensive to build in a V12 Ferrari as it is in a Fiat 500.
And that's in two years, not twelve.
Sounds good on the surface. We really do need to move backwards a world where cars are something you choose to spend your money on and not an absolute necessity for life.
We really need a system of subsidies in place for those in rural areas however and hefty investment in public transport. Which needs to have started years ago if 25 were a cut off point.
Quote from: Zanza on March 23, 2023, 11:31:17 PMQuote from: Tamas on March 23, 2023, 06:40:29 PMThe plebs can just ride the bus after that, then.
Looks like it. There is a visible trend already that small car lines with base prices up to 20k Euro are discontinued with all carmakers in the EU, e.g. Smart, VW up!, Opel Karl, Fiat 500, Ford Fiesta etc. That's because of Euro 7 in 2025. Either cheap BEV replace them, probably imported from China, or larger, more expensive ICE cars. The reason is that Euro 7, as that is similarly expensive to build in a V12 Ferrari as it is in a Fiat 500.
And that's in two years, not twelve.
I had to look up the VW up! and Opel Karl as I don't think I'd heard of them. I'm really out of tune with cars these days. :lol:
Quote from: Syt on March 24, 2023, 03:38:49 AMQuote from: Zanza on March 23, 2023, 11:31:17 PMQuote from: Tamas on March 23, 2023, 06:40:29 PMThe plebs can just ride the bus after that, then.
Looks like it. There is a visible trend already that small car lines with base prices up to 20k Euro are discontinued with all carmakers in the EU, e.g. Smart, VW up!, Opel Karl, Fiat 500, Ford Fiesta etc. That's because of Euro 7 in 2025. Either cheap BEV replace them, probably imported from China, or larger, more expensive ICE cars. The reason is that Euro 7, as that is similarly expensive to build in a V12 Ferrari as it is in a Fiat 500.
And that's in two years, not twelve.
I had to look up the VW up! and Opel Karl as I don't think I'd heard of them. I'm really out of tune with cars these days. :lol:
I did not recognize half the models either, don't worry. :lol: If I'm not mistaken they're all A-segment cars, the smaller ones in the market, so it's a fairly specialized segment. I'd guess that most cars in Europe are at least B-segment (your VW Polo, Opel Corsa, Toyota Yaris and the like), or even C-segment (VW Golf, Audi A3, Ford Focus, etc.).
One doubt regarding ICE vehicles that I have is related to those vehicles besides cars. Jos said that trucks are not affected until 2050. What about other kinds of, so to speak, industrial vehicles? Tractors, forklifts, construction machinery... how are those covered?
Quote from: The Larch on March 24, 2023, 04:12:59 AMOne doubt regarding ICE vehicles that I have is related to those vehicles besides cars. Jos said that trucks are not affected until 2050. What about other kinds of, so to speak, industrial vehicles? Tractors, forklifts, construction machinery... how are those covered?
I think that's a really important concern because while EVs have awesome instant torque. Currently the available vehicles for hauling & towing are heavy vehicles that need recharging in less than an hour.
Quote from: Grey Fox on March 24, 2023, 06:15:59 AMQuote from: The Larch on March 24, 2023, 04:12:59 AMOne doubt regarding ICE vehicles that I have is related to those vehicles besides cars. Jos said that trucks are not affected until 2050. What about other kinds of, so to speak, industrial vehicles? Tractors, forklifts, construction machinery... how are those covered?
I think that's a really important concern because while EVs have awesome instant torque. Currently the available vehicles for hauling & towing are heavy vehicles that need recharging in less than an hour.
Pssst, do not overcomplicate the picture here. The narrative is that the expensive EV you buy is also your implied indulgence paper, since by engaging in upper middle class consumerism, you have done your bit for the planet.
Quote from: The Larch on March 24, 2023, 04:12:59 AMI did not recognize half the models either, don't worry. :lol: If I'm not mistaken they're all A-segment cars, the smaller ones in the market, so it's a fairly specialized segment. I'd guess that most cars in Europe are at least B-segment (your VW Polo, Opel Corsa, Toyota Yaris and the like), or even C-segment (VW Golf, Audi A3, Ford Focus, etc.).
A and B segment is a bit more than a quarter of the market, typically the cheaper end.
QuoteWhat about other kinds of, so to speak, industrial vehicles? Tractors, forklifts, construction machinery... how are those covered?
The amount of these vehicles is absolutely miniscule compared to passenger cars and light commercial vehicles. They could electrify them using e-fuels, hydrogen etc.
Quote from: Zanza on March 24, 2023, 11:21:17 AMA and B segment is a bit more than a quarter of the market, typically the cheaper end.
How's the market split? I'd assume that B and C segment would be the most of it.
Quote from: The Larch on March 24, 2023, 04:12:59 AMOne doubt regarding ICE vehicles that I have is related to those vehicles besides cars. Jos said that trucks are not affected until 2050. What about other kinds of, so to speak, industrial vehicles? Tractors, forklifts, construction machinery... how are those covered?
I just want to point out that forklifts are already electric, at least for the most part. They're a perfect situation for it - typically in a factory or warehouse with very easy access to electricity, plus don't need to travel very far.
Something like a tractor though is the opposite - out in a field, not with easy access to electricity, may have to travel a pretty fair distance.
In the UK at least tractors already have special rules what with red diesel and all.
Quote from: The Larch on March 24, 2023, 11:27:08 AMQuote from: Zanza on March 24, 2023, 11:21:17 AMA and B segment is a bit more than a quarter of the market, typically the cheaper end.
How's the market split? I'd assume that B and C segment would be the most of it.
https://www.acea.auto/figure/new-passenger-cars-by-segment-in-eu/
Quote from: Josquius on March 24, 2023, 12:16:39 PMIn the UK at least tractors already have special rules what with red diesel and all.
Unless the uk is different dyed diesel is just cheaper (less tax) and is dyed so that personal vehicles are caught if they use them. That being said most tractors over a certain motor size do have diesel particulate filters. Farmers hate them because they're a point of failure, but that's a different matter :D . They have been getting better though. Compact and subcompact don't require them in NA though, so hobby farmers can still pollute.
Quote from: Zanza on March 24, 2023, 12:28:06 PMQuote from: The Larch on March 24, 2023, 11:27:08 AMQuote from: Zanza on March 24, 2023, 11:21:17 AMA and B segment is a bit more than a quarter of the market, typically the cheaper end.
How's the market split? I'd assume that B and C segment would be the most of it.
https://www.acea.auto/figure/new-passenger-cars-by-segment-in-eu/
So many more SUVs that I'd have assumed...
Quote from: Barrister on March 24, 2023, 11:30:56 AMQuote from: The Larch on March 24, 2023, 04:12:59 AMOne doubt regarding ICE vehicles that I have is related to those vehicles besides cars. Jos said that trucks are not affected until 2050. What about other kinds of, so to speak, industrial vehicles? Tractors, forklifts, construction machinery... how are those covered?
I just want to point out that forklifts are already electric, at least for the most part. They're a perfect situation for it - typically in a factory or warehouse with very easy access to electricity, plus don't need to travel very far.
Something like a tractor though is the opposite - out in a field, not with easy access to electricity, may have to travel a pretty fair distance.
I think I'm yet to see a single electric forklift, all those I've seen were diesel powered.
Quote from: Josquius on March 24, 2023, 12:16:39 PMIn the UK at least tractors already have special rules what with red diesel and all.
Red diesel? :huh:
Quote from: The Larch on March 24, 2023, 01:27:49 PMQuote from: Barrister on March 24, 2023, 11:30:56 AMQuote from: The Larch on March 24, 2023, 04:12:59 AMOne doubt regarding ICE vehicles that I have is related to those vehicles besides cars. Jos said that trucks are not affected until 2050. What about other kinds of, so to speak, industrial vehicles? Tractors, forklifts, construction machinery... how are those covered?
I just want to point out that forklifts are already electric, at least for the most part. They're a perfect situation for it - typically in a factory or warehouse with very easy access to electricity, plus don't need to travel very far.
Something like a tractor though is the opposite - out in a field, not with easy access to electricity, may have to travel a pretty fair distance.
I think I'm yet to see a single electric forklift, all those I've seen were diesel powered.
I've worked at places that use them, but they're usually smaller than their counterparts and used for small jobs. Though I'm sure they have larger version. They having to charge also means places with multiple shifts are less likely to use them. Natural gas or propane ones are popular here though, which I guess is more environmentally friendly than diesel.
Quote from: HVC on March 24, 2023, 01:32:23 PMQuote from: The Larch on March 24, 2023, 01:27:49 PMQuote from: Barrister on March 24, 2023, 11:30:56 AMQuote from: The Larch on March 24, 2023, 04:12:59 AMOne doubt regarding ICE vehicles that I have is related to those vehicles besides cars. Jos said that trucks are not affected until 2050. What about other kinds of, so to speak, industrial vehicles? Tractors, forklifts, construction machinery... how are those covered?
I just want to point out that forklifts are already electric, at least for the most part. They're a perfect situation for it - typically in a factory or warehouse with very easy access to electricity, plus don't need to travel very far.
Something like a tractor though is the opposite - out in a field, not with easy access to electricity, may have to travel a pretty fair distance.
I think I'm yet to see a single electric forklift, all those I've seen were diesel powered.
I've worked at places that use them, but they're usually smaller than their counterparts and used for small jobs. Though I'm sure they have larger version. They having to charge also means places with multiple shifts are less likely to use them. Natural gas or propane ones are popular here though, which I guess is more environmentally friendly than diesel.
True, I've seen gas powered ones as well, I had forgotten about them.
Quote from: The Larch on March 24, 2023, 01:30:08 PMQuote from: Josquius on March 24, 2023, 12:16:39 PMIn the UK at least tractors already have special rules what with red diesel and all.
Red diesel? :huh:
I assume it might be similar to Germany, where the cheaper oil used for heating was often used for Diesel cars. IIRC they added additives to the heating oil (originally coloring, I think?), but also gave special license plates to farmers so they could get tax rebates when filling up on Diesel.
Quote from: Syt on March 24, 2023, 01:46:17 PMQuote from: The Larch on March 24, 2023, 01:30:08 PMQuote from: Josquius on March 24, 2023, 12:16:39 PMIn the UK at least tractors already have special rules what with red diesel and all.
Red diesel? :huh:
I assume it might be similar to Germany, where the cheaper oil used for heating was often used for Diesel cars. IIRC they added additives to the heating oil (originally coloring, I think?), but also gave special license plates to farmers so they could get tax rebates when filling up on Diesel.
What we have over here is a special, lower price for diesel intended for farm machinery. Diesel for fishing vessels is also subsidized.
Red diesel is just ordinary diesel with a red dye added. Farmers and suchlike are entitled to use it, it attracts a much lower tax than ordinary diesel. The dye is to prevent dodgy farmers creating a secondary market by selling it on to ordinary road users.
Quote from: Richard Hakluyt on March 25, 2023, 01:13:40 PMRed diesel is just ordinary diesel with a red dye added. Farmers and suchlike are entitled to use it, it attracts a much lower tax than ordinary diesel. The dye is to prevent dodgy farmers creating a secondary market by selling it on to ordinary road users.
Hungary had the same thing with painted heating oil at the start of the 90s. "Blonding" heating oil and then selling it as diesel fuel was a massive black market thing that started many an organised crime careers, so it got phased out eventually.
The point of it being farmers are already being treat very differently to motorists so stands to reason the same would hold with the ice phase out.
I'd be surprised if the wording of the laws say nothing about them though.
Quote from: Josquius on March 25, 2023, 04:26:41 PMThe point of it being farmers are already being treat very differently to motorists so stands to reason the same would hold with the ice phase out.
I'd be surprised if the wording of the laws say nothing about them though.
Because when it comes to global warming there is good carbon and there is bad carbon.
Quote from: Admiral Yi on March 25, 2023, 04:33:46 PMQuote from: Josquius on March 25, 2023, 04:26:41 PMThe point of it being farmers are already being treat very differently to motorists so stands to reason the same would hold with the ice phase out.
I'd be surprised if the wording of the laws say nothing about them though.
Because when it comes to global warming there is good carbon and there is bad carbon.
Yes?
Quote from: Admiral Yi on March 25, 2023, 05:29:10 PMQuote from: Josquius on March 25, 2023, 04:56:14 PMYes?
There isn't.
Of course there is.
Something that can be easily replaced with renewables vs something which would cause more emissions (not to mention effort and cost) than it saves to replace.
Quote from: Richard Hakluyt on March 25, 2023, 01:13:40 PMRed diesel is just ordinary diesel with a red dye added. Farmers and suchlike are entitled to use it, it attracts a much lower tax than ordinary diesel. The dye is to prevent dodgy farmers creating a secondary market by selling it on to ordinary road users.
It's also dyed in Spain for the very same reason.
Quote from: Josquius on March 25, 2023, 05:30:51 PMOf course there is.
Something that can be easily replaced with renewables vs something which would cause more emissions (not to mention effort and cost) than it saves to replace.
How in the world would it cause more emissions to replace diesel farm tractors with E tractors?
Quote from: Admiral Yi on March 25, 2023, 05:54:05 PMQuote from: Josquius on March 25, 2023, 05:30:51 PMOf course there is.
Something that can be easily replaced with renewables vs something which would cause more emissions (not to mention effort and cost) than it saves to replace.
How in the world would it cause more emissions to replace diesel farm tractors with E tractors?
At current technology it's going to require a lot of batteries and fossil fuel produce electricity. Easier to just use a ice tractor.
EVs are the perfect solution for light, quick and recurring work, it's not has straight forward for anything requiring heavy lifting for a long time.
Really enjoyed this long piece on the EU's first attempt to foster a European microchip industry in the 1980s and the long quest for a Eurochip. It failed - but hopefully the lessons from that (and from countries that were more successful) are learned for Eurochip 2.0. I also feel it's probably relevant for the European response to the IRA/industrial policy generally:
https://www.phenomenalworld.org/analysis/the-eurochip/
Quote from: Grey Fox on March 25, 2023, 08:07:34 PMQuote from: Admiral Yi on March 25, 2023, 05:54:05 PMQuote from: Josquius on March 25, 2023, 05:30:51 PMOf course there is.
Something that can be easily replaced with renewables vs something which would cause more emissions (not to mention effort and cost) than it saves to replace.
How in the world would it cause more emissions to replace diesel farm tractors with E tractors?
At current technology it's going to require a lot of batteries and fossil fuel produce electricity. Easier to just use a ice tractor.
EVs are the perfect solution for light, quick and recurring work, it's not has straight forward for anything requiring heavy lifting for a long time.
Depends on usage of course. It is the rare farm that uses a tractor for long periods of time of constant use. Thinking back to the farmwork involving tractors I did in my youth, there would have been lots of time in between uses to recharge.
And the great benefit of an electric over an ICE is torque. Lots of tasks involve pulling stuff with a tractor, and an electric is perfect for that.
Quote from: crazy canuck on April 06, 2023, 01:48:23 PMQuote from: Grey Fox on March 25, 2023, 08:07:34 PMQuote from: Admiral Yi on March 25, 2023, 05:54:05 PMQuote from: Josquius on March 25, 2023, 05:30:51 PMOf course there is.
Something that can be easily replaced with renewables vs something which would cause more emissions (not to mention effort and cost) than it saves to replace.
How in the world would it cause more emissions to replace diesel farm tractors with E tractors?
At current technology it's going to require a lot of batteries and fossil fuel produce electricity. Easier to just use a ice tractor.
EVs are the perfect solution for light, quick and recurring work, it's not has straight forward for anything requiring heavy lifting for a long time.
Depends on usage of course. It is the rare farm that uses a tractor for long periods of time of constant use. Thinking back to the farmwork involving tractors I did in my youth, there would have been lots of time in between uses to recharge.
And the great benefit of an electric over an ICE is torque. Lots of tasks involve pulling stuff with a tractor, and an electric is perfect for that.
Interesting. Is BC or Quebec different or is it that the standards have change but my cousin (egg producer employee) regularly will be in fields for 16 hours+.
Yes, the advantage is instant torque but there will be no wide range adoption if your range is now 45 minutes for every 8 hours of level 2 charge time.
(Level 3 charging is faster but reduces life time of the batteries)
Quote from: Grey Fox on April 06, 2023, 01:56:04 PMQuote from: crazy canuck on April 06, 2023, 01:48:23 PMQuote from: Grey Fox on March 25, 2023, 08:07:34 PMQuote from: Admiral Yi on March 25, 2023, 05:54:05 PMQuote from: Josquius on March 25, 2023, 05:30:51 PMOf course there is.
Something that can be easily replaced with renewables vs something which would cause more emissions (not to mention effort and cost) than it saves to replace.
How in the world would it cause more emissions to replace diesel farm tractors with E tractors?
At current technology it's going to require a lot of batteries and fossil fuel produce electricity. Easier to just use a ice tractor.
EVs are the perfect solution for light, quick and recurring work, it's not has straight forward for anything requiring heavy lifting for a long time.
Depends on usage of course. It is the rare farm that uses a tractor for long periods of time of constant use. Thinking back to the farmwork involving tractors I did in my youth, there would have been lots of time in between uses to recharge.
And the great benefit of an electric over an ICE is torque. Lots of tasks involve pulling stuff with a tractor, and an electric is perfect for that.
Interesting. Is BC or Quebec different or is it that the standards have change but my cousin (egg producer employee) regularly will be in fields for 16 hours+.
Yes, the advantage is instant torque but there will be no wide range adoption if your range is now 45 minutes for every 8 hours of level 2 charge time.
(Level 3 charging is faster but reduces life time of the batteries)
In Ontario farm equipment is usually intermittent use, but when used it's for a long time. You might not use a tractor for a weeks, but when you do it's a full day thing. cutting hay all day, or bailing all day to beat the rain, for example.
An EV would be good for a hobby farm. Moving feed, or tilling a small plot. Commercial farming wouldn't really be ideal, I don't think.
As for level three, as of right now that's not available for residential/private. Common level 2 is like 11kwh which would still take 8 or so hours to "fill" a tractor. Leviton makes a 18kwh charger, but that needs 100 amps.
Quote from: crazy canuck on April 06, 2023, 01:48:23 PMQuote from: Grey Fox on March 25, 2023, 08:07:34 PMQuote from: Admiral Yi on March 25, 2023, 05:54:05 PMQuote from: Josquius on March 25, 2023, 05:30:51 PMOf course there is.
Something that can be easily replaced with renewables vs something which would cause more emissions (not to mention effort and cost) than it saves to replace.
How in the world would it cause more emissions to replace diesel farm tractors with E tractors?
At current technology it's going to require a lot of batteries and fossil fuel produce electricity. Easier to just use a ice tractor.
EVs are the perfect solution for light, quick and recurring work, it's not has straight forward for anything requiring heavy lifting for a long time.
Depends on usage of course. It is the rare farm that uses a tractor for long periods of time of constant use. Thinking back to the farmwork involving tractors I did in my youth, there would have been lots of time in between uses to recharge.
And the great benefit of an electric over an ICE is torque. Lots of tasks involve pulling stuff with a tractor, and an electric is perfect for that.
Are you thinking just specifically about a tractor? And not all farm equipment?
Because I think I agree a tractor is used periodically. But if you're seeding or harvesting (or spraying) then you're going from sunup to sundown.
Quote from: Grey Fox on April 06, 2023, 01:56:04 PMQuote from: crazy canuck on April 06, 2023, 01:48:23 PMQuote from: Grey Fox on March 25, 2023, 08:07:34 PMQuote from: Admiral Yi on March 25, 2023, 05:54:05 PMQuote from: Josquius on March 25, 2023, 05:30:51 PMOf course there is.
Something that can be easily replaced with renewables vs something which would cause more emissions (not to mention effort and cost) than it saves to replace.
How in the world would it cause more emissions to replace diesel farm tractors with E tractors?
At current technology it's going to require a lot of batteries and fossil fuel produce electricity. Easier to just use a ice tractor.
EVs are the perfect solution for light, quick and recurring work, it's not has straight forward for anything requiring heavy lifting for a long time.
Depends on usage of course. It is the rare farm that uses a tractor for long periods of time of constant use. Thinking back to the farmwork involving tractors I did in my youth, there would have been lots of time in between uses to recharge.
And the great benefit of an electric over an ICE is torque. Lots of tasks involve pulling stuff with a tractor, and an electric is perfect for that.
Interesting. Is BC or Quebec different or is it that the standards have change but my cousin (egg producer employee) regularly will be in fields for 16 hours+.
Yes, the advantage is instant torque but there will be no wide range adoption if your range is now 45 minutes for every 8 hours of level 2 charge time.
(Level 3 charging is faster but reduces life time of the batteries)
My workdays were often 14-16 hours, in the summer months. But tractors are used intermittently during those hours. The trick would be to have a charging station(s) near where the work is being done. Having to continually drive them back to a central charging hub would not be very practical.
Quote from: Barrister on April 06, 2023, 02:48:10 PMQuote from: crazy canuck on April 06, 2023, 01:48:23 PMQuote from: Grey Fox on March 25, 2023, 08:07:34 PMQuote from: Admiral Yi on March 25, 2023, 05:54:05 PMQuote from: Josquius on March 25, 2023, 05:30:51 PMOf course there is.
Something that can be easily replaced with renewables vs something which would cause more emissions (not to mention effort and cost) than it saves to replace.
How in the world would it cause more emissions to replace diesel farm tractors with E tractors?
At current technology it's going to require a lot of batteries and fossil fuel produce electricity. Easier to just use a ice tractor.
EVs are the perfect solution for light, quick and recurring work, it's not has straight forward for anything requiring heavy lifting for a long time.
Depends on usage of course. It is the rare farm that uses a tractor for long periods of time of constant use. Thinking back to the farmwork involving tractors I did in my youth, there would have been lots of time in between uses to recharge.
And the great benefit of an electric over an ICE is torque. Lots of tasks involve pulling stuff with a tractor, and an electric is perfect for that.
Are you thinking just specifically about a tractor? And not all farm equipment?
Because I think I agree a tractor is used periodically. But if you're seeding or harvesting (or spraying) then you're going from sunup to sundown.
Yes I agree. Harvesting and seeding equipment could not be electric with current tech.
Not sure which thread to post this in - but this one seems to work. Really extraordinary piece of reporting (and brilliantly presented) by AP investigating "ghost ships" turning up in the Caribbean and Brazil:
https://apnews.com/article/adrift-investigation-migrants-mauritania-tobago-663a576e233cb4b363f5eda8d5969b5a
Quote from: Sheilbh on April 15, 2023, 07:24:00 AMNot sure which thread to post this in - but this one seems to work. Really extraordinary piece of reporting (and brilliantly presented) by AP investigating "ghost ships" turning up in the Caribbean and Brazil:
https://apnews.com/article/adrift-investigation-migrants-mauritania-tobago-663a576e233cb4b363f5eda8d5969b5a
Hats off to AP for such an in depth report and getting out of their way to help some of the families involved obtain some closure.
Reports like these makes one realize that no matter how many barriers and obstacles to inmigration are put on people's way, as long as people are desperate enough to risk their lives, things like this will keep happening.
SO I am reading that VDL was saying that a break with China is not realistic and not practical.
I am really glad Europe has learned its lesson from Russia on how tolerating the abuses of autocracies and getting economically dependent on them works out. What the hell.
Quote from: Tamas on April 19, 2023, 02:04:19 AMSO I am reading that VDL was saying that a break with China is not realistic and not practical.
I am really glad Europe has learned its lesson from Russia on how tolerating the abuses of autocracies and getting economically dependent on them works out. What the hell.
What did you expect.
Quote from: Tamas on April 19, 2023, 02:04:19 AMSO I am reading that VDL was saying that a break with China is not realistic and not practical.
I am really glad Europe has learned its lesson from Russia on how tolerating the abuses of autocracies and getting economically dependent on them works out. What the hell.
She's right.
I've said many times but I really rate VdL - including on China. On a purely practical level it is not realistic or possible to have a break with China. Our economies are massively interlinked and Europe doesn't like talking about de-coupling, her line is around de-risking. This is the relevant section and I think she's right:
QuoteMuch has been said about this since I set out the principles of this de-risking strategy. And even more has been said since the last trip. In many ways, that reaction is good because Europe needs to have this discussion. And so, I want to first and foremost thank the Parliament for putting this debate on today. It is urgent and it is good that we have this debate. Most importantly, I say this because this relationship is too important for us not to define our own European strategy and principles for engagement with China. I believe we can – and we must – carve out our own distinct European approach that also leaves space for us to cooperate with other partners, too. And the starting point for this is the need to have a shared and very clear-eyed picture of the risks and the opportunities in our engagement with China. And this means acknowledging – as well as clearly saying – that the Chinese Communist Party's actions have now caught up with its stated ambitions and the hardening of China's overall strategic posture over the last years. For example, the shows of military force in the South China Sea, in the East China Sea, and at the border with India, directly affect our partners and their legitimate interests. Or on the issue with Taiwan. The EU's 'One China' policy is long-standing. We have consistently called for peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and we stand strongly against any unilateral change of the status quo, in particular by the use of force. We must also never shy away from talking about the deeply concerning and grave human rights violations in Xinjiang. And just as China has been ramping up its military posture, it has also ramped up its policy of economic and trade coercion as we have seen from Lithuania to Australia and the targeting of everything from pop bands to trade brands. We have also seen these tactics directed right here in the House of European democracy. And I want to express my solidarity to those Members of the European Parliament who have been unfairly sanctioned by the Chinese Communist Party just for calling out human right violations. And all this is symptomatic for the fact that China has now turned the page on the era of 'reform and opening' and is moving into a new era of 'security and control'. I heard this in Beijing from many European companies who have witnessed first-hand this shift towards security and away from the logic of open markets and free trade. And to strengthen that security and control leverage, China is openly pursuing a policy of reducing its dependency on the world – that is completely okay, that is their right –, but while increasing the world's dependency on itself. You know the examples, for example, whether it is on critical raw materials or the renewable energy, on emerging tech like artificial intelligence, quantum computing or biotech.
That is about as strong a summary as you get from any European leader right now.
The de-risking line is aimed at companies working in China or very involved in China but then there's a few European areas the Commission is working on - trying to increase resilience (also part of the IRA response), more aggressive use of trade retaliation, more protection of high risk sectors and trying to work with G7 partners on
Charles Michel who is far less impressive has been more doubtful about even that.
I think VDL and the Commission (and the Parliament) are clear-eyed and, broadly, right on China. The problem is ultimately member states and the Council. The Commission and Parliament have a reasonable shot at doing the sort of things they're talking about around trade and markets etc because that's their competence - but general attitudes to China, foreign policy etc doesn't have a European consensus among member states.
One thing I'd like to see is on the "trade defence" piece - Lithuania's the big example. China put a lot of sanctions on Lithuania after Lithuania kept causing problems in the 17+1 format, and then engaged very heavily with Taiwan. In my view there should have been strong European retaliation at that point on Chinese trade on a sort of an attack on one is an attack on all basis. Instead the EU is taking its case to the WTO which just seems painfully inadequate and not engaging in the world we're now in, meanwhile European companies have largely re-engineered their supply chains to make sure nothing Lithuanian touches exports to China. But that's something VDL is at least gesturing towards.
Fine but talking the talk and not walking the walk is exactly what I mean. I understand it is inconvenient, even damaging, to de-couple from a murderous dystopia when your economy has made big bucks on exploiting the cheap labour provided by said dystopia.
What I am saying is, Russia should serve as an example that going all "oh geez, it's awful and we will stand up to anything further more evil they do, we absolutely will, pinky swear! But for now we just ask people to consider not raking THIS much money in for them. Won't be making any steps to enforce that though, as that might actually decrease profits" is NOT the right way.
A break with China is coming. They'll butt heads with the US eventually, and it will turn into a (cold) war of two ideologies for the future of our civilisation. This I find inevitable.
I agree - but I don't think the problem is the EU or VDL. I think the EU is doing what it can with its competence and VDL is doing the same and trying to rasie the concern.
Ultimately - I can't remember who it was who pointed it out - but while Scholz was far better on comms on his trip to China than Macron, it won't have escaped the notice of the Chinese state that both of them went with a coachload of CEOs and business leaders. It's on the member states and that's where I think the problem and very divided views are located.
If we want VdL's message to be taken seriously, then the next trip to China by a big European leader should just be their political team (and maybe some EU figures) - no business leaders, no CEOs, no big commercial announcements during the trip. Until then China will, rightly, interpret the message as Europe still primarily caring about Chinese money.
In lighter EU news - I love France :frog: :lol:
Quote'Champagne of beers' falls foul of French protections
EURACTIV.com with AFP
Belgian customs have destroyed almost 2,400 cans of US-brewed beer bearing the slogan "The Champagne of Beers", France's Champagne Committee said Tuesday (18 April), in the latest episode around the bubbly's fiercely-protected designation.
The cargo of 2,352 Miller High Life cans was seized in the port of Antwerp in early February but only destroyed on Monday, the Comite interprofessionel du vin de Champagne (CIVC) said in a statement.
Miller's slogan "represent(s) an infringement of the protected designation of origin Champagne," it complained.
"The consignee of the cans in Germany... did not contest the decision" after the Champagne Committee "requested the destruction of these illicit goods," it added.
The powerful CIVC, which groups the famed eastern French region's 16,200 growers and 360 brands, tracks anyone in the world seen as hijacking the Champagne name.
Under European regulations, "goods that infringe a protected designation of origin... are counterfeit," the committee highlighted.
The destruction of the beers — which the committee insisted was done in an environmentally responsible manner — "confirms the importance that the European Union attaches to designations of origin and rewards the determination of the Champagne producers to protect their designation," committee chief Charles Goemaere said.
The Champagne Committee tackles about 1,000 cases of alleged misappropriation of its moniker in 80 countries each year, its lawyers told AFP in 2021.
One rare case of blowback came in June that year, when Moscow decreed that only Russian-made bubbly can be called "champagne" while the French product must be labelled "sparkling wine".
Should have brewed it in China, then they'd have been fine with it ;)
Holy crap - I googled "the Champagne of Beers".
That tag line for Miller High Life goes back to freaking 1906. Supposedly back then bottled beer was a new thing (you normally had to go to the bar to get it), so Miller High Life was an upscale product sold in bars shaped like Champagne bottles, and wrapped with foil on top to complete the look.
I had no idea - I knew it was an old tagline, just I thought it went back to the 70s or so.
But then again I'm firmly in the "champagne is a genericized term at this point" camp and any sparkling wine can be called champagne.
Ironically if they still sold it like that, despite it being more champagne-y, they might have a case under EU law.
No statute of limitations? Assuming the used the ad/saying in Europe before that is. Hard to come and complain after 100 years.
Miller can probably play an angle in the US. Good timing now with anheuser is have a tough go at it.
Quote from: HVC on April 19, 2023, 03:07:35 PMNo statute of limitations? Assuming the used the ad/saying in Europe before that is. Hard to come and complain after 100 years.
Miller can probably play an angle in the US. Good timing now with anheuser is have a tough go at it.
Statue of limitations doesn't really apply - it's more a question of whether Miller High Life has been sold in Europe during this time.
I mean this goes way back to the Budweiser (US) vs Budweiser (CZ) wars...
I'm very supportive of AOC issues but this is a ridiculous ruling. It's a marketing tag line, like saying this tshirt is the Cadillac of tshirts. You have to be an idiot to think Miller was pretending High Life was double fermented sparkling wine.
On a different note, I'm surprised there is any market at all for High Life in Europe. It's a reasonable overfizzed American lager, and I drank a lot of it in high school, but of all the beers in the world this one does give you the nastiest wino breath.
Cool label though.
Quote from: Admiral Yi on April 19, 2023, 06:52:58 PMI'm very supportive of AOC issues but this is a ridiculous ruling. It's a marketing tag line, like saying this tshirt is the Cadillac of tshirts. You have to be an idiot to think Miller was pretending High Life was double fermented sparkling wine.
Could also be the Belgians sending a message by proxy about false trappist stuff. :hmm: :tinfoil:
Different marketing regulations I guess.
QuoteOn a different note, I'm surprised there is any market at all for High Life in Europe. It's a reasonable overfizzed American lager, and I drank a lot of it in high school, but of all the beers in the world this one does give you the nastiest wino breath.
Cool label though.
I don't there is, it's completely unknown over here and I don't see it changing.
As for marketing tag lines and real genericised drinks, take a look at this:
(https://images.bfmtv.com/OtJ7gWG2OI9Gb01Od1bvPmjnsMo=/0x0:1280x720/1280x0/images/La-viere-une-boisson-hybride-entre-biere-et-vin-1492141.jpg)
Yes, it's a mix of beer and wine. Saw the ads on the métro. :hmm: I am not exactly excited.
Quote from: Duque de Bragança on April 20, 2023, 08:21:26 AMQuote from: Admiral Yi on April 19, 2023, 06:52:58 PMI'm very supportive of AOC issues but this is a ridiculous ruling. It's a marketing tag line, like saying this tshirt is the Cadillac of tshirts. You have to be an idiot to think Miller was pretending High Life was double fermented sparkling wine.
Could also be the Belgians sending a message by proxy about false trappist stuff. :hmm: :tinfoil:
Different marketing regulations I guess.
QuoteOn a different note, I'm surprised there is any market at all for High Life in Europe. It's a reasonable overfizzed American lager, and I drank a lot of it in high school, but of all the beers in the world this one does give you the nastiest wino breath.
Cool label though.
I don't there is, it's completely unknown over here and I don't see it changing.
As for marketing tag lines and real genericised drinks, take a look at this:
(https://images.bfmtv.com/OtJ7gWG2OI9Gb01Od1bvPmjnsMo=/0x0:1280x720/1280x0/images/La-viere-une-boisson-hybride-entre-biere-et-vin-1492141.jpg)
Yes, it's a mix of beer and wine. Saw the ads on the métro. :hmm: I am not exactly excited.
You don't have to purchase everything you see in ads.
Quote from: garbon on April 20, 2023, 08:34:13 AMYou don't have to purchase everything you see in ads.
You don't have to bitching so much, bitch. Was your alcohol-flavored sweet sparkling grape juice that bad or what?
Who said I was going to purchase everything? Furthermore, based on ads? :lol:
But then garbonites must be garbonites, I guess.
PS: Besides, ads mentioned a tasting event festival, to lure people in.
Someone must have peed on Duque's AOC Nutella sandwich this morning :lol:
Quote from: Jacob on April 20, 2023, 10:03:38 AMSomeone must have peed on Duque's AOC Nutella sandwich this morning :lol:
:x
Nutella is garbonite-level crap!
Quote from: Jacob on April 20, 2023, 10:03:38 AMSomeone must have peed on Duque's AOC Nutella sandwich this morning :lol:
:lol:
Quote from: Duque de Bragança on April 20, 2023, 08:45:05 AMQuote from: garbon on April 20, 2023, 08:34:13 AMYou don't have to purchase everything you see in ads.
You don't have to bitching so much, bitch. Was your alcohol-flavored sweet sparkling grape juice that bad or what?
Who said I was going to purchase everything? Furthermore, based on ads? :lol:
But then garbonites must be garbonites, I guess.
PS: Besides, ads mentioned a tasting event festival, to lure people in.
Oh, of course. You are that übermensch immune to ads.
Quote from: garbon on April 20, 2023, 12:02:45 PMQuote from: garbon on April 20, 2023, 08:34:13 AMYou don't have to purchase everything you see in ads.
Oh, of course. You are that übermensch immune to ads.
:yawn:
Make up your mind, bitch.
:yawn:
From a Hungarian journalist - looks like the Commission and Hungary have reached a deal to unlock most of the frozen EU spending in Hungary. Subject to political approval at the Council:
QuoteKatalin Halmai
@eublogo
According to various sources, the @EU_Commission & the Hungarian government have reached a conditional agreement on the judicial reform that would allow the release of cohesion funds due to #Hungary in 2021-2027. The deal still has to be approved at political level, @nepszava writes 2/1
The final agreement would unlock €13 billion out of 22 billion. The release of the 6.3bln blocked in the #RuleOfLaw procedure and the 2.5bln frozen for violations of fundamental rights is subject to further conditions, but the #Orban government is in no hurry to meet them 2/2
:bleeding:
I don't even need to know the details to know Orban won this one then. There is NO way he'd agree to anything restricting his absolute powers in any meaningful ways, and if he is not curtailed the EU funds will continue to be used to further cement and maintain his grip on the country. Way to go EU, financing a Russian agent among your ranks.
I hope someone in the Council vetoes this.
Quote from: Zanza on April 24, 2023, 10:22:02 AMI hope someone in the Council vetoes this.
More likely they're trying to figure out how to repeat this on EU wide scale.
Quote from: Crazy_Ivan80 on April 24, 2023, 10:58:24 AMQuote from: Zanza on April 24, 2023, 10:22:02 AMI hope someone in the Council vetoes this.
More likely they're trying to figure out how to repeat this on EU wide scale.
I guess it is just your knee-jerk anti-EU stance, but that does not even make any sense here. Neither removing non-existent sanctions nor establishing an authoritarian regime on an EU-wide scale is something people try to figure out...
Quote from: Zanza on April 24, 2023, 12:27:08 PMI guess it is just your knee-jerk anti-EU stance,
Nah, that's me being cynical and not overly enamoured with people who have too much power for their own good.
You put way too much trust in politicians. Those people have a lot of power and play around with a lot of money. You don't ascend to that level if you have no desire for power and money. We also know that absolute power corrupts absolutely.
That Hungary's slide towards autocracy needs to be countered: obviously. That it's not easy: obviously.
But that doesn't mean that the commission and EP aren't also sliding towards authoritarianism in their own way.
All of that is rather different from being knee-jerk anti-EU.
QuoteYou don't ascend to that level if you have no desire for power and money
Indeed. This I have learned through some family members' time in local council politics. They only needed one ruthless power-hungry bastard (such as the mayor) to poison the whole thing and see several decent people chased out and those who stayed see their health ruined as their opposition to individual policies countered with vicious personal attacks and a desire to destroy them politically (for the magnificent goal of ruling small town politics).
I can only imagine what must be going on behind the scenes when there is actual meaningful power to be gained. But I am sure anyone who doesn't turn into a vicious cynical bastard despite whatever intentions they started with, gets eaten alive.
I feel sorry for you two having such a negative view of other humans. Must be really depressing. :hug:
Quote from: Zanza on April 25, 2023, 11:43:05 AMI feel sorry for you two having such a negative view of other humans. Must be really depressing. :hug:
Not humans. Politicians. :contract:
Quote from: Josquius on April 25, 2023, 02:20:54 PMNot humans. Politicians. :contract:
What a profoundly anti-democratic attitude.
There's been lots of reports form human rights groups of how migrants are handled in the Med, with a lot of allegations against the Greek government especially. A report on one incident by the NYT (with footage) which is incredibly grim:
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/19/world/europe/greece-migrants-abandoned.html?smid=url-share
QuoteGreece Says It Doesn't Ditch Migrants at Sea. It Was Caught in the Act.
Video evidence shows asylum seekers, among them young children, being rounded up, taken to sea and abandoned on a raft by the Greek Coast Guard.
The head of Frontex (awarded honours by the Greek government) resigned last year - https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-border-agency-fabrice-leggeri-resigns-watchdog-probe-findings-released-misconduct/ - and has been replaced so hopefully there'll be some pressure on this.
I've mentioned it before but I feel like there needs to be more concern/coverage about some of what's going on in Greece right now. They're the country with the biggest fall in Europe in media freedom indexes in recent years (more than Hungary or Poland). It feels like a lot of the restrictions on media, clampdowns on NGOs (particularly those working with migrants) and the repeated evidenced reports of pushbacks and worse have been happening without much attention from the rest of Europe.
There's an election tomorrow and while Syriza have narrowed the gap it still looks far more likely that the ND government will be re-elected.
It's a report from the Serbian side of the Hungarian border (which is also an ethnic Hungarian region hence the Hungarian place names and such) from an independent news site (so not Orban propaganda). They were looking into reports of a steadily escalating situation near the border with migrants and especially the traffickers. Apparently firefights (likely between rival trafficker bands) are becoming regular and the locals find efforts by the authorities to be lacklustre and pointless.
It's in Hungarian of course but Google Translate might be able to make sense of it: https://telex.hu/kulfold/2023/08/27/migracio-vajdasag-embercsempesz-hajdujaras-szerbia
Can Google translate make sense of Hungarian?
It's come a long way if so.
Quote from: Josquius on August 27, 2023, 01:38:09 PMCan Google translate make sense of Hungarian?
It's come a long way if so.
English to Hungarian at least has come a LONG way.
Said before but I'm still a big fan of the German Greens and think Habbeck (of the energiewende) seems particularly impressive, and it strikes me that he's right here too:
QuoteNoah Barkin
@noahbarkin
German Economy Minister Robert Habeck's speech to ambassadors today is worth a listen. He goes where Scholz has never dared:
- Trade & investment is now geopolitical
- The unwinding of globalisation is unlikely to reverse
- Europe may need to choose between the US & China
I think that's all true - he also noted that in the European context they needed to start thinking about "outbound controls as part of our policy toolbox so as to ensure that strategic know-how is not being transferred abroad through foreign investments", which seems clearly directed. I hope that already exists and he means something more intensive because if that's not been a thing in Europe until now, we're maybe a little bit too late.
But all seems to reflect the world we're in (increasingly) and hopefully he won't just be a Cassandra.
Freeland has been staking out a similar position as well, it seems.
The energywende being a failure of course because they shut down their nucleair plants...
Quote from: Crazy_Ivan80 on September 07, 2023, 12:57:40 AMThe energywende being a failure of course because they shut down their nucleair plants...
I don't know about failure. Just like Brexit it has done what it set out to do.
Quote from: Crazy_Ivan80 on September 07, 2023, 12:57:40 AMThe energywende being a failure of course because they shut down their nucleair plants...
... without having a replacement and before ending coal. For which you have to blame mainly the conservatives, e.g. Habeck's predecessor Altmayer. I guess they figured cheap Russian gas would do the trick.
Yeah and the reason I mention it with Habeck is that it is the policy which he has been delivering while keeping the lights on after Russia turned off the (gas) taps, which I think is pretty impressive.
It's not great from a climate perspective at the minute but I think he's been really effective on energy in the last 18 months.
Quote from: Zanza on September 07, 2023, 02:40:31 AMQuote from: Crazy_Ivan80 on September 07, 2023, 12:57:40 AMThe energywende being a failure of course because they shut down their nucleair plants...
... without having a replacement and before ending coal. For which you have to blame mainly the conservatives, e.g. Habeck's predecessor Altmayer. I guess they figured cheap Russian gas would do the trick.
True, doesn't change the fact that the green opposition to nuclear is dogmatic rather than ecological. Especially with the amount of electricity that will be needed at all times if electrification continues to rise.
Is this still an issue, as it's a bit unclear to me as there's a lot of mist and fog in the sea off the coast here.
Quote from: Crazy_Ivan80 on September 07, 2023, 05:00:28 AMTrue, doesn't change the fact that the green opposition to nuclear is dogmatic rather than ecological. Especially with the amount of electricity that will be needed at all times if electrification continues to rise.
Agreed, shutting down the existing plants before their "natural end" is a silly policy.
Still not convinced that there will be a nuclear renaissance anywhere, so I doubt that nuclear will contribute meaningfully to the increased electrification.
So is it a coincidence that in the weeks before the Slovakian election, illegal border crossings to there increased significantly, to the degree that Czechia and Austria re-instituted border checks a week or so ago, and now Slovakia has introduced them on their border with Hungary?
Or, more likely, this is linked to Hungary releasing a lot of human traffickers from jail a couple of months ago, and that Orban's ally needed this "crisis" to win?
Not sure as I thought Fico had basically been leading in the polls all year?
On Hungary though I saw yesterday that the Commission is considering unlocking funding suspended over rule of law in eschange for Hungary's approval on movements around accession for Ukraine and the next EU budget (again particularly around aid for Ukraine).
A Commission source said the funds are an "incentive for reform" by Orban and they weren't sure that the Commission "will or can move" on those funds without "movement" on reform by Hungary. I'm less confident (not least because they're briefing this story at all) :bleeding:
I knew the relationship between Michel and VDL was bad and pretty dysfunctional (I'm very much team VDL). But just saw that they're both visiting Washington next week and have separate individual meetings with Biden :lol: :blink:
All politicians have an ego etc but I don't even understand how they can have ended up in that situation.
Do we even really need the EU Council Presidency? I feel this could be organized by bureaucrats and the agenda could be set by the rotating presidency.
I basically agree. I don't think the role has lived up to what it was supposed to when it was created in the constitutional treaty/Lisbon.
I also think it suffers from a little bit of the title inflation/prestige that is a thing in the EU (e.g. the "Five Presidents' Report" :lol:). I also (and I have no basis for this) get the sense that Michel is prickly about that sort of thing. I always remember the meeting with Erdogan when there's only one big seat for the EU and then basically an aide's seat - and lots of people complained about Erdogan being sexist for that. That's not how I read it as I think it was a power-play by Erdogan but the sexist/unacceptable behaviour was Erdogan who absolutely raced to get into the big seat ahead of VDL. There's also been other events where I think his behaviour is not great/very much about him.
I think Tusk was very good but maybe that's what it needs is a serious figure from a big country and that won't happen often (especially as I think many would prefer to get a good Commission role). Instead we've had Michel who's a single term Belgian PM and van Rompuy who took the job after one year as PM of Belgium. I get that Benelux politicians are very good at coalition building/deal making so can be effective in EU roles, but if that's what the role actually is I'm not sure it adds much.
From the American presidential election thread:
Quote from: Sheilbh on October 27, 2023, 02:27:22 PMI think in France it's more staying at home not turning out for a republican front in the second round. Although if you are a voter who cares aboutsome cultural issues and migration etc on the left - then Macron's Interior Minister has accused Le Pen of being "soft on Islam" and has tried to outflank her. So if those are your big issues, it is more difficult to justify.
This is a danger - which I think is quite common in the Eurozone because of the fiscal rules - of not providing alternatives within the mainstream. Kicking out the bums is a really core democratic principle and if you basically wipe out the centre left and centre right and just have one super-party, it may help consolidate support against the extremes for a while.
But at some point there'll be a change election and the only alternatives will be the radical right or left. I think it's a danger of that sort of "grand coalition" politics is that the only place from which you can oppose is with the extremes. It can work for a while in a response to a specific set of circumstances but is dangerous if it becomes the norm. You always need meaningful choice and difference for voters.
Yeah I agree.
In Denmark, for the last many decades the government was always either a centre-right to rightwing coaltion (blue block) or centre-left to leftwing coalition (red block). There were some common things, but many other things were up for grabs and how far the gov't went left or right depended on the constellation of coalition parties making the government (and a whole bunch of horse trading). To me, at least, it seemed like there were real choices to be made - voting far left or far right had a good shot at increasing the quotient of policies you liked; and same for voting centre right or left.
Now there's a government "across the middle" consisting of the bigger centre-right and centre-left parties, as well as a "moderate" party that's split from the centre-right one. And the parties on the left and right flanks have no real chance of getting into government unless those centre parties decide. So there's a strong sense of there not being many alternatives available... which I think is driving anti-politician sentiment significantly.
On this I think a lot about Peter Mair's point in Ruling the Void that the role of parties is really important in this. The social infrastructure that used to surround and maintain European mass parties - unions, churches, social clubs etc - withered and, then, so did the parties. But the parties politically served a really important role - in creating a place where citizens and political elites were able to meet and interact. But also the parties represented distinct, specific constituencies within society and their interests. That mean, broadly speaking, that when they won they would advance the agenda and interests of a specific, grounded group that politicians knew through their party. As the infrastructure and party has gone those politicians don't have that grounding but also don't really have accountability to their core constituency.
He argues that it is tied to politicians and parties no longer trying to represent a specific interest in society, but instead to position themselves as speaking for everyone (which is, of course, impossible). What that practically means is that their grounding is the media and comms because that is their constituency. And in its own way it inadvertantly paves the way for populism because instead of a party representing labour interests and unions, or established social institutions and capital - they both ultimately claim to speak for "the people" in their own way. I always think Blair is the most extreme at this with his line that the goal of New Labour was to become the political wing of the British people. But because they are all competing for that same media and comms constituency - they increasingly present similiarly and have a similar and constrained worldview in terms of policy. But also not representing a specific group in society means the vote is less reliable - as I say in Europe the trend is not entrenching polarisation but unprecedented volatility.
I also think in a UK context there is something about the class background of politicians mainly having gone to university etc compared with decades ago when the unions especially were a route into politics of working class people who'd worked their entire lives. I'm not sure if it's similar in the rest of Europe. But I think it's why Angela Rayner comes across so well and does really well in focus groups (even unprompted) is because she left school pregnant at sixteen with no qualifications, she was a single mum living in a council flat and working for the local council in social care. She got vocational qualifications in social care and British Sign Language and became active in her union. It's a very different background than most politicians and I think people like her for that - there is a grounding in a real experience there.
But I generally think a lot about Peter Mair's Ruling the Void (he died before completing it) on the "hollowing of Western democracy" which is basically Europe focused. He describes a mutual withdrawal by citizens and political elites - so the governed and the governors. He initially wrote about these ideas in 2006 was that there was growing disaggregation of democracy's popular and constitutional sides and broadly the triumph of democracy in the post Cold War was also accompanied by the downgrading and limiting of the popular part of democracy. His argument, ultimately was that the victory in that form was causing problems of representative legitimacy for the new political elites/governors. And the resulting gap between citizens and politics, as well as, in his view, a legitimacy crisis would fuel a response at both popular and elite levels. At the popular level it would populist mobilisation because the political class itself would become a political issue; on the elite level it would increase demands for more non-majoritarian (or non-democratic) decision making and more role for non-partisan, non-political bodies: judges, regulatory bodies, central banks, international organisations etc (which would also incidentally provide employment if the populist mobilisation overwhelmed them). I don't think it has a treatment proposed or how to solve it - and I don't know if we can - but I think the processes he describes are very true.
Separately that is, incidentally, my major hesitation with PR over FPTP. I think it boils down to when political decisions are made and by who, and accountability for them. In FPTP generally (I know the last couple of elections in Canada have been a bit of an exception), the party that wins the most votes will be able to form a government with a sufficient majority to pass the manifesto they presented to voters. If they disappoint or they fail or their manifesto actually delivers dreadful results, it is relatively easy to then kick them out. PR is more representative but the electoral manifesto for voters is then only a platform for coalitions negotiations by politicians and - depending on the system - it can be very difficult to get rid of them.
I've mentioned Mark Rutte before - who is leaving office at the next election (and might become NATO SecGen). For a number of years he's had the second lowest approval rating in the EU, after Macron. His party consistently win about 20% and he's been PM for 13 years because he's really good at coalition building/negotiations. So he starts in a coalition with Christian Democrats and Geert Wilders, then his second term is with the Labour party, then his third term is a grand coalition with social liberals, Christian Democrats and some very socially conservative Christian Democrats - which is then the same basis for his fourth term. As a voter you don't necessarily know what you're going to get and even though he's one of the most unpopular leaders in Europe it's really difficult to get rid of them :lol: I think a higher threshold - as in Germany - would help with that. Similarly I quite like the typical approach in some countries - I think Israel does this quite regularly - of coalition negotiations basically happening before the election so people know what they'll get and have a choice rather than so much power going to the party leaders after an election.
You'll have seen Orban is blocking Ukrainian membership due to their language rules oppressing the Hungarian minority.
My first impression was this seemed fair enough. Orban may have the wrong intentions but this complaint seems valid enough. Ukraines recent laws targeted against Russian are a bit dodgy and it's not unexpected they might hit other minority languages by mistake.
And its not like this is a reform that would completely derail Ukraines chances. Easy enough for them to change when they can set their mind to peaceful matters again.
Read an interesting explanation today though. Turns out... It's not a broken clock being right twice a day. It's just orban being orban.
It's not that he cares about the Hungarian minority in Ukraine being oppressed too much... It's that he's pissed about not being able to oppress minorities in Hungary and wants EU minority language rules destroyed.
Quote from: Josquius on November 11, 2023, 03:18:31 AMYou'll have seen Orban is blocking Ukrainian membership due to their language rules oppressing the Hungarian minority.
My first impression was this seemed fair enough. Orban may have the wrong intentions but this complaint seems valid enough. Ukraines recent laws targeted against Russian are a bit dodgy and it's not unexpected they might hit other minority languages by mistake.
And its not like this is a reform that would completely derail Ukraines chances. Easy enough for them to change when they can set their mind to peaceful matters again.
Read an interesting explanation today though. Turns out... It's not a broken clock being right twice a day. It's just orban being orban.
It's not that he cares about the Hungarian minority in Ukraine being oppressed too much... It's that he's pissed about not being able to oppress minorities in Hungary and wants EU minority language rules destroyed.
Ok, defending Orban causes me physical pain, but that is not true. There is no ethnic minority in Hungary substantial enough to worth oppressing from a political/powerplay point of view except gypsies and they have been plenty disadvantaged already without the EU interfering. Minority language use is an absolute non-issue within the borders of Hungary.
That doesn't mean of course that Orban genuinely cares about the Hungarians in Ukraine (even though yes, they have been collateral damage in the cultural war between Ukrainians and Russians since 2014). Rather, their blight (which can be argued just how bad actually is, but certainly they are not in a good or EU-compatible situation) is a very useful excuse for him to continue being anti-Ukraine and coerce concessions for every little ground he gives on that.
Incidentally, Orban will be doing another round of "national consultation" it's a now long-established practice of loaded (to put it mildly) questions presented to the populace to mail in their feedback. It's along lines of "Some people think Hungarian families should be protected and supported. Others want to take away family support and give it to illegal immigrants. Which do you prefer?" So anyway, one of the questions will be if you support Ukraine's EU membership and government ministers already are talking it up like "If Ukraine joins the EU, Hungary loses all EU grants" etc. Just limitless scumbaggery.
In fairness on that question - it is probably true. I think this is the side of the EU needing to transform in order to accept Ukraine. It's a very agricultural country and also a lot poorer than the rest of Europe. Both the CAP and cohesion represent about a third each of the EU's total budget at around €600-700 billion.
Estiates are that Ukraine would, from both, receive something like €200-300 billion. I think at the minute the net contributors are France, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands - everyone else is a net recipient. Many of those net recipients would become net contributors if Ukraine joins - absent significant reform of the EU. Don't know about Hungary though - Hungary is one of the top recipients (ahead of Bulgaria!) which seems odd as it's definitely a converging economy that's done better than some others who receive less. Which suggests, if nothing else, Orban is good at European politics.
Sometimes, just sometimes, I get where eurosceptics are coming from.
Big thing euroskeptics always fail to notice/willfully ignore is that funding for poorer countries isn't forever.
Look at the current Eastern members and many are gaining on the west fast.
But yes. Cap needed reform anyway but Ukraine furthers this
Also worth noting even as things stand today the net recievers becoming net contributers thing is a bit overblown. Many are net recievers of only a small amount. Doesn't take much to nudge them.
Quote from: Tamas link=msg=1424791Ok, defending Orban causes me physical pain, but that is not true. There is no ethnic minority in Hungary substantial enough to worth oppressing from a political/powerplay point of view except gypsies and they have been plenty disadvantaged already without the EU interfering. Minority language use is an absolute non-issue within the borders of Hungary.
That doesn't mean of course that Orban genuinely cares about the Hungarians in Ukraine (even though yes, they have been collateral damage in the cultural war between Ukrainians and Russians since 2014). Rather, their blight (which can be argued just how bad actually is, but certainly they are not in a good or EU-compatible situation) is a very useful excuse for him to continue being anti-Ukraine and coerce concessions for every little ground he gives on that.
Incidentally, Orban will be doing another round of "national consultation" it's a now long-established practice of loaded (to put it mildly) questions presented to the populace to mail in their feedback. It's along lines of "Some people think Hungarian families should be protected and supported. Others want to take away family support and give it to illegal immigrants. Which do you prefer?" So anyway, one of the questions will be if you support Ukraine's EU membership and government ministers already are talking it up like "If Ukraine joins the EU, Hungary loses all EU grants" etc. Just limitless scumbaggery.
I'm seeing a sizable German minority on Wikipedia?
And yes. The roma.
Sigh on those dumb referenda. Such a cheap trick but they get away with it.
Quote from: Josquius on November 11, 2023, 03:04:22 PMBig thing euroskeptics always fail to notice/willfully ignore is that funding for poorer countries isn't forever.
Look at the current Eastern members and many are gaining on the west fast.
But yes. Cap needed reform anyway but Ukraine furthers this
You're paying Hungary to slap you in the face :P
And while I get the feel good nature of letting Ukraine in, you really shouldn't until they meet criteria.
Quote from: HVC on November 11, 2023, 03:09:41 PMQuote from: Josquius on November 11, 2023, 03:04:22 PMBig thing euroskeptics always fail to notice/willfully ignore is that funding for poorer countries isn't forever.
Look at the current Eastern members and many are gaining on the west fast.
But yes. Cap needed reform anyway but Ukraine furthers this
You're paying Hungary to slap you in the face :P
And while I get the feel good nature of letting Ukraine in, you really shouldn't until they meet criteria.
I wish hungary could be kicked out and I don't support Ukraine entering until meeting the criteria?
Ok, glad we agree :unsure:
Quote from: HVC on November 11, 2023, 03:09:41 PMAnd while I get the feel good nature of letting Ukraine in, you really shouldn't until they meet criteria.
Yeah - plus the EU will need fundamental reform.
In part because of how big and agricultural Ukraine is. But also because of how poor it is, which I think is under-appreciated. Even if we set aside the reconstruction needs Ukraine's per capita GDP is around the level of, say, Vietnam or Indonesia or Egypt. The current EU model is not built for that and even the experience of the EU 10 or Romania and Bulgaria are not close.
Ukraine needs reform to meet the criteria, I think the EU needs reform to be built in a way where it can accept Ukraine.
This failure is a choice made by European leaders. I think in the UK there were very good reason the Tories were right to oust Johnson but there has been a shift in Ukraine policy as a consequence - Sunak (and I suspect Starmer) are happy to be in the pack of countries supporting Ukraine while I think Johnson always wanted to be bolder and we would have been.
But more generally I just don't understand why we still haven't ramped up production. It's crazy. We've given loads of arms to Ukraine, without ramping up production meaning we've accidentally disarmed ourselves and aren't giving the Ukrainians enough to fight back properly. This is why I slightly sympathise with the Poles that they've given Ukraine everything they can out of their existing stocks, but they're doubling defence spending and need to arm themselves first - there is at least a policy there as opposed to wishful thinking.
Also to be super clear - the target and timeline is not the problem here <_<
QuoteArtillery blame game hits Brussels over the million shell pledge to Ukraine
The idea of setting a hard target and timeline is under fire.
By Laura Kayali, Jacopo Barigazzi, Stuart Lau and Caleb Larson
November 14, 2023 10:08 am CET
BRUSSELS — Critics of the EU target of supplying 1 million artillery shells to Ukraine by March — which is increasingly unlikely — have been skeptical since day one.
Now, as EU defense ministers gather in Brussels, the blame game is on.
"We have to assume that the 1 million will not be achieved," German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said at the start of Tuesday's summit of EU defense ministers.
When the idea was launched last March, there were worries that it was unwise to put a specific figure linked to a deadline for the ammunition pledge if there was the slightest doubt about the bloc's ability to hit that target.
"The question of whether 1 million was ever realistic was actually the right one," Pistorius added. "There have been voices that have said, 'Be careful. One million is easy to decide, the money is there, but the production has to be there.' Unfortunately, those voices are now right."
The initiative came from Estonia in response to Kyiv's desperate plea for enough ammunition to counter Russia's grinding offensive.
That's not to say that it's been a complete failure; 300,000 rounds have been shipped since February 9 under a program to send shells from national stockpiles to Ukraine. But officials have increasingly poured cold water on reaching the million mark in just four more months. On Friday, a senior EU diplomat said the goal was "very ambitious" to begin with.
Diplomats and some ministers put the blame on Europe's production capabilities. "Even a decision on the war economy, from which I expressly distance myself, will not lead to production starting up tomorrow or being able to cover the demand," Pistorius said.
However, senior Commission officials pointed to a lack of national contracts and of ammunition suppliers selling shells to countries besides Ukraine.
Exports and contracts
One way of ensuring the 1 million target is met would be for defense firms to focus on sending more ammunition to Ukraine and exporting less to other countries, the EU's foreign and security policy chief Josep Borrell said.
He questioned the claim that the Continent's defense production capacity has reached the upper limit.
"Keep in mind the European defense industry is exporting a lot — about 40 percent of the production is being exported to third countries," he told reporters before chairing the defense ministers' meeting. "So it's not a lack of production capacity; it is that they send their products to [other] markets. So maybe what we have to do is to try to shift this production to the priority one, which is Ukrainians."
As for Internal Market Commissioner Thierry Breton, he's putting the blame on capitals. The EU's ammunition target will be met if governments sign contracts, he said.
"Ammunition production capacity increased by 20 to 30 percent. We're on target to increase our production capacity by spring, now it's a matter of member states placing the orders," he told reporters.
Breton said he has seen production increases in countries including Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary and Romania. Now it's up to capitals to place orders and to ensure that their arms industries make Ukraine a priority.
Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur announced his country on Friday launched what he called "the biggest procurement in Europe at this moment" — a contract for €280 million worth of 155 millimeter artillery ammunition.
"We sent the procurement offer to five European companies, so this money goes to European companies to produce 155," he told reporters ahead of the meeting. "This is the message to the industry: 'We've said many times that we need contracts, here they are.'"
Pistorius acknowledged "close coordination" with Europe's defense industries is a prerequisite to boosting production and procurement so that "projects can be realized more quickly."
"That's what matters now," he said. "But you can't influence time."
Borrell also underlined the importance of governments signing deals with arms producers.
"According [to] Commissioner Breton, the European industry has the capacity to produce 1 million shots a year. But it doesn't mean that we already have 1 million shots ready by March. So maybe we will not have 1 million by March," Borrell said. "But it will depend on how quickly the orders come to the industry and how quickly the industry reacts."
While aid to Ukraine was high on the Council meeting's agenda, defense ministers also approved new priorities for the EU's defense capabilities during a European Defence Agency steering board meeting.
Among the main lessons from Ukraine reflected in the new priorities are the importance of land forces and integrated air and missile defense. The war has also shown that quantity is as important as quality when it comes to equipment and ammunition.
This article has been updated.
The EU figures Borrell and Breton are absolutely right - it owuld be a rubicon but you can't help but feel that some form of common procurement might be a way around this. But I find this learned helplessness from some of those quotes unbearable. It's that Flanders line: we've tried nothing and we're all out of ideas. Especially given that it's normally accompanied by a general view that everything will basically be okay for Europe so it doesn't really matter.
I don't know why people haven't woken out of that or what it'll take to happen. I'm not sure Trump 2 will make any difference given that his first term didn't. There'll be furrowed brows, deep concern about the international rules based order expressed and think tank symposia - meanwhile China and the US ignore trade rules to ensure they have an advantage in AI and green tech etc, while Russia nibbles at the territory of sovereign European states - and every neighbouring despot realises they can get billions of funding by holding some migrants hostage and threatening to release them into Europe. It's very, very depressing :(
Not surprising though since Ukraine is an issue that requires more than just virtue-signalling and finger-wagging. The same with protecting our borders and pushing back the illegals to whence they came.
It requires balls and they don't have any.
Meaning that the Europeans are going to end up being the idiots playing by a rulebook everyone has almost thrown away.
So we don't care about the far-right Dutch guy winning the election, then?
Quote from: Tamas on November 23, 2023, 06:59:24 AMSo we don't care about the far-right Dutch guy winning the election, then?
https://languish.org/forums/index.php/topic,16777047.0.html
pffft
Obviously not just the EU, but Europe-wide - a very important project by the Guardian (with Süddeutsche Zeitung) on the unmarked graves of migrants along Europe's migrant routes:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2023/dec/08/revealed-more-than-1000-unmarked-graves-discovered-along-eu-migration-routes
Reminds me of the AP story trying to find the identity of migrants who'd died trying to get to Spain and washed up in the Caribbean.
Also another interesting, useful example of what the Guardian's doing with their European edition - really enjoyed their air pollution project too.
29k dead just this year. It's a terrible tragedy. Add the huge negative impact it has on European politics and it is just an all-round bad situation. And bound to get worse with climate change. :(
Clearly we just aren't treating foreigners enough like shit. More of the same is bound to solve things!
Looks like the PiS government in Poland is finally over and Tusk will now be elected. On the same day as Poland's constitutional court not accepting the supremacy of European law again. Let's see if Poland returns long term towards more a more pro-European policy.
Quote from: Zanza on December 11, 2023, 11:54:28 AMLooks like the PiS government in Poland is finally over and Tusk will now be elected. On the same day as Poland's constitutional court not accepting the supremacy of European law again. Let's see if Poland returns long term towards more a more pro-European policy.
Didn't the German supreme court had a similar ruling a few years ago?
No, the German constitutional court claimed that the ECJ acted outside its jurisdiction. It did not question the general supremacy of European law.
Looks like Donald Tusk is the new Prime Minister of Poland :cheers:
A mix of Donald Trump and Elon Musk. Yay?
Quote from: Tamas on December 11, 2023, 02:44:34 PMDidn't the German supreme court had a similar ruling a few years ago?
That's been the position of the German Constitutional Court for decades - this goes back to the 70s. But that's slightly separate from the recent case.
The German Constitutional Court's position is basically that the EU derives its legitimacy in relation to German through German constitutional arrangements and is subject to (in particular the limits and rights contained in) the German constitution. The CJEU position is that the EU treaties created a sui generis legal order which must - in order to be effective and meet the purpose of the treaties - be supreme over all domestic law, including constitutional law. From a UK perspective this was most clearly demonstrated when the CJEU confirmed that British courts could overrule Parliament in a conflict between domestic legislation and EU law (that is, Parliament is no longer sovereign), which British courts did, because EU law is supreme.
That's a long-running dispute which has so far never been pushed. The German Constitutional Court has basically always found that the EU's incremental growth in power is sufficiently in accordance with Germany's constitution that it doesn't need to exercise its right of review (which the CJEU doesn't acknowledge). So the question has never been forced. But, from my understanding, the position of the German courts is unique (we were only taught very briefly Germany, France, UK and Italy of differing approaches - so there may be other exceptions). As a matter of EU law, it is wrong.
The more recent ruling is slightly different because it was effectively saying the CJEU - as a matter of European law - was acting ultra vires. The CJEU extraordinarily issued a press release after this pointing out that the EU courts alone have the jurisdiction to rule, as a matter of European law, on what is and isn't ultra vires from any EU institution including the courts. It was a bit like the New York Supreme Court (or, perhaps more pertinently, the South Carolina Supreme Court) saying the US Supreme Court is acting beyond its powers in its ruling on Federal law or that it got Federal law wrong.
The German Constitutional Court is a highly respected and responsible institution - and it doesn't push it. But its decisions on EU law are wrong under EU law and if applied by other member states would lead to the disintegration of the EU. That is the reason that from the 60s (because this isn't in the treaties) the CJEU has asserted their sole jurisdiction over EU law and that EU law is supreme - because if each national court gets to decide what is or isn't within the scope of European law and what EU law means, it doesn't work.
QuoteLooks like Donald Tusk is the new Prime Minister of Poland :cheers:
I've always had a soft spot for him, so good to see. Although co-habiting with a hostile President and not enough votes to overturn vetoes so it may be a little constrained.
Quote from: The Brain on December 11, 2023, 03:08:17 PMA mix of Donald Trump and Elon Musk. Yay?
But somehow significantly better than the constituent parts.
@Sheilbh: You should not compare the ultra vires jurisdiction the German court claims with a state supreme court in the US.
In the US, the union is ultimately sovereign and the states are only sovereign within the limits of the US constitution, but not on their own. The ACW clarified that.
In the EU it is not that easy. The member states are still sovereign on their own, independent of the union. See Brexit. If they are sovereign, they obviously only transfer some of their sovereignty to the union. If the union institutions exceed the extent of that transferred sovereignty you get into the territory of the ultra vires review.
Now you know I am in favour of a real sovereign EU, but as it is, I see reason in ultra vires reviews.
It's not a perfect comparison, I accept. It's not a federal state, it's not all part of the same cohesive system - but I think that strengthen's the CJEU position that it is the court with jurisdiction over a sui generis legal order. And fundamentally that's the point - the German Constitutional Court has no jurisdiction to opine on the powers of the EU institutions as a matter of European law, anymore than the CJEU can rule on German Basic Law. They are different legal orders.
The CJEU is really clear on this and has been since the 60s - "the law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, could not, because of its special and original nature, be overriden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, without being deprived of its character as Community law and with the legal basis of the Community itself being called into question." There may be disputes over the power of the EU institutions within the legal order crated by the treaties - the sole courts with the power to decide are the European courts created by that legal order in the treaties, if all the courts are able to review that then Union/Community law disintegrates.
I absolutely accept the US comparison is imperfect - but...at the same time...the position of the German Constitutional Court on this is not a million miles from the nullification crisis where you have South Carolina saying the Federal government is acting unconstitutionally. Again if you just imagine what it would mean for European law if all 27 member state supreme courts in each respective constitutional order was entitled independently to decide: whether the transfer of power necessary to comply with EU law was in line with their constitution (which can be amended as in Hungary), or whether EU institutions (including the courts) are acting within the scope of their powers under EU law.
Total asied but one particular way the EU courts are different from the US is that they issue a single judgement (which can be a bit gnomic), they are always unsigned and are decided on a majority decision. I often wonder how it would be read if we had dissents, or if we knew that foundational decisions like Costa or Van Gend en Loos, which are key in creating the EEC, were decided 4-2. Especially as, in the early days, the court is really the engine of integration - what would that or European law look like if there were alternative legal theories of Europe rather than the authoritative (if sometimes cryptic) single voice?
Edit: Although worth flagging that the CJEU rulings on all of this is basically not based at all on the treaties. There is no provision that EU law is supreme or that the CJEU has exclusive jurisdiction. That is created by the CJEU as necessary to give effect to the treaties. Again it's an American comparison but it is, a bit like Marbury v Madison, a creative leap by the court that is necessary for the logic of the treaties.
Hungary set to get €10 billion that was frozen over corruption/rule of law. Decision by Commission but shortly after Macron-Orban meeting.
Not clear what EU is getting in return but presumably it unblocks Hungary on the various Ukraine decisions. Obviously official position is it's entirely unconnected - but that is, I imagine, a legalist fiction. There'll be some pablum to allow the funds to be unfrozen, but I imagine there's been a political deal (if you trust Orban to follow through - and I probably do to be honest, this is his MO after all).
What's the over under on orban renegging on whatever possible deal?
Not sure. In my line of work there's work done on cyber criminals who launch random ware attacks based on whether they'll return your data/systems largely unharmed if you pay them. And most do.
It's their business model so weirdl they need a reputation as trustworthy criminals. I feel like Orban is the same?
With the leeway he gets I feel like he can burn a few bridges before he has none left with europe. Putin would certainly punish him before the EU would in any regards.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PVUoQAtEUnU
Polish MP uses fire extinguisher to douse menorah in the parliament building. He later said it was a symbol of a Satanic religion and was told to leave the session of parliament.
So 10 billion euros unlocked for Hungary, 21 billion remains locked. Also the EU has authorised Orban the Hungarian state purchasing the Budapest airport.
EDIT: nice caricature. The text for the two pub-goers says "Look, without Brexit, I'd have thought this was a Guy Ritchie movie":
(https://assets.telex.hu/images/20231213/1702463008-temp-fOIplf_cikktorzs.jpg)
Quote from: Admiral Yi on December 13, 2023, 03:05:54 AMhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PVUoQAtEUnU
Polish MP uses fire extinguisher to douse menorah in the parliament building. He later said it was a symbol of a Satanic religion and was told to leave the session of parliament.
Amidst all the shit going down around Israel and the muddy waters the left often finds itself in, it is lovely to see some proper grade A old fashioned anti semitism for a change.
Quote from: Tamas on December 13, 2023, 12:37:40 PMSo 10 billion euros unlocked for Hungary, 21 billion remains locked. Also the EU has authorised Orban the Hungarian state purchasing the Budapest airport.
Can you explain to me why Orban campaigns on EU-phobia non-stop 24/7 but never campaigns on leaving the EU?
I understand the grift, corruption etc. But how do Hungarians reconcile the rhetoric that the EU is the Great Satan with never advocating for leaving it and always asking for more $$$?
As a rule people don't turn down free money, Satanic or otherwise.
Also I think he could argue that he's winning and support for his vision of Europe is growing - or that his politics (on migration especially, but I also think in a bit of a "civilisational turn") have really shaped the direction of travel for Europe in the last 13 years he's been in office.
Quote from: Sheilbh on December 13, 2023, 03:03:30 PMAlso I think he could argue that he's winning and support for his vision of Europe is growing - or that his politics (on migration especially, but I also think in a bit of a "civilisational turn") have really shaped the direction of travel for Europe in the last 13 years he's been in office.
You give him too much credit, I think, I wish we could blame Orban for that.
But why does Hungary need to be in the EU to do any of that?
Quote from: Zoupa on December 13, 2023, 02:39:48 PMQuote from: Tamas on December 13, 2023, 12:37:40 PMSo 10 billion euros unlocked for Hungary, 21 billion remains locked. Also the EU has authorised Orban the Hungarian state purchasing the Budapest airport.
Can you explain to me why Orban campaigns on EU-phobia non-stop 24/7 but never campaigns on leaving the EU?
I understand the grift, corruption etc. But how do Hungarians reconcile the rhetoric that the EU is the Great Satan with never advocating for leaving it and always asking for more $$$?
For the limited way Orban has tried to address this is that it makes economic sense for Hungary to stay. Which I guess is as much honesty as you'll ever get out of him.
Fair.
I don't really think he's to blame for those trends in Europe, he's just riding the same waves as everyone else.
Where I'd give him "credit" is that I think he is partly responsible for turning the radical and far-right from being anti-EU (the other part was Brexit :lol: :bleeding:). He's shown a way to use Europe to help achieve their goals and help mould it. I think before Orban a far-right/radical right EU was more or less unimaginable - I now think it's possible. I can imagine Le Pen, Meloni, Wilders, Orban etc meeting at the European Council, rotating Presidents etc shaping the agenda for Europe.
Quote from: Zoupa on December 13, 2023, 03:15:34 PMBut why does Hungary need to be in the EU to do any of that?
They get money and, from my understanding, Hungary is one of those countries that's very heavily integrated into, particularly German, European supply chains (I believe especially the CSU have deep business and political links). It'd be a catastrophe for them to leave.
Quote from: Zoupa on December 13, 2023, 03:15:34 PMBut why does Hungary need to be in the EU to do any of that?
1. Free money, as the Brain points out.
2. Hungary wields more power inside Europe than outside.
2A. The EU is a big player and EU decisions reach far beyond their borders. As a member, Hungary has more influnce on EU decisions than a non-member does.
2B. It makes Orban a more worthwhile ally for all sorts of other actors - inside or outside the EU. Countries inside the EU need to deal with him for the purposes of internal EU politics. Powers outside the EU may find Hungary the most amenable ally to influence events and get intel from inside the EU.
3. It's safer. Hungary is less vulnerable to being pressured by outside powers.
Guys, I know all this. I realize my question was not very clear. I guess it's not really a Hungary-specific question, more like a "how can the electorate keep selecting the absolute worst option in so many instances" kind of reflection.
I guess humans have a sky-high tolerance for hypocrisy or something.
Quote from: Sheilbh on December 13, 2023, 03:18:59 PMFair.
I don't really think he's to blame for those trends in Europe, he's just riding the same waves as everyone else.
Where I'd give him "credit" is that I think he is partly responsible for turning the radical and far-right from being anti-EU (the other part was Brexit :lol: :bleeding:). He's shown a way to use Europe to help achieve their goals and help mould it. I think before Orban a far-right/radical right EU was more or less unimaginable - I now think it's possible. I can imagine Le Pen, Meloni, Wilders, Orban etc meeting at the European Council, rotating Presidents etc shaping the agenda for Europe.
I think that was mainly Brexit though. It really shut the anti-EU crowd up in Europe.
Quote from: Tamas on December 13, 2023, 03:32:53 PMQuote from: Sheilbh on December 13, 2023, 03:18:59 PMFair.
I don't really think he's to blame for those trends in Europe, he's just riding the same waves as everyone else.
Where I'd give him "credit" is that I think he is partly responsible for turning the radical and far-right from being anti-EU (the other part was Brexit :lol: :bleeding:). He's shown a way to use Europe to help achieve their goals and help mould it. I think before Orban a far-right/radical right EU was more or less unimaginable - I now think it's possible. I can imagine Le Pen, Meloni, Wilders, Orban etc meeting at the European Council, rotating Presidents etc shaping the agenda for Europe.
I think that was mainly Brexit though. It really shut the anti-EU crowd up in Europe.
They saw how bad things can get when you leave? Or they just lost their most powerful voice?
Quote from: HVC on December 13, 2023, 03:38:21 PMThey saw how bad things can get when you leave? Or they just lost their most powerful voice?
UK goverments were never a powerful voice for the far right. Whether Labour or Tory they were the most reluctant for further integration, very hostile to anything that could undermine NATO's primacy on defence and very supportive of trade deals/liberalisation. Normally allied with the Dutch, the Nordics and sometimes Germany depending on the issues as they had similar-ish views.
They saw leaving was chaos which discredited any voice calling to leave or for referendums on it - so they adjusted. I also think part of it was that they saw you didn't need to just oppose, Orban showed how you could use the EU to further your agenda and shape it. There was a model which I don't think really existed before for the type of politics Orban represented. I think maybe the Kaczynskis tried but I don't think they actually managed much time in office - while Orban is now, I think, the longest serving EU leader.
Although I'd add that there is a degree of perceptions here and I think this will turn because reality always bears out. For all that chaos, in practical terms since either the referendum or actually leaving the UK's growth has been about average for Western Europe - about the same as France. Of course that is because many of the problems we have are actually broadly shared by most of the rest of Europe....
Quote from: Zoupa on December 13, 2023, 03:30:09 PMGuys, I know all this. I realize my question was not very clear. I guess it's not really a Hungary-specific question, more like a "how can the electorate keep selecting the absolute worst option in so many instances" kind of reflection.
I guess humans have a sky-high tolerance for hypocrisy or something.
Oh yes, we do.
I think some of it is maybe Hungary specific. The acts against the free media and creating difficulties for the opposition. I also think - and I could be wrong on this, Tamas will know - but the financial crisis really hit Hungary. They had to get the IMF in, large scale cuts, income falling etc - and since 2010 things have improved for the average Hungarian and Hungary is back to converging with Austria.
Again all of that, particularly for that type of economy, enabled by the EU.
I imagine there's about three voters in Hungary who think about the tension of that and Orban's position - and one of them posts here. For most people, from my understanding, life's got better in the last decade - their living standards have improved. It's maybe a bit like China or Putin's Russia (before the war) - there's a bit of results/output legitimacy.
True although it is very relative. A lot of people are in destitute poverty but paradoxically it seems many have experienced the switch from straight-out welfare payments to "communal work" (you are no longer entitled for unemployment benefits, rather you are employed by the local council for pittance, in a lot of ways becoming a neo-serf strata in service of the local noble mayor) as a positive thing. And in recent years any additional hardship (which has grown a lot since the high inflation) is blamed on pretty much everyone but Orban, thanks to the tireless efforts of the overwhelming media empire.
The so-called middle class has probably seen more genuine improvement, but for that feeling to persist they increasingly need to ignore the rotting of public services, education and healthcare in particular, both of which are in very dire states.
Also worth noting that at the first sign of a challenge (such as the last couple of years) the Orban system -built on feudal chains of loyalty instead of competence- is in trouble. The state budget has been in absolute shambles, I think this 10 billion will be a huge lifeline for Orban. Congrats to the EU for saving his skin.
Was the opposition forming a joint bloc not really effective at the last election? I thought that might work but then also got the sense the picked the worst possible frontman (I think something similaar happened in Turkey where the opposition united but picked the least charismatic/popular candidate :bleeding:).
Quote from: Sheilbh on December 13, 2023, 06:22:01 PMWas the opposition forming a joint bloc not really effective at the last election? I thought that might work but then also got the sense the picked the worst possible frontman (I think something similaar happened in Turkey where the opposition united but picked the least charismatic/popular candidate :bleeding:).
Ugh, that guy. I am going to cover that in the Hungarian thread in a bit
So Ukraine and Moldova can start negotiating to join the EU.
I guess we know what that 10 billion Euro to Hungary bought.
it would have been nice if the memberstates would also have placed massive orders for military equipment, so that we have a massive increase in capacity in 2024 rather than in 2402.
But bon, this is good news even if UA won't be joining in the next few decades. Since I'm pretty sure the enlargement won't be with a cyprus-scenario (country half occupied by invaders) we'll be seeing, in due time, the eviction of the Russians (ideally).
Now if the Ruspublicans in the US can stop being idiots for a bit (or maybe get beamed off world) we can get back to business making sure the rest of the world doesn't descend into war
Quote from: Jacob on December 14, 2023, 05:17:58 PMSo Ukraine and Moldova can start negotiating to join the EU.
I guess we know what that 10 billion Euro to Hungary bought.
Saw one reporter saying an EU diplomat described it as "easier than expected". Which presumably means Orban just accepted the bribe and let this get waved through as opposed to accepting the bribe, then forcing the EUCO to run until 5 am before letting it get waved through :lol:
Edit: And the way this works - he left the room at a pre-agreed time to allow unanimity:
QuoteViktor Orban was "momentarily absent from the room in a pre-agreed and constructive manner" when the decision was made.
So, essentially, the EU will stop Orban making a mockery of its values and rules as soon as there will be nothing left for him to obscure. In other words, after he dies.
Have you seen the size of his belly? The man is not long for this world.
Well, Austrian chancellor Nehammer seems quite happy to see Tusk. :D
https://packaged-media.redd.it/c06rr4bp5a6c1/pb/m2-res_720p.mp4?m=DASHPlaylist.mpd&v=1&e=1702641600&s=d854789a74bbe3b8daaf67da7cd67afedce9acee#t=0
Well, now we also know what 10 billion euros do NOT buy: from Orban's Twitter account:
QuoteSummary of the nightshift:
🚫 veto for the extra money to Ukraine,
🚫 veto for the MFF review.
We will come back to the issue next year in the #EUCO after proper preparation.
We can't kick Hungary out of the EU, but what we CAN do is recognize a Hungarian government-in-exile as the legitimate representative of Hungary, given the flagrant asshattery of the clearly illegal squatter in Budapest. :hmm:
I guess the fact that he has the Liberum Veto had really dawned on Orban. Bulgaria announced last month to introduce a punitive tax on Russian gas flowing through them which would have meant about a 25% hike for Hungary.
But the Hungarian "foreign minister" announced today that Bulgaria had withdrawn this bill. It's understood this is because Orban threatened to block their Schengen membership if they didn't.
Big deal on new immigration framework reached, details are peppered in here: https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2023/dec/20/eu-reaches-deal-on-migration-and-asylum-pact-live
To me it sounds significantly more strict, I think there are two provisions which will serve as fig leaf for turning almost everyone back: not letting asylum seekers (free access?) into EU territory until their applications are processed (Orban's mini concentration camps right on the Serbian border say hi) and having to process an application in 7 days or it is rejected automatically.
It also has more provisions for sharing the load, though.
So a much stricter framework. Needless to say, Hungary Orban opposed it but had no chance to veto it. Which just again shows that he is not anti-migration, he is anti-stability.
Which reminds me, I have seen reports that the unusual pressure from illegal border crossing of migrants into Slovakia in the weeks/months before the election has subsided significantly since Fico won. Orban can be a useful ally I guess.
Separately in Poland:
QuoteAlexandra von Nahmen
@AlexandravonNah
New Polish government sacks the heads of Polish state media. TVP info website is off, the channel apparently not broadcasting any more.
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GByYpPkWkAAkFkC?format=jpg&name=small)
Strikes me as one of the Popper-ish challenges. I'm not sure how politicised Polish state media was pre-PiS, I feel like it was a bit but not as much. But restoring the status quo before PiS/illiberal democrats, means using the same tools and asking people to believe that this is de-politicisation/restoring institutions or norms rather than just politicisation by the other side. Not sure there's an easy way out of it.
My instinct is one solution would be, as with policing, say, that you split out the operational from the strategic. Allow more politicisation of the strategic (with fixed terms and term limits for, say, directors/presidents of these bodies) but try to get all sides to agree on operational independence (subject to that strategic leadership).
It's the same with the courts - I don't know how you make changes that you need to without further politicising the judiciary.
Surely you judge by the results. If state TV never airs criticism of the government, or the courts always rule in their favor, then it looks like one set of yes men replaced by another.
Quote from: Admiral Yi on December 20, 2023, 08:06:10 AMSurely you judge by the results. If state TV never airs criticism of the government, or the courts always rule in their favor, then it looks like one set of yes men replaced by another.
Sure at an abstract and as an outsider - I have no doubt this is being done for different ends than it was by PiS.
But the means or process are the same. And I'm not sure that necessarily helps build legitimacy within Poland or, to an extent, legitimacy around process/input legitimacy.
I'm also not sure how, say, you justify a different position from the EU on rule of law. It would be right but the objection was in part around firing judges and court packing which you now need to do in order to unwind what PiS did.
What other choice do you have though, Sheilbh? Leave the absolutely, ridiculously pro-PiS crew in place and continue financing their efforts to subvert democracy with taxes?
Quote from: Tamas on December 20, 2023, 08:25:36 AMWhat other choice do you have though, Sheilbh? Leave the absolutely, ridiculously pro-PiS crew in place and continue financing their efforts to subvert democracy with taxes?
No, I basically agree. I'm not sure there is an alternative or a way out - it is, as I say, a bit Popper-ish.
The best I can offer is possibly to try and start a new principle that allows politicisation to some extent - strategic board v operational. Possibly try to set out a legislative framework based on primary law that goes through parliament rather than using the exact same executive/administrative tools. Try to build a new settlement in one way or other because there's a fruit of the poisonous tree issue?
But I think it's also the real risk around democracy and "institutions" is that so much depends on people's belief. Once the belief goes even, and perhaps particularly if, for good reason it seems really difficult/possibly impossible to recover/recreate. It's part of the reason cynicism can be corrosive in a democratic society.
It's the thing I always wonder about the US and I don't know how you get back.
Quote from: Zanza on December 11, 2023, 04:30:11 PM@Sheilbh: You should not compare the ultra vires jurisdiction the German court claims with a state supreme court in the US.
In the US, the union is ultimately sovereign and the states are only sovereign within the limits of the US constitution, but not on their own. The ACW clarified that.
In the EU it is not that easy. The member states are still sovereign on their own, independent of the union. See Brexit. If they are sovereign, they obviously only transfer some of their sovereignty to the union. If the union institutions exceed the extent of that transferred sovereignty you get into the territory of the ultra vires review.
Now you know I am in favour of a real sovereign EU, but as it is, I see reason in ultra vires reviews.
Incidentally on this fair to mention that literally today I just read something by Lord Sumption (former Supreme Court justice) arguing that fundamentally the British courts' approach were the same as the German Constitutional Courts (since at least 1974). I'm not entirely convinced and think it's a creative reading of the UK courts' approach but he is vastly cleverer than me and has forgotten more about this than I'll ever know.
But seemed worth flagging.
On Poland and the Popper problem:
QuotePolish culture minister says he will put state media into liquidation
By Alan Charlish
December 28, 20238:41 AM GMTUpdated 5 days ago
WARSAW, Dec 27 (Reuters) - Poland's culture minister has decided to put its state television, radio and news agency into liquidation, he said on Wednesday, deepening a dispute over the future of publicly- owned media after a momentous change in government.
A pro-European Union coalition headed by Donald Tusk took power in Poland this month and started an overhaul of state media institutions which critics say had become propaganda outlets during the nationalist Law and Justice (PiS) party's eight years in power.
The changes have drawn strong opposition from PiS, which says the new government has circumvented normal parliamentary procedure in implementing them.
Wednesday's move follows a decision by President Andrzej Duda, a PiS ally, to veto the new government's spending proposals for public media financing.
"Due to the decision of the President of the Republic of Poland to suspend financing of public media, I decided to put into liquidation the companies Telewizja Polska SA, Polskie Radio SA and Polska Agencja Prasowa SA," Bartlomiej Sienkiewicz said in a statement posted on social media platform X.
"In the current situation, such action will ensure the continued operation of these companies, carry out the necessary restructuring and prevent layoffs of employees in the above-mentioned companies."
He said that the state of liquidation could be withdrawn at any time by the companies' owner, which is the state.
PiS lawmaker Joanna Lichocka said in a post on X that "Tusk's government is destroying the Polish media".
"This is an act which damages the state," she added.
'TYPICAL AGGRESSOR '
Earlier in December the new government had taken state news channel TVP Info off air and dismissed executives from state media in what it said was a move designed to restore impartiality.
Media analysts and free speech activists say that under PiS, TVP did not act as the neutral news provider its charter says it should be but as a government mouthpiece.
However, PiS says that the new government's changes damage pluralism in the media by removing a conservative voice and that the means by which the changes were implemented, without a bill going through parliament, were not legal. Tusk's government rejects these claims.
On Saturday, Duda said that he was vetoing a bill which included 3 billion zlotys ($771 million) in financing for state media in light of the government's moves regarding public broadcasters.
The head of Duda's office on Wednesday accused Sienkiewicz of behaving like "a typical aggressor".
"This is proof of the complete powerlessness of the authorities, who have not found any legal way to change the authorities in these companies," Marcin Mastalerek wrote on X.
On Tuesday a body dominated by PiS designated a new television boss despite the current administration having appointed somebody else to the role.
I think it shows the challenge for Tusk. The President is still PiS and has veto power and PiS are still the largest party in the Sejm so the government doesn't have a large enough majority to override a veto. So going through parliamentary procedure and passing legislation to unwind the things PiS did or to re-found institutions is going to be challenging. Which means Tusk's government will probably do it through powers the state/executive has, like this.
It's worth noting that it's not just PiS raising issues with this. From my understanding the legal issue is that basically the government is using corporate law to do what it's doing with the state media companies because they are state owned companies, so they're just treating them like a company with the state as the owner. Basically because they can't make the changes they want to them either quickly enough (by changing personnel) or through legislation changing the laws that establish these media companies.
The Helsinki Foundation has put out saying it raises serious legal doubts. I saw a lawyer for the Stefan Batory Foundation (civil society group) say that while the current state media is impossible to defend that it's not clear how much of this is legal and that the comms have been bad so even if the "legal actions are dubious then at least a good narrative with a clear vision should have been prepared". The Prague Civil Society Center has also said it's raising many concerns. The Left who support the coalition (though aren't part of the coalition agreement or in government) have also said they're not sure this is legal - obviously from their perspective you don't just want the state using normal corporate law to make decisions about state corporations established by legislation.
I'd say you'll probably at some point (possibly out of the challenges to these actions) have a similar confrontation with the judiciary where there'll be a similar problem. It'll be difficult to unwind PiS' changes while Duda is President and it'll take a long time to actually make the change through personnel. It's like the challenge in the US with SCOTUS.
Maybe all of this is fine if you think PiS will never win an election again - but after the last election, they're still the largest party so it seems pretty likely to me they'll win and even if there's an anti-PiS President they'll have whatever happens now as precedent. And I always think in politics that it's worth considering how you'd feel if the boot was on the other foot because whatever is fair game for your side to do will be done by the other side too. The other particular challenge for Tusk is that I think he promised to fix the media in one day which was probably never possible, but that also reflects, I think, the impatience of his supporters/anti-PiS voters to see something happen (again can't help but think of Trump) - you can either meet that demand and make things happen quickly through dubious leglity, or follow normal procedure (change personnel over time, win the Presidential election in 2025) which will disappoint your base.
But as I say I think it's the wider Popper challenge of how do you defend (or in this case, to an extent, restore) a liberal order against its opponents without resorting to illiberal means that they could use against you (especially as, bad as PiS are, they're not inter-war fascist or communist bad).
As before, I don't care what the armchair legalising people are concerned with here. As tbe presidents veto of the TV budget shows, PiS has no intention to play fair and they likely are willing to do what I have no doubt Orban would be ready to do if election defeat was still a possibility for him:burn the country down to collapse the government. Tusk I am sure needs to move and move fast to dismantle the anti-democratic power base before it dismantles him.
edit: nevermind, didn't realize how old the post I was responding to was.
Interesting piece in Politico on Delors' death that it marks the lack of a European "demos" - in European terms it's hard to think of a statesman who would be more deserving of state funeral etc. There have been articles everywhere (including the UK*) but he has been mourned really as a French figure, with a state funeral today. Slightly surprised that there was no EU flag at all. He is by some distance, still the most consequential Commission President and to a very large extent, even after Lisbon, the EU is still what he shaped in that decade. And still the Commission President all his successors are measured against.
*On the UK I think he's possibly the most important politician in the history of Britain's relationship with the EU. His speech at the TUC calling for the British left to support Europe and outlining the vision of a social Europe was seismic. The trade unions were traditionally the most Euro-sceptic bit of the left and that was already shifting, but by the end of his speech he had the delegates on their feet and singing "frere Jacques". He returned to address them agin in 1992. But to an extent that also shifted the approach of the left to the EU - as European law is supreme, it was a tool (and arguably the only one) for embedding change that no Tory parliament could undo with a simple majority.
It also transformed the right. Until then the EU had its strongest supporters on the right and Thatcher had just triumphed with the single market which was her - and their - vision of Europe as primarily an economic policy area (while Delors was a committed federalist and from the French Socialists). Thatcher responded within a fortnight with her (in)famous Bruges speech at the College of Europe which became the touchstone of the Eurosceptic right - against a social Europe (not pushed back the boundaries of the state at home to have them re-imposed by Europe), against any furthere integration, against any European "sovereignty" (or anything beyond NATO). Strikingly though, in a way, she had arguably a more ambitious pitch than Delors as she had a big (now very anachronistic section) talking about European civilisation and urging her audience not to focus on themselves and forget Europeans in Warsaw, Prague, Budapest ("great European cities").
Obviously he also proudly advocated federalism in a way I don't think any other big politician has - which made him a bit of a hate figure in the tabloid press (after Bruges and then, especially, after Thatcher was deposed primarily over Europe). Famously there was the Sun headline "Up Yours Delors" which he took well, saying very politely that he might not agree with the sentiment or tone but thought it was good that the UK had a grassroots debate on Europe which France didn't which was exceptionally diplomatic. And according to the rumours he was ultimately in favour of Brexit as he had thought but became, reportedly, more convinced of the need for a multi-speed Europe with a core that was fully committed to ever greater union and (he is French, after all) European sovereignty but with separate looser membership options for countries that weren't all in on that.
Ultimately though I suspect he will have ended slightly disheartened, in 1989 he said that "if we do not succeed with political union...then the historic decline of Europe which began with the First World War will resume". I think it is touching that he thought the historic decline of Europe had paused as opposed to precipitously continued - especially during the Cold War when we were divided (although this may point to the Delors-Thatcher contrast; he was very much a man of the Franco-German engine which defined his Europe, she was a Cold Warrior). But I don't think the political union has really advanced that significantly since the breakthroughs in his presidency - and even on his term, it's fair to say Europe's decline has resumed :(
It is amazing how completely unknown he is in the UK despite his pivotol role in completely upending British politics on Europe.
At the time he was - he was a front page news figure which I don't think has been the case for any subsequent President of the Commission.
But also, to an extent, it was a long time ago. He was President from 85-95. He had a seismic impact on Europe as a whole and I think was an important part in the great EU switcheroo in British politics.
The thing I found striking though was actually perhaps the absence of vision. You might agree or disagree with one or the other, you might want to mix and match. But I think there's something admirable - in a democracy - in Delors setting out his vision that so enraged Thatcher that she set out her alternative vision. That there was a dialectical, debating element about the future of Europe. Especially when you add that you also had Mitterrand and Kohl at the same time who also at different points spelled out views on Europe. There was a future being debated.
For all his faults it feels like the only European leader really still trying to do that is Macron - and, arguably and with far more faults, Orban.
Separately, but not a million miles away, Michel is going to stand down as President of the Council in order to run as an MEP (no doubt desperate to vote for a potential other VDL term :lol:).
Which doesn't really matter because if anything his time in office has shown how sort of pointless it is. But on the other hand it does matter because until a new President is appointed, the member state holding the rotating presidency takes up the position. When Michel leaves, that will be Orban :bleeding: So until there's a new appointment, that's who'll be responsible for chairing and agenda setting and (formally at least, practically it's VDL) representing the EU on the international stage.
I've said before but with some mistakes - and the Ukraine funding-budget thing was a big one - I think VDL has impressed. Michel far less so. I suspect he knew he was unlikely to get a second term and not sure about his chances in a return to domestic politics, so I suspect running as MEP was probably the best move purely from a career perspective.
Michel wasn't selected because he'd be effective, but because cause he'd be more or less inoffensive and actually ineffective.
Don't forget he comes from a country that can't manage anything and that's he's from the part that is de facto bankrupt.
Are the Flemtards feeling oppressed? Now's the time to ask your big idol Wilders to declare a special military operation.
Quote from: Zoupa on January 07, 2024, 06:47:54 PMAre the Flemtards feeling oppressed? Now's the time to ask your big idol Wilders to declare a special military operation.
Oh look, a francophone being clueless
Belgium: the Moldavia of Western Europe.
As there's a couple of stories on what's going on in the far right in Europe thought they'd be here. First the AfD meeting to discussion deportations with an even more extreme group.
I hadn't been aware of this but I saw that Alex Clarkson said this shouldn't necessarily be a suprise. Apparently, according to him, the AfD and FPO are both more closely tied to the really extreme like Sellner or other groups that were basically 20-30 years ago the skinhead wing of the far right. While they may not necessarily be further right than other far right parties in Europe - the milieu they operate in, the ties they have etc are among the most extreme in Europe - again I wasn't aware of that and don't know much about it:
QuotePoliticians from Germany's AfD met extremist group to discuss deportation 'masterplan'
Martin Sellner, member of the Identitarian Movement, reportedly spoke of 're-migration' ideas
Philip Oltermann in Berlin
@philipoltermann
Wed 10 Jan 2024 14.33 GMT
First published on Wed 10 Jan 2024 12.59 GMT
Politicians from Germany's far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party, including a personal aide to its leader Alice Weidel, met the head of the rightwing extremist Identitarian Movement and neo-Nazi activists to discuss a "masterplan" for mass deportations in the event of the party coming to power, it has been reported.
The meeting, which was first reported on Wednesday by the investigative outlet Correctiv, took place last November at a countryside hotel on the outskirts of Potsdam. It is likely to feed a fraught debate over whether the AfD should be banned due to growing concerns that it poses a fundamental threat to German democracy.
Buoyed up by discontent over immigration, the AfD is polling in first place in all five of Germany's eastern states, three of which are holding elections later this year. While both the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the liberal, pro-business Free Democratic party (FDP) have, for now, ruled out entering coalitions with the party, its presence at the meeting suggests a far-right organisation with its eye on political gains in the near future.
(https://i.guim.co.uk/img/media/5f39c10dcc0dd83ced0b443964b7a337bdcc60a3/0_246_6048_3628/master/6048.jpg?width=620&dpr=1&s=none)
Martin Sellner, a key figure in the pan-European 'New Right', who is banned from the UK, reportedly spoke about mass deportation at the Potsdam meeting. Photograph: Christian Bruna/EPA
Invitations seen by Correctiv and the Guardian describe the meeting as an opportunity to present "an overall concept in the sense of a masterplan". The meeting was attended not only by two state and municipal-level AfD politicians but also one active member of the Bundestag, Gerrit Huy, as well as Roland Hartwig, a former MP who has acted as a personal aide to Weidel since September 2022. One party branch of the AfD's has described Hartwig as being tasked with the party's "strategic positioning".
The AfD figures were meeting with Martin Sellner, who was tasked with introducing the "masterplan" and is a key figure in the pan-European "New Right" and who, in 2019, was permanently barred from entering the UK because of his extremist views. The Identitarian Movement, whose Austrian branch Sellner used to lead, openly opposes the idea of multicultural societies and expounds the conspiracy theory of a "great replacement" to replace Europe's white population with people from Africa and the Middle East.
The Identitarian Movement is on a list of organisations whose membership the AfD considers incompatible with party membership, and the party has denied ties to the movement in the past. However, in recent years the AfD has done little to distance itself from the activist network.
One key idea that Sellner has been trying to nudge into the political mainstream is "re-migration": the forceful return of migrants to their countries of origin via mass deportations. Such deportations would target not only asylum seekers but, as Sellner elaborated in a recent article for the New Right journal Sezession, also citizens holding German passports who, he claims, "form aggressive, rapidly growing parallel societies".
According to Correctiv's account, the explosive subject of "re-migration" apparently dominated the discussions between AfD politicians and rightwing extremist activists, with Sellner allegedly presenting the forcible extradition of "non-assimilated" German citizens as the biggest "challenge" if the AfD were to gain power.
(https://i.guim.co.uk/img/media/c286889542a7896d4a1e8b80272fe8b914759d27/0_0_7813_4690/master/7813.jpg?width=620&dpr=1&s=none)
An aide to Alice Weidel, the leader of AfD, was also said to be at the meeting. Photograph: Hannibal Hanschke/EPA
Ideas discussed at the meeting, according to Correctiv, included that of deportations to an unnamed state in northern Africa that would provide space for up to 2 million people. People who lobby on behalf of refugees in Germany could also go there, Sellner is reported to have suggested.
In a statement sent to the Guardian, Sellner confirmed he had presented the idea of "re-migration" at the meeting but said it was not about a "secret masterplan" and his comments had been shortened and taken out of context.
During the meeting, Sellner said, he had made it "unmistakably clear that no distinction can be made between different types of [German] citizens – that there must be no second-class citizens – and that all re-migration measures have to be legal".
"Remigration also includes not only deportations, but also local assistance, Leitkultur ['guiding culture'] and pressure to assimilate. The demand is part of an alternative migration and family policy, the aim of which is to control immigration so that it does not exceed Germany's reception limits."
Huy, the AfD Bundestag delegate, is reported to have claimed that she developed her own "re-migration" concept, and appeared to suggest her party no longer opposed the government's plan to lift a ban on dual citizenship for that reason. "Then you can take away the German [citizenship], and they still have one," she is alleged to have said at the meeting. Currently it is illegal under German law to strip people of citizenship if it means they would then become stateless.
In a phone call with the Guardian, Huy confirmed her attendance of the meeting and that the discussion of "re-migration" was on the agenda. "In 2017, I presented my party association chairman with plans for a re-migration programme for non-German nationals who can't find their way into the labour market, which were not picked up by the party," Huy said. "I still stand by those proposals."
Huy said she could not remember if plans for the removal of German nationals were also part of the discussions at the Potsdam meeting. Her comments on dual citizenship, she said, "were clearly meant as a joke".
Contacted by Correctiv and the Guardian, neither Weidel nor Hartwig commented on the report. The AfD confirmed that Hartwig had been at the meeting but said the reported proposals were not party policy.
"The AfD won't change its position on immigration policy because of a single opinion at a non-AfD meeting," the party told Reuters.
(https://i.guim.co.uk/img/media/f10e6ecb5d3da3e9cc1881d825fca1b3ebe1af09/0_32_1364_818/master/1364.jpg?width=620&dpr=1&s=none)
Gerrit Huy, an AfD MP, confirmed that she had attended the meeting and that 're-migration' was on the agenda. Photograph: Facebook
The AfD's gradual transformation from an economically liberal, anti-euro party into what many believe to be a far-right outfit is not new. In the three eastern states where the party could triumph at elections this year – Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia – the party has been classified as "certified rightwing extremist" by the German domestic spy agency, allowing its covert surveillance and potentially even infiltration. The party, however, denies that it is extremist.
Postwar Germany defines itself as a "militant democracy", and its constitutional court can shut down political parties if they pursue anti-constitutional goals – and are in a position to achieve these goals. In recent weeks, some politicians, such as the co-leader of Olaf Scholz's Social Democrats (SDP), have called for a debate about whether the constitutional court should consider such a ban for the AfD.
Others, including the SPD's federal commissioner for the east, Carsten Schneider, have said that such a move could backfire by further radicalising AfD supporters, especially if the constitutional court were to reject a ban.
In practice, the bar for outright party bans is relatively high. In 2017, Germany's top constitutional court ruled that even though the radical-right NPD resembled Adolf Hitler's Nazi party, it would not be banned because it did not pose a sufficient threat to democracy.
Second story is Italy - where the far right gathered outside the former Italian Social Movement HQ and gave fascist salutes at their commemoration of three MSI militants who were killed by left-wing terrorists during the years of lead:
This commemoration is an annual event and, to some extent, not that new. But it is the centenary of Mussolini extinguishing Italian democracy so is particularly resonant. The FdI were not formally involved/attending.
I also think it's important because of Meloni. She was not present but this is an annual event tied to the MSI. MSI was the post-fascist party founded by ex-ministers and politicians who had been part of Mussolini's Salo Republic post-43 - indeed in its early days the MSI actually debated whether they should even be open to politicians who were just "normal" fascists pre-43 or if, actually, joining Salo was a necessary condition as it demonstrated ultimate commitment to the cause.
I flag all that because in 1992 when Giorgia Meloni was 15 in her working class district of Rome, she went to the local Youth Front branch to sign up and join. The Youth Front were the youth wing of MSI (and the organisation the murdered militants belonged to) - they also had close links to Lazio ultras. The MSI were dissolved in 1995 and then re-created by their leader, Gianfranco Fini, into the National Alliance (with a small right-wing split). The National Alliance subsequently merged into Berlusconi's People of Freedom, but there was a larger right-wing split this time who went on to creat the Fratelli d'Italia. Meloni was part of that right-wing split - and they're now the biggest party. Both the AN and FdI have always had the MSI's symbol, the tricolour flame in their party logos.
I think that's the problem I have with the framing of the divide/problem in Europe as populists v non-populists. Meloni isn't populist in style, she isn't really threatening to the Euro (unlike even a centrist like, say, Renzi who wanted significant reform), and she's on the right side on Ukraine (which isn't surprising given the MSI's position). All of that's true - the problem is she comes from a far-right tradition which is dangerous. I think the populist v non-populist framing also flattens the populist left and right. The danger with the right isn't the populism but their ties to anti-democratic and far-right ideas. I don't think there is any equivalence between that and, say, Podemos or SYRIZA. I think it might be a consequence of - as with the AfD - the framing emerge in the context of the Euro crisis (and perhaps also Brexit - at the same time as Corbyn's leadership and Melenchon's rise - with an embattled centre seeing all opponents as a populist hydra).
On Meloni she is proposing a constitutional reform to change the voting system and ensure majority rule in Italy. In effect the party that won the most votes would automatically get, I think, 55% of the seats in the lower house. It's not a million miles from the old Greek system (which has now been restored) where the largest party got their share of the parliament plus an extra 30 seats (or 10%) in the aim of increasing the chance of stable majority government. Thinking of what's going on in Poland, it's also not that far from voting system reforms proposed by Renzi who would have subordinated the upper house and also introduced a run off system in the lower house - so if a party got 40%+ they'd be given a majority, if they didn't there'd be a run off between the two most successful parties with the winner getting a majority. These "majoritarian" proposals - like Renzi's or Greece's - have historically been supported by more centrist press in Europe (like the FT, Economist etc) as ways of helping driving market reform. But obviously could be used in different ways.
Meloni and Italy are also key on the potential for a shift at the EU level. There are European Parliament elections this year - where there are fears that the far right across Europe will do well. Seat projections are very difficult and it will all depend on national politics but it looks possible that the centre right and far right might win a majority in the Parliament which will raise the question for the centre right of how much they decide to use that. There are already rumours of someone from her party getting one of the top Commission roles (and a vice-presidency). Not sure if that'll happen but it's definitely being talked about as a possibility.
I remember years ago there was some whining from Germany that some German Nazis had relocated to Sweden where they were more free to promote their cause. WE got THEIR Nazis and THEY were the ones who should complain? Surely if anything it was Sweden who had reason to complain. Germans are weird.
Quote from: Sheilbh on January 12, 2024, 02:53:13 AMOn Meloni she is proposing a constitutional reform to change the voting system and ensure majority rule in Italy. In effect the party that won the most votes would automatically get, I think, 55% of the seats in the lower house. It's not a million miles from the old Greek system (which has now been restored) where the largest party got their share of the parliament plus an extra 30 seats (or 10%) in the aim of increasing the chance of stable majority government. Thinking of what's going on in Poland, it's also not that far from voting system reforms proposed by Renzi who would have subordinated the upper house and also introduced a run off system in the lower house - so if a party got 40%+ they'd be given a majority, if they didn't there'd be a run off between the two most successful parties with the winner getting a majority. These "majoritarian" proposals - like Renzi's or Greece's - have historically been supported by more centrist press in Europe (like the FT, Economist etc) as ways of helping driving market reform. But obviously could be used in different ways.
The mechanism is a bit different, but the outcome is similar to what the FPTP system in the UK produces, no? Not a fan personally though.
Quote from: Zanza on January 12, 2024, 11:01:04 AMQuote from: Sheilbh on January 12, 2024, 02:53:13 AMOn Meloni she is proposing a constitutional reform to change the voting system and ensure majority rule in Italy. In effect the party that won the most votes would automatically get, I think, 55% of the seats in the lower house. It's not a million miles from the old Greek system (which has now been restored) where the largest party got their share of the parliament plus an extra 30 seats (or 10%) in the aim of increasing the chance of stable majority government. Thinking of what's going on in Poland, it's also not that far from voting system reforms proposed by Renzi who would have subordinated the upper house and also introduced a run off system in the lower house - so if a party got 40%+ they'd be given a majority, if they didn't there'd be a run off between the two most successful parties with the winner getting a majority. These "majoritarian" proposals - like Renzi's or Greece's - have historically been supported by more centrist press in Europe (like the FT, Economist etc) as ways of helping driving market reform. But obviously could be used in different ways.
The mechanism is a bit different, but the outcome is similar to what the FPTP system in the UK produces, no? Not a fan personally though.
I don't mind FPTP though because each MP is also accountable to their local voters, and jot just the party leader. If party leadership is supporting a policy that is deeply unpopular in your own home riding you can form a kind of internal opposition. It also promotes parties that have broad regional support, and not just a deep reserve of support in one region.
In a system as described though the MP (or whatever term) is still only accountable to the party leadership - that's who put them on the party list to get elected in the first while. So you do run the risk of a party getting as little as 25-30% of the vote, concentrated in one region, who then gets an absolute majority.
So you run the risk
Quote from: Zanza on January 12, 2024, 11:01:04 AMThe mechanism is a bit different, but the outcome is similar to what the FPTP system in the UK produces, no? Not a fan personally though.
Yeah similar-ish. And voting system shapes voter behaviour - so people would probably respond. The consequence of FPTP is that it trends to a two party system with big tent parties. Similarly PR tends to fragment the vote - which is more fragmented in the Netherlands or Israel where there's no minimum threshold than Germany (5%) or Turkey (10%). I'm not sure quite what it would look like if those two systems overlapped. Italy often has pre-election coalitions but I think that change would trend to two party so the immediate consequence would be for FdI to become the Italian right - no need for Berlusconi's old party or Lega. It seems like a weird mix of presidential and parliamentary.
But the combination of that and a party in government and leading the right that comes from a post-fascist tradition seems potentially risky.
Although I think the key difference with FPTP though is the constituency - which I know everyone is cynical about but I think is a real thing that has an impact. Every candidate is selected independently by 650 local parties and if they win, as an incumbent, they're very difficult to remove (unless the boundaries of their constituency change significantly) because in most parties the incumbents are automatically the next candidate if they want it. The central parties can (and do) try to rig selection of candidates but ultimately have only limited control over who gets elected - and because of incumbency even in a landslide they can only really rig the selection of MPs in the seats that they won (or the incumbent stepped down).
Every MP has and believes they have an independent, individual mandate. We've seen it with this government with a majority of 80 occasions when they've lost votes because there's too many rebels, or just been forced to u-turn - but it even happened to Blair who had 400 MPs. I think that happens far less in, say, Israel where there's a pure list system and your rank is just based on reliably voting as the party leadership tells you. I believe it's similar in the Netherlands as the other far end of PR example. And in both I think if there's a resignation or whatever, you just move onto the next person on the list to replace the outgoing MP. It's also why I think in, say, the Netherlands the longest serving MP is Wilders who's been around since 1998 while in the Commons there's MPs who were first elected in the 70s or 80s, they're difficult to remove and they've got a base that is not dependent on the central party/party leadership.
The only party that doesn't have automatic re-selection is the SNP - which is also the party with fewest rebellions (basically none) and strongest party discipline. It's also a big demand of the Corbyn wing of Labour (and I think Farage has pushed for it to). It's always described as more democratic - which it sort of is, but it also favours the people who turn up to every local party meeting. On the left it was a thing in some of the local councils that got taken over by the hard left to force out their internal opponents/discipline waverers on the soft left.
Quote from: Barrister on January 12, 2024, 12:19:32 PMI don't mind FPTP though because each MP is also accountable to their local voters, and jot just the party leader. If party leadership is supporting a policy that is deeply unpopular in your own home riding you can form a kind of internal opposition. It also promotes parties that have broad regional support, and not just a deep reserve of support in one region.
In a system as described though the MP (or whatever term) is still only accountable to the party leadership - that's who put them on the party list to get elected in the first while. So you do run the risk of a party getting as little as 25-30% of the vote, concentrated in one region, who then gets an absolute majority.
So you run the risk
Sure, but that cuts both ways. If you hate the dude in your constituency, but like the party, what do you do?
Fair and there's always a trade-off, which is partly why my preference is for AV (having once been a staunch PR-er).
Having said that I've never really heard anyone moan about that dilemma. It will come up and happen in some places. But the more common complaint I've heard is that they hate the party but quite like their local MP.
Quote from: Zanza on January 12, 2024, 12:48:11 PMQuote from: Barrister on January 12, 2024, 12:19:32 PMI don't mind FPTP though because each MP is also accountable to their local voters, and jot just the party leader. If party leadership is supporting a policy that is deeply unpopular in your own home riding you can form a kind of internal opposition. It also promotes parties that have broad regional support, and not just a deep reserve of support in one region.
In a system as described though the MP (or whatever term) is still only accountable to the party leadership - that's who put them on the party list to get elected in the first while. So you do run the risk of a party getting as little as 25-30% of the vote, concentrated in one region, who then gets an absolute majority.
So you run the risk
Sure, but that cuts both ways. If you hate the dude in your constituency, but like the party, what do you do?
As Sehilbh says, not usually an issue. At worst you may view your local MP as a potted plant or trained seal, but at best some MPs can have support well above that of the national party. But as I type I can think of a handuful of times when a bad candidate lost a party an otherwise winnable riding.
It's pretty unusual for a sitting MP to win the nomination a second time, but if a candidate is that unpopular it can happen.
Quote from: Barrister on January 12, 2024, 01:00:57 PMAs Sehilbh says, not usually an issue. At worst you may view your local MP as a potted plant or trained seal, but at best some MPs can have support well above that of the national party. But as I type I can think of a handuful of times when a bad candidate lost a party an otherwise winnable riding.
It's pretty unusual for a sitting MP to win the nomination a second time, but if a candidate is that unpopular it can happen.
In the UK there's been studies and we have more rebellious MPs now than in a long time and it's basically been continually rising since the 50s. One of the key reasons seems to be that MPs think voters will reward them for being more independent of their party/voting their beliefs instead of just the party whip. That is, after all, what everyone says they wants (same reason many of them do more and more local constituency work).
But the evidence is that it neither reblling nor being a good local MP has much impact on voter behaviour and actually at the same time as they've been doing that stuff more, the impact of national swing has been increasing on how voters' vote.
So the strength/impact of the local link is not really true but at the same time MPs believe it's true so it changes how they behave which weirdly makes it true :lol:
As you say it's rare but I can definitely think of a bad candidate losing a winnable seat for a party though - I lived in (what was then) a swing seat which was a big target for the Tories in 2010. They chose one of Cameron's A-listers (scheme to increase women and minority Tory MPs) as candidate who was a media lawyer and she was an absolute disaster - refused to talk to the local press (who I think she later accused of lying), got into a huge row with her local party who she called "dinosaurs" which inevitably meant she didn't have much support canvassing and loads of other nonsense.
By contrast the Labour MP who won was a very, very good local MP for 15 years, was very good on housing won (and the swing from Labour was a lot lower than the national average). She's still an MP now and still excellent on housing.
Quote from: Barrister on January 12, 2024, 01:00:57 PMAs Sehilbh says, not usually an issue. At worst you may view your local MP as a potted plant or trained seal, but at best some MPs can have support well above that of the national party. But as I type I can think of a handuful of times when a bad candidate lost a party an otherwise winnable riding.
It's pretty unusual for a sitting MP to win the nomination a second time, but if a candidate is that unpopular it can happen.
Hopefully obvious from context, but should read "pretty unusual for a sitting MP to LOSE the nomination a second time".
Incidentally, speaking of Meloni:
QuoteGeert Wilders
@geertwilderspvv
Today I received in my office in Parliament the Ambassador of Ukraine H.E @karasevych, accompanied by Honorary Consul @KBurgerDirven, and expressed my respect for the brave Ukrainian people in their fight for freedom and the regaining of total national sovereignty.
No doubt domestic signalling as well. But I think Nicolai von Ondarza's right in pointing out that the condition of some in the EPP to start working more with the far right in the EU was support for EU integration (plus don't threaten the Euro) and the Atlantic alliance, particularly expressed through support for Ukraine. It looks like Wilders (who had been suspect on Ukraine) is indicating he'll follow Meloni's approach if he becomes PM.
Totally separately - just saw this. What is going on with Luxembourg? :blink: :huh:
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GDoeZZnWwAECxd2?format=jpg&name=medium)
Tiny but still has basic infrastructure so the per capita gets skewed? Kind of like Greenland I'd assume. Can't explain Australia though.
Quote from: HVC on January 12, 2024, 02:16:56 PMTiny but still has basic infrastructure so the per capita gets skewed? Can't explain Australia though.
Yeah it must be some weird function of per capita calculation. Although Malta seems normal? :hmm: Maybe something to do with being a tax haven somehow?
Australia I can get - it's like the US or Canada. Big, lots of cars, extraction economy etc. And their right are very anti-anything on climate.
Edit: Also the range in the Baltics is striking :hmm:
Yeah, I forgot about Australian mining. Don't think they're big on manufacturing (hence. Everything is super expensive). Make sense they'd be a driving culture, but never really thought about it.
Is Malta just super poor?
Quote from: Sheilbh on January 12, 2024, 02:15:49 PMIncidentally, speaking of Meloni:
[ Meloni's approach if he becomes PM.
Totally separately - just saw this. What is going on with Luxembourg? :blink: :huh:
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GDoeZZnWwAECxd2?format=jpg&name=medium)
Probably something to do with a lot of cross border commuters and poor transport infrastructure?
Or I wonder whether polluting corporations being registered there does it.
Iirc they made all internal public transport free some years ago?
On the Italian electoral reform and what I don't quite understand - the same was true with Renzi's - is it's described as a "directly elected PM" which is what I mean about it being a weird mix of presidential in a parliamentary system.
I'm not sure how that works unless you basically have a Meloni list v, say, a Schlein list and whoever wins gets 55%.
I can't work out how you can have a directly elected PM in a parliamentary system - but it's one of a package of reforms to strengthen the PM's position (FdI had previously focused on moving to a more presidential republic).
https://amp.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/17/crises-have-split-european-voters-into-five-tribes-survey-suggests
QuoteCrises have split European voters into five 'tribes', survey suggests
Attitudes to climate, migration, global economic turmoil, Ukraine and Covid will dominate this year's elections, research indicates
Europe's voters are no longer divided into left or right, pro- or anti-EU camps, a survey suggests, but into five distinct tribes whose conflicting concerns are likely to dominate nearly 20 elections across the continent this year.
The report argues that Europeans' lives have been affected by five major crises in recent years - the climate emergency, the 2015 migration crisis, global economic turmoil, the war in Ukraine and Covid - and suggests voters in European parliament and national elections this year will focus on the one they feel most concerned by.
The report's authors argue that all five of these crises "were felt across Europe, although to varying intensities in different corners of the continent; experienced as an existential threat by many Europeans; dramatically affected government policies – and are by no means over".
The study's co-author Mark Leonard said: "In 2019, the central struggle was between populists who wanted to turn their back on European integration, and mainstream parties that wanted to save the European project from Brexit and Trump."
"This time around, it will be a contest between competing fears of rising temperatures, immigration, inflation, and military conflict," Leonard, the director of the Berlin-based European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) thinktank, said.
Ivan Krastev of the Centre for Liberal Strategies in Sofia, Bulgaria, said the study showed that in terms of how they saw the EU, citizens were "drifting away from the ideological bonds of right and left" and were instead swayed more by their views of these crises.
The report, A Crisis of One's Own: the Politics of Trauma in Europe's Election Year, suggests mainstream political parties might struggle to mobilise voters on issues such as the future of the European project, suggesting instead that they should "examine and propose solutions" for voters' most urgent concerns.
Overall, the report's authors said, the climate crisis and immigration would prove the two biggest mobilisers in the election campaigns due to be fought across Europe in 2024 – as they were in the Dutch parliamentary poll in November.
Make or break for the EU? Europeans vote in June with far right on the rise
Dutch voters placed Geert Wilders' anti-immigrant Freedom party (PVV) top of the poll, with the pro-environment Green-Labour alliance headed by the former European Commission vice-president Frans Timmermans finishing second.
"The struggle between these two 'tribes' is ... a clash of two 'extinction rebellions'," the authors said. "Climate activists fear the extinction of human and other life; anti-migration activists fear the disappearance of their nations and cultural identity."
Voters who view immigration as the biggest crisis mostly back rightwing parties such as the National Rally in France or Germany's Alternative für Deutschland (AfD); those who prioritise the climate tend to support green or leftist parties such as Spain's Socialists or Poland's Left.
One early political consequence of this was the "Europeanisation" of migration as the EU sought to assuage voter concerns, the authors said, and, simultaneously, the "renationalisation" by rightwingers of the debate around slowing global heating.
Besides the European parliament election, due in June, voters in 15 European countries – including Portugal, Belgium, Austria, Croatia, Lithuania and the UK – go to the polls this year in national parliamentary and presidential ballots.
The survey – of nine EU member states representing 75% of the bloc's population, plus Great Britain and Switzerland – suggested that 73.4 million European voters believed the climate emergency was the single most important crisis affecting their future.
Almost as many (72.8 million) felt Covid – which exposed the vulnerability of national healthcare systems, with major economic consequences – was the most important, while 69.3 million said global economic turmoil was their chief concern, 58.2 million opted for immigration, 49 million for Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and 46.4 million chose none of the five.
The study found, however, that these voter "tribes" were not evenly distributed either geographically, by age or by education. Voters in Germany, for example, felt immigration was the most transformative crisis (31%), whereas in France it was climate change (27%).
In Italy and Portugal, both of which were badly affected by the 2008 financial crash and ensuing eurozone crisis, a plurality (34%) of respondents said worldwide economic turmoil and the rising cost of living were paramount among their concerns.
Fears about Russia's war on Ukraine, meanwhile, were greatest in countries closest to the conflict: respondents in Estonia (40%), Poland (31%) and Denmark (29%) saw it as the most important crisis, against 7% in France and Italy and 6% in Spain and Great Britain.
In terms of generations, the climate crisis topped the agenda among the young, with 24% of 18- to 29-year-olds considering it the most important issue for their future. That age group also saw immigration as its least important concern (9%).
Of all age groups, older generations were most worried by immigration as a vital issue, with 13% of 50- to 69-year-olds and 16% of respondents aged 70-plus ranking it as their biggest concern. Among highly educated voters, the climate crisis was the chief concern (22%).
For supporters of far-right parties in countries where they are not in power immigration was the issue that had most changed the way they look at their future, for example Reconquête (76%) in France, AfD in Germany (66%) and Reform in Great Britain (63%).
In countries where the far right is in government, however, such as Italy, barely 10% of survey respondents reported immigration as their biggest concern, including only 17% of voters aligned with the Brothers of Italy party of Italy's prime minister, Giorgia Meloni.
The 2024 European parliament elections would be "about projections rather than projects", the study's authors said. "Each of Europe's five crises will have many lives, but it is at the ballot box where they will live, die or be resurrected.
"The European election will not just be a competition between left and right – and Eurosceptics and pro-Europeans – but also a battle for supremacy between the different crisis tribes of Europe."
Charts on the article are badly done but interesting data for big nations.
It does seem a key tactic should be in trying to get across the message that if you're terrified of brown people and anti-immigration then climate change should be your priority.
Interesting media project from across the EU (including Le Monde, Dutch paper etc) has found that about one quarter of MEPs have been involved in an "affair".
This was worked out by political scientists but basically an "affair" had to have had media coverage and/or sanction, official investigation or reprimand. The causes vary from corruption, fraud, misappropriation, conflicts of interest, improper use of authority, lots of fictitious "aides" collecting salaries etc. The most extreme example seems to be the Greek MEP who is still writing legislation and amendments from his prison cell :lol:
But I mention because I think this goes to one of my hobby horses about corruption in local government which I think is becoming more and more of a problem because of the decline of the local press. And I feel there's something similar with Europe - with a couple of exceptions (Politico) there is still no "European" press which covers the European institutions the way national institutions are - and I think it's a problem. The most striking thing about this report for me is that no-one had really done it before and the difficulty in doing it as these were, broadly, reported in national media as a local scandal about x party MEP.
Not sure how to solve it (of the death of the local press) as, sadly, I don't think there's much of a market for it but I think it is important - especially as power/responsibilities increase at that level of government.
Was tempted to post this in the China thread as this may be the answer to "where will the demand come from" and I think captures the possible dilemma that what is bad for the Western order might actually be good for the world in a climate crisis.
But I think it is more of an EU issue and the point I'd add here is that through subsidies and industrial policy Europe was the world leader in solar production and until the austerity of the 2010s was the world leader in installation. Both of those have effectively collapsed and instead there is increased dependence on China - and I fully acknowledge I'm very much on the side of emphasising "geopolitical risk" over economic efficiency or energy transition. And I get that we have the technology and we can build these things in the future but I think it would be, in the event of geopolitical disruption, more difficult if the industry is allowed to die now - so hopefully some action soon:
QuoteEU mum as solar industry time bomb ticks
Brussels is considering aiding local producers, but didn't announce anything in a Monday statement.
(https://www.politico.eu/cdn-cgi/image/width=1024,quality=80,onerror=redirect,format=auto/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/05/GettyImages-1137858759-scaled.jpg)
EU solar manufacturers say they face an existential crisis due to Chinese subsidies | Gerard Julien/AFP via Getty February 5, 2024 11:46 pm CET
By Victor Jack
BRUSSELS — The EU is racing to save its ailing solar producers as the industry warns it has just weeks before it implodes.
Yet you might not have known such a crisis was at hand from the tone the European Commission took on Monday. The EU executive issued a muted and bureaucratic statement on the situation that anxious industry executives parsed for any semblance of a lifeline.
EU solar manufacturers say they face an existential crisis due to Chinese subsidies, which they blame for flooding the EU with dirt-cheap solar panels and creating a supply glut that is causing a wave of bankruptcies. Not everyone agrees, however, that Brussels should challenge China over its solar practices, given that it might ultimately restrict much-needed solar imports. Others wonder whether emergency cash wouldn't be wasted on a sector that may already be terminal.
For local companies, though, their livelihoods are on the line.
"The situation is really, really, really troublesome," said Johan Lindahl, secretary general of the European Solar Manufacturing Council (ESMC), which represents local producers. "We might lose a majority of the European industry in the next couple of months if there's no strong political signal."
That signal didn't come on Monday.
While the Commission has begun early-stage talks on options to help producers, it made no commitments during a hotly anticipated debate in the European Parliament that many in the industry had hoped would show the bloc was taking immediate action.
Low prices are "clearly a challenge to EU solar panel producers," EU financial services chief Mairead McGuinness told MEPs in Strasbourg, adding the EU executive would "work closely with the EU industry to deploy every effort at the technical and political level" to help manufacturers.
MEPs from all the Parliament's main parties expressed dismay.
"Our market is being attacked by cheaper imports from third countries fueled by huge subsidies," said center-right lawmaker Liudas Mažylis of the European People's Party group. "We have to think about providing immediate support to solar manufacturers."
"I expect more from the Commission ... because otherwise, we're not going to be able to achieve our [industrial policy] objectives," added center-left MEP Matthias Ecke of the Socialists and Democrats.
Dark skies ahead
The debate over how — and whether — to save Europe's solar industry comes as Brussels takes an increasingly assertive stance toward Beijing.
Last fall the EU opened a probe into whether Chinese subsidies for electric vehicles — another key next-generation technology — were unfairly harming EU manufacturers. The investigation triggered a tit-for-tat response from China targeting French brandy.
At the same time, the EU wants to avoid overreliance on a single country for its energy supplies — having been stung when Russia suddenly cut off gas exports in 2022 amid the war in Ukraine, sending prices skyward.
The solar industry, represented in Brussels by SolarPower Europe and ESMC, has for months urged Brussels to spearhead an EU-led buyout of manufacturer stocks; to further relax state aid laws for solar initiatives; and to adopt rules favoring local producers for green energy projects.
Such initiatives could tide the industry over for "two to three years," said ESMC's Lindahl, when new EU laws favoring local manufacturing and penalizing foreign products made with forced labor take effect. The rules will make EU producers more competitive, Lindahl said, given that Beijing faces accusations of human rights abuses in its solar production chain.
But others argue that EU support for solar producers is futile given that the bloc's tiny industry can't compete with China in the long term. Beijing controls over 80 percent of global solar manufacturing capacity, while the EU produced just 3 percent of the solar panels it installed last year.
"Unless you absolutely pour money into this ... anything you do will just be very, very short term and give breathing space to manufacturers," said Lara Hayim, head of solar research at BloombergNEF. "I can't help but feel that these are all efforts that are a bit in vain."
In the meantime, many of the bloc's solar firms have already gone bust, with Dutch panel producer Exasun and Austrian module manufacturer Energetic filing for insolvency in recent months.
Germany — home to more than half of the EU's 5 gigawatt solar module production capacity — will likely suffer most.
The Berlin government is in last-ditch talks with Meyer Burger after the Swiss solar firm said it would halt production of modules in the country by April. Two other solar producers, Solarwatt and Heckert Solar, have also threatened closures and investment pauses.
The China enigma
At the heart of local producer complaints is that copious Chinese subsidies are distorting the market, leaving EU manufacturers unable to compete.
Beijing began to experiment with solar production in the early 2000s, but it wasn't until the 2008 financial crisis and the EU's slapping tariffs on Chinese solar panels a decade ago that the government built up local capacity, said Alexander Brown, an analyst at the Mercator Institute for China Studies.
After labeling solar a "strategic emerging industry" in 2010, Beijing pumped cash into the sector via state-owned banks, while private firms invested heavily into research and development, Brown said.
Solar cells now form part of China's self-professed "new three" export pillars, alongside lithium-ion batteries and electric vehicles. The term has come to symbolize Beijing's push to swap its historically labor-intensive economy for a technology-intensive upgrade.
But whether the country's current solar dominance is owed to distortive state aid isn't clear.
ESMC argues that Chinese module prices — which are up to three times cheaper than their European equivalents — are sold below the cost of production, indicating significant state aid.
But low prices also derive from fierce internal competition among Chinese manufacturers, as well as from lower labor costs, economies of scale, and rapid innovations in solar technology, said Hayim, the solar researcher at BloombergNEF.
"Subsidies might be helping," she said. "But I don't think that's the reason why China can produce at the rates that they can do."
China's mission to the EU didn't respond to a request for comment, but Beijing envoy Fu Cong told Bloomberg last month that blaming Chinese subsidies was "a bit unfair," given that EU capitals also dole out support.
As if in confirmation, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni announced on Saturday that €90 million in EU post-pandemic recovery cash would be used to expand the 3Sun solar factory in Sicily, already one of the bloc's largest manufacturers.
Impossible tradeoff
But penalizing China's solar industry represents a conundrum for the EU.
Brussels wants to bring 30 GW of solar manufacturing capacity back to Europe by 2030, but will also need to deploy 750 GW of solar panels across the Continent by then to meet EU climate goals.
Not only does the bloc need Chinese imports, but any trade measures against China's solar industry could prompt retaliation.
Europe has a "crucial dilemma when it comes to green industrial policy," said Simone Tagliapietra, a climate policy specialist at the Bruegel think tank. "How to strike the right balance between economic efficiency and geopolitical resilience, without slowing down the green transition."
ESMC, representing EU manufacturers, called on the Commission last week to apply "provisional safeguarding measures" such as a partial import ban on Chinese solar panels "as a last resort."
But SolarPower Europe CEO Walburga Hemetsberger told POLITICO such moves "would really be detrimental for the solar sector," and could slow deployment by up to 50 percent.
That split is also apparent among countries. At a December meeting of EU ministers on solar manufacturing, five out of seven countries appeared resistant to any trade defense measures — but that opinion wasn't universal, according to a person who took part in the meeting, and was granted anonymity to speak candidly.
"[The] situation is worrying ... there is an obvious trade imbalance and dependence on China here," said a diplomat from an EU country, who was also granted anonymity to speak freely. But "tariffs against China are probably a bad idea."
"We need to start making strategic choices," the diplomat said. "Maybe solar is not the battle we should fight."
Koen Verhelst and Julia Wacket contributed reporting. Graphics by Giovanna Coi.
And I get the "maybe this isn't the right battle" point. But it feels like the EU is currently shirking all battles or at most proceeding through BAU process like probes into x trade distortion or reporting China (or the US) to the WTO which I don't think recognises the scale of the issue or the risk.
Also I think of Habeck's line that Europe might have the best regulations in the world on future technologies, but it doesn't really matter if it doesn't have any companies in them - and there's something so telling in Europe worrying about China unfairly building dominance in electric vehicles, and China's response hitting an artisanal luxury good like French brandy.
I used to work on PV solar back in the day, and most of the money ended up in China even back then.
Inverters and the like were European, but the panels themselves were almost always Chinese.
Meeting of Czech and Polish foreign ministers.
(https://i.postimg.cc/prmqQc81/image.png)
:cheers: :beer:
Interesting thought I've just seen - and I think there is something to it - are the AI powered tools to translate videos about to transform EU politics?
They're getting really good. Probably too soon for this election cycle but I wonder if we are at the cusp of a genuine European public square. From an English perspective, for example, Macron's recent interview on Ukraine:
https://x.com/vtchakarova/status/1768390964727472315
That was done by journos but here's (inevitably taking the technological lead) a far right politician, Marion Marechal, AI translating her comments into English but you can see her doing this in German, Italian, Polish too etc:
https://x.com/MarionMarechal/status/1770894693481537884
It might open up genuine Europe-wide political parties. Although, as with the Marechal clip, I think the most integrated cross-border politics is probably actually the far right in Europe so I wonder if they'll take an early lead on adopting this?
Could be wrong but it feels like this could be potentially transformative if European politics moves from Bong Joon-Ho's "one inch barrier of subtitles" or the stilted voiceover translations you get in the European Parliament. You almost feel the next generation could even have an impact on the functioning of the Parliament and Council itself as translations are able to sync to a user's tone of voice etc.
That is pretty cool. Wonder how long the processing takes. As it does seem just a few steps from a proper star trek universal translator.
Though poor professional translators.
Quote from: Syt on March 21, 2024, 02:09:27 AMMeeting of Czech and Polish foreign ministers.
(https://i.postimg.cc/prmqQc81/image.png)
:cheers: :beer:
Nothing ever went wrong politically related to a beer hall meeting. :D
Quote from: Syt on March 21, 2024, 02:09:27 AMMeeting of Czech and Polish foreign ministers.
It is amazing the kind of innovative foreign policy strategies you can come up with after having a few beers.
Fascinating Draghi speech - and I more or less totally agree, in particular on the absolute catastrophe that was Europe's 2010s:
https://geopolitique.eu/en/2024/04/16/radical-change-is-what-is-needed/
But absolutely damning on the last 15 years of policy making:
QuoteFor a long time, competitiveness has been a contentious issue for Europe.
In 1994, the nobel-prize-to-be economist Paul Krugman called focusing on competitiveness a "dangerous obsession". His argument was that long-term growth comes from raising productivity, which benefits everyone, rather than through trying to improve your relative position against others and capture their share of growth.
The approach we took to competitiveness in Europe after the sovereign debt crisis seemed to prove his point. We pursued a deliberate strategy of trying to lower wage costs relative to each other – and, combine this with a procyclical fiscal policy, the net effect was only to weaken our own domestic demand and undermine our social model.
But the key issue is not that competitiveness is a flawed concept. It is that Europe has had the wrong focus.
We have turned inwards, seeing our competitors among ourselves, even in sectors like defence and energy where we have profound common interests. At the same time, we have not looked outwards enough: with a positive trade balance, after all, we did not pay enough attention to our external competitiveness as a serious policy question.
In a benign international environment, we trusted the global level playing field and the rules-based international order, expecting that others would do the same. But now the world is changing rapidly and it has caught us by surprise.
On the challenge from US and China's industrial policies:
QuoteWe are lacking a strategy for how to keep pace in an increasing cutthroat race for leadership in new technologies. Today we invest less in digital and advanced technologies than the US and China, including for defence, and we only have four global European tech players among the top 50 worldwide.
We are lacking a strategy for how to shield our traditional industries from an unlevel global playing field caused by asymmetries in regulations, subsidies and trade policies.
Energy-intensive industries are a case in point.
In other regions, these industries not only face lower energy costs, but they also face a lower regulatory burden and, in some cases, they are receiving massive subsidies which directly threat the ability of European firms to compete.
Without strategically designed and coordinated policy actions, it is logical that some of our industries will shut down capacity or relocate outside the EU.
And we are lacking a strategy to ensure that we have the resources and inputs we need to fulfil our ambitions without increasing our dependencies.
We rightly have an ambitious climate agenda in Europe and hard targets for electric vehicles. But in a world where our rivals control many of the resources we need, such an agenda has to be combined with a plan to secure our supply chain – from critical minerals to batteries to charging infrastructure.
Our response has been constrained because our organisation, decision-making and financing are designed for "the world of yesterday" – pre-Covid, pre-Ukraine, pre-conflagration in the Middle East, pre return of great power rivalry.
And I think there's a lot to his proposals on the areas he's flagged - defence, research and public goods.
Not sure if it'll be acted on - I think there's still quite a lot of sort of "end of history" fundamentalism in the institutions that is struggling to face the world as it is. See the regular attacks on various Biden policies as just protectionism and corporate subsidies rather than that - but also climate policy and also about security of supply chains and economic policy in a geopolitical world. Or the EU's response to Chinese protectionism and industrial policy mainly, so far, being investigations and WTO threats. In both cases I think it's interpreting what China and the US are doing as bad economic policies that are against the rules, when I think for the US and China they're strategic and geopolitical policies.
Also couldn't help but notice Scholz's visit to China with a big business delegation including Siemens chief who says they're "doubling down" on China. I also think there was possibly the Mercedes head who opposed the EU's investigation into China's subsidies for EVs - which suggests he either doesn't think subsidies are anti-competitive or is worried about Chinese retaliation.
So I really hope Draghi's vision wins out - but I think it'll be a fight and I think there's a real risk Europe repeats the mistakes of the last 15 years. Especially when you add failure to ramp up defence manufacturing for Ukraine. May end up not just dependent on the US for security and China for growth - but with both the US and China not caring about Europe because that's secondary to their own agendas. Which would not be great.
Edit: E.g. I really rate Margethe Vestager but this just feels profoundly inadequate in response to Draghi's speech (and also Enrico Letta's). Doubling down on the 1990s: "Unlike what we may hear, Europe does not need to reinvent itself, it needs to get back to basics: remove barriers, enforce existing rules. ... Rather than betting on taxpayers' money to subsidize our economy...Europe can never outspend the U.S. and China. We're not good at being American. Even worse at being Chinese."
Edit: Also read this piece on China's EV industry: https://www.phenomenalworld.org/analysis/byd/ And again - I just can't be struck by the idea that all the stuff about overproduction may be the intended outcome of policy decisions by China, and possibly right for the objectives of the CCP :ph34r: Maybe not - but I feel like we should at least be open to the possibility... I also think there is an echo of them in the US now - obviously with different politics and tools (China's, obviously, more coercive).
Yes, the overproduction is intentional.
Invite foreign companies, steal their tech, build it yourself, destroy your competitors by producing a massive glut, victory as your enemies have now been deindustrialised and are dependent on you.
The eu needs to develop a real industrial policy too, and today rather than tomorrow, and means actually behaving as if industry is welcome and necessary. That's not how it currently seems, especially if you take the outside influence of the green nutters into account.
So cheap energy is a must, acquisition of raw materials is too, having the factories to process everything the same. Notions of degrowth must be removed as are the intentions to be greener than the pope.
Once you have the economical base then you can use that to protect your interests-with and without the necessarily strong military- around the globe because no one else will. So the threat of wielding the stick instead of just a carrot is also in.
Once Europe's interests are more secure we can increase the pace of greening again, but now we're just shooting ourselves in our feet, as is clear by the ever decreasing importance of the European countries and economies, and the eu as a whole on the world stage.
The said: it's not really going to matter if Russia wins in Ukraine.
I think Draghi's specific points are really worthwhile ideas too - it is obviously part of his pitch to replace Michel as EUCo President (and he would absolutely be a heavyweight in that role). I have a lot of admiration for Draghi generally - and I think he could go in even harder on the last 15 years. It's not just the catastrophe of the European response to the crash, but the failure to see the world changing and adapt (I think it's not accidental that the bits of the EU still most wedded to the 90s "international rules based order" are the bits that are not elected/not exposed to popular politics):
QuoteEach sector requires specific reforms and tools. Yet in our analysis there are three emerging common threads for policy interventions.
The first common thread is enabling scale. Our major competitors are taking advantage of the fact that they are continental-sized economies to generate scale, increase investment and capture market share for the industries where it matters most. We have the same natural size advantage in Europe, but fragmentation is holding us back.
In the defence industry, for example, lack of scale is hampering the development of European industrial capacity, which is a problem acknowledged in the recent European Defence Industrial Strategy. The top five players in the US represent 80% of its larger market, while in Europe they constitute 45%.
This difference arises in large part because EU defence spending is fragmented.
Governments do not procure much together – collaborative procurement accounts for less than 20% of spending – and they do not focus enough on our own market: almost 80% of procurement over the last two years has been from outside the EU.
To meet new defence and security needs, we need to step up our joint procurement, increase the coordination of our spending and the interoperability of our equipment, and substantially reduce our international dependencies.
[...]
And scale is also crucial, in a different way, for young companies that generate the most innovative ideas. Their business model depends on being able to grow fast and commercialise their ideas, which in turn requires a large domestic market.
And scale is also essential for developing new, innovative medicines, through the standardisation of the EU patients' data, and the use of artificial intelligence, which needs all this wealth of data we have – if only they could be standardised.
In Europe we are traditionally very strong in research, but we are failing to bring innovation to market and upscale it. We could address this barrier by, among other things, reviewing current prudential regulation in bank lending and setting up a new common regulatory regime for start-ups in tech.
The second thread is providing public goods. Where there are investments from which we all benefit, but no country can carry out alone, there is a powerful case for us to act together – otherwise we will underdeliver relative to our needs: we will underdeliver in climate, in defence for example, and in other sectors as well.
There are several chokepoints in the European economy where lack of coordination means that investment is inefficiently low. Energy grids, and in particular interconnections, are one such example.
They are a clear public good, as an integrated energy market would lower energy costs for our firms and make us more resilient in the face of future crises – a goal that the Commission is pursuing in the context of REPowerEU.
But interconnections require decisions on planning, financing, procurement of materials and governance that are difficult to coordinate – and so we will not be able to build a true Energy Union unless we agree on a common approach.
Another example is our super computing infrastructure. The EU has a public network of high-performance computers (HPCs) which is world-class, but the spillovers to the private sector are currently very, very limited.
This network could be used by the private sector – for instance AI startups and SMEs – and in return, the financial benefits received could be reinvested to upgrade HPCs and support an EU cloud expansion.
Once we identify these public goods, we also need to give ourselves the means to finance them. The public sector has an important role to play, and I have spoken before about how we can better use the joint borrowing capacity of the EU, especially in areas – like defence – where fragmented spending reduces our overall effectiveness.
[...]
The third thread is securing the supply of essential resources and inputs.
If we are to carry out our climate ambitions without increasing our dependence on countries on whom we can no longer rely, we need a comprehensive strategy covering all stages of the critical mineral supply chain.
We are currently largely leaving this space to private actors, while other governments are directly leading or strongly coordinating the whole chain. We need a foreign economic policy that delivers the same for our economy.
[...]
These three threads require us to think deeply about how we organise ourselves, what we want to do together and what we want to keep at the national level. But given the urgency of the challenge we face, we do not have the luxury of delaying the answers to all these important questions until a next Treaty change.
To ensure coherence between different policy tools, we should be able to develop now a new strategic tool for the coordination of economic policies.
And if we are to find that this is not feasible, in specific cases, we should be ready to consider going forward with a subset of Member States. For example, enhanced cooperation in the form of a 28th regime could be a way forward for the CMU to mobilise investments. But as a rule, I believe that the political cohesion of our Union demands that we act together – possibly always. And we have to be aware that the same political cohesion is now being threatened by the changes in the rest of the world.
I think the point that defence manufacturing in Europe is primarily an export industry helps explains the point those companies have made about needing contracts to ramp up manufacturing for Ukraine.
Two slightly random thoughts on that. One is whether going for that role undermines his ambition? In the last 30 years the nexus of decision making and power and influence in Brussels has pretty decisively moved from the Commission to the Council. That may reflect the EU expanding its competencies into more areas which are more politically sensitive and require more involvement from democratically accountable leaders in member states, but is the intergovernmental/member state bit of the EU really able to drive a more unified EU level response?
The other very random thought is that Draghi is 76 so five years younger than Biden. I know lots of people just hate on boomers but there is something striking about the fact that with Biden and with Draghi (and perhaps others) that the political figures who speak with a sort of ambition are from that generation - they came of age in the trentes glorieuses and from an EU perspective in the heroic age of European integration. I feel like there's something in that that ties to Macron's point about post-modernism and our inability, incapacity to believe in grand narratives. Can we have progress or agency if we've lost the ability to believe in progress or agency - or do we need to keep reaching back for that generation who actually experienced it? :hmm:
FPÖ poster for the EU elections:
(https://i.postimg.cc/sXyxp10z/image.png)
Main slogan: "STOP EU INSANITY"
Smaller items:
"Asylum Crisis"
"War Mongering"
"Eco-Communism"
"von der Leyen and Zelinskyy"
"Corona Chaos"
No way FPÖ can claim all of those. von der Leyen and Zelensky aren't even members.
20th anniversary of EU expansion and I think the EU's greatest achievement.
At the same time ongoing popular revolt in Georgia against their pro-Russia oligarch President for a more decisively European orientation (which the EU shouldn't accept but still).
Their Prime Minister. Their President is actually pro-West.
Sorry - you're absolutely right.
https://www.tijd.be/politiek-economie/europa/algemeen/slovaakse-premier-fico-in-kritieke-toestand-na-politieke-aanslag/10546583.html
In dutch but I'm sure it'll be all over:
Slovak PM Fico has survived what might be an attempt at (non-professional) assassination.
Dutch government announced - to be confirmed but agreed in principle between Wilders' PVV, the farmers' revolut party BBB, the new sort of centrist to centre-right populist NSC and (not) Rutte's VVD. I think the VVD and NSC objected to Wilders as PM so he won't actually be part of the government (I think that's a risk that may allow him the benefits of power and opposition). I think the cabinet's still being negotiated but the agenda for the coalition is largely agreed.
But also fascinating thread on far-right rally hosted by Vox which included Kast, the former Chilean Presidential candidate, Milei, Le Pen, via videolink Meloni and Orban - as well as Chega and an Israeli minister. Lots of attacks on global elites, the EU Green Deal and Islam - what seems to be the theme is the line from Ventura's speech: "Europe is ours!"
https://x.com/EoghanGilmartin/status/1792134428061282369
It's also a mix of European parliamentary families with ECR groups (FdI, PiS, Vox, Swedish Democrats) and ID (Chega, Le Pen, AfD). Meloni de facto leads the ECR which the EPP is increasingly open to working with as a "respectable" far-right (they're not "populist", which seems to mean not explicitly anti-Europe, pro-Ukraine and not causing issues for the Euro) v the ID group which is still perceived as more problematic.
But again I'm struck at how the bit of European politics that seems most European in clearly learning from each, rallying and campaigning together working out something that approaches a genuine European politics is the far-right. I can't really imagine the equivalent of a multinational EPP event or an SD event (perhaps with international speakers from the US). I feel like maybe the Greens or the regionalists could pull something like this off? In part I think it probably is, in part, just that the old establishment parties are exactly that - old and established so it is more challenging to innovate but also a sense of it being disruptive to potentially get involved in other member states' politics (if you're an RE, EPP or SD party you probably assume you'll be in government or working with other governments from those families so don't want to piss them off). There's always been a similar irony in the UK with Farage and UKIP were arguably the most European of Britain's parties.
The increased interest in the Latin American far-right is also interesting. It's definitely something that's come from memes about Bukele and Milei but is, I think, real. There is cooperation and forums for these movements to work together - can't help but think of similar (very sinister) trans-Atlantic links in the Cold War.
I also think it's why, while there are links with some in the US and UK, there is maybe a need to look beyond an English language/Trump/Brexit frame for thinking about the far-right.
Election poster in Hungary from fidesz. "We brought the future."
(https://i.imgur.com/ffHlTsa.png)
:hmm:
Man, how bad was the past?
*Gestures at Hungary/CEE's 20th century*
:lol: What an apt summary of the country.
Quote from: Sheilbh on May 20, 2024, 06:03:45 PMIt's also a mix of European parliamentary families with ECR groups (FdI, PiS, Vox, Swedish Democrats) and ID (Chega, Le Pen, AfD). Meloni de facto leads the ECR which the EPP is increasingly open to working with as a "respectable" far-right (they're not "populist", which seems to mean not explicitly anti-Europe, pro-Ukraine and not causing issues for the Euro) v the ID group which is still perceived as more problematic.
Le Pen has broken up with AfD as the AfD is too Nazi even for them.
I think they're both still in ID in the European Parliament, but those groups don't always really have a party line (even by EP standards).
But yeah in a way it's interesting who is and isn't invited and, except for Orban, it's an interestingly South America and Southern European group.
It's news from today. The RN said adieu after the last comments by AfD top candidate Krah on how the Waffen SS was not completely criminal.
Edit: They are basically developing in opposite direction. Le Pen wants to be a "respectable" right populist like Meloni. The AfD wants to be the NSDAP.
Interesting - wonder if it will be more than Le Pen who will move into ECR and that will be the split of a "respectable" far-right v ID?
(Although I always add my comment here that FdI is from a literal post-fascist party founded by Social Republic dead enders who, on the streets, still hold events mourning "fallen comrades" giving fascist salutes. She is not "populist" - I think she's more dangerous. Even if it appears her party and others associated with it are increasingly ushered in as respectable Europeans like the EPP or SD or RE.)
Edit: Also interesting how the boundaries matter on that side of politics - Farage would always express "admiration" for Le Pen for changing the party after her father but always refuse to sit in a party with her. It sounds similar.
The four right of centre parties that are forming the government in the Netherlands have appointed a public servant and former head of the intelligence service as the prime minister. While he's a former member of the social democrats, he has never had a political career.
Additionally, it seems that none of the leaders of the four government parties are not going to take ministerial posts and instead sit in parliament as regular MPs.
Beyond what I've read in the article linked below (and a few similar ones), I have no insight into why they're doing it this way, nor of the the likely repercussions.
Fascinating stuff.
https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/05/29/who-is-dick-schoof-and-why-did-geert-wilders-appoint-him
I get why the VVD (I think) insisted they couldn't work with Wilders as PM - which I think is why none of the party leaders are in cabinet. But I slightly worry it'll allow him a position of power without responsibility where he'll be able to shape the government agenda, while also disowning it/acting as if in opposition if things get tough. They're appointing a government of "experts" who are broadly not really political figures, from my understanding.
I think the polls since the election have shown there would be even better results for Wilders if they went to another election. I think the BBB (farmer's party founded after EU rules on nitrogen, as interpreted by Dutch courts, have basically resulted in family farms being shut down) and the NSC (centrist-ish party founded by a former Christian Democrat who I think was prominent in the benefits algorithm scandal) are both fairly populist/anti-system so can work with Wilders as shaking up the established order. I think the VVD is the more interesting case because they're European liberals and the party of former PM, Mark Rutte. Apparently Macron has been outraged that a sister party would enter into coalition with the forces he thinks they're there to vanquish. On the other hand I think except for one term of four years, the VVD have been in every Dutch government since 1994 - they're very good at coalition politics and can go right or left depending on the results.
What they'll do doesn't sound great. But they have committed on Ukraine - which is interesting as I think that has increasingly become the shibboleth in Europe. If you are still committed to Ukraine then you are within the boundaries of acceptable politics - it helped relations with the PiS in Poland and has played a huge part in laundering Meloni's party.
A bbc article on the fascist rise with the young.
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cqqq952e3v6o.amp
As per usual with the far right it's made even more depressing as the logic is completely counter intuitive. The left has failed to fix the world's issues so now let's give the right a turn.... What? We live in a right wing world.
Sadly I've heard this same nonsense belief in reality too. Elon musk the centrist style bizare logic.
Did the EU Vote Match thing - basically various forms of either Volt or Pirate Parties :lol: :bleeding:
Also regionalists/nationalists in Spain.
The only country where no party was even over 50%: Ireland. Apparently Fine Gael comes closest - which I'm not sure about. Sweden was also very low, but apparently closest to the Centre Party which I don't like the sound of <_<
Exit poll from France looks as bad as expected (although pleased to see the PS fightback continues):
QuoteIfop Opinion
@IfopOpinion
🌀 Estimations France entière - Résultats à l'élection européenne – 20h - @IfopOpinion-@Fiducial pour @TF1, @LCI et @Le_Figaro
RN : 32,4%
Renaissance : 15,2%
PS : 14,3%
LFI : 8,3%
LR : 7%
Les Ecologistes : 5,6%
Reconquête ! : 5,1%
Macron, as ever, living for the drama has said it's been a bad night for those who "defend Europe" and will dissolve the Assemblee nationale for new legislatives before the Olympics :ph34r:
(I'd argue that the problem is precisely that the divide is not between those who "defend Europe" and those who don't - but rather different visions of Europe. The pro v anti-EU dichotomy is not accurate and hasn't been since Britain left. To some extent Macron has played into this with his own civilisational vision. But, not just with results in France, we need to start thinking what a far-right European Union would look like.)
Edit: Macron calling it a "democratic moment of truth". I mean maybe he's trying to a Mitterrand 86 - get cohabitation in order to destroy the opposition and win again? Only Le Pen isn't Chirac and Macron can't run again....so....
Or maybe Sunak's precedent of electorally Leeroy Jenkins-ing is just quite inspiring to other rash leaders around the world :lol: :ph34r:
In East Germany, the fascists are now by far the biggest party. Add in a pro-Russian party and 40% of the electorate vote for anti-democratic parties.
Was that the BSW? Over 5%?
Also a very distressing result for the SPD generally :(
Slightly surprised by how strong the AfD result looks, at second nationwide. And from what I've seen pretty dreadful for all the governing parties (though as I've said elsewhere - I think this is a really, really tough environment for incumbents).
Quote from: Sheilbh on June 09, 2024, 02:26:22 PMWas that the BSW? Over 5%?
Also a very distressing result for the SPD generally :(
Slightly surprised by how strong the AfD result looks, at second nationwide. And from what I've seen pretty dreadful for all the governing parties (though as I've said elsewhere - I think this is a really, really tough environment for incumbents).
Having a muslim asylumseeker stab police to death a few days before the elections (and a rather sizeable muslim pro-sharia protest a few weeks earlier) is going to piss of a sizeable number of people.
And Germans are weird in the best of times (and these are not the best of times)
Quote from: Zanza on June 09, 2024, 02:21:19 PMIn East Germany, the fascists are now by far the biggest party. Add in a pro-Russian party and 40% of the electorate vote for anti-democratic parties.
So the DDRs constant paranoia about nazis was right afterall. They were dealt a totally different hand to the west. :P
Quote from: Crazy_Ivan80 on June 09, 2024, 02:38:52 PMHaving a muslim asylumseeker stab police to death a few days before the elections (and a rather sizeable muslim pro-sharia protest a few weeks earlier) is going to piss of a sizeable number of people.
And Germans are weird in the best of times (and these are not the best of times)
Actually these events did not move polls much and they have shown this outcome for weeks and months. This seems to be fairly stable level of support unmoved by current events.
This is more young people and politics - but I might swerve that thread for a little while. But striking that in Germany CDU and AfD level pegging with 17% of the 18-24 vote. We need to snap out of the Anglo-perception of the young = left.
I think AfD peaked with working age voters and do worse with the old - which I think is also the pattern for the RN in France and the far-right in Italy. So while I think there's something going on with young men and Gen Z in the US, maybe a better question is about the working age?
Also worth noting that while the general story across Europe is fall in the Left, Liberals and Greens - with the Social Democrats probably doing better than expected, the EPP doing well and the far-right doing well (across the three big groups they're in) - that doesn't hold up in Scandinavia. There it looks like the Greens and Left have done very well.
No basis for this but can't help but think Greens down, far-right up is possibly a divide of most and least committed to net zero - and as we move from the low hanging fruit of the energy transition that is going to start having an impact on people's lives which needs to be mitigated and managed in a fair way, that is perceived as fair.
(https://i.imgur.com/VySA52J.png)
In Austria, interestingly, the biggest shift seems to have happened ÖVP => FPÖ. In the past, the ÖVP has tried on and off to co-opt FPÖ topics (esp. migration), but it always seems to result in strengthening FPÖ instead.
Quote from: Sheilbh on June 09, 2024, 07:15:43 PMThis is more young people and politics - but I might swerve that thread for a little while. But striking that in Germany CDU and AfD level pegging with 17% of the 18-24 vote. We need to snap out of the Anglo-perception of the young = left.
I think AfD peaked with working age voters and do worse with the old - which I think is also the pattern for the RN in France and the far-right in Italy. So while I think there's something going on with young men and Gen Z in the US, maybe a better question is about the working age?
Also worth noting that while the general story across Europe is fall in the Left, Liberals and Greens - with the Social Democrats probably doing better than expected, the EPP doing well and the far-right doing well (across the three big groups they're in) - that doesn't hold up in Scandinavia. There it looks like the Greens and Left have done very well.
No basis for this but can't help but think Greens down, far-right up is possibly a divide of most and least committed to net zero - and as we move from the low hanging fruit of the energy transition that is going to start having an impact on people's lives which needs to be mitigated and managed in a fair way, that is perceived as fair.
Perhaps some will only learn by facing the consequences of their votes.
Perhaps, although I hope not given how older Europeans learned their aversion to the far-right.
Quote from: Sheilbh on June 10, 2024, 03:22:03 AMPerhaps, although I hope not given how older Europeans learned their aversion to the far-right.
Of course.
The trouble with promising simple problems to complex solutions is they don't work.
So it is a fair thought that give the fasc a term in power and hope they don't fuck up too much and people will start to see sense.
But then look to trump. Fascists by definition are professional victims. If they fail to solve all the world's problems then it's someone else's fault and you need to vote for them even harder.
In Finland, the results were actually quite good compared to the big EU countries. The big winners are National Coalition (center-right) who rose from 3 seats to 4, and the Left Alliance (mainstream left), who got 2 new seats and are now at 3. Far-right nationalist The Finns are big losers, with only 1 seat remaining as their support melted. So no far-right rise over here! I understand it's similar in Sweden, where the far-right SD did not get as much as was feared.
Finnish parties are also a bit different in that our left is very anti-Russia and our greens are pro-science and like nuclear power.
Quote from: Josquius on June 10, 2024, 03:50:43 AMSo it is a fair thought that give the fasc a term in power and hope they don't fuck up too much and people will start to see sense.
Didn't work in Austria, with FPÖ having easily recovered from the Ibiza affair, despite losing, arguably, their most charismatic public figures through the affair and the power struggle afterwards. Though it's conceivable that FPÖ would be polling even better if Strache and Hofer were still in the front row.
Quote from: Josquius on June 10, 2024, 03:50:43 AMThe trouble with promising simple problems to complex solutions is they don't work.
So it is a fair thought that give the fasc a term in power and hope they don't fuck up too much and people will start to see sense.
But then look to trump. Fascists by definition are professional victims. If they fail to solve all the world's problems then it's someone else's fault and you need to vote for them even harder.
If that's what the people want...
Zeit has some good maps of the German results :
https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2024-06/wahlergebnisse-europawahl-deutschland-landkreise-live
Quote from: Syt on June 10, 2024, 04:43:43 AMDidn't work in Austria, with FPÖ having easily recovered from the Ibiza affair, despite losing, arguably, their most charismatic public figures through the affair and the power struggle afterwards. Though it's conceivable that FPÖ would be polling even better if Strache and Hofer were still in the front row.
I saw that from Olivier Blanchard - formerly of IMF (and possibly angling for a big appointment) - saying that this was a bold and smart move because either the election campaign will highlight the RN's inconsistencies and they'll lose, or they'll win and fail in office very badly. Either way inoculating France from Le Pen, President in 2027.
If that's the thinking (and obviously different voting system than Euros which will be a challenge for RN), in Europe 2024 it seems breathtakingly complacent/arrogant.
To illustrate, 5 years between these covers.
(https://i.imgur.com/TZaQqxy.jpeg)
Right: "FPÖ in tatters!"
Left: "FPÖ for the first time in first place in Austria"
Quote from: Richard Hakluyt on June 10, 2024, 04:50:23 AMZeit has some good maps of the German results :
https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2024-06/wahlergebnisse-europawahl-deutschland-landkreise-live
Maybe it is time to build an Anti-Fascist Protection Wall. :hmm:
I find it fascinating how the DDR persists; they have been free now for nearly as long as they were under the soviets. I suppose there is a continual leakage of their brightest and best to the west of Germany which does not help.
Quote from: Richard Hakluyt on June 10, 2024, 11:35:56 AMI find it fascinating how the DDR persists; they have been free now for nearly as long as they were under the soviets. I suppose there is a continual leakage of their brightest and best to the west of Germany which does not help.
I was thinking the Allies might have been better at de-Nazification than the Soviets.
Quote from: Richard Hakluyt on June 10, 2024, 11:35:56 AMI find it fascinating how the DDR persists; they have been free now for nearly as long as they were under the soviets. I suppose there is a continual leakage of their brightest and best to the west of Germany which does not help.
East Germany lost about 15% population since 1990, West Germany grew by 10%. In 1990, the West had 4.1 times the population, now the ratio is 5.4 times. There are a few cities that have population growth, but in rural areas, population is collapsing. Fast.
It is very tough for companies to attract talent and the anti-migrant party being so strong does not help.
That population collapse makes keeping up infrastructure, public transport and retail or health services impossible.
The people left in these dying villages don't understand why money is spent on refugees or Ukraine and the Nazis are sometimes the only group that organize local activities. That's why they get so much support.
Edit: Saxony-Anhalt peaked in 1964 with 3.23 million people. Nowadays it has 2.18 million.
Quote from: Zanza on June 10, 2024, 10:59:43 AMQuote from: Richard Hakluyt on June 10, 2024, 04:50:23 AMZeit has some good maps of the German results :
https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2024-06/wahlergebnisse-europawahl-deutschland-landkreise-live
Maybe it is time to build an Anti-Fascist Protection Wall. :hmm:
Indeed! Worked wonders last time! :lol:
Plus another wall around Bavaria to protect it from Saupreißland :P
Quote from: Richard Hakluyt on June 10, 2024, 11:35:56 AMI find it fascinating how the DDR persists; they have been free now for nearly as long as they were under the soviets. I suppose there is a continual leakage of their brightest and best to the west of Germany which does not help.
Although 35 years isn't very long. I mean we can still see Congress Poland (Poland's election results - which were very good for KO) :P
(https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/0/00/2024_Polish_voivodeship_sejmik_elections.svg/180px-2024_Polish_voivodeship_sejmik_elections.svg.png)
And maybe even the Danelaw :lol:
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GOzt03ZWEAEPjYf?format=jpg&name=small)
(Or who came second in 2019):
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GPYMDddacAAed0r?format=png&name=900x900)
Obviously Communes not people, but fair to say the French map looks a bit different:
https://www.lemonde.fr/en/les-decodeurs/article/2024/06/10/map-the-2024-european-election-results-in-france-town-by-town_6674392_8.html
It's funny. I recall not too long ago speaking to an American woman who had moved to the posh paris suburbs to escape trump.
Woops.
Quote from: Richard Hakluyt on June 10, 2024, 04:50:23 AMZeit has some good maps of the German results :
https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2024-06/wahlergebnisse-europawahl-deutschland-landkreise-live
What the hell is the BSW? Or the FW?
And here I thought I had learned my German parties.
Quote from: Duque de Bragança on June 10, 2024, 12:01:33 PMIndeed! Worked wonders last time! :lol:
Got to watch those East German Panzers through the Ardennes
Quote from: Josquius on June 10, 2024, 02:02:57 PMIt's funny. I recall not too long ago speaking to an American woman who had moved to the posh paris suburbs to escape trump.
Woops.
It is part of the reason I am resolved just to stay here regardless of how weird things get in Texas. Within reasonably limits, us going full Orban might do it.
Quote from: Josquius link= :Embarrass: msg=1443622 date=1718046177It's funny. I recall not too long ago speaking to an American woman who had moved to the posh paris :P to escape trump.
Woops.
American woman in Neuilly, Versailles or the like?
Nah, probably too colbertist/socialist for her. :P
Quote from: Valmy on June 10, 2024, 08:09:51 PMQuote from: Richard Hakluyt on June 10, 2024, 04:50:23 AMZeit has some good maps of the German results :
https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2024-06/wahlergebnisse-europawahl-deutschland-landkreise-live
What the hell is the BSW? Or the FW?
And here I thought I had learned my German parties.
Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht.
True/radical left not too big on gender ideology/« pronouns »/non-binarism etc., soy/veganism/gluten-free/tofu etc. In French that would be described as
progressiste socialement (higher wages and more welfare) and .
conservateur sociétalement.
Also, not at all for mass immigration, and green transition will have to wait since the burden falls too much on the proletariat.
Basically, a throwback to left-wing parties of yore, as in working class, socialist parties.
That was the best part. :P
Splinter of Die Linke, which they beat in votes.
Anti-atlantist, anti-EU and guess what, « neutral » in the Ukraine-Russia war (no weapons to Ukraine). Pro-Palestine but the issue is not played up to the same extent as your run of the mill islamo-leftist party à la Mélenchon.
May be described as as left-wing populists and/or left-wing nationalists.
It's the ex-DDR party, after the AfD that is, if you will.
Analysis of how voters switched between elections in Austria. FPÖ's new votes mostly come from conservative ÖVP and non-voters.
With non-voters increasing and forming such a large block, I hope that in the Federal elections in Autumn there will be an "anyone but FPÖ" surge (kind of like the presidential elections 8 years ago when Greens Alexander Von Der Bellen stood vs Norbert Hofer from FPÖ in the final run off).
(https://i.imgur.com/so6sbau.png)
Quote from: Solmyr on June 10, 2024, 04:11:31 AMIn Finland, the results were actually quite good compared to the big EU countries. The big winners are National Coalition (center-right) who rose from 3 seats to 4, and the Left Alliance (mainstream left), who got 2 new seats and are now at 3. Far-right nationalist The Finns are big losers, with only 1 seat remaining as their support melted. So no far-right rise over here! I understand it's similar in Sweden, where the far-right SD did not get as much as was feared.
Finnish parties are also a bit different in that our left is very anti-Russia and our greens are pro-science and like nuclear power.
Yeah the Scandi results generally are interesting and very good for the Greens and Left. I think Helen Thompson's attempt to provide a scheme was quite helpful: Scandinavia good for Greens with the Left and Liberals doing well in some areas; Southern Europe (except Italy) broadly the traditional party groups are holding up; and then the founder 6 (particularly Germany and France) where there's a large decline in support for the incumbents and the hard right are doing well (Italy's similar but a bit different).
Both in terms of the election results, but then also the analysis (maps of Germany, French parliamentary elections) and consequences it is striking how national these elections were. I know that in theory VdL and Metsola, say, do campaign events across Europe but I think it's still not a European demos voting.
QuoteWith non-voters increasing and forming such a large block, I hope that in the Federal elections in Autumn there will be an "anyone but FPÖ" surge (kind of like the presidential elections 8 years ago when Greens Alexander Von Der Bellen stood vs Norbert Hofer from FPÖ in the final run off).
And interesting how that can have different affects in different countries. I believe the Netherlands saw the PVV vote decline and the GreenLeft win in large part because PVV voters stayed at home.
Overall it looks like turnout might have been a little lower than the last European elections (once adjusting for the UK).
Totally separate from elections etc - a really important story in the Guardian (part of a series) on the use of migrant children in Europe's cocaine trade:
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/ng-interactive/2024/jun/11/north-african-children-beaten-tortured-europe-cocaine-gangs
... I expect that those children who are beaten and tortured by criminals will - if they survive - are at risk of becoming unpleasant grown ups, perpetuating the social damage :(
Quote from: Valmy on June 10, 2024, 08:09:51 PMQuote from: Richard Hakluyt on June 10, 2024, 04:50:23 AMZeit has some good maps of the German results :
https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2024-06/wahlergebnisse-europawahl-deutschland-landkreise-live
What the hell is the BSW? Or the FW?
And here I thought I had learned my German parties.
In German federal elections, you have to win 5% of the vote to get any seats. That rule does not apply to the EU parliament elections.
https://www.techradar.com/computing/cyber-security/proposed-eu-chat-control-law-wants-permission-to-scan-your-whatsapp-messages
QuoteProposed EU Chat Control law wants permission to scan your WhatsApp messages
Shared photos, videos, and URLs are now the target
The EU is currently considering a new plan to scan citizens' encrypted communications, in yet another chapter of its fight against online child sexual abuse material (CSAM).
After harsh criticism, legislators have abandoned the idea of allowing law enforcement to access text messages and audio—shared photos, videos, and URLs are now the target. Yet, experts still warn that citizens' privacy is at risk.
Belgium, which heads the Council of Europe until June 30, proposed the new text as a compromise on what was nicknamed Chat Control law last May, and it's now under review.
There's a catch, though. People must consent to the shared material being scanned before being encrypted. Choosing to reject the scanning will lead to users being prevented from using this functionality at all. The tech world isn't buying it, in fact, Romain Digneaux, Senior Public Policy Associate at Proton, describes it to TechRadar as "a blatant attempt to pull the wool over our eyes."
"This compromise from the Belgian Presidency is a depressing step backward compared to the European Parliament's position," Digneaux told me.
"It will potentially subject all EU citizens to mass surveillance, undermining their fundamental rights while doing nothing to address the spread of CSAM online, nor any of the criticism from the European Data Protection Supervisor and countless experts."
Encryption, meaning the process of scrambling data into an unreadable form to prevent third-party access, is at the base of online communications's security behind today's privacy software.
Virtual private networks use it to secure internet communications and conceal your online activities, for example. Popular messaging apps, like WhatsApp and Signal, or secure email providers like ProtonMail implement encryption to guarantee your messages remain private between you and the sender (end-to-end). Not even the provider itself can access it. As the presentation leaked by digital rights group Netzpolitik shows, Belgian legislators now recognize the need to protect end-to-end encryption.
"Regulation shall not create any obligation to decrypt or create access to end-�to-�end encrypted data, or that would prevent providers from offering end�-to-�end encrypted services," the proposed wording reads. So, how are they planning to implement the CSAM scanning then?
User consent or blackmail?
The key here is the 'user consent' clause. That's the way to make the scanning of privately shared multimedia files not an obligation but a choice. How they plan to do so resembles more to blackmail, however. As we mentioned, if you want to share a photo, video, or URL with your friend on WhatsApp you must give consent, or just stick to texting, calls, and vocal messages.
Commenting on this point, Digneaux said: "There is no consent. There is no choice. If innocent users don't agree to let the authorities snoop on their messages, emails, photos, and videos they will simply be cut off from the modern world."
Proton isn't alone in feeling this way. A group of over 60 organizations—including Proton, Mozilla, Signal, Surfshark, and Tuta, alongside 50+ individuals, signed a joint statement to voice their concerns against the new proposal.
"Coerced consent is not freely given consent," wrote the group. "If the user has no real choice, feels compelled to consent, or would defacto be barred from the service if they do not consent, then the consent given will not be freely given."
Worse still, experts also warned that such intrusive powers might end up being unfit for catching the bad guys. That's because cybercriminals could simply embed the illegal photos or video on a different type of file, for instance. Moreover, as Digneaux pointed out, criminals already use their own services to conduct illegal activity.
A rebrand of client side scanning
The plan to perform CSAM scanning while protecting encryption also includes a new 'upload moderation' provision. Legislators seek to implement content detection before being transmitted—so, before being encrypted. Again, tech experts believe this approach is rather "a mere cosmetic change" from the Chat Control proposal.
The original bill was pushing for client-side scanning instead, a method that requires the device to automatically analyze files for unlawful material and flag them to authorities. To date, there's no way to do this without creating dangerous backdoors into the encryption. This is further supported by the fact that the UK postponed its side-scanning provision for the Online Safety law until it is "technically feasible" to do so.
However, experts now argue that also scanning messages at the upload point defeats the end-to-end principle—complete protection between the sender and receiver—that characterizes strong encryption. They warn this may create new security vulnerabilities for third parties to exploit too.
Digneaux deemed the move as just a "disingenuous rebrand" of client-side scanning. He told me: "No matter what the Presidency claims, it is not a silver bullet to protect privacy. It's simply a backdoor to encryption in disguise. European users will become ideal targets for hackers, putting people and businesses more at risk."
This is why secure end-to-end encrypted messaging apps like Signal (see above) are already reiterating they will leave the EU market rather than undermine privacy protections.
As Netzpolitik reported, though, the new approach remains ambivalent among the country members. During a meeting held at the end of May, Germany and the Czech Republic expressed perplexities about the Belgian proposed scanning solutions before encrypting the messages. Austria, Estonia, and Luxembourg also criticized the 'user consent' provision. While France said that they could accept 'upload moderation' under user consent but demanded that "there should be no circumvention of encryption."
Overall, though, France seems more positive about the proposal and ready to find a compromise that could work for all. That's also why the country's support is set to be decisive for the final agreement.
"We're counting on France to maintain its support for cybersecurity, encrypted services, and privacy," Digneaux told me. "If these proposals are not thrown out now we risk dismantling the vital cybersecurity protections that encryption offers putting everyone at risk. But saddest of all, EU citizens will be treated as guilty before being proven innocent by the very people appointed to protect them."
It is also worth noting that legislators plan to exempt staff of intelligence agencies, police, and the military from the CSAM scanning.
And then they wonder why there's a modicum of distrust if the eu behaves like the ccp.
It reminds me of the DSA and DMA - there are very real, serious risks from this legislation (especially in the hands of an authoritarian government). But it's incredibly difficult to make that argument when the other side is CSAM - or in the case of the DSA and DMA, disinformation, the power of big tech and various real problems like content promoting self-harm to young people. But I think these are often very blunt and potentially quite dangerous powers.
Separately, undercover investigation on the FdI youth wing (you can auto-subtitle on YouTube). This is the descendant of the movement that Meloni joined, aged 15:
I know I bang on about it - but the fact that she's not "populist", isn't Eurosceptic (or endangering the Eurozone) and sound on Ukraine (in line with the Atlanticist tradition of Italian post-fascism) should not blind us to the FdI's politics or why they're dangerous. I'd also add that while she's not provoking fights with other leaders or Europe, Meloni's government has tightened its grip on the media quite dramatically in the last couple of years (media campaigners have said Italy is entering the "Hungary zone" on press freedom). But she's also proposing a referendum style direct election of a PM who will immediately be given a majority in the legislature (which actually is not a million miles from Mussolini's Acerbo Law).
This video includes the leader of the FdI at a European level doing a fascist salute - this isn't a "moderate" version of the far right. It just looks and sounds different (and crucially less pro-Russia) than, say, Le Pen.
I've been thinking about the argument that encroachments in privacy would be bad if government went bad. What's to stop a government gone bad from just legislating encroachments anyway? Is there validity to the argument?
Quote from: Threviel on June 17, 2024, 07:39:37 AMI've been thinking about the argument that encroachments in privacy would be bad if government went bad. What's to stop a government gone bad from just legislating encroachments anyway? Is there validity to the argument?
That's fair. Ultimately there's nothing - it comes down to politics. I suppose forcing a bad government to say what it wants to do and try to do it is helpful in that sense. But I have a general suspicion of this sort of thing and any sort of "emergency legislation" which is passed for good reasons by good governments - because if the police especially, but state institutions generally, have a power in law then they will use it and, probably, it will be used in ways it wasn't originally intended for. It's like legal Chekhov's gun - so you should be careful what powers you introduce.
I think in a European law context, there can be a disconnect between the law in abstract and the powers it creates from the national member state governments responsible for enforcing/using those powers. So for example you can see the logic of platforms having to comply with mandatory take-down orders of illegal content, unmasking anonymous users and to respect "trusted flaggers" to help distinguish disinformation.
However those powers are at the national level and can be exercised by "authorities" (which expressly includes the police) with no requirement for a court order or even hearing. We saw this in the French riots following the death of Nahel Merzouk last year where Macron mused about shutting down social media networks and Breton said (rightly) that this is a power that will exist with the Digital Services Act. He said it would be up to judges which is not true on a European level (but could be in French legislation).
Well also it establishes the infrastructure the bad government could use to enforce its bad intentions quickly. Trying to build an intricate spy network to control your citizens from scratch would be more work than having one provided to you.
Ccp practices are ccp practices, even when not done by the ccp. Or maybe stasi or gestapo would leave a bigger impression on the eu politicians
Meloni's ECR have now become the third biggest grouping in the European Parliament, overtaking the liberals. This is because of new entries so some parties in Bulgaria, Romania and Denmark - as well as the Reconquete MEPs Zemmour expelled.
Quote from: Sheilbh on June 19, 2024, 04:17:19 PMMeloni's ECR have now become the third biggest grouping in the European Parliament, overtaking the liberals. This is because of new entries so some parties in Bulgaria, Romania and Denmark - as well as the Reconquete MEPs Zemmour expelled.
Orban did a publicly advertised visit to her in person to request to join, was publicly refused, then his people declared ok we don't want to join, actually.
I find it fascinating how she is drawing the line of what allows her to operate "credibly" at a European level. Like Marion Marechal is in, while RN are still in the further right.
Quote from: Sheilbh on June 20, 2024, 03:17:58 AMI find it fascinating how she is drawing the line of what allows her to operate "credibly" at a European level. Like Marion Marechal is in, while RN are still in the further right.
Where do you see that line being drawn?
Is it "must support Europe vs Putin"? Is it "we believe we can influence or take over the European project, so if your defined by being anti-EU, you're out"? Something else?
Quote from: Jacob on June 20, 2024, 11:46:10 AMWhere do you see that line being drawn?
Is it "must support Europe vs Putin"? Is it "we believe we can influence or take over the European project, so if your defined by being anti-EU, you're out"? Something else?
I think she is guided by the EU's redlines - but I'm not sure. I'd always understood Marion Marechal as more radical than her aunt but she's in. Part may also be ego/dominance - the leadership of the ECR is Meloni/FDI and PiS, that would shift if you include Le Pen especially now that RN are the largest national party in the European Parliament (and also reportedly they don't like each other).
That may shift if Le Pen wins in 2027 - it seems that inevitably (if only from prestige of founder 6 members) an alliance of far-right leaders in the Netherlands, France and Italy changes things.
For who the EU can work with I think there's basically three criteria: won't blow up the Eurozone, won't get in the way of European support for Ukraine and won't try to leave/blow up the EU. I think if you don't cross those red lines then the EU will flex to include you (especially if you lead a big country - and, perhaps, especially if you're one of the founder members).
Not EU but a European NATO position - Mark Rutte replaces Stoltenberg as the new Secretary-General of NATO.
Good luck to him!
Quote from: Jacob on June 26, 2024, 12:56:29 PMNot EU but a European NATO position - Mark Rutte replaces Stoltenberg as the new Secretary-General of NATO.
Good luck to him!
Not until October.
Hopefully this mighty Dutchman leads us to victory like that great Dutch military leader...um...er...well I am sure they have had some.
Quote from: Valmy on June 26, 2024, 01:06:36 PMQuote from: Jacob on June 26, 2024, 12:56:29 PMNot EU but a European NATO position - Mark Rutte replaces Stoltenberg as the new Secretary-General of NATO.
Good luck to him!
Not until October.
Hopefully this mighty Dutchman leads us to victory like that great Dutch military leader...um...er...well I am sure they have had some.
He's just the political leader, as you know.
Quote from: Sheilbh on June 20, 2024, 12:19:25 PMQuote from: Jacob on June 20, 2024, 11:46:10 AMWhere do you see that line being drawn?
Is it "must support Europe vs Putin"? Is it "we believe we can influence or take over the European project, so if your defined by being anti-EU, you're out"? Something else?
I think she is guided by the EU's redlines - but I'm not sure. I'd always understood Marion Marechal as more radical than her aunt but she's in. Part may also be ego/dominance - the leadership of the ECR is Meloni/FDI and PiS, that would shift if you include Le Pen especially now that RN are the largest national party in the European Parliament (and also reportedly they don't like each other).
That may shift if Le Pen wins in 2027 - it seems that inevitably (if only from prestige of founder 6 members) an alliance of far-right leaders in the Netherlands, France and Italy changes things.
For who the EU can work with I think there's basically three criteria: won't blow up the Eurozone, won't get in the way of European support for Ukraine and won't try to leave/blow up the EU. I think if you don't cross those red lines then the EU will flex to include you (especially if you lead a big country - and, perhaps, especially if you're one of the founder members).
Marion Maréchal is both out of Reconquête, following her disagreement with Zemmour; and RN now, so she has a bit more of margin now. :P
Interesting Fidesz and the FPO with Ano (Czech party) setting up a third far right grouping in the European Parliament.
Arguably the basic split on the radical and far-right is anti-Russia ECR (Meloni, PiS, Baltic far-right etc), Putin-curious ID (Le Pen, Wilders etc) and out and out Russian entryists.
Orban was rejected by everyone so created his own club. But as I understand they don't have enough yet for an official faction.
It is rumoured that Orbans newly minted right-of-right faction might collapse Le Pen's as he is courting some of its members.
I reckon this is going to cost a lot of bribes paid from Hungarian revenues.
Maybe the reason he is visiting Kyiv is to give PIS the excuse to switch.
Also he is using the logo of Hungarys EU presidency to advertise his new faction. Just a despicable human, as always.
Seems to me Le Pen is a winning horse atm? I personally wouldn't switch unless bribes are indeed involved.
I doubt PiS would switch.
Lega are definitely very interested. I think it's interesting that the AfD have said they won't join as it opens up a lot of other parties - most of the Le Pen ID group for example. Also interesting that Smer wouldn't join despite the rumours.
I think in a way it's a bit of a humiliation for Orban. He has enough MEPs to form a group, but not from enough countries (up to four - and he needs seven). At the minute I think the group includes the fifth, seventh and eighth largest far-right parties in the parliament. And, for some reason, entirely based in Austro-Hungarian countries. Not a great position to lead from (I think one of the interesting dynamics will be Orban's position slipping as bigger countries acquire similar governments - particularly in the founding six states).
France continues to love the drama/attention. Meanwhile in the Netherlands the new Health Minister is revealed to have had a Stormfront account :bleeding:
I feel this happened to half The Finns when they did well.
Quote from: celedhring on July 02, 2024, 06:27:46 AMSeems to me Le Pen is a winning horse atm? I personally wouldn't switch unless bribes are indeed involved.
He's got his group which has actually overtaken Meloni's ECR. And reports a third far-right grouping is being formed around AfD :lol: :bleeding:
(https://i.guim.co.uk/img/media/373fa66b050808046c0efa79803780758e19994e/285_80_1625_975/master/1625.jpg?width=1900&dpr=2&s=none)
For some reason I thought AfD was in Orbans group. I don't think they can match his Russian bribes budget though.
No Le Pen kicked them out of I&D (apparently "the SS - were they wrong?" was a bridge too far for her), so unlikely to let them in the new group.
The report I saw from a Brussels reporter:
QuoteJorge Liboreiro
@JorgeLiboreiro
Growing reports that *another* far-right group is about to be formed in the European Parliament with:
🇩🇪 Alternative for Germany (AfD): 15
🇵🇱 Konfederacja: 6
🇪🇸 Se Acabó La Fiesta (SALF): 3
🇧🇬 Revival: 3
🇷🇴 SOS România: 2
🇨🇿 SPD: 1
🇬🇷 NIKI: 1
🇫🇷 Reconquête: 1
Total: 32 MEPs
Apart from Reconquest and Konfederacja, I don't even know any of the others :lol:
Von Der Leyen re-elected as head of the EU commission.
From what I've seen she's done a decent enough job.
Yeah. There's been lot's of criticism - and on specific points some of it maybe justified - but overall I think she's been the most effective and impressive President of the Commission since Delors.
Apparently wind and solar has generated 30% of the EU's electricity in the first half of 2024 - which is more than that generated by fossil fuels (27%). That's pretty good.
So 43% is from Nuclear/Hydroelectric? That's higher than I would have thought, unless there's a category I haven't thought of.
Quote from: Sheilbh on July 09, 2024, 02:42:16 PMAnd reports a third far-right grouping is being formed around AfD
Even far right extremists get a little nervous when it's German far right extremists.
Quote from: frunk on July 30, 2024, 11:53:54 AMSo 43% is from Nuclear/Hydroelectric? That's higher than I would have thought, unless there's a category I haven't thought of.
That's my assumption as well.
Found a graphic this link (https://ember-climate.org/insights/research/eu-wind-and-solar-overtake-fossil-fuels/)that suggests the categories are:
Wind, Solar, Hydro, Nuclear, Coal, Gas, Other Fossil, Other, Demand
Not sure what "other" entails (geothermal, hydrogen...?) or what "demand" means.
Various bits of news from Germany today that are quite striking.
I assume politically responding to the elections in Saxony and Thuringia, Scholz has called for increased negotiations to achieve peace between Russia and Ukraine "more quickly". Also, I think because of those elections, the German government has announced that they will be imposing temporary checks on all of Germany's land borders for the next six months.
Semi-relatedly - due to Germany's balanced budget constitutional rules Germany is intending to halve its bilateral aid to Ukraine, instead it will rely more heavily on contributing to European aid to Ukraine.
There is an echo of this across Europe as the EU fiscal rules are being re-imposed after suspension for covid - the biggest challenge here (which is the context for a lot of the political ructions there), is France. Historically France has not always complied with EU fiscal rules - when he was Commissioner Juncker was asked why France wasn't being put into excessive deficit procedures and responded, with admirable honesty, "because it's France" :lol: But those days are gone - in part this was Macron's grand pitch for Europe - and the French budget deficit looks bad. A consequence of this, especially given the make up of the Assemblee Nationale is likely a President who is very strongly supportive of Ukraine and wants to do more but may find that increasingly challenging, not least for budgetary reasons (given that France's domestic budgets will need to be very austere very soon).
Separately Mario Draghi - again - announced a grand vision of increasing European competitiveness in a 300 page report he produced for the Commission. From what I've seen lots of very, very good stuff in there - basically built around using common debt at a European level to boost private investment. Lots for energy transition, investing in new industries, industrial policy generally and the need to build up European defence industries. In less than three hours Germany's Finance Minister rejected it, saying "joint EU borrowing will not solve the structural problems" and that this type of pooling would create "democratic and fiscal problems. Germany won't agree to this."
Meanwhile, as Daniela Gabor put it, Germany's energy policies (which mean energy is still at least four times the price for industry as it is in the US or China) is basically actively inflicting carbon shock therapy on its own industrial base:
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GXDSwbUXIAAQ8TR?format=jpg&name=900x900)
(And worth pointing out is also broadly pushing against the EU moving too much against China or the US on trade...)
Today is just a lot of things coming together on migration, energy, fiscal constraint/debt fetishisation, trade/China and Ukraine. But when it all comes at once like that I only half jokingly wonder if Angela Merkel was actually a sleeper agent :ph34r:
(And not for the first time I think Draghi could be the saviour of Europe :()
I know the Americans are mourning the decline of 90s style fiscal conservatism, all I can say from Europe in our second decade of austerity is that we should be so lucky :(
Given that we're still collecting debt as if there's infinite money I'd say that there's 'austerity' and austerity.
And stupid energy policies result in stupid prizes/prices.
Yeah. You have to really hate money, the environment, and human life to shut down fine working order nuclear power plants and keep burning coal.
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 09, 2024, 04:40:07 PMMeanwhile, as Daniela Gabor put it, Germany's energy policies (which mean energy is still at least four times the price for industry as it is in the US or China) is basically actively inflicting carbon shock therapy on its own industrial base:
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GXDSwbUXIAAQ8TR?format=jpg&name=900x900)
What happened in 2018 to German energy policies that would explain this decline? I am aware of the extreme 2022 energy price hike. But that's now mostly mitigated. What energy policy caused this before 2022?
I think that energy is just one of many factors, some from public policy, others from private mismanagement that have caused the industrial decline.
When were the nuclear power plants shut down to proactively protect the country from tsunami damage?
Quote from: Tamas on September 10, 2024, 07:58:38 AMWhen were the nuclear power plants shut down to proactively protect the country from tsunami damage?
The first in 2011, the last in 2023.
Quote from: The Brain on September 10, 2024, 08:03:12 AMQuote from: Tamas on September 10, 2024, 07:58:38 AMWhen were the nuclear power plants shut down to proactively protect the country from tsunami damage?
The first in 2011, the last in 2023.
Peak Merkelism. Enact a policy with decades-long impact to quiet a hot-button discussion topic that's bound to be forgotten in a week.
Quote from: Tamas on September 10, 2024, 08:14:20 AMQuote from: The Brain on September 10, 2024, 08:03:12 AMQuote from: Tamas on September 10, 2024, 07:58:38 AMWhen were the nuclear power plants shut down to proactively protect the country from tsunami damage?
The first in 2011, the last in 2023.
Peak Merkelism. Enact a policy with decades-long impact to quiet a hot-button discussion topic that's bound to be forgotten in a week.
With the added side effect of benefiting Russia.
It's amazing how much absolute idiocy fukushima created.
Quote from: Josquius on September 10, 2024, 09:02:14 AMIt's amazing how much absolute idiocy fukushima created.
I blame the Simpsons.
The price for electricity for industrial consumers in Germany. I can see the effect of the Ukraine war, but I find it hard to see the phase out of nuclear power between 2011 and 2023. Currently, prices are at 2017 levels.
(https://cdn.statcdn.com/Statistic/250000/252029-blank-355.png)
I tried finding a graph that track Russian oil exports to Germany but couldn't (probably just bad at it). That could offset loses from the nuke plants, right?
Quote from: HVC on September 10, 2024, 10:46:56 AMI tried finding a graph that track Russian oil exports to Germany but couldn't (probably just bad at it). That could offset loses from the nuke plants, right?
Germany has a relatively small share of gas powerplants and no oil powerplants. The significant amount of gas imported from Russia, especially with Nordstream, was mainly used in household heating and in industrial processes. Both of which can of course with different technology be electrified, which is now happening.
Quote from: Tamas on September 10, 2024, 08:14:20 AMPeak Merkelism. Enact a policy with decades-long impact to quiet a hot-button discussion topic that's bound to be forgotten in a week.
Are you saying there are other decisions Merkele took that fit this description? Sounds like you want to throw shade at her granting asylum to six billion Middle Eastern refugees but I wanted to give you the chance to clarify.
My overall impression is that her only stable policy was to not rock the boat, whatever that would cost. Although her going to the wall on the prevailing sentiment of the day regarding refugees also fits in there, I was not focusing on that. In fact, it was another specific example which I called out as her peak bad move. Focus on the immigration policy is something you just did so perhaps you should clarify your position on it.
I think her decision was awesome. And incidentally it did rock the boat.
Quote from: Crazy_Ivan80 on September 10, 2024, 01:01:38 AMGiven that we're still collecting debt as if there's infinite money I'd say that there's 'austerity' and austerity.
And stupid energy policies result in stupid prizes/prices.
My issue is the debt fetishisation. The state does not exist to achieve balanced budgets or to serve an arbitrary debt target. Obviously you shouldn't be relying on debt for current spending.
But, for example, I do not think energy transition, Ukraine, European de-industrialisation v US and China are policy issues that should be subordinated to fiscal balance.
QuoteWhat happened in 2018 to German energy policies that would explain this decline? I am aware of the extreme 2022 energy price hike. But that's now mostly mitigated. What energy policy caused this before 2022?
I don't think you can really disentangle Germany's energy and Ukraine policies - which is the context of the extreme spike in 2022. It's a little "aside from that Mrs Lincoln, how was the play?"
Similarly I think we should be careful about mitigation. We've had some helpfully mild winters and Europe has been able to pivot so the lights don't go out. My understanding is energy prices (gas and electricity) are still multiples higher than they were pre-war (I think 2-4 times higher). Crucially Europe's economic competitors do not have that issue and energy prices there have largely reverted to pre-war levels.
It's why I quite like the framing of "carbon shock therapy" because the underlying policy you're trying to address may well have worth but it's how you do it and the global context. But setting up a policy framework of the price signal for carbon, without any measures to adjust or protect local industry is just going to lead to deindustrialisation as "market discipline". The Bundesbank is broadly comfortable with this, in 2023 they said that "a certain convergence in the size of the German industrial sector to the proportions seen in other advanced economies would not be cause for concern, per se, especially if it were to occur gradually." (I'm not sure how much you can achieve the gradual occurring if you rely on price signal alone - hence shock therapy).
QuoteI think that energy is just one of many factors, some from public policy, others from private mismanagement that have caused the industrial decline.
I agree I think there are many other factors.
But I do think a number boil back to policy decisions.
QuoteI tried finding a graph that track Russian oil exports to Germany but couldn't (probably just bad at it). That could offset loses from the nuke plants, right?
As I say I think this is why it's difficult to disentangle and why I flag fiscal policy (as spread to Europe), energy, Ukraine and China particularly.
So to take nuclear you can absolutely see how that makes sense on its own. I believe it provided around 25% of German electricity in 2010 and I believe Germany's an energy exporter within Europe. So the context for scaling it down to closure over 10 years: Europe's a leader in renewables and the pace of growth of that type of power is high, in addition you have increased security of supply of cheap-ish gas from Russia through Nordstream and Germany is a large and increasing trade partner with China which is the major growing economic centre, to the extent there are issues German industry moves up the supply chain.
But the policy becomes a lot more challenging if any of those go wrong and, in fact, all of them went wrong. So on energy transition, European renewable roll-out collapses in the early 2010s because of austerity (Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal were the early adopters and it falls apart). For the rest of the 2010s the pace of renewables in Europe basically flatlines and Europe loses its early lead in the renewables to China. Separately, in 2015, China launches their "made in China 2025" policy of wanting to remove their dependencies on foreign trade partners and also to move up the supply chain themselves, which will increase competition in other markets for their German trade partners. Plus it turns out that Russia's gas polciy (as was repeatedly stated by Germany's allies: UK, US, Poland, Baltic states and other neighbours like Ukraine) actually increased risk and exposure rather than being a win-win solution.
And I think that's the case for all of them is that on everyone of those issues the policy decision as a standalone, singular issue but strategically when they are linked they rely on, at best, nothing changing - or perhaps even quite benign outcomes. Which is the end result of that 25% of Germany's electricity supply gone, Germany now importing electricity (primarily from nuclear heavy France or lignite coal heavy Germany so not even necessarily helpful from a decarbonisation perspective), Europe's lead on renewables is gone, the cost of gas for industry is about 4 times higher than in competitors and (with all those issues impacting competitiveness) China is moving up the supply chain.
Then you have Draghi coming out with a detailed, really important report (at the request of the Commission) on how Europe addresses this which is basically that Europe needs to leverage its role in the global economy to count and increase competitiveness and security through energy transition, industrial policy and defence industry. And the German immediately rejects it - which I think will just reinforce and build on those issues in a vicious cycle :( And why I think the shock therapy explanation helps as faced with an age of eco-mercantilism, increasing geopolitical risks and supply shocks, particularly around fossil fuel prices, Germany is very committed to their particular version of rules based liberalism.
Does "debt fetishization" have an actual meaning?
Enough for the CDU to do campaign posters based on it in the 2019 European elections:
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EKYJBijWsAA87r7?format=jpg&name=900x900)
("We stand by our fetish.")
QuoteMy understanding is energy prices (gas and electricity) are still multiples higher than they were pre-war (I think 2-4 times higher).
At least in Germany, energy (electricity, gas, heating oil, car fuel) is now cheaper than it was in February 2022.
Source: https://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/energiemonitor-strompreis-gaspreis-erneuerbare-energien-ausbau
Is that for households or industry though? Because I think households have (rightly) been supported through carbon "shock therapy", nowhere more than Germany:
(https://cepr.org/sites/default/files/styles/flexible_wysiwyg/public/2024-01/ferriani11janfig3.png?itok=Ee9u43tF)
But, from my understanding, less so for industry. And worth noting - to tie to the industrial performance chart - that consumption is down by 10%. From my understanding the industrial decline so far is overwhelmingly concentrated in the energy intensive sectors. It's why I find the "shock therapy" analogy quite helpful - and households/individuals have been protected
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 10, 2024, 02:00:37 PMEnough for the CDU to do campaign posters based on it in the 2019 European elections:
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EKYJBijWsAA87r7?format=jpg&name=900x900)
("We stand by our fetish.")
Fair enough. You're in effect saying there is or there have been debates in Germany about the constitutional debt ceiling, and the arguments made were encapsulated in the word fetish. I've got no argument with you there.
The potential disagreement would arise if the word were the argument, i.e. debt ceilings are based on irrational thinking and therefore primitive and on that basis we should do away with them. Or in other words debt ceiling fetishes are bad because all fetishes are bad.
And I would like to note that you immediately proposed your own debt fetish, i.e. "you shouldn't be relying on debt for current spending."
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 10, 2024, 01:38:50 PMSo to take nuclear you can absolutely see how that makes sense on its own. I believe it provided around 25% of German electricity in 2010 and I believe Germany's an energy exporter within Europe. So the context for scaling it down to closure over 10 years: Europe's a leader in renewables and the pace of growth of that type of power is high, in addition you have increased security of supply of cheap-ish gas from Russia through Nordstream and Germany is a large and increasing trade partner with China which is the major growing economic centre, to the extent there are issues German industry moves up the supply chain.
In the best case scenario forced shutdown of nuclear power plants while still using coal power plants means people needlessly dying, climate change being needlessly enabled, and vast sums of money being needlessly lost. Merkel didn't even have the feeble defense of being personally ignorant, her science background means she was very well aware of this. Of course, from her perspective it made perfect sense, she is the kind of person who will make the world burn to cling on to power.
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 10, 2024, 02:13:58 PMIs that for households or industry though? Because I think households have (rightly) been supported through carbon "shock therapy", nowhere more than Germany:
(https://cepr.org/sites/default/files/styles/flexible_wysiwyg/public/2024-01/ferriani11janfig3.png?itok=Ee9u43tF)
But, from my understanding, less so for industry. And worth noting - to tie to the industrial performance chart - that consumption is down by 10%. From my understanding the industrial decline so far is overwhelmingly concentrated in the energy intensive sectors. It's why I find the "shock therapy" analogy quite helpful - and households/individuals have been protected
Industrial electricity is back at 2017 cost level. Gas is not as the cheap pipeline gas is not coming back. That hurts industrial processes that need heat (as substitution with electricity or hydrogen takes lots of investment first) and those that use gas a chemical precursor.
Quote from: Admiral Yi on September 10, 2024, 03:17:13 PMFair enough. You're in effect saying there is or there have been debates in Germany about the constitutional debt ceiling, and the arguments made were encapsulated in the word fetish. I've got no argument with you there.
And across Europe. As I say that campaign was from the 2019 European elections.
QuoteThe potential disagreement would arise if the word were the argument, i.e. debt ceilings are based on irrational thinking and therefore primitive and on that basis we should do away with them. Or in other words debt ceiling fetishes are bad because all fetishes are bad.
And I would like to note that you immediately proposed your own debt fetish, i.e. "you shouldn't be relying on debt for current spending."
Nothing wrong with a bit of irrational thinking or primitivity (not that they're anywhere near the same). I'm also not a kink-shamer - even for the CDU :P
I think debt ceilings are wrong because they're an artificial constraint on politics, in a world which isn't constrained or orderly. So at best you'll either need to make a mockery of them, or live in states of emergency which I don't think is a good thing. Just be prudent on the everyday stuff.
I think you see the impact of that in Europe and in Germany - the point I made to Ivan - that the state and politics is subordinated to fiscal target. Debt is literally a fetish. It is the objective and key measure - not the actual policy goal. Germany is halving bilateral support for Ukraine in order to meet their debt rules; Europe is not investing in industrial capacity in the same way (or at the same scale) as the US or China because of opposition to common European debt from the German government. Those are bad outcomes driven because the focus is on the debt not the politics and the outcomes we want to see. If we're faced in a future of Russia nibbling at the Baltics caught between an indifferent US and hostile China, I'm not sure the sacrifices made to achieve schwarze null will really compensate.
And, if these debt rules lead to a halving of German bilateral support to Ukraine and retrenchment in France and at a European level, then the outcome will be like Trump winning and doing the worst we expect. If the policy outcome is the same as the GOP crazies, then while it may not be because "irrational thinking" and was instead because of very sensible, centrist figures who profoundly believe in the rules based order - then what is the point of them?
Quote from: Zanza on September 10, 2024, 03:31:51 PMIndustrial electricity is back at 2017 cost level. Gas is not as the cheap pipeline gas is not coming back. That hurts industrial processes that need heat (as substitution with electricity or hydrogen takes lots of investment first) and those that use gas a chemical precursor.
Okay so looking into it (ignore the red circle which was a computer glitch causing panic) that's sort of true at some points. There's some volatility in 2017 but basically it's broadly between 0 and 50 EUR. 2024 is far more volatile and the range is broadly between 0 and 100 EUR. I don't know on the average level but it does look about double the level it was between 2015-2020:
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GQ-0NOjXYAAM0wm?format=png&name=900x900)
Given that I imagine the price for industrial users is hedged in some way, given the levels of volatility I expect there's some premium there.
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 10, 2024, 04:05:52 PMDebt is literally a fetish. It is the objective and key measure - not the actual policy goal.
Debt rules are instituted in furtherance of *a* actual policy goal. There is always more than one. Sometimes they conflict and we have to choose.
Quote from: Admiral Yi on September 10, 2024, 04:33:53 PMDebt rules are instituted in furtherance of *a* actual policy goal. There is always more than one. Sometimes they conflict and we have to choose.
If it's a constitutional rule or quasi-constitutional rule as in Germany and the EU (where it's in the treaties) it isn't a policy goal. It's not a question of them conflicting and choosing. It is the condition of other policies and structures the debate and choices you can make over them.
I don't think it's directly related to the Ukraine decision, but in Germany I believe the constitutional limit on deficit spending is 0.35% of GDP. There are exceptions for states of emergency, such as over covid. A lot of the recent budgetary issues is because the government basically agreed to spend leftover deficit money allowed for the covid emergency to be used for other purposes (largely climate spending). The Constitutional Court, I believe, ruled this wasn't allowed as it had to be related to the underlying emergency - which means all the coalition commitments were pushed into the normal budget - so either abandon them or cut other spending.
But I believe zeitenwende and Ukraine spending have also been using the special rules to incur debt without deficit spending. As I say we're moving from a debate about what is the right, how to pay for it and trade offs to debates about how to account for it, get around rules or (when that's exhausted) cancelling really important policies (like energy transition and supporting Ukraine) for accounting reasons. Debt becomes a fetish, distorting and displacing the actual politics.
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 10, 2024, 04:50:57 PMIf it's a constitutional rule or quasi-constitutional rule as in Germany and the EU (where it's in the treaties) it isn't a policy goal.
It was included in the constitution in furtherance of policy goals at the time.
Are we having a meaningless semantic debate? Policy goal to me is just another way of saying desired result.
Quote from: Admiral Yi on September 10, 2024, 04:55:00 PMIt was included in the constitution in furtherance of policy goals at the time.
Are we having a meaningless semantic debate? Policy goal to me is just another way of saying desired result.
Maybe.
A constitution to me is the ground rules of politics (and I'm generally very, very suspicious of having to many of those rules). I don't think constitutional amendments are the way to achieve policy goals - they are (or should be) for a higher purpose. The bar to changing them is higher and for them to have legitimacy they require broad general consensus.
Policies operate within those rules. The way to achieve policy goals is normal legislation and executive action (within that constitutional framework).
And I would like to say that I am both sides on this. I don't really support hiving policy objectives of left or right into constitutional documents. For it's for the how and why of politics, not the what. (Edit: And I think it moves what should be a policy debate: "should we have a deficit to increase spending on Ukraine and energy transition" into a legal debate of whether or not it is allowed - and the adjudication moves from democratic decision-making by voters and legislators to the courts.)
The other side of the argument is that the broad electorate, if left unconstrained, will always engage in short term thinking and vote themselves free money, with the disastrous consequence of default. An assumption which I think is amply supported by modern history.
And to extend the debate, isn't that the entire justification for having a constitution in the first place? That if voter choice is unconstrained, they will do something stupid and destructive?
replace "always" with "tend to"
We're back to the democracy v anti-democracy debate. Which is fair enough - it's been with us since the Greeks :lol: I don't buy the Greeks or the founders argument that is suspicious of the "mob" risk of democracy. It is however disguised an argument for some form of oligarchy or other power base and I'm not sure their record is significantly better (hunting for glory etc).
I am not convinced by the argument that modern history shows courts to be better at protecting the rights and freedoms of individuals, or democracy itself than a democratic public. It may well be the case that on certain policy measures a legal or other type of technocratic elite can deliver very impressive outcomes (obviously Lee Kuan Yew - I think the's also an argument in that direction for the Chinese Communist Party since Deng). But there are also many examples of those groups failing - history is littered with failed technocrats, modernisers and enlightened despots.
This is also partly why I'm suspect of policy goals in constitutions. If the measure is what has been achieved v how and why, I think that leads in a concerning direction - for example I can't help but wonder if we are approaching a point where certain state decisions could almost be determined in an optimal and most fair way algorithmically, which might absolutely meet the what test. You could smooth out the conflict, set the parameters of the algorithm from you constitutional debt rules and your constitutional duty to protect the rights of the child (Ireland 2012) etc and let it play out. In EU debate terms, in balancing output legitimacy v input legitimacy - I don't think we should build systems around output legitimacy too much (not least because I think that's brittle).
There is a question of where power should lie in order to determine the limits of politics. I am very much in political constitution camp - that the limits should be determined politically and that, to nick another German phrase, we should dare more democracy. I think it is striking in the US with Trump that the most effective resistance both institutionally and at the level of policy came not from national politics, the courts or the civil service ("this anonymous NYT op-ed will matter") - but from America's deep democracy at the state, city, county local level. The challenge with the mob is that they're difficult to control and might do something crazy; the problem with elites is that they're supine and won't.
I don't know that modern history amply supports that idea - or that default is really the worst thing we can consider.
My broad view is that the world is uncertain and becoming more uncertain (I hope it won't happen in my lifetime but there'll be another pandemic, climate events and their knock-on effects are the new normal, geopolitics matters again etc). I don't know that democracy necessarily delivers the best results, but I think it tends to be the most able to change and adapt to the times and challenges which I think should be an advantage. And is why I think one of the problems we have is that I think a lot of democratic states have shirked responsibility in recent years (in the name of good, liberal, limited power, technocratic ideals) to such an extent that it is mere managerialism - and I think we're in an age that needs a bit more of the FDR style bold, persistent experimentation. And can, hopefully, draw upon the input legitimacy of an empowered people not just the output delivery of a state meeting its KPIs.
But constitutions are created through democratic processes, at least in democratic countries. The US Federal Reserve Bank was granted independence by the democratic process after the electorate was convinced they were not very good at performing the balancing act required to optimize money supply. The Justice Department is in theory supposed to be immune to political pressure because we believe justice is best served by the technocrats and not the mob.
As to whether default is a big deal or not, I guess one of us gets to say I told you so when it happens to one of us.
One other thing I forgot to include: the people who want to send German aid to Ukraine (I'm one of them) could achieve that goal by establishing a national emergency fund. Pretax oneself to spend on future unforseen events. Win win.
People are too dumb for unfettered democracy. See Trump voters.
Quote from: Admiral Yi on September 10, 2024, 06:03:14 PMBut constitutions are created through democratic processes, at least in democratic countries. The US Federal Reserve Bank was granted independence by the democratic process after the electorate was convinced they were not very good at performing the balancing act required to optimize money supply. The Justice Department is in theory supposed to be immune to political pressure because we believe justice is best served by the technocrats and not the mob.
As to whether default is a big deal or not, I guess one of us gets to say I told you so when it happens to one of us.
Are they? Some constitutions are created through democratic means. But many constitutions are created in a "constitutional moment" - an event that requires some sort of reset. For example, independence, occupation, revolution, coup - I think it's relatively rare for democratic states to replace or create their constitutions anew through democratic means. They are normally products of crisis. And there is, of course, an awe-inspiring confidence in any constitution binding not just themselves but future generations - few constitutions are contingent and subject to re-ratification. I think their legitimacy is, instead, often tied to that moment of crisis and that generation of founders.
Although I think there is an argument that constitutions actually aren't created by the writing or even ratifying, but through the interpretation of the living. It's a bit like the house that gets re-built constantly - how many bits need to be replaced while you can still call it the same house. Part of that process is democratic through living politics, other parts are not like the interpretations of the courts. But that practical living of a constitution is how it is re-ratified and democratically legitimised.
I think there are areas where technocracy works. I'm not sure they're fixed. Technocracy works are ones where there is a high level of technical expertise required and a broad degree of consensus on the desirable outcomes. That broadly applies, for now, to central banks (I think that may become contested in the future - as, in the past, the role of central banks has been contested). And there is an alternative story - that the functions of central banking was being performed but by a few big banks (especially JP Morgan) and New York. That the consensus was formed not because the electorate finally realised they were too stupid but because it was a coalition of moving power from private to public hands, distributing it around the US while insulating from too much democratic turmoil.
QuoteOne other thing I forgot to include: the people who want to send German aid to Ukraine (I'm one of them) could achieve that goal by establishing a national emergency fund. Pretax oneself to spend on future unforseen events. Win win.
Right but to me that means either regular states of emergency related to Ukraine or sort of looking for loopholes. For me a constitutional requirement should be pretty solid and principle driven - having regularly to subvert the intent of a constitutional rule to meet legitimate political goals seems to me exactly the problem. And a dangerous precedent: assume bad people win office and we've now established that it's a rule you follow in letter not spirit. Does that apply to all the constitution? Why just this bit?
QuotePeople are too dumb for unfettered democracy. See Trump voters.
Of course, in an unfettered democracy they've never won a majority so would have lost in 2016 :P
Fetters kept someone like him from running for 250 years :lol:
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 10, 2024, 06:38:16 PMAre they? Some constitutions are created through democratic means.
The German one we've been discussing was.
QuoteRight but to me that means either regular states of emergency related to Ukraine or sort of looking for loopholes. For me a constitutional requirement should be pretty solid and principle driven - having regularly to subvert the intent of a constitutional rule to meet legitimate political goals seems to me exactly the problem. And a dangerous precedent: assume bad people win office and we've now established that it's a rule you follow in letter not spirit. Does that apply to all the constitution? Why just this bit?
I don't understand this.
Quote from: Admiral Yi on September 10, 2024, 06:55:12 PMThe German one we've been discussing was.
The German one written in 1949? I'd put that one under the created under occupation camp.
I think the intent, and why it's Basic Law and not a constitution, was that it would be revised on reunification. My understanding, and I could be totally wrong, is that it on a purely technical legalist level is still provisional rather than a constitution. I'm not sure about the formal process of East Germany acceding to the Bundesrepublik with the Basic Law - I think it'd be quite interesting to read about though so might look that up :hmm:
QuoteI don't understand this.
Which bit?
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 10, 2024, 07:14:57 PMThe German one written in 1949? I'd put that one under the created under occupation camp.
I think the intent, and why it's Basic Law and not a constitution, was that it would be revised on reunification. My understanding, and I could be totally wrong, is that it on a purely technical legalist level is still provisional rather than a constitution. I'm not sure about the formal process of East Germany acceding to the Bundesrepublik with the Basic Law - I think it'd be quite interesting to read about though so might look that up :hmm:
Was it not written and voted in by democratically elected Germans? Was it not ratified by the German people? These are honest questions. I'd always assumed yes but now that it comes up I don't know for sure.
Similarly with East Germany. Did they have a say, like a referendum, or was it more like an annexation.
QuoteWhich bit?
The whole thing?
Quote from: Admiral Yi on September 10, 2024, 07:27:18 PMWas it not written and voted in by democratically elected Germans? Was it not ratified by the German people? These are honest questions. I'd always assumed yes but now that it comes up I don't know for sure.
There were democratic processes for sure. So I could be totally wrong I think the state "legislatures" elected representatives to the drafting committee and then the state legislatures endorsed the Basic Law. But those state "legislatures" are to an extent advisory in the context of the allied occupation zones and administrators from France, UK and US - and it is in the context of hundreds of thousands of occupying troops.
My understanding is the Western allies basically gave a framework to those elected representatives to work within when drafting a constitution. I think there was some degree of sign-off as well, so if the occupying powers were not happy with provisions they either had a veto or could remove them.
What's really interesting though is that, from my understanding, many, many West German politicians and people did not want the Basic Law or any constitution at all. The German Historical Museum in Berlin is mostly closed for renovations but they've got a temporary exhibition on "turning points" and there's a couple around this time. Because many, many Germans do not want their country divided and writing a constitution for the areas occupied by the Western powers in effects institutionalises the split - I think this is around the time that Stalin makes his offer (which you can read however you want) of a disarmed, democratic, neutral, unified Germany) which the Western allies oppose and doesn't happen. Many Germans in the West wanted that. I believe that's part of the reason Germany ends up with a "provisional" Basic Law rather than a constitution - it allowed space for the aspiration to unification.
Italy's a really interesting counter-point though - because (as in the war) Italy's a bit of a sideshow. But also there were huge amounts of anti-fascist partisan fighting in Italy. So there's no "de-fascistification" in Italy. They very quickly have a referendum on monarchy or republic. They elect a constituent assembly which basically requires the (anti-fascist) Christian Democrats and Communists to do a deal. The outcome is what Italian commentators, lawyers, historians still refer to as the most "elegant" constitution in the world - everything's really very balanced, power is distributed, there's lots about the rights of workers and the family. And it is, I think, one of the world's only explicitly anti-fascist constitutions because it was basically written by the intellectual wing of the partisans. Needless to say FdI is very explicitly anti-constitutional and wants to "reform" it in part because it fundamentally de-legitimises their politics.
But it's really interesting because it's so much less influenced by the allies - Italy's a sideshow, there are armed partisans on the edge of civil war and the Communists need to be brought in in a way that isn't the case in West Germany. But also how the understanding of the constitution as this anti-fascist bulwark built by the left and anti-fascist right is a really big part of its legitimacy.
QuoteSimilarly with East Germany. Did they have a say, like a referendum, or was it more like an annexation.
I think annexation is wrong - there are certainly people on the hard-left who talk in those terms.
My understanding is that East Germany acceded to West Germany's legal framework in order to form Germany, rather than both West and East Germans having a constitutional convention to create Germany. I don't know on the actual process or reason for that approach. I can't help but wonder, given that Thatcher, who went mad over this, and Mitterrand, who used it to get the Euro, were both very, very anxious about German reunification and a convention to debate "Germany" might have caused conniptions :lol: But I think there are queries about this now - there are novels by East German writers and I think they have flagged a feeling of loss/becoming "second class" less citizens who just became part of West Germany - and AfD and BSW voters both very strongly feel that the East is treated as "second class".
Edit :And of course this is framed by retrospection. It is the looking back of writers and people 30 years after the event. It perhaps may have been different in 1990 but, from my understanding, we don't necessarily know.
QuoteThe whole thing?
Okay, I'll try again :lol:
My general view about constitutions is that everyone should be looking to comply. If it is too political it makes the operation of normal politics difficult because everything is constitutional and if it is too prescriptive it makes all procedure constitutional.
I think debt rules fall into the category of both. Tax and spending power is normally the base of democratic politics. And crises are regular (just not predictable) that may require extra spending or tax cuts for various reasons. Or it could simply be shifts in in-year accounting in the Finance Department or short-term shifts require a change because they have constitutional impacts?
On the one hand you could, in effect, ignore it. Or get around it through accounting tricks where the debate around policy decisions moves from being about the thing itself, to whether you can do it off-book or not. Or use the emergency exceptions. If you are regularly having to declare states of emergency to do normal politics of responding to crises, that is a problem.
But I think all of those have a problem because the constitution is no longer a document that you are trying to comply but one that you are regularly working to get around. I think that's not a good thing - and I think precedent matters. You'd be able to say "the other side did it" because non-compliance/working around the constitution gets baked into politics.
Looks like Germany is excluding Swiss arms manufacturers from future tenders - and that other European countries are considering similar measures: https://www.watson.ch/international/wirtschaft/254669912-deutschland-will-keine-ruestungsgueter-mehr-aus-der-schweiz
Quote from: Linked article translated to English via Google TranslateGermany no longer wants military equipment from Switzerland
A letter from Germany is causing quite a stir. It states that Swiss companies are excluded from applying for procurement from the German armed forces.
A Swiss company wants to take part in a large German tender for 100,000 stationary multispectral camouflage equipment for the German army. The catch: the company's production facility must be located on EU territory, the tender states.
A mistake, the company thinks. The European Free Trade Association EFTA with Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Iceland and Norway has probably been forgotten. It turns to the Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and In-Service Support.
Then comes the sobering realization: the EFTA states have by no means been forgotten. The company consciously decided to have a production site in the EU and will not deviate from that.
Letter explains German "Lex Switzerland"
A short time later, a letter from Germany to the Federal Office for Armaments (Armasuisse) provided clarity, which was reported on by "Le Temps". The Federal Office, which is subordinate to the Federal Ministry of Defense, announced that it wanted to avoid an effect similar to that of the ammunition for the Gepard anti-aircraft tank when procuring the weapons. A production facility in the EFTA states was deliberately ruled out. The multispectral camouflage equipment was one of the key technologies for the Bundeswehr. In addition, it must be possible to pass it on to a partner country in the event of war.
The German Federal Office's letter referred to the squabble between Germany and Switzerland over 12,000 rounds for the Gepard anti-aircraft tank. Germany wanted to pass them on to Ukraine. It had bought them in Switzerland and needed the country's blessing because of a non-re-export declaration. The country said no for reasons of neutrality.
The letter is proof that there is a "Lex Switzerland" in Germany: The country no longer buys arms products from Switzerland. Armaments chief Urs Loher put it bluntly in "Le Temps": "Germany no longer trusts Switzerland. In the German parliament, for example, 'Swiss Free' is apparently used in the same breath as 'China Free'."
The Dutch parliament has already decided not to buy any more military equipment from Switzerland. Similar considerations are also being made in Denmark and Spain. The VBS is not yet clear whether the German letter is a warning shot or just the beginning.
Citizens blame themselves
The situation has led to mutual blame among the bourgeois parties. "We are in the process of definitively destroying the Swiss arms industry," says FDP President Thierry Burkart. The left has been working towards this for decades by tightening the War Material Act. "The SVP is now the executor of this law because it is preventing the transfer of arms from European states to Ukraine by misinterpreting our neutrality."
In 2022, Burkart submitted a motion demanding that a non-re-export declaration be waived entirely if the delivery is made to states that are committed to our values. "It has nothing to do with neutrality if other countries want to support each other with weapons that they bought in Switzerland years ago."
The SVP is passing the hot potato on to the centre. "The damage was caused by the tightening of the War Material Act," says President Marcel Dettling. "The centre is to blame for this with its back and forth: it tightened the law with the left, but wanted to go back after the war broke out." Without the tightening, the export authority would have remained with the Federal Council. "This policy lacks longevity."
The SVP was against tightening the law, but then did not want to make an exception for Ukraine because it was not prepared to deliver to war zones. "Now we are offering to ensure that countries that have bought military equipment in Switzerland are allowed to export it again after a period of five years."
The center is holding the government accountable. "The Federal Council can, on its own initiative, authorize the export of weapons purchased in Switzerland to other countries, based on Articles 184 and 185 of the Federal Constitution," says President Gerhard Pfister. "The general tightening of the arms export law still allows this. But the SVP-FDP Federal Council does not want to do this." And Parliament has so far not succeeded in finding a solution that can gain a majority.
Pfister counters the SVP accusation with a counter question: "Why is it now opposing the delivery of protective vests on grounds of neutrality, but wants to allow the re-export of weapons?"
The Swiss company now wants to produce in an EU country. (aargauerzeitung.ch/lyn)
I didn't know Switzerland had arms manufacturers. I though they all died out when the pike became obsolete. :D
Quote from: PJL on September 11, 2024, 12:41:17 PMI didn't know Switzerland had arms manufacturers. I though they all died out when the pike became obsolete. :D
The Swiss arms industry is actually pretty big, as I understand it. It's a classic neutral country thing to do - sell weapons to the non-neutral countries. It might be a little less effective if you insist your buyers can't use the weapons they get from you the way they like, I reckon.
Looks like that industry won't be big for long.
Quote from: Jacob on September 11, 2024, 12:56:14 PMThe Swiss arms industry is actually pretty big, as I understand it. It's a classic neutral country thing to do - sell weapons to the non-neutral countries. It might be a little less effective if you insist your buyers can't use the weapons they get from you the way they like, I reckon.
That does feel like a pretty big issue for an arms manufacturer.
I suppose they could just focus on very repressive regimes or states unlikely to get involved in wars with states who also like Swiss banking. Saudi feels like a safe bet because I doubt they'd care about shelling Yemen, say.
Yeah, the Swiss arms makers have already been hurt by their decisions over Ukraine. Interesting to see it's official.
https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/swiss-weapons-exports-plunge-neutral-stance-hurts-trade-2024-03-05/#:~:text=Despite%20its%20long%2Dheld%20neutrality,Stockholm%20International%20Peace%20Research%20Institute.
Quote from: Josquius on September 11, 2024, 02:43:28 PMYeah, the Swiss arms makers have already been hurt by their decisions over Ukraine. Interesting to see it's official.
https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/swiss-weapons-exports-plunge-neutral-stance-hurts-trade-2024-03-05/#:~:text=Despite%20its%20long%2Dheld%20neutrality,Stockholm%20International%20Peace%20Research%20Institute.
According to that article Denmark was the second biggest buyer of Swiss arms in 2023 (after Germany). That makes the report that Denmark is considering excluding the Swiss from future procurement more weighty I think.
Quote from: Sheilbh on September 11, 2024, 07:19:33 AMOkay, I'll try again :lol:
My general view about constitutions is that everyone should be looking to comply. If it is too political it makes the operation of normal politics difficult because everything is constitutional and if it is too prescriptive it makes all procedure constitutional.
I think debt rules fall into the category of both. Tax and spending power is normally the base of democratic politics. And crises are regular (just not predictable) that may require extra spending or tax cuts for various reasons. Or it could simply be shifts in in-year accounting in the Finance Department or short-term shifts require a change because they have constitutional impacts?
On the one hand you could, in effect, ignore it. Or get around it through accounting tricks where the debate around policy decisions moves from being about the thing itself, to whether you can do it off-book or not. Or use the emergency exceptions. If you are regularly having to declare states of emergency to do normal politics of responding to crises, that is a problem.
But I think all of those have a problem because the constitution is no longer a document that you are trying to comply but one that you are regularly working to get around. I think that's not a good thing - and I think precedent matters. You'd be able to say "the other side did it" because non-compliance/working around the constitution gets baked into politics.
These are all valid arguments. But all these advantages of flexible borrowing will be lost if your country defaults. I suppose the counter to that is what's the point of working to save the ability to borrow for future generations if no one, including those future generations, ever gets to use it.
And I suppose I don't consider "well, who cares if we default" to be a very rationale response to the issues I've raised.
As to the historical stuff: OK? They should rewrite it?
It seems weird to sell weapons if you think them being used in a war will violate your neutrality. That seems like a good scenario compared to other uses your weapons could be put to.
Besides, they're doing neutrality wrong. You're supposed to be neutral so that you can take money from both sides. So let Russian oligarchs keep using your banks to store I'll gotten gains, while still suppling the Ukrainians with arms. They're disappointing their Swiss forebearers.
Quote from: HVC on September 11, 2024, 06:09:07 PMBesides, they're doing neutrality wrong. You're supposed to be neutral so that you can take money from both sides. So let Russian oligarchs keep using your banks to store I'll gotten gains, while still suppling the Ukrainians with arms. They're disappointing their Swiss forebearers.
And have mercenaries fight on the various battlefields