Will Israel ever physically attack Iran's nuclear infrastructure?

[Eddie Teach]

Khamenei may have enough sense not to tangle with Israel, but the Iranian populace would eat it up.

[Admiral Yi]

I think the biggest worry is deniable 3rd party transfer, not Iranian first strike.

[Bluebook]

You can't compare the Iraq and Syria strikes, which were on parts of individual facilities, to the wide-ranging campaign that would be needed to merely set back the Iranian programme. The title says it all: Iran has a nuclear infrastructure.

So you attack and set it back. And then you set it back again. And then again.

I honestly do not understand people who seem to think you cannot prevent Iran from getting the bomb via air-strikes.

[Darth Wagtaros]

I think the biggest worry is deniable 3rd party transfer, not Iranian first strike.

Yes.  That would be it.

[Eddie Teach]

I think the biggest worry is deniable 3rd party transfer, not Iranian first strike.

I don't think their denials will save Tehran from Israeli nukes.

[Admiral Yi]

I don't think their denials will save Tehran from Israeli nukes.

If it gets to that point, deterrance has failed.

[Barrister]

Has anyone mentioned Iran's unveiling of it's brand new stealth fighter?

http://www.theatlanticwire.com/global/2013/02/iran-new-stealth-fighter-jet-fake/61781/

[dps]

This aint yo momma's IDF.  There won't be another Osirak strike.

There was in Syria not that long ago. 

Not that there won't be military strikes (after all they hit Gaza, again, recently).  It's that there won't be effective strikes such as Osirak.

You earlier seemed to be suggesting that there wouldn't be an attack on Iran's nuclear program because the current Isreali leadership lacked the balls to do it. Now you're saying that they lack the competance to pull a strike out effectively, which is quite a different thing.

[Malthus]

This aint yo momma's IDF.  There won't be another Osirak strike.

There was in Syria not that long ago. 

Not that there won't be military strikes (after all they hit Gaza, again, recently).  It's that there won't be effective strikes such as Osirak.

They stuck at Syria a few years ago (2007), basically just as effectively as at Iraq.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Orchard

[Malthus]

I suspect the issue here is an advanced case of "victory disease" by proxy - that is, seriously over-estimating Israeli military prowess in the past and thus being overly dismayed by Israeli military failures in the present.

In reality, the Israeli military and intelligence always had its share of military screw-ups and failures, right from the very beginning. Some of the worst were right after their remarkable victory in '67 - as revealed by the disasterous opening to '73. 

In dealing with partisan and guerilla or terrorist enemies, it is very difficult to score flashy successes. "Success" is often essentially negative - meaning, your citizens aren't being murdered (as much). Conflicts like Gaza lack a purely military solution: Israel has no interest in actually ruling Gaza, so invading 'em makes little sense.

[CountDeMoney]

I think the biggest worry is deniable 3rd party transfer, not Iranian first strike.

Considering that's the most likely scenario, yeah.

[derspiess]

Has anyone mentioned Iran's unveiling of it's brand new stealth fighter?

http://www.theatlanticwire.com/global/2013/02/iran-new-stealth-fighter-jet-fake/61781/

That's hilarious.

[Warspite]

I think the biggest worry is deniable 3rd party transfer, not Iranian first strike.

It's not a realistic worry. My understanding from proliferation experts is that the origin of a bomb is pretty much traceable through forensic examination even if it has detonated. So even in the case of a supposedly deniable third party transfer, the warhead material could be traced back to the Iranian programme. The attribution pillar of deterrence would hold. If a proxy suitcase-bomb Tel Aviv, Tehran gets nuked.

[crazy canuck]

I think the biggest worry is deniable 3rd party transfer, not Iranian first strike.

It's not a realistic worry. My understanding from proliferation experts is that the origin of a bomb is pretty much traceable through forensic examination even if it has detonated. So even in the case of a supposedly deniable third party transfer, the warhead material could be traced back to the Iranian programme. The attribution pillar of deterrence would hold. If a proxy suitcase-bomb Tel Aviv, Tehran gets nuked.

Lets just hope the Iranians know that. ie - their risk assessment guys are better than their fake plane design guys.

[Warspite]

You can't compare the Iraq and Syria strikes, which were on parts of individual facilities, to the wide-ranging campaign that would be needed to merely set back the Iranian programme. The title says it all: Iran has a nuclear infrastructure.

So you attack and set it back. And then you set it back again. And then again.

I honestly do not understand people who seem to think you cannot prevent Iran from getting the bomb via air-strikes.

The mowing the lawn approach has been touted, but it isn't very realistic. Actually, it's nigh on impossible logistically for Israel to achieve unilaterally.

There are also other side effects. Right now, despite some obstruction from the Iranian regime, IAEA inspectors have extensive access to Iranian facilities, including some important ones at two hours notice. I know the Languish way is to scoff at any international organisation, but analysts of the Iranian crisis agree that the IAEA regime has provided extremely useful insight into the programme that even Western intelligence agencies draw from.

If you bomb the Iranian programme, it goes underground, both figuratively and literally: no inspections, and even less data on what the Iranians are actually doing, where they're doing it, how and with what.