The China Thread

[Viking]

However.
The CP in China is an unusual organization.  It is highly meritocratic, (internally) competitive, open to outside talent, and pragmatic.  Internally and sometimes publicly, it engages in deep reflection and self-criticism.  The fact that it has been able to achieve such extraordinary developmental results in such a short time while maintaining political stability is an impressive achievement and testament to the Party's adaptability and resoucefulness.  It is true, of course, that the Party in nonetheless prone -- as all one-party collegial structures -- to corruption, cliquism, and over-emphasis on consensus (or the appearance over consensus).  And it is also true that the challenge of suppressing the natural middle class desire for greater political participation and voice will only increase as that middle class grows in number, in affluence and in education.

Only time will tell.

Time did tell, this is how china has been run for most of the last 2500 years. The mandarins have taken over the kitchen and there is no emperor to shake things up anymore. This is part of the standard chinese cycle or Inspiration-Stagnation-Deterioration-Chaos-Inspiration. Chinese history has been about getting to Stagnation and staying there for as long as possible.

[Camerus]

It could also be said that the real developmental breakthrough for Germany came after the combination of the world wars.

I doubt it.  Germany's relative global economic, cultural and scientific standing in 1914 was far greater than anything post-1945.

Thats nice.  We were talking about the democratization process.

If you were just talking about that, then you comment was utterly meaningless and obvious. 

[Eddie Teach]

If you were just talking about that, then you comment was utterly meaningless and obvious.

Obvious, sure, but hardly meaningless.

[jimmy olsen]

There shall be no peace in our time.

http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-sources-the-sino-american-spiral-9088

The Sources of the Sino-American Spiral
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Jennifer Lind, Daryl Press

September 18, 2013

The paramount question looming over twenty-first century international politics is: will the United States and China get along?

Most national-security experts express guarded optimism. Although rising powers have historically clashed with their established rivals—adopting revisionist foreign policies to secure more influence, territory, or status—this time, people say, is different. China is a major stakeholder in the current economic order and has no reason to overthrow the very system that has allowed it to grow rich and powerful. The regional maritime disputes that do exist [4]—over small uninhabitable islets—may arouse emotions but do not demonstrate a deep revisionist streak in Beijing. In short, a status quo Washington and a status quo Beijing need not clash.

But pondering the future of East Asia—and great power relations—in terms of whether China will adopt a "status-quo" or "revisionist" grand strategy obscures the real sources of Sino-American conflict. It ignores the range of options available to Beijing, and it pins the future on China's strategic decisions alone.

In reality, the tenor of great-power relations in the coming decades will depend on the interaction of U.S. and Chinese foreign policies—which collide to a far greater degree than is frequently acknowledged. In fact, smooth relations between the United States and China will only be possible in the unlikely event that China adopts an extremely docile national-security strategy, or in the equally unlikely event that the United States cedes its dominant position in the Western Pacific.

CHINESE MENU

Beijing has a broader array of options than the categories "status quo" or "revisionist" imply. What is striking, however, is that all but one of its options put Beijing and Washington on a collision course.

At one extreme, China might continue its rise as an economic powerhouse without substantially enhancing its military might, and without seeking to alter the international order in East Asia or the world.

The logic of this "Rich Nation, Weak Army" strategy is straightforward: China has enjoyed spectacular economic success for four decades while pursuing Deng Xiaoping's strategy of strategic restraint—so why rock the boat now? Foreign-policy restraint has allowed China to focus on its homeland security, prioritize butter over guns, and benefit from the fact that other countries—particularly the United States—have borne the costs of protecting the global order. Continuing this modest strategy would help reassure Beijing's wary neighbors, minimize the odds of conflict with the United States, and allow Beijing to concentrate on China's many domestic challenges (social, demographic, environmental, and institutional).

According to this grand strategy, Beijing would pursue its foreign policy goals through multilateral institutions and posture its military for modest and internationally sanctioned missions such as peacekeeping, disaster relief and antipiracy operations. Its national-security policy and military would be akin to that of Australia, Indonesia or the Philippines. Skeptics might note that this strategy entails, de facto, relying upon the United States to ensure global order and protect China's interests. True; but modern China has never been able to defend its airspace or coastal waters from the major military powers, let alone project military power far from its shores. And yet it has prospered.

Alternatively, Beijing might choose a strategy that reflects its emergence as the major regional power in East Asia. An accommodating version of a regionally focused strategy would seek to establish China as a major East Asian military power—while not changing the region's political and economic order. China would not become expansionist, overturn the existing liberal economic system, or try to expel the U.S. military from the region. Rather, the goals of this strategy are modest and the logic is straightforward: although the current liberal order is good for Beijing—and should continue—it is natural that a great power such as China be able to defend itself and its interests in its own backyard.

In a more assertive version of this regional strategy, China would seek to become not just a major regional power, but also the dominant one. This would not necessarily be accomplished through conquest or coercion; instead, Beijing would simply generate so much economic influence and military might that it would become obvious to the countries of East Asia that there is one natural leader of the region—and it is China. China's growing military capabilities would convince other East Asian countries that the United States could no longer reliably protect them. The goal: to ensure that the countries of East Asia begin to look to Beijing—even with gritted teeth—much as the countries in Eastern Europe look to Moscow, and those in Latin America look to Washington. In the long term, China would establish its own informal Monroe Doctrine: while of course other countries' ships would be welcome to sail through regional sea lanes, foreign military bases operated by regional outsiders would be as unwelcome in East Asia as they are now in the Americas.

To implement either version of this regional strategy, China would build the air and naval forces to control the airspace and waters out to a few hundred miles from the Chinese coast, and to project military power throughout maritime East Asia. Beijing would likely seek allies in the region to host Chinese military forces. The more assertive version would require the same sort of military forces—just more of them.

If Beijing chose to pursue a revisionist regional strategy, it would engage in diplomacy aimed at ousting the United States from the region. It would use various forms of influence and leverage to try to break up America's key alliances. China's diplomacy would seek to convince its neighbors of two things—first, that they can be just as rich, free, safe, and independent within a Chinese-led order as they are within the current order. Second, Beijing would seek to convince them that allying with powerful outsiders against China is a dangerous option—because eventually those outsiders will leave, and when they do, the neighbors will be left next to an unfriendly and regionally dominant Beijing.

Critics might protest that China would not want to topple the economic order that has promoted its rise—but there is nothing about even the more revisionist version of this strategy that would do this. This strategy would promote free trade and investment, and seek peaceful relations among the countries of East Asia, but would do so without the intrusions of a distant great power. Like Russia's dominance in Eastern Europe, and U.S. preeminence throughout North America, this strategy would establish China as the dominant player in East Asia.

A third overarching option for China: look beyond its region to become a global political and military power. China has global interests. It is a leader in international trade, a key player in currency and bond markets, a major target and sender of international investment. Its economy depends on access to distant energy supplies. And Chinese firms and people have spread across the world from Suriname to Iran, from Kazakhstan to Angola. Yet Beijing has limited ability to influence events around the world. In Europe, the members of the EU and the United States (through NATO) make the key decisions; the Persian Gulf is dominated by the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council and their U.S. partners. While China has a stake in all of these regions, it is marginalized. Under a global strategy, China would seek the global influence commensurate with power and global interests.

In a more benign version of a global strategy, China would merely seek greater influence around the world to ensure that its interests are respected. It would not try to remake the Persian Gulf or Latin America, or to push the United States out of any region. Rather, China as a status-quo global power would merely seek a portfolio of interests—which because of economic globalization now span the globe.

China might alternatively adopt a more revisionist global posture. (This is generally what people have in mind when they contemplate China as a "revisionist" great power.) This strategy would seek to reorder international politics and to minimize American power and influence around the world, by luring countries out of the U.S. orbit and by providing an alternative to opponents of the United States (through political support, trade agreements, security guarantees and arms sales). It would give cohesion to countries—such as Iran and Venezuela—that oppose the U.S.-led world order, yet are regionally dispersed and lack the coordination to effectively oppose Washington.

Pursuing either version of a global strategy would require increased defense spending—though perhaps merely maintaining China's current spending as a percentage of GDP, as Beijing's GDP increases—to develop global power-projection capabilities. A revisionist China would likely purvey an ideology or narrative that justified its own global authority and discredited American leadership. Fundamentally this strategy would be about shaping the world in a way that is most conducive to Chinese influence, by building alliances and a network of friends across the globe. Even the revisionist version of a global strategy is not necessarily aggressive or violent; it is about leadership—the same kind of strategy that the United States has followed for the past twenty years.

PEACE THROUGH DOMINANCE

Peaceful U.S.-China relations depend not merely on Chinese decisions, but on how they interact with the American national-security strategy. Like China, the United States has a menu of strategic options; unlike China, however, the United States has a well-established grand strategy, which includes longstanding alliances in East Asia.

Since the end of the Cold War, across four successive administrations, the United States has pursued a strikingly consistent national-security strategy—variously called "hegemony," "global leadership," or "deep engagement." While the specifics fluctuate, the core principles—exercising leadership and promoting stability through a global network of alliances—have remained constant.

To be sure, disagreements about implementation arise regularly. Liberals tend to favor humanitarian intervention, value broad international coalitions, and prefer to work through international institutions. Conservatives are more inclined to use force to prevent the spread of WMD, and worry less about passing a "global test" (as Secretary of State John Kerry famously commented as a presidential candidate) when they contemplate using force. But tactical disagreements should not obscure the underlying bipartisan consensus: the United States will exercise global leadership, and ensure stability, through a network of alliances and powerful military presence in critical regions.

To implement this strategy in East Asia, the United States pursues three benign-sounding objectives. First, assurance: the United States seeks to assure its friends that it will protect them in time of crisis or war, and that it can do so effectively. The goal of assurance is to convince U.S. allies to forego independent steps to protect themselves (e.g., building powerful conventional military forces or nuclear weapons)—because such steps could trigger arms races and upset the region's political and economic order.

A second American objective is deterrence. The United States seeks to dissuade potential adversaries from turning disagreements into crises, and to deter them from turning crises into wars.

Finally, the United States seeks to promote political and economic cooperation—thereby turning allies and potential adversaries into stakeholders in a mutually beneficial, peaceful and prosperous region.

None of these goals sound provocative—who would argue against promoting stability and cooperation? The potential for trouble lies in the strategy's military requirements.

Because of the structure of the U.S. alliance system, and the nature of modern naval warfare, the benign-sounding U.S. policy toward Asia requires not merely U.S. military presence in the region, it requires a substantial degree of military dominance. Depending on China's future national-security choices, U.S. military dominance may cause considerable friction with Beijing.

Two pillars of the U.S. strategy—assuring allies, and deterring potential adversaries—rest upon U.S. military dominance in the Western Pacific. Allies can only feel safe outsourcing their security to the United States if they are confident that in time of crisis or war, Washington will be able to defend them effectively. This means that U.S. allies must be sure that the U.S. military will be able to cross five thousand miles of ocean with enough military power to decisively defeat whoever is menacing them. If allies begin to doubt U.S. power projection capabilities, they will, quite reasonably, feel compelled to develop more military power of their own. Similarly, the U.S. strategy requires that adversaries have no practical means for keeping American power projection at bay. If adversaries believe that they can keep U.S. reinforcements out of the region, deterrence will be undermined. The cornerstone of the U.S. strategy in East Asia is thus the ability to bring decisive force to bear if needed.

The changing nature of warfare makes power projection across vast oceans increasingly difficult. Modern sensors—satellite-based, ground-based, on unmanned aerial vehicles, and underwater—make tracking ships at sea easier than ever before. Furthermore, long-range strike systems, such as ballistic missiles and antiship cruise missiles, make it easier to destroy lumbering ships once they've been located. The United States has other means of projecting power into East Asia—for example, using forward air bases—but those bases are also easy targets for missile strikes, and increasingly sophisticated air-defense systems threaten to keep U.S. aircraft far from enemy coasts. The central role of power projection in U.S. national-security strategy—and the growing threat to ships and forward bases—explains the U.S. Defense Department's focus over the past decade on the "antiaccess" threat, especially China's growing capabilities.

The U.S. military's answer to this problem (known as "AirSea Battle [5]") is straightforward: be prepared to defeat antiaccess forces by blinding enemy sensors, degrading their command and control systems, and destroying their most capable conventional strike systems (e.g., those that target U.S. ships and airfields). The point is that in the age of advanced sensors and lethal long-range missiles, projecting overwhelming power across an ocean requires the ability to blind, disrupt, and disarm one's enemies at the opening stages of conflict.

Critics accuse the U.S. military of exaggerating the China threat. These critics protest that China has only a fraction of U.S. military power, and they decry expensive new weapons to defeat antiaccess capabilities as provocative and unnecessary. But regardless of the aggregate balance of military power between the United States and China, the U.S. Navy and Air Force are correct that U.S. strategy in Asia hinges on the promise to bring overwhelming force to bear—despite the expanse of the Pacific Ocean and the growing threat to power-projection forces. If China can substantially impede U.S. access during a war, the U.S. strategy toward the region will unravel.

WINTER IS COMING

Given Washington's national-security strategy, the only Chinese policy that will not conflict with U.S. national-security goals is the most docile option—the strategy of "rich nation, weak army." If China pursues any of the other options—including the more defensive ones—U.S.-China relations are likely to grow much more conflictual. Even if Beijing merely wants to be Washington's peer in China's own backyard, that would threaten the U.S. ability to move military forces to and around East Asia, undermining the core of Washington's regional strategy. Those analysts who argue that a status-quo China need not conflict with the United States underestimate the extent to which Chinese and American grand strategies are on trajectories that collide.

The best hope for amicable U.S.-China relations rests on Beijing adopting a highly restrained grand strategy, but it would be historically unprecedented if it did so. China would be choosing to live within a security order managed by another great power—one with whom it has tense relations. While some countries have pursued docile grand strategies (one thinks of Australia, Canada and Japan), they have done so under the protection of a friendly, like-minded ally, the United States. In fact, two of America's closest cold war allies, West Germany and Japan, took docility only so far. They built potent conventional military forces and, in Japan's case, a nuclear hedge in the form of a giant stockpile of plutonium. Great powers have not entrusted their security to this degree to another great power unless they had little choice or unusually warm relations.

Indeed, a look at China's national-security policy—its pursuit of antiaccess capabilities, its territorial claims, and discussions of claims to "second island chains"—suggests that it is (at a minimum) aspiring to be a regional great power. The remaining questions are the extent to which Beijing will confine its ambitions to East Asia (as opposed to pursuing a global strategy), and the extent to which it will tolerate U.S. global leadership or seek to undermine U.S. influence.

And the United States? In theory, Washington, like Beijing, has a number of strategic alternatives and could choose to adopt a strategy (such as "offshore balancing") that would not require U.S. military dominance in the Pacific. But this appears unlikely. There is little support for this move within the American foreign-policy establishment, the U.S. military or the globalized American economic elite. Offshore balancing would be a radical departure from the way that the United States currently operates in East Asia; from how it plans to operate in the region in coming decades; and from how it has organized U.S. security in the region for the past sixty years.

Some might argue that by demonstrating greater humility and modesty the United States can continue its current strategy while still reassuring China. Summits can be held; regional institutions can be strengthened; Beijing can be empowered with leadership roles. Liberals criticized George W. Bush for aggressive policies that were offensive to U.S. allies and adversaries alike. They argue that more diplomatically savvy, consensus-building leaders can reassure allies and soothe others that We Come In Peace.

But evidence from the past five years does not support this view. American grand strategy under a Democratic administration has not noticeably changed—if anything, U.S. policy is even more assertive in East Asia. Though a supporter of the policy, Asia scholar Michael Green characterizes the Obama administration's rebalancing effort as aimed at China's "soft underbelly" in Southeast Asia—deepening military ties with the Philippines and Singapore; stationing 2,500 U.S. Marines in Darwin, Australia; and even flirting with America's Cold War adversary Vietnam (which dwells on the Chinese border). The very dynamics we describe—China fearing the United States and acting to counter it; the United States fearing those countermeasures and then responding in turn—have not only occurred but have accelerated during the Obama administration.

In some sense, the greatest danger for the United States is the illusion that the current strategy of "leadership" or "deep engagement" is benign and unthreatening. China's pursuit of a policy of "deep engagement" in Latin America or the Caribbean would be viewed by policymakers in Washington as outrageously provocative. As China's power grows, Beijing's leaders are likely to develop similar intolerance of American aircraft flying near their shores, U.S. warships plying nearby waters and the network of U.S. military bases that surrounds China.

The fundamental problem in U.S.-China relations—the engine of conflict between the two countries—is neither America's grand strategy nor Beijing's. China would be entirely reasonable in wanting the ability to defend its airspace and coastal waters from foreign powers. It is also perfectly reasonable for the United States to want to uphold its sixty-year-long security commitments to the region by retaining the ability to move powerful air and naval forces there.

Of course, perhaps a U.S.-China clash will never occur—after all, as with the much-hyped rises of the Soviet Union and Japan, China's economy may languish or implode; a "Chinese Spring" could also derail its future prosperity. But assuming China's economy continues to grow at a healthy rate, unless the United States departs from six decades of foreign-policy precedent, or unless China elects to pursue extreme foreign-policy meekness, America's and China's reasonable national-security interests will collide. This is how the tragedy of great-power politics unfolds.

Jennifer Lind [6] is an associate professor of government at Dartmouth, and the author of Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics (Cornell, 2008). Follow her on Twitter @profLind [7].

Daryl Press [8] is an associate professor of government at Dartmouth, and the author of Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (Cornell, 2005).

[Jacob]

If Abe is an indication of the direction in Japan, that's not going to help either:

[Back to the future: Shinto's growing influence in politics
A small organization, little known to the public, has helped restore much of Japan's controversial past — and it is only getting started

BY DAVID MCNEILL
SPECIAL TO THE JAPAN TIMES
NOV 23, 2013

Immaculate and ramrod straight in a crisp, black suit, Japan's education minister, Hakubun Shimomura, speaks like a schoolteacher — slowly and deliberately. His brow creases with concern when he talks about Japan's diminished place in the world, its years of anemic economic growth and poorly competing universities. Mostly, though, he appears to be worried about the moral and spiritual decline of the nation's youth.

"The biggest problem with Japanese education is the tremendous self-deprecation of our high school children," he says in an interview at his Tokyo office. He cites an international survey in which children are asked: "Are there times when you feel worthless?" Eighty-four percent of Japanese kids say yes — double the figure in the United States, South Korea and China, he laments. "Without changing that, Japan has no future."

Shimomura's remedy for this corrosive moral decay is far-reaching: Children will be taught moral and patriotic education and respect for Japan's national symbols, its "unique" culture and history. Textbooks will remove "self-deprecating" views of history and references to "disputed" war crimes. They will reflect the government's point of view on key national issues, such as Japan's bitter territorial disputes with its three closest neighbors: China, Russia and South Korea.

Education reform represents only one layer of Shimomura and his government's ambitions. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, a close political ally, wants to revise three of the country's basic modern charters: the 1946 Constitution, the education law, which they both think undervalues patriotism, and the nation's security treaty with the United States. The Emperor would be returned to a more prominent place in Japanese society. The special status of Yasukuni Shrine, which enshrines most of Japan's war dead, including the men who led the nation to disaster between 1933 and 1945, would be restored.

"They're trying to restore what was removed by the U.S. Occupation reforms," explains Mark Mullins, director of the Japan Studies Center at the University of Auckland. If it succeeds, the project amounts to the overturning of much of the existing order in Japan — a return to the past, with one eye on the future.

For an explanation of the core philosophy behind this project I visit an imposing black building that sits on the leafy borders of Meiji Shrine in Tokyo. The Association of Shinto Shrines, representing about 80,000 shrines, is classed as a religious administrative organization. It is also one of Japan's most successful political lobbyists.

Many of the nation's top elected officials, including Abe and Shimomura are members of the organization's political wing, Shinto Seiji Renmei (officially, the Shinto Association of Spiritual Leadership — eschewing the word "political" from the title). A sister organization, the Shinto Political Alliance Diet Members' Association boasts 240 lawmakers, including 16 out of the government's 19-member Cabinet. Abe is the association's secretary-general.

Seiji Renmei sees its mission as renewing the national emphasis on "Japanese spiritual values." In principle, this means pushing for constitutional revision and patriotic and moral education, and staunchly defending conservative values in ways that seem to contradict Abe's internationalist capitalism. The association opposes the free trade of rice and the sale of "strategic property" such as forests or lakes to non-Japanese, for instance.

Since its birth in 1969, Shinto Seiji Renmei has notched several victories in its quest to restore much of the nation's prewar political and social architecture. In 1979, it successfully lobbied the government to reinstate the practice of using imperial era names. In 2007, it won a national holiday, April 29, for Japan's wartime monarch, Hirohito — a day when Japanese might "look in awe at the sacred virtues of the Showa Emperor."

Over the past decade, Tokyo has tried to impose a directive demanding that teachers lead schoolchildren in singing the Kimigayo national anthem — another Shinto concern. In April this year, 168 Diet members visited Yasukuni for its spring festival — the largest number since these counts began 24 years ago. "A lot more politicians now understand the importance of our views," concludes Yutaka Yuzawa, head of Shinto Seiji Renmei.

Though not a member of the association, former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi helped end the taboo on any overt show of sympathy with the militarism of the past with his six pilgrimages to Yasukuni, climaxing in his visit on Aug. 15, 2006. Yuzawa's father, Tadashi, was the head priest of Yasukuni at the time. For both, it was a vindication of years of struggle. "Our stance is that it is natural for the prime minister to pay his respects at the shrine on behalf of the country." Lawmakers such as former Prime Minister Naoto Kan who refuse to go are "impertinent," he adds.

Yuzawa accepts that these visits will worsen already dangerously frayed ties with Beijing and Seoul but insists it is "not something Japan can bend on."

"It relates to our culture, history and tradition," he says. "To us, Yasukuni Shrine is a god." Criticism that prime-ministerial visits confer legitimacy on the Class-A war criminals enshrined there cannot be taken seriously, he says.

"Perhaps, according to today's judgment, they might have made mistakes but back then they were doing their best for the country. In Japan, our way of thinking about the dead souls is that we don't criticize them. They were protecting the Emperor and, by extension, the Japanese people." That vital point, he says, is now understood by a growing number of Japanese politicians.

The American Occupation of 1945-51 ended Shinto's status as a state religion and attempted to banish its influence from Japan's public sphere, notably its emphasis on a pure racial identity linked to the Emperor. The core element of this belief, ruthlessly enforced through the education system, was the emperor's divine status as a direct descendant of the sun goddess Amaterasu. Though weakened, Shinto conservatives in Japan "were simply biding their time" until they could restore the religion's rightful place in Japanese society, says Mullins.

He sees 1995 — the year of the Kobe earthquake and Aum Shinrikyo deadly gas attacks on Japan's subway — as a turning point. The two events, combined with the agonizing decline of the miracle economy, had a profound impact on the nation's confidence. "The sense after that was: 'We have so many troubles in Japan, we need to go back and get what we had,' " recalls Mullins. "There are certain people very sympathetic to that, to Shinto's restoration vision."

One of those people is Abe. In October, he became the first prime minister in 84 years to attend the most important ceremony in Shinto, the Sengyo no Gi at Ise Shrine — a centuries-old ritual in which the main shrine buildings are demolished and rebuilt. Ise is considered home to the emperor's ancestors; Amaterasu is enshrined in the inner sanctum. The highlight of the ceremony is the removal of a mythological "sacred mirror" used to lure the sun goddess out of her cave. Abe took eight members of his Cabinet along to watch. Some scholars were agnostic on the visit, given that prime ministers routinely go to the shrine to show respect for Japanese traditions and culture. Others, however, were alarmed.

"In the past, Ise Jingu (shrine) was the fountainhead for unifying politics and religion and national polity fundamentalism," author Hisashi Yamanaka recently told the Asahi newspaper. "Abe's act is clearly a return to the ways before World War II."

It is far from clear how much of the past, exactly, Abe and his Cabinet want to revive, or how much sway Shinto holds over them. Shimomura swats away concerns about the government's agenda. "Sections of the media have an allergy to moral education," he says. "They are sending out the wrong image that we are trying to reinstate the prewar education system." However, parts of Shinto clearly sit uneasily with the modern, globalized economy the government says it is trying to build.

Yuzawa says Japan should prohibit sales of land and property to China, Japan's largest trading partner. Another possible point of conflict is the free trade of agricultural products, a key demand of U.S. negotiators in the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade talks. Traditional ties between rice cultivation and Shinto rituals make this a no-no for Shinto fundamentalists, historian Matthew Penney notes in a recent article on the Asia-Pacific Journal.

Mullins says this magnetic tug of the past is not unique to Japan. "I see Shinto fundamentalists as very similar to U.S. Christian fundamentalists and Hindu neo-nationalists," he says. "It's people trying to cope with the modern world: to make it all black and white and nail it down."

But he says an "ecumenical group" of like-minded conservatives is in the ascendancy in Japan, led by Shinto and Nippon Kaigi, a nationalist think tank that advocates a return to "traditional values" and rejects Japan's "apology diplomacy" for its wartime misdeeds. "Abe's comeback has given them this sense of confidence," Mullins says.

Whatever happens to his government's larger agenda — much depends on Abe's economic performance — Shinto conservatives will likely continue their quiet mission to transform Japan. John Breen, a religion specialist at the International Research Center for Japanese Studies in Kyoto, cites the restoration of imperial markers on the annual calendar: State Foundation Day; Culture Day, which marks the birthday of the Meiji Emperor; the current Emperor's birthday in December; and Labor thanksgiving, which marks "the Emperor's annual performance of the Niiname rite, a celebration of Amaterasu's gift of rice to Japan."

"The deep imperial meanings of these holidays are concealed behind innocuous names like Culture day and Labor thanksgiving," Breen says. But the Shinto Association of Spiritual Leadership is determined to restore their original titles, "and so make apparent to all their true meaning."

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/11/23/national/back-to-the-future-shintos-growing-influence-in-politics/#.UpOd7tKsiSo

[Tonitrus]

I've been to the Yasukuni shrine.  And bought a souvenir there too. 

[Ed Anger]

I've been to the Yasukuni shrine.  And bought a souvenir there too. 

White devil!

[Tonitrus]

I've been to the Yasukuni shrine.  And bought a souvenir there too. 

White devil!

And in addition, Japanese festival food selections make American festivals look paupers.

Of course, ours have less tentacles.

[jimmy olsen]

Looks like the Japanese are taking the Chinese threat seriously.

Some good pics here.
http://news.usni.org/2013/10/09/japans-amphibious-buildup

Japan's Amphibious Buildup
By: Kyle Mizokami
Wednesday, October 9, 2013

Japan recently has been in the news as a result of several high-profile territorial incidents with its neighbor China. The incidents involve what Japanese call the Senkaku islands—the Diaoyu islands to the Chinese. Japan has legal ownership of the islands, which China disputes. The incidents have involved non-government activists and the coast guards of both nations, with many fearing an escalation could lead to some form of armed conflict.

Spurred on by those developments, Japan has accelerated what have been until now quiet plans to develop a specialized unit of marine infantry. This force, mentored by the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, is seen by Japan as essential in guarding the Senkakus, as well as other disputed territories. Like the Navy/Marine Corps team, the Japanese force will be a joint group consisting of the Ground, Air, and Maritime Self- Defense Forces, with everything from infantry to air support to the ships that carry them.

The creation of the Japanese marine unit is part of a series of a wide-ranging overhaul of Japan's ability to defend its borders. During the Cold War, Japan anticipated a Soviet invasion of the northernmost island of Hokkaido and built up forces there appropriately. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of Japan's neighbors, particularly China, Japan has shifted attention from the far north to the far south, in particular the Ryukyu and Senkaku islands west of Okinawa.

Specifically, Japan was concerned that activists from other countries with whom it has territorial disputes (countries including Russia, China, and South Korea) would land on Japanese territory and symbolically seize it, perhaps with weapons. Unfortunately these islands are on the periphery of Japan, without nearby military facilities, or even ports or airstrips. That necessitated an expeditionary force capable of self-deploying by air and sea to the periphery of the Japanese archipelago.

Japan has no forces tailored to amphibious operations, since marines are typically considered offensive in nature and Japan has barred itself from having offensive forces. However, the ban was merely a self-imposed policy decision, and in 2012 it was decided that defense-minded marines, who would transport themselves to places such as the Senkakus in time of crisis to defend or eject interlopers, were legal for Japan to operate.

Ground and Air Forces

Based at Nagasaki in southern Japan, the Western Army Infantry Regiment (WAIR) has been tasked the amphibious mission. The location ensures that the WAIR can be quickly embarked on Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) ships at Nagasaki/Sasebo; alternately they could board V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft at the nearby air bases of Nyutabaru and Tsuiki. The WAIR is considered only the core of a new marine force, which will be considerably larger.

The WAIR is approximately of battalion size, consisting of at least three infantry companies. The regiment is equipped as light infantry, with the heaviest weapons being 84mm Carl Gustav recoilless rifles and French MO-120-RT 120mm towed mortars. The regiment has no vehicles except for Mitsubishi Type 73 light trucks. Japan recently announced it is procuring up to six AAV-7A1 amphibious assault vehicles of the kind the U.S. Marines use. Such vehicles would afford a platoon of WAIR troops armored protection up to and onto the beachhead.

One company of the WAIR is sent every year to San Diego for the annual Iron Fist exercises. There they learn to conduct a variety of operations from the U.S. Marine Corps. Each year the exercises have grown progressively more complicated, starting with rigid-hull inflatable boat training to more recently conducting actual amphibious landings.

Air support for the marine unit is currently in the form of helicopters from the 1st Aviation Brigade, headquartered near Tokyo. During the June 2013 Dawn Blitz exercises in southern California, Japanese AH-64 Apache and CH-47 Chinook helicopters from 1st Brigade crossed the Pacific on Maritime Self-Defense Force ships to provide air support for WAIR. Tokyo is currently exploring buying organic air transport for the marines in the form of up to 20 V-22 Ospreys, which would allow the unit to quickly self-deploy to the Senkakus.

Naval Forces

Ironically, although Japan's amphibious warfare doctrine has been minimal it actually does have several highly capable amphibious ships. The three Landing Ship, Tanks (LSTs) of the Oosumi class feature full-length flight decks and a well deck, and can transport nearly a battalion of infantry, tanks and other vehicles. Each can carry two American-built Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC), of which Japan has six. In addition to the LCAC, Japan has a dozen medium landing craft that can move 30 tons of equipment or up to 80 personnel from ship to shore.

The recent addition of the Hyuga-class "helicopter destroyers" has added an interesting new dynamic to the new amphibious force. The ships, equipped to carry up to 14 helicopters and 400 personnel, functioned as helicopter landing platform ships during the Dawn Blitz exercises, much along the lines of the old U.S. Navy Iwo Jima class. Together with the Oosumi LSTs, the new helicopter destroyers could form the core of an ad hoc amphibious ready group, or even a sea base.

Under the tutelage of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, Japan is slowly but surely building up a credible, flexible amphibious force capable of responding to national emergencies. Highly trained with a high level of mobility, it could eventually become the equal of both. The force will not only be highly useful in Japan's territorial disputes, it will likely be a excellent partner for their American counterparts in joint operations.

[Valmy]

Woah.  A ship with the Rising Sun flag.  That makes me feel surprisingly uneasy.

[CountDeMoney]

Woah.  A ship with the Rising Sun flag.  That makes me feel surprisingly uneasy.

This is the new Japan, my friend.  This time, they're on our side.  The only kamikazes they're flying these days have little umbrellas in them.

Today's JSDF:  Little.  Yellow.  Different.

[derspiess]

[Barrister]

Woah.  A ship with the Rising Sun flag.  That makes me feel surprisingly uneasy.

Rising Sun flag isn't like the Swastika - it's the traditional Japanese naval ensign IIRC.

[11B4V]

2 U.S. Air Force jets flew into China's new defense zone without following China's ID rules, U.S. official tells CNN's Barbara Starr.

Just breaking apparently. Headline only.

http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/?hpt=sitenav

[The Minsky Moment]

B-52s.
Even Chinese radar won't miss those.

Monroe was bright enough to make sure the British were on board before making big declarations about exclusions.
PRC seems to have forgotten to check with USAF and USN.