The China Thread

[Valmy]

Yeah it does make one a bit nervous. China doesn't have any allies with interests in the Balkans though, so that's good.

[Jacob]

I disagree, Sheilbh - I think you're seeing China and China's interest too monolithically. China had a numer of options available to it on key issues - nationalist populism, how to get what you want from your neighbours, how to manage internal friction, how to approach diaspora Chinese (incl. Hong Kong and Taiwan, but elsewhere as well), international collaboration etc. All could be blended in different proportions, prioritized differently, and be approached more or less collaboratively for example.

Xi Jinping and his clique has taken a very specific and muscular approach, and is very nakedly trying to punish anyone who annoy them in a way that IMO is ultimately beyond their reach. A different clique could (would) have taken a different approach and blended the various policy objectives and methods in a different way.

China's path and actions are no more purely determined by it's situation than the UK's or the US'. Sure there are broad realities that shape incentives and possible actions, but individual decisions still matter. And Xi's China has really been shitting the bed.

Incidentally, a prevailing theory among a number of anti-CCP diaspora Chinese is that the H&M debacle was deliberately staged by anti-Xi factions to hurt Xi, as the  EU response very clearly has. Xi put a lot of stock in the EU agreement when he was sparring with Trump over trade.

[Jacob]

IMO, Xi and his clique have very much done a "drop the mask and proclaim WE ARE POWERFUL, RESPECT US OR SUFFER THE CONSEQUENCES" move for China in a two-penny villain style. Again IMO, even if that was inevitable for China (which I don't think it was), they pulled it a few decades too early for it to be successful.

The only way it makes sense as a clever move is, IMO, if they think they need to lean hard into nationalist populism and pushing potential partners around to head off internal threats and instability from economic downturns in the next few decades. But personally I think it's more down to the personal failings of Xi and his closest cronies.

[Barrister]

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/05/china-paper-dragon/618778/

There's also the argument that China is increasingly belligerent because, like Russia, it is a deeply unpopular government that has to rely on increasing repression at home.  It has an aging, even declining, population https://www.ft.com/content/008ea78a-8bc1-4954-b283-700608d3dc6c which will increasing hurt economic growth as time goes on.

Picking fights with foreigners is a well-known strategy to get people to "rally around the flag" all over the world.

I'm not sure if that's a better or worse perspective than "China is aggressive because it is strong", but it is one to keep in mind.

[Sheilbh]

I agree on Xi. Xi is taking that in a particular direction which is far more aggressive than others probably would - although wasn't his main competition Bo and who knows what his approach would have been? Genuine question - is there any stuff on what Bo's China might look like?

But I think the broad confrontational approach is inevitable because the US isn't going to share or cede global leadership (and by not re-electing Trump shows they don't yet want to just relinquish it) and China is not going to subordinate itself to a still US-dominated Western rules-based order and is powerful enough that it doesn't have to. I think that dynamic will lead to confrontation even if the details and the speed and the aggression around it are set by Xi.

I don't think the outcome is determined but I think it is likely to take skilful handling by leaders of both sides to avoid some conflict - even if it is indirect (but bloody) like the Cold War. Given the last few years I'm not convinced either side has that leadership which is what worries me most.

I think something similar with the UK and the EU. Because they are based on fundamentally different ideological bases and bets on what is best-placed to handle the future (nimble nation state v powerful coalition) they will always be in competition because the success or failure of one is the vindication or not of the other. The details and tone may change, but I think that's likely to be the dynamic.

Edit: And the other side is there may be something to BB's point around Xi adopting this to get a "rally round the flag" but I slightly wonder if we underestimate the power of Chinese public opinion. I've seen articles for years about the Chinese state encouraging nationalism - stuff that way pre-dates Xi - and whether the Chinese state could actually control it. They're still stoking it.

China's obviously a million miles from democratic but it is aware of and I think quite responsive to public attitudes/opinion (possibly more than democracies because it's based on constant monitoring rather than a vote every four years). There's a bit of me that wonders if part of this is actually a consequence of the years when China encouraged nationalism it is now finding it difficult to manage or de-escalate situations because of public opinion - or public opinion on monitored social media platforms.

Again no idea but I wonder if the CCP is far more afraid of public unrest in the event of a perceived "humiliation" rather than say a desire for democracy.

[Valmy]

And alienating the EU is a good way to do that? It seems to me if you were trying to undermine the US you would court the other big countries. Do they figure you can achieve USA type hegemony with just Russia and a few other malcontents?

That doesn't make much sense to me Sheilbh. The Chinese aren't stupid so that cannot be their motivation.

[Sheilbh]

And alienating the EU is a good way to do that? It seems to me if you were trying to undermine the US you would court the other big countries. Do they figure you can achieve USA type hegemony with just Russia and a few other malcontents?

That doesn't make much sense to me Sheilbh. The Chinese aren't stupid so that cannot be their motivation.

No - I think they've clearly fucked up.

But that's why I think China is behaving differently than it did in the 90s. It doesn't mean I think they're doing it well or this is their sole path. It's because they are significantly more powerful than they were in 1989 and they aspire to more power.

Edit: And in terms of motivation I think they have overestimated their strength. In relation to the EU in particular I think the rush by the EU to agree the deal last year gave the impression to China that the EU was basically very weak and willing to agree almost anything to do a deal, which meant China's position was quite strong.

I think they have probably been surprised in Beijing that imposing sanctions on European parliamentarians and think tanks has resulted in issues with their deal. I think they probably miscalculated the politics in Europe, but not unreasonably given the rush at the end of last year to agree the deal in principle.

[Jacob]

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/05/china-paper-dragon/618778/

There's also the argument that China is increasingly belligerent because, like Russia, it is a deeply unpopular government that has to rely on increasing repression at home.  It has an aging, even declining, population https://www.ft.com/content/008ea78a-8bc1-4954-b283-700608d3dc6c which will increasing hurt economic growth as time goes on.

Picking fights with foreigners is a well-known strategy to get people to "rally around the flag" all over the world.

I'm not sure if that's a better or worse perspective than "China is aggressive because it is strong", but it is one to keep in mind.

I think there's a lot of truth to this.

[Jacob]

I agree on Xi. Xi is taking that in a particular direction which is far more aggressive than others probably would - although wasn't his main competition Bo and who knows what his approach would have been? Genuine question - is there any stuff on what Bo's China might look like?

It's hard to say. At the time of the showdown, Bo was the one who was leaning into the nationalism and harking back to the Cultural Revolution as a good thing and so on. But whether he would've gone harder that way, or whether he'd be more heavy on the trappings but more considered with the policy is beyond me.

But I think the broad confrontational approach is inevitable because the US isn't going to share or cede global leadership (and by not re-electing Trump shows they don't yet want to just relinquish it) and China is not going to subordinate itself to a still US-dominated Western rules-based order and is powerful enough that it doesn't have to. I think that dynamic will lead to confrontation even if the details and the speed and the aggression around it are set by Xi.

Yeah tension and conflict is inevitable, I agree. The way it is expressed and handled is the real issue. Personally, I think a more slowly-slowly approach would've served China better, but perhaps that entailed other risks from the regime perspective (internal challenges, popular dissatisfaction once the economic growth slowed).

I don't think the outcome is determined but I think it is likely to take skilful handling by leaders of both sides to avoid some conflict - even if it is indirect (but bloody) like the Cold War. Given the last few years I'm not convinced either side has that leadership which is what worries me most.

Concur.

I think something similar with the UK and the EU. Because they are based on fundamentally different ideological bases and bets on what is best-placed to handle the future (nimble nation state v powerful coalition) they will always be in competition because the success or failure of one is the vindication or not of the other. The details and tone may change, but I think that's likely to be the dynamic.

Heh, that's a pretty UK centric perspective. I don't think the EU needs to see itself in competition with the UK much more than it's in competition with Canada. Conversely, the UK is going to perpetually define itself in terms of its relation to the EU, and there it has very much cast itself as being in competition. But from my perspective it'll likely be pretty one-sided (much like how Canada often defines itself relative to the US, but the US doesn't really think that much about Canada).

Edit: And the other side is there may be something to BB's point around Xi adopting this to get a "rally round the flag" but I slightly wonder if we underestimate the power of Chinese public opinion. I've seen articles for years about the Chinese state encouraging nationalism - stuff that way pre-dates Xi - and whether the Chinese state could actually control it. They're still stoking it.

Not sure about the "we" there 

Personally I think Chinese public opinion is one of the most important factors in Chinese politics. Chinese politicians absolutely care about it (which is why they spend so much effort in shaping and controlling it). And China has a long history of serious social upheaval once the people get well and truly sick of the governing class' shit.

Almost every Chinese political decision I'm aware of - and I follow internal Chinese politics somewhat, albeit second hand via my wife and in-laws - are framed in terms the people, and the public reaction is considered and discussed in great detail and as having basically equal importance as the manoeuvres of various factions.

China's obviously a million miles from democratic but it is aware of and I think quite responsive to public attitudes/opinion (possibly more than democracies because it's based on constant monitoring rather than a vote every four years). There's a bit of me that wonders if part of this is actually a consequence of the years when China encouraged nationalism it is now finding it difficult to manage or de-escalate situations because of public opinion - or public opinion on monitored social media platforms.

Yeah, I think they jumped on the tiger and they're going to have a hard time coming off of it. The H&M story - or at least the theory I shared upthread - is a good example of how populist sentiment can be used to harm the interests of specific factions (in this case Xi).

Again no idea but I wonder if the CCP is far more afraid of public unrest in the event of a perceived "humiliation" rather than say a desire for democracy.

I think they're against democracy because they don't want to give up power, but I think they're confident they can continue to crush any democracy or rule of law groups as required. But international humiliation that makes them look weak in the eyes of the population (and rival internal factions)? Yeah, that's a serious risk IMO. Which is why, to me, stepping up the overseas conflict as much as they have is a big risk as it increases both the stakes and the risks of such a humiliation down the road.

But obviously they consider it worth the risk, either because they think the alternatives are worse or because they think they can handle it.

[Valmy]

China is also doing a great job getting India and the US close together. That strikes me as a disastrous development if your goal is to knock the US down a few pegs.

[Jacob]

No - I think they've clearly fucked up.

But that's why I think China is behaving differently than it did in the 90s. It doesn't mean I think they're doing it well or this is their sole path. It's because they are significantly more powerful than they were in 1989 and they aspire to more power.

Edit: And in terms of motivation I think they have overestimated their strength. In relation to the EU in particular I think the rush by the EU to agree the deal last year gave the impression to China that the EU was basically very weak and willing to agree almost anything to do a deal, which meant China's position was quite strong.

I think they have probably been surprised in Beijing that imposing sanctions on European parliamentarians and think tanks has resulted in issues with their deal. I think they probably miscalculated the politics in Europe, but not unreasonably given the rush at the end of last year to agree the deal in principle.

Like I said, there's a prevailing theory that the conflict with the EU - and the flash point over H&M - was engineered internally by Xi's opponents within the CCP to weaken him. It's a bit of Zhongnanhaiology as it were, but it's at least plausible. Whether it was engineered or an overplay by Xi, I agree the consequences have been disagreeable to the regime.

... which is satisfying

[Jacob]

China is also doing a great job getting India and the US close together. That strikes me as a disastrous development if your goal is to knock the US down a few pegs.

IMO, China's motive is not to specifically to knock down the US however many pegs. I think there are two motives:

1) Be treated more like the Great Power they are, by everyone (including by, but not limited, to the US). They want to be able to push around their immediate neighbours. They want to be able to marshal minor countries elsewhere to support their interests. They want to be treated respectfully by peer powers.

2) Manage their internal politics, by succeeding at 1).

[Crazy_Ivan80]

China seems to be working very hard to burn all the goodwill they built up after 1989.

I don't get it. They were being very successful playing nice but then looked over at Russia and decided to be like them instead for some reason. The Chinese, in a very un-Mono way, are letting politics get in the way of money.

I wonder to what extent the change is caused by the possibility that the CCP will be old before it is rich enough to care for all the elders, and/or before they'll be able to solve their environmental degradation (and what not)

Iirc, there are already more people retiring than there are joining the workforce, population growth is probably over (or will be real soon), people are putting their money in houses they'll never use, water is a massive issue (one that might very will trigger a war with India), no social security worth the name....

It's as if the Party has decided to throw around it's weight now because there might very well be no later.

edit: ah, I now see that the comparison with Germany pre-1914 has already been made (rising power, place in the sun, in their case a big ass neighbour that was industrialising at an equally insane pace)

[Sheilbh]

Agree with all of that

It's hard to say. At the time of the showdown, Bo was the one who was leaning into the nationalism and harking back to the Cultural Revulotion as a good thing and so on. But whether he would've gone harder that way, or whether he'd be more heavy on the trappings but more considered witht he policy is far beyond me.

Yeah - and it may also just be my ignorance of how Xi positioned himself before coming to power, particularly in relation to Bo and actually this was all terribly predictable. But I, again possibly ignorantly, would've assumed this scenario would be more likely if Bo had taken over.

Heh, that's a pretty UK centric perspective. I don't think the EU needs to see itself in competition with the UK much more than it's in competition with Canada. Conversely, the UK is going to perpetually define itself in terms of its relation to the EU, and there it has very much cast itself as being in competition. But from my perspective it'll likely be pretty one-sided (much like how Canada often defines itself relative to the US, but the US doesn't really think that much about Canada).

I'm less sure - maybe in general at an EU or European level you're right and I think you're definitely right if things go badly for the UK. But I think the UK v EU comparison is something that will, below the surface possibly, matter in France, for example.

But an example is that I don't think vaccines become as big a political issue in Europe if the UK is going at the same pace as them. If it was just Israel and the US storming ahead I think that it doesn't matter because there are reasons/rationalisations why they're doing better: Israel's small (or the size of many EU member states) and did a deal with Pfizer, the US is very capitalist and morally vacuous hoarding all their vaccines. I think it's the fact that the UK was doing well having opted out of the EU scheme that intensified the political pressure. Similarly if the EU program was miles ahead of the UK I think it would have had huge political salience here, while Israel is broadly ignored.

I'm not sure that dynamic is unique to vaccines, I think it will recur in lots of bits of policy because for the first time in a while the systems/alternative approaches in Europe will not be the EU (and acceding states) or Russia, Turkey, Belarus or Ukraine.

Not sure about the "we" there 

I think they're against democracy because they don't want to give up power, but I think they're confident they can continue to crush any democracy or rule of law groups as required. But international humiliation that makes them look weak in the eyes of the population (and rival internal factions)? Yeah, that's a serious risk IMO. Which is why, to me, stepping up the overseas conflict as much as they have is a big risk as it increases both the stakes and the risks of such a humiliation down the road.

But obviously they consider it worth the risk, either because they think the alternatives are worse or because they think they can handle it.

Yeah - I agree.

And I think there is also ideological/philosophical content around this - I don't think the rise in Carl Schmitt studies in China or papers on theorising "empire" means is just window dressing. I think it is relevant and shaping decisions. I think too much of that is written off or ignored in the West.

I also wonder if there is a generational angle of this being the first proper leadership generation (from my understanding) that is out of Deng's shadow and, you know, under Mao China stands up, under Deng it gets rich and now there needs to be a new project or purpose. I get that the CCP isn't the old Maoist party or the Soviet Communist party - but I think a Communist Party needs an endpoint it should be aspiring to reach - without that it is meaningless in a way that normal/non-Communist parties aren't.

[Valmy]

under Mao China stands up,

China was already up. It was already recognized as one of the five great powers even when Chiang Kai-shek was in charge. Mao helped knock it down a bit by isolating it and killing off tens of millions of people due to idiocy and mismanagement.