The State of Affairs in Russia

[Sheilbh]

I think they do. Unfortunately that usually seems to mean being behind a cordon of "friendly" countries and territories who act as buffer and remain firmly in their sphere of influence, whether they like it or not.

Agreed. - at least for Europe, Central Asia and the Caucasus. I think what happens between/with Russia and China in Central Asia and whether it stays relatively cooperative or becomes competitive is going to be quite important.

I think Lawrence Freedman's take on the talks from his substack is pretty interesting:

Has diplomacy with Russia failed this week?
Lawrence Freedman
Jan 14   

Has diplomacy with Russia failed this week?

This week's diplomacy has – unsurprisingly – not led to much of an obvious change in the current standoff between NATO and Russia. As expected the Russians demanded that the US close the door on the future expansion of the alliance, and as expected the Americans said that this was not possible. As expected the Americans offered discussions on a variety of arms control and confidence-building measures, and as expected the Russians showed no more than polite interest and demanded that everyone focus on their core agenda.

No More Talks

If anything the closing event – yesterday's meeting of the 57members of the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) - was more downbeat than Monday's bilateral between the US and Russia, and Wednesday's gathering of the NATO-Russia Council. Ukraine only got its chance to speak at the OSCE. It pointed out that there were 106,000 troops and 1,500 tanks near its border. As it called for a 'verified withdrawal' of these forces there were other reports of more Russian units joining them.

Eight hours of the bilateral conversation and a few hours each in the larger sessions were never going to produce new agreements. Wendy Sherman, the US Deputy Secretary of State, called them 'discussions' rather than 'negotiations'. The question was always whether they would lead to a proper negotiating forum to be set up where teams of experts could work out the technicalities of new agreements on such matters as missile deployment or large-scale exercises.

NATO has expressed its readiness for talks for such talks: Russia now says there is no point although it has not quite closed the door. The problem for the Russians with discussions on what are for them the secondary measures is not only that they bypass their main demands but also impose reciprocal obligations. Their aim is not to accept restrictions on their behaviour but to reduce NATO's strength and reach.

The Financial Times quotes Vladimir Putin's spokesperson as saying the talks had been 'unsuccessful' despite 'positive elements' on the more peripheral issues. Moscow's current position is that it is waiting for a formal response to the draft treaty language they had submitted last December, which the US has yet to provide. But they know from everything that has been said that they are not going to be satisfied with the response. Russia's OSCE Ambassador, explained his country's position on Twitter:

'If we don't hear constructive response to our proposals within reasonable timeframe & aggressive behaviour towards Russia continues, we'll have to take necessary measures to ensure strategic balance and eliminate unacceptable threats to our national security.'

There have been warnings  that 'all necessary means' will be taken, with dark references to their 'severe and unpredictable consequences'.

Yet at the same time Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov has insisted that there are no plans to invade Ukraine. As he couldn't say much else this assurance has been dismissed by those who hear only the beat of the war drums, though it was a point he went out of his way to make. But then if we can disregard this statement why do we have to take more seriously other statements that point in a more belligerent direction? Are the two sets inconsistent? There is a lot to be unpacked here. Do the proposed 'necessary measures', which have been described as 'military-technical' have to mean a new invasion of Ukraine?

Diplomacy and Deterrence

There is a natural assumption that the purpose of diplomacy is to negotiate agreements that will avoid war, so if there is not even a process that offers the prospect of a deal then that must mean war. By insisting that diplomacy has been exhausted the Russians are almost bound not to escalate in some way.

At the same time we have to keep in mind that there is a performative aspect to these occasions. Russia has left no doubt that it objects to efforts to 'contain' Russia and that a substantial NATO push into Ukraine, including a formal offer of membership, would be tantamount to a casus belli. Few believe it is prepared to go to war because it is upset with the past three decades of Western policy but the possibility that it might do so if it thought that Ukraine was about to be integrated into NATO is credible. After all it used force in Georgia in 2008 on a similar basis.

This has actually been understood by NATO for some time, and explains why attitudes within the alliance have been cautious on this matter, and why, whatever Moscow says, it is unlikely that the US has plans to deploy long-range offensive systems in Ukraine. It is a fair question, and one that has been asked by western critics of NATO's hard line, that if this is the case why not make a formal agreement with Russia to remove the tentative offer of membership, first made in 2008, in return for Russia withdrawing its forces and stop making threats?

The official answer is that there is a matter of principle. Ukraine is an independent sovereign state and entitled to arrange its security affairs as it sees fit, just as NATO members are entitled to welcome any country they wish into their ranks. More importantly, however, Russia has already annexed part of Ukraine and has been stirring up trouble throughout Ukraine, mainly by directing and assisting separatist groups in its eastern provinces. Until Russia stops this interference it cannot expect new treaties limiting Ukraine's options. Nonetheless the Russians have used the past week to put down a marker that reminds NATO of the risks that would be faced should the alliance decide to expedite Ukraine's membership. So arguably one purpose of the current drama is to deter Ukraine, along with NATO, from taking any offensive initiatives.

That interpretation is consistent with Russia's language, although they are sufficiently ambiguous to allow for more disturbing interpretations – which is presumably the intention. Thus far neither the United States nor its allies have been ready to make any concessions or really take its draft treaty at all seriously. Putin may calculate that the next stage requires that he intensifies the sense of crisis and urgency in the hope that this will encourage the more faint-hearted among the allies to start moving towards the Russian position, and agitate for a promise not to enlarge the alliance further.

To add to the sense of menace the Russians might also look to boosting its military presence close to Ukraine on a more permanent basis, or deploying longer-range and deadlier weapons in the vicinity. These could still be considered 'military-technical' measures and would be seen as escalations but would still fall short of actual war.

There have even been suggestions, how seriously is unclear, that military deployments in Cuba or Venezuela might be appropriate responses. Approaching the 60th anniversary of the missile crisis, one might note an awkward precedent.

Back to Minsk

In the end we are still left with the question at the heart of this crisis – the future of the conflict in Ukraine. One discussion that did not get so much publicity this week took place Tuesday in Kyiv between the Ukrainian government and senior German and French diplomats. Germany and France formed the Normandy group that negotiated, with Ukraine and Russia, the Minsk accords of September 2014 (slightly revised in February 2015).

These were supposed to establish a road map for a resolution of the conflict, requiring the Russians to withdraw all support for their enclaves and agree to a new constitutional arrangement which would give those in Eastern Ukraine more control over the government's policy. This might make it harder for Kyiv in the future to move towards joining NATO and also the EU (it is often forgotten in the preoccupation with NATO that Russia first stepped up the pressure on Ukraine in 2013 to stop it signing an Association Agreement with the EU). The Ukrainians are reporting that the Russians are amenable to more talks in the Normandy format. If so that offers one way forward. It is hard to be optimistic that about a Russian withdrawal but there are still issues connected with past cease-fire agreements to be discussed, such as exchange of prisoners and opening up of checkpoints.

These situations have their own dynamics so it would be unwise to preclude anything at the moment, but it is important to emphasise that despite Russia's warnings and movement of forces its military options remain not only dangerous but full of potential pitfalls, as I argued in Monday's post. For the moment the next step is up to Putin.

Of course the Ukrainians are developing their own medium and long-range missiles - so aside from Russia's (I think incorrect) fear of NATO placing missiles in Ukraine, I don't know what happens when Ukraine has a missile with a bloody big Ukrainian flag on it.

One other issue of re-focusing on Minsk is there is that it envisages basically a highly decentralised Ukraine (at least in relation to the eastern regions), the most Kyiv is willing to consider is some form of federation which doesn't the Russians and implementation of something that would satisfy Russia is seen as unacceptable by, say, nationalists in Ukraine. Squaring that circle is a challenge even if Russia is happy to go back to those talks.

It is striking that Russia is open to returning to the Normandy format and negotiations with Ukraine, France and Germany, while Ukraine is proposing a further round of talks between Ukraine, Russia and the US.

[DGuller]

I guess Gaijin de Moscu is one of the secret Russian operatives working in social media to further Russian propaganda. Funny how he suddenly re-appeared recently. I wonder why...

Damn. We are getting paranoid in our old age.

And hey even if he is, so what? What harm can he do here?

Languish is very important to Western strategic planning, you know.

Languish is very important, just like millions Facebook walls and the like.  I guarantee you that if Russia does invade Ukraine, there are going to be voices all over the place that seemed to organically came to the conclusion that we have no business interfering with Russia, even before FoxNews starts parroting that message.  Russia realizes that if it does invade Ukraine, the most important battlefield is the propaganda battlefield:  the popular support for getting involved must be nuked as early as possible as heavily as possible.  Russia has also realized for a while how to do propaganda at a grassroots level.

[Berkut]

I think the only way you can look at the expansion of NATO as "threatening" to Russia is if you insist on looking at Russian security from the eyes of the mid 20th century.

And while it is reasonable to look and note that historically, Russia was invaded twice from the West (well...once really, but from Russians perspective...) in the space of two generations....well, does anyone actually buy that as a credible threat, NOW?

People raised during the Cold War are currently running Russia. So yes, they totally do think like that.

I don't believe it. Hell, I don't actually think even Soviet Cold Warriors thought there was ever a credible threat of NATO sending tanks into the USSR.

It was about their ability to send tank into the West, not "defense" against attack. That was just the excuse. And you can tell from the force makeup that that was the case.

[Tamas]

Russia wants to be left alone.

I think they do. Unfortunately that usually seems to mean being behind a cordon of "friendly" countries and territories who act as buffer and remain firmly in their sphere of influence, whether they like it or not.

Only with the West, Syt. Our eastern border is mostly unprotected.

I wonder why

It is a good question because I think you have had more border skirmishes with China than with NATO, so far.

I guess it comes back to "Russia" meaning a very different geographical area for Russians than to the rest of the world.

[Habbaku]

Only with the West, Syt. Our eastern border is mostly unprotected.

I wonder why

The West's maniacal plan to put 90% of the Russian population west of the Urals and within a thousand or so miles of a dozen European capitals is finally coming to fruition!

[Razgovory]

This idea that American foreign thought and policy is centered on some nefarious plot to "get Russia" is kind of bemusing.

Yes please, do leave us alone. Stop funding the colour revolutions around our borders, stop moving your military bases to our borders, stop meddling with our economic projects such as the Nord Streams, and so on.

Just... leave us alone.

Edit: now that I think about it, I may have just summarised the latest Russian demands

But all these involve third parties.  Ukraine is not Russia so a revolution in Ukraine leaves Russia alone.  Lithuania is not in Russia so a base in Lithuania leaves Russia alone.  Nordstream is a pipeline so it's very nature is extra-territorial.  All these demands corresponding to a desire for a sphere of influence not the isolationist "Just leave me alone".

[Razgovory]

Our eastern AND western borders are unprotected for the same reason.  There is no profit in war against the Deep Ones.

[Jacob]

On the colour revolutions... I guess the Russian narrative is that they were created and funded by Western powers in an attempt to draw the affected countries out of Russia's sphere and into the West's?

Because the narrative I'm familiar with is that broad sectors of the populations attempted to hold the elites - who governed the country and captured most of the wealths through undemocratic manipulation - to account.

I'm guessing that the official Russian point of view is "that's what they want you to think, but obviously it's not true"?

I honestly have very little in depth knowledge of the colour revolutions. To what degree did the West encourage or drive the colour revolutions vs to what degree were they genuinely popular and internal to the countries in which they happened?

[Razgovory]

And I heard it was the arch-communist George Soros who did it.

[grumbler]

"Funny" is a figure of speech. I find nothing funny about the current situation.

On mirroring accusations... it goes both ways. You choose to see one side of it, I choose the other. We can talk for many pages funding credible examples illustrating both points of view.

Indeed, the entire purpose of the Russian mirroring tactic is to allow you to comfortably see the Russian side of things.  One would figure that someone as experienced and traveled as you would understand what NATO actually is,  but it seems one would figure wrong.

It would be less embarrassing if you just blamed the CIA, like everyone did in the old days.  It has more street cred as a boogieman than NATO does.

[Josquius]

Russia wants to be left alone.

I think they do. Unfortunately that usually seems to mean being behind a cordon of "friendly" countries and territories who act as buffer and remain firmly in their sphere of influence, whether they like it or not.

Only with the West, Syt. Our eastern border is mostly unprotected.

I wonder why

Because Russia already has the friendliest and most controlled of buffers in the east in the form of siberia?

Then there's the whole European plain thing

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/russia-geography-ukraine-syria/413248/

[Valmy]

This idea that American foreign thought and policy is centered on some nefarious plot to "get Russia" is kind of bemusing.

Yes please, do leave us alone. Stop funding the colour revolutions around our borders, stop moving your military bases to our borders, stop meddling with our economic projects such as the Nord Streams, and so on.

Just... leave us alone.

Edit: now that I think about it, I may have just summarised the latest Russian demands

Wouldn't know how to start or stop funding revolutions that even if I wanted to. The color revolutions were forever ago and who exactly we would fund to do that I have no idea. How does one fund a revolution? Are we talking about donating to political parties who are friendly to Western nations?

I certainly am not interested in any new military bases either near or far from Russia's borders.

As for Nord Stream: STOP INTERFERING WITH PIPELINES THAT CROSS YOUR TERRITORY WESTERNERS AND ARE INTENDED TO SELL YOU NATURAL GAS!!!!111 Um...what kind of idiotic demand is that? Why shouldn't westerners be involved in where and from whom they purchase natural gas from? Is Russia demanding the West not be sovereign in its own territory? Or is Germany not part of the west here? I have no idea. What kind of dictatorial power over the West is required before Russia is being "left alone" if not interfering with projects that directly involve their own territory and domestic policies is a requirement?

Leaving Russia alone suddenly seems impossible, unless you refuse to do any business at all with Russia. 

[Valmy]

Also I should probably point out Europe is quite small. The distance between Russia and the West is therefore very small. Heck if Finland is part of the West then it is no distance at all. Demanding we leave you alone and stay far far away when we live next door is going to be hard to accomplish.

[Solmyr]

I think the only way you can look at the expansion of NATO as "threatening" to Russia is if you insist on looking at Russian security from the eyes of the mid 20th century.

And while it is reasonable to look and note that historically, Russia was invaded twice from the West (well...once really, but from Russians perspective...) in the space of two generations....well, does anyone actually buy that as a credible threat, NOW?

People raised during the Cold War are currently running Russia. So yes, they totally do think like that.

I don't believe it. Hell, I don't actually think even Soviet Cold Warriors thought there was ever a credible threat of NATO sending tanks into the USSR.

It was about their ability to send tank into the West, not "defense" against attack. That was just the excuse. And you can tell from the force makeup that that was the case.

What I mean is that these people's entire world view is based on confrontation between Russia and the West. So expecting them to not view NATO as the Enemy is wishful thinking.

[Gaijin de Moscu]

"Funny" is a figure of speech. I find nothing funny about the current situation.

On mirroring accusations... it goes both ways. You choose to see one side of it, I choose the other. We can talk for many pages funding credible examples illustrating both points of view.

Indeed, the entire purpose of the Russian mirroring tactic is to allow you to comfortably see the Russian side of things.  One would figure that someone as experienced and traveled as you would understand what NATO actually is,  but it seems one would figure wrong.

It would be less embarrassing if you just blamed the CIA, like everyone did in the old days.  It has more street cred as a boogieman than NATO does.

On mirroring.

The Russian minister of defense has warned about the possible provocation as early as December 20, 2021:

https://www.interfax.ru/russia/811647

"It's been established with full certainty that over 120 employees of US private military companies are present in Avdeevka and Priasovsk of Donetsk Region. They're setting up firing positions inside residential housing and in socially import objects, training Ukrainian special forces and radical groups for military action... To perform a provocation, reservoirs with unidentified chemical components have been delivered to Avdeevka and Krasny Liman."

As you can see, his information is specific and stated briefly and clearly.

The US has claimed the Russians are preparing a false flag attack mid-Jan, a few days ago:

https://edition.cnn.com/2022/01/14/politics/us-intelligence-russia-false-flag/index.html?utm_content=2022-01-14T14%3A58%3A30&utm_source=twcnnbrk&utm_term=link&utm_medium=social

The US info is vague, with no specifics on the numbers, locations, type of action, and so on.

So... who is mirroring whom?