The State of Affairs in Russia

[Jacob]

Chamberlain had every "right" to go sell Czechoslovakia to Germany.

I don't understand the idea of "rights" when it comes to this kind of stuff. The question isn't whether they have the moral "right" to do so, it is whether or not it is actually beneficial to their countries for them to do so.

Fair enough, there are no "rights" involved, though I think implying that Scholz' meeting is equivalent to "peace in our time" is perhaps a bit premature.

Personally I think it's pretty natural for the new chancellor of Germany to actively engage with one of the biggest foreign policy challenges facing his country and the EU. Maybe his actions won't be helpful, maybe they will, but this is an area where Germany should be involved.

I absolutely see the argument that Germany cold shouldering or ignoring Putin for a bit may be the right move, but I don't see anything particularly egregious in Scholz deciding to start the conversation as he starts his chancellorship either. Of course, if he goes in like a wet noodle that's different than if he goes with some gravity.

I'm just a bit surprised to see Sheilbh, who typically is fairly understanding of countries pursuing their interests, framing Scholz' visit purely in terms of the needs of a larger international consensus.

[Zanza]

If Merkel was still chancellor and would announce that she seeks a private talk with Putin, would your perception be any different?

[Sheilbh]

If Merkel was still chancellor and would announce that she seeks a private talk with Putin, would your perception be any different?

Six of one, half dozen of the other to be honest.

I think as a new Chancellor - as with any head of government/state - a crisis is not a great time for your first trip to any country, because what they normally want to do is a reasonably friendly meeting that will try to set or "reset" the tone. In practice I'm not sure whether that matters very much because I think the reasons there were problems to begin with will re-assert themselves, but I think there's more desire on a first meeting to go well than if you've been to Moscow and met Putin 20 times. You'll already have had difficult meetings. I think it's a particular issue with Russia (and maybe China) because I think they're relatively comfortable exploiting that - see Borrell's trip to Moscow which happened during the Navalny protests. While the press conference was happening Russia announced they were expelling several EU diplomats, Lavrov spent his time attacking the EU as an "unreliable partner" and called out the failure to authorise the Sputnik vaccine - and (which I'm sure was a coincidence) one of the Russian journalists asked Borrell about Cuban sanctions which obviously the EU opposes. I'm not saying any of that will happen, but I think the Kremlin is good at taking advantage of Western politicians who want a good, polite meeting (basically I think Western leaders care about relationships - and I think the Kremlin and maybe Beijing are just more focused on interests including exploiting the concern about relationships).

Edit: I think Turkey does similar - see the lack of chairs at the EU-Erdogan meeting. I think they're both leaderships that don't mind taking advantage of courtesy/politeness. But similarly if Turkey was massing troops on a neighbours borders and making threats toward Greece, I'd suggest that European leaders probably shouldn't seek a meeting in Ankara until that situation was resolved.

I also think that whatever message Scholz is intending to take with him is a challenge for a new leader - especially one who doesn't have much foreign policy experience (from my understanding) in their first couple of months.

On the other hand I'm not sure Merkel would be particularly good at delivering that message given German policy with Russia (v the rest of Eastern Europe, including Germany's EU partners) when she was Chancellor - or that she'd have the trust of CEE members of the EU and NATO, as I think that disillusionment with German policy largely started under Merkel.

I'm just a bit surprised to see Sheilbh, who typically is fairly understanding of countries pursuing their interests, framing Scholz' visit purely in terms of the needs of a larger international consensus.

I wouldn't say international consensus in general should be a huge concern - because there are bad international consensuses. But on security I think the Western alliance matters and - whether in the EU or the NATO framework - I think you have to be guided and very careful to be close to the countries who are most directly affected. Scholz has visited Warsaw - I think at this stage the better move would probably be a quick set of visits to the Baltics or maybe Finland. It's not "provocative" like going to Kyiv (Borrell's doing that on behalf of the EU), but it emphasises Germany's EU and NATO partners who are on the border with Russia and have all expressed public concerns about Russia and their security in the last month.

Also I think it's very important not to have big countries talking over the heads of little countries - I think one of the things Biden's done well in the last month is there's been read-outs of regular calls with Ukraine, but also with the US's regional NATO allies - Poland, the Baltics, Romania,, Bulgaria, Hungary etc. I think that's helpful - and right - I also think it's how you show leadership, in a way that skipping to Biden-Putin talks wouldn't.

I also think it's a question of what is in Germany's interests. Is it establishing the relationship with Russia, or is it rebuilding trust with Germany's actual allies and EU partners to the east? It is incredibly low given NordStream 2, the Franco-German surprise proposal on EU-Putin summits and other issues while Putin's been in charge. Trust in Germany (and France and Italy) is low even with very mainstream, centrist pro-EU politicians in CEE when it comes to Russia and I think this move has the potential to just reinforce that lack of trust and, as that ECFR guy says, deepen the trenches on month two of a new government which is not great.

Personally I think it's pretty natural for the new chancellor of Germany to actively engage with one of the biggest foreign policy challenges facing his country and the EU. Maybe his actions won't be helpful, maybe they will, but this is an area where Germany should be involved.

The EU point is part of the issue though. I think on Russia that Germany (and France and Italy) do not have the trust of basically any CEE EU member. So to speak for the EU they first need to build that trust and part of that will involve trimming their interests which may be more open to cooperating with Russia to the interests of their CEE partners - rather than presuming to speak for the EU when they clearly don't and there's huge dissatisfaction with their policy from "New Europe".

Edit: Although I suspect all of this is going to be overtaken by events - protesters storming government buildings in Almaty:
https://twitter.com/Reevellp/status/1478657476123889665?s=20

I've no doubt the Kremlin will interpret this as Western sponsored/backed possibly the US launching a colour revolution (Moscow's great fear) next door to distract from Ukraine/Putin's push in Europe. Obviously that's nonsense but is, I think, how they will genuinely interpret it.

Edit: I understand cost of living/the huge global price increases in food staples has been a bit driver of whatever's happening in Kazakhstan (which sounds familiar). Worth noting the price of staples in Turkey have doubled in the last couple of months. It could all be nothing but food security is often linked to waves of protests/revolutions so I wouldn't be surprised if we saw similar big protests in other countries - though no idea where.

[Berkut]

Chamberlain had every "right" to go sell Czechoslovakia to Germany.

I don't understand the idea of "rights" when it comes to this kind of stuff. The question isn't whether they have the moral "right" to do so, it is whether or not it is actually beneficial to their countries for them to do so.

Fair enough, there are no "rights" involved, though I think implying that Scholz' meeting is equivalent to "peace in our time" is perhaps a bit premature.

Not making any such claim. Just using the standard rhetorical technique of illustrating a more extreme example of the same principle.

Personally I think it's pretty natural for the new chancellor of Germany to actively engage with one of the biggest foreign policy challenges facing his country and the EU. Maybe his actions won't be helpful, maybe they will, but this is an area where Germany should be involved.

Of course. But since he is doing so as a member of an actual military alliance with close allies who are also involved, it probably makes a lot of sense to coordinate your diplomacy with those other allies and involved parties. Assuming, of course, his desire is to actually contain Putin, rather then accommodate Putin.

I absolutely see the argument that Germany cold shouldering or ignoring Putin for a bit may be the right move, but I don't see anything particularly egregious in Scholz deciding to start the conversation as he starts his chancellorship either. Of course, if he goes in like a wet noodle that's different than if he goes with some gravity.

I'm just a bit surprised to see Sheilbh, who typically is fairly understanding of countries pursuing their interests, framing Scholz' visit purely in terms of the needs of a larger international consensus.

I think how the West deals with China and Russia is in fact going to suceed or fail around a larger international consensus. Especially China, but Russia as well.

The entire point of both countries current international diplomatic stance is to destroy the last 70 years of international, consensus around democracy and the rule of law and go to a regional power dynamic where countries are constrained by their regional economic and military power. Russia is trying to rather hard to convince the world that NATO is no longer a thing, and that the EU is meaningless, and hence any agreements made should be made between Russia and Poland, and Russia and Estonia and Russia and Ukraine and Russia and Germany. Etc., etc.

So yeah, Germany going and meeting with Putin on Putin's terms matters. Maybe it was a good idea for Germany anyway, but I can certainly understand why people would find it concerning.

[Zoupa]

Zanza, the perception in the rest of the EU, rightly or wrongly, is that Germany is way too chummy with Russia, hence it will not deliver strong warnings of sanctions or anything of the sort. It's seen as a desperate attempt to placate your energy daddy.

[Tamas]

Zanza, the perception in the rest of the EU, rightly or wrongly, is that Germany is way too chummy with Russia, hence it will not deliver strong warnings of sanctions or anything of the sort. It's seen as a desperate attempt to placate your energy daddy.

Yep, pretty much.

[Zanza]

Let's see how it goes. So far only a meeting of the German and French national security advisors with their Russian counterpart was announced, no meeting between Scholz and Putin.

His foreign minister is currently in Washington to align with Blinken on Ukraine. She wants to be tougher on Russia, but Scholz - as is his character - remains vague. He is not that interested in foreign policy, so it is likely he will pick a course that he hopes will avoid conflict. Basically a continuation of Merkel's mercantilism and focus on dialog.

The topic shows again the weakness and limits of the EU foreign policy. The views of e.g. Poland have no weight at all in Germany as Poland is itself rather hostile towards Germany, so their governmenthas zero influence. Also the German "let's talk with Russia" approach has other proponents in the EU, e.g. Austria, Italy or Luxembourg. Not sure if the different views can be reconciled. When Germany recently proposed to move more decision making power to the EU level, which would create a more coherent policy, this was considered the coming of the Fourth Reich in Poland...

[Zanza]

By the way, I personally would immediately authorize weapons exports to Ukraine and stop Nordstream 2, so I do not share Scholz' or Merkel's cautious approach.

[Jacob]

I wouldn't say international consensus in general should be a huge concern ...

Okay, those are all fair points.

[Jacob]

Zanza - I guess the response to the German proposal re: foreign policy is based on the assumption that the more united EU would hew closer to German policy, rather than allow smaller countries to influence EU (and German) policy more effectively.

[Sheilbh]

Let's see how it goes. So far only a meeting of the German and French national security advisors with their Russian counterpart was announced, no meeting between Scholz and Putin.

I think that's the right level and approach

The topic shows again the weakness and limits of the EU foreign policy. The views of e.g. Poland have no weight at all in Germany as Poland is itself rather hostile towards Germany, so their governmenthas zero influence. Also the German "let's talk with Russia" approach has other proponents in the EU, e.g. Austria, Italy or Luxembourg. Not sure if the different views can be reconciled. When Germany recently proposed to move more decision making power to the EU level, which would create a more coherent policy, this was considered the coming of the Fourth Reich in Poland...

Yeah and obviously the Polish government is bad generally, but why would they want more decision making power at the EU level when they don't think their concerns and fears about their biggest neighbour are taken seriously in Germany, France or Italy - three of the biggest countries in the EU with pretty solid voting power (especially if you add in the tax havens/other countries bought by Moscow). And, without war comparisons, it is historically an area of large powers talking to each other and making decisions about small powers, who aren't even at the table - it's not a post-colonial experience but it's not a million miles away. I think that is an important part of the view that the current situation - unanimity at the EU level and a US security guarantee - is less risky than the alternative.

I've said before but I think the model on this for Europe and the EU should be France and Greece. Where France has worked really hard to support Greece in recent confrontations with Erdogan, including sending some of the French fleet. It's partly driven by the dynamic in the Franco-Turkish relationship but France and Greece have now signed an even stronger mutual defence pact than NATO and I think Greece basically trusts France to hear its view, respect it and incorporate it into France's assessment of their own interests in the Eastern Med. They have made Greek concerns their own - and that allows Greece to actually relax about overtures with Turkey because there's enough trust with France.

I think until CEE countries feel that way with the big Western EU countries - Germany, France and Italy - about relations with Russia then EU foreign policy/strategic autonomy will go nowhere, because they don't trust those countries on what is, in their view, an existential issue.

Separately I also think the EU should focus on smaller issues where there is consensus rather than pushing for a voice on things like Russia or Iran. Because I think acting is better even if it's on a minor issue you consider beneath you like the Western Balkans, rather than getting a seat at the table and revealing you can't do anything beyond bromides because the member states are divided. I think that would build credibility and capacity both externally, but also with EU countries more effectively.

[Berkut]

Shelf, you seem to be saying that the core concept of the EU as a foreign policy actor is basically bullshit...?

[Zanza]

Shelf, you seem to be saying that the core concept of the EU as a foreign policy actor is basically bullshit...?

Sheilbh and me have said so before here on the board. It's hardly a controversial view.

[Zanza]

The EU is not a sovereign state, but a unique way the sovereign states of Europe organize their own foreign policy by building shared institutions that pool some of the sovereignty of its members. But no member state is willing to give up its core sovereignty and that includes many foreign policy topics.

[Tamas]

So has anyone raised the idea of involving Ukraine in discussing Ukraine with Russia, or are we really doing a Czechoslovakia here?