Iraq - is our debt there paid?

[saskganesh]

the "obligations to remove saddam" still doesn't wash.

the US acted acted then as now out of perceived self interest. much like every other country involved in geopolitics.

next time, use more soap.

[Berkut]

... our investment in Iraq is and should be based strictly on standard enlightened self-interest.

  Not those of the iraqis of course.  As a matter of fact, I don't recall the iraqui people asking for the help of the US to get rid of Saddam either.  Instead of trying to export democracy you people should focus on the home front where right wing conservative nutjubs are arming themselves.




G.

Right. Will do!

Thanks for the input, Mr. Left Wing Nutjob!

[The Brain]

I was thinking about this the other day when I heard there was another spate of bombings.

I think we've pretty much fulfilled our obligation to Iraq created, IMO, when we went and kicked out Saddam.

That does not mean I think we should bail, by any means. It does mean that if they fail, I won't feel like it is *our* failure, but rather *their* failure.

From here on out, as far as I am concerned, our investment in Iraq is and should be based strictly on standard enlightened self-interest. Iraq should not be considered any differently than any other country, except insofar as it presents different opportunities.

Thoughts?

Good for you.

[Berkut]

the "obligations to remove saddam" still doesn't wash.

I am sure it doesn't wash, but then, you just made up that quote, so it is hardly surprising.

[Norgy]

I think we've pretty much fulfilled our obligation to Iraq created, IMO, when we went and kicked out Saddam.


Thoughts?

Apparently not.

[Valmy]

the "obligations to remove saddam" still doesn't wash.

the US acted acted then as now out of perceived self interest. much like every other country involved in geopolitics.

next time, use more soap.

No no no we are talking about our obligations after we removed Saddam.

I also do not understand the point of saying we consider our interests in deciding what to do....so fucking what?  Grass is green and the sky is blue.  That does not mean there are no other considerations.  People are capable of having complex motives and not everything is black and white.  There is a question of justice, after we went in and fucked up everything we do have a responsibility to build it back up again...and it so happens we benefit with an Iraq built back up and suffer with a failed Iraq also.

[PDH]

Semi-serious thought here, what really has changed since the campaigns of 10 months ago when many people were upset about "cutting and running" from Iraq?  Is there just a growing sense that the Iraqi internal solution is just not working?

[Valmy]

Semi-serious thought here, what really has changed since the campaigns of 10 months ago when many people were upset about "cutting and running" from Iraq?  Is there just a growing sense that the Iraqi internal solution is just not working?

I thought the sense was that Iraq was about on as firm a footing as it is going to be and the Iraqi government is feeling secure enough to start asking us to cut down force levels.

[PDH]

I thought the sense was that Iraq was about on as firm a footing as it is going to be and the Iraqi government is feeling secure enough to start asking us to cut down force levels.

That is why I asked.  The recent month of violence seems to show that divisions and problems are still there, and was it just a sense that the Iraqi government can't get its shit together driving such thoughts as the IP?  I don't know, that is why it was a question rather than a basic languish papal pronouncement.

[Berkut]

Semi-serious thought here, what really has changed since the campaigns of 10 months ago when many people were upset about "cutting and running" from Iraq?  Is there just a growing sense that the Iraqi internal solution is just not working?

I can't speak for anyone else, but that is not my feeling at all.

My problem with the lefts "Cut and run" strategy was that it was motivated by a desire to ensure that the Iraq operation was seen as a failure. They wanted to, literally, cut and run.

What is going on now is that we are pullign out after achieving a level of success we feel comfortable with. I am very glad we are doing so for the right reasons, and can live with the left takling credit, since I care more about results than I do about ideology and 'getting" anyone.

So, what has changed, in my mind, is that I think the US and those allies who helped have achieved a basic level of success such that we can reasonably say (and by reasonably I mean reasonable to myself, not just cover for public consumption, which is a MUCH lower bar) that we ahve in fact led the Iraqi horse to water, and now it is up to them to drink, so to speak.

All the US could ever do is set up the conditions for Iraq to succeed - we cannot and could not do more. We could certainly do MUCH less - and in fact the "Hate Bush First" crowd insisted that we should in fact do much less. I think we have done enough, however, to say that we have given them a credible shot at making it work, and if it doesn't now, then it is mainly on them.

We can and should, of course, continue to help them, but on no different fundamental terms than we help any other country. We may help them a lot more, but only because there is a lot more potential gain from doing so, compared to the investment.

[vinraith]

I was thinking about this the other day when I heard there was another spate of bombings.

I think we've pretty much fulfilled our obligation to Iraq created, IMO, when we went and kicked out Saddam.

That does not mean I think we should bail, by any means. It does mean that if they fail, I won't feel like it is *our* failure, but rather *their* failure.

From here on out, as far as I am concerned, our investment in Iraq is and should be based strictly on standard enlightened self-interest. Iraq should not be considered any differently than any other country, except insofar as it presents different opportunities.

Thoughts?

I'm curious, what defined the break point between our responsibility and their responsibility in your opinion?

[Berkut]

I'm curious, what defined the break point between our responsibility and their responsibility in your opinion?

That is a good question - not really sure I have a good, objective answer though.

I guess it is just an accumulation of the results and the costs, and the realization that I do not emotionally think that if we leave and a year later it has turned into a mess *I* would feel like we bailed on them, and it is our fault. I would feel more like we did our best, and if it wasn't enough, nothing would be.

Not a very satisfying answer, I know.

edit: and to be honest, I don't think there is a defined "breaking point" really - it was always a combined effort, no clear demarcation line, just a gradually shifting burden, I guess.

[Warspite]

Whether or not a 'debt' has been 'paid' depends on how functioning states are formed (note that I deliberately do not mention democratic there).

There is little debate from the non-partisan scholars I have heard, met or read that the US ballsed up the initial occupation. No complaints about the military campaign: that worked superbly. But there were simply too few troops on the ground to enforce order, and local resources were mishandled. The decision not to bring the Iraqi army back to work to try and keep order is particularly roundly criticised.

As a result, the latent ethnic tensions and various actors' desires for power and profit combined to exploit the temporary anarchy. We've seen dynamics like this in Bosnia and Somalia - with the former only having held together because of concerted international pressure since 1995 (since 1994 if you consider the Croat-Muslim alliance).

I see some key parallels to Bosnia (I would, though, wouldn't I ). Although it was not the direct fault of the West that the state collapsed, and there are other key differences in the nature of the combatants, some lessons were plain to see for the Coalition states in 2003.

Firstly, there are people whose interests are simply not served by peace. War or thuggery, for them, is a tool for political power or economic gain. Then there are political entrepreneurs can see an opportunity to whip up fear and hatred to solidify their own base (see Karadzic and Milosevic for examples of how to do this). And there are just people who are plain afraid of other ethnicities in such situations.

So an otherwise decent person has to therefore try to find safety in the local militia, or criminal gang. One great example of this was the initial defence of Sarajevo in 1992. The regulars were not ready, so the only thing between the Bosnian Muslims and annihilation in the city were the mafia. And the toxic links between government and crime because of that war persist to this day in all communities.

Even extensive international involvement, to the point of proconsulship, has been unable to scrub the Bosnian political class clean. Emotions are too strong; memories fresh; and the real issues that actually bother voters (especially corruption) remain untouched while the politicians scream at each other about secession and constitutional reform.

These are all lessons that had been learnt and extensively documented in the peacebuilding literature by 2000 - three years before Iraq.

The comparison has been made to occupation of Germany, where extensive local apparatus that generally functioned well existed. The German regime had been repulsive; but it had also been an effective, modern, bureaucratic state at plenty of levels. It also had a well educated population and a sound economic base, provided the Allies chose to help redevelop it. And the Allies had enough troops on the ground to impose order, and the locals had little appetite for resistance, so the project had a number of factors in its favour.

So my point is basically that assumptions that a functioning state apparatus can just emerge are overly naive; it is unfair to assume that the Iraqis could have just picked up the pieces given the nature of Saddam's state. Political violence, corruption, ethnic division and minority rule, had all characterised his regime. Remove the iron fist, and you have an extremely high risk of disaster. The Coalition did not do enough to mitigate this risk in Iraq. On this basis, I would therefore say the debt lies more heavily with the US; though of course we cannot excuse in any way the Iraqis who chose to abuse the anarchy.

Yet the US government and military made a genuinely sincere effort to address its failure - hence the Surge. I know political efforts have perhaps lagged because of domestic Iraqi difficulties.

But there can be no denying the blood and treasure America has expended in trying to rectify its mistakes. Whereas in 2004, British officers shook their heads at events up north as they put on their berets and smugly recounted 'the experience of Northern Ireland', in 2009 these same officers are quietly astonished and impressed by the capacity of the US military to sit down, learn, and implement.

So my conclusion would then be that this debt is probably paid off. However, that in no way excuses the initial, highly naive, assumption that you can knock a government like Saddam's down and expect there to be social harmony. It just doesn't happen. And that has to be figured into the planning and execution - anything less is negligence. On the other hand, this does not detract from the decision to stick it out and give the Iraqis another shot.

[Berkut]

So my conclusion would then be that this debt is probably paid off. However, that in no way excuses the initial, highly naive, assumption that you can knock a government like Saddam's down and expect there to be social harmony. It just doesn't happen. And that has to be figured into the planning and execution - anything less is negligence.

Agree, certainly. Even to the extent that if this "debt" I am talking about (which s really jsut a short hand way of referring to something considerably more complex and not nearly as "neat" as I make it out to be) existed, it was largely multiplied by the inept and naive handling of the war to begin with.

I guess that is the curse of our government system - it never really has much "memory" and has to re-learn lessons over and over again. the naivete of the administration after that military operations conclude is simply breathtaking in hindsight - but even worse, it was rather obvious at the time as well.

[Warspite]

I haven't read much about the decision-making dynamics within the administration, but it is not the case that there were some warnings sounded from other parts of government and military? I heard someone once make a throwaway comment that the Bush team 'threw out the State Department plan'. Is this true in any way?