Korea- Too boring

[Josquius]

Developments are kind of surprising considering this kid was nothing until a few years ago. How quickly he learned the family business....
Unless of course its just different  factions of puppet masters at work.

[Camerus]

I don't get the surprise either.  Political purges (even of high ranking party members) and executions are fairly commonplace in totalitarian states.

[citizen k]

"If you don't like your uncle, you can execute your uncle."
                                               - President Obama

[Jacob]

The Chinese internet rumour mill says that the uncle had slept with Kim's wife (before they were married), and that it is this fact coming to light that triggered the execution. They also say that the wife hasn't been seen in public for over fifty days.

[jimmy olsen]

Since the late 50's purges in North Korea have been secret and only mentioned long after the fact. This kind of public show is unprecedented.

http://www.nknews.org/2013/12/analysis-jang-song-thaeks-very-public-purge/

ANALYSIS: Jang Song Thaek's very public purge

Dr. Andrei Lankov discusses the very public political purge of the once powerful Jang Song Thaek

by Andrei Lankov , December 9, 2013

One cannot say that the two year long rule of Kim Jong Un has been tranquil and quiet. As a matter of fact, it has been marked by series of large scale purges – on a scale that North Korea has not seen for decades. Last year was a time when the top echelons of the military were systematically replaced. It now appears that the time for a similar purge of the civilian bureaucracy has come.

The very recent downfall of Jang Song Thaek – Kim Jong Un's uncle – is an important event. It can be described as both unexpected but also anticipated. On the one hand, Jang's displacement has been expected within certain circles for sometime now. On the other hand, the dramatic form this purge took is completely unexpected.

DANGERS OF A MENTOR'S JOB

When, in October 2010, the hitherto almost unknown Kim Jong Un was suddenly promoted to become his father's heir designate, it was rumored that in the case of his father's death (then not seen as a imminent prospect), the young Kim would be advised and assisted by a trio of elder officials.

This council of regency included Kim Jong Un's aunt Kim Kyong Hee, her husband and lifelong bureaucrat, the aforementioned Jang Song Thaek  and Lee Yong Ho, a career soldier. It was widely assumed at the time that Kim Jong Il would be alive for another 5-10 years and that, therefore, the new heir would have some time to learn the wheels of the state and gather his own group of confidants gradually over time.

Things did not however turn out as expected, Kim Jong Il was to die in December of 2011, and Kim Jong Un suddenly found himself in charge of the country. Under the circumstances, the young leader had no choice but to rely on his father's team. It created manifold problems for Kim Jong Un – since virtually all his immediate subordinates are roughly double his age and have a dramatically different worldview and life experiences.

Such things in a Western country would create a lot of trouble for a company CEO even in the most individualist Western societies. Of course, it creates the greatest discomfort for an authoritarian leader in a nation with a strong Confucian background.

There is therefore little doubt that one of Kim Jong Un's major goals was to gradually dispose of his father's team, replacing these old people with a new generation of officials who are far closer to Kim Jong Un himself in their worldview and age. However, one should not expect that the old guard would go quietly. It is therefore not surprising that some would have to be removed forcibly.

The purge began in spring of 2012 when Kim Jong Un, having made an alliance with Jang Song Thaek and other civilian bureaucrats, essentially decapitated Kim Jong Il's army command. Established military leaders were replaced by lower leaders, and in July 2012, Ri Yong Ho, one of the three mentors, was removed. Soon after he became a non-person whereby his image was airbrushed out of photos, and his name was removed from all documents and texts that once mentioned his name in all subsequent prints.

Many observers expected that Kim Jong Un would eventually turn against top civilian bureaucrats, replacing them as well. This has happened, Jang is very similar in power terms to Ri Yong Ho, and his purge can therefore be seen as the first step in undermining the power of Kim Jong Il's old guard.

The fate of Jang has obviously been further aggravated by his position as mentor – he was by default supposed to pester and boss around the young ruler, giving him largely unsolicited advice. Being a mentor has always been a risky job, sooner or later the young king – or in this particular case 'Kim' – was going to come of age.

When this happens, he is likely to take out his grudges on the old men who used to boss him around and poked their noses into something that was clearly the King's exclusive business. A smart mentor must know when to retire, to be rewarded with a nice castle in the countryside. Many mentors however are too ambitious to know when is the time.

It indeed seems that, in this particular case, the King has developed a great deal of personal dislike and irritation for this particular mentor – this might be the reason why the long anticipated purge of Jang took a peculiar turn.

Nonetheless, one should not forget that Kim Jong Un's move against his father's old guard was logical and had little to do with his personal feelings. Until these people are removed from power, it is difficult – perhaps impossible – for Kim Jong Un to begin to execute a policy of his own, whatever that policy may be.

A MOST PECULIAR POLITICAL SHOW

While Jang Song Thaek's removal has been expected for some time, the North Korean public has been treated to a most unusual piece of political stagecraft. After several days of rumors, on early morning of the 9th December 2013, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), North Korea's official wire agency, issued a lengthy report about the alleged crimes of Jang Song Thaek. On the same day, the entire first page of Rodong Sinmun was dedicated to the same topic.

Finally, in the afternoon of the same day, North Korean television broadcast dramatic pictures of Jang being arrested at the extended meeting of the Korean Workers Party politburo. While the arrest itself is reminiscent of Beria's downfall in 1953 – Stalin's right-hand man was also arrested at a politburo meeting – it might be the first incident of this kind to ever be shown on TV.

The accusations against Jang are both nebulous and voluminous. He has been accused of counter-revolutionary factional activities, and also anti-state anti-party activities. It was said that he had had numerous affairs, used drugs and was a gambler to boot.

On a more serious note, he was accused of selling the country's resources too cheaply – a hint at deals with Chinese mining companies – and attempted to undermine the cabinet system. The much trumpeted accusations of factionalism have gained a lot of traction outside North Korea, but such accusations are rather unremarkable as pretty much every purged dignitary since the late 1950s has been accused of the sin of factionalism.

It is important to remember though that these events have little or no precedent in North Korean history. It is not widely understood, but since the late 1950s, all purges in North Korea have been done surreptitiously, with no direct mention being made publicly until long after the event.

In many, but by no means all cases, party cadres were issued with secret letters that described the alleged crimes of the purged officials. Such letters however were classified, and theoretically should remain beyond the reach of normal people. In some other cases, purges were mentioned writings on history – usually published many years later.

Even in the early 1950s, when the North Koreans still followed the Stalinist model of open, widely publicized purges, reports about the sins of unmasked counter-revolutionaries were never as prominent as the recent reports about Jang Song Thaek's misdeeds.

For example in December 1955, Pak Hon Yong the founder of the Korean Communist Party, had the report of his death sentence published in Rodong Sinmun but only as a small and short item. Needless to say, the decision to broadcast the footage of Jang Song Thaek's arrest is without precedent in North Korea's history and that of the Socialist bloc.

Why did Kim Jong Un initiate such a dramatic departure from established patterns? Of course, we can only guess, but two mutually compatible explanations are possible. First, it seems highly likely that the young leader holds a great personal grudge against Jang who is indeed known to be an overbearing and pushy person. Therefore, the usual irritation of a young king against an old mentor might be particularly strong.

Second, it is possible that the young leader is driven not merely by emotions but also by political calculations. The theatrics of Jang's public arrest might be designed to send a signal to all officials, telling them that the young leader, in spite of his weakness for exotic looking basketball players and Western music, is a tough leader one should never mess with.

Indeed, this seems to have been the intention. Contrary to many earlier expectations, Kim Jong Un has proven himself to be a surprising tough and ruthless leader, quite capable of outsmarting powerful enemies, and always ready to use violence against real or potential resistance.

WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?

Of course one might ask what this all means for the country's future. Currently, many things remain uncertain, but some suggestions can still be made. The world media has recently described Jang Song Thaek as a closet reformer, this might indeed be the case, but we should not forget that the same man used to be a rumored hardliner.

In both cases, it is not clear where such assumptions come from. Most likely we are talking about generally unreliable hearsay, and we should therefore not see Jang's removal as a deadly blow to incipient reforms in North Korea.

It is also remarkable that changes in North Korea's economy (a new system of agricultural management, 14 new economic zones etc.) began to speed up in recent months, when Jang was out of favor. It is therefore likely that his removal will have little impact on the speed and direction of Kim Jong Un's moderate economic reforms.

Jang's removal might however have some impact on North Korea's relations with China. In Pyongyang, Jang was often seen as a China expert and was heavily involved with Sino-North Korean economic exchanges. Critical remarks about sales of resources to other countries at bargain prices might indicate that North Korea will become more hostile toward Chinese investment. Generally it seems that Kim Jong Un still harbors some expectations about the possible arrival of Western capital, and is therefore rather unenthusiastic about Chinese money.

However, one should not overestimate the significance of a such possible problems with China. At any rate, the Chinese are not too eager to dramatically increase their investment portfolio in North Korea. Their reluctance has to do with Jang.

It is possible, however, that the current political show will have an impact on the regime's internal cohesion. On the one hand, it might produce a healthy terrifying effect on officials, but it also likely to plant seeds of doubt into the minds of many common people and lower bureaucrats.

Jang's removal is an indicator of cracks in the North Korean leadership, and as history has shown many times, an obvious lack of cohesion among the top elite may encourage domestic discontent. However, it may take a rather long time before such an impact comes noticeable.

At any rate, Jang's removal has shown that the rules of the political game in Pyongyang are changing fast. It is clear that Kim Jong Un's North Korea will be very different from the North Korea once ruled by his father and the one ruled by his grandfather before him.

[Razgovory]

Since the late 50's purges in North Korea have been secret and only mentioned long after the fact. This kind of public show is unprecedented.

Well, it turns out he's a reformer after all.

[Malthus]

The NK statement is hilarious.

http://www.nknews.org/kcna-watch/kcna-article/?0038638e

The specific crime mentioned?

When his cunning move proved futile and the decision that Kim Jong Un was elected vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Workers' Party of Korea at the Third Conference of the WPK in reflection of the unanimous will of all party members, service personnel and people was proclaimed, making all participants break into enthusiastic cheers that shook the conference hall, he behaved so arrogantly and insolently as unwillingly standing up from his seat and half-heartedly clapping, touching off towering resentment of our service personnel and people.

Half-hearted clapping! 

[jimmy olsen]

He looks like his Grandfather, I guess he thinks he has to rule like him too, after all he was far more successful than his son.

http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/12/13/21889289-execution-of-kim-jong-uns-uncle-recalls-grandfathers-lethal-era?lite

By Ed Flanagan, Producer, NBC News

News analysis

BEIJING – North Korean leader Kim Jong Un's highly scripted execution of his uncle makes one thing abundantly clear: Two years after taking power, the training wheels are now off for the world's youngest head of state. He truly is his grandfather's son.

Kim's uncle by marriage, Jang Song Taek, was executed Thursday for treason, the country's state-run news service said in a dramatic announcement which characterized him as "despicable human scum." He had also been accused of corruption, womanizing, gambling and taking drugs.

Rampant theories began circling immediately, chief among them the speculation that it was the start or end of a power struggle within the hermit kingdom.

Ultimately Jang's extremely public removal was an anachronism – a throwback to the lethal, high-level purges conducted in the 1950s by his grandfather and the nation's founder, Kim Il Sung.

In the years that followed, though, top officials in North Korea soon found themselves privy to an unspoken pact with their leader: Make it to the highest levels of power and while you may be purged for your transgressions, seldom will you be executed.

"Historically North Korea was unique in one regard: It was a Stalinist dictatorship where high-level officials were seldom killed," North Korea expert and Kookmin University professor Dr. Andrei Lankov said Friday. "If you look at the history of North Korea after 1960, you will discover that if you were lucky to belong to the top 100, you were generally secure physically."

"People who were purged would lose their jobs and occasionally their freedom," noted Lankov. "But it was very unusual... that a purged official was killed."

Jang, 67, was seen by many North Korea watchers as a regent of sorts behind the Kim dynasty and the main conduit between the isolated nation and its biggest trade partner and only ally, China. With his death come serious questions – many of which have plausible answers on both sides of the debate.

Does his purging consolidate 30-year-old Kim's power or does it perhaps expose previously unseen cracks? Does Jang's death signal a repudiation of Chinese-style economic reform or perhaps a reinterpretation of such reform under Kim's personal supervision? Will the removal of Jang take a toll on the relationship with China or is there potential for greater stability and cooperation through a strengthened Kim?

On the latter question, China's North Korea experts have been working furiously to come up with consensus. One expert reached by NBC News grudgingly let out that many of his peers had been called in by China's Foreign Ministry Friday morning to decide that very issue.

The result was a tame response from the Foreign Ministry that declared the toppling of Jang as a "domestic issue" and renewed hopes that cooperation and close ties would continue.
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Jang's denouncement this week was not the first time he had been purged: In 2004 he fell from grace before being rehabilitated and brought back to power in 2006. For many, this most recent purge was an inevitable step the younger Kim needed to take to further consolidate his power and ensure that the elder would be sent into relative anonymity again.

But the very public and extreme denunciation of Jang on North Korean state television earlier this week -- and again on Friday morning when his execution was announced -- strongly suggests that Kim Jong Un will not brook any challenge to his authority, even from family.

It also puts North Korean officialdom on notice that the once unspoken pact has been severed.

"If he has to go as high as purging and then executing Jang, it tells you that everything's not normal," Victor Cha, a former senior White House adviser on Asia told The Associated Press.

"When you take out Jang, you're not taking out just one person -- you're taking out scores if not hundreds of other people in the system," he added. "It's got to have some ripple effect."

In the years since he's taken power, Kim has worked hard to cultivate a more approachable persona for his people. Video clips of him enjoying Disney characters dancing, supervising the opening of sports facilities for the people and having his wife escort him to state events as near equals humanized him in ways his father, Kim Jong Il, took pains to avoid.

This brutal, but perfectly Machiavellian move clearly shows he is prepared to continue in the footsteps of the Kim dynasty.

[jimmy olsen]

Very annoying. 

Not only was everything 15-20 minutes late this week, there were fewer trains than normal so I had to wait over an hour for a train in Daejeon on Thursday.
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/search1/2603000000.html?cid=AEN20131213002800315

Rail strike to partially limit train services from next week

2013/12/13 01:36
SEOUL, Dec. 13 (Yonhap) -- Passenger train services will be partially disrupted starting from early next week as an ongoing strike by thousands of unionized rail workers is forecast to be protracted, the state-run rail operator said Friday.

More than 6,500 unionized workers of the state-run Korea Railroad Corp. (KORAIL) walked away from their jobs on Monday in protest against a government decision to set up a subsidiary to run part of its high-speed train services.

The walkout had so far only affected freight and some passenger train services with all bullet trains operating normally.

KORAIL said, however, it will reduce the number of KTX high-speed trains and subway services around the metropolitan area from next week due to safety concerns.

"Reduction of the KTX service is inevitable to prevent accidents as substitute workers and KTX engineers are being exhausted," a KORAIL official said.

Daily KTX services will be reduced by 10-12 percent starting from Tuesday and the operation of the normal-speed Mugunghwa trains will also be affected, KORAIL said.

The number of subway services in Seoul and its surrounding Gyeonggi Province will also be brought down by an average of 8.4 percent on weekdays, it added.

KORAIL workers have criticized the planned establishment of the affiliate, claiming that it is a first step toward privatizing the state-run company, which they say could result in mass layoffs and fare hikes.

The company has denied the claim, saying the new unit will be 41 percent and 59 percent owned by KORAIL and state-run investors, respectively, and that private firms will never be allowed to buy stakes in it.

The new service will run from Suseo-dong in southern Seoul to the southern provincial city of Busan. After several delays, it is expected to begin operations in 2016.

[Ed Anger]

Break out the emergency evacuation rickshaw.

[The Brain]

Can the rail strike be used for shore bombardment?

[jimmy olsen]

Must have been a little awkward when the waitress busted out into song out of the blue. 

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-25452941

North Korea is one of the world's most hermit-like countries, so it's rare to get a chance to meet people who live there. But the Chinese border town of Dandong is different. There are North Korean businessmen, waitresses and drivers. Some even speak - and sing - in English.

There is a seaside feel to this Chinese border town - its glitter-hard edge softened by the passage of river boats and wedding couples posing for photographs.

The lights strung up along the waterfront remind me of Europe. And there is music floating in from somewhere, the notes blown about in the wind.

Looking over the balustrade, across the narrow stretch of the Yalu River, it is hard to believe that the other bank is North Korea.

It is easy when living in Seoul to think that the notorious Demilitarized Zone is the only kind of border North Korea has.

The first trip inside that 4km-wide (2.5 miles) stretch of no-man's land, with its bristling weapons and twitchy atmosphere, is a shock.
The Friendship Bridge, pictured in front of Dandong

But when it comes to North Korean borders, this one here in China is the biggest surprise of all.

Because the atmosphere here is so, well, different. There is no visible security, no armed guards patrolling the riverbank, no razor wire along the promenade - at least not on the Chinese side.

The other side does not look very inviting - a vista of idle factories and sludge-coloured buildings lowering in the scrubland on the opposite bank which, one Dandong local told me, had barely changed in 40 years.

The only new buildings to appear, he said, were warehouses - built to store all the goods being brought over from China.

But Dandong is North Korea's gateway to the world - a place where the long alliance between the two countries takes physical form. It is also a place to make money.

And, as a result, Dandong is full of North Koreans - party officials, businessmen and government-contracted waitresses.

If I tell you that many of my hotel staff understood only Korean, not Chinese, you will get a sense of how many visitors this city has.

Not everyone in the insular regime is banned from leaving.

I met my first members of Pyongyang's elite at breakfast.

Having studied the hotel room service menu the night before, which included an item described as "North Korea's Characteristic Grim", I was set on the breakfast buffet.

Next to me in the hotel cafe sat three middle-aged men. Their clothes were almost identical, but then so were their hairstyles, and their regulation lapel badges - bearing the portraits of North Korea's leaders. Brand new versions of them, they told me, issued just a few days before.

They told me they were investors, come to China on business. More than that, they would not say.

But this is a gold rush town for North Korean businessmen - and the evidence is lined up at the nearby cargo port.

The yard is full of trucks, dozens of them, covered in the dust of North Korea's roads and stacked with the goods that each side is hungry for - coal and other natural resources coming out of North Korea, construction materials and equipment going in.

On the wall is a timetable, notifying staff of the arrival times of the convoys from across the river.

The Chinese truckers, immersed in a game of chess by the side of the yard, nodded towards the sign: "You had better get out of here before the North Korean drivers arrive, or there will be trouble," they said.

We found them anyway. Even here, North Korea's class privileges stick, and truckers eat in different places to party officials - a string of small canteen-kitchens along a stretch of highway on the outskirts of town.

There, a dozen North Korean drivers packed into the most popular joint. They had already begun drinking and were ordering lavishly - meat, vegetables and other dishes.

They were also surprisingly friendly, at least to begin with. "Yes, I am North Korean," one of them told me, "I am heading back there later today. Where you from?"

My reply - that I was from the UK - did not seem to faze him at all.

I tried again to strike up a longer conversation, but more colleagues had begun to arrive, and suddenly no-one at the table would even make eye contact with me.

I had learned one valuable lesson though - restaurants are a great place to meet North Koreans in Dandong. And so I headed for my third meal of the day - to a hotel chain run by North Korea's own government.

There, we had more luck. Our two waitresses, both in their early twenties, took turns to ask shy questions, and flirt with our local driver. Was I married, they asked? And where on earth had I learned my few words of Korean?

North Korean agents send waitresses over to Dandong for months or years at a time, monitoring their movements and collecting their pay-packets, most of which go to the government.

One of our waitresses told us she had only recently arrived and, as if she was still in a job interview, proudly listed the subjects she had learnt at school - mathematics, chemistry, biology, and "our leader's revolution".

Her English lessons also seemed to be a highlight - mainly, perhaps, because they seem to have consisted of singing English-language songs.

"I will show you," she said. And, standing stiffly behind my chair, proceeded to sing When A Child Is Born.

"A silent wish sails the seven seas, the winds of change whisper in the trees..." Strange lyrics for an insular dictatorship to teach its children.

When she had finished, I asked her whether there was any difference between North Korea and China. "The people's minds are different," she said. "North Koreans function together, Chinese are individuals."

There are some similarities though. No-one apparently can resist the allure of a modern British supermarket.

Tesco has been a presence in Dandong for several years - a remote outpost of brand-name products, catering to affluent Chinese families and, yes, reportedly to visiting North Koreans as well.

The vats of cooking oil and barrels of cut-price chicken feet would not sit comfortably with the teabags and breakfast cereal familiar to Tesco's UK customers, but soap, shampoo and toilet paper were all said to be popular at one time among North Korea's visiting elite.

And with its large Korean-Chinese population, Dandong is a good place to stock up on Korean groceries. But what a change it must be from home.

Walking out on to Dandong's truncated Broken Bridge - a relic of the Korean War - I stand midway above the waters of the Yalu River.

From here, I can hear the music blaring from Dandong's bars and clubs, can see the neon pulsing through the falling dusk, like a mini-Las Vegas perched on the edge of the bank.

And you cannot help but wonder what they think, on the other side, watching it all from the silent, darkening shore.

[Eddie Teach]

Many of the hotel staff in American cities only understand Spanish.

[Josquius]

Read that the other week. I want to visit!

[garbon]

odd...

http://news.yahoo.com/kim-jong-un-fed-his-uncle-to-120-starving-dogs--report-145303810.html

Kim Jong Un fed his uncle to 120 starving dogs

Forget the hangman's noose, the firing squad or lethal injection: North Korean leader Kim Jong Un executed his uncle and a handful of the man's aides by feeding them to a horde of 120 starving dogs, according to a shocking account.

Jang Song Thaek, the former No. 2 official in the secretive regime, was stripped naked and tossed into a cage along with his five closest aides.

"Then 120 hounds, starved for three days, were allowed to prey on them until they were completely eaten up. This is called 'quan jue', or execution by dogs," according to the Straits Times of Singapore. The daily relied on a description of the execution in a Hong Kong newspaper that serves as the official mouthpiece of China's government.

"The entire process lasted for an hour, with Mr. Kim Jong Un, the supreme leader in North Korea, supervising it along with 300 senior officials," the Straits Times said in a piece published Dec. 24, 2013, but only now getting traction in the United States. Two American national security officials contacted for comment said they had not heard that account, which first appeared in the Wen Wei Po newspaper on Dec. 12, 2013.

While China acts as North Korea's patron, relations between the two have been strained. The United States wants Beijing to take a more active role in pressuring Kim's Stalinist regime in Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons. The Straits Times suggested that China's government leaked the account of the December execution to signal its anger at Kim's government.

The United States has labored to get a grip on what kind of leader Kim Jong Un will be, amid worries in Washington that he is more reckless than his father, Kim Jong Il, whom he succeeded as supreme leader in December 2011.