Hamas moves away from violence in deal with Palestinian Authority

[jimmy olsen]

Somehow I'm skeptical.  I wonder why?

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/dec/18/hamas-moves-from-violence-palestinian

Hamas moves away from violence in deal with Palestinian Authority

Islamic party that has controlled Gaza for five years is to shift emphasis away from armed struggle to non-violent resistance

    Phoebe Greenwood in Gaza City
    guardian.co.uk, Sunday 18 December 2011 19.57 GMT
 

Hamas has confirmed that it will shift tactics away from violent attacks on Israel as part of a rapprochement with the Palestinian Authority.

A spokesman for the Hamas prime minister, Ismail Haniya, told the Guardian that the Islamic party, which has controlled Gaza for the past five years, was shifting its emphasis from armed struggle to non-violent resistance.

"Violence is no longer the primary option but if Israel pushes us, we reserve the right to defend ourselves with force," said the spokesman, Taher al-Nounu. On this understanding, he said, all Palestinian factions operating in the Gaza Strip have agreed to halt the firing of rockets and mortars into Israel.

The announcement on Sunday does not qualify as a full repudiation of violence, but marks a step away from violent extremism by the Hamas leadership towards the more progressive Islamism espoused by groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo.

The approach was concluded at recent talks between Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal and Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian president, in Cairo. Senior delegations representing the two factions met again in the Egyptian capital on Sunday to forge ahead with efforts to form a reconciled Palestinian government.

Iran recently cut its financial support to Hamas in a punitive response to moves within the Palestinian faction to relocate its exiled leadership, including Meshaal, from its base in Syria. Many among the Hamas rank and file have criticised their former ally, President Bashar Assad's violent assault on Syrian civilians.

Hamas believes the events of the Arab spring, in which uprisings have thrown off the old autocratic order and ushered in democratic, moderate Islamic governments in Tunisia and Egypt, have changed the landscape of the Middle East and is repositioning itself accordingly away from the Syria-Iran axis that has sustained it for decades, closer to the orbit of regional lslamist powers like Turkey and Qatar.

"European countries in particular see that the Muslim Brotherhood is a special kind of Islamic movement that is not radical. It could be the same with Hamas," said Nouno.

In a further concession to international legitimacy, the Hamas leadership confirmed on Sunday that it could entertain discussions regarding a peace agreement with Israel if the Quartet of peacebroking powers agree to modify its preconditions. Hamas will accept the foundation of a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders but stands firm in its refusal to acknowledge the state of Israel.

This softened tone on the international stage is not yet evident in Haniya's domestic rhetoric. Speaking at a rally in Kateeba Square, Gaza City, to mark the 24th anniversary of the foundation of the movement last week, the prime minister vowed to continue the "resistance".

"The resistance and the armed struggle are the way and the strategic choice for liberating Palestinian land from the (Jordan) river to the (Mediterranean) sea," he said.

The next step towards reconciliation will be made on Tuesday when representatives from all Palestinian factions meet in Cairo. Despite the process, officials within both Hamas and Fatah are sceptical that the effort will be successful. Hamas cites Abbas' insistence that Salam Fayyad continue as prime minister in a reconciled government as an obstacle to unity.

[Sheilbh]

From what I've read this looks to be a consequence of the Arab revolutions. 

The Assad regime's outraging the Arab world and even Hamas are distancing themselves from them, unlike Hezbullah who it's alleged are helping the regime.  Spotting this the Qataris - who are playing a very interesting game right now - and the Egyptians are trying to move Hamas from the Iranian sponsored Shia, revolutionary resistance party in the Middle East to a more Sunni power bloc orientation.  In addition the Egyptians are trying to negotiate a power sharing deal, a sticking point seems to be elections which Hamas will almost certainly lose in Gaza - from what I've read.  The idea of a national unity government is part of the Palestinian version of the 'Arab Spring' (I hate that phrase).  There've protests in support of it in the West Bank and Gaza.  The latter tend to be shut down quickly and aggressively.

I think the violent/non-violent aspect isn't that important at this point.  It'll be a while before that happens.  But if Hamas are shifted from being Iranian backed and being part of that revolutionary Shia wing in the Middle East then I think eventual non-violence and negotiations become a lot more plausible.

Of course the fear hanging over Hamas in Syria is that whatever happens they're probably screwed.  I've read comparisons with the position of Arafat in the Gulf War.  If Hamas don't oppose Assad then they lose a lot of credibility in the Arab world, the unity of criticism is remarkable.  On the other hand if they oppose him they lose a lot of funding and a base and it's more than possible that the Assad regime will inflict reprisals on the thousands of Palestinians in Syria.  So far they've been equivocal leaning to opposition, I think it looks like they'll be far more opposed in the future.

[jimmy olsen]

words

That's interesting. Are there any good sources you can direct us to?

[Sheilbh]

I think this article covers the speculation, I think Jane's have covered it too:
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/13/a_new_home_for_hamas

WSJ and others have reported on Hamas pulling out and Iranian unhappiness.  According to the Israelis it looks like the Iranians are shifting almost all of their funding to Islamic Jihad.  But there's been reports of general unhappiness with Hamas's ambivalence on Syria.  The Egyptian blogs have been relatively big on their role in trying to mediate with Hamas - they had a large part in the release of Gilad Shalit, for example. 

I think the essay on Qatar's role in this, and the rest of the Arab revolutions, will be fascinating when it comes out.

[Viking]

Isn't this just because they are skiddadelling from Damascus and will have to go on the lam or hide out in Gaza. It's not like they have changed any of their objectives.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/15/world/middleeast/on-anniversary-hamas-repeats-vows-on-israel-and-violence.html

At a Rally for Hamas, Celebration and Vows
By FARES AKRAM
Published: December 14, 2011

GAZA — The Hamas movement celebrated the 24th anniversary of its founding on Wednesday by reasserting that it would never recognize Israel nor abandon violence.

Tens of thousands of supporters watched the Hamas prime minister, Ismail Haniya, speak from a large outdoor stage in the shape of a ship with a model of Jerusalem's Al Aksa Mosque. Denying speculation that Hamas would turn its attention to nonviolent resistance, Mr. Haniya said: "Today we say it clearly. Armed resistance and armed struggle are the strategic way to liberate the Palestinian land from the sea to the river."

He was referring to all of Israel as well as to what his rivals in the Palestinian Authority want to become the state of Palestine — Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem. He said Hamas had never said that "Palestine is only Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem." He hinted that should those areas be handed over by Israel, Hamas could take a "temporary" respite "without Israel being recognized and without any concession being made."

Next week, Israel and Hamas are to carry out the second part of a prisoner exchange in which an Israeli soldier was freed for more than 1,000 Palestinians.

Political changes in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya augur well for Hamas's brand of Islamist politics, and the flags of those countries were present on the stage. The flag of Syria, where there is a popular revolt against President Bashar al-Assad and where the Hamas exiled leadership remains based, was absent.

I'm sorry, but when you have to find complex convoluted explanations to make it seem like what they are going to do is the exact opposite of what they say they will do again and again without remorse and with pride just makes you look foolish. 

[KRonn]

I'm skeptical given that we're talking about pretty entrenched radical views here. But could there actually be a significant change in Hamas coming? Hamas and the PA maybe working together - more strength together than fighting each other? Most of all, with the big changes in Mid East regimes, falling of many autocratic regimes, Syria in near civil war for months, the Iran-Syria axis perhaps becoming less significant, Hamas might begin to think they need to change with the times as well. Well, I'll not get too hopeful for positive change yet, but maybe a bit, and have to wait and see for now.

[PJL]

Considering most Muslim countries don't recognise Israel. Hamas position on Israel isn't that extreme in the Middle East. This isn't really about sofening their position against Israel, but merely strengthening their position in the wider Arab world (both governments and the general public). In the short term things won't change much, in the longer term hopefully there's be more Western influence on them to moderate their demands. Well that's the theory anyway....

[Sheilbh]

words

That's interesting. Are there any good sources you can direct us to?

Here's another relevant article:

Hamas on the move
Hussein Ibish, December 20, 2011   share

Hamas is on the move, both literally and figuratively, but how far it can and will go very much remains to be determined.

Hamas is in an impossible position, given the regional realignments following from the Arab uprisings, and is frantically trying to adjust without paying too high a price.

For more than a decade, Hamas' strategy was based on being simultaneously allied with both the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood network and the, essentially, Shiite, Iranian-led alliance. This incongruous ideological contortion was made possible by a narrative embraced by both of these broader anti-status quo alignments: that the Middle East was the site of a trans-historic battle between a "culture of resistance" and a "culture of accommodation."

This narrative has collapsed completely, and is rapidly being replaced by a new sectarian order pitting Sunni actors, including both Arab governments and Islamists, as well as Turkey, against what is now perceived as the non- or even anti-Sunni alliance led by Iran. This realignment has been most starkly illustrated in Syria, whose pro-Iranian government is now supported entirely by non-Sunni forces in the Middle East and opposed by virtually all Sunni ones.

Hamas can no longer have a foot in each of these camps when they are increasingly at odds, often in existential ways. The movement's political bureau cannot long remain based in Damascus since the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood is a core part of the uprising trying to overthrow the regime of Bashar al-Assad. The break with Assad also means a break with Tehran.

Hamas needs not only a new home but also new sponsors and a new regional profile, since the strategic landscape in which it operates has shifted so dramatically.

Literally on the move, its de facto "prime minister" in Gaza, Ismail Haniyyeh, is planning a tour of Arab states, beginning with Qatar and possibly including Turkey. Khaled Meshaal, who heads Hamas' political bureau, meanwhile, has been trying to engineer a reconciliation with Jordan, and has been planning a trip there that has yet to happen. Both sides insist this has not been canceled.

Figuratively on the move, Meshaal, according to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, has agreed that resistance to occupation must be nonviolent and must seek to create a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders. A spokesman for Hamas leaders in Gaza appeared to confirm these commitments, but reiterated that Hamas would not recognize Israel.

This apparently difficult readjustment has exposed latent tensions within Hamas. The organization is divided along multiple axes, but the most obvious is the division between many in the leadership in Gaza, which is entrenched in power and only stands to lose from any changes, and the external leadership, which has no choice but to urgently find new headquarters and patrons.

This squabble has been most publicly expressed in an ongoing feud between Meshaal and the Hamas hardliner in Gaza, Mahmoud Zahhar. In May, Zahhar was harshly critical of Meshaal for recognizing the authority of Abbas and the Palestine Liberation Organization to negotiate with Israel. Worse still, he questioned the authority of the political bureau itself, claiming, "the leadership is here [in Gaza], and the part that is abroad is just a part of that."

However, Meshaal reportedly retains the support of key Hamas leaders, including Ahmed Jabari, the head of its paramilitary Ezzedine al-Qassam brigades. The group reportedly imposed "severe disciplinary measures" against Zahhar in response to his challenge to the authority of Meshaal and the political bureau.

The big question is whether Hamas' need to adjust to the changing Arab political order will compel the movement to moderate its positions. Probably not if Hamas can help it, for it remains locked in a long-term power struggle with Fatah over leadership of the Palestinian national movement. Yet its ability to remain a viable contender for such leadership cannot be based on Islamist social conservatism alone. If it cannot outbid the PLO when it comes to the struggle with Israel, it's hard to see what its broad appeal will be.

Hamas is hoping that the Arab uprisings will strengthen its hand by bringing its Muslim Brotherhood allies to power in numerous Arab states. It has reportedly recently formally joined an international umbrella group of the Brotherhood movement. But as it has to abandon the Iranian-Syrian alliance and explore deeper relations with Qatar, Egypt and even Jordan, Hamas will be dealing with states that, at least for now, will not be willing to take responsibility for the movement's traditional policies and actions.

The outcome of the Arab uprisings and realignment writ large will probably determine the future of Hamas. Fatah, too, will have to adjust to the emerging strategic and political environment. These new regional realities will probably affect the future of both organizations more than anything the Palestinian groups decide independently or between themselves.