Why did Allies go easy on Nazi war criminals?

[Valmy]

I'm more inclined to make the argument that Britain and France were themselves exceptionally bad at grand strategy

You are not kidding man.  The French leadership was so unsure of itself and so at a loss about what to do (and even those who DID have a vision were powerless against the general malaise).  Their strategic ideas seem like wishful thinking.  At least the guys in 1914 were determined and decisive despite their obvious strategic and tactical shortcomings.

[Razgovory]

I was mostly critical of your racist thing.  That's something Slargos would say.

[Razgovory]

Your blame is misplaced if you think that was the cause.

What do you believe the cause to be?  My argument was to counter the idea that Germans were released because they would be helpful in building an army to fight the Soviets.  Since the army was very poor, then they couldn't have been that helpful.

If it were accurate to say the Bundeswehr was crap in 62. I would point to the overall morale/will of the German people. Which was probably not what you would call "High".

Why would it be inaccurate?  And what does the will of the people have to do with peace time combat maneuvers?

[11B4V]

Your blame is misplaced if you think that was the cause.

What do you believe the cause to be?  My argument was to counter the idea that Germans were released because they would be helpful in building an army to fight the Soviets.  Since the army was very poor, then they couldn't have been that helpful.

If it were accurate to say the Bundeswehr was crap in 62. I would point to the overall morale/will of the German people. Which was probably not what you would call "High".

Why would it be inaccurate?  And what does the will of the people have to do with peace time combat maneuvers?

I am fronting you that maybe there a sherd of truth to the CIA report.

That little event called WW2. Morale and Will everything.

From personnel experince stationed in Germany from '87-92, the Bundeswehr were every bit the professionals and capable of holding there own.

This would include personnal experience with line Panzer Grenadiers formations and more extensively Fernspähkompanies.

[Neil]

I'm more inclined to make the argument that Britain and France were themselves exceptionally bad at grand strategy

You are not kidding man.  The French leadership was so unsure of itself and so at a loss about what to do (and even those who DID have a vision were powerless against the general malaise).  Their strategic ideas seem like wishful thinking.  At least the guys in 1914 were determined and decisive despite their obvious strategic and tactical shortcomings.

I think that their strategic shortcomings flowed from their economic shortcomings.  They had built their armies to win The Great War, and so they had infantry support tanks and static defence lines.  Their strategy was set by the investments of the previous generation.  They had rebuilt their armies in the 20s, whereas the Germans were building from scratch in the 30s.

[Valmy]

They had built their armies to win The Great War, and so they had infantry support tanks and static defence lines.  Their strategy was set by the investments of the previous generation.  They had rebuilt their armies in the 20s, whereas the Germans were building from scratch in the 30s.

Well that is theoretically true I think in actuality they looked at the lessons of WWI and drew rather bizarre conclusions.  Defense in WWI was just as devastating on your troops as attacking.  Success came from massing armor and airpower and infantry in a combined assualt like how the Allies smashed the Hindenburg Line or the Americans cleared the St. Mihiel salient.  Seeing the Hindenberg line fall so quickly in 1918 and then thinking 'Wow if only we had a bigger Hindenburg Line we would win the next war easily' just baffles me.  It is as if they took the Chemin des Dames of 1917 as the eternal truth of warfare and refused to study whatever happened after it.

[Razgovory]

I am fronting you that maybe there a sherd of truth to the CIA report.

That little event called WW2. Morale and Will everything.

From personnel experince stationed in Germany from '87-92, the Bundeswehr were every bit the professionals and capable of holding there own.

This would include personnal experience with line Panzer Grenadiers formations and more extensively Fernspähkompanies.

What does that have to do with 1962?  WW2 proved that Morale and Will do not win wars.  The Japanese had more Will then anyone, the Germans quite a bit as well.  The Will to win is nice, but it is a poor substitute for food, ammunition, fuel, and weaponry.

[Razgovory]

They had built their armies to win The Great War, and so they had infantry support tanks and static defence lines.  Their strategy was set by the investments of the previous generation.  They had rebuilt their armies in the 20s, whereas the Germans were building from scratch in the 30s.

Well that is theoretically true I think in actuality they looked at the lessons of WWI and drew rather bizarre conclusions.  Defense in WWI was just as devastating on your troops as attacking.  Success came from massing armor and airpower and infantry in a combined assualt like how the Allies smashed the Hindenburg Line or the Americans cleared the St. Mihiel salient.  Seeing the Hindenberg line fall so quickly in 1918 and then thinking 'Wow if only we had a bigger Hindenburg Line we would win the next war easily' just baffles me.  It is as if they took the Chemin des Dames of 1917 as the eternal truth of warfare and refused to study whatever happened after it.

I think much lower manpower the the major factor.  Going on the offensive takes more manpower simply because you have to defend the areas you are not attacking at the same time you are building a large superiority in the area you are attacking.  For a successful attack in WWII your typically needed a local superiority of 4:1.

[11B4V]

What does that have to do with 1962?

You have no clue what it takes to successfully train even a unit at the lowest level (the building blocks) do you. Say a squad or Platoon.

Let alone training and coordinating large manuever formations. Have you ever worked at a Division and/or Corps Level staff and see what it takes, along with all the pieces in play, I have. If you had any practical experience with the above you could answer that.

But your claim that it was the fault of the supposed former Nazi Officer Corps is clueless.

WW2 proved that Morale and Will do not win wars.

True
Poland
Denmark
France
China
Korea
Austria
Czech
Baltic States
etc
etc

But then we were talking about the Bundeswehr. Werent we.

[Habbaku]

How many  high-level, former-Wehrmacht officers were in the Bundeswehr in 1962?

[11B4V]

How many  high-level, former-Wehrmacht officers were in the Bundeswehr in 1962?

Unsure, but I think the number would be suprising.

[Razgovory]

What does that have to do with 1962?

You have no clue what it takes to successfully train even a unit at the lowest level (the building blocks) do you. Say a squad or Platoon.

Let alone training and coordinating large manuever formations. Have you ever worked at a Division and/or Corps Level staff and see what it takes, along with all the pieces in play, I have. If you had any practical experience with the above you could answer that.

But your claim that it was the fault of the supposed former Nazi Officer Corps is clueless.

WW2 proved that Morale and Will do not win wars.

True
Poland
Denmark
France
China
Korea
Austria
Czech
Baltic States
etc
etc

But then we were talking about the Bundeswehr. Werent we.

I have no idea what you are on about here.  Korea and Czechia weren't even belligerents in the war.  The CIA thing was about recruiting German intelligence agents.  The US generally found them dishonest, unmotivated and incompetent (German intelligence proved  inept during the war, so that should prove no surprise).  I brought up the 1962 since it was a famous incident and it happened within a decade of the founding of the new German army.  Nobody really knows the quality of the German army since it's never been tested.  I also find the '62 event interesting because it happened around the same time as the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Chinese invasion of India.  This was probably the time when NATO and the WP were closest to war.

[11B4V]

I remember reading the CIA found them completely useless. And the Bundeswehr was not that good of a force.  At least by 1962, when NATO rated the Germans the lowest possible standard after the Fallex 62 maneuvers.  We would have done better using Poles, who actually did defeat the Soviets in a war.

Bundeswehr was still in it's infancy in '62.

It is also the period of time when all those useful German officers from WWII would still be around.

Kursk is the best example of this.  Hitler allowed his generals a great deal of latitude in planning and executing the operation.  They fucked up royally, which is probably why they wanted to focus on Stalingrad rather then Kursk as the turning point of the war.

The CIA thing was about recruiting German intelligence agents.  The US generally found them dishonest, unmotivated and incompetent (German intelligence proved  inept during the war, so that should prove no surprise).  I brought up the 1962 since it was a famous incident and it happened within a decade of the founding of the new German army. 

Nowhere in your posts, up until your last one, are you talking about German Intel agents. You were talking about the ww2 german army leadership in the Bundeswehr.

[Zanza]

How many  high-level, former-Wehrmacht officers were in the Bundeswehr in 1962?

All high-ranking officers of the Bundeswehr in 1962 were Wehrmacht veterans. The leadership was mostly former generals and staff officers of the Wehrmacht. The inspector general (= chief of staff) was the former head of operations of the OKH, Adolf Heusinger. The top civilian advisor of the government regarding the military was Erich von Manstein, who had been sentenced for war crimes by the Allies but was later cleared by a German court.

[11B4V]

How many  high-level, former-Wehrmacht officers were in the Bundeswehr in 1962?

All high-ranking officers of the Bundeswehr in 1962 were Wehrmacht veterans. The leadership was mostly former generals and staff officers of the Wehrmacht. The inspector general (= chief of staff) was the former head of operations of the OKH, Adolf Heusinger. The top civil advisor of the government regarding the military was Erich von Manstein, who had been sentenced for war crimes by the Allies but was later cleared by a German court.

Good info Zanza, thanks.