Why was Russia ok with NATO in Libya? Why is Poland unhappy about it?

[Berkut]

A rather interesting read, I thought:

The Realist Prism: Libya Could Shift NATO Focus Southward

The commencement of military operations in Libya has led to some  unexpected reactions in Eastern European capitals. It was widely  expected that Russia, whose uneasiness with the very principle of  humanitarian intervention is well-known, would have used its veto at the  U.N. Security Council to block the passage of Resolution 1973. After  all, Russia's firm opposition to the Kosovo intervention in 1999 led the  United States to work through NATO rather than bring the matter to the  Security Council. And Moscow has had a clear track record over the last  decade of resisting Western calls for intervention on humanitarian  grounds in places like Sudan, Zimbabwe and Burma. Yet Russia chose to  abstain from the vote on the Libya resolution, not veto it, and in the  absence of Russian resistance, China chose not to be the lone standout  on the issue. While there has subsequently been a great deal of  criticism -- most notably expressed by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin --  emanating from some circles in Russia, there has been no indication that  Moscow is prepared to take any drastic steps to register its  displeasure.

At the same time, Poland, which traditionally has  been one of the strongest proponents of the concept of a "league of  democracies" and sent contingents to Iraq and Afghanistan, was far less  enthused about the prospects of the Libya operation. Warsaw's reluctance  to endorse the Libya mission, combined with its decision to play no  active role in it, caught many American policymakers by surprise. Former  U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski spoke for many in  Washington when he expressed his concerns with the "passively neutral stand that Poland has taken on this issue."

However,  Moscow's lack of existential concern over the Libya mission and  Warsaw's cool reaction to it are more understandable when we consider  that both Russia and Poland sense the operation may prove to be a  turning point in the future direction of the North Atlantic alliance.

Only a few short years ago, it seemed that NATO was beginning to coalesce around a post-Cold War purpose:  the extension of the Euro-Atlantic zone deep into the Eurasian  hinterland. Even as the alliance embraced the stabilization mission in  Afghanistan, a third wave of expansion brought the Baltic States into  NATO and efforts began to encourage other post-Soviet states, notably  Ukraine and Georgia, to move along the path to membership. Meanwhile, a  Yeltsin administration which had proven to be relatively compliant with  Western directives was replaced by a more assertive Putin administration  anxious to reclaim a Russian sphere  of influence in its immediate geopolitical neighborhood. That allowed  some in the West to argue that NATO's original mission of "keeping the  Russians out" of Europe was still relevant, even in a post-Cold War  context.

But this led to tensions within NATO, which were famously on display  in the 2008 Bucharest summit. A resurgent Russia might indeed have been  throwing its weight around, but Western Europeans did not see Moscow as  an existential threat. Russian tanks might cross the border into  Georgia, but they weren't going to be gunning across the Elbe and  through the Fulda Gap, or racing for the English Channel anytime soon.  NATO's continued eastward focus was at odds with attempts --  particularly on the part of the Germans, the Italians and the French --  to build new economic and security partnerships with Russia.

Over  time, the intractable nature of the Afghan conflict also drained away  whatever enthusiasm there might be have been for promoting stability and  reconstruction in the mountains of the Hindu Kush. When the Obama  administration came into office, it tried to convince its partners in  NATO that the Afghan mission was the defining test of the relevance of  NATO. Indeed, in March 2011, Defense Secretary Robert Gates read the riot act to NATO defense ministers,  bluntly stating, "Frankly, there is too much talk about leaving and not  enough talk about getting the job done right; too much discussion of  exit and not enough discussion about continuing the fight; too much  concern about when and how many troops might redeploy and not enough  about what needs to be done before they leave."

But the Libya  mission, when combined with the ongoing deployment of a NATO task force  off the shores of Somalia, provides a new rationale for the alliance's  existence: securing the soft southern underbelly of Europe from the  threats that lie across the water. Afghanistan is far away, and its  chaos unlikely to be solved anytime soon. Why not, therefore, expend  time, effort and resources to stabilizing the Mediterranean basin, in  effect declaring it to be NATO's "mare nostrum"?

Such a shift  would fit very well with France's own conception of European security,  reinforce France's claims to renewed leadership within the alliance, and  permit Paris to avoid the zero-sum choice of either improving its ties  with NATO or pushing ahead with a new partnership with Russia.  In turn, Moscow need not fear the rejuvenation of the North Atlantic  alliance if its primary field of focus and activity turns toward North  Africa instead of the Eurasian steppes.

That kind of change in  focus, however, would be regarded with unease in the former Soviet-bloc  states of Eastern Europe. While Poland's relations with Russia have been  steadily improving over the past year, there is no doubt that Warsaw  would prefer to see NATO's attention remain focused on expanding its  eastern vector. That explains why the Polish government might be less  sanguine about a NATO mission in Libya that could end up demanding a  great deal of time and engagement.

For NATO, however, this could  be a "Tilsit" moment. Just as Napoleon Bonaparte reached an accord with  Tsar Alexander in 1807 that stopped France's eastern advance,  permitting Paris to focus more time and attention on the empire's  southern flanks, the Libya mission could be the alliance's first step  toward formally abandoning any further eastward expansion. By this  argument, the stabilization of the Baltic basin has been accomplished:  Europe's natural frontiers in the east have been reached at the Vistula  and the western shore of the Black Sea, and now it is time to look  south.

In doing so, NATO would effectively acknowledge that the  status quo achieved in the borderlands between Europe and Russia is  likely to last, with Ukraine under President Viktor Yanukovych assuming a  "neutral" status marked by the pursuit of a balanced approach to both Moscow and the West.  Tilting the axis of NATO away from an East-West divide and toward a  North-South bridge diminishes the relevance of Western "beachheads"  across the Black Sea: If the future of the alliance is the Mediterranean  basin, not the Eurasian plains, a NATO-aspirant country like Georgia  becomes far more distant and peripheral to the alliance.

Russia's 2010 military doctrine  identified the continued expansion of NATO as a prime security threat  to the country. But an Atlantic alliance that looks south instead of  east would be a NATO that Russia could learn to live -- and even partner  -- with. The effort to oust Moammar Gadhafi might have the unexpected  consequence of allowing NATO to write a new chapter of its history not  only with the Arab world, but also with Russia.

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8371/the-realist-prism-libya-could-shift-nato-focus-southward