Sovereign debt bubble thread

[crazy canuck]

So they figure that there's no chance whatsoever of a Canadian default?  A bold prediction.

That's what I thought.  Seems rather odd.

That prediction may change if the election goes badly.  But if the same government is in charge surplus is just around the corner...

[MadImmortalMan]

So they figure that there's no chance whatsoever of a Canadian default?  A bold prediction.

That's what I thought.  Seems rather odd.

Maybe it's incomplete. Then again, can you think of a more solvent place than Canada?

[HVC]

So they figure that there's no chance whatsoever of a Canadian default?  A bold prediction.

That's what I thought.  Seems rather odd.

That prediction may change if the election goes badly.  But if the same government is in charge surplus is just around the corner...

So you're the guy the pay to write up all those ads

[crazy canuck]

So they figure that there's no chance whatsoever of a Canadian default?  A bold prediction.

That's what I thought.  Seems rather odd.

That prediction may change if the election goes badly.  But if the same government is in charge surplus is just around the corner...

So you're the guy the pay to write up all those ads

Meh, truth is truth.

[MadImmortalMan]

Well now, look who else was lying about the budget all along.

Portugal's Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho discovers 'colossal' budget hole
Portugal's new leader Pedro Passos Coelho has told the nation to brace for further austerity measures after his government discovered a "colossal" €2bn (£1.7bn) hole in the public accounts left by the outgoing Socialists.


Yields on two-year Portuguese debt rose to a fresh record of 20.3pc on Monday, reflecting fears by investors that the country would struggle to pull itself out of downward spiral without some form of debt restructuring.

Mr Passos Coelho also appeared to caution the European authorities that his government will not tolerate heavy-handed interference in the country.

"We want to take part in an ambitious European project and make our contribution so Europe can confront its problems in the most ambitious way, but as prime minister I will not stand by and let Europe govern Portugal," he told a party gathering.

There is growing rancor in Lisbon over the term of the €78bn rescue by the EU and the International Monetary Fund, and the sweeping powers of the inspectors as they impose a "structural adjustment" on the economy.

The penal rate of interest charged by the EU is expected to top 5.5pc and risks trapping the country in debt-deflation. At the same time fiscal austerity, without offsetting monetary stimulus or devaluation, may tip the economy into an even deeper downturn.

EU officials are pushing hard for a 100 basis points reduction in rates on rescue loans, hoping to win backing from a reluctant Germany at an EU summit on Thursday.

The revelation of a budget hole in Portugal has echoes of what occurred in Greece in late 2009, when an audit by the new Pasok government exposed a budget deficit twice the level previously declared to the European Commission.

Portugal's government will have to cover the gap with another round of spending cuts, mostly in the civil service and state-owned industries. The sacrosanct Christmas Bonus is already being slashed, effectively cutting salaries.

Portugal is obliged to cut the budget deficit to 5.9pc of GDP this year under its rescue terms. This looks like a Sisyphean task since the deficit was still 8.7pc in the first quarter, and further austerity will have the side-effect of choking tax revenue. The experience of Greece is that the country can find itself chasing its tail, with the deficit remaining stubbornly high in a shrinking economy. Portugal's central bank said the economy will contract a further 1.8pc next year.

"There are limits to cutting: you can't just cut blindly," said Mr Passos Coelho.

1.7bn isn't really "colossal" by our standards.



Good thing it broke after the trading day. Here are the current spreads. Expect them to go back up tomorrow.

Portugal   1175   -20 (-1.7%)   17:30
Italy             306   -24 (-7.2%)   17:30
Ireland   1160   -17 (-1.4%)   17:30
Greece   2500   -1 (0%)   17:30
Spain   358   -26 (-6.9%)   17:30

[Admiral Yi]

The Socialists were forced into lying by the banks. 

[derspiess]

The Socialists were forced into lying by the banks. 

[MadImmortalMan]

The verdict!

STATEMENT BY THE HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT OF THE EURO AREA AND EU INSTITUTIONS

Since the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area, important measures to stabilize the euro area, reform the rules and develop new stabilization tools have been taken. The recovery in the euro area is well on track and the euro is based on sound economic fundamentals. But the challenges at hand have shown the need for more far reaching measures. We reaffirm our commitment to the euro and to do whatever is needed to ensure the financial stability of the euro area as a whole. We also reaffirm our determination to reinforce convergence, competitiveness and governance of the Euro area.

Today, we agreed on the following measures:

Greece:

1. We welcome the measures undertaken by the Greek government to stabilize public finances and reform the economy as well as the new package of measures recently adopted by the Greek Parliament. These are unprecedented, but necessary efforts to bring the Greek economy back on a sustainable growth path.

2. We agree to support a new programme for Greece and to provide an additional amount of up to [xx] ¤. This programme will be designed, notably through lower interest rates and extended maturities, to decisively improve the debt sustainability and refinancing profile of Greece. We call on the IMF to contribute to the financing of the new Greek programme in line with current practices.

3. We have decided to lengthen the maturity of the EFSF loans to Greece to the maximum extent possible from the current 7.5 years to a minimum of 15 years. In this context, we will ensure adequate post programme monitoring. We will provide EFSF loans at lending rates equivalent t othose of the Balance of Payment facility (currently approx. 3.5%) without going below the EFSF funding cost. This will be accompanied by a mechanism which ensures appropriate incentives to implement the programme, including through collateral arrangements where appropriate.

4. We call for a comprehensive strategy for growth and investment in Greece. Structural funds should be re-allocated for competitiveness and growth under a European "Marshall Plan". Member States and the Commission will mobilize all resources necessary in order to provide exceptional technical assistance to help Greece implement its reforms.

5. Greece is in a uniquely grave situation in the Euro area. This is the reason why it requires an exceptional solution. The financial sector has indicated its willingness to support Greece on a voluntary basis through a menu of options (bond exchange, roll-over, and buyback) at lending conditions comparable to public support with credit enhancement.

6. All other Euro countries solemnly reaffirm their inflexible determination to honour fully their own individual sovereign signature and all their commitments to sustainable fiscal conditions and structural reforms. The Euro area Heads of States or Government fully support this determination as the credibility of all their sovereign signatures is a decisive element for ensuring financial stability in the Euro area as a whole.

Stabilization tools:

7. To improve the effectiveness of the EFSF and address contagion, we agree to increase the flexibility of the EFSF, allowing it to:

- intervene on the basis of a precautionary programme, with adequate conditionality;

- finance recapitalisation of financial institutions through loans to governments including in non programme countries;

- intervene in the secondary markets on the basis of an ECB analysis recognizing the existence of exceptional circumstances and a unanimous decision of the EFSF Member States.

Fiscal consolidation and growth in the euro area:

8. We welcome the progress made on the implementation of the programmes in Ireland andPortugal and reiterate our strong commitment to the success of these programmes. The EFSF lending conditions we agreed upon for Greece will be applied also for Portugal and Ireland. In this context, we note Ireland's willingness to participate constructively in the discussions on the Consolidated Common Tax Base draft directive (CCTB) and in the structured discussions on tax policy issues in the framework of the Euro+ pact framework.

9. All euro area Member States will adhere strictly to the agreed fiscal targets, improve competitiveness and address macro-economic imbalances. Deficits in all countries except those under a programme will be brought below 3% by 2013 at the latest. In this context, we welcome the budgetary package recently presented by the Italian government which will enable it to bring the deficit below 3% in 2012 and to achieve balance budget in 2014. We also welcome the ambitious reforms undertaken by Spain in the fiscal, financial and structural area. As a follow up to the results of bank stress tests, Member States will provide backstops to banks as appropriate.

10. We will implement the recommendations adopted in June for reforms that will enhance our growth. We invite the Commission to enhance the synergies between loan programmes and EU funds in all countries under EU/IMF assistance. We support all efforts to improve their capacity to absorb EU funds in order to stimulate growth andemployment.

Economic governance:

11. We look forward to the rapid finalization of the legislative package on the strengthening of the stability and growth pact and the new macro economic surveillance. Euro area members will do their utmost to help reaching agreement with the EP on voting rules in the preventive arm of the Pact.

12. We commit to introduce legally binding national fiscal frameworks as foreseen in the fiscal frameworks directive by the end of 2012.

13. We agree that reliance on external credits ratings in the EU regulatory framework should be reduced, and look forward to the Commission proposals in this respect.

14. We invite the President of the European Council, in close consultation with the President of the Eurogroup, to make concrete proposals byOctober on how to better organize crisis management in the euro area and improve working methods.

We call on the Eurogroup to implement expeditiously and as a matter of priority the decisions taken today.

The bundling of all Eurozone sovereign debt into one big collateralized debt obligation is nearly complete.

[mongers]

I'm still having difficulty see how the whole sovereign debt/banking crisis is going to end happily ever after; based on some figures I saw today I reckon UK bank exposure to Republic of Ireland debt is around 33,000 USD for every man, woman and child in the Ireland.

How are they ever going to pay that off, or even a significant proportion ?

[Neil]

I'm still having difficulty see how the whole sovereign debt/banking crisis is going to end happily ever after; based on some figures I saw today I reckon UK bank exposure to Republic of Ireland debt is around 33,000 USD for every man, woman and child in the Ireland.

How are they ever going to pay that off, or even a significant proportion ?

By borrowing, with interest.

[Zanza]

http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=17495:stratfor-germanys-choice-part-2&catid=52:Human%20Security&Itemid=114

Seventeen months ago, STRATFOR described how the future of Europe was bound to the decision-making processes in Germany. Throughout the post-World War II era, other European countries treated Germany as a feeding trough, bleeding the country for resources (primarily financial) in order to smooth over the rougher portions of their systems. Considering the carnage wrought in World War II, most Europeans — and even many Germans — considered this perfectly reasonable right up to the current decade. Germany dutifully followed the orders of the others, most notably the French, and wrote check after check to underwrite European solidarity.

However, with the end of the Cold War and German reunification, the Germans began to stand up for themselves once again. Europe's contemporary financial crisis can be as complicated as one wants to make it, but strip away all the talk of bonds, defaults and credit-default swaps and the core of the matter consists of these three points:

* Europe cannot function as a unified entity unless someone is in control.
* At present, Germany is the only country with a large enough economy and population to achieve that control.
* Being in control comes with a cost: It requires deep and ongoing financial support for the European Union's weaker members.

What happened since STRATFOR published Germany's Choice [in February 2010] was a debate within Germany about how central the European Union was to German interests and how much the Germans were willing to pay to keep it intact. With their July 22 approval of a new bailout mechanism — from which the Greeks immediately received another 109 billion euros — the Germans made clear their answers to those questions, and with that decision, Europe enters a new era.


The Origins of the Eurozone

The foundations of the European Union were laid in the early post-World War II years, but the critical event happened in 1992 with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty on Monetary Union. In that treaty, the Europeans committed themselves to a common currency and monetary system while scrupulously maintaining national control of fiscal policy, finance and banking. They would share capital but not banks, interest rates but not tax policy. They would also share a currency but none of the political mechanisms required to manage an economy. One of the many inevitable consequences of this was that governments and investors alike assumed that Germany's support for the new common currency was total, that the Germans would back any government that participated fully in Maastricht. As a result, the ability of weaker eurozone members to borrow was drastically improved. In Greece in particular, the rate on government bonds dropped from an 18 percentage-point premium over German bonds to less than 1 percentage point in less than a decade. To put that into context, borrowers of $200,000 mortgages would see their monthly payments drop by $2,500.

Faced with unprecedentedly low capital costs, parts of Europe that had not been economically dynamic in centuries — in some cases, millennia — sprang to life. Ireland, Greece, Iberia and southern Italy all experienced the strongest growth they had known in generations. But they were not borrowing money generated locally — they were not even borrowing against their own income potential. Such borrowing was not simply a government affair. Local banks that normally faced steep financing costs could now access capital as if they were headquartered in Frankfurt and servicing Germans. The cheap credit flooded every corner of the eurozone. It was a subprime mortgage frenzy on a multinational scale, and the party couldn't last forever. The 2008 global financial crisis forced a reckoning all over the world, and in the traditionally poorer parts of Europe the process unearthed the political-financial disconnects of Maastricht.

The investment community has been driving the issue ever since. Once investors perceived that there was no direct link between the German government and Greek debt, they started to again think of Greece on its own merits. The rate charged for Greece to borrow started creeping up again, breaking 16 percent at its height. To extend the mortgage comparison, the Greek "house" now cost an extra $2,000 a month to maintain compared to the mid-2000s. A default was not just inevitable but imminent, and all eyes turned to the Germans.


A Temporary Solution

It is easy to see why the Germans did not simply immediately write a check. Doing that for the Greeks (and others) would have merely sent more money into the same system that generated the crisis in the first place. That said, the Germans couldn't simply let the Greeks sink. Despite its flaws, the system that currently manages Europe has granted Germany economic wealth of global reach without costing a single German life. Given the horrors of World War II, this was not something to be breezily discarded. No country in Europe has benefited more from the eurozone than Germany. For the German elite, the eurozone was an easy means of making Germany matter on a global stage without the sort of military revitalization that would have spawned panic across Europe and the former Soviet Union. And it also made the Germans rich.

But this was not obvious to the average German voter. From this voter's point of view, Germany had already picked up the tab for Europe three times: first in paying for European institutions throughout the history of the union, second in paying for all of the costs of German reunification and third in accepting a mismatched deutschemark-euro conversion rate when the euro was launched while most other EU states hardwired in a currency advantage. To compensate for those sacrifices, the Germans have been forced to partially dismantle their much-loved welfare state while the Greeks (and others) have taken advantage of German credit to expand theirs.

Germany's choice was not a pleasant one: Either let the structures of the past two generations fall apart and write off the possibility of Europe becoming a great power or salvage the eurozone by underwriting two trillion euros of debt issued by eurozone governments every year.

Beset with such a weighty decision, the Germans dealt with the immediate Greek problem of early 2010 by dithering. Even the bailout fund known as the European Financial Security Facility (EFSF) — was at best a temporary patch. The German leadership had to balance messages and plans while they decided what they really wanted. That meant reassuring the other eurozone states that Berlin still cared while assuaging investor fears and pandering to a large and angry anti-bailout constituency at home. With so many audiences to speak to, it is not at all surprising that Berlin chose a solution that was sub-optimal throughout the crisis.

That sub-optimal solution is the EFSF, a bailout mechanism whose bonds enjoyed full government guarantees from the healthy eurozone states, most notably Germany. Because of those guarantees, the EFSF was able to raise funds on the bond market and then funnel that capital to the distressed states in exchange for austerity programs. Unlike previous EU institutions (which the Germans strongly influence), the EFSF takes its orders from the Germans. The mechanism is not enshrined in EU treaties; it is instead a private bank, the director of which is German. The EFSF worked as a patch but eventually proved insufficient. All the EFSF bailouts did was buy a little time until investors could do the math and realize that even with bailouts the distressed states would never be able to grow out of their mountains of debt. These states had engorged themselves on cheap credit so much during the euro's first decade that even 273 billion euros of bailouts was insufficient. This issue came to a boil over the past few weeks in Greece. Faced with the futility of yet another stopgap solution to the eurozone's financial woes, the Germans finally made a tough decision.
The New EFSF

The result was an EFSF redesign. Under the new system the distressed states can now access — with German permission — all the capital they need from the fund without having to go back repeatedly to the EU Council of Ministers. The maturity on all such EFSF credit has been increased from 7.5 years to as much as 40 years, while the cost of that credit has been slashed to whatever the market charges the EFSF itself to raise it (right now that's about 3.5 percent, far lower than what the peripheral — and even some not-so-peripheral — countries could access on the international bond markets). All outstanding debts, including the previous EFSF programs, can be reworked under the new rules. The EFSF has been granted the ability to participate directly in the bond market by buying the government debt of states that cannot find anyone else interested, or even act pre-emptively should future crises threaten, without needing to first negotiate a bailout program. The EFSF can even extend credit to states that were considering internal bailouts of their banking systems. It is a massive debt consolidation program for both private and public sectors. In order to get the money, distressed states merely have to do whatever Germany — the manager of the fund — wants. The decision-making occurs within the fund, not at the EU institutional level.

In practical terms, these changes cause two major things to happen. First, they essentially remove any potential cap on the amount of money that the EFSF can raise, eliminating concerns that the fund is insufficiently stocked. Technically, the fund is still operating with a 440 billion-euro ceiling, but now that the Germans have fully committed themselves, that number is a mere technicality (it was German reticence before that kept the EFSF's funding limit so "low").

Second, all of the distressed states' outstanding bonds will be refinanced at lower rates over longer maturities, so there will no longer be very many "Greek" or "Portuguese" bonds. Under the EFSF all of this debt will in essence be a sort of "eurobond," a new class of bond in Europe upon which the weak states utterly depend and which the Germans utterly control. For states that experience problems, almost all of their financial existence will now be wrapped up in the EFSF structure. Accepting EFSF assistance means accepting a surrender of financial autonomy to the German commanders of the EFSF. For now, that means accepting German-designed austerity programs, but there is nothing that forces the Germans to limit their conditions to the purely financial/fiscal.

For all practical purposes, the next chapter of history has now opened in Europe. Regardless of intentions, Germany has just experienced an important development in its ability to influence fellow EU member states — particularly those experiencing financial troubles. It can now easily usurp huge amounts of national sovereignty. Rather than constraining Germany's geopolitical potential, the European Union now enhances it; Germany is on the verge of once again becoming a great power. This hardly means that a regeneration of the Wehrmacht is imminent, but Germany's re-emergence does force a radical rethinking of the European and Eurasian architectures.


Reactions to the New Europe

Every state will react to this new world differently. The French are both thrilled and terrified — thrilled that the Germans have finally agreed to commit the resources required to make the European Union work and terrified that Berlin has found a way to do it that preserves German control of those resources. The French realize that they are losing control of Europe, and fast. France designed the European Union to explicitly contain German power so it could never be harmed again while harnessing that power to fuel a French rise to greatness. The French nightmare scenario of an unrestrained Germany is now possible.

The British are feeling extremely thoughtful. They have always been the outsiders in the European Union, joining primarily so that they can put up obstacles from time to time. With the Germans now asserting financial control outside of EU structures, the all-important U.K. veto is now largely useless. Just as the Germans are in need of a national debate about their role in the world, the British are in need of a national debate about their role in Europe. The Europe that was a cage for Germany is no more, which means that the United Kingdom is now a member of different sort of organization that may or may not serve its purposes.

The Russians are feeling opportunistic. They have always been distrustful of the European Union, since it — like NATO — is an organization formed in part to keep them out. In recent years the union has farmed out its foreign policy to whatever state was most impacted by the issue in question, and in many cases these states has been former Soviet satellites in Central Europe, all of which have an axe to grind. With Germany rising to leadership, the Russians have just one decision-maker to deal with. Between Germany's need for natural gas and Russia's ample export capacity, a German-Russian partnership is blooming. It is not that the Russians are unconcerned about the possibilities of strong German power — the memories of the Great Patriotic War burn far too hot and bright for that — but now there is a belt of 12 countries between the two powers. The Russian-German bilateral relationship will not be perfect, but there is another chapter of history to be written before the Germans and Russians need to worry seriously about each other.

Those 12 countries are trapped between rising German and consolidating Russian power. For all practical purposes, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova have already been reintegrated into the Russian sphere. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria are finding themselves under ever-stronger German influence but are fighting to retain their independence. As much as the nine distrust the Russians and Germans, however, they have no alternative at present.

The obvious solution for these "Intermarium" states — as well as for the French — is sponsorship by the United States. But the Americans are distracted and contemplating a new period of isolationism, forcing the nine to consider other, less palatable, options. These include everything from a local Intermarium alliance that would be questionable at best to picking either the Russians or Germans and suing for terms. France's nightmare scenario is on the horizon, but for these nine states — which labored under the Soviet lash only 22 years ago — it is front and center.

Wow, I never knew that bailing out Greek pensioners is actually the Fourth Reich.

[jimmy olsen]

http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=17495:stratfor-germanys-choice-part-2&catid=52:Human%20Security&Itemid=114

Wow, I never knew that bailing out Greek pensioners is actually the Fourth Reich.

We really need some kind of pickelhaube smile for this kind of post.

[MadImmortalMan]

Map about to require an update.

[The Minsky Moment]

US Treasury CDS premiums hit over 80bp yesterday for 1 year protection.  In addition - the CDS curve inverted - the cost of buying 1 year credit protection was higher than buying 5 year.

[Admiral Yi]

How in the world did Saudi Arabia ever aquire a credit rating?