Social Democrats in the Wilderness

[The Minsky Moment]

My point is this: you are faced with a contradiction.

If there is no moral content to a society, then why is favoring the individual to the detriment of any other political construction "a good thing" ? For it to be "a good thing", you need to have a society which is structured around providing and allowing things which are deemed good; or else "liberalism" becomes solely a preference - the preferences so loved by economists - which does not or should not provide any guideline for any sort of policy.

In other words, you are discrediting morals in government based on a moral position; that a government structured around individualism is a good thing.

One can have a moral position without believing that the state should actively pursue one.  Similarly, a society can have "moral content" even if that society is not organized around directing the pursuit of one single moral vision.  I don't see where the contradiction arises here.

[The Minsky Moment]

Religion as purpose and, I suppose, automatic fraternity.  I still think the recent crash was fundamentally a moral failing and that Wall Street was made by and a reflection of Main Street.

What was the moral failing?

[Oexmelin]

One can have a moral position without believing that the state should actively pursue one. 

There are therefore two different problems. The first is how to separate the State from the individuals that act within its various institutions. My reading is not merely that you cannot, but that tracing the line between what is the State and what isn't the State is an important performative act - quite frequently informed by morals - that, in effect, become the State. The issue is even more important in societies where the State is tied with the democratic process: can we hold the belief that an absolute freedom of morals is "good" (i.e., it should be pursued) without reference to a value-system, and can we sustain such a thought without reference to shared morals ? I would argue that you cannot.

The second lies in what means "actively pursuing" a moral position. I contend that a justice system, for instance, is "actively pursuing" a moral position, reinforcing certain actions, sanctionning others. My personal morals might very well hold that private property of the means of production is theft, and amoral, something tells me the State is not going to enforce such a view.

Similarly, a society can have "moral content" even if that society is not organized around directing the pursuit of one single moral vision.  I don't see where the contradiction arises here.

The mistake here is to take moral content as if it were war objectives that "society" established (how ? by whom ?) and then single-mindedly pursued. Usually, moral content seems a much more a cloud of related ideas, linked by various related concepts, and which can cristallize heavily under stress. I am not a communist who argues that the State dictates (or should dictate) what the moral outcome should be. What I do decry is the illusionary undermining of morals as meaningful terms of relationships. That morals should never come into play, and that they, indeed, never come into play. My point here is that there is a moral system that is being celebrated / reinforced by the various social actors, and this is one of all-powerful egoism, and an individualism that is centered on the self, rather than towards the others. And that is certainly not divided beween left/right.

[Martinus]

I think the question of whether the law or the state policy should be inspired by morality is a fallacious one - since it always is to a degree.

I think the real question (and therein lies the difference between a communist regime or a theocracy on one hand and a liberal democracy on the other) is what vision of morality (in the meta-sense) the state adopts.

If the state wishes to enforce a maximalist morality then it creates a totalitarian state, where every moral choice becomes also a legal one.

If the state wishes to enforce only a minimalist, "basic" morality (leaving a significant part of moral questions up to the decisions of its citizens without a legal fiat) then it creates a pluralistic society.

[Oexmelin]

I could agree with such a presentation, except for one - major - thing: it is a presentation that once again, places the State in a rapport of exteriority: the State as a creator of society, as an enforcer of morality, leaving said society as a collection of islands that have little need to create their own moral rapports.

I am, again, not saying this is how things functions in reality, but rather how it is often presented. And then, such presentations have a real effect on the realities of relationships.

[crazy canuck]

The sides here are not "the privatization crowd" with the dogma that "the private sector can always do things for less cost but with the same outcomes or value" and CC's more reasonable side, but rather sides based on more nuanced evaluations of what non-monetary value we should place on certain outcomes, and therefor how much government interference with "distribution efficiency" we are willing to accept in order to achieve those outcomes.

I am glad you restated your position. This makes a bit more sense.  However, the privatization crowd often does make the argument you made earlier that private actors can always do things for less cost and even here you continue to make the argument that private actors can always do things more efficiently.  It is an assumption which underlies the logic of privitization.

However, it isnt necessarily so.

One of the things that gives the private sector the impression of efficiency is that private actors who are not able to successfully compete no longer exist.  However, this process of removing inefficient private actors is distorted by government subsidy. 

[grumbler]

I am glad you restated your position. This makes a bit more sense.  However, the privatization crowd often does make the argument you made earlier that private actors can always do things for less cost and even here you continue to make the argument that private actors can always do things more efficiently.  It is an assumption which underlies the logic of privitization.

Can you cite me some writings of actual members of this "privatization crowd" that states hat private actors can always do things for less cost?

And, yes, the assumption behind economics is that free markets are the most efficient way to distribute goods and services, because they have the lowest exchange costs.  It is an assumption that underlines all of economic market theory.

However, it isnt necessarily so.

Can you give me an example of where a government monopoly has proven more efficient at distributing goods or services than a private actor was or would have been?  You keep saying that economic theory is wrong, but you don't support that assertion.

One of the things that gives the private sector the impression of efficiency is that private actors who are not able to successfully compete no longer exist.  However, this process of removing inefficient private actors is distorted by government subsidy. 

Government subsidies don't exist in a free market.  It is true that government subsidies distort the markets by keeping in business private actors that should be out of business, but this is an example of the government decreasing efficiency, not increasing it.

The thing that gives the private sector (in a free market) the impression of efficiency is the existence of efficiency.

[Martinus]

I could agree with such a presentation, except for one - major - thing: it is a presentation that once again, places the State in a rapport of exteriority: the State as a creator of society, as an enforcer of morality, leaving said society as a collection of islands that have little need to create their own moral rapports.

I am, again, not saying this is how things functions in reality, but rather how it is often presented. And then, such presentations have a real effect on the realities of relationships.

I disagree. I think the society that fosters freedom and equality (including equal opportunity measures) can and does create a set of moral values people could stand behind. The problem with a society like this is that it does not have natural measures of combating "viruses", i.e. competing values that enter the system and appear to have a purpose of perverting it (which make it appear unstable in a short run). The upside however is that it has much better tools to evolve and eventually "assimilate" and "disarm" such viruses, making them work for the overall good (which makes it much more stable in the long run, since it tends to diffuse revolutions).

[MadImmortalMan]

I think the question of whether the law or the state policy should be inspired by morality is a fallacious one - since it always is to a degree.

I think the real question (and therein lies the difference between a communist regime or a theocracy on one hand and a liberal democracy on the other) is what vision of morality (in the meta-sense) the state adopts.

If the state wishes to enforce a maximalist morality then it creates a totalitarian state, where every moral choice becomes also a legal one.

If the state wishes to enforce only a minimalist, "basic" morality (leaving a significant part of moral questions up to the decisions of its citizens without a legal fiat) then it creates a pluralistic society.

Yes, this. However, I somewhat reject the idea that a "society" or a state can really have a morality of its own. IMO--morality is a property of the choices and actions of individuals. It doesn't really scale into collective action. A state can be an enforcer of moral values, but it holds no morality or virtue of its own. It's a reflection of the values of the individuals who created it. Not, the people ruled or governed by it, mind you, but those who created it.

I do disagree with the notion I think Yi mentioned that a non-interventionist state is lacking moral imperative. I think the non-interventionism is itself a moral reflection of the values of the individuals involved. ie--Deciding not to interfere in a gay guy's sex life is itself a choice with a moral component to it, and the individuals who make up the society he lives in, at least the majority of them or the decision-making portion of them, consider it a moral value to be non-interventionist in that area. In other words, not all morality is reflected through the actions that the state takes. Just as much is reflected by the action the state doesn't take.

[The Brain]

Of course you can quantify costs like scandals and inmates escaping.

[crazy canuck]

Government subsidies don't exist in a free market.  It is true that government subsidies distort the markets by keeping in business private actors that should be out of business, but this is an example of the government decreasing efficiency, not increasing it.

The thing that gives the private sector (in a free market) the impression of efficiency is the existence of efficiency.

You have taken us completely off topic.  What we are taking about are ventures that are taken over by private actors but which government still pays for.    We are not taking about private actors operating in a free market but private actors performing functions for government at the pay of government.

How is this in any way operating in a free market?

edit: also, often these ventures are also monopolies so I really dont understand what point you are trying to make in the context of the discussion I was having with our British friend.

[The Minsky Moment]

There are therefore two different problems. The first is how to separate the State from the individuals that act within its various institutions.

That can be said any time two or more persons get together for some common endeavor.  The proposition you seem to be stating here is tautological - because any system of organization involving more than one atomized indivudal acting alone (a literary construct) automatically implicates moral principles, therefore all common activities are informed by such principles.  True enough but trivial.  The question is whether a meaningful distinction can be made between collective institutions that reflect moral principles and those that autonomously promote and seek to implement a particular moral agenda. 

My reading is not merely that you cannot, but that tracing the line between what is the State and what isn't the State is an important performative act - quite frequently informed by morals - that, in effect, become the State. The issue is even more important in societies where the State is tied with the democratic process: can we hold the belief that an absolute freedom of morals is "good" (i.e., it should be pursued) without reference to a value-system, and can we sustain such a thought without reference to shared morals ? I would argue that you cannot. 

There is a distinction between the proposition that collective action is "informed by morals" and the separate proposition -- which sheilbh appeared to be advancing and Yi rejecting that the institutionalized instantiation of the collective can and should autonomously purse particular moral agendas on its own.  It is the difference between (for example) a business partnership that reflects the morals of the persons who happen to have created it (perhaps in the way on a day-to-day basis they deal with suppliers, customers or employees) and a similar partnership that -- apart from the individual actions of the persons who constitute it -- actively pursues a particular moral goal - for example, converting people to a particular set of religious beliefs so they can be "saved".

The second lies in what means "actively pursuing" a moral position. I contend that a justice system, for instance, is "actively pursuing" a moral position, reinforcing certain actions, sanctionning others. My personal morals might very well hold that private property of the means of production is theft, and amoral, something tells me the State is not going to enforce such a view.

A "justice system" does not pursue anything - it is the resultant of the various legislative and judicial decisions that constitute it.  The underlying legislation and procedures may be informed by moral principles of those who created them, and they may have significant effects that relate to moral principles.  But that does not make it accurate to say that the system itself is animated by some particular moral program. 

The mistake here is to take moral content as if it were war objectives that "society" established (how ? by whom ?) and then single-mindedly pursued. Usually, moral content seems a much more a cloud of related ideas, linked by various related concepts, and which can cristallize heavily under stress. I am not a communist who argues that the State dictates (or should dictate) what the moral outcome should be. What I do decry is the illusionary undermining of morals as meaningful terms of relationships. That morals should never come into play, and that they, indeed, never come into play.

But no one is contending this.  The proposition at issue was shielbh's: "social democracy does reinject a moral and philosophical purpose to society which we need".  Yi (I think?) and I both took this a proposition about the state and/or "society" adopting a particular set of animating moral concepts to use in order to direct action.   In which case, the mistakes you flag above are problems inherent in shielbh's position (how are these purposes established and pursued?  what does it mean for a society to have "a" moral purpose?), not Yi's.  And yet your original post critiqued Yi in defense of shilebh's proposition.

[grumbler]

Of course you can quantify costs like scandals and inmates escaping.

To whom is this written?

If to me, then, yes, I can do so:  4 and 14, respectively.

[The Minsky Moment]

Yes, this. However, I somewhat reject the idea that a "society" or a state can really have a morality of its own. IMO--morality is a property of the choices and actions of individuals. It doesn't really scale into collective action. A state can be an enforcer of moral values, but it holds no morality or virtue of its own. It's a reflection of the values of the individuals who created it. Not, the people ruled or governed by it, mind you, but those who created it.

I do disagree with the notion I think Yi mentioned that a non-interventionist state is lacking moral imperative. I think the non-interventionism is itself a moral reflection of the values of the individuals involved . . . In other words, not all morality is reflected through the actions that the state takes. Just as much is reflected by the action the state doesn't take.

A liberal state could reflect:
+ the result of the input of individuals whose own values revolve affirmatively around principles of collective non-intervention
+ individuals with widely dispersed values where no one tendency is strong enough to impose itself on others without provoking an effective political response
+ radical skepticism which prevents individuals from commiting to any particular moral framework
+ attitude of philosophical modesty where individuals do hold moral positions but while not radical skeptical are also less than 100% certain about their validity.  Thus, "liberal" political institutions are preferred to allow for flexibility, challenge and the potential for revision or evolution.

[grumbler]

You have taken us completely off topic.  What we are taking about are ventures that are taken over by private actors but which government still pays for.    We are not taking about private actors operating in a free market but private actors performing functions for government at the pay of government.

You don't understand what my topic is, I think.  The issue isn't who is paying for a good or service, but rather what you hope to accomplish by purchasing that good or service.  Some of the things you would hope to accomplish are things that government alone would want to do (e.g. put people in prison) while others are things that both governments and non-governmental actors would want to do (eg drive from point A to point B).  Where possible, you would like to determine the best way to accomplish the goal via competing ideas or implementations of an idea (eg "should I buy a Ford or a Chevy?").  That is more difficult in the case of prisons not because there is some government subsidy involved, but because there is little competition for the job and there are non-quantifiable  variables involved (eg cost versus escape rates).  The latter is what makes some tasks unsuitable for the private sector, not the fact that competing private sector firms will not be more efficient.

edit: also, often these ventures are also monopolies so I really dont understand what point you are trying to make in the context of the discussion I was having with our British friend.

I don't understand your use of monopoly in this context, and the point I am making is that the cost of doing something is not fixed.