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Shattered Sword (the book) - some observations

Started by grumbler, January 31, 2010, 08:53:05 PM

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grumbler

Berk, I think that you are right, and that furthermore the Japanese would have been infinitely better off simply threatening to capture Midway.  If the whole op was just a fake, it would still bring out the US fleet, but Nagumo could have withdrawn on the morning of 4 June to a position which the US could not easily attack.  Merely raiding Midway would keep up the pretense of invasion preps, while allowing KB to retain a full anti-ship strike package on alert.  Actually taking the island would have caused the Japanese more problems than it would have solved.
The future is all around us, waiting, in moments of transition, to be born in moments of revelation. No one knows the shape of that future or where it will take us. We know only that it is always born in pain.   -G'Kar

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Alatriste

Great, just great. Now I have to buy another book  :D

@KRonn

I have to disagree. If Yamamoto hadn't considered US carriers dangerous he wouldn't have sent a force with two carriers to invade the Aleutians and attract them far from Midway. Hiyo and Junyo were slower and less capable than Nagumo's carriers, but they could perfectly have been left in charge of attacking Midway airfields and supporting the landing, leaving Kaga, Akagi, Hiryu and Soryu with only one mission to accomplish.

It should be mentioned too that for the Japanese taking Midway in all probability was a higher priority than sinking the American carriers... Midway was their strategic target, sinking carriers meant a mere tactical, temporary advantage (quite logical thinking IMHO, considering that American shipyards would outbuild Japan's by a huge margin)

grumbler

Quote from: Alatriste on February 02, 2010, 02:48:53 AM
I have to disagree. If Yamamoto hadn't considered US carriers dangerous he wouldn't have sent a force with two carriers to invade the Aleutians and attract them far from Midway. Hiyo and Junyo were slower and less capable than Nagumo's carriers, but they could perfectly have been left in charge of attacking Midway airfields and supporting the landing, leaving Kaga, Akagi, Hiryu and Soryu with only one mission to accomplish.
Actually, the Aleutians campaign was forced on Yamamoto; he hadn't wanted it, and it wasn't a diversion (as an examination of the timetable would show).  CariDiv Four consisted of Junyo and Ryujo, with a couple of scratch-built air wings.  CarDiv Four couldn't have successfully suppressed the Midway airfields, but Ryujo would have been perfectly suited to launching scouting Vals and maintaining the CAP fighters, thus freeing up the big decks for spotting and launching strikes, as well as recovering them.  Junyo couldn't have kept up with the carriers and would have been forced to stay with the Main Force.

QuoteIt should be mentioned too that for the Japanese taking Midway in all probability was a higher priority than sinking the American carriers... Midway was their strategic target, sinking carriers meant a mere tactical, temporary advantage (quite logical thinking IMHO, considering that American shipyards would outbuild Japan's by a huge margin)
No, the whole purpose of the attack on Midway was to draw out the US carriers and sink them.  the Japanese would probably have evacuated Midway after the battle, as the strain on their logistics train to keep it supplied would have been disproportionate to its utility.
The future is all around us, waiting, in moments of transition, to be born in moments of revelation. No one knows the shape of that future or where it will take us. We know only that it is always born in pain.   -G'Kar

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Alatriste

Ouch!  :Embarrass:

You are completely right about Hiyo, of course... but Junyo, Ryujo and Zuiho had 52 Zero, 33 Kate and 15 Val, which once deducted CAP is obviously less than the 36, 36 and 36 Nagumo launched against Midway, but doable, I'd say (unless 15 Val imply 15 Zero and 15 Kate)

I had always read the Aleutians invasion was meant as a diversion and Midway was meant as a base to attack Oahu. I see modern scholarship says otherwise (I really have to buy Shattered Sword) but then the Japanese plan makes less sense than ever. Yamamoto planned Midway to destroy US carriers, and he didn't use every carrier available? That's difficult to understand... and risking four irreplaceable carriers and air wings just to gain a temporary advantage in numbers and occupy an untenable island? Even if all goes well, it's not worth the risk and the unavoidable losses. 


   

grumbler

Quote from: Alatriste on February 02, 2010, 07:42:31 AM
You are completely right about Hiyo, of course... but Junyo, Ryujo and Zuiho had 52 Zero, 33 Kate and 15 Val, which once deducted CAP is obviously less than the 36, 36 and 36 Nagumo launched against Midway, but doable, I'd say (unless 15 Val imply 15 Zero and 15 Kate)
These may have been capacities (though Ryujo carried no Kates in this battle and Junyo couldn't carry them, being too slow to launch them), but the actual totals were much smaller (and Zuiho was still carrying some Claudes). Plus, these air groups had been cobbled together and lacked (as the Aleutian strikes demonstrated) much actual striking power.  All of the Japanese carriers in this time frame were well short of their full complement of aircraft.

QuoteI had always read the Aleutians invasion was meant as a diversion and Midway was meant as a base to attack Oahu. I see modern scholarship says otherwise (I really have to buy Shattered Sword) but then the Japanese plan makes less sense than ever. Yamamoto planned Midway to destroy US carriers, and he didn't use every carrier available? That's difficult to understand... and risking four irreplaceable carriers and air wings just to gain a temporary advantage in numbers and occupy an untenable island? Even if all goes well, it's not worth the risk and the unavoidable losses. 
I had always thought the Aleutians as a diversion as well, but SS makes a strong case that this was untrue.

The reason not to include CarDivs Three and Four in KB at Midway was that doctrine didn't support this, and the ships were seen as too slow anyway.  A point SS tries to make is that Yamamoto planned the battle according to Japanese doctrine, not according to anything like an objective assessment of needs and available capabilities.
The future is all around us, waiting, in moments of transition, to be born in moments of revelation. No one knows the shape of that future or where it will take us. We know only that it is always born in pain.   -G'Kar

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grumbler

Discovered the worst thing about this book - it motivated me to play some WitP-AE yesterday during the snow day.  :(

That game could have been so brilliant, but I still cannot honestly say whether it is an improvement on the original version or not.
The future is all around us, waiting, in moments of transition, to be born in moments of revelation. No one knows the shape of that future or where it will take us. We know only that it is always born in pain.   -G'Kar

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Agelastus

Quote from: grumbler on February 01, 2010, 11:11:35 AM
Disagree.  Hornet was worth, at best, half the value of the Yorktown (and, given that I don't think Hornet's aviators landed a bomb on target in the whole battle, maybe not even that), because she was brand new.  The Midway air group was a mixed bag of rookies in brand-new planes and veterans in obsolete planes, none of whom had ever worked together.  It was worth far less than a real air wing would have been worth.  In other words, there were only two moderately competent American air groups at Midway, and both of them were seeing real combat for the first time.

From what I've read, I'd agree with you on the status of Hornet and Midway Island itself. In fact, I'd probably rate Enterprise's wing low as well, given the lack of co-ordination shown by the various components of that carrier's air group.

Yorktown's air group, however, I'd rate as good, rather than competent, since as far as I've read they pretty much pulled off a co-ordinated strike intentionally, rather than by accident (as Enterprise did.) I'd also say that Yorktown's crew and airwing would object to Midway being described as their first real combat, given their experience at Coral Sea (I thought that her airgroup was augmented by planes from Saratoga, not replaced wholesale.)

I'll admit I have not read Shattered Sword...yet. I have seen it discussed though, and on fora frequented by the authors.
"Come grow old with me
The Best is yet to be
The last of life for which the first was made."

grumbler

Quote from: Agelastus on February 04, 2010, 11:59:34 AM
Yorktown's air group, however, I'd rate as good, rather than competent, since as far as I've read they pretty much pulled off a co-ordinated strike intentionally, rather than by accident (as Enterprise did.)
Well, Yorktown's strike coordination was eased by the fact that they were 22 planes short of Enterprise's strike strength; 2 1/2 squadrons as opposed to 3 1/2, but your evaluation is probably more nuanced than mine.

QuoteI'd also say that Yorktown's crew and airwing would object to Midway being described as their first real combat, given their experience at Coral Sea (I thought that her airgroup was augmented by planes from Saratoga, not replaced wholesale.)
No Wing 3 squadron was at Coral Sea; at Coral Sea York had CVW-5 (VF-42, VS-5, VB-5, and VT-5); at Midway it carried VF-3, VS-3, VB-3, and VT-3.

QuoteI'll admit I have not read Shattered Sword...yet. I have seen it discussed though, and on fora frequented by the authors.
I think you will like it.  It is kind of a wargame goober's delight.
The future is all around us, waiting, in moments of transition, to be born in moments of revelation. No one knows the shape of that future or where it will take us. We know only that it is always born in pain.   -G'Kar

Bayraktar!