Afghan Strategy

[citizen k]

Emerging Goal for Afghanistan: Weaken, Not Vanquish, Taliban

By Scott Wilson
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, October 9, 2009

As it reviews its Afghanistan policy for the second time this year, the Obama administration has concluded that the Taliban cannot be eliminated as a political or military movement, regardless of how many combat forces are sent into battle.

The Taliban and the question of how the administration should regard the Islamist movement have assumed a central place in the policy deliberations underway at the White House, according to administration officials participating in the meetings.

Based on a stark assessment by Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, and six hours of debate among the senior national security staff members so far, the administration has established guidelines on its strategy to confront the group.

The goal, senior administration officials said Thursday, is to weaken the Taliban to the degree that it cannot challenge the Afghan government or reestablish the haven it provided for al-Qaeda before the 2001 U.S. invasion. Those objectives appear largely consistent with McChrystal's strategy, which he says "cannot be focused on seizing terrain or destroying insurgent forces" but should center on persuading the population to support the government.

"The Taliban is a deeply rooted political movement in Afghanistan, so that requires a different approach than al-Qaeda," said a senior administration official who has participated in the meetings but has not advocated a particular strategy.

Some inside the White House have cited Hezbollah, the armed Lebanese political movement, as an example of what the Taliban could become. Hezbollah is considered a terrorist organization by the U.S. government, but the group has political support within Lebanon and participates, sometimes through intimidation, in the political process.

Some White House advisers have noted that although Hezbollah is a source of regional instability, it is not a threat to the United States. The senior administration official said the Hezbollah example has not been cited specifically to President Obama and has been raised only informally outside the Situation Room meetings.
"People who study Islamist movements have made the connection," said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations.

Obama identified al-Qaeda as the chief target of his Afghanistan policy in March, when he announced that he would dispatch an additional 21,000 U.S. troops to the region, and his advisers have emphasized during the policy review that the administration views al-Qaeda and the Taliban as philosophically distinct organizations. White House press secretary Robert Gibbs said Thursday that "there is clearly a difference between" the Taliban and "an entity that, through a global, transnational jihadist network, would seek to strike the U.S. homeland."
"I think the Taliban are, obviously, exceedingly bad people that have done awful things," Gibbs said. "Their capability is somewhat different, though, on that continuum of transnational threats."

While some White House officials are advocating a narrower approach in Afghanistan focused first on al-Qaeda, some senior military leaders have endorsed McChrystal's call to vastly expand the war effort against insurgents, including those from the Taliban. The general is seeking tens of thousands of additional troops to carry out his strategy, and Obama will take up the specifics of that request for the first time Friday during a meeting at the White House with his national security team.
In his 66-page assessment of the war, McChrystal warns that the next 12 months will probably determine whether U.S. and international forces can regain the initiative from the Taliban.

McChrystal, whom Obama named in May as commander of the 100,000 U.S. and international forces in Afghanistan, writes that "most insurgents are Afghans" and "are directed by a small number of Afghan senior leaders based in Pakistan." He says in the report that the Taliban operates a "shadow government" that "actively seeks to control the population and displace the national government and traditional power structures."

But weakening the Taliban politically, as McChrystal and the emerging White House strategy calls for, has been complicated by recent events on the ground.
For example, McChrystal's strategy relies on building an effective Afghan government as an alternative to the Taliban. But that goal has been undermined by widespread allegations of electoral fraud appearing to benefit President Hamid Karzai. Such allegations have raised questions about the legitimacy of his government.At the same time, McChrystal is redeploying troops to towns and cities to better protect the Afghan population. The decision effectively leaves large stretches of territory to the Taliban, made up of a variety of groups united by an opposition to the international military presence. McChrystal argues in his assessment that securing the population and building a viable political alternative to the Taliban are at times more important than holding territory in such a counterinsurgency campaign.

Asked how many troops would be needed to weaken the Taliban to an acceptable degree, the senior administration official said, "That's the question. That's the sweet spot we're looking for." About 68,000 U.S. troops are already scheduled to be on the ground in Afghanistan by the end of the year.

Obama has informed staff members and congressional leaders that he does not contemplate reducing the U.S. military presence there in the near term, and even those within the administration who argue against additional combat forces support maintaining the number of troops already there.

Saying that additional troops would provide the Taliban with fodder for further propaganda, Vice President Biden and some other senior White House officials have pushed an alternative. They have outlined a plan that would maintain current combat troop levels, speed up training of Afghan forces, intensify drone strikes against al-Qaeda operatives and help the nuclear-armed government of Pakistan counter the Taliban within its borders.
"If you accept as a premise that you will not eradicate every last element of the Taliban, preventing it from providing sanctuary to al-Qaeda or threatening the government will still require resources," the official said. "That's why we're not talking about only a counterterrorism campaign."

Officials: Obama advisers are downplaying Afghan dangers
By Jonathan S. Landay, John Walcott and Nancy A. Youssef, McClatchy NewspapersWASHINGTON — As the Obama administration reconsiders its Afghanistan policy, White House officials are minimizing warnings from the intelligence community, the military and the State Department about the risks of adopting a limited strategy focused on al Qaida , U.S. intelligence, diplomatic and military officials told McClatchy .
Recent U.S. intelligence assessments have found that the Taliban and other Pakistan -based groups that are fighting U.S.-led forces have much closer ties to al Qaida now than they did before 9/11, would allow the terrorist network to re-establish bases in Afghanistan and would help Osama bin Laden export his radical brand of Islam to Afghanistan's neighbors and beyond, the officials said.

McClatchy interviewed more than 15 senior and mid-level U.S. intelligence, military and diplomatic officials, all of whom said they concurred with the assessments. All of them requested anonymity because the assessments are classified and the officials weren't authorized to speak publicly.
The officials said the White House is searching for an alternative to the broader counterinsurgency strategy favored by Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal , the U.S. military commander in Afghanistan , and Gen. David Petraeus , the head of the U.S. Central Command.
White House officials, they said, have concluded that McChrystal's approach could be doomed by election fraud, corruption and other problems in Afghanistan ; by continued Pakistani covert support for the insurgency; by the strains on the Army , Marine Corps and the federal budget; and by a lack of political and public support at home, which they fear could also undermine the president's domestic priorities.One phrase that always comes up in the administration's strategy sessions is "public opinion," one participant told McClatchy .

However, the officials said, in their effort to muster domestic support for a more limited counterterrorism strategy that would concentrate on disrupting and dismantling al Qaida , White House officials are neglecting warnings from their own experts about the dangers of a more modest approach.

"McChrystal and Petraeus are ignoring the problems their (counterinsurgency) approach would face in Afghanistan and here at home," said one intelligence official with extensive experience in South Asia and counterterrorism. "We don't have a reliable partner in Afghanistan or Pakistan ; doubling the size of the Afghan army is a pipedream, given the corruption and literacy problems; and neither Congress or the American people are likely to give it the money, the troops or the decade or so it would need to work, if it would work.

"Now the White House is downplaying the dangers of doing the only thing that they think Congress and the public will support -- a limited war against the guys who hit us on 9/11. The truth is, both approaches have huge problems, and neither one's likely to work."

The White House , as well as Congress and U.S. military, "have got to level with the American people, and they are not doing it," said Marvin Weinbaum , a former State Department intelligence analyst now with the Middle East Institute . "They are taking the easy way out by focusing on the narrow interest of protecting the homeland" from al Qaida .

Some U.S. intelligence and military officials expressed deep frustration with what they see as the administration's single-minded focus on al Qaida's threat to the U.S., saying it's not discussing publicly other, more serious consequences of a U.S. failure in Afghanistan as identified in some assessments.

A U.S. withdrawal or failure could permit al Qaida and other groups export their violence from Afghanistan into Pakistan's heartland, the Indian-controlled side of the disputed Kashmir region and former Soviet republics in Central Asia whose autocrats have been repressing Islam for decades, the U.S. officials said.

Allowing the Taliban to prevail, the officials said, could reignite Afghanistan's civil war, which was fought largely on ethnic lines, and draw nuclear-armed India and Pakistan into backing opposing sides of the conflict.

"It is our belief that the primary focus of the Taliban is regional, that is Afghanistan and Pakistan ," one senior U.S. intelligence official said. "At the same time, there is no reason to believe that the Taliban are abandoning their connections to al Qaida , which has its sights set beyond the region."

"The two groups . . . maintain the kind of close relationship that — if the Taliban were able to take effective control over parts of Afghanistan — would probably give al Qaida expanded room to operate," the official added.

Pakistan has long patronized Afghanistan's dominant Pashtun ethnic group, which constitutes the Taliban . India — whose Kabul embassy was hit on Oct. 8 by a car bomb for the second time in 16 months — supports the U.S.-backed Afghan government of President Hamid Karzai . New Delhi backed the ethnic minorities who fought the Taliban before the 2001 U.S. invasion.

"The region right now is as volatile as I have ever seen it. The tension is not waning; it is on the rise," another senior U.S. intelligence official said. "The Indo-Pakistan issue looms like a dark cloud on a horizon that might look clear blue, but it is actually a tidal wave that is rushing in."

Finally, failure in Afghanistan would deal a massive blow to U.S. international standing to the benefit of Iran , Russia and China , and undermine the NATO alliance, the U.S. officials said.

The intelligence assessments and the U.S. officials' views are in stark contrast to briefings and statements made last week by administration officials who downplayed the threat al Qaida that could pose if the Taliban regained control of Afghanistan .The administration officials said the Taliban are focused on Afghanistan and don't share al Qaida's goals of striking the U.S. and forcing its brand of extreme Islam on the Muslim world.

"There simply is a difference in intent among these groups," White House spokesman Robert Gibbs said Thursday. "Our primary focus is to protect our homeland and . . . help to protect our allies."

"Anyone who . . . believes what the Taliban says today is fooling themselves," countered one senior U.S. intelligence official, referring to an Internet statement in which the Islamic militia claimed that its sole goal is driving foreign forces from Afghanistan .

The official said he's worried that the Afghanistan strategy debate isn't focused on "the rise of Islamist extremism in a way that would shadow what we saw building up prior to 9/11."

The more limited counterterrorism approach promoted by Vice President Joe Biden would require fewer than the 20,000 to 45,000 additional soldiers sought by McChrystal. In August, McChrystal submitted a 60-day assessment that called the situation in Afghanistan "dire" and said that without more troops, the mission could fail.

"Here we go again," a veteran U.S. intelligence official said. "The Bush administration ignored anything that didn't support its arguments for invading Iraq and exaggerated the threat from Saddam Hussein . This administration is minimizing the threat from radical Islam in South and Central Asia , which is much worse today than it was eight years ago, in order to defend a minimalist policy that it's settling on for domestic political reasons."

This official said that the White House has been "spoon-feeding distorted information" to a few news organizations in an effort to build public and congressional support for a policy that another U.S. official said "rests on the nonsensical notion that you can separate some of the Taliban from other Taliban , al Qaida and other groups, when in reality those groups are more closely allied today than they've ever been."

"I read in the paper that there are only 100 al Qaida fighters in Afghanistan ," said another U.S. intelligence official, referring to an Oct. 4 CNN interview with National Security Adviser Jim Jones, a retired Marine general. "That might be true at a particular point in time, but an hour later there might be 200 or 250. The distinction between Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan is meaningless because as a practical matter, the border between them doesn't exist, and all the groups share sources of financing, training and weapons."

The intelligence assessments based their conclusions that the Taliban and related groups would back al Qaida's global agenda on the fact that the Afghan insurgents not only continue to greatly admire bin Laden and his Arab followers, but also are indebted to them for financial, military and technical assistance.

Moreover, the Taliban and allied groups are also indebted to the jihadists in the Middle East who've helped fund their insurgency, and they remain wedded to Pashtunwali, the centuries-old Pashtun tribal code that mandates protection of fellow Muslims.

Does the U.S. double down or scale back? 

[CountDeMoney]

Some inside the White House have cited Hezbollah, the armed Lebanese political movement, as an example of what the Taliban could become.

NOT. RIGHT. ANSWER.

[Josquius]

The Taliban are a threat to the US?

[Valmy]

The Taliban are a threat to the US?

Remember that time they provided safe haven to train A-Q?  That was awesome.

[Berkut]

Some inside the White House have cited Hezbollah, the armed Lebanese political movement, as an example of what the Taliban could become.

NOT. RIGHT. ANSWER.

Watching the continuing disillusionment of Seedy with his Great Black Hope is the only thing that makes Obama's continuing global meltdown remotely interesting.

[Valmy]

Watching the continuing disillusionment of Seedy with his Great Black Hope is the only thing that makes Obama's continuing global meltdown remotely interesting.

Yeah well I clearly misjudged Obama on the Afghan thing.  His rhetoric suggested he was committed to the war there.  Pity.

[Warspite]

I'm very concerned that high-ranking advisers think Afghanstan is in danger of falling back into civil war. What have the last twenty years been?

[Admiral Yi]

The Norwegian head of the UN mission held a press conference to defend himself against accusations from his (since fired) US deputy that he was soft on election fraud.

Is this story getting much coverage in the rest of the world?  The US dude, Galbraith, is firing off articles right left and center.

[AnchorClanker]

We're also seeing a re-do of the classic COIN vs. CT argument, between McChrystal and Biden.

[Valmy]

We're also seeing a re-do of the classic COIN vs. CT argument, between McChrystal and Biden.

Well I think searching Afghanistan for rare coins is a rather poor use of military resources myself.

[Alcibiades]

It's actually pretty worrying, from the news and what my friends over there say as well.  I think McChrystal knows what he's doing, but I really don't think hearts and minds is going to have the same effect as it did in Iraq...

It's really kind of shocking how badly we let Afghanistan get out of hand in the last two years.

[Admiral Yi]

Turns out Pashtuns aren't really all that much into kite flying after all.

[AnchorClanker]

It's actually pretty worrying, from the news and what my friends over there say as well.  I think McChrystal knows what he's doing, but I really don't think hearts and minds is going to have the same effect as it did in Iraq...

It's really kind of shocking how badly we let Afghanistan get out of hand in the last two years.

Ahem, at least SIX years.  Iraq ate Afghanistan's lunch - but attempting to make AF a liberal democracy is a fool's errand in any case... when are we gonna learn that they are going to have to sort things out for themselves?  Afghanistan is more of a mess in an ethnic identity sense than Iraq ever was, and Pakistan is playing the 'meddling neighbor' role in much the same manner as Iran play(ed) and play(s) in Iraq.  Problem - Pakistan can't even control her own generals and ISI, much less the insurgents / Kashmir militants / Pashtun tribesmen.  Have fun with that.

[Berkut]

That funny Ank, since the lefty CW during the Iraq war was that Iraq was hopeless, while Afghanistan was not, and we should be spending our efforts in Afghanistan rather than Iraq.

Now that Iraq has actually turned out much better than anyone thought it would in the dark days, and Afghanistan is turning into a mess under the expert direction of Obama, suddenly Afghanistan is hopeless, and to the extent that there could be any hope, Iraq ruined it.

Which of course makes no damn sense - if it is hopeless, it is hopeless regardless of Iraq.

[DGuller]

To people who want more war in Afghanistan, what's the end game?  That's the greatest thing that seems to be missing from the picture.  Invading Afghanistan was the right thing to do, and we're justified in staying there, but I just don't see where this is going.  At least Iraq is civilized and used to the idea of strong central government.  By comparison, Afghanistan is an ungovernable wasteland.  On the other hand, abandoning wastelands creates safe heavens for the people that are or would eventually become a danger to us, so it's not an easy option either.