Which fourth-generation dreadnought do you think looks best?

[Agelastus]

One thing I am getting from these documents is that "official" policy and Admiralty intentions are not always one and the same. The "New Standard" of 1937 is particularly open to debate.

I seem to have made an error in concentrating on 1940 to 41 documents, and need to find more 1937-39 papers.

Cab/66/3/35:
   Australian and New Zealand naval defence, 21.11.39
   Author: Winston Churchill
   
Section 1 and 2 discuss relief of Singapore or Australia – discounts possibility of attack! But in both cases relief is in the form of a significant fleet.

Section 3 discusses abandoning the Mediterranean, by sealing Suez and the straits of Gibraltar, while despatching a fleet east.

Section 4 discusses a "deterrent" fleet, as Grumbler has suggested. This is a wartime document however, and this statement is not entirely in accord with the sentiments of sections 1 and 2 which discuss a "superior fleet" being sent. Again, it states unequivocally that the Mediterranean would be abandoned to support Australia and New Zealand.

Section 5 discusses the likelihood of Japanese aggression against the DEI bringing the USA into the war. Followed by a rather fatuous "trust the admiralty" statement!

Section 6 points out that Britain is at the lowest point of its strength relative Germany and Japan, and that this position will improve as new ships commission.

It is interesting to note that the last line of section 6 tells us exactly who this document is aimed at – "There are no naval grounds, therefore, always assuming that the United States is our friend, which should prevent the despatch of Australian and New Zealand armies to the decisive battlefields, where their name stands so high."

CAB/65/24/2
   WM (41) 109th conclusions, Minute 2, confidential annex 05/11/41

Little here referring to Main Fleet East although it is interesting to read some of the units that would be sent east (it refers to Prince of Wales staying on station until Nelson and Rodney are available, and possibly longer – that's three of the five most modern battleships in the Royal Navy at the time.)

The interesting thing is that the prime-minister, WSC, is quoted as saying that if Australia was in need, the Mediterranean would be abandoned. Given this is from 1941, this surprised me a great deal; perhaps it shouldn't have, as other cabinet papers back this up.

CAB/65/22/18
   WM (41) 48th conclusions, Minute 6, Confidential annex 08/05/41

This document is interesting mainly for the apparent belief of the United States that 12 "capital" ships based at Singapore and Hawaii would be sufficient to deter Japan. Although the document's recommended "split" was not followed, it is interesting to note that the US and Britain did have roughly this number of capital ships in the Pacific in December 1941.

The document does use "capital" ships as a synonym for battleships in one section, but in another section points out that "capital" ships does not just mean battleships!

CAB/66/18/21 Is a report on Australian parliamentary activity in July 1941 debates; it is interesting solely for a reference by Curtin to ensuring that conditions in the Mediterranean not be allowed to deteriorate to the extent that the Mediterranean Fleet could not be despatched east.

The debate seems to be have triggered by the disastrous Greek campaign.

I do find it interesting that Curtin acts as if the entire Mediterranean Fleet has been promised to come east in the event of war, given the size of that fleet in 1941.

CAB/66/9/2
   25.06.40 report for the War Cabinet, authored by the Chiefs of Staff committee
It is interesting to note that one of the authors is Tom Phillips, who later died on the Prince of Wales.

Section C admits that a Fleet cannot be spared for the Far East "at present." This is quite a significant change from the attitude of WSC in November of the previous year, but is not really surprising given the date.

It does not, unfortunately, make further reference to pre-war planning as it is concerned with current issues.

CAB/68/1/25
   1st monthly report by First Lord of the Admiralty, dated 03.09.39
   
Not germane to "Main Fleet East", but this paragraph supports my contention that "Magnificent" could be built relatively quickly using the turret mountings that existed for "Anson" and "Howe".

Retardation of Battleships.
(a)   LION and TEMERAIRE – work to be suspended for a year
(b)   Two 1939 program battleships – ordering to be deferred for a year.
Action on gun mountings and any other requirements on which delay is expected will proceed, and it is expected that this retardation will not materially prejudice the ultimate date of completion of the ships.

Also of interest is a note that construction on various projects has been slowed partly due to the fact that "night work is no longer possible due to ARP regulations"!

CAB/24/273
   "Comparison of the strength of Great Britain with certain other nations as of January 1938".

At first I was very disappointed, as Japan was only mentioned in the context of supporting Germany and Italy if Russia was fighting on the side of Britain and France, despite the listing of her naval strength as part of the comparison tables.

Then I hit paydirt on p.14, section 4, docking.

4. Docking.—The position as regards docking in the event of the fleet
having to operate from Singapore is satisfactory. The Graving Dock at the
Naval Base has been completed, and, although the channel at the entrance has
not yet been fully dredged, any existing ship could now be docked at high water.
The dredging, which will enable ships to be docked at any state of the tide, will
be completed by March 1938.
There are at Singapore a number of commercial docks belonging to the
Singapore Harbour Board capable of docking cruisers, destroyers and submarines.
There is also a small dock at Penang which can dock destroyers and submarines.
Under a skeleton programme which has been prepared to allow for the docking
of the British main fleet under conditions of a Far Eastern War, all destroyers
and submarines and a certain percentage of cruisers are shown as docking in
these commercial docks.

The above does not read at all as the preparations for a defensive or deterrent fleet, and is an official document post-dating 1937.

The document itself is a fascinating read concerning the British perception of relative strengths in 1938, albeit mostly pertaining to Europe.

CAB28/284 is a Far East situation appraisal from March 1939. Unfortunately, it is almost solely concerned with the prospect of applying economic pressure to Japan, rather than listing, as I expected, defensive arrangements and wartime plans.

CAB/66/10/63 is an appreciation of the Far East by the Chiefs of Staff from August 1940. It is concerned for the defence of the Far East in the absence of the Fleet always proposed to be sent there.

It does include the rather plaintive-

In view of the foregoing considerations, it has become clear that we
must press on with our future naval construction programmes to the maximum
extent possible; this is a long-term project and no naval building programme
has ever allowed for a war in which we alone would be fighting Germany, Italy
and Japan.

CAB/24/259 is a report on the programs, proposed or otherwise, of the defence services as of March 1936. It includes the following, which on the surface backs up Grumbler's position, I must admit.

I am curious as to exactly what 'cover' means in the 1932 context, since it is such a non-descript word. Given the known capital ship strength of the Japanese, a 'cover' force would surely need to involve half or more of the surface fleet, especially if it was supposed to defend Hong Kong (Hong Kong seems from the various sources I have read in the last few days not to be definitively written off until 1940.)

8. Since 1932 the standard of naval strength has for practical purposes
been based on the following formula :—
" We should be able to send to the Far East a Fleet sufficient to provide
' cover' against the Japanese Fleet; we should have sufficient additional
forces behind this shield for the protection of our territory and mercantile
marine against Japanese attack; at the same time we should be able to
retain in European waters a force sufficient to act as a deterrent and to
prevent the strongest European Naval Power from obtaining control of our
vital Home terminal areas while we can make the necessary redispositions."
(N.C.M. (35) 12.)
The coming increase in German naval power combined with continuing
anxiety for the safety of our possessions in the Far East have properly led the
Defence Requirements Committee to a careful reconsideration of our naval needs,
.and they recommend a netv standard of naval strength defined as follows :—
(i) To enable us to place a Fleet in the Far East fully adequate to act on
the defensive and to serve as a strong deterrent against any threat
to our interests in that part of the globe.
(ii) To maintain in all circumstances in Home Waters a force able to meet
the requirements of a war with Germany at the same time.
Included in (i) and (ii) would be the forces necessary in all parts of the world,
behind the cover of the main fleets, to protect our territories and merchant ships
against sporadic attacks.   

The above would seem to back Grumbler's position...except, the new proposed requirement actually reduces the number of ships required in the European theatre! The previous policy is based on "any European power" which, oddly enough to us in 2009, would have included France in the calculations. The French fleet in 1932 consisted of five dreadnoughts and was the most powerful after Britain's in Europe, whereas the Germans only had old and obsolete pre-dreadnoughts at the time, and were not considered a threat.

Although I cannot state with certainty what the Admiralty requirement to secure Britain would be, the logic of pre-WWI "Germany plus sixty percent" would suggest the retention of eight ships in home waters. Allowing for two vessels to be in refit at any one time, this leaves only five vessels available for the Far East. This is indeed a defensive fleet only.

Just based on the number (15) of capital ships available at the time, this restatement of aiming at Germany significantly increases the firepower available against Japan! As of March 1936, Germany had the three "pocket battleships" of the Deutschland class, and had laid down the two units of the Scharnhorst class (Bismarck is not laid down until later in the year.)

Now, one can argue as to whether or not the Royal Navy considered the Deutschlands as capital ships or not, or whether they could be dealt with by cruisers. Regardless, this 1936 strategy immediately reduces the number of capital ships for European service to 5, based on "Germany plus sixty percent." Allowing again for two in refit, we have eight ships available for use in the Far East, the majority of the Royal Navy's strength.

If the contention is accepted that the Admiralty was willing to fight with equivalent numbers, which seems to be a thread through various books on the subject, we actually have ten ships available for service in the Far East.

It seems clear from Cowan's book that the Admiralty was willing to engage Japan with inferior numbers (although his sources for some of this are listed on pages not available on the web.) Eight ships against nine (or ten, the Admiralty still had a "?" over the status of Hiei in 1938 – it's recorded as such in the tables of the 1938 defence comparison) is certainly a return to the "Main Fleet East" concept in its essence. The known Admiralty Building program, compared to Japanese and German construction, also supports this interpretation.

Year         Britain      Japan      Germany
1936        2                                         
1937        3              1
1938        2*            1   
1939        2                              3
1940        3**          1              3***
               10             3              8 (Admiralty expectation 6)

*Actually laid down in 1937
**2 x Lion, 1 x Vanguard (the proposal to lay down a "Vanguard" concept ship in 1940 predates the war.)
***An assumption based on the laying down dates, actual and proposed, of the first three H class ships. It should be noted that the Admiralty appreciations were that Germany could lay down no more than two large ships a year, and the fact that the Germans had laid down 3 ships in one year could very well have led to a demand for yet more ships by the Admiralty.

The Admiralty's attempt to maintain an equal or superior fleet to Germany and Japan combined is clear from these figures. The "H" class really screw up the Admiralty's estimates, but due to the war we do not know how the Admiralty would have responded.

It's interesting that the Admiralty believes the new standard will require more cruisers than the old one. Presumably, this can be partially attributed to the construction of the "Deutschlands", since they were seen as being used as commerce raiders.

In another section we have a recommendation which is remarkably prescient.

16. We consider it to be a cardinal requirement of our national and imperial
security that our foreign policy should be so conducted as to avoid the possible
development of a situation in which we might be confronted simultaneously with
the hostility, open or veiled, of Japan in the Far East, Germany in the West,
and any Power on the main line of communication between the two. So far as
Japan is concerned, in our previous Report we emphasized strongly the
importance of an ultimate policy of accommodation and neighbourliness with
that country. Recent events accentuate the desirability of that policy, difficult
though it may be to carry out.

Events ran out of the Foreign office's control, of course!

The above is a comprehensive listing of the documents I have studied today, even where they were not directly relevant.

I've got more documents to go over, including the above 141 page item to finish, but that's enough for today...I did NOT get enough sleep last night.

[Agelastus]

http://ir.lib.sfu.ca/bitstream/1892/9839/1/b3155183x.pdf

The above thesis, despite at least two factual errors (or oddities) that I caught, offers a cogent and well documented case for the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935 being entered in to in order to maintain the viability of the "Main Fleet to Singapore" strategy in spite of German naval rearmament.

It also provides me with the information (and supporting references) that show that the Royal Navy was willing to accept 1:1 odds as the minimum neccessary for security of the homeland. Meaning that even when France or Italy were being considered as the standard for Europe during the 1920s and early 1930s, allowing for refits, the Admiralty had the capacity and intention to send eight capital ships east in accordance with the 1932 declaration - effective parity with Japan, and more than half of the fleet, which more than qualifies for the Main Fleet East strategy.

[grumbler]

Been busy with other stuff over the weekend, but did a little bit of research, with the following results:
(1) disagree that Britain was willing to accept parity with the German fleet as the minimum necessary.  In fact, the RN was willing to fight Japan down one ship to maintain a one-ship edge over Germany.
(2) At the 1937 Imperial Defense Conference, the British formally notified the Dominions that the size of the British fleet to be sent east was no longer to be dependent on the size of the Japanese threat, but rather what was left after British home security was assured (and thus that "Main Fleet East" was no longer the strategy).
(3) Britain wanted to build a fleet big enough to dominate in Europe and Asia, but couldn't afford it.  Nor could they accomplish their aims diplomatically.  They refused to be forced to choose which to do, though, and in the end attempted both with disastrous consequences.