Coup in Niger

[Sheilbh]

Sure, but it's the justification for the coups after ten years of increasing instability (and increasing militarisation/power to the security forces) - and order and stability are normally pretty core to military regimes.

As it is feels like they've undermined the state, can't deliver security so may well end up being victims of other coups etc and the region seems like it could be stuck in a vicious cycle - with Wagner, I imagine, trying to pivot to keep their position.

[Tamas]

Sure, but it's the justification for the coups after ten years of increasing instability (and increasing militarisation/power to the security forces) - and order and stability are normally pretty core to military regimes.

As it is feels like they've undermined the state, can't deliver security so may well end up being victims of other coups etc and the region seems like it could be stuck in a vicious cycle - with Wagner, I imagine, trying to pivot to keep their position.

I don't think we should concern ourselves with coup justifications. Africa especially has been choke full of various very democratically-named "organisations" grabbing/fighting for autocratic power. Of course it is nonsense.

[crazy canuck]

Sure, but it's the justification for the coups after ten years of increasing instability (and increasing militarisation/power to the security forces) - and order and stability are normally pretty core to military regimes.

As it is feels like they've undermined the state, can't deliver security so may well end up being victims of other coups etc and the region seems like it could be stuck in a vicious cycle - with Wagner, I imagine, trying to pivot to keep their position.

I don't think we should concern ourselves with coup justifications. Africa especially has been choke full of various very democratically-named "organisations" grabbing/fighting for autocratic power. Of course it is nonsense.

But that is what makes Niger worth a discussion.  It has been viewed as different from many other countries in Africa.  That fact that it too has experienced a coup is noteworthy.

[Sheilbh]

I don't think we should concern ourselves with coup justifications. Africa especially has been choke full of various very democratically-named "organisations" grabbing/fighting for autocratic power. Of course it is nonsense.

I disagree. All political systems have (or don't have) legitimacy by reference to what they are promising or how they justify themselves. That goes for coup regimes as much as any other system - it's normally restoring order, or stability, or protecting the constitution.

On it's own that won't necessarily be enough for a system to survive. But I think if they fail at delivering their core promise it makes them more vulnerable to a challenge. Not least because while I agree with Minsky's point I'm also not sure Wagner are there to die in a ditch to defend these regimes as opposed to ride out any instability and work with the replacements too - it's not Syria.

The fact that these regimes have not been and, I think, are probably unlikely to be able to deliver stability and security makes me think they're probably going to be relatively transient. So I expect we'll see further coups by rival groups, or maybe jihadis challenging urban areas or taking over (like Afghanistan) - honestly, I can't think of a good result/alternative that seems likely at this point - rather than this as a new normal state.

Obviously could be totally wrong on all of this.

[Jacob]

I find your analysis persuasive, Sheilbh.

[crazy canuck]

I don't think we should concern ourselves with coup justifications. Africa especially has been choke full of various very democratically-named "organisations" grabbing/fighting for autocratic power. Of course it is nonsense.

I disagree. All political systems have (or don't have) legitimacy by reference to what they are promising or how they justify themselves. That goes for coup regimes as much as any other system - it's normally restoring order, or stability, or protecting the constitution.

On it's own that won't necessarily be enough for a system to survive. But I think if they fail at delivering their core promise it makes them more vulnerable to a challenge. Not least because while I agree with Minsky's point I'm also not sure Wagner are there to die in a ditch to defend these regimes as opposed to ride out any instability and work with the replacements too - it's not Syria.

The fact that these regimes have not been and, I think, are probably unlikely to be able to deliver stability and security makes me think they're probably going to be relatively transient. So I expect we'll see further coups by rival groups, or maybe jihadis challenging urban areas or taking over (like Afghanistan) - honestly, I can't think of a good result/alternative that seems likely at this point - rather than this as a new normal state.

Obviously could be totally wrong on all of this.

I am not sure the justification for the coup is important.  It could be so much bullshit.  What is important is getting to the actual reasons the coup occurred.

Afghanistan is a good example of the distinction.  Much ink has been spilled describing the policy failures which created the circumstances in which it was inevitable the Taliban would return. 

[Sheilbh]

I am not sure the justification for the coup is important.  It could be so much bullshit.  What is important is getting to the actual reasons the coup occurred.

Afghanistan is a good example of the distinction.  Much ink has been spilled describing the policy failures which created the circumstances in which it was inevitable the Taliban would return. 

I think they tend to be very closely linked. The conditions which enable a coup seems likely to form the justification or ideological reasoning presented by that next regime.

But I thought the first part of that Ken Opalo piece I linked to is good on this - though on the wider "coup belt" not just Niger (and his emphasis):

I: How did we get here?

The recent spate of coups (or serious attempts) in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, and Sudan are not just about democratic backsliding. They are also symptoms state-building failures, elite complacency, perceived failures of democratic government, and the shaky sovereignty of these states. Unfortunately for the citizens of these countries, the constellation of pivotal actors that will shape their immediate future — from ruling elites, to regional and global organizations, to donor countries and major powers — have conflicting incentives and are unlikely to make the investments needed to cycle out of the coup trap.


A map depicting countries from Guinea-Bissau to Sudan (the so-called "coup belt") that have recently experienced coup activity. Map created on MapChart.

This post attempts to put the recent coups in the so-called "coup belt" in perspective and provides some thoughts on potential ways forward for affected countries. Having a firm understanding of how we got here is important for making sure that 1) everyone has a realistic understanding of the problem at hand; and 2) pivotal actors do not keep repeating the same mistakes.

Perhaps with the exception of Guinea, all affected countries experienced coups partially as a by-product of the imbalanced aggrandizement of their armed forces in the face of serious security threats — whether from domestic insurgencies, organized crime, or the spread of militancy related to the global "war on terror" and/or insecurity contagion from failing neighboring states. Geographic diffusion has since locked in strong negative neighborhood effects, especially since affected countries typically are also involved in proxy conflicts with each other. It follows that the coup risk in affected states will most likely not subside unless their domestic elites serious invest in the painstaking tasks of state-building, repairing their social contracts, and tackling overall regional drivers of insecurity.

The usual formula of add deeply-flawed elections, sprinkle some foreign aid, stir, and then leave — beloved by the "the international community" — will not work. If anything, it will likely multiply the list of grievances fueling political instability within and across countries in the region. Unfortunately for everyone involved, there are no easy solutions to the problem of state weakness. State-building in socio-politically fractious low-income states is one of the biggest challenges of our time. Plus the current international system's tolerance of weak states means that there are no structural incentives to invest in state-building. Finally, it doesn't help that a lot of experts out there prefer to hide behind the dangerous delusion that weak states wracked by systemic instability and unbelievable levels of violence can simply elect their way to political order and economic prosperity.

A number of the coups were met by jubilant crowds. Such scenes occasioned intellectual pearl-clutching across Africa and beyond. For example, a naive reader of much of the commentary on Niger so far would be forgiven for thinking that the country was a bastion of democracy before last week's coup. Forget Niger's barely functional state, government suppression of dissent and free speech, arbitrary arrests, and documented cases of security forces murdering civilians in the name of fighting insurgents. Briefly stated, "democracy" in Niger and other countries in the region was not delivering on its promises. It should therefore not come as a surprise that a section of the country celebrated the coup. In the most recent Afrobarometer survey, 67% of respondents supported military intervention in politics (see comparative image below). It is possible that some of the respondents genuinely prefer autocratic military rule. But I bet the vast majority are simply frustrated by the chronic failures of whatever they keep being served as democracy by their elites and the international community. In the same Afrobarometer survey, about 61.4% of respondents expressed a preference for democracy over other forms of government.


Data on openness to military intervention in politics across 36 African states. Data from Afrobarometer.

The point here is not to justify extra-constitutional power grabs in imperfect democracies. It is to remind us all that browbeating the victims of mis-governance in service to abstract principles that aren't backed by tangible material outcomes will not work. You can't eat the idea of democracy and associated rituals of electoralism. Invariably, juntas that promise better material conditions will show up and win enough people's hearts and minds. Supporters of much-needed democracy promotion efforts in the region should understand that the best way to secure democracy is to demonstrate that it works. As Howard French reminds us in an excellent piece in Foreign Policy, what the international community has so far aspired for in Niger and the wider Sahel is not real democracy but client states that can cheaply be coopted into wider global agendas — whether it is defeating jihadis, countering geopolitical competitors, hoarding vital resources, or stemming migrant flows.

To reiterate, democracy promotion for the benefit of regular citizens in these countries has not always been a top priority. Complacent local elites have principally focused on ascending to power and dominating networks funded by resource rents, illicit trade, and foreign aid. Their foreign security/development partners have mainly been interested in stemming the flows of migrants, accessing natural resources, fighting jihadist in the Sahel so they don't have to fight them in Western cities, and maintaining overall geopolitical influence in the region. Democracy and economic development have mostly been subordinated to these larger objectives, and often get abandoned whenever there is a conflict over means towards the other goals.

The resulting perceived subordination to foreign interests fuels the intense sovereignty discourse that remains to be an under-appreciated subplot in the current crisis. Much ado has been made about Russian influence in the Sahel at the expense of France and other Western powers. However, only willful ignorance would lead one to conclude that the sporadic waving of Russian flags that have followed coups in Bamako, Ouagadougou, Conakry, and Niamey are well-considered mass expressions of love for Putin. Instead, these acts (and accompanying expressions of anti-French sentiment) should be viewed as rejections of more than a century of brutal French colonialism and neocolonial influence in the region. They are also sentiments that the coup leaders have been more than willing to harness for their own designs.

The recent speech in St. Petersburg by Ibrahim Traoré of Burkina Faso perfectly encapsulates this fact. The speech went viral in WhatsApp groups across Africa precisely because it spoke to a reality that few so far have been willing to discuss publicly.

Those who dismiss Traoré's message as the empty rants of a misguided tyrant cosplaying Sankara but in reality carrying water for Putin/Prigozhin do so at their own peril. He and his fellow coup leaders in Mali and Guinea may be deeply flawed messengers, but their message on the region's century-long unquenched thirst for real self-determination has legs.

Importantly, it is a message that should be internalized by African political elites and democracy activists. While one should expect that foreign actors will always act to advance their own interests, what has become clear is that the wider region is increasingly hostile to leaders who perpetuate the historical unholy alliance between complacent ruling elites and foreign neocolonial interests. Obviously, publics in these countries are not rejecting all forms of collaboration with outside actors — many understand that African states need all the friends they can get. Rather, they want such collaboration to meaningfully address their concerns and respect their sovereignty. Accepting the realities of the hierarchy of states in the international system ought not lead one to ignore the fact that the absence of meaningful self-determination is inimical to democratic consolidation.

I think the section on the growth of security services is an example of what I mean by the conditions and the justification normally being tied. In order to fight jihadis (or stem migrant flows, or for regional cooperation), states (with Western backing and support) have increased the size and power of the armed forces. But they've failed to achieve their goal, while increasing instability - which means the armed forces are in a position to organise a coup and instability/restoring order is a plausible justification (plus kick out the French). I don't think it's a million miles off to describe the Sahel as France's own Afghanistan - and the endgame may ultimately be the same.

Not directly on topic but it's one of the reasons I worry about China is I think they have an example and a model of lifting people out of poverty and improving material conditions for their citizens - I'm not sure the West has a similar model we can point to.

[OttoVonBismarck]

The problem is the West's "development" phase largely meant very limited democracy with strong control by some version of a landed gentry or aristocracy. But most modern developing nations don't have that, and Western powers would also view attempts to entrench one as..antidemocratic. Not saying it's a great system either, but the West did have a system for development, it just...got done developing before WW2.

[crazy canuck]

I am not sure the justification for the coup is important.  It could be so much bullshit.  What is important is getting to the actual reasons the coup occurred.

Afghanistan is a good example of the distinction.  Much ink has been spilled describing the policy failures which created the circumstances in which it was inevitable the Taliban would return. 

I think they tend to be very closely linked. The conditions which enable a coup seems likely to form the justification or ideological reasoning presented by that next regime.

But I thought the first part of that Ken Opalo piece I linked to is good on this - though on the wider "coup belt" not just Niger (and his emphasis):

I: How did we get here?

The recent spate of coups (or serious attempts) in Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, and Sudan are not just about democratic backsliding. They are also symptoms state-building failures, elite complacency, perceived failures of democratic government, and the shaky sovereignty of these states. Unfortunately for the citizens of these countries, the constellation of pivotal actors that will shape their immediate future — from ruling elites, to regional and global organizations, to donor countries and major powers — have conflicting incentives and are unlikely to make the investments needed to cycle out of the coup trap.


A map depicting countries from Guinea-Bissau to Sudan (the so-called "coup belt") that have recently experienced coup activity. Map created on MapChart.

This post attempts to put the recent coups in the so-called "coup belt" in perspective and provides some thoughts on potential ways forward for affected countries. Having a firm understanding of how we got here is important for making sure that 1) everyone has a realistic understanding of the problem at hand; and 2) pivotal actors do not keep repeating the same mistakes.

Perhaps with the exception of Guinea, all affected countries experienced coups partially as a by-product of the imbalanced aggrandizement of their armed forces in the face of serious security threats — whether from domestic insurgencies, organized crime, or the spread of militancy related to the global "war on terror" and/or insecurity contagion from failing neighboring states. Geographic diffusion has since locked in strong negative neighborhood effects, especially since affected countries typically are also involved in proxy conflicts with each other. It follows that the coup risk in affected states will most likely not subside unless their domestic elites serious invest in the painstaking tasks of state-building, repairing their social contracts, and tackling overall regional drivers of insecurity.

The usual formula of add deeply-flawed elections, sprinkle some foreign aid, stir, and then leave — beloved by the "the international community" — will not work. If anything, it will likely multiply the list of grievances fueling political instability within and across countries in the region. Unfortunately for everyone involved, there are no easy solutions to the problem of state weakness. State-building in socio-politically fractious low-income states is one of the biggest challenges of our time. Plus the current international system's tolerance of weak states means that there are no structural incentives to invest in state-building. Finally, it doesn't help that a lot of experts out there prefer to hide behind the dangerous delusion that weak states wracked by systemic instability and unbelievable levels of violence can simply elect their way to political order and economic prosperity.

A number of the coups were met by jubilant crowds. Such scenes occasioned intellectual pearl-clutching across Africa and beyond. For example, a naive reader of much of the commentary on Niger so far would be forgiven for thinking that the country was a bastion of democracy before last week's coup. Forget Niger's barely functional state, government suppression of dissent and free speech, arbitrary arrests, and documented cases of security forces murdering civilians in the name of fighting insurgents. Briefly stated, "democracy" in Niger and other countries in the region was not delivering on its promises. It should therefore not come as a surprise that a section of the country celebrated the coup. In the most recent Afrobarometer survey, 67% of respondents supported military intervention in politics (see comparative image below). It is possible that some of the respondents genuinely prefer autocratic military rule. But I bet the vast majority are simply frustrated by the chronic failures of whatever they keep being served as democracy by their elites and the international community. In the same Afrobarometer survey, about 61.4% of respondents expressed a preference for democracy over other forms of government.


Data on openness to military intervention in politics across 36 African states. Data from Afrobarometer.

The point here is not to justify extra-constitutional power grabs in imperfect democracies. It is to remind us all that browbeating the victims of mis-governance in service to abstract principles that aren't backed by tangible material outcomes will not work. You can't eat the idea of democracy and associated rituals of electoralism. Invariably, juntas that promise better material conditions will show up and win enough people's hearts and minds. Supporters of much-needed democracy promotion efforts in the region should understand that the best way to secure democracy is to demonstrate that it works. As Howard French reminds us in an excellent piece in Foreign Policy, what the international community has so far aspired for in Niger and the wider Sahel is not real democracy but client states that can cheaply be coopted into wider global agendas — whether it is defeating jihadis, countering geopolitical competitors, hoarding vital resources, or stemming migrant flows.

To reiterate, democracy promotion for the benefit of regular citizens in these countries has not always been a top priority. Complacent local elites have principally focused on ascending to power and dominating networks funded by resource rents, illicit trade, and foreign aid. Their foreign security/development partners have mainly been interested in stemming the flows of migrants, accessing natural resources, fighting jihadist in the Sahel so they don't have to fight them in Western cities, and maintaining overall geopolitical influence in the region. Democracy and economic development have mostly been subordinated to these larger objectives, and often get abandoned whenever there is a conflict over means towards the other goals.

The resulting perceived subordination to foreign interests fuels the intense sovereignty discourse that remains to be an under-appreciated subplot in the current crisis. Much ado has been made about Russian influence in the Sahel at the expense of France and other Western powers. However, only willful ignorance would lead one to conclude that the sporadic waving of Russian flags that have followed coups in Bamako, Ouagadougou, Conakry, and Niamey are well-considered mass expressions of love for Putin. Instead, these acts (and accompanying expressions of anti-French sentiment) should be viewed as rejections of more than a century of brutal French colonialism and neocolonial influence in the region. They are also sentiments that the coup leaders have been more than willing to harness for their own designs.

The recent speech in St. Petersburg by Ibrahim Traoré of Burkina Faso perfectly encapsulates this fact. The speech went viral in WhatsApp groups across Africa precisely because it spoke to a reality that few so far have been willing to discuss publicly.

Those who dismiss Traoré's message as the empty rants of a misguided tyrant cosplaying Sankara but in reality carrying water for Putin/Prigozhin do so at their own peril. He and his fellow coup leaders in Mali and Guinea may be deeply flawed messengers, but their message on the region's century-long unquenched thirst for real self-determination has legs.

Importantly, it is a message that should be internalized by African political elites and democracy activists. While one should expect that foreign actors will always act to advance their own interests, what has become clear is that the wider region is increasingly hostile to leaders who perpetuate the historical unholy alliance between complacent ruling elites and foreign neocolonial interests. Obviously, publics in these countries are not rejecting all forms of collaboration with outside actors — many understand that African states need all the friends they can get. Rather, they want such collaboration to meaningfully address their concerns and respect their sovereignty. Accepting the realities of the hierarchy of states in the international system ought not lead one to ignore the fact that the absence of meaningful self-determination is inimical to democratic consolidation.

I think the section on the growth of security services is an example of what I mean by the conditions and the justification normally being tied. In order to fight jihadis (or stem migrant flows, or for regional cooperation), states (with Western backing and support) have increased the size and power of the armed forces. But they've failed to achieve their goal, while increasing instability - which means the armed forces are in a position to organise a coup and instability/restoring order is a plausible justification (plus kick out the French). I don't think it's a million miles off to describe the Sahel as France's own Afghanistan - and the endgame may ultimately be the same.

Not directly on topic but it's one of the reasons I worry about China is I think they have an example and a model of lifting people out of poverty and improving material conditions for their citizens - I'm not sure the West has a similar model we can point to.

Thanks, that makes sense.

on your last point, I am not sure China is that great of an example of a stable model either though.  To Otto's point, China had no propertied elite and so in place of that was the party.  And that necessarily means corruption in the absence of the Rule of Law as the means of working out disputes both regarding property and regulatory matters.

[Sheilbh]

The problem is the West's "development" phase largely meant very limited democracy with strong control by some version of a landed gentry or aristocracy. But most modern developing nations don't have that, and Western powers would also view attempts to entrench one as..antidemocratic. Not saying it's a great system either, but the West did have a system for development, it just...got done developing before WW2.

Yeah I think that's part of the problem that the examples of development in the West. Even in post-war world they seem either pretty particular (be a borderline emerging market in Europe and join the EU, or post-war Europe and Japan) or ones that are challenging to our "values" (the Tiger economies) - although in both cases possibly shaped by the needs of the Cold War too. I don't necessarily think that type of politics is necessary for growth - but I think the lack of a development model makes our pitch for support internationally challenging. I think it is really important that we somehow demonstrate that our values and political system can deliver for developing economies now, not just for countries that have, as you said, already "developed".

I have a friend who worked in NGOs in the "coup belt" region where China was also very involved. Some of the criticisms he had of Western development approaches seem fair. Although worth saying that his experience was Western aid agencies are very good at humanitarian aid, it's the rest/BAU stuff they're not great at.

In particular he complained that the West was very faddish and driven by strategies and initiatives in Europe or America (less so Japan who are a big donor) - so one year they want all project proposals to be really big on sustainable development, the next it's about inclusive growth, then it's about public health. Meeting those donor needs/KPIs drive a lot of the project development, from my understanding. That was basically his job - looking at RfP style documents from Western aid agencies and trying to shoe-horn his organisation's projects into this year's objectives to win the funding. China very much has their own needs and goals in their development aid but his view was its focus seems to change less and his impression was also a bit more consultative with the recipient country - i.e. where do you need a road. Chances are it's normally for good economic reasons and aligns with China's interests.

Possibly relatedly he complained that a lot of money also actually ends up circulating in Western countries - with consultancies, professional advisors, vendors etc. On that point it struck me that if it was happening at the recipient end we'd probably call it corruption and it would fall foul of all sorts of monitoring.

on your last point, I am not sure China is that great of an example of a stable model either though.  To Otto's point, China had no propertied elite and so in place of that was the party.  And that necessarily means corruption in the absence of the Rule of Law as the means of working out disputes both regarding property and regulatory matters.

I don't disagree with any of that - although the propertied class was not immune from corruption in the West. I think there's maybe an argument that corruption might play a role in early stages of democracy developing (and delivering for citizens in a very direct way) but also that it has often run parallel, not necessarily contrary, to the development of the rule of law. As ever my instinct is that politics is primary - so I think it's also maybe the case that reform movements develop within a democratic system against that earlier democratic model (spoils systems, patronage, machine politics) and use the law as a tool to destroy it.

But I take your point on China. I just think that China has largely replaced the US and EU as the major trading partner for much of the world and they can say, credibly, that they've got experience in lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. I think those two factors combined are enough to require a better development story from the West. And, also, they're a challenger - they're a revisionist power who wants to change the world order so they have to convince.

I think we need an answer showing our values and order do not simply entrench the already rich. I think we also need a way to say, credibly, that they can offer a way of lifting countries' populations out of poverty. In a way I think that we don't already have an alternative development model (that isn't either odd like Europe, or against our values), or an easy answer to that challenge is, in its way, slightly damning.

[Zoupa]

Wagner is not there to fight jihadis. They prop up the generals in the capital, take over mining companies and send the money offshore. That's it. It's been their playbook everywhere in Africa.

We can try to find the reason for the coup all day long. Oh, the Franc CFA, the posh NGOs, the wasteful EU, how terrible it all is. The fact is there was a peaceful transfer of power and Bazoum was democratically elected less than 3 years ago.

I find no reason to give any sort of legitimacy to the junta. Do we really think they took power through violence because of some desire to better the lives of Niger citizens? 

[DGuller]

It's almost like Jagged Alliance in real life.

[Iormlund]

China's development model relies on being a stable country of over a billion people. First attractive as a source of cheap labor, then potential consumers.

There's no country in Africa like that. Much less in the land-locked Sahel.

[crazy canuck]

But most fundamentally China is not stable.  Africa has demographics on its side so I am not sure the rest of your argument holds into the future.

[viper37]

But most fundamentally China is not stable.

It seems pretty stable to me.

There is no danger of a coup anytime soon.  There is no major popular revolt going on, any attempt of doing so will be swiftly dealt with as in the past.

There is not threat to the regime in place.

People may or may not be happy with the regime, but they will not challenge it.

I'd say it's stable compared to Niger or Mali.