Global military buildup

[Zanza]

Just make 10.000 reasonably cheap drones. Even if one percent is lost to dege cases that you did not consider, you still have 9.900 drones left. Even if half of them are lost, your enemy still has to deal with 5.000 drones...

Easy enough. Release the dogs of war flocks of Languish Lethal Lemmings Mk 1.0!

What do you think the role of these 10,000 reasonably cheap drones darkening the sky are going to be? Are they a replacement for artillery? For infantry? Tanks? Helicopters? Jets? All of the above?

I feel that drones can mainly replace helicopters and jets, not so much infantry or artillery and could render tanks of little use. And as Brain says, drones need to be able to fight other drones.

[grumbler]

And I would dispute the idea that in the "real world" you don't see the 1000 deaths prevented. I in fact think in the "real world" they very much do - in the media world? The civilian world? Maybe not so much.

Modern militaries certainly do work very hard to minimize them. Vast effort is spent doing so. But at the end of the day, war is about violence, and DG was exactly right. Once you decide to engage in war, there are going to be mistakes and friendly fire. Over-emphasizing the avoidance of that would be a mistake if it meant that more friendly die in the long run because you are worried about preventing friendly fire in the short run.

This was pretty well understood when we engaged in serious wars. Danger close artillery is, well, danger close. Sometimes "danger" means "Ooops, our guys are dead".

What I mean by you don't "see" those saved lives is this:

Covid-19 vaccines have saved hundreds of thousands of human lives.  But nobody knows who those "saved lives" are.  Nobody gets a text message saying 'you would have died if you didn't get your Covid vaccine'.  Same things for those saved casualties.  Intellectually you might know that those saved lives exist, but you can never put a face to them.

And it's not just about fighting "serious wars".  Friendly fire incidents are terrible for morale, and have a real impact on a unit's ability to fight effectively.

Which goes back to my point that I don't think a military would accept the "we'll save 1000 lives in exchange for 100 dying from friendly fire", even if you could quantify it that way.

I think every military everywhere accepts exactly that, because to not accept that (or something like that) would mean that you simply do not engage.

And my point about serious war was just that in those the acceptance is much more, well, accepted. In a more transparent manner. There are multiple examples where the US Army ordered things done that they 100% knew would result in significant friendly fire casualties, but did so anyway.

In a "less serious" war, they do the same thing, but just not in as transparent a manner, because there is less political tolerance for acceptance of that reality. But it still happens just the same.

Anyone who has read the book or seen the movie "We Were Soldiers Once, and Young" probably remembers an actual case of exactly what you are talking about.  The Broken Arrow artillery and air response was overwhelming, and broke a NVA attack that was about to overrun the US position and kill some 400 troopers. It also killed the US troops that were closely engaged with those enemy soldiers, and LCOL Moore knew it would, but deemed the cost acceptable because of the lives to be saved.  I've never heard a single word of criticism about his decision.

[crazy canuck]

Friendly fire is a fact of life.  If you deploy artillery or bombers, you're going to kill your own people sometimes, and yet no one is considering to not use them for those reasons. 

I don't think the military shares the risk aversion expressed here.  The cold reality is that if you have a weapons system that prevents 1000 kills of your own by the enemy at the cost of increasing friendly fire kills by 100, you're going to use it as much as you can.  Unreasonable risk aversion is not a luxury you can afford in an endeavor where people die a lot.

While I understand your point, I very much doubt that western militaries would find a 10:1 ratio of extra enemy casualties to friendly fire casualties acceptable.

" The cold reality is that if you have a weapons system that prevents 1000 kills of your own by the enemy at the cost of increasing friendly fire kills by 100"

He is saying that if you can PREVENT 1000 friends getting kills at the cost of 100 friendly fire casualties, you should do that.

Yes, but that reasoning is fallacious if it is possible to bring down the friendly kills to a lower number.  Just as the military now attempts to do.  No one plans an operation which accepts that a 10% friendly fire kill rate is possible.  Quite the contrary, friendly fire events are avoided as much as possible.

Thanks, I am sure nobody realized that friendly fire was something that everyone tries to avoid and minimize.

Thanks.  Given his comment somebody had to say the obvious. Too many people were actually agreeing with him.

[crazy canuck]

And I would dispute the idea that in the "real world" you don't see the 1000 deaths prevented. I in fact think in the "real world" they very much do - in the media world? The civilian world? Maybe not so much.

Modern militaries certainly do work very hard to minimize them. Vast effort is spent doing so. But at the end of the day, war is about violence, and DG was exactly right. Once you decide to engage in war, there are going to be mistakes and friendly fire. Over-emphasizing the avoidance of that would be a mistake if it meant that more friendly die in the long run because you are worried about preventing friendly fire in the short run.

This was pretty well understood when we engaged in serious wars. Danger close artillery is, well, danger close. Sometimes "danger" means "Ooops, our guys are dead".

What I mean by you don't "see" those saved lives is this:

Covid-19 vaccines have saved hundreds of thousands of human lives.  But nobody knows who those "saved lives" are.  Nobody gets a text message saying 'you would have died if you didn't get your Covid vaccine'.  Same things for those saved casualties.  Intellectually you might know that those saved lives exist, but you can never put a face to them.

And it's not just about fighting "serious wars".  Friendly fire incidents are terrible for morale, and have a real impact on a unit's ability to fight effectively.

Which goes back to my point that I don't think a military would accept the "we'll save 1000 lives in exchange for 100 dying from friendly fire", even if you could quantify it that way.

I think every military everywhere accepts exactly that, because to not accept that (or something like that) would mean that you simply do not engage.

And my point about serious war was just that in those the acceptance is much more, well, accepted. In a more transparent manner. There are multiple examples where the US Army ordered things done that they 100% knew would result in significant friendly fire casualties, but did so anyway.

In a "less serious" war, they do the same thing, but just not in as transparent a manner, because there is less political tolerance for acceptance of that reality. But it still happens just the same.

Anyone who has read the book or seen the movie "We Were Soldiers Once, and Young" probably remembers an actual case of exactly what you are talking about.  The Broken Arrow artillery and air response was overwhelming, and broke a NVA attack that was about to overrun the US position and kill some 400 troopers. It also killed the US troops that were closely engaged with those enemy soldiers, and LCOL Moore knew it would, but deemed the cost acceptable because of the lives to be saved.  I've never heard a single word of criticism about his decision.

Right! A very good example of a situation specific decision that is in No part of the normal planning for that operation.  Rather it was, by definition, an extreme event.

Proposition being discussed here is that kind of friendly fire being excepted as a matter of course.

[The Minsky Moment]

Just make 10.000 reasonably cheap drones. Even if one percent is lost to dege cases that you did not consider, you still have 9.900 drones left. Even if half of them are lost, your enemy still has to deal with 5.000 drones...

Easy enough. Release the dogs of war flocks of Languish Lethal Lemmings Mk 1.0!

What do you think the role of these 10,000 reasonably cheap drones darkening the sky are going to be? Are they a replacement for artillery? For infantry? Tanks? Helicopters? Jets? All of the above?

I don't know but this is a tech still in its early stages.  A mechanical military system could take any form, any size, any combination of weapons or capabilities that can be imagined and implemented.

[DGuller]

I agree that it's too early to say.  I think drones have the potential to became the next airplane:  a weapons system that fundamentally changes the game, rather than a system that replaces one of the pieces in the existing game.  I think the drones right now are at the level of biplanes with pilots tossing bombs with their hands:  already useful, but barely scratching the surface of possible.

[Jacob]

I don't know but this is a tech still in its early stages.  A mechanical military system could take any form, any size, any combination of weapons or capabilities that can be imagined and implemented.

Yeah, autonomous AI drones are going to utterly disrupt war-fighting and create a complete paradigm shift if they perform as imagined. I'm just a little more skeptical about the ease of implementation than some of the other folks in this thread.

[Threviel]

A simple drone using GPS or radio guidance with a rifle underneath can fly around at 300m and kill everything that moves in a given area.

Could probably be built for $1-2000 a piece or so at scale production. Quadruple the cost and make them solar powered for increased loitering time.

If I were an evil dictator an a hypothetical evil empire with huge production capacity and resources I would build hundreds of thousands of something like that, augmented by more serious versions for AA suppression and AT capability. What do I care about civilian casualties?

Civilian casualties is something that western democracies care about, Commie-China wouldn't care one iota if every citizen of the RoC were to die with a bullet hole in the skull, there are lots of other Chinese that can replace them. The same with Russia with regards to everyone else, but luckily they are a technological basket case.

[Berkut]

Proposition being discussed here is that kind of friendly fire being excepted as a matter of course.

[Sheilbh]

This probably merits a different topic, but the results of the Russian war to date seem to reinforce the Fukuyama thesis.  To the extent Putinism sought to pose as a viable alternative to the liberal democratic Western model, it has been badly discredited.

I thought Tooze's take in the New Statesman that to the extent anyone has broken out of the end of history it's Zelensky and Ukraine. Putin's war was not, as he expected, a post-modern Baudrillard style simulation of a war, but instead turned out to be a real one for national survival.

The 19th century figure is not Putin (who thought you could topple a state with some paratroopers and a few days of conflict), but Zelensky who I think taps into that legacy of liberal nationalism and self-determination. The response overseas is not dissimilar to Kossuth in America or one of Garibaldi's tours.

And linked to that is this interesting piece arguing that the radical centre of Czechia and Slovakia is where Europe should look for a new form of liberal idealism, not, perhaps, the Fukuyama liberal democracy that becomes either the EU or a Japanese tea ceremony (until someone overturns it all out of boredom):
https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/are-czechia-and-slovakia-eus-new-radical-centre

This on the Slovaks is particularly interesting as, today, Fico was arrested for organising corrupt gangs within the police force so it is quite the shift:

For Slovakia and Czechia, however, things look rather different. In Bratislava, Prime Minister Eduard Heger has emerged from inauspicious beginnings – taking over from a scandal-hit party-colleague in April 2021 – to become a surprisingly staunch liberal internationalist. His OL'aNO party started as an anti-corruption, anti-establishment and even anti-political movement with little interest in foreign affairs. Yet Heger's steady hand helped steer Slovakia through the tumultuous early days of the crisis, ensuring refugees were welcomed and that Slovakia's defences were bolstered by allies as the country welcomed a NATO Enhanced Forward Presence for the first time.

Warming to the role, Heger, in concert with Defence Minister Jaroslav Nad' and Foreign Minister Ivan Korčok, moved to step up support to Ukraine. Having ensured that their air defence would be backfilled with Patriot missiles, the Slovak leadership agreed to transfer their S-300 air defence system to Ukraine, thus providing some of the heaviest weaponry sent by a NATO state so far.

Significantly, Heger grounded this move in liberal solidarity, arguing that 'The Ukrainian nation is bravely defending its sovereignty – and [ours] too. It is our duty to help, not to stay put and be ignorant to the loss of human lives under Russian aggression'. He also travelled to Kyiv and to Bucha, leading a Slovak media outlet to note an unfamiliar feeling: 'This is how it feels to be proud of your Prime Minister'.

[Threviel]

I've been thinking about the ebb and flow of military development lately. Most this don't apply to the US seeing as they are in their own league.

Modern militaries are a bit like the old Anglo-Saxon militaries. Well trained professional and relatively small armies that more or less fight each other special forces style. Kind of like the 18th century armies. In both of those cases they were crushed by an enemy with numerically superior and perhaps slightly less trained mass armies, the great heathen army and the revolutionary armies.

Very broad generalizations here, but it seems that we are in the middle of a swing the other way. Soldiers are expensive and we are seeing a total war where a nation of 40 million or so that can't put more than a few 100' in the field due to expense. Professional and well equipped armies seem to be far superior to somewhat trained mass armies.

The same argument can be made for fortresses. The haven't been in vogue for 80 years or so, but Mariupol and Azovstal seem to imply that fortresses might have a future. Lack of precision ammunition and heavy weapons would make it difficult to siege anything and at the same time have an offensive going. A fortress is also a force multiplier, making worse equipped and trained troops be of some use.

So kind of like in the 17th century the cost of armies are sky-rocketing right now, we will be forced to create new solutions to be able to finance it. Back then the western nations developed the modern state and bureaucracy.

[grumbler]

I've been thinking about the ebb and flow of military development lately. Most this don't apply to the US seeing as they are in their own league.

Modern militaries are a bit like the old Anglo-Saxon militaries. Well trained professional and relatively small armies that more or less fight each other special forces style. Kind of like the 18th century armies. In both of those cases they were crushed by an enemy with numerically superior and perhaps slightly less trained mass armies, the great heathen army and the revolutionary armies.

Very broad generalizations here, but it seems that we are in the middle of a swing the other way. Soldiers are expensive and we are seeing a total war where a nation of 40 million or so that can't put more than a few 100' in the field due to expense. Professional and well equipped armies seem to be far superior to somewhat trained mass armies.

The same argument can be made for fortresses. The haven't been in vogue for 80 years or so, but Mariupol and Azovstal seem to imply that fortresses might have a future. Lack of precision ammunition and heavy weapons would make it difficult to siege anything and at the same time have an offensive going. A fortress is also a force multiplier, making worse equipped and trained troops be of some use.

So kind of like in the 17th century the cost of armies are sky-rocketing right now, we will be forced to create new solutions to be able to finance it. Back then the western nations developed the modern state and bureaucracy.

I think that your analogy is very useful.  In the 17th Century it wasn't the manpower that cost so much, it was the hand-crafted firearms and cannon, as well as gunpowder.  Today, manpower is expensive to recruit, train, and pay but it is the equipment costs that are going to limit military size.

The Russians are seeing this with their new T-14 tank.  It looks like real costs are almost 20 times that of a T-72 and twice that of a T-90SM.  The result is that they cannot afford to field effective numbers of them.  Over the last 7 years they have built about 25 T-14 tanks.

[The Minsky Moment]

Very broad generalizations here, but it seems that we are in the middle of a swing the other way.  . . . Professional and well equipped armies seem to be far superior to somewhat trained mass armies.

Maybe.

The optimal size of armies is as you indicate a function of both the ability to mobilize economic and manpower resources - both physically and socially, and of the military technology of the age.  Armies appear relatively small now because the prevailing military technology involves heavy use of hideously expensive and complex equipment that requires lots of training and expertise to use effectively.  But clearly the capacity exists to mobilize manpower to a much greater degree if that manpower could be deployed to militarily useful purposes:

1) The focus on the number of troops holding front line position misses the continuing expansion in the numbers, significance and roles of support and rear area personnel since the world wars.  One of the reasons Russia is losing the war is that even though it appears they have numerical parity or better on the front lines, they are in reality vastly outnumbered by a Ukraine that has mobilized much of its entire population in the war effort, and is being reinforced by highly skilled and resourced NATO country personnel in areas like intelligence, recon, logistical support, information warfare etc. 

The "column of doom" in the drive of Kyiv illustrated how counter-productive it can be to send large numbers of combat troops forward without proper support and planning.  But the failure of the slapdash Russian effort doesn't mean that any effort to support large numbers of combat troops an advance is doomed to failure.

2) In a combat space where drones and cyber-warfare acquires greater significance, that raises the prospect of a different kind of mass warfare.  One of the many interesting stories to come of Ukraine was the civilian enthusiast club that turned their drone hobby to military purposes.  The skills required to operate and maintain that technology is not trivial, but it is well within the capacities of many individuals with modern educations, and that kinds of equipment that group was operating is cheap to mass produce.

Future conflicts could involve mass human mobilization in similar degree to WW1/WW2, but the deployment of that manpower may differ - with more people behind computer screens and operator consoles than in trenches clutching rifles.

[Josquius]

The same argument can be made for fortresses. The haven't been in vogue for 80 years or so, but Mariupol and Azovstal seem to imply that fortresses might have a future. Lack of precision ammunition and heavy weapons would make it difficult to siege anything and at the same time have an offensive going. A fortress is also a force multiplier, making worse equipped and trained troops be of some use.

This is  true. Albeit for very dubious reasons that I doubt anyone is keen on.
Even with Russia as the aggressor the civilians around Azovstal are a big blocker on how much power they can bring to bear, they can't just completely level it and have to at least pretend to be careful.
By investing in fortresses a nation is essentially admitting that it is investing in human shields which...is a iffy look. Especially if you live next door to said fortress.

Also a problem with forts is they're useful in very specific cases where the town where they sit is itself the target. They can still be ignored and bypassed if an invading army wants.  I can see them being a useful investment for e.g. Estonia whose entire war planning scenario must revolve around try to survive until reinforcements come and make the inevitable occupation as painful as possible, but for most there's no reason to consider it.

But yes. As said the Gulf War was the big lesson for those nations that still invested in quantity over quality. Its a wonder so many nations still put so much into national service. Hopefully the Ukraine war experience will show the error of this.

[The Minsky Moment]

In the 17th Century it wasn't the manpower that cost so much, it was the hand-crafted firearms and cannon, as well as gunpowder. 

That's a big part of it, but even if equipment costs were lower, 17th century states wouldn't have been mobilizing en masse because in an era of regular subsistence crises they needed to keep the masses of peasants on the farm producing food and because the polities would have been wary of the social implications of mass mobilization.  That is why army sizes were still relatively restrained into the late 18th century when the costs of producing small arms on a standardized plan had become more manageable.