Aukus

[Sheilbh]

  This is an interestingly insular way of looking at it.  The US is a Pacific power with a history of being central to Asia-Pacific security for over 150 years.  No new treaty could more closely bind the US into Asia-Pacific security for the future, because essential US interests already do that.  It's like arguing that the US-japan mutual defense treaty is "about binding Japan into Asia-Pacific security for the long term."  Treaties cannot accomplish more than interests, and treaties without interests are mere symbolic gestures.

Isn't the key point the first part of that sentence: "the unstated implication is, regardless of who the presidents of the US are over that period, Aukus is about binding the US into Asia-Pacific security for the long term."

From an Aussie perspective they've faced a lot from China in recent years and there's not been a huge amount of support for them beyond the symbolic from the US while Trump was in charge (I think Mike Pompeo tweeted about buying Australian wine in solidarity) so this is about deepening the formal institutional ties, so even if there's another Trump Australian has another string tying it to the US (and vice-versa). I think the timing of the first approach to the UK in March-April this year suggests this is something the Australians wanted to move on ASAP once Trump was gone.

[grumbler]

Isn't the key point the first part of that sentence: "the unstated implication is, regardless of who the presidents of the US are over that period, Aukus is about binding the US into Asia-Pacific security for the long term."

From an Aussie perspective they've faced a lot from China in recent years and there's not been a huge amount of support for them beyond the symbolic from the US while Trump was in charge (I think Mike Pompeo tweeted about buying Australian wine in solidarity) so this is about deepening the formal institutional ties, so even if there's another Trump Australian has another string tying it to the US (and vice-versa). I think the timing of the first approach to the UK in March-April this year suggests this is something the Australians wanted to move on ASAP once Trump was gone.

There's never been a US president that pulled the US out of the Asia-Pacific security realm.  Not even Trump.  Under Trump, the US Seventh Fleet remained the same strength, the US maintained its forces in Korea, Japan, Guam, etc...

Now, of the professor just mis-typed US when she meant UK and president when she meant prime minister, the statement would make sense.  The UK, unlike the US, has been very uneven in its participation in Asia-Pacific security.

[Sheilbh]

There's never been a US president that pulled the US out of the Asia-Pacific security realm.  Not even Trump.  Under Trump, the US Seventh Fleet remained the same strength, the US maintained its forces in Korea, Japan, Guam, etc...

I don't think that's quite what he means as the alternative - but I don't think it's controversial to say that US allies including in the Pacific and Europe felt the US as less committed and reliable under Trump. The US didn't pull its forces out of Europe but I don't know that it was felt to have the same meaning under Trump and there is a difference between being in Asia-Pacific from the perspective of the US and its location and from the perspective of Australia and its location. As I say my guess in the next step will be US fleets spending more time in Austrlian ports.

It's going to take at least 20 years for these subs, but in the meantime there's a framework for Australia to thicken its ties to the US.

Now, of the professor just mis-typed US when she meant UK and president when she meant prime minister, the statement would make sense.  The UK, unlike the US, has been very uneven in its participation in Asia-Pacific security.

The UK's very much a bit part player on that You're absolutely right on the UK (unlike France) but I don't think that's the appeal for Australia - the UK is just helpful in terms of technology transfer and cooperation with some of the tech but we're nothing compared to the US (or France) in the region.

[grumbler]

There's never been a US president that pulled the US out of the Asia-Pacific security realm.  Not even Trump.  Under Trump, the US Seventh Fleet remained the same strength, the US maintained its forces in Korea, Japan, Guam, etc...

I don't think that's quite what he means as the alternative - but I don't think it's controversial to say that US allies including in the Pacific and Europe felt the US as less committed and reliable under Trump. The US didn't pull its forces out of Europe but I don't know that it was felt to have the same meaning under Trump and there is a difference between being in Asia-Pacific from the perspective of the US and its location and from the perspective of Australia and its location. As I say my guess in the next step will be US fleets spending more time in Austrlian ports.

It's going to take at least 20 years for these subs, but in the meantime there's a framework for Australia to thicken its ties to the US.

I think that it IS controversial to argue that the treaty can "[bind] the US into Asia-Pacific security for the long term" regardless  of who the POTUS is.  If US interests (even if only as seen by the US Administration) call for the US to withdraw from the Asia-Pacific security structure, then it will, treaty or not.  If US interests call for the US to remain bound into Asia-Pacific security, it will do so, treaty or not (and, indeed, has been doing for over a century without this treaty).

Your point about the agreement providing an in for Australia to thicken ties to the US in areas other than the subs is, IMO, the correct take, and Prof Mitter's is wrong.

[Zoupa]

As for economics and soft power, the Australians are seeing the solidifying political consensus in the USA in standing up to Chinese over-reaching - one of the few policy areas that remains truly bipartisan.  Whereas France signed a huge trade deal with China just before COVID.  Can Australia trust France to consistently back Australia even at the cost of losing billions in commercial contracts?  The fact that France is so upset about the loss of the sub contact is not a good indicator in that score.

Not just that but the fact that you've got French foreign policy figures saying France should change its entire approach on China and the Indo-Pacific because of this, sort of indicates why Australia may have wanted a different partner.

"We just fucked you over royally. How come you're reacting like that? See? That's exactly why we fucked you over!"

I mean what did you expect exactly? That we grin and smile through the black eye?

[Eddie Teach]

I didn't realize you were a defense contractor.

[Sheilbh]

"We just fucked you over royally. How come you're reacting like that? See? That's exactly why we fucked you over!"

I mean what did you expect exactly? That we grin and smile through the black eye?

That France's interests and strategy don't spin on a sixpence. I think the anger's fair - my point is just that response is possibly part of the reason why Australia didn't feel aligned/wanted a different option when they feel the threat from China is increasing.

I think France is probably going to re-emphasise ties with India and Japan, because I don't think arranging meetings with China and Russia as some have suggested is the right response (and doing that with Russia would torpedo any chance of using the EU to build strategic autonomy because a lot of the CEE states and most other EU and NATO members wouldn't be thrilled by it).

[Admiral Yi]

I think the anger's fair

Please help me understand how the anger is fair.

[Sheilbh]

Please help me understand how the anger is fair.

Combination of personal, policy and political reasons. There's been a generational project to re-orient France from a Gaullist perspective towards engaging with the US and the UK (and other "Anglo-Saxons") as the core of France's foreign policy. Related to that is that the US wanted European nations to engage more in the Indo-Pacific - France was the first country to do so and has been regularly doing freedom of navigation patrols and building relations with other partners in the region like Australia, India and Japan. France was pleased to see the UK engaging more in the Indo-Pacific but it was late to the party compared to France. Just last month there was a US, UK, Japan, Australia, France and NZ common naval exercise - France felt part of that framework. One of the participants was actually planning to replace France with two of the others.

Macron has invested a lot in building personal rapport with Biden and Morrison - he made a big deal of the Franco-Australian relationship being the cornerstone of France's strategy in the region at the G7 and a big deal of welcoming Biden (most of the time with Johnson was spent on Brexit/Northern Ireland Protocol issues). At the summit those three were meeting separately to hammer out this deal. And it does sort of confirm that perhaps the Gaullists are right and fundamentally you can't trust the Anglos who'll always work with each other over France.

And, on a purely political level losing a AUS$90 billion contract and up to 30,000 jobs in an election year is not great.

I think the anger is totally fair and we should look to engage France on other issues. But I also think it's entirely fair if Australia didn't think the deal was working and didn't feel aligned with France to move elsewhere - and there is a chasm between how clearly the Australians felt they were communicating about this and what the French understood (as I say I think one of the minor points in this is the Australians were expressing issues that to their view went to the very core of the viability of the project, while the French understood that it was just standard defence contract haggling). But, as I say, I'm not sure how it could have been handled differently - which perhaps makes the anger even more justifiable.

[Admiral Yi]

And it does sort of confirm that perhaps the Gaullists are right and fundamentally you can't trust the Anglos who'll always work with each other over France.

This to me is the nub of the issue.  If you can't trust someone that means they broke their word or welched on a deal. 

Do you feel that there was an understanding involving France, the US, and Australia, that if France increased its presence in the Pacific Australia would buy French subs?  Or some other form of quid pro quo?

[Sheilbh]

This to me is the nub of the issue.  If you can't trust someone that means they broke their word or welched on a deal. 

Do you feel that there was an understanding involving France, the US, and Australia, that if France increased its presence in the Pacific Australia would buy French subs?  Or some other form of quid pro quo?

No I don't think there was a quid pro quo. But I also think that's an incredibly narrow understanding of trust. I don't think trust is just broke their word or welched on a deal - there's loads of people who I don't trust because I think they're shady or I think they're blowhards or bullshitters (wouldn't trust them as far as I could throw them). They don't need to have broken their word for me to not trust them. I certainly think trust is a significantly broader concept among allies than sort of contractual obligations - or in everyday life: friends, family, loved ones. Both in terms of what you'll tolerate and how much it hurts.

I think in this context I think France understood that it was the first country responding to the US call for Europe to engage more in the Indo-Pacific, it was really building its strategy around its relationship with Australia - and I think France thought it was making those choices in good faith. I think they'd invested a lot in them and the really mattered to France. And they now feel they weren't treated with good faith/were being led up the garden path by the Anglos who would always do their own thing and dump the French as soon as they could.

Edit: So I suppose it's not you can't trust them because they'll break their word or some similarly legalist definition, but you can't trust them because they're not reliable and they're not honest and up-front.

[Admiral Yi]

So dishonest in the non-legalistic sense.  I see.

Not really.

[HVC]

Losing a 90 billion dollar contract sucks. Sucks more for Australia that I started at half that amount. The fact that Naval Group is way over budget and reducing the amount of work being done in Australia ( lowering it from 90% local input to 60%) and trying to lower it more seems to be being wholly ignored. France owns a majority share in Naval Group so they're losing a chunk of money, but as a supplier they're less then ideal partners.

[grumbler]

Are there any French politicians who are not owned by their industries?  I find it surprising that the French government is taking harsh diplomatic action to lash out at anyone deemed to be part of the Australian decision to move on from a troublesome contract that it had signed with a French company.

This all seems to me to be counterproductive.  If the French government is going to lean on the customers of French companies when the customers grow dissatisfied with the service they are getting, maybe its best to avoid dealing with French companies at all.

And it's double ironic that the French government is asserting both that the UK is just "the spare wheel on the carriage" and is engaged in "a form of accepted vassalization" while, at the same time, complaining that they were not made part of the treaty... so they are jealous that the cannot also be a spare wheel "hiding in the American bosom?"

Frankly, the French government has been overly emo several times in their history, but seldom this shamelessly.  Some of the stories out of France sound like they are from The Onion.

[Sheilbh]

Are there any French politicians who are not owned by their industries?  I find it surprising that the French government is taking harsh diplomatic action to lash out at anyone deemed to be part of the Australian decision to move on from a troublesome contract that it had signed with a French company.

In terms of harsh diplomatic action, France's Europe Minister has said it's "unthinkable" that the EU will continue to negotiate a free trade agreement with Australia. France would have a veto in any deal so that may be inevitable anyway but, given the general silence from the rest of Europe so far, it'll be interesting to see whether other member states are entirely thrilled at this decision.

And it's double ironic that the French government is asserting both that the UK is just "the spare wheel on the carriage" and is engaged in "a form of accepted vassalization" while, at the same time, complaining that they were not made part of the treaty... so they are jealous that the cannot also be a spare wheel "hiding in the American bosom?"

Not just that, Le Drian's also said of Australia "I do not understand the logic of this agreement [...] It illustrates Australia's willingness to be a surrogate for the United States and to abandon its sovereignty".

And Xavier Bertrand, best polling right wing candidate for President (and I think any lost jobs would be in his area so more understandable) has called for an extraordinary NATO summit and if France doesn't get answers from the US should "put on the table France's" participation in NATO's command structure. He's also said that France should open talks with China and Russia (which would thrill the rest of the EU): "France is not intended to be treated like an American servant" for whom "it is always 'America First'. It is time that we have the same vission for France."

It is pretty extraordinary - especially given that until Russia literally invaded Crimea France was agreeing to supply them with jets and warships over US, UK and EU partners' objections - and while I think the anger is justifiable, I don't really get the level it's reached.