Aukus

[Zanza]

Neighbors across the Coral Sea.

Yes, when I think "neighbor", I too think of them being "2000km* across the ocean."

*Approximate Sydney.

New Zealand and Australia are typically considered neighbours, no? Auckland is further away from Sydney than Noumea is.

[crazy canuck]

They're bordering in Antarctica

[OttoVonBismarck]

The fact that India has reacted very positively to the announcement of AUKUS in my opinion is pretty good news; India is the essential partner in Asia to countering China. India takes this as the Anglosphere committing itself more fully to working against Chinese negative behavior in the region.

There are likely to be long term beneficial economies of scale for Australia being able to lean on the United States for these systems, and greater interoperability between the operations of Australian and American fleets will be a benefit. I'm still a little curious to see the nature of nuclear propulsion cooperation with the British--will this mean increased cooperation in future reactor systems or more of the "arms-length" collaboration we've always had. The Rolls-Royce reactors currently powering the British nuclear submarines are primarily British design and entirely British made, albeit they did get design help from General Dynamics under the existing nuclear information sharing treaties between the US/UK; my understanding is if the British move to the newer Rolls-Royce PWR3 reactors they'll be operating a design much more American influenced, that is likely to have much lower maintenance costs over their lifetime.

Frankly I think it's a good thing if AUKUS leads to even more material collaboration in nuclear propulsion systems between the US/UK; at the end of the day for close allies working to a common purpose, it is in the interests of the United States for the UK and Australia to be able to field nuclear submarines cheaper and more efficiently, as smaller countries the whole alliance essentially can field more firepower by sharing in US economies of scale.

The announcement has been quite vague on what exactly is meant by greater cooperation on "AI, cyber and quantum computing", but I'll note that cooperation on those things is not necessarily linked with nuclear cooperation. We could easily create a separate framework between the US / Japan / UK / Canada / Australia that would bring those other countries on board for the cooperation in those fields but not in nuclear--Canada has flirted with nuclear submarines a few times since the 80s, but frankly I don't see much future along those lines, and Japan has understandable aversion to any militarized nuclear technology, but would be a major contributor in cooperation in those other areas.

[grumbler]

They voted against independence twice in the last four years.

I'm not saying that they should be independent, especially against their will.  I am just saying that I am surprised that they are not independent.

[Berkut]

There's also frankly a reason Russia hits above the weight of any European power, or even the EU, in most matters of force projection--because they maintain a sizable military. There's a reason that China is actively working hard to convert its massive economic power into having a first tier military. It's simply obvious some things cannot be achieved through diplomacy and trade deals.

I think what has happened with the US is that we go so damn good at "hard power" that

1. People forget it's there. It is so dominant, that the idea of trying to contend with it has been largely abandoned. There is no modern equivalent of the London Naval Treaty for example, because there aren't any countries that would even contemplate the idea of trying to build a navy that is even 50% the power of the USN, and hence no need for a treaty. Instead, US dominance in traditional hard power nation comparisons is just a given, and ironically, that is just not even seen as a sphere of contention anymore. The USSR tried for a while, but failed.

2. The US tends to forget that all the hard power in the world doesn't actually accomplish a lot of things. Sure, you can destroy Japan and Germany, and contain the USSR. But you can't force Vietnam to be Western, and it won't help you build a nation in the western sense no matter how many bombs you drop on them.

3. The ROTW wants to pretend that hard power doesn't matter anymore - that something has changed outside of the US just being dominant that means that somehow it just doesn't really matter. And to the extent that something HAS changed, they are right, just not in the way they think. The thing that changed is that the US just did it better then everyone else (and yes, our economy drove that, but also innovation and technology). But they are wrong in the idea that many seem to really, really, really want to believe is that something ELSE changed that makes hard power just not really relevant anymore, and hence they can look at the US as just a big ogre stomping around that doesn't realize none of that matters anymore.

The EU is, IMO, just the crystallization of this idea that the world is beyond violence, and everything can just be handled by diplomacy or trade talks or a well timed sanction - at worst, maybe an occasional drone strike. The reality is that we still live in a world that has shitty actors, willing to use their own hard power to get what they want. Russia and China both are in fact constrained by US military dominance. The fact that they are constrained is taken as evidence that no such constraint is actually needed, sadly enough.

There is nothing stopping France or the EU from becoming a relevant player in global force projection. They have the economy, technology, and infrastructure to do so if they wish. It is just a question of the will to do it. But it is incredibly expensive.

[Sheilbh]

I think I understand your perspective, but I disagree. I still remain convinced that the Greenback, not the GI is the biggest source of American power. I think American military power is just a reflection of its economic might. And that it is this economic might that has won WWII and shaped the postwar order to this day.

I think it's very difficult to untangle. The financial/monetary system was devised by the Americans in opposition to the Soviet alternative because they were the two big powers left standing at the end of WW2. They won WW2 because of their ability to leverage immensive economic powers of production. But using that for hard power was (for the US) really its military and political influence catching up with its economic heft since the end of WW1. And it keeps going back (the Soviet Union is the more interesting less obviously explicable case I think).

I think the ultimate point is that in general economic power has normally equated to hard power because it has an impact on the forces you can maintain and the influence you can have/push overseas. Part of what's happening now is America is trying I think to stop that equation for China as China becomes more and more economically powerful - I don't know if that'll be successful or is necessarily wise.

It doesn't necessarily equate directly - Germany for historical reasons does not have that equation, but I think the UK, France and maybe Italy do and are roughly where you'd expect them to be. Other countries like Turkey, Russia, Greece seem to have outsized force (that they're all to some extent or other willing to use) compared to their economy.

I think the monetary system is slightly different and I don't really understand how the monetary policy makers (where there's a clear global hierarchy) interacts with other forms of power.

And I was thinking about this - and no doubt there are millions of IR books on this already, but I feel like hard/soft is not necessarily the most useful distinction especially given the almost hard power effects of being frozen out of the global financial system (which is largely in the power of the US). Perhaps coercive/attractive power is a better framing?

The EU is, IMO, just the crystallization of this idea that the world is beyond violence, and everything can just be handled by diplomacy or trade talks or a well timed sanction - at worst, maybe an occasional drone strike. The reality is that we still live in a world that has shitty actors, willing to use their own hard power to get what they want. Russia and China both are in fact constrained by US military dominance. The fact that they are constrained is taken as evidence that no such constraint is actually needed, sadly enough.

I think just to go back to Zanza's point - I think the EU is an economic, trade and regulatory superpower and can get disappointed that it doesn't translate into other forms of power or influence, but member states (crucially Germany) aren't willing and don't want to take the steps to do that. Even now the talk of autonomous European defence policy is still focused - as it was 15 years ago - on the idea of a "rapid reaction forces", which is basically something that might help with a crisis in the Balkans. I'm not sure that's the nature of the issues Europe is facing or what it needs.

In a way I thnk that Europeans are the only people in the world who think there is such a thing as an international rules based order. It is neither international, nor rules based. I think if you asked China, Russia, any country in the global south they would laugh at that idea - and I think American leaders when they're being honest (as in the Larry Summers questions) would also acknowledge it is an American led order and while there are rules in general and principle there is also a rule of exception when necessary for America. You know it was the American order during the Cold War and it then became international in the end of history.

As I say I think part of the key challenge right now is China is large enough economically, and building up its hard power too, to not just take a subordinate position in an American based order - so can America accept/re-shape its order to deal with pluralism at the top or is it going to be a competition of an American based order v China's version of an "international rules based order".

[Sheilbh]

(And France has some Pacific territories.)

Yeah - I've seen French people point out that they have 1.5 million citizens in the Indo-Pacific and three quarters of French territorial waters are in the Pacific so it is the most Pacific European power, which is true.

I still find it kind of weird that Europeans are confused with how colonial British overseas territories (where the UK is only responsible for defence and foreign policy and they're not part of our domestic politics are) while accepting that the EU has a border with Brazil and territorial waters from Africa to Tahiti because of French territories

Edit: Incidentally I absolutely love the French comments on why they didn't recall their ambassador to London and the UK position:

Macron did not recall the UK ambassador, apparently, according to sources close to the Elysee, "for the same reason that when the cooking in a restaurant is not first class, you sack the chef, not the guy who washes the dishes."

From Le Drian:

"No need to call back our ambassador in the UK. We are familiar with Britain's permanent opportunism - and in this case they're the "spare wheel on the carriage"

From Clement Beaune:

France didn't pull its ambassador to London despite the UK's role in the sub deal, but they're not off the hook: "[Britain] is hiding in the American bosom," said France's minister for European affairs. "This is a return to the American fold and a form of accepted vassalization."

I'm very glad the Skybolt crisis didn't happen during 24 rolling news and Twitter But also I think these points would have more weight when this was first announced as it has subsequently seemed like the UK was actually more involved (Australia came to the UK with the request, the UK helped work out the deal with the US - it sounds like it'll be UK nuclear tech that's being transferred with US support etc). It's all very high Gaullist at the minute - which, personally, I generally approve of.

As Sam Freedman put it - the Macron line especially is the most magnificently high-handed insult since de Gaulle said of Churchill that "I get angry when I'm right. He gets angry when he's wrong. We are angry with each other a lot of the time."

[HVC]

Gotta hand it to them, the French do know how to hilariously insult people

[Admiral Yi]

The financial/monetary system was devised by the Americans in opposition to the Soviet alternative because they were the two big powers left standing at the end of WW2.

The Bretton Woods architecture was devised in collaboration with the UK.

[Sheilbh]

The Bretton Woods architecture was devised in collaboration with the UK.

Which was very kind of you and no doubt Keynes did some good work - but if it relied in any substantial way on the British economy we'd probably all still be on rations I mean how many Sterling and balance of payments crises did we have in the Bretton Woods era - I want to say 5 off the top of my head.

[Berkut]

In a way I thnk that Europeans are the only people in the world who think there is such a thing as an international rules based order. It is neither international, nor rules based.

Ironically, I actually think there IS an international, rules based order.

It is just only honored among western liberal nations. The post-WW2 era of peace between the western nations is kind of amazing, if you know any history at all.

It is only NOT amazing because it is just so taken for granted now.

The problem is that the rest of the world doesn't appear to be interested, or rather, significant parts don't appear to be interested. A lot of parts ARE interested, which is great.

But Russia seems to have rejected it out of hand, and China pretty clearly thinks they have a better way. At least better for them anyway.

[Sheilbh]

Yeah I suppose my view is that the US didn't become so great at hard power, but built an order around, in support of and supported/defended by American power.

It was clear this wasn't a neutral objective international rules based order in the Cold War - I think we fooled ourselves that it was during the end of history and we're now possibly going to return to confronting the fact it's not. I think as America moves more into a confrontational against China it will become even clearer especially to Europeans (I think particularly Germany) who are still I think a little end of history - that the order they participate is not neutral and value free, but ultimately an American order.

And I think in terms of China - you know, I think there's areas we'll need to work together, there's areas where there'll be natural competition, there's areas we should protect and we should absolutely have red lines and support regional allies. But I mean you say they think they have an idea for a better way - given the bipartisan views on China and the view from the Pentagon - what would China need to do to prove it could join the international rules based order? What would be sufficient?

Edit: Incidentally on the French reaction to the UK - there was a bit of me that found it weirdly appropriate that while a "Jupiterian" leader in Paris was making these comments and clearly frustrated that the Dutch PM was on a visit to London

[Berkut]

I don't know, its an interesting question.

Basically, the success of the post WW2 international rules based order at avoiding violent confict has been pretty much entirely limited to western liberalism. Is that correlation or causation?

Can an authoritarian, populist, ultra-nationalistic nation that thinks genocide is a pretty reasonable tool of statecraft fit into that liberal world order that eschews the use of force to resolve disputes between themselves?

It doesn't feel like it would. I don't think they've evidenced anything that suggests that is something they even contemplate, much less are capable of.

[OttoVonBismarck]

The biggest thing China would need would be to abandon the idea that anywhere a Chinese person ever lived is part of "Greater China", a lot of the other stuff can be somewhat reconciled with the liberal world order. Russia has essentially the same problem--just because Tsar or Stalin once ruled over it, doesn't meant it is part of Russia.

Much of the heart of the order we built after WWII was to dissuade and act against wars of territorial expansionism, since such wars had lead directly to the greatest conflagration in human history. By tacitly rejecting that, both Russia and China are forever outside unless they abandon that.

Like as self-interested as Germany or America might be, I can't imagine either going to war to annex land, now or anytime in our lifetimes. That's a very important core difference between us and the Chinese/Russians.

[Berkut]

I don't actually think either of them care about that, really.

It is just an excuse to grab some more territory, really.