Has Biden Made the Right Choice in Afghanistan?

[Neil]

Depends on what one's priorities are. The US pull out was handled so as to end US involvement, and it did just that, but at the cost of leaving piles of equipment to US enemies, accelerating the collapse of a US ally, and demonstrating once again the US will not stand by its friends.

Afghanistan is not some friend and ally we were assisting at the request of their citizens and government. We were not invited in.

But even if it's a colonial enterprise, you're not going to maintain that forever.  The European colonial powers weren't able to hold out indefinitely against the native independence movements, so it stands to reason that the US would eventually have to give in as well.  Or if you're looking to just punish America's enemies, maybe a return to more Clintonian strategies of just launching an few air strikes and calling it even would be more productive than what we've seen here. 

[The Minsky Moment]

Whether ISIS controls Iraq or Syria or the Taliban controls Afghanistan just doesn't matter to US interests. It is the other side of the world and simply doesn't matter.

I get that's your view and that's where we disagree.  I find the notion that mere separation in space completely insulates a country from any impact from events occurring outside its political borders to be absurd.  It would be nice if true - hey, no need to worry about China anymore! 

And dude, it is a massive golden parachute to get into the US from a place like Afghanistan. Per capita income there is $493 / year. Minimum wage in a place with real workplace protections is pretty damn sweat by comparison.

Per capita income has nothing to do with it. Much of the Afghan labor force consists of subsistence famers.  The official GDP statistics count most of these people at zero because they produce no marketable product. Of course in reality many of these farmers are selling a cash crop.  But illicit opium sales don't show up in the GDP accounts.

What is relevant for this inquiry is not the mass of rural famers or even the masses of unemployed in the cities, but the urban middle class that is the most likely to openly support the US and live "Western" lifestyles.   This middle class - while a relatively small minority of the overall population - is able to maintain a respectable standard of living because even though their nominal incomes in dollar terms seem low, their costs of living are also very low by Western standards. 

If you aren't familiar with the very ample literature on migration and refugees specifically - and if you don't have significant personal anecdotal connections with refugees, it is going to be hard to explain why you are mistaken with this.  It can't be done with a flippant one line response.  At the highest level, if people though the way you believe, levels of migration legal and illegal would be orders of magnitude greater than they are. This is a known economic puzzle that has been studied and there are many reasons why it is so.  For example, from 2005 to 2014, more Mexicans left the US for Mexico then left US for Mexico - something that makes no sense if you view the world from the "golden ticket" perspective. 

[Malthus]

Depends on what one's priorities are. The US pull out was handled so as to end US involvement, and it did just that, but at the cost of leaving piles of equipment to US enemies, accelerating the collapse of a US ally, and demonstrating once again the US will not stand by its friends.

Afghanistan is not some friend and ally we were assisting at the request of their citizens and government. We were not invited in.

The "friends" here are the individual Afghanis who aided the US - the ones now so frantic to leave the country. Many of whom did so out of sincere conviction that the US pointed the way to a better form of civilized life.

The lesson here is: aiding the US is risky.

[Malthus]

Is the contention that the US had no idea what would happen when they suddenly withdrew? That strikes me as a pretty fundamental failure in intelligence gathering.

Suddenly withdrew? We have been talking about withdrawing for years.

There are different ways to manage a withdrawal. Apparently in this case it was pretty sudden.

[Valmy]

Depends on what one's priorities are. The US pull out was handled so as to end US involvement, and it did just that, but at the cost of leaving piles of equipment to US enemies, accelerating the collapse of a US ally, and demonstrating once again the US will not stand by its friends.

Afghanistan is not some friend and ally we were assisting at the request of their citizens and government. We were not invited in.

The "friends" here are the individual Afghanis who aided the US - the ones now so frantic to leave the country. Many of whom did so out of sincere conviction that the US pointed the way to a better form of civilized life.

The lesson here is: aiding the US is risky.

And I am all for aiding that tiny minority of Afghanistan who did not see us as a distasteful occupying force.

As for the lesson, it depends on your circumstances doesn't it? I would say backing a foreign occupation is usually risky.

[Malthus]

I'm not in love with the 'The US didn't stand by their allies' take. 

The US spent twenty years in Afghanistan, and spent a great deal of time and treasure trying to build institutions and striking at the enemies of the new Afghan state.  That's twice as long a the occupation of Iraq and three times longer than Japan or Germany.  At what point should Afghanistan be expected to be able to deal with these internal security issues without constant and significant foreign support?  If the Afghan government has no public support in Afghanistan, is it really appropriate for American troops to maintain a sort of a colonial or Vichy regime? 

Maybe they could have done a better job building institutions (although I'd argue that it would be politically unpalatable in the West for the United States to build institutions that would be acceptable to most Afghans), but that would have been an argument for 2002.  In 2021, these choices had already been made and the US was in a position of either continuing their permanent occupation in a time where American resources are growing ever thinner, or moving towards a final withdrawal.

The US is still in Korea. There are more troops there, than there were in Afghanistan prior to the withdrawal (some 28k).

Clearly, in some cases, it considers long-term engagement in its interests. No-one considers Korea a Vichy regime or a colonial imposition (other than the North Koreans).

A central question is why government-building succeeded in Korea.

[Valmy]

Is the contention that the US had no idea what would happen when they suddenly withdrew? That strikes me as a pretty fundamental failure in intelligence gathering.

Suddenly withdrew? We have been talking about withdrawing for years.

There are different ways to manage a withdrawal. Apparently in this case it was pretty sudden.

I mean we have been steadily drawing down our involvement for years and Biden promised to do this if elected over a year ago. Then he announced the date of withdrawal in the Spring, several months ago.

Eventually, no matter how steadily we backed out, we would reach a tipping point where the Taliban would feel comfortable enough to move in.

[alfred russel]

Whether ISIS controls Iraq or Syria or the Taliban controls Afghanistan just doesn't matter to US interests.

Control of Iraq and Syria are definitely a big deal in terms of US interests.  The US is enormously interested in insuring the supply of Gulf oil to Europe and Asia.  A hostile, aggressive caliphate controlling Iraq and threatening the Saudis and the Gulf states is a pretty big deal.  Maintaining global trade (without which American prosperity cannot be maintained) is in US interests.

Pick 1:

-US interests are severely threatened by climate change caused by the use of fossil fuels.
-US interests depend on the supply of Gulf Oil to Europe and Asia at a reasonable price.

[Sheilbh]

I mean one solution would have been to try and bring the Taliban (who clearly have a constituency) into the system and I think there were talks along those lines in the past that went nowhere. Arguably that with a national unity government of Ghani plus the Taliban attending handover ceremonies at the various NATO held bases may have been an alternative.

It would probably still devolve into a Taliban takeover but it would perhaps have been a route to a more stable withdrawal (while giving time and space of Afghans to get visas and get out).

[Valmy]

The US is still in Korea. There are more troops there, than there were in Afghanistan prior to the withdrawal (some 28k).

And I think we should leave there as well. South Korea is more than capable of defending itself. But I believe South Korea compensates us for that. It is not like us pulling out of South Korea would lead to North Korea moving in before we were even done withdrawing, even in 1970.

Clearly, in some cases, it considers long-term engagement in its interests. No-one considers Korea a Vichy regime or a colonial imposition (other than the North Koreans).

A central question is why government-building succeeded in Korea.

I don't know why it worked in Korea or Germany and Japan and Austria and so badly in South Vietnam and other places, though I imagine we could all give some guesses. But it was pretty obvious it had by 1970, 20 years after we moved in to South Korea. I mean Japan was hosting the Olympics in under 20 years. Somehow we weren't able to swing the Kabul 2020 games this time.

[Neil]

The "friends" here are the individual Afghanis who aided the US - the ones now so frantic to leave the country. Many of whom did so out of sincere conviction that the US pointed the way to a better form of civilized life.

The lesson here is: aiding the US is risky.

This was always known though.  Aiding an occupying power against your countrymen because you believe that the occupying power will help your country adopt policies and practices more in line with your own values only works so long as the occupying power remains.  Consider Pierre Laval. 

[Valmy]

I mean one solution would have been to try and bring the Taliban (who clearly have a constituency) into the system and I think there were talks along those lines in the past that went nowhere. Arguably that with a national unity government of Ghani plus the Taliban attending handover ceremonies at the various NATO held bases may have been an alternative.

It would probably still devolve into a Taliban takeover but it would perhaps have been a route to a more stable withdrawal (while giving time and space of Afghans to get visas and get out).

I think we tried this but, as pointed out in the thread, the Taliban had little to gain and lots to lose by doing so.

[Sheilbh]

I think we tried this but, as pointed out in the thread, the Taliban had little to gain and lots to lose by doing so.

We might be talking about different things because my memory is that the Afghan government vetoed - but it is a very loose memory of something happening in the news a few years ago.

Edit:

I don't know why it worked in Korea or Germany and Japan and Austria and so badly in South Vietnam and other places, though I imagine we could all give some guesses. But it was pretty obvious it had by 1970, 20 years after we moved in to South Korea. I mean Japan was hosting the Olympics in under 20 years. Somehow we weren't able to swing the Kabul 2020 games this time.

I think a key factor is the institutions that were established had buy-in and beecame seen as legitimate. I mean if you look at post-war Germany and Japan, the early leaders were political figures from the 1930s who were reasonably untainted after the war.

By contrast I think in Afghanistan all of the leaders supported by the US have spent large parts of their lives in exile touring, or lecturing in foreign capitals. I think that is an issue and maybe a solution would have been to actually try and bring in some of the warlords/rebel leaders more formally, maybe try and bring parts of the Taliban - I'm not even convinced the British idea of bringing back the King is crazy. But that does mean accepting that while it might be a democracy it is unlikely to be a Western style liberal democracy (in the same way that Pakistan or Bangladesh or India aren't when it comes to various bits of human rights protections).

I don't know if that would have worked but I think given the way the government has clearly lost all legitimacy it might have been an idea?

[Neil]

Whether ISIS controls Iraq or Syria or the Taliban controls Afghanistan just doesn't matter to US interests.

Control of Iraq and Syria are definitely a big deal in terms of US interests.  The US is enormously interested in insuring the supply of Gulf oil to Europe and Asia.  A hostile, aggressive caliphate controlling Iraq and threatening the Saudis and the Gulf states is a pretty big deal.  Maintaining global trade (without which American prosperity cannot be maintained) is in US interests.

Pick 1:

-US interests are severely threatened by climate change caused by the use of fossil fuels.
-US interests depend on the supply of Gulf Oil to Europe and Asia at a reasonable price.

I reject your false dichotomy.  It's perfectly reasonable for the US to adopt a strategy of encouraging less reliance on oil through the use of other energy sources while still wanting to ensure that their global trade and defence partners have access to oil during the transitional period. 

[alfred russel]

Whether ISIS controls Iraq or Syria or the Taliban controls Afghanistan just doesn't matter to US interests. It is the other side of the world and simply doesn't matter.

I get that's your view and that's where we disagree.  I find the notion that mere separation in space completely insulates a country from any impact from events occurring outside its political borders to be absurd.  It would be nice if true - hey, no need to worry about China anymore! 

And dude, it is a massive golden parachute to get into the US from a place like Afghanistan. Per capita income there is $493 / year. Minimum wage in a place with real workplace protections is pretty damn sweat by comparison.

Per capita income has nothing to do with it. Much of the Afghan labor force consists of subsistence famers.  The official GDP statistics count most of these people at zero because they produce no marketable product. Of course in reality many of these farmers are selling a cash crop.  But illicit opium sales don't show up in the GDP accounts.

What is relevant for this inquiry is not the mass of rural famers or even the masses of unemployed in the cities, but the urban middle class that is the most likely to openly support the US and live "Western" lifestyles.   This middle class - while a relatively small minority of the overall population - is able to maintain a respectable standard of living because even though their nominal incomes in dollar terms seem low, their costs of living are also very low by Western standards. 

If you aren't familiar with the very ample literature on migration and refugees specifically - and if you don't have significant personal anecdotal connections with refugees, it is going to be hard to explain why you are mistaken with this.  It can't be done with a flippant one line response.  At the highest level, if people though the way you believe, levels of migration legal and illegal would be orders of magnitude greater than they are. This is a known economic puzzle that has been studied and there are many reasons why it is so.  For example, from 2005 to 2014, more Mexicans left the US for Mexico then left US for Mexico - something that makes no sense if you view the world from the "golden ticket" perspective.

About 2 months ago I was (very briefly) in the eastern section of the DRC (though just barely inside the border). One of the most unstable places on earth but hardly anyone knows anything about it. I could see the smoke from a volcano erupting nearby from which thousands of people were evacuating on foot. I doubt it made the news in the US. There are lots of poor unstable places on the planet. That a few get headlines doesn't correspond with them being more strategically important.