WW2 questions

[Malthus]

I watched the Tom Cruise movie about Von Stauffenberg, enjoyable enough. I would be fascinated to learn what sort of peace or cease-fire the plotters thought they might be able to negotiate. We keep France? Sorry about our recent misunderstanding Josef, please don't steamroller all the way to Berlin? Always wondered what they hoped for beyond the most nebulous goals of ending the war.

My understanding is that they were willing to make concessions to the Western Allies in the hopes of splitting the alliance - after all, the UK and US were natural enemies of the Soviets, and surely would not want to help them gain a big empire in Eastern Europe as a result of the war (which as you know is what actually happened). They figure self-interest would lead the West to accept a peace deal that left the Soviets hung out to dry. After all, that would allow the Western allies to concentrate on the Japanese.

Then, they hoped to offer uncle Joseph a deal: the Germans keep some but not all of their gains in the east, no more war. They figured if Joe was on his own, he's be in more of a mood to accept, with no more lend-lease, facing the Germans alone, etc. The Plotters figured they would be in a better bargaining position.

[Threviel]

I would imagine that there would be a unified reaction to the plot. Once H was dead everyone needed to get their shit together to not have the eastern front collapse. If a civil war were to break out the Soviets would crush everyone in no-time and every German leader knew it.

[The Minsky Moment]

I think they sincerely misread the status of relations between the Soviets and the West.

Agreed - you cant read the situation in 44 based on what we know happened later. It also misreads how general opinion in the US and UK viewed Germany at the time - recall that it was a high ranking US cabinet official - Henry Morganthau - who in 1944 would propose his post-war settlement plan of a partition and permanent de-industrialization of Germany's core manufacturing areas. I don't see FDR selling out the Soviets and doing a separate deal, especially with what would appear to be a traditional militarist clique.  The US and Britain had committed to the principle of unconditional surrender at Casablanca and I don't see how replacing Hitler with a military government replaces that. 

[The Brain]

Another question: sometimes you hear that the Western Allies could/should have advanced into Germany on a narrow front in 1944, rather than the broad front approach of Eisenhower, and if they did they could possibly have ended the war in '44. Was such an approach logistically possible? If so, would it have been a reasonably safe option given risk/reward, or would it have been a serious gamble that there was little reason to engage in when you're already winning the war?

[Berkut]

If the plot succeeds, and the Allies firmly rebuff any proposed negotiated end to the war, I still thing the plotters come out ahead.

Not being crazy fucking megalomaniacs, the move at that point seems pretty obvious, at least to me.

If the Allies won't agree to a seperate peace, give them one anyway.

Strip the Western and Italian fronts, and simply refuse to fight the Western Allies and ship all of those men to the Eastern Front and resist the Soviets as long as you can, while the Western allies overrun Germany. Force the eventual unconditional surrender line as far east as possible.

[grumbler]

Another question: sometimes you hear that the Western Allies could/should have advanced into Germany on a narrow front in 1944, rather than the broad front approach of Eisenhower, and if they did they could possibly have ended the war in '44. Was such an approach logistically possible? If so, would it have been a reasonably safe option given risk/reward, or would it have been a serious gamble that there was little reason to engage in when you're already winning the war?

I think that the Allied seizure of Antwerp with virtually no damage (go Canadians and Belgian Resistance!) offered the chance at such an offensive.  But the Canadians had no orders to go on and trap the German 15th Army on the wrong side of the Scheldt estuary and open the sea route to Antwerp.  That was a rather serious blunder by Montgomery, who seems to have been distracted by all the plans leading up to, and including, Market-Garden.  In fact, Monty then stripped Canadian First Army of half its strength to hold the useless salient gained by market-Garden.  Antwerp fell to the Allies on the 4th of September but didn't start receiving ships until Nov 28th, by which time the chance for a quick end to the war was gone.

Some British authors have argued that Monty didn't want to open Antwerp because that would have allowed the American Twelfth Army Group to be fully supplied and thus back in competition to be "the ones who won the war."  Air Marshal Tedder seems to be the origin of this theory (he hated Monty far more than any American).

For whatever reason, Monty forwent the excellent chance to win the war quickly for the flashier but riskier Market-Garden.  The real cost of Market-Garden was the failure of 21st Army Group to clear the Scheldt and bag a German army when it would have been easy to do so.  The Canadians would lose 6,000 men doing it the hard way.