The EU thread

[Crazy_Ivan80]

And Romania is looking wobbly too, since they may end up with their own pro-russia president soon. You'd think they've learned their lessons in eastern europe but it seems not

[Jacob]

I basically agree with Sheilbh, both on where Russia is and where Europe is at.

IMO Europe is in a very precarious situation both politically and in terms of ability to effectively marshal and deploy force against the Russians.

It MAY be that the differences in technology level and economic fundamentals are enough to ensure European victory, but  I think taking that as a given is extremely foolish (especially given the reports from various military experts).

[crazy canuck]

I think we have the record for logical leaps. Sheilbh went through a lengthy explanation for why Russia probably won't lose the war to Ukraine next year and then concluded by that observation that Europe alone couldn't win a war against Russia.

There needs to be a bit of support for that conclusion.

And Jacob, what military experts are you talking about?  The guy who's YouTube video you posted who said he didn't think France alone could withstand a war with Russia?

[Josquius]

Ukraine is basically holding Russia. Making them bleed tens of thousands for a few km of land.
The default situation is a slightly Russia leaning stalemate - but even that leaning is by somewhat choice of Russias enemies since it hurts Russia more that way.
Add the rest of Europe to Ukraines side and I am pretty confident Europe would win.

That's no reason to rest easy and do nothing of course. Merely winning isn't something that should be accepted. Europe wants to win with a minimum of casualties and damage. There's a lot of work to be done there, especially around drones.

But purely in terms of "who would win" I'm confident in saying Europe.

Russias collapse... As said the article I posted is from a guy who usually leans towards the positive. I didn't see Russia going under in a few months. They will have some trick to play.
But the problems he talks about are very real.
Russia is a collapsing country, even if it has reached a place where the rules of normal countries don't apply to it anymore.
As has been said collapses don't happen then they suddenly happen all at once. It could be any time.

Which does make the current situation with Russia vs Europe more dangerous yes. If peace were to be declared with Ukraine, Russia knows it has a small window to expand more , 5 years or so, during which it's forces are still bloodied and ready to go again.
Also a factor there is that Putin is not a young man. Time isn't on his side.

As I say though this who will win Europe or Russia stuff I do think is missing the point.
Russias next moves will look far more 2014 than 2022.
Key for Europe is less in "can they beat Russia" - as of course they would. But rather "would they beat Russia".
Apparently Russia is really starting to kick into gear nonsense propeganda that Lithuania isn't a real country (with Ukraine you can see their point as wrong as it is, they've long been under the rule of others, but Lithuania? Wut.) and they are keeping at their support for populist morons in western politics.

[Sheilbh]

I think we have the record for logical leaps. Sheilbh went through a lengthy explanation for why Russia probably won't lose the war to Ukraine next year and then concluded by that observation that Europe alone couldn't win a war against Russia.

There needs to be a bit of support for that conclusion.

Well that post is about Russia.

But on the European side I've posted all of this here but in one place, there's a lot of weaknesses. In looking at a reassurance force for post-war Ukraine the view from within Europe is that we can probably muster 20-25,000 troops (of which 10-20,000 would be British and French).

There are well known shortages and deficiencies within Europe's militaries - and even the militaries that are more combat ready like the British and French have spent the last twenty years fighting counter-insurgency and focusing their doctrine on small wars, asymmetric warfare. There's been a lot of emphasis on special forces etc. They're not built for combat between states and I think there's a lot of lessons about that type of war to be learned from Ukraine. More broadly if you look at an American army corps as a reference for credible deterrence - one American army corps right now is better equipped than French, German, Italian and British land forces combined.

Also European infrastructure has degraded. The underinvestment in German infrastructure especially is a problem because of its role as a lynchpin for logistics from one side of Europe to the other. Until 1990 West German infrastructure - motorways and railways etc - would always have signs basically saying the weight they could take. All of West Germany's infrastructure was built with the idea that you'd need to transport tanks and troops and artillery over it. I think that side has been less of a focus. The Deutsche Bahn is, I believe, the least reliable rail network in Europe, the Americans had to stop using it for supplying Ukraine and instead charter barges and the NATO estimate is that basically there is infrastructure (including rolling stock) to transport about one and a half brigades at one time.

Then there's the Americans. They provide the enablers and logisitical support across Europe. There is not a deployment of European troops at this point - to my knowledge - that is not at least partially reliant on American logistical support. In particular (especially given the ground infrastructure problems) there aren't any European airforces with strategic air support capacity. Whether it's the Brits and Germans in the Baltics or the French in Romania, every NATO deployment of Western European troops to Eastern Europe relies on American logistical support - but so, too, did the French war in the Sahel. (As an aside this is why I think Merz's €500 billion infrastructure spending might matter as much, if not more than increasing military spending.)

Obviously the other bit is actual troops. According to joint work by Bruegel and the Kiel Institute NATO plans currently are that there's about 100,000 US troops in Europe which would be supplemented in the event of a conflict by 200,000 more. I don't know that necessarily means Europe generally needs to recruit an extra 300,000 (though the Poles are already planning to build an army of 500,000) - but we definitely need to recruit and train significantly more now. I also wonder if there's a 1933 King and Country debate element to this - in the UK, recruitment has declined really significantly in recent years, I don't think any of the forces hit their recruitment targets. I think of Macron's complaint about the post-modern deconstruction of everything, but particularly the grand narratives and a need for Europe to have a grand narrative of some sort. Certainly in the UK, I expect in the rest of Europe too, joining the armed forces is a bit looked down upon - it's a little bit suspect. And even though they're Eurozone members I do slightly wonder the degree to which the Baltics would be viewed as faraway countries of which we know little by many Europeans (there was some really grim polling on this pre-war - I think basically Britain and France were the only countries where public opinion said we should send troops to defend the Baltics).

Again none of this is insurmountable - and it is true that Europe has a bigger population and is richer (and if history teaches us anything it's that rich, well-populated areas always prevail against highly militarised, poorer neighbours ). But I think for all the challenges Russia has and will increasingly face it is a war-fighting state right now in a way that nowhere in Europe is - I also think that creates a sort of path dependency for Russia. Having become a war economy and focused on capacity to fight a war it may almost be easier to just re-arm, build up some stocks and fight again than to demobilise.

For example given the lack of equipment, lower numbers of troops and logisitical challenges - how much time would it take for the rest of Europe to mobilise, deploy and maintain sufficient forces to stop a Russian breakthrough in the Baltics? It doesn't seem clear to me that we'd be able to do that at any pace.

Edit: Also worst case scenario from thinking we're not prepared or read is that there isn't a war and Europe spends a lot of money on infrastructure and, through military Keynesianism, stimulating domestic demand - both of which have been necessary since the start of the financial crisis. The alternative worst case scenario strikes me as pretty catastrophic - which is that we're not ready and Russia is.

[crazy canuck]

Of course current plans involve the US. It has only been since January that the US has dramatically changed it relationship with the world and NATO. 

But just because somebody hasn't gotten around to changing the plans on paper that you have access to doesn't mean that there isn't an alternative plan in place necessary for Europe to succeed in a war against Russia. 

Edit, just got around to looking up relative expenditure.  In 2024, when Russia has turned into a war economy, Europe still dramatically outspent the Russians on defence.  Russia spent about $125 billion and the Europeans spent about $500 billion.  And that is before the Europeans felt threatened by the comments by the current US administration. The expenditures by the Europeans are going up, and we will have to wait to see by how much.

Is there work for the Europeans to do to make themselves less reliant on the US? Certainly. But as to your claim in your previous post that as of now Russia would defeat Europe in a war - that is fanciful.  As of right now, Russia can barely maintain a front with Ukraine.

[Crazy_Ivan80]

russia can do more with those dollars though due to ppp.

[Sheilbh]

russia can do more with those dollars though due to ppp.

Yes - via Politico:
https://www.politico.eu/article/russian-defense-spending-overtakes-europe-study-finds/

I'd add that there are two additional complications. One is the effectiveness of spending. So this is pre-war but there was a study of the British, French and German militaries (all of whom spend a similar amount on defence - though not proportionally). The conclusion was basically that Britain and France would probably take a few weeks to a month to stand up a full armoured brigade and both could sustain it indefinitely, it would take a little bit longer for Germany but they would struggle to sustain it and it would largely rely on cannibalising other units. Part of it is how money is spent - the famous example here is Belgium where a huge amount of the defence budget goes on pension costs - but also effectiveness of spending, I think that's been a big concern particularly around procurement with the Bundeswehr for a while.

The other point is that there is no European budget. So that $500 billion needs to be split (I'm not sure who it's counting) but at least 27 ways if it's EU, 28 if EU+UK and about 30 if it's European NATO. There is inevitably a lot of redundancy and overlap as well as gaps simply because within NATO the US provides stuff that everyone else uses - such as the logistical support and other enablers. There have been attempts at consolidating and joint forces with some countries (I think this will be the way forward on a "mini-lateral" basis of like minded states). Sadly in a European context I think 99% of that has been one primarily with an objective of cutting budgets rather than enhancing capabilities.

I'd also push back on the idea that the world dramatically changed in January. In 2008 Obama wanted to pivot to Asia and Russia invaded Georgia, in 2012 (in the context of dramatic European defence cuts as Europe nosedived into austerity) Robert Gates delivered this warning:

With respect to Europe, for the better part of six decades there has been relatively little doubt or debate in the United States about the value and necessity of the transatlantic alliance.  The benefits of a Europe whole, prosperous and free after being twice devastated by wars requiring American intervention was self evident.  Thus, for most of the Cold War U.S. governments could justify defense investments and costly forward bases that made up roughly 50 percent of all NATO military spending.  But some two decades after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the U.S. share of NATO defense spending has now risen to more than 75 percent – at a time when politically painful budget and benefit cuts are being considered at home.

The blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S. Congress – and in the American body politic writ large – to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defense.  Nations apparently willing and eager for American taxpayers to assume the growing security burden left by reductions in European defense budgets.

Indeed, if current trends in the decline of European defense capabilities are not halted and reversed,  Future U.S. political leaders– those for whom the Cold War was not the formative experience that it was for me – may not consider the return on America's investment in NATO worth the cost.

In 2014 Russia invaded Ukraine for the first time, in 2016 Trump was elected for the first time (and European defence spending started to climb), in 2022 there's the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine and in 2025 there's Trump and Vance at Munich etc. This is not a shock out of a clear blue sky but over a decade of "wake up calls" from friends and foes alike on European defence being ignored. I'd even say the current moment is an example of that - the consistent complaint from European defence companies and what they cite as an obstacle to building up capacity is that European states will not make long-term spending commitments/contracts. I think even for the last two years there's been almost a cruel comfort in Biden that Europe could basically respond to Ukraine as a short-term crisis because the Americans would look after the long-term. I think that's a challenge because I think February-March 2022 was politically possibly the time when it was most possible for European leaders to make the case for the need for sacrifices etc.

On secret plans - I'm sure they exist. But plans are only part of the deficiencies I think there are currently - which are basically logistics, personnel, equipment and infrastructure. At the moment America does the first three for Europe - so unless those plans can conjure up a shadow America I don't really know that they could change much. There's no European strategic airforces, there's a lack of 300,000 troops, the biggest armies in Europe combined have less combat power than an American army corps. Obviously the infrastructure is also key (and why I think Merz's proposal is very significant and positive).

I'd also add that I don't think the last 25 years fill me with confidence in the statecraft of Western countries. Through those two failed wars, the financial crisis which metastasised into the Eurozone crisis and austerity, the handling of Russian aggression from 2008 - I feel like European powers especially have consistently disempowered themselves to an extraordinary extent and always seemed to expect the best case scenario would play, so they're consistently shocked and scrambling on the downside.

This isn't insurmountable - I think Merz could be hugely significant. But what needs to happen is the recruitment and training of tens of thousands more into the armed forces, significant increases in spending to re-arm effectively and build entire new capabilities (particularly logistics and the enablers provided by the US) and largescale improvements to European infrastructure. Fundamentally the purpose of that is to build up forces in the armed forces to deter Russia hopefully, but in the worst case to fight and die. There are also inevitable trade-offs in the spending requirements. I think in a democratic society you need to make the case for that and prepare people for it, to build democratic consent for it. I don't think it is something executives and militaries can simply prepare for in secret - again I think the point when European publics would have been most receptive to those types of changes was possibly February-March 2022.

[Jacob]

This isn't insurmountable - I think Merz could be hugely significant. But what needs to happen is the recruitment and training of tens of thousands more into the armed forces, significant increases in spending to re-arm effectively and build entire new capabilities (particularly logistics and the enablers provided by the US) and largescale improvements to European infrastructure. Fundamentally the purpose of that is to build up forces in the armed forces to deter Russia hopefully, but in the worst case to fight and die. There are also inevitable trade-offs in the spending requirements. I think in a democratic society you need to make the case for that and prepare people for it, to build democratic consent for it. I don't think it is something executives and militaries can simply prepare for in secret - again I think the point when European publics would have been most receptive to those types of changes was possibly February-March 2022.

Once again I find myself in agreement with you.

[crazy canuck]

russia can do more with those dollars though due to ppp.

They are going have to do a lot better with those dollars given the fact of being outspent more than 4 to 1.

And now that Europe knows that the United States is undependable that ratio of spending is going to increase. Remember the Russians are already in a war economy they don't have anywhere to go from here.  The Europeans are just waking up.

So into the future, the claims that people are making that this would be a victory for Russia is far-fetched to say the least.  Bordering on fear mongering I would say.

But the claim wasn't even about what might happen in the future. The claim was that right now Russia would defeat the Europeans and that's just nonsense.  How could the Russians possibly fight against the Europeans while they are bogged down in Ukraine?

If the Russians declared war against Poland right now, Poland stands a good chance of re-creating the Commonwealth.

[Jacob]

But the claim wasn't even about what might happen in the future. The claim was that right now Russia would defeat the Europeans and that's just nonsense.  How could the Russians possibly fight against the Europeans while they are bogged down in Ukraine?

That's not my claim, nor do I think it's Sheilbh's claim.

My claim is that there's a serious risk that:

• ... if Russia is no longer fighting in Ukraine, and
• ... if Russia's economy doesn't collapse from being on war footing, and
• ... if the EU doesn't address the current shortcomings in logistics, staffing, materiel, and infrastructure, and
• ... if Russia continues as is, reconstituting its army and materiel after the cessation of fighting with Ukraine,

...then there's a risk within a short timeframe (1-5 years) that Russia would be able to take and hold territory from the EU (say in the Baltics) without Europe being able to take it back for years.

Europe has great potential to beat Russia, no doubt, but there are practical limitations that need to be overcome and they need to be identified and addressed sooner rather than later in my opinion.

It's not a given, and counter scenarios may happen, but it is a real and substantial risk. And it's one articulated by several European intelligence agencies and analysts.

If the Russians declared war against Poland right now, Poland stands a good chance of re-creating the Commonwealth.

That's reassuring.

I'd like to read more about Poland's ability to single-handedly defeat Russia. Do you have any reasonably accessible sources or analysis that expands on this claim?

[Jacob]

EU plans tariffs on 100 billion euros of US goods if talks fail, Bloomberg News reports

May 6 (Reuters) - The European Union plans to hit about 100 billion euros ($113.26 billion) worth of U.S. goods with additional tariffs if trade talks fail to deliver a satisfactory result for the bloc, Bloomberg News reported on Tuesday.

The proposed retaliatory measures will be shared with member states as early as Wednesday and consultations will last for a month before the list is finalized, the report said, citing people familiar with the matter.

https://www.reuters.com/business/eu-plans-tariffs-100-billion-euros-us-goods-if-talks-fail-bloomberg-news-reports-2025-05-06/

[Sheilbh]

Yeah I'd totally agree with that summary.

[Jacob]

Is Romania going to elect a Putinist president and go down the path of Hungary?