The EU thread

[The Larch]

Don't know how to say this without perhaps sounding "wrong", so to speak, so I'll try to give a quick and rough answer and trust on our many years of virtual friendship so it's not wrongly interpreted. IMO, all those identity worries are wildly overplayed, and it's not something that most people look up at the EU for. Most EU countries don't share those worries about identity, colonialism, race, minorities, etc, (let's jokingly call them "sociological 1st world problems") those might be concerns for the UK and France (and for them they can be big issues), and to lesser degrees other EU countries with that kind of profile, but for most EU countries they're completely alien topics and stressing them can make them feel alienated from what the EU represents to most of them, that is, peace, stability and material well-being, and that's what the EU should focus on.

[Tamas]

Don't know how to say this without perhaps sounding "wrong", so to speak, so I'll try to give a quick and rough answer and trust on our many years of virtual friendship so it's not wrongly interpreted. IMO, all those identity worries are wildly overplayed, and it's not something that most people look up at the EU for. Most EU countries don't share those worries about identity, colonialism, race, minorities, etc, (let's jokingly call them "sociological 1st world problems") those might be concerns for the UK and France (and for them they can be big issues), and to lesser degrees other EU countries with that kind of profile, but for most EU countries they're completely alien topics and stressing them can make them feel alienated from what the EU represents to most of them, that is, peace, stability and material well-being, and that's what the EU should focus on.

Agreed.

[Sheilbh]

Don't know how to say this without perhaps sounding "wrong", so to speak, so I'll try to give a quick and rough answer and trust on our many years of virtual friendship so it's not wrongly interpreted. IMO, all those identity worries are wildly overplayed, and it's not something that most people look up at the EU for. Most EU countries don't share those worries about identity, colonialism, race, minorities, etc, (let's jokingly call them "sociological 1st world problems") those might be concerns for the UK and France (and for them they can be big issues), and to lesser degrees other EU countries with that kind of profile, but for most EU countries they're completely alien topics and stressing them can make them feel alienated from what the EU represents to most of them, that is, peace, stability and material well-being, and that's what the EU should focus on.

on sociological 1st world problems.

I get what you're saying and I agree on just the post-colonial angle - and I think Europe is an interesting side of that. I've never read anything about it in any history I've read, but I know that the Treaty of Rome included sections on Belgian, Dutch and French colonies. I think the imperial disentanglement and identity issues is definitely a concern in only a few states. There's a lot of cross-over with  the UK, but it mainly affects Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and France. Having said that I don't think we should just think about the imperial powers at the creation of "Europe". At the height of the statues debate I read a really interesting piece by a black German - I think art historian - about German statues and in particular the way statues of the Nazi regime were treated but also touching on the contrasting treatment of Hohenzollern statues - including quite controversial colonial figures. So on the one hand Germany (or Spain or Italy) are not "imperial" powers but have a legacy.

But on the wider issue, I'm not sure. As long as I've been on these forums or at Paradox there's been discussions around integration and migration in Europe - I think that impacts all of the EU15 in one way or another because they are destination countries. There are often stories in the press about, say, Sweden and Denmark or Austria who are not countries grappling with a big global imperial legacy; it has an impact on Greece or Malta as common entry points; and it is now used as a wedge issue by, say, Poland and Hungary who have low immigration but are using it to drive a fortress Europe agenda and an identitarian agenda of Europe as having a Christian "European" identity.

So I wonder how alien they are and it seems to me that in many European countries (including the UK) there are political forces questioning the idea of integration and a multi-racial national identity, I don't see how that doesn't have an impact on European identity. I think there is a bit of a laziness/complaceny that because the EU is diverse within Europe and because it is typically on the other side of populist/far-right parties (though not always - see FdI) that it is inevitably on the liberal, cosmopolitan, diverse side of this issue. I'm not sure that's necessarily true and even if it is, I'm not sure it's enough.

But also more fundamentally - doesn't that perspective also apply to LGBT issues, which have also been used as a wedge issue by Poland especially? It seems to me that there has been far more pushback from a European level and within Western Europe on that issue. It is something we are comfortable stressing even though it is a minority issue, it isn't a big deal many countries and certainly it has less political clout in parts of Eastern Europe. But I think it's a similar part of what is European-ness - does it include modern progressive values on LGBT rights or is it the values of Europe in the 90s (the club Eastern European countries wanted to join which has since developed) or of its Christian past/past in general? Isn't it partially about putting those fundamental rights into action - as well as the more limited European vision of peace and material well-being? Is a black Spanish person or a French Muslim as able to take advantage of the benefits and rights of being a European (not least free movement and non-discrimination) as a white person? (Edit: And the impact - if they aren't, is it wrong to query if European-ness is something they're included in?) Or to put it another way - would we accept this argument or have similar doubts about the original author in the context of the US?

[The Brain]

FWIW I don't think I've ever come across anyone in Sweden who thinks at all about a European identity, or thinks of the EU at all when discussing immigration and integration (beyond the EU making immigration from other EU countries easier). The EU is viewed as a utilitarian tool for practical matters, anything about identity is thought of at the national level.

[Sheilbh]

FWIW I don't think I've ever come across anyone in Sweden who thinks at all about a European identity, or thinks of the EU at all when discussing immigration and integration (beyond the EU making immigration from other EU countries easier). The EU is viewed as a utilitarian tool for practical matters, anything about identity is thought of at the national level.

Yeah I think it's still a minority taste - it's something that Eurobarometer has done surveys on in the past. Since the referendum there's been a huge upsurge in European-identifying Brits - so we moved from one of the lowest to one of the highest

And I think the key moment for all of this was around the 2010s. I think the combination of the financial crisis, Eurozone crisis and refugee crisis combined to create a feeling of insecurity. I think the left lost the argument that the solution at a European level should be to strengthen social and economic protections, and since then things have moved in more of a cultural/identitarian idea of protection. Merkel is still a huge moderating figure who I think does restrain that - but when she goes I have fears of the direction things can go in.

In addition at the same time there is a growing emphasis on the EU as a sovereign political actor and that is almost always in the context of competition with other powers - China, India, US. I think that is a shift in understanding and emphasis from when Europe saw itself as a bit of a model.

[Sheilbh]

Meanwhile - the risk I'm talking about, just seen a Fidesz MEP endorsing Barnier's proposal ("finally a sane voice from Western Europe") and talking more widely about the need for "family friendly" policies not immigration as a solution to "Europe's demographic problems". Barnier is not Le Pen, he's on the mainstream centre-right in France and Macron isn't a million miles from this sort of idea either - there's going to be a hell of a battle over the direction of Europe after Merkel leaves office.

And Italy plays a really striking role as a sort of clearing house of this sort of politics - Salvini chatting with Le Pen today and Orban last week, Meloni chatting with the Vox leadership. Edit: Plus on current polls it's relatively likely Salvini and Meloni will in some way or other be in the next Italian government.

[Sheilbh]

This feels more EU than just Italy - but fascinating profile of Draghi:
https://thecritic.co.uk/issues/may-2021/the-sphinx-who-reshaped-europe/

Particularly interesting next to Adam Tooze's profile of Paul Krugman.

[Zanza]

What material change do you expect to immigration policy? It is still mainly a domestic issue as each country has its own policies on who is accepted.

On the European level, there are no real distribution mechanisms anyway and I feel that topic is pretty dead. Beyond that, we already pay dictators and warlords money to keep refugees in camps, we have high tech borders guarded by the EU's Frontex with questionable means, we let hundreds or thousands of people drown in the Mediterranean Sea every year, there are mechanisms like Dublin II where e.g. Salvini has a very different position than Orban or Kurz. I don't see what Merkel has as a moderating influence here. Beyond her unilateral action in 2015, she has been supportive of these policies or at least not fought them.

In Germany, the topic is currently not worth a headline. Our country has many more pressing issues. Occasional mention in other contexts, e.g. migrants being antisemitic or not willing to be vaccinated. I don't expect it to be a relevant topic in our federal election this year. Let's see.

[Sheilbh]

What material change do you expect to immigration policy? It is still mainly a domestic issue as each country has its own policies on who is accepted.

Oh I've no idea - the prompt for me thinking about this again was Barnier proposing a 3-5 year ban on non-EU migration in France plus discussions with European partners about Schengen. He's incredibly vague about the Schengen part.

Also Macron's general and vague stuff against "Islamist separatism" - the latest manifestation of which is forcing a Muslim candidate of his own party to stand down because she wore a headscarf on her election poster.

I think there's three elements - immigration, "geostrategic" Europe (as vdL's discussed) and internal values/identity - that interact together.

On the European level, there are no real distribution mechanisms anyway and I feel that topic is pretty dead. Beyond that, we already pay dictators and warlords money to keep refugees in camps, we have high tech borders guarded by the EU's Frontex with questionable means, we let hundreds or thousands of people drown in the Mediterranean Sea every year, there are mechanisms like Dublin II where e.g. Salvini has a very different position than Orban or Kurz.

Yeah - I agree and I don't think it's about internal distribution. I think it's more likely to focus on Europe's borders - possibly on Europe's internal identity.

I think Frontex is really interesting - in part I think it reflects European failure to be a strategic actor. There are lots of European states doing things in the Sahel and the Middle East but it's not coordinated and I think they probably get less bang for their buck than if they were able to cooperate at a a European level on their objectives. But part of the consequences of that is increasing immigration on Europe's southern border which is helping prompt the development of Frontex and there was a really interesting look at the various bits of common security and defence policy that noted that Frontex is becoming the main agency of genuine coherent European level action.

The recent new Frontex regulation transforms it - the proposed budget for the next few years is small in global terms but unprecedented for a European security/law enforcement policy. So Frontex has gone from basically the same level of budget as Europol 5 years ago to four times that and it is becoming the dominant voice in common security policies because it has operational capabilities. In addition to the 10,000 uniformed Frontex agents (which I expect will increase) there is huge ambition in the stuff they are taking the lead on: adoption of drones and AI, technical assessments and diligence of member states, security risk assessments, it is apparently increasingly trying to elbow out Europol and Eurojust on cross-border law enforcement. All of which you'd sort of expect in a bureaucratic fight - that the agency with a growing budget will come to dominate.

I think Frontex is a really important bit of EU state-building and I think it will be deployed more and more under solidarity mechanisms. But it's similar to the way in the UK I wonder if the Home Office and internal security roles shape the way immigration enforcement is done, or in the US that mental health crises aren often dealt with by police shapes that. If Europe's main effective, operational common security agency is an immigration and law-enforcement agency, that will shape the way Europe views itself and behaves internationally. It seems more likely to focus on the symptoms of crises (immigration flows, crime, political violence) not the drivers of those crises and that more and more of Europe's focus will be on its borders and a fortress Europe. And also I wonder if there's a lowest common denominator element - it's easier to agree on measures to address consequences than to try and address causes in advance?

I don't see what Merkel has as a moderating influence here. Beyond her unilateral action in 2015, she has been supportive of these policies or at least not fought them.

I think Merkel is moderating because I think her focus is more pragmatic and more economic.

I think the wider shift is that I think Europe sees itself as in competition more and there is, I think, a sort of Huntington "civilisational" view of this - that European values and the European project is not a universal model of nations cooperating in a sort of post-sovereign way, but rather competing with China, India etc. I think in this competitive and more European/sovereign view - Merkel basically sees it as economic. It's about ensuring Europe can compete economically through structural reforms, fiscal discipline etc. I think her influence in Europe is still huge because of both her European and domestic political capital.

By contrast I think Macron's alternative, increasingly, is identitarian/civilisational and that Europe is about protecting those uniquely European values and culture. Which aligns with some far and populist right leaders on securing Europe's external border while pushing a, in my view, Islamophobic agenda domestically. (Macron is such a disappointment ). Because he lost the fight over a Europe that protects from economic markets, he's shifted to a Europe that protects its culture/"our European way of life". I think he might get some goodies on this in the gap between the German election and the French election. If he wins re-election I'd also suspect that for a while at least Macron will be the central/core European leader so his vision matters.

[Zanza]

Strengthening Fortress Europe is easily a majority opinion in every member state, so it is just a question of the details, not enough to create a major rift. That's also why Frontex is allowed to grow when otherwise member states are not very willing to pool sovereignty on security measures. As Frontex is miniscule compared to national security organizations, I doubt that it's cultural impact will matter.

Merkel has no domestic capital left, she is a lame duck and treated so by other German politicians. That's pretty obvious in our Covid response. I doubt that she still has much international weight as she has no means to deliver beyond the next few months. General German interests will be shared by whoever is her successor though.

[Josquius]

A majority opinion albeit an incredibly ill thought out one. It's easy enough to say "stop illegal immigrants from Africa!", but international law and the right to asylum is what it is.
This would have to be taken up at an above EU level even with a fundamental change to how claiming asylum works.
But of course thought out approaches to real problems aren't what wins elections.

[Sheilbh]

Strengthening Fortress Europe is easily a majority opinion in every member state, so it is just a question of the details, not enough to create a major rift. That's also why Frontex is allowed to grow when otherwise member states are not very willing to pool sovereignty on security measures. As Frontex is miniscule compared to national security organizations, I doubt that it's cultural impact will matter.

Yeah I don't think Fortress Europe will create a rift - I think it probably should.

The other benefit of Frontex is that there's still a limited European press. So I think a scandal in x country's immigration service will get picked up by that country's media and may become a political issue which causes problems for that government. I think a scandal by Frontex in x country is less likely to get picked up and less likely to have political consequences.

Merkel has no domestic capital left, she is a lame duck and treated so by other German politicians. That's pretty obvious in our Covid response. I doubt that she still has much international weight as she has no means to deliver beyond the next few months. General German interests will be shared by whoever is her successor though.

Interesting - it feels like she's leaving office with political capital. She could run again and easily win.

On a possible civilisational turn - an argument for it by Luuk van Middelaar who is, I think, one of the best writers on the EU. And of course he makes explicit the link between a European identity based on history and culture with European sovereignty in an age of civilisation states (Russia, India, China etc). Google translated:

Europe has cut itself off from its history
Luuk van Medelaar

In their cowardly meaninglessness, the euro notes are eloquent. A design competition was held for the new coin in 1996. Participants had to depict specific bridges and buildings - in a series running from the Pont du Gard in Nîmes (five euros) to the modernist Rietveld-Schröder house (the five hundred). Thus, the new currency would be anchored in European architectural history.

Designer Robert Kalina made an intervention that won him the prize: he made the bridges and buildings anonymous. As a result, the notes in our wallets show architectural styles but no individual buildings. The jury of bank governors must have feared public disapproval: "No, that's not our European bridge in Nîmes, but their French bridge!" Fear of national reflexes trumped the desire to give the euro cultural soil. A missed opportunity.

That was then. But the world is changing. China, Russia and India are also mobilizing civilization and culture under Xi, Putin and Modi for their raw power politics. The idea of ​​'the West', geographic umbrella and cultural hyphen for North America and Europe, is losing meaning. This is another reason why the desire for a place of its own in the world has grown in recent years - Europe not only as a beacon of universal values, but as a continent with a culture, history and story.

From Amsterdam wants The European Review of Books , a recentannounced upstart in crowd-funding phase, to initiate a European conversation between writers and intellectuals, as a successor to enlightenment philosopher Pierre Bayle 's Nouvelles de la République des Lettres . The high-quality website Le Grand Continent has been operating from Paris since 2019 , driven by people in their twenties and thirties, to keep the conversation about politics, geography, law and art "on the right scale": the continental one.

Multilingualism is the first obstacle to a European-wide public debate. Both initiatives make it a strength. The young Parisians started out in French, but are increasingly publishing in Italian and Spanish; German and Polish are on the way. The European Review - which for the time being has attracted more authors from the UK and the US than from continental Europe - wants to publish essays in English and (if different) the author's language. This doubling fits well with Europe's relationship to our national political-cultural spaces: the shelter of a common roof, not the threat of expulsion.

Naturally, the 'Europe' of culture and civilization does not coincide with that of Brussels. Britain's departure (2020) alone cuts across the EU's dream of one day spanning the continent geographically. That, too, makes Brexit so painful, even more so than cod disputes or vaccine disputes: 'Europe' as a space of imagination is losing Shakespeare, Newton and The Beatles.

Nevertheless, bridges must be built between the political-legal sphere and Europe's culture and history. The problem is not so much that the EU is blind to culture, as Review founder Sander Pleij suggested . The economic, social and cultural importance of the film industry or museums is also recognized in Brussels; billions are going there.

The real problem is that the EU has cut itself off from history. In the Brussels discourse, it sometimes seems as if Europe was 'born' on 9 May 1950 - the day on which the French minister Schuman made the proposal for its founding. After two world wars, the strong line under the past was palpable. But the states and peoples of Europe cannot build a common future on such a short, thin past.

Time to give the story a different 'main character'. Not post-war integration, with its heroes and setbacks, treaties and expansions, but rather the European Union as a follower of the State Concert between 1648 and 1914 and as a political expression of a civilization space that goes back to Athens and Rome, to Socrates, Cicero and Paul.

Of course, that would be criticized. Some accuse Europe of being a 'white' project. But a tradition of reason and doubt, of plurality and freedom, does not necessarily have to sink into guilt and shame. Let the debate begin.

The only European leader who recognizes the importance of a non-universal historical narrative is Emmanuel Macron. Just as he did not want to leave the thorny term 'sovereignty' to Europe's opponents, but has been claiming for the Union since 2017, he wants to be able to rely on civilization and history on behalf of Europe - no longer to shrink from fear of the unexploded mines in the bottom of our imagination. He is right: anyone who cuts himself off from history cannot imagine a future either.

Luuk van Middelaar is a political philosopher, historian and professor of EU law (Leiden).

[The Larch]

Merkel has no domestic capital left, she is a lame duck and treated so by other German politicians. That's pretty obvious in our Covid response. I doubt that she still has much international weight as she has no means to deliver beyond the next few months. General German interests will be shared by whoever is her successor though.

Interesting - it feels like she's leaving office with political capital. She could run again and easily win.

It is my impression that Merkel has a much higher reputation and influence at the EU level than within Germany, she can still be really influential for EU decissions while simultaneously being ignored at home. It seems to me that her stature is magnified outside of Germany, possibly because within Germany she's understood and interpreted within the German political context, with all the nuances and additional issues it entails, while in an EU context she's the avatar for Germany.

On a possible civilisational turn - an argument for it by Luuk van Middelaar who is, I think, one of the best writers on the EU. And of course he makes explicit the link between a European identity based on history and culture with European sovereignty in an age of civilisation states (Russia, India, China etc). Google translated:

Europe has cut itself off from its history
Luuk van Medelaar

If that guy's big opening argument is that Euro bank notes are lame for presenting generic bridges rather than particular ones, I fear that his argument doesn't really hold any water. 

And of course for EU purposes a post WWII context is a break from the past and is kind of a "new beginning", what the EU tries to achieve is overcoming all the situations that led to inter-European conflict, so it's only natural that their frame of reference is that, rather than the entire European history.

[celedhring]

And what shared political past are we supposed to draw upon, the Continental System? 

More seriously, all possible examples are rather horrible for different reasons. And again, I feel the whole thing's unnecessary. I'm pretty happy with building an "identity" around post-WWII ideas of liberal democracy.

[Maladict]

And what shared political past are we supposed to draw upon, the Continental System? 

More seriously, all possible examples are rather horrible for different reasons. And again, I feel the whole thing's unnecessary. I'm pretty happy with building an "identity" around post-WWII ideas of liberal democracy.

Yeah, the EU being born out of the ashes of WW2 should make for a pretty strong and useful identity, and a lot more relevant than Westphalia.

And I agree the bank notes are bland and boring as hell, but that's not much of an argument. He also conveniently leaves out the fact that the coins still have plenty of country-specific nationalism on them.