WW1: German victory in France = peace?

[Valmy]

Wait... what?  If the Russians hadn't been utterly defeated and routed, the Germans would have lost the war in 1915?  That's rather a bizarre claim, especially as the British and French didn't even launch any successful major attacks in 1915 and the British commander was fired at the end of the year.

Is it? They had Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania all lined up ready to jump in. Everybody thought that Austria-Hungary and the Ottomans were about to be done and the vultures were circling. But then the Russians spectacularly collapsed and only Italy was unfortunate enough to have committed themselves. The grand British plan for ending the war early came to nothing. It was a good plan though and I think it would have worked.

Who, exactly, was going to defeat the CP in 1915?  Not the Russians (even if not routed, they would have been defeated), not the British, and not the French.  The Belgians?  Italy?

Austria was 10 minutes to midnight in 1915 after the shocking amount of troops they lost during the Carpathian campaign and the battle for Przemsyl. Fortunately for them the Russians had badly extended themselves bringing Austria-Hungary to that point so they folded when the Germans hit them.

[grumbler]

Is it? They had Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania all lined up ready to jump in. Everybody thought that Austria-Hungary and the Ottomans were about to be done and the vultures were circling. But then the Russians spectacularly collapsed and only Italy was unfortunate enough to have committed themselves. The grand British plan for ending the war early came to nothing. It was a good plan though and I think it would have worked.

The Allies never had Bulgaria "lined up," and, in fact, couldn't even agree on whether it was worth wooing Bulgaria. Greece was totally broken and the Allies had no hope of bringing it into the war in 1915.  Rumania was totally unready for war in 1915 (and would still be unready in 1916, when it finally joined the war).   Italy couldn't defeat Germany, even had they been able to access it. You are the first person, in all my reading on the topic, to suggest that there was some "grand British plan for ending the war early" by creating some unicorn alliance in the Balkans.

Austria was 10 minutes to midnight in 1915 after the shocking amount of troops they lost during the Carpathian campaign and the battle for Przemsyl. Fortunately for them the Russians had badly extended themselves bringing Austria-Hungary to that point so they folded when the Germans hit them.

Both AH and Russia were ten minutes to midnight after their encounters in the Carpathians (the Russians had had the better of the military exchanges, but had also advanced beyond their capability to supply themselves).  The Germans were not teetering on the brink of disaster, however; they were teetering on the brink of victory.  To argue that the Russians narrowly escaped destroying Germany by virtue of their utter rout is bizarre, to say the least.  That's like arguing that the Tennessee Titans would have won Super Bowl 50 if only they had won 19 games instead of three.

[Valmy]

The Allies never had Bulgaria "lined up," and, in fact, couldn't even agree on whether it was worth wooing Bulgaria. Greece was totally broken and the Allies had no hope of bringing it into the war in 1915.  Rumania was totally unready for war in 1915 (and would still be unready in 1916, when it finally joined the war).   Italy couldn't defeat Germany, even had they been able to access it. You are the first person, in all my reading on the topic, to suggest that there was some "grand British plan for ending the war early" by creating some unicorn alliance in the Balkans.

I am most certainly not the first person. This was the major focus of diplomatic initiatives that year. But I appreciate the compliment that this idea was my own. It is my interpretation. I get that you have your own incorrect one.

And naturally none of those countries were in great shape to declare war in 1915. Which is why the Allies were rushing large numbers of troops to the area.

Both AH and Russia were ten minutes to midnight after their encounters in the Carpathians (the Russians had had the better of the military exchanges, but had also advanced beyond their capability to supply themselves).  The Germans were not teetering on the brink of disaster, however; they were teetering on the brink of victory.  To argue that the Russians narrowly escaped destroying Germany by virtue of their utter rout is bizarre, to say the least.  That's like arguing that the Tennessee Titans would have won Super Bowl 50 if only they had won 19 games instead of three.

The Germans were very concerned about the situation in 1915, they felt like the whole war was slipping away.  Which was the entire reason for even a Westerner like Falkenhayn to launch that attack to begin with. I disagree they felt like things were going great for them or that they were on the edge of victory in early 1915. But by the end of the year the situation had definitely radically changed in their favor. And I was talking about the defeat of the Central Powers, not just Germany.

[Berkut]

I cam very close to taking Berlin in Paths of Glory once in 1915 with the Russians, so I know it can be done.

Anyone up for a game?

[Razgovory]

I think Russia would sue for peace with the fall of France.  There would be no hope of beating the CP, and France's surrender would give the Tsar a scapegoat for his inability to protect the Serbs.  Germany and Russia had no significant disputes between them and a great deal of commonality.  Germany could afford to give Russia a white peace, and Cousin Willie would probably insist on it.

This seems unlikely considering the panic Russia caused Germany during the invasion of East Prussia.  The Prussian gentry would almost certainly demand either a buffer state or the extension of Germany's borders.

[grumbler]

I am most certainly not the first person. This was the major focus of diplomatic initiatives that year. But I appreciate the compliment that this idea was my own. It is my interpretation. I get that you have your own incorrect one.

Again, you can say whatver you like.  There is no historical record to show that the British "had Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania all lined up ready to jump in," and a huge historical record to show that neither Greece nor Romania was at all eager to "jump in," and that Bulgaria's terms for entering the war were only seriously considered by the CP (Serbia being entirely unwilling to pay the price for a Bulgarian alliance).  Your "interpretation" can be whatever you say, so long as you don't claim you are interpreting facts.

And naturally none of those countries were in great shape to declare war in 1915. Which is why the Allies were rushing large numbers of troops to the area.

The first Allied troops didn't get rushed in until October of 1915, long after Russia was defeated in the Gorlice-Tarnow offensive that you claim was the only thing that ruined this unicorn alliance.  You can't reconcile the claims that the unicorn alliance was on the cusp of being realized before the Russian defeat, and "the Allies were rushing large numbers of troops to the area," with he timetable of what actually happened.   The Allied force at Salonika came as a response to the Bulgarian DOW of the consequent collapse of Serbia, not as part of an alliance with Bulgaria and Serbia against Germany.

The Germans were very concerned about the situation in 1915, they felt like the whole war was slipping away.  Which was the entire reason for even a Westerner like Falkenhayn to launch that attack to begin with. I disagree they felt like things were going great for them or that they were on the edge of victory in early 1915. But by the end of the year the situation had definitely radically changed in their favor. And I was talking about the defeat of the Central Powers, not just Germany.

The Germans saw an opportunity to employ the attack they had planned for some time:  the Polish salient made an attack between Gorlice and Tarnow practically inevitable.  The timing was partly determined by the need to relieve the pressure on the Austrians (as had, indeed, the German offensive the previous fall that had led to the Battle of the Vistula), but the Germans certainly knew how much superior their forces were to the Russians in everything but numbers.  I've seen no indication that the Germans thought that they were losing the war in 1915.  Quite the contrary, and for reasons that are quite evident today.

The Germans were surprised by the scale and swiftness of their success in 1915, but not that they won.  The uncertainty was between Russian defeat and Russian disaster, not between Russian defeat and the defeat of the Central Powers (which included Germany, btw, so the defeat of the CP in 1915 would require the defeat of Germany in 1915).